• Activision Blizzard, Inc. v. Milestone Entertainment, LLCSome claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Oct 13, 2026 · IPR2025-00710 · APJ Scott A Daniels · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–7, 9, 13, and 16–20 are unpatentable as obvious over Schneier and over Schneier with Okita; claim 8 was not shown unpatentable under either ground.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “On this record, Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art is not contradicted and is consistent with the technology and descriptions in the ’294 patent and the asserted prior art references. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001). For purposes of this Decision, we rely on Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 7

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “Petitioner indicates that “[t]his Petition establishes that the prior art meets each of the claim limitations under any reasonable construction. Thus, no express construction is required.” Pet. 13 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 86). In its Response, Patent Owner indicates that no constructions are necessary “because under any reasonable construction of the claim terms, the prior art fails to disclose or suggest the claimed features.” PO Resp. 4–5. Because there is no dispute between the parties as to any particular claim term and because the claims, as a whole, are reasonably clear on their face, no specific claim construction is necessary in this proceeding.” slip op. at 8

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableNot shown unpatentableMixed

    “rather than 10 credits, does not have a temporal component. Ex. 1008, 63:31–34. Rather, it describes an option for the user or player to obtain a discount at a particular point in time if the player is willing to purchase 20 rather than 10 credits. Id. Petitioner’s citations to this embodiment do not 9. Pet. 31; Pet. Reply 3–7 (citing Ex. 1008, 63:31–34). In this embodiment the $0.30 and $0.50 multipliers are constant, and the user is simply choosing between two existing options at a particular time to potentially take advantage of a $0.20 discount on credits. Comparatively, the $0.30 and $0.50 multipliers are different, but they are not “variable over time,” as required by claim 9. Ex. 1001, 47:38–40.” slip op. at 17

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner

    “and reliance on Figure 19 do not in any way explain how updating game costs by meter 502 with a new Cost_Table is relevant to a credit multiplier or even a multiplier being varied over time. Ex. 1003 ¶ 155. Considering this evidence, we determine that Petitioner and Mr. Crevelt’s reliance mainly on snippets from Schneier’s “Updating Cost Information protocol” embodiment does not sufficiently explain why or how a person of ordinary skill in the art would have understood updating game cost to encompass varying a multiplier of credits over time. We also note that during his deposition, Mr. Crevelt was given opportunity to clarify his testimony as to Figure 19 and explain the cost updating embodiment in Schneier, and mostly demurred. See Ex. 2004:158:4–182:6. Explaining his reliance on Figure 19, Mr. Crevelt stated: A: And whatever latest price from that updated cost information coming from the central site is -- is variable, it’s variable as time proceed[s]. It’s a – it’s a, much of a complicated section, and -- but the information is in the Schneier patent and shows that it could have -- it should change over time. Id. at 158:23–159:5. Mr. Crevelt further stated that: A: . . . for a metered play where you’re buying so much time or so many credits or so many games on a specific game and when it runs out, then have you to buy more, and that variable can change over time. relates Schneier’s “updated cost,” with the claimed “multiplier” and “variable,” and does not adequately explain how they are equivalent or interconnected. See, e.g., id. at 160:16–23 (Mr. Crevelt testifying that “we can go from the description of figure 19, which starts at basically the top of column 56 in the Schneier patent, and . . . describes this process in detail of how the information is transferred from one place to the other and updated.”). Mr. Crevelt concludes that Schneier’s description is “complicated,” and from Figure 19 asserts the cost somehow includes a credit multiplier that “could” or “should” change over time. Id. at 158:23– 159:5. Overall, this testimony fails to sufficiently explain or point to persuasive evidence in Schneier as to how or why a person of ordinary skill in the art would have understood that the Figure 19 cost updating embodiment discloses a time-variable multiplier as required in claim 8.” slip op. at 20

  Patent outcomesUS 10,825,294 mixed
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,825,294
• Activision Blizzard, Inc. v. Milestone Entertainment, LLCSome claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Oct 13, 2026 · IPR2025-00709 · APJ Scott A Daniels · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1, 2, 4, 6, 8, 10, 14–18, 21–23, 25, 27, and 29 are unpatentable as obvious over Schneier and over Schneier with Okita; claim 9 was not shown unpatentable.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Patent Owner states it “does not dispute Petitioners’ proposed level of skill, and under any level of skill a POSITA would not understand the asserted Grounds to raise any unpatentability issue.” PO Resp. 4. Patent Owner states further that “this [Patent Owner Response] and supporting declarations apply Petitioner’s proposed level of skill.” Id. On this record, Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art is not contradicted and is consistent with the technology and descriptions in the ’635 patent and the asserted prior art references. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001). For purposes of this Decision, we rely on Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 7

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “Petitioner indicated in the Petition that “[t]his Petition establishes that the prior art meets each of the claim limitations under any reasonable construction.[] Thus, no express construction is required.” Pet. 12–13 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 85). In its Response, Patent Owner indicates that no constructions are necessary “because under any reasonable construction of the claim terms, the prior art fails to disclose or suggest the claimed features.” PO Resp. 4–5. Because there is no dispute between the parties as to any particular claim term and because the claims, as a whole, are reasonably clear on their face, no specific claim construction is necessary in this proceeding.” slip op. at 8

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner

    “We also note that during his deposition, Mr. Crevelt was given opportunity to clarify his testimony as to Figure 19 and explain the cost updating embodiment in Schneier, and mostly demurred. See Ex. 2004, 158:4–182:6. Explaining his reliance on Figure 19, Mr. Crevelt stated: A: And whatever latest price from that updated cost information coming from the central site is -- is variable, it’s variable as time proceed[s]. It’s a – it’s a, much of a complicated section, and -- but the information is in the Schneier patent and shows that it could have -- it should change over time. Id. at 158:23–159:5. Mr. Crevelt further stated that: A: . . . for a metered play where you’re buying so much time or so many credits or so many games on a specific game and when it runs out, then have you to buy more, and that variable can change over time. Id. at 161:2–6. These explanations are unpersuasive because the testimony relates Schneier’s “updated cost,” with the claimed “multiplier” and “variable,” and does not adequately explain how they are equivalent or interconnected. See, e.g., id. at 160:16–23 (Mr. Crevelt testifying that “we can go from the description of figure 19, which starts at basically the top of column 56 in the Schneier patent, and . . . describes this process in detail of how the information is transferred from one place to the other and updated.”). Mr. Crevelt concludes that Schneier’s description is “complicated,” and from Figure 19 asserts the cost somehow includes a credit multiplier that “could” or “should” change over time. Id. at 158:23– 159:5. Overall, this testimony fails to sufficiently explain or point to in the art would have understood that the Figure 19 cost updating embodiment discloses a time-variable multiplier as required in claim 9.” slip op. at 21

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableNot shown unpatentableMixed

    “Discount Credit Pricing Structure The $0.20 discount described by Schneier for purchasing 20 credits, rather than 10 credits, does not have a temporal component. Ex. 1008, 63:31–34. Rather, it describes an option for the user or player to obtain a discount at a particular point in time if the player is willing to purchase 20 rather than 10 credits. Id. Petitioner’s citations to this embodiment do not address the idea of a time component, i.e., “over time,” as required by claim 9. Pet. 31; Pet. Reply 3–7 (citing Ex. 1008, 63:31–34). In this embodiment the $0.30 and $0.50 multipliers are constant, and the user is simply choosing between two existing options at a particular time to potentially take advantage of a $0.20 discount on credits. Comparatively, the $0.30 and $0.50 multipliers are different, but they are not “variable over time,” as required by claim 9. Ex. 1001, 47:38–40.” slip op. at 18

  Patent outcomesUS 10,650,635 mixed
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,650,635
• Tesla, Inc. v. Intellectual Ventures II LLCSome claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Aug 18, 2026 · IPR2025-00339 · APJ Kristen L Droesch · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 22, 23, 28, and 30 are unpatentable over Choi, Labaziewicz, and Yu; claims 1–3, 10–12, 24, 25, 32, and 33 were not shown unpatentable.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Plain and ordinary meaningOther

    “We decline Patent Owner’s invitation to construe “during a frame” of “independently controlling simultaneous data acquisition with each of the first and second channels during a frame” by importing the extraneous limitations “at some point between the beginning and the end of the exposure interval during which the image sensors capture a single image.” As pointed out by Petitioner, Patent Owner’s proposed construction is unsupported by the language of claim 22 and the ’180 Specification because Specification does not disclose an exposure interval nor suggest “during a frame” is limited to an exposure interval. Patent Owner and its expert Dr. Saber cite only extrinsic evidence (Exs. 2006, 2009) to support its argument that claim 22 should be limited to an “exposure interval during which the image sensors capture a single image.” See PO Resp. 16–17; Ex. 2020 ¶ 64. Similarly, Patent Owner relies only on extrinsic evidence (e.g., Ex. 2011, 1; Ex. 2022, 1; Ex. 2020 ¶ 66) to limit “during” to “at some point between the beginning and the end.” See id. at 18. When considered in the context of claim 22 and the ’180 Patent Specification which do not limit “during a frame” to an exposure interval, we find that we cannot rely on Patent Owner’s citations to extrinsic evidence to yield a reliable construction for “during a frame.” As demonstrated in the analysis below, we need not provide an explicit construction for “during a frame” to resolve the parties’ disputes regarding the merits of the patentability challenges. See Realtime, 912 F.3d at 1375. We apply the ordinary and customary meaning for “during a frame.” To the extent that an explicit identification of the ordinary and customary meaning may aid the understanding of our analysis, consistent with the language of claim 22 and the ’180 Patent Specification, we find that the ordinary and customary meaning for “during a frame” is “during the period of time that data for an image frame is acquired.” See Ex. 1001, code (57), 20:6–24, 25:23–35.” slip op. at 12

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “had a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or a related field and 2-3 years of experience in digital imaging systems,” and that “[l]ess experience may be necessary with additional education, and likewise, less education may be necessary with additional work experience.” Pet. 6 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 16–19). Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s definition. See generally PO Resp. We adopt Petitioner’s definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art because it is consistent with the level of skill reflected by the ’180 Patent Specification and the prior art of record.” slip op. at 20

  • Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Not entitled to earlier dateDecided for petitioner

    “Owner to show that Labaziewicz is not prior art because the ’180 Patent is entitled to the earliest August 25, 2004, filing date of the ’854 Provisional Application. See Dynamic Drinkware, 800 F.3d at 1379–1380. For a claim in a later-filed application to be entitled to the filing date of an earlier application, the earlier application must provide written description support for the claimed subject matter. Anascape, Ltd. v. Nintendo of Am. Inc., 601 F.3d 1333, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2010). To satisfy the written description requirement, “a prior application itself must describe an invention, and do so in sufficient detail that one skilled in the art can clearly conclude that the inventor invented the claimed invention as of the filing date sought.” Lockwood v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 107 F.3d 1565, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1997); see also VasCath v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1563–64 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (“[T]he applicant must . . . convey with reasonable clarity to those skilled in the art that, as of the filing date sought, he or she was in possession of the invention . . . now claimed.” (emphasis omitted)), Ariad Pharm. Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc) (“[I]t is the specification itself that must demonstrate possession.”). Patent Owner’s arguments fail to meet this burden of production because, aside from addressing deficiencies of written description support the ’854 Provisional Application provides written description support for all of the limitations of the claimed invention. See PO Resp. 60–64; PO Sur-reply 25–28. Specifically, Patent Owner does not address written description support in the ’854 Provisional Application for “independently controlling simultaneous data acquisition with each of the first and second channels during a frame”––limitation [22.3]––the heart of the parties’ claim construction disputes addressed above in Section II.A. See PO Resp. 60–64; PO Sur-reply 25–27. Accordingly, Patent Owner has not met its burden of production in coming forward with evidence or argument to show possession of the claimed invention in the ’854 Provisional Application. As a result, the burden of production does not shift back to Petitioner, and, therefore, the ’180 Patent is not entitled to the benefit of the August 25, 2004, filing date of the ’854 Provisional Application.” slip op. at 23

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable

    “Petitioner does not present arguments that it would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention to modify the teachings of Matsushima to acquire data for images 62A and 62B at the argues that Matsushima renders obvious this limitation. See id. at 21, 23, 30; PO Resp. 33–34 (“[T]he Petition provides no further explanation why Matsushima renders this limitation obvious.”). In the Reply for the first time, Petitioner asserts that “a POSITA would understand that Matsushima’s disclosure, including its multi-channel architecture, synchronous control of channels, and capturing two images that are scaled versions of the same scene, renders obvious simultaneous acquisition during a frame. Pet. Reply 13 (citing Ex. 1069 ¶ 49). We do not consider Petitioner’s belated argument because it exceeds the proper scope of a reply. A reply may only respond to arguments raised in the corresponding patent owner response. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.23. As explained in the Trial Practice Guide, “respond” “does not mean proceed in a new direction with a new approach as compared to the positions taken in a prior filing.” Trial Practice Guide at II.I. (December 2025)(citing 37 C.F.R. § 42.23).10 A reply that raises a new issue or belatedly presents evidence may not be considered. See id. For example, a “[p]etitioner may not submit new evidence or argument in reply that it could have presented earlier, e.g. to make out a prima facie case of unpatentability.” Id.” slip op. at 32

  Patent outcomesUS 7,916,180 mixed
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 7,916,180
• Tesla, Inc. v. Intellectual Ventures II LLCSome claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jul 21, 2026 · IPR2025-00339 · APJ Kristen L Droesch · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 22, 23, 28, 30, and 33 are unpatentable over Choi, Labaziewicz, and Yu under § 103; claims 1–3, 10–12, 24, 25, and 32 were not shown unpatentable.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have had a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or a related field and 2-3 years of experience in digital imaging systems,” and that “[l]ess experience may be necessary with additional education, and likewise, less education may be necessary with additional work experience.” Pet. 6 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 16–19). Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s definition. See generally PO Resp. We adopt Petitioner’s definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art because it is consistent with the level of skill reflected by the ’180 Patent Specification and the prior art of record.” slip op. at 20

  • Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Not entitled to earlier dateDecided for petitioner

    “Owner to show that Labaziewicz is not prior art because the ’180 Patent is entitled to the earliest August 25, 2004, filing date of the ’854 Provisional Application. See Dynamic Drinkware, 800 F.3d at 1379–1380. For a claim in a later-filed application to be entitled to the filing date of an earlier application, the earlier application must provide written description support for the claimed subject matter. Anascape, Ltd. v. Nintendo of Am. Inc., 601 F.3d 1333, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2010). To satisfy the written description requirement, “a prior application itself must describe an invention, and do so in sufficient detail that one skilled in the art can clearly conclude that the inventor invented the claimed invention as of the filing date sought.” Lockwood v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 107 F.3d 1565, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1997); see also VasCath v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1563–64 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (“[T]he applicant must . . . convey with reasonable clarity to those skilled in the art that, as of the filing date sought, he or she was in possession of the invention . . . now claimed.” (emphasis omitted)), Ariad Pharm. Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc) (“[I]t is the specification itself that must demonstrate possession.”).” slip op. at 23

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable

    “We do not agree with Petitioner’s arguments based on retrieval of data from CCD 18A and CCD 18B. Although Matsushima’s CCD drive circuits 20A and 20B are driven synchronously by timing generator 28 (see Ex. 1007 ¶ 27), Matsushima discloses that “accumulated signal charges are retrieved by CCD drive pulses applied by CCD drive circuits 20A and 20B, and are sequentially output from CCD 18A and CCD 18B as voltage signals (analog image signals) corresponding to each signal charge” (see Ex. 1007 ¶ 23) (emphasis added). In other words, regardless of whether CCD drive circuits 20A and 20B are driven synchronously by timing generator 28, Matsushima discloses that voltage signals corresponding to the accumulated 8 Petitioner’s citation erroneously includes ¶¶ 34–36 of Exhibit 1069. CCD 18A and CCD 18B sequentially––not output at the same time or simultaneously.” slip op. at 30

  • Strike new argumentNew argument disregardedDecided for patent owner

    “argues that Matsushima renders obvious this limitation. See id. at 21, 23, 30; PO Resp. 33–34 (“[T]he Petition provides no further explanation why Matsushima renders this limitation obvious.”). In the Reply for the first time, Petitioner asserts that “a POSITA would understand that Matsushima’s disclosure, including its multi-channel architecture, synchronous control of channels, and capturing two images that are scaled versions of the same scene, renders obvious simultaneous acquisition during a frame. Pet. Reply 13 (citing Ex. 1069 ¶ 49). We do not consider Petitioner’s belated argument because it exceeds the proper scope of a reply. A reply may only respond to arguments raised in the corresponding patent owner response. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.23. As explained in the Trial Practice Guide, “respond” “does not mean proceed in a new direction with a new approach as compared to the positions taken in a prior filing.” Trial Practice Guide at II.I. (December 2025)(citing 37 C.F.R. § 42.23).9 A reply that raises a new issue or belatedly presents evidence may not be considered. See id. For example, a “[p]etitioner may not submit new evidence or argument in reply that it could have presented earlier, e.g. to make out a prima facie case of unpatentability.” Id. Petitioner clarifies that the Petition does not argue inherency. See Pet.” slip op. at 33

  Patent outcomesUS 7,916,180 mixed
  § 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 7,916,180
• Tesla, Inc. v. Intellectual Ventures II LLCSome claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jul 1, 2026 · IPR2025-00222 · APJ Frederick C Laney · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1, 2, 4, 5, 8–11, 13, and 14 are unpatentable over Yu and Miyazaki; claims 15, 16, and 19 were not shown unpatentable over Matsushima.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art “at, and before, the earliest claimed priority date of the ’158 patent . . . would have had a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or a related field and 2–3 years of experience in digital imaging systems,” adding that “[l]ess experience may be sufficient with additional education, and likewise, less education may be sufficient with additional work experience.” Pet. 6–7 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 16–18). Patent Owner does not offer a competing definition or dispute Petitioner's articulation. Based on the entire record, we adopt Petitioner’s characterization of the level of skill for one of ordinary skill in the art because that characterization, we find, is consistent with the ’158 patent and the asserted prior art.” slip op. at 9

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownOther

    “We determine that the claims require a per-channel determination of integration time—that is, an integration time arrived at for each sensor or channel individually—and cannot be satisfied by a single global value merely applied uniformly across the sensors. We do not, however, read the independent claims to require that the per-channel integration times differ from one another.” slip op. at 11

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Lexicography (patentee as own lexicographer)Term construed board ownDecided for patent owner

    “We adopt the definition clearly and unambiguously set forth in the specification, which was likewise adopted by the Court in the related litigation. See Pet. 7–8, 55; Pet. Reply 1–2 (district court construing the term to mean “the time the image sensor collects and integrates signal from the scene”). The specification states that the integrated photo-charge “is directly related to the time the image sensor collects and integrates signal from the scene,” and that “[t]his is known as integration time.” Ex. 1001, 4:4–7. Accordingly, the ’158 patent demonstrates that the inventors indisputably acted as a lexicographer for the term “integration time.”” slip op. at 13

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed board ownOther

    “We construe “during a frame” to mean the period during which data for a single frame of an image is captured. The limitation is satisfied where the per-channel integration time is effectuated during the frame; it does not require that the integration time be re-determined mid-frame, nor does it require actuation of a “charge integration switch.” The specification’s only use of the phrase confirms this reading: “each camera channel is controlled during a frame under an independent integration time.” Ex. 1001, 3:45–50. Consistent with that usage, the specification describes selecting an integration time for each channel and then integrating the photo-signal “within a single frame of data,” and describes placing the charge-integration switch in a state to allow charge to accumulate for the selected period and then transferring the accumulated charge upon completion of the integration period. Id. at 4:51–54, 11:3–18. We decline Patent Owner’s proposal to require in-frame actuation of a charge-integration switch, for the same reason we decline to import that structure into “integration time.” We also decline to read the phrase to require mid-frame re-determination of the integration time, because the patent’s own embodiment selects an integration time and then integrates charge during the frame under that selected time. Ex. 1001, 4:51–54, 11:3– 18. So construed, “during a frame” is not redundant of the independentclaim limitation: it adds that the per-channel control occurs within a single frame (intrascene), as distinct from adjustment from one frame to the next (interscene).” slip op. at 15

  Patent outcomesUS 9,232,158 mixed
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 9,232,158
• Boe Technology Group Co., Ltd. v. 138 East LCD Advancements LimitedSome claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Dec 1, 2025 · IPR2024-00973 · APJ George R Hoskins · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1, 3–7, 9–13, and 15–18 are unpatentable as obvious over Reiner and over Reiner with Takahara; claims 2, 8, and 14 were not shown unpatentable.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableNot shown unpatentableMixed

    “patentability based solely on arguments considered above in the context of claim 4. See, e.g., PO Resp. 42–43, 47–52. Therefore, Patent Owner has waived any other argument. See Inst. Dec. 44; Paper 10, 10. We adopt Petitioner’s arguments concerning these claims having been obvious over Reiner as our own in this Decision. See Pet. 40–44, 50–56, 57–70, 71; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 134–142, 154–168, 174–221, 227. Accordingly, we conclude a preponderance of the evidence establishes these claims are unpatentable as having been obvious over Reiner.” slip op. at 83

  • Expert testimonyOther
  • Skill levelOther

  Patent outcomesUS 9,184,157 mixed
  § 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 9,184,157
• Bizlink Technology, Inc. v. Anderson Power Products, Inc.Some claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Nov 7, 2025 · IPR2024-00687 · APJ Lisa L Tsang · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–3 and 7–12 are unpatentable; claim 4 is not shown unpatentable because Winkler does not establish that its insulating barriers press against each other when partially disconnected.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level board ownDecided for patent owner

    “We agree with Patent Owner’s first argument that a level of ordinary skill in the art that encompasses an individual having experience with electrical circuits but not electrical connectors is not consistent with the technology and descriptions in the ’017 patent. See PO Resp. 7. The field of the invention of the ’017 patent is “electrical connectors, and more particularly, . . . an electrical connector that suppresses arcing if connected or disconnected while current is flowing.” Ex. 1001, 1:7–9. Consistent therewith, the challenged claims are directed to “[a]n electrical connector pair” and recite structural features of the electrical connector pair. Id. at 4:20–56, 5:1–20.” slip op. at 10

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner

    “We find that the intrinsic evidence supports maintaining our construction in the Institution Decision that “insulating” means “electrically insulating.” See Dec. 11–12. In particular, we agree with Patent Owner’s argument that the insulating barriers would be unable to be configured to “block[] substantially all through-air arcing paths between the first and second electrical contacts,” as claimed, unless they were electrically insulating. See Ex. 1001, 4:36–44. Moreover, as Patent Owner avers, our interpretation of “insulating” as it applies to the first and second insulating barriers should be the same as for the first and second housings. See Digital Biometrics, 149 F.3d at 1345 (“whatever interpretation we assign [to a word used in a claim] should encompass both uses because the same word appearing in the same claim should be interpreted consistently” (citation omitted)).” slip op. at 15

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “Ex. 2001 ¶ 102. Accordingly, we find Dr. Eldering’s testimony persuasive as to this issue and determine that the diagram shows what an ordinarily skilled artisan would have reasonably inferred Winkler to disclose when the connectors are partially disconnected. Compare Ex. 1004, Fig. 2, with Pet. 33; see also Ex. 1004, 3:14–27 (discussing the process by which the connectors are engaged with each other).” slip op. at 44

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundUnpatentable

    “Id. at 3:27–37 (emphasis added). These wall portions 58 are located between the distal ends of the terminals and where Petitioner proposes to add a printed circuit board or wiring board to Winkler. See id. at Fig. 2; Pet. 44–46 (diagrams showing Winkler as modified to have a printed circuit board or wiring board). As such, movement of Winkler’s terminals appears to be mostly limited to within their respective receiving pockets. Given the above teachings, we fail to see how Petitioner’s proposed modification would have meaningfully interfered with the degree of freedom of movement required by Winkler’s terminals. Notably, Mr. Locati’s testimony regarding this issue is conclusory. See Ex. 2001 ¶ 120. Because movement of Winkler’s terminals occurs primarily in the receiving pockets, we also do not discern how the solder joint of Petitioner’s proposed modification would experience undue stress or risk breaking due to that movement. See Ex. 1004, 1:47–55, 3:14–37, Fig. 2; Pet. 44–46. This is particularly true in view of Winkler’s teaching that each cylindrical end portion may be soldered to a cable. See id. at 2:6–10; see also Pet. 43 (arguing that Winkler teaches soldering to a cable but not specifically to a printed circuit or wiring board). Accordingly, we determine that Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that claim 8 would have been obvious over the combined teachings of Winkler and Handbook.” slip op. at 55

  Patent outcomesUS 8,808,017 mixed
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,808,017
• Luminex International Co., Ltd. / Menard, Inc. v. Signify Holdings B.V.Some claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Aug 13, 2025 · IPR2024-01469 · APJ Steven M Amundson · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–7, 9–15, and 18–20 are unpatentable; claims 8, 16, and 17 are not determined unpatentable under the asserted prior-art grounds.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › §315(b) time barNot time barredDecided for petitioner

    “G. Analysis 1. REAL PARTY IN INTEREST Based on the record before us and for the reasons explained below, we disagree with Patent Owner that Menard is a “real party in interest” under § 315(b). See Resp. 77–82; Sur-reply 27–28. First, the circumstances here differ materially from the circumstances in Ventex. There, two agreements defined the relationship between Ventex (the petitioner and manufacturer of Heatwave fabric) and Seirus (the alleged real party in interest and purchaser of Heatwave fabric). Ventex, IPR2017- 00651, Paper 152 at 7 & n.8. First, a 2013 Supplier Agreement “prevented Ventex from selling to Seirus competitors” and included an indemnity provision requiring Ventex to indemnify Seirus for losses arising from Ventex’s failure to perform certain obligations. Id. at 7, 14. Second, a 2016 Exclusive Manufacturing Agreement provided that Ventex would manufacture the Heatwave fabric only for Seirus in exchange for Seirus’s payment of an exclusivity fee. Id. at 7. Columbia (the patent owner) accused Seirus products incorporating the Heatwave fabric of infringing the patent at issue, and Columbia served Seirus with a complaint alleging patent infringement in 2014 more than two years before Ventex filed a petition in 2017. Id. at 5, 7. When determining that Seirus was a “real party in interest” under § 315(b), the Board reasoned that “Ventex and Seirus had a specially structured, preexisting, and well established business relationship with one another, including indemnification and exclusivity arrangements.” Ventex, IPR2017-00651, Paper 152 at 10; see id. at 12. Additionally, the Board noted that certain evidence “suggest[ed] that” slip op. at 32

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Real party in interest / privityRpi dispute resolved for petitionerDecided for petitioner

    “G. Analysis 1. REAL PARTY IN INTEREST Based on the record before us and for the reasons explained below, we disagree with Patent Owner that Menard is a “real party in interest” under § 315(b). See Resp. 77–82; Sur-reply 27–28. First, the circumstances here differ materially from the circumstances in Ventex. There, two agreements defined the relationship between Ventex (the petitioner and manufacturer of Heatwave fabric) and Seirus (the alleged real party in interest and purchaser of Heatwave fabric). Ventex, IPR2017- 00651, Paper 152 at 7 & n.8. First, a 2013 Supplier Agreement “prevented Ventex from selling to Seirus competitors” and included an indemnity provision requiring Ventex to indemnify Seirus for losses arising from Ventex’s failure to perform certain obligations. Id. at 7, 14. Second, a 2016 Exclusive Manufacturing Agreement provided that Ventex would manufacture the Heatwave fabric only for Seirus in exchange for Seirus’s payment of an exclusivity fee. Id. at 7. Columbia (the patent owner) accused Seirus products incorporating the Heatwave fabric of infringing the patent at issue, and Columbia served Seirus with a complaint alleging patent infringement in 2014 more than two years before Ventex filed a petition in 2017. Id. at 5, 7. When determining that Seirus was a “real party in interest” under § 315(b), the Board reasoned that “Ventex and Seirus had a specially structured, preexisting, and well established business relationship with one another, including indemnification and exclusivity arrangements.” Ventex, IPR2017-00651, Paper 152 at 10; see id. at 12. Additionally, the Board noted that certain evidence “suggest[ed] that” slip op. at 32

  • Skill levelOther

    “C. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Factors pertinent to determining the level of ordinary skill in the art include (1) the educational level of the inventor; (2) the type of problems encountered in the art; (3) prior-art solutions to those problems; (4) the rapidity with which innovations are made; (5) the sophistication of the technology; and (6) the educational level of workers active in the field. Envtl. Designs, Ltd. v. Union Oil Co., 713 F.2d 693, 696–97 (Fed. Cir. 1983). Not all factors may exist in every case, and one or more of these or other factors may predominate in a particular case. Id. These factors are not exhaustive, but merely a guide to determining the level of ordinary skill in the art. Daiichi Sankyo Co. v. Apotex, Inc., 501 F.3d 1254, 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2007). Moreover, the prior art itself may reflect an appropriate skill level. Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001). Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art at the ’336 patent’s effective filing date would have had “a bachelor’s degree in mechanical engineering, electrical engineering, optics, or physics with at least three years of experience working in the design of LED lights or lighting fixtures; a master’s degree in one of the above disciplines with at least two years of experience; or equivalent experience.” Pet. 14 (citing Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 26–29). Dr. Eden’s testimony supports Petitioner’s assertion. See Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 27–28. Patent Owner “adopts for purposes of this proceeding only” Petitioner’s description of an ordinarily skilled artisan. Resp. 10 (citing Pet. 14). We adopt Petitioner’s description of an ordinarily skilled artisan because it comports with the technology and claims of the ’336 patent as” slip op. at 40

  • Obviousness (§103) › Objective indicia / secondary considerationsObjective indicia no nexusDecided for petitioner

    “Alleged Objective Indicia of Nonobviousness (i) General Principles Before reaching a conclusion about obviousness, we consider evidence concerning objective indicia of nonobviousness. See Apple, 839 F.3d at 1048. For such evidence to have substantial weight, “its proponent must establish a nexus between the evidence and the merits of the claimed invention.” ClassCo, Inc. v. Apple, Inc., 838 F.3d 1214, 1220 (Fed. Cir. 2016); see Ancora Techs., Inc. v. Roku, Inc., 140 F.4th 1351, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2025) (noting that the Board did not err by requiring “a nexus to the challenged claims as opposed to the patent as a whole”). “[T]here is no nexus unless the evidence presented is ‘reasonably commensurate with the scope of the claims.’” ClassCo, 838 F.3d at 1220 (quoting Rambus Inc. v. Rea, 731 F.3d 1248, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2013)). The patentee “bears the burden of showing that a nexus exists.” WMS Gaming, Inc. v. Int’l Game Tech., 184 F.3d 1339, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 1999). A rebuttable presumption of nexus arises “when the patentee shows that the asserted objective evidence is tied to a specific product and that product ‘embodies the claimed features, and is coextensive with them.’” Fox Factory, Inc. v. SRAM, LLC, 944 F.3d 1366, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (quoting Polaris Indus., Inc. v. Arctic Cat, Inc., 882 F.3d 1056, 1072 (Fed. Cir. 2018)). Whether a rebuttable presumption of nexus arises “turns on the nature of the claims and the specific facts.” Teva Pharms. Int’l GmbH v. Eli Lilly & Co., 8 F.4th 1349, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2021). The presumption analysis should consider the unclaimed features in the product tied to the objective evidence to assess their significance and impact on the correspondence between the patented invention and the product. Quanergy Sys., Inc. v. Velodyne Lidar USA, Inc., 24 F.4th 1406, 1418 (Fed. Cir. 2022). When, “for example, the patented invention is only a small component of the product tied to the objective evidence, there is no presumption of nexus.” Henny Penny Corp. v. Frymaster LLC, 938 F.3d 1324, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2019). Absent a presumption of nexus, the patentee may prove nexus by” slip op. at 76

  Patent outcomesUS 10,299,336 mixed
  § 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,299,336
• Luminex International Co., Ltd. / Menard, Inc. v. Signify Holdings B.V.Some claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Aug 13, 2025 · IPR2024-00101 · APJ Steven M Amundson · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–7, 9–15, and 18–20 are unpatentable; claims 8, 16, and 17 are not shown unpatentable under the asserted grounds.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Real party in interest / privityRpi dispute resolved for patent ownerDecided for patent owner

    “G. Analysis 1. REAL PARTY IN INTEREST Based on the record before us and for the reasons explained below, we” slip op. at 32

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › §315(b) time barDecided for patent owner

    “III. WHETHER THE PETITION IS TIME BARRED The parties dispute whether the Petition is time barred based on a” slip op. at 18

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

    “vacated the panel’s decision denying institution. Paper 12, 6. Among other things, the Director determined based on a “review of the current record” that (1) Menard is not a real party in interest in this proceeding and (2) Menard is not a privy of Petitioner. Id. at 5. Further, the Director remanded the case to the panel and instructed the panel “to determine whether the Petition presents a reasonable likelihood of prevailing with respect to at least one of the challenged claims under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), and to determine whether to institute inter partes review accordingly.” Id. at 5–6.” slip op. at 3

  • BurdenMixed

    “U.S. Patent No. 10,299,336 B2 (“the ’336 patent”) (Exhibit 1001). For the reasons explained below, a preponderance of the evidence shows that claims 1–7, 9–15, and 18–20 in the ’336 patent are unpatentable and does not show that claims 8, 16, and 17 are unpatentable. See 35 U.S.C. § 316(e) (2024).” slip op. at 2

  Patent outcomesUS 10,299,336 mixed
  § 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,299,336
• Billerud Aktiebolag (Publ) v. Westrock MWV, LLCSome claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Mar 12, 2025 · IPR2023-01206 · APJ Elizabeth M Roesel · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1, 2, and 4–22 are unpatentable as obvious; claim 23 was not shown unpatentable. Substitute claims 25–26 are allowed, while 24 and 27 are denied for lack of written-description support.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedOther

    “Exhibits 1013 and 1014 are also not admissible as expert testimony because Mr. Wirén is not “qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education.” Fed. R. Evid. 703. “To offer expert testimony from the perspective of a skilled artisan in a patent case—like for claim construction, validity, or infringement—a witness must at least have ordinary skill in the art. Without that skill, the witness’ opinions are neither relevant nor reliable.” Kyocera Senco Indus. Tools Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 22 F.4th 1369, 1376–77 (Fed. Cir. 2022). Mr. Wirén does not meet our definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art. See Section II.B, supra. That definition is based on the undisputed testimony of Messrs. Zotterman and Klass. Ex. 1003 ¶ 24; Ex. 2003 ¶ 26. Although Mr. Wirén has a Master’s of Science in chemical engineering, he lacks any experience or specialization in paperboard manufacturing. Ex. 2011, 12:1–10, 19:6–25, 20:2–7. We therefore agree with Patent Owner that Exhibits 1013 and 1014 are the testimony of Mr. Wirén and should be excluded from evidence because Mr. Wirén is not a person of ordinary skill in the relevant art. PO MTE 5–6, 9; Sundance, Inc. v. DeMonte Fabricating Ltd., 550 F.3d 1356, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“Unless a patent lawyer is also a qualified technical” slip op. at 61

  • Skill levelSkill level board ownOther

    “Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Based on the testimony of the parties’ witnesses, we determine that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had a bachelor’s degree in paper science and engineering, chemical engineering, process engineering, mechanical engineering, or a related degree, with three to five years of experience in paperboard manufacturing, or a master’s degree in paper science and engineering, chemical engineering, process engineering, or mechanical engineering, or a similar field with a specialization in paperboard manufacturing. Ex. 1003 ¶ 24; Ex. 2003 ¶ 26. We find that the level of ordinary skill in the art, as articulated above, is consistent with the level of technical understanding and competence reflected in the ’142 Patent Specification and the asserted prior art references.” slip op. at 10

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Specification disavowal / 'present invention' languageTerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

    “A claim construction that excludes a particular element is viewed as a “negative limitation.” Ethicon LLC v. Intuitive Surgical, Inc., 847 Fed. App’x 901, 907 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 15, 2021). “[S]uch exclusions must find support either in ‘the words of the claim’ or through an ‘express disclaimer or independent lexicography in the written description that would justify adding that negative limitation.’” Id. (citing Omega Eng’g, Inc. v. Raytek Corp., 334 F.3d 1314, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2003); CCS Fitness, Inc. v. Brunswick Corp., 288 F.3d 1359, 1366–67 (Fed. Cir. 2002)). “The standards for finding lexicography and disavowal are exacting.” GE Lighting Sols., LLC v. AgiLight, Inc., 750 F.3d 1304, 1309 (Fed. Cir. 2014). “To act as its own lexicographer, a patentee must ‘clearly set forth a definition of the disputed claim term,’ and ‘clearly express an intent to define the term.’” Id. (citing Thorner, 669 F.3d at 1365). Similarly, disclaimer or disavowal requires that the specification or prosecution history demonstrate that the invention does not include a particular feature. Id. Here, we find no claim language, lexicography, or disclaimer in the ’142 Patent or its file history that would support defining a “hot-hard calender” as requiring that only one of the two rollers be heated to an elevated temperature.” slip op. at 12

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundUnpatentable

    “a contact surface of said thermo-roller is heated to an elevated temperature of at least 250°F.” Petitioner shows persuasively that the temperature limitation is taught by the combination of Fugitt and Papermaking. Pet. 32–34. Fugitt discloses that “[t]he rolls of the calender may be steam heated.” Ex. 1004 ¶ 26. In a section titled “Heated Rolls,” Papermaking discloses that “Steam can be used up to 170°C [338°F] surface temperature.” Ex. 1010, 95, 98. Petitioner is thus correct that, “[w]hile Fugitt teaches that a hot calender may be steam heated, Papermaking clarifies that one of ordinary skill in the art would understand that steam heated thermo-rollers may reach up to 338°F.” Pet. 36. Based on these disclosures, we are persuaded by Mr. Zotterman’s testimony that it would have been “obvious to heat the thermo-roller of Fugitt to at least 250°F.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 159. combine Fugitt and Papermaking because of Papermaking’s status as a “trusted handbook[],” because both references disclose a method of manufacturing a paperboard structure with hot calendering,” and “because of the known advantages of heated rollers.” Pet. 36–37; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 157, 159, 162. Petitioner’s contention is supported by Papermaking’s disclosures that, for cartonboard, “[p]recalendering is used before the coater to reduce roughness and porosity” and “[h]igh thermo roll temperatures (in some cases over 200°C) result in bulk savings because of the temperature gradient.” Ex. 1005, 80–82; see also Pet. 38; Ex. 1003 ¶ 164 (citing these disclosures). Papermaking’s disclosed range of “up to 170°C [338°F]” for steam- heated rolls (Ex. 1010, 98), overlaps the claimed range of “at least 250°F.” Patent Owner agrees. Tr. 27:11–13. “If the relevant comparison between a disputed claim limitation and the prior art pertains to a range of overlapping values, ‘. . . even a slight overlap in range establishes a prima facie case of obviousness.’” Genentech, Inc. v. Hospira, Inc., 946 F.3d 1333, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (citing In re Peterson, 315 F.3d 1325, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2003)). “[S]uch an overlap creates a presumption of obviousness, and . . . the burden of production falls upon the patentee to come forward with pertinent evidence that the overlapping range would not have been obvious in light of the prior art.” Id. (citing E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Synvina C.V., 904 F.3d 996, 1006, 1008 (Fed. Cir. 2018)). slip op. at 21

  Patent outcomesUS 11,293,142 mixed
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,293,142

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.