• Micron Technology, Inc. v. Yangtze Memory Technologies Company, Ltd.Some claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jul 6, 2026 · IPR2025-00191 · APJ Michael T Cygan · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 3, 8, 11, 12, and 19 are unpatentable under §103; Petitioner did not show claims 6, 9, 10, 13–18, and 20 unpatentable.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “at the critical time “would have had a Bachelor of Science degree in electrical engineering or a similar discipline, along with 2–3 years of professional experience working with (e.g., researching, designing, or teaching) monolithic 3D structures and NAND memory devices, or an equivalent level of skill, knowledge, and experience (e.g., an advanced degree may replace some of the professional experience).” Pet. 27 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶34–38). Petitioner further asserts that a POSITA “would have been aware of and generally knowledgeable about 3D NAND’s structure, how it is manufactured, and its component parts.” Id. Patent Owner does 5 Neither party presents evidence or arguments regarding objective evidence of non-obviousness. Pet. 100; PO. Resp. circuit design. PO Resp. 9–10 (citing Ex. 2021 ¶ 35). Neither Patent Owner nor Dr. Campbell considers the obviousness of the claims to turn on the precise definition of the level or ordinary skill in the art. PO Resp. 10; Ex. 2021 ¶ 35. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill, as it appears to be consistent with the specification of the ’322 patent and the prior art of record.” slip op. at 7

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for petitioner

    “C. Claim Construction Neither party proposes any express claim construction. Pet. 27 (stating claims should receive their “plain and ordinary meaning”); PO Resp. 10 (stating that Petitioner’s challenges fail “under any reasonable construction”). In an inter partes review, we construe a patent claim “using the same claim construction standard that would be used to construe the claim in a civil action under 35 U.S.C. [§] 282(b).” 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b). Under this standard, the words of a claim generally are given their “ordinary and customary meaning,” which is the meaning the term would have to a person of ordinary skill at the time of the invention, in the context of the entire patent including the specification. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312–13 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). We determine no terms require express construction for purposes of this Decision.” slip op. at 8

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner

    “We determine that such a configuration would be neither inoperable nor significantly undesirable. Dr. Campbell testified that he does not argue that this configuration would be inoperable. Ex. 1106, 74:12–17; Ex. 2021 ¶60. Dr. Lee testifies that this configuration is “consistent with Nishikawa[123]’s Figure 14B.” Ex. 1105 ¶ 13. Dr. Lee further testifies that this configuration would not necessarily require a larger footprint, but instead, “could simply replace the trenches, abutting the device edge.” Id. Dr. Campbell testified that if the circular TAC replaced the rectangular trench, “I don’t know what it would be or exactly where it would be,” and therefore, “I can’t say what the size of the red circle would have to be.” Ex. 1106, 83:19–84:3. Therefore, the record does not support finding a circular TAC to have a larger footprint. Absent a larger footprint, there is no evidence that the end-connected TAC would be undesirable.” slip op. at 15

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedPatent owner expert discountedMixed

    “nor significantly undesirable. Dr. Campbell testified that he does not argue that this configuration would be inoperable. Ex. 1106, 74:12–17; Ex. 2021 ¶60. Dr. Lee testifies that this configuration is “consistent with Nishikawa[123]’s Figure 14B.” Ex. 1105 ¶ 13. Dr. Lee further testifies that this configuration would not necessarily require a larger footprint, but instead, “could simply replace the trenches, abutting the device edge.” Id. Dr. Campbell testified that if the circular TAC replaced the rectangular trench, “I don’t know what it would be or exactly where it would be,” and therefore, “I can’t say what the size of the red circle would have to be.” Ex. 1106, 83:19–84:3. Therefore, the record does not support finding a circular TAC to have a larger footprint. Absent a larger footprint, there is no evidence that the end-connected TAC would be undesirable.” slip op. at 15

  Patent outcomesUS 11,581,322 mixed
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,581,322
• Google LLC v. Sandpiper CDN, LLCInstituted
  PTAB · Nov 7, 2025 · IPR2025-00826 · APJ Michael T Cygan · IPR · Institution

  The Board instituted IPR on all asserted grounds for claims 1–23, finding a reasonable likelihood of obviousness for claims 13–22 over Glines and Gupta.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

    “review. See 35 U.S.C. § 314 (2018); 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2023). The standard for instituting an inter partes review is set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), which provides that an inter partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” For the reasons given below, on this record, Petitioner has established a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in showing the unpatentability of at least one of challenged claims 1–23 of the ’112 patent. Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review of the ’112 patent.” slip op. at 2

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSITA”) at the critical time “would have had at least a bachelor’s degree in computer science, electrical engineering, or a related field, and at least two years of work or research experience in the field of content delivery management or networks,” and that “additional education could substitute for work experience.” Pet. 3 (citing Ex. 1008 ¶¶ 51–53). Patent Owner does not provide any such assessment in its Preliminary Response. Prelim. Resp. 11. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill, as it appears to be consistent with the specification of the ’112 patent and the prior art of record.” slip op. at 7

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “claim construction standard that would be used to construe the claim in a civil action under 35 U.S.C. [§] 282(b).” 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b). Under this standard, the words of a claim generally are given their “ordinary and customary meaning,” which is the meaning the term would have to a person of ordinary skill at the time of the invention, in the context of the entire patent including the specification. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312–13 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). Neither party proposes any express claim construction at this stage of the proceeding. Pet. 3; Prelim. Resp. 12. Based on the record before us, we determine that no claim term requires express construction for purposes of this Decision.” slip op. at 8

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner

    “Dr. Mowry further attests that “A POSITA would have understood Glines’s disclosure of providing content from an origin source would have included supporting more than one origin source (e.g., more than one website or content provider[)].” Ex. 1008 ¶ 262 (citing Ex. 1002, 12:11–22 (storing replica files that originate at an origin server 40), 13:21–14:3 (requesting “example.com”)). That statement, however, goes only to what Glines might be capable of doing, not to whether one would have modified Glines to do so. See Belden Inc. v. Berk-Tek LLC, 805 F.3d 1064, 1073 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“[o]bviousness concerns whether a skilled artisan not only could have made but would have been motivated to make the combinations or modifications of prior art to arrive at the claimed inventions.”). Dr. “content providers” limitation, stating that it “would have been nothing more than replicating Glines’s teaching of storing and providing content associated with one origin server, with expected results.” Ex. 1008 ¶ 263. That statement, however, is unsupported, and moreover, does not explain how such replication would occur or what results would be expected. Prelim. Resp. 25–26. At this stage in the proceeding, Dr. Mowry’s testimony amounts to a “conclusory generalization” that does not provide the “reasoned explanation” sufficient to show that a limitation missing in the cited art was taught by the knowledge in the art. Arendi S.A.R.L v. Apple, Inc., 832 F.3d 1355, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2016).” slip op. at 14

  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 9,021,112
• Micron Technology, Inc. v. Yangtze Memory Technologies Company, Ltd.Some claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Oct 23, 2025 · IPR2024-00790 · APJ Jo-Anne M Kokoski · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–3 are unpatentable as obvious over Kim; claims 4 and 5 were not shown unpatentable over the asserted grounds.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner

    “SuperGuide, 358 F.3d at 875 (“We review the patent’s written description and drawings to confirm that the patentee’s own use of the disputed term is consistent with the meaning given to it by the court.”). The ’031 patent teaches that dielectric pairs of different tiers are etched to form staircases extending along the x-y plane. Ex. 1001, 13:27–28. As described above (§ I.D, supra), dielectric filling structure 311 is formed by depositing a dielectric filling material to fill the space remaining after portions of dielectric stack 203 are removed to form staircase structure 303. Id. at 13:36–41; see also id. at 22:63–65 (“Memory structure 1200 can be formed by forming dielectric filling structure 1201 to fill the space formed by the removal of portions of dielectric stack 1003.”) The ’031 patent then teaches that excess dielectric filling material overlying the topmost surface of staircase structure 303 is removed using a suitable planarization method. Id. at 13:41–44; see also 22:67–23:5 (performing a planarization process to remove excess dielectric filling structure 1201 over the top surface of memory structure 1200). According to the ’031 patent, the portion of the deposited dielectric filling material that remains “over staircase structure 303 and isolation layer 109” forms “dielectric filling structure 311 that surrounds staircase structure 303.” Id. at 13:44–48 (emphasis added); see also id. at 1:56–58 (stating in “some embodiments, the memory device also includes a filling structure surrounding the multiple-stack staircase structure”). structure is etched along the x-, y-, and z-axes, and the dielectric filling structure fills the spaces in the x-, y-, and z-directions created when the staircase structure is etched. Because the excess portion of the dielectric filling structure overlying the top of the staircase structure is removed, what remains is dielectric filling structure in the spaces around the staircase structure in the x-, y-, and z-planes. In this way, the ’031 patent teaches that the dielectric filling structure surrounds, i.e., is all around or encircles, the staircase structure.” slip op. at 11

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “(“POSITA”) would have had “a bachelor of science degree in electrical engineering or a similar discipline” with “2–3 years of professional experience working with (e.g., researching, designing, or teaching) monolithic 3D structures and NAND memory devices,” or “an equivalent level of skill, knowledge, and experience (e.g., an advanced degree may replace some of the professional experience).” Pet. 22–23. Petitioner further contends that a “POSITA would have been aware of and generally knowledgeable about 3D NAND’s structure, its component parts, how it operates, and how it is controlled.” Id. at 23 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 41–44). Patent Owner states that it does not object to the definition of a POSITA proffered by Petitioner. PO Resp. 13–14 (citing Pet. 22). In the Institution Decision, we adopted the assessment offered by Petitioner. Dec. 7. Because Petitioner’s definition of the level of skill in the art is consistent with the ’031 patent and the asserted prior art, we maintain it for purposes of this Final Written Decision. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir 2001).” slip op. at 7

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundMixed

    “Dr. Banerjee adequately explains why a POSITA would have been motivated to make dummy structures DS with a conductive core as Petitioner proposes. In an obviousness analysis, some kind of reason must be shown as to why a POSITA would have thought of combining or modifying the prior art to achieve the patented invention. See Innogenetics, N.V. v. Abbott Labs., 512 F.3d 1363, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2008). Here, Petitioner offers only the general proposition that pillar support structures comprising electrically conductive material were known in the art, but this does not provide a reason why a POSITA would have been motivated to modify Kim’s dummy structures. Pet. 55–56; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 156–157. Petitioner’s arguments and Dr. Banerjee’s testimony with respect to the modification of Kim leaves an analytical gap that does not apprise us of why a POSITA would have modified Kim’s dummy structures to include a conductive core as the pillar-support material recited in claim 4. Instead, Petitioner attempts to imbue a POSITA with the knowledge of the claimed invention, when no prior art reference, references of record, or other evidence conveys or suggests that knowledge. Petitioner’s argument that a POSITA would have modified Kim in this way appears to be premised on Petitioner’s knowledge of the ’031 patent disclosure. This is improper hindsight reasoning. Petitioner needed to explain sufficiently what invention to consider modifying Kim’s dummy structures to include a conductive core. Petitioner fails to provide such an explanation. See W.L. Gore & Assoc., Inc. v. Garlock, Inc., 721 F.2d 1540, 1553 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (In an obviousness analysis, we must “cast the mind back to the time the invention was made” and “occupy the mind of one skilled in the art who is presented only with the references, and who is normally guided by the thenaccepted wisdom in the art.”).” slip op. at 23

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of success › HindsightNot shown unpatentableDecided for patent owner

    “Dr. Banerjee adequately explains why a POSITA would have been motivated to make dummy structures DS with a conductive core as Petitioner proposes. In an obviousness analysis, some kind of reason must be shown as to why a POSITA would have thought of combining or modifying the prior art to achieve the patented invention. See Innogenetics, N.V. v. Abbott Labs., 512 F.3d 1363, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2008). Here, Petitioner offers only the general proposition that pillar support structures comprising electrically conductive material were known in the art, but this does not provide a reason why a POSITA would have been motivated to modify Kim’s dummy structures. Pet. 55–56; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 156–157. Petitioner’s arguments and Dr. Banerjee’s testimony with respect to the modification of Kim leaves an analytical gap that does not apprise us of why a POSITA would have modified Kim’s dummy structures to include a conductive core as the pillar-support material recited in claim 4. Instead, Petitioner attempts to imbue a POSITA with the knowledge of the claimed invention, when no prior art reference, references of record, or other evidence conveys or suggests that knowledge. Petitioner’s argument that a POSITA would have modified Kim in this way appears to be premised on Petitioner’s knowledge of the ’031 patent disclosure. This is improper hindsight reasoning. Petitioner needed to explain sufficiently what invention to consider modifying Kim’s dummy structures to include a conductive core. Petitioner fails to provide such an explanation. See W.L. Gore & Assoc., Inc. v. Garlock, Inc., 721 F.2d 1540, 1553 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (In an obviousness analysis, we must “cast the mind back to the time the invention was made” and “occupy the mind of one skilled in the art who is presented only with the references, and who is normally guided by the thenaccepted wisdom in the art.”).” slip op. at 23

  Patent outcomesUS 10,868,031 mixed
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips
  Patents in suitUS 10,868,031
• Micron Technology, Inc. v. Yangtze Memory Technologies Company, Ltd.Some claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Oct 22, 2025 · IPR2024-00794 · APJ Michael T Cygan · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1 and 6 are unpatentable over Park; claims 2–5 and 7–11 were not shown unpatentable on the asserted grounds.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSITA”) at the critical time “would have had a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering or a similar discipline, along with 2-3 years of professional experience working with (e.g., researching, designing, or teaching) NAND flash memory devices, or an equivalent level of skill, knowledge, and experience (e.g., an advanced degree may replace some of the professional experience).” Pet. 19 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 36–37). Petitioner further asserts that a POSITA “would have been aware of and generally knowledgeable about 3D NAND’s structure, its component parts, how it operates, and how it is controlled.” Id. Patent Owner does not object to this assessment, arguing that its claims are valid regardless of the precise definition. PO 3 Neither party presents evidence or arguments regarding objective evidence of non-obviousness. skill, as it appears to be consistent with the specification of the ’623 patent and the prior art of record.” slip op. at 5

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedMixed

    “the Petition, Petitioner’s approach to Shibata’s drive circuit and Park’s dummy channel/open region teachings results in a deficiency in its showing of reasonable expectation of success for its expressed combination of extending Park’s insulative trenches to replace some of its common source lines. Petitioner relies solely on the fact that the references are capable of performing the relied-upon functions or could possess the relied-upon structure. See, e.g., Pet. Reply 19–20 (stating, “If Shibata accommodates this type of trench . . . there is no reason Park cannot as well,” and “Park itself already presents a variety of ways to minimize any etching problem that may be encountered when using wet etching”). But Park does not describe its dummy channel or open region teachings as generally applicable to all of its embodiments. And Petitioner needs to show a reason why the application of Shibata would be reasonably expected to have been successfully applied in Park, not merely state that there is “no reason” to expect that it would not be successful. See DSS Tech. Mgmt., Inc. v. Apple Inc., 885 F.3d 1367, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (finding that even where two structures have “the same physical structure,” applying the teachings of one structure to the other requires “additional, reasoned analysis.”). The knowledge of one skilled in the art cannot bridge this gap, because these are inventive features of Park and Shibata. Furthermore, Petitioner also has not sufficiently explained, for any of its proposed augmentations, how metal gate deposition would occur sufficiently in the most remote regions of the long, parallel insulating layers in Petitioner’s Park-Shibata combination of such regions to avoid the risk of incomplete gate electrode layers in the final memory device that Patent Owner argues would result in a significant trade-off in memory device accuracy, and device scalability. PO Resp. 68 (citing Ex. 2010 ¶ 145). For example, Dr. Lee addresses only etching issues, not deposition issues. Ex. 1025, ¶¶ 32–47.” slip op. at 46

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

    “We agree with Petitioner. As pointed out by Patent Owner, the “trenches formed in the BSG” language of claim 1 reflects specific description of the gate-first method of manufacturing, but not the gate-last method of manufacturing. Ex. 1001, 7:17–19 (“referring to Fig. 1A, one or more first dielectric trenches . . . are formed in the one or more BSGs”). However, as Petitioner points out, the claims are to a memory “device,” not to a method of manufacturing or a device produced by specific manufacturing steps. Pet. Reply 1. During prosecution of the application that matured into the ’623 patent, the Examiner determined that the device of claim 1 was distinct from a separately claimed method of manufacturing and The Examiner’s requirement stated that the memory device of claim 1 is not limited by the disclosed process of manufacture because “the process claims require . . . deposition steps of polysilicon whereas the product claims do not require any polysilicon.” Id. Applicant agreed “without traverse” with the Examiner’s determination and selected to pursue only the “device” claims. Id. at 596 (“Applicant elects, without traverse, Invention I, Claims 1–11, drawn to a device”).4 The distinctiveness is also supported by the discussion in the ’623 patent of “formed in the BSG” that describes its device separately from its method of formation. The ’623 patent describes that “[i]n the disclosed memory device, one or more first dielectric trenches are formed in the BSG and extend in a length direction of the substrate to separate the BSG into a plurality of sub-BSGs.” Ex. 1001, 2:25–28. This description precedes, and is separate from, its description of an aspect of a process for manufacturing a memory device in which the BSG layer is formed and then “dielectric trenches are formed” that may “pass through the BSG layer” so that the “BSG layer is separated by the one or more first dielectric trenches into a plurality of sub-BSG layers.” Id. at 3:30–45. The description of the device having trenches formed in the BSG, which is not limited to a particular manufacturing process, further supports Petitioner’s contention that the “formed in the BSG” language is not limited to a particular manufacturing embodiment.” slip op. at 7

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Specification disavowal / 'present invention' languageTerm construed board ownDecided for patent owner

    “We do not agree that such arguments support Patent Owner’s conclusion. Patent Owner acknowledges that two portions of a BSG that are connected at a small opening are not separated because both portions remain electrically connected to each other. Id. at 17 (stating, “common source regions 52a is merely in the middle of a single sub-BSG 2 (‘SUB-BLK2’) and does not divide it into further sub-BSGs because there is an H-cut 72 that connects the two sides of the common source region such that both regions are part of the same sub-BSG”) (citing Ex. 1001, 9:15–19, 9:41–44) (emphasis omitted); Ex. 1026, 34:4–15, 41:23–42:16 (Dr. Kuhn attesting that common source regions may isolate adjacent BSGs). Patent Owner considers other portions of the BSG to be separated into sub-BSGs because there is no such connection between the sub-BSG portions. Id. at 17–18 (annotating Ex. 1001, Fig. 1B). Under such reasoning, the addition of a trench closing a gap between two neighboring BSG portions, thereby breaking the electrical connection therebetween, would “separate” the two BSG portions into further sub-BSGs. In its obviousness assertions, Petitioner argues for such an interpretation of the claim. See Pet. Reply 10 (“Park’s layers 111 electrically separate its BSG”). Based on the above, we determine that the phrase “dielectric trenches formed in the BSG and extending in a length direction of the substrate to perform electrical separation between sub-BSGs, but does not require that the trenches act alone, extending from one end of the device to the other across the entire BSG. Similarly, the trenches need not have any particular length, and need only to have some length that performs that separation.” slip op. at 13

  Patent outcomesUS 10,950,623 mixed
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,950,623
• Micron Technology, Inc. v. Yangtze Memory Technologies Company, Ltd.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Oct 7, 2025 · IPR2024-00795 · APJ Michael T Cygan · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–9 and 11–19 are unpatentable as obvious over Lee or Zhao and Lee; the Board did not find claims unpatentable over Zhao or Yang alone.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSITA”) at the critical time would have had a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering or a similar discipline, along with 2-3 years of professional experience working with (e.g., researching, designing, or teaching) NAND memory devices (including issues relating to the operation, e.g., programming, of said devices), or an equivalent level of skill, knowledge, and experience (e.g., an advanced degree may replace some of the professional experience). Pet. 18 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 35–38). Petitioner further asserts that a POSITA “would have been aware of and generally knowledgeable about NAND memory’s structure, its component parts, how it operates, and how it is controlled. Id. (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 38). Patent Owner does not object to this assertion. PO Resp. 12. We adopt Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill, as it appears to be consistent with the specification of the ’822 patent and the prior art of record.” slip op. at 6

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached

    “1. Word line pre-pulse signal Patent Owner argues that such a signal “must increase in value and then decrease in value (or vice versa).” PO Resp. 13; PO Sur-Reply 1. Petitioner agrees with this construction. Pet. Reply. 3. Patent Owner further argues that the pre-pulse signal “prepares the word line before the programming step.” PO Resp. 13. We agree that Petitioner applies its teachings with the same understanding of “pre-pulse signal” as Patent Owner. See, e.g., Pet. 38–39 (asserting that Lee teaches, or that that Lee would make obvious, pre-bias signals applied as pulses). Because both parties agree that a pre-pulse signal “must increase in value and then decrease in value (or vice versa),” and apply this construction in their assertions and arguments, no dispute as to the meaning of this phrase exists in a manner that would affect the outcome of this decision. Therefore, we do not need to determine a particular construction. Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“[W]e need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci & Eng'g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 7

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner

    “with the plain language of the claims, each claim states “disposed.” Patent Owner provides dictionary definitions for “disposed,” which is described as a verb. See, e.g., Ex. 2016, 3. When described as a verb in these definitions, “disposed” is the action of the actor; i.e., “the chief disposed his attendants in a circle” (Ex. 2019, 3); “She disposed of her estate among her heirs” (Ex. 2018, 3); “disposed of the matter efficiently” (Ex. 2017, 3); “troops disposed for withdrawal” (Ex. 2016, 3). Petitioner offers no contrary definition from either the Specification or any extrinsic source for that term. We agree with Patent Owner’s construction of “disposed” as “put in place” or “arranged in a particular position.” Nevertheless, the construction of “disposed” does not resolve the controversy over the language of claims 2, 3, 12, and 13. The claims recite “are disposed.” For example, claim 2 recites, “wherein the [first through third groups] of the plurality of word lines are disposed in an order of distance from the selected word line.” Under Patent Owner’s construction, this reads as, “wherein the [first through third groups] of the plurality of word lines are arranged in a particular position in an order of distance from the selected word line.” But claim 2 does not recite that the word lines are arranged “based on” the selected word line, or that the arrangement occurs only after a word line is selected, as argued by Patent Owner. We agree with Petitioner that the express language of claim 2 does not recite any limitation as to how or when the groups of word lines are disposed. Both parties point to the same language in the ’822 patent Specification in support of their position: “the word lines disposed between the selected word line and the top select gate TSG can be divided into multiple groups of the word lines.” PO Sur-Reply 2 (citing Pet. Reply 11 requires the recited arrangement to exist, at some point. But we determine that none of claims 2, 3, 12, or 13 require a step of arrangement, or an action to change the arrangement of grouped word lines.” slip op. at 9

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundUnpatentableUnpatentable

    “not based on the location of the source or bit lines. Instead, Petitioner relies upon the distance from the selected word line and the drain-side of the string. See Pet. 66 (“the channel length between the drain-side of the string and word line selected for programming would be quite long, resulting in a relatively high channel resistance” (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 360)). Petitioner asserts that Lee’s application of higher pre-charge voltages to the drain-side word lines “offset the channel resistance effect.” Id. (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 361). Lee and Zhao both admittedly have “typical memory strings, which are a ‘vertical column’ of memory cells arranged in series between a source side select transistor and a drain side transistor.” PO Resp. 53 (emphasis omitted). Petitioner asserts that applying pre-charging to mitigate program disturb (sought by both Lee and Zhao) relies on the creation of a potential difference to facilitate electron redistribution. Pet. Reply 17–18 (citing Ex. 1004, 1:52–56; Ex. 1005, 17:4–12; Ex. 1021 ¶¶ 72–78). Petitioner asserts that the application of voltage can be performed from either end of the channel so long as it targets the portion of the channel desired to be pre- charged. Id. at 18 (citing Ex. 1021 ¶¶ 77–78; Ex. 1010, 17:16–23). Although Patent Owner points to Yang as showing different “biasing schemes” based upon whether the bit line, source line, or both are used for pre-charging, each of the cited Figures 8–10 of Yang indicates that Vbypass (Yang’s uncontested pre-pulse signal) is applied to at least some word lines between the selected word line and the drain-side SGD0. Ex. 1010, Figs. 8C, 9C, 10C; see PO Resp. 25–28 (“a ‘bypass voltage’ (‘Vbypass’) is applied to ‘not yet programmed’ memory cells during the ‘pre-charge phase’” (citing Fig. 8C) (emphasis omitted)). We do not discern in Patent Owner’s arguments, or in the evidence provided during trial, sufficient reasons why applying voltage from either source or bit line disturbs Petitioner’s asserted advantage of offsetting the resistance of the channel between a selected word line and the drain side of the string. Patent Owner further argues that Lee discusses a “wholly disparate approach” for mitigating program disturb than Zhao and that a POSITA would not have been motivated to apply Lee’s teaching to Zhao. PO Resp. 56–58. Patent Owner contends that because Zhao does not conduct current when applying its bypass voltage to equalize charges, but Lee does conduct current when doing so, Lee need only compensate for insufficient charge boosting due to the increased resistance component between source and drain and does not need to compensate for “resistance” effects creating voltage differences along the length of the memory string channel. Id. at 56. Dr. Przybylski’s supporting testimony is based upon such differences in the resistance components. See, e.g., Ex. 2011 ¶ 128. However, we have credited Dr. Liu’s testimony that a chain of transistors in both systems creates a resistance effect regardless of current flow in the steady state. Supra § II.F.1.b.2. We further agree with Petitioner that applying pre- on the creation of a potential difference to facilitate electron redistribution. Pet. Reply 17–18 (citing Ex. 1004, 1:52–56; Ex. 1005, 17:4–12; Ex. 1021 ¶¶ 72–78). We further credit Dr. Liu’s testimony that Zhao’s use of the same pre-charge voltages to not-yet-programmed word lines presents an issue of inadequate pre-charging that Lee addresses. Ex. 1021 ¶¶ 55–56; Pet. Reply 22–23. Consequently, we are persuaded by Petitioner that the chain resistance effects in Zhao and Lee permit the application of Lee’s method of pre-charging to mitigate program disturb to be applicable and desirable in Zhao’s method of applying pre-charging to mitigate program disturb. Consequently, we determine that Petitioner has shown persuasive motivation for its combination.” slip op. at 45

  Patent outcomesUS 11,501,822 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,501,822
• Micron Technology, Inc. v. Yangtze Memory Technologies Company, Ltd.Instituted
  PTAB · Jul 25, 2025 · IPR2025-00191 · APJ Michael T Cygan · IPR · Institution

  The Board instituted review on all challenged grounds for non-disclaimed claims 3, 6, 8–20; it found a reasonable likelihood of success for claims 8–12 and 19.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

    “review. See 35 U.S.C. § 314; 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a). The standard for instituting an inter partes review is set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), which provides that an inter partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” For the reasons discussed below, we determine that Petitioner has sufficiently shown a reasonable likelihood that it will prevail as to the unpatentability of claims 8–12 and 19 of the ’322 patent but has not sufficiently shown a reasonable likelihood that it will prevail as to the unpatentability as to claims 3, 6, 13–17, and 20. Because Petitioner has sufficiently shown a reasonable likelihood that at” slip op. at 2

  • Adverse judgmentAdverse judgmentOther

    “B. Patent Owner’s Disclaimer of Claims 1, 2, 4, 5, and 7 As indicated above, Patent Owner filed a statutory disclaimer of claims 1, 2, 4, 5, and 7 of the ’322 patent. See Ex. 2006. In view of Patent Owner’s statutory disclaimer, we treat claims 1, 2, 4, 5, and 7 as having never been part of the ’322 patent. See Vectra Fitness, Inc. v. TNWK Corp., 162 F.3d 1379, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (“This court has interpreted the term ‘considered as part of the original patent’ in [35 U.S.C.] § 253 to mean that the patent is treated as though the disclaimed claims never existed.”). Because inter partes review cannot be instituted based on disclaimed claims, claims 1, 2, 4, 5, and 7 are outside the scope of this proceeding. 37 C.F.R. § 42.107(e) (“No inter partes review will be instituted based on disclaimed claims.”); General Elec. Co. v. United Techs. Corp., IPR2017- 00491, Paper 9 (PTAB July 6, 2017) (precedential) (denying institution in view of a statutory disclaimer of all the challenged claims). Thus, we confine our analysis in this Decision to claims 3, 6, and 8–20, the challenged claims that have not been disclaimed.” slip op. at 3

  • Other 314aDenied

    “Patent Owner filed a Brief on Discretionary Denial, and Petitioner filed a brief in opposition. Papers 10 and 18. The Director considered the briefing and determined that discretionary denial was not warranted. Paper 21.” slip op. at 2

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “at the critical time “would have had a Bachelor of Science degree in electrical engineering or a similar discipline, along with 2–3 years of professional experience working with (e.g., researching, designing, or teaching) monolithic 3D structures and NAND memory devices, or an equivalent level of skill, knowledge, and experience (e.g., an advanced degree may replace some of the professional experience).” Pet. 27 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 34–38). Petitioner further asserts that a POSITA “would have been aware of and generally knowledgeable about 3D NAND’s structure, how it is manufactured, and its component parts.” Id. Patent Owner does not provide any such assessment in its Preliminary Response. Prelim. Resp. 8; Ex. 2007 ¶ 22 (reserving the right to opine as to an alternative level of a POSITA). For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill, as it appears to be consistent with the specification of the ’322 patent and the prior art of record.” slip op. at 8

  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,581,322
• Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC v. Yechezkal Evan SperoSome claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jan 16, 2025 · IPR2023-01027 · APJ Aaron W Moore · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 37–70 are unpatentable: claims 37–41, 47, 50–56, 58–59, 60–62, 64–65, and 70 as anticipated by Alden; the remaining challenged claims as obvious over Alden and the listed combinations.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “alleged invention “would have had an undergraduate degree in mechanical engineering, electrical engineering, automotive engineering, optical engineering, applied physics, computer science, or similar disciplines, along with two years of experience working with intelligent vehicle systems, automotive control systems, or lighting control systems” and that more education could compensate for less experience and vice versa. See Pet. 8–9 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 33). 3 PCT Patent App. Pub. No. WO 01/70538 A2 (Exhibit 1010). 4 PCT Patent App. Pub. No. WO 01/01038 (Exhibit 1006). 5 U.S. Patent No. 4,970,628 (Exhibit 1007). 6 U.S. Patent No. 6,144,158 (Exhibit 1008). 7 U.S Patent No. 6,049,749 (Exhibit 1009). 8 PCT Patent App. Pub. No. WO 02/04247 A1 (Exhibit 1011). Patent Owner “does not dispute Petitioner’s proposed skill level for a person of ordinary skill in the art” (PO Resp. 4), and, as we generally agree that it is consistent with the subject matter disclosed in the ’503 patent and the prior art, we adopt it for purposes of this decision. B.” slip op. at 9

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “Claim Construction We construe claims using the standard that would be applied in a civil action under 35 U.S.C. § 282(b), giving terms their ordinary and customary meaning to one of ordinary skill in the art in view of the specification and prosecution history. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b). The Petition asserts that all claim terms should be given their “ordinary and customary meaning.” See Pet. 8. Patent Owner also proposes that the claim terms be given their ordinary meaning, and identifies the “ordinary meaning” for the terms “identify,” “turn,” and “curve,” which we discuss in our analysis below. We otherwise find that that no express claim construction is necessary. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (explaining that construction is needed only for terms that are in dispute, and only as necessary to resolve the controversy). C.” slip op. at 10

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for petitioner
  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableNot shown unpatentableMixed

  Patent outcomesUS 10,894,503 mixed
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness
  Patents in suitUS 10,894,503
• Google LLC v. Flypsi, IncAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jul 29, 2024 · IPR2023-00361 · APJ Michael T Cygan · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–11 are unpatentable: claims 1–11 are shown obvious on the decided grounds; the additional Taylor grounds are not reached.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “time “would have had an undergraduate degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science or a related field along with two years of work experience in the field of telecommunication. . . . More education can supplement practical experience and vice versa.” Pet. 4–5 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 17–18). Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s assessment of the level of ordinary skill. PO Resp. 6. Determining the level of ordinary skill in the art involves various factors, including the “type of problems encountered in the art; prior art solutions to those problems; rapidity with which innovations are made; sophistication of the technology; and educational level of active workers in the field.” In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (citation omitted). The prior art of record also reflects the level of ordinary skill in the art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001). Based on the complete trial record, we adopt the assessment offered by Petitioner and undisputed by Patent Owner, as it is consistent with the ’105 patent and the asserted prior art.” slip op. at 7

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededTerm construed board ownMixed

    “the term, and invited further briefing. Dec. on Inst. 14–15. Patent Owner does not assert that this construction affects Petitioner’s “first way” obviousness assertions. PO Resp. 31. After consideration of the post- Institution briefing, we agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner’s “second way” obviousness assertions rely upon a lack of ordering in claims 1 and 2 such that the transmitting of pre-call information may occur prior to the receiving on an incoming call (Pet. Reply 3); therefore, the term “pre-call information” requires construction to resolve the controversy. The “general rule [is that], ‘[u]nless the steps of a method [claim] actually recite an order, the steps are not ordinarily construed to require one.’” Mformation Techs., Inc. v. Research In Motion Ltd., 764 F.3d 1392, 1398 (Fed. Cir. 2014). As discussed above, we do not find the asserted information having a bridge number be transmitted after a call to a secondary number is made. The plain language of the claim requires that the pre-call information include a bridge number “for connecting the handset to the incoming call at the switch”; i.e., information to be used with respect to the incoming call recited in limitation [1.d]. The transmission of the pre-call information may therefore be at any time such that its contents (the bridge number) may be used with respect to the recited incoming call. Consequently, we do not adopt Patent Owner’s proffered construction.” slip op. at 13

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundUnpatentable

    “whether teachings other than Winbladh would be preferentially considered, improperly frame the obviousness question. Patent Owner and Dr. Akl emphasize that Winbladh uses a “‘host resource’ that manages multiple call legs,” arguing that is different from Backhaus’s “more limited” system that uses a “conventional call routing system.” PO Resp. 36–37 (citing Ex. 2010 ¶ 113). However, the obviousness question is “whether the relevant artisan would be motivated to make the combination to arrive at the claims’ actual limitations,” not whether such a combination would preserve all aspects of either Backhaus or Winbladh. See Axionics, Inc. v. Medtronic, Inc., 2023 WL 4410686 (Fed. Cir. July 10, 2023). Moreover, “it’s not necessary to show that a combination is ‘the best option, only that it be a suitable option.” Intel Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 21 F.4th 784, 800 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (quoting PAR Pharm., Inc. v. TWI Pharms, Inc., 773 F.3d 1186, 1197–98 (Fed. Cir. 2014)). Further, “[t]he test for obviousness is not whether the features of a secondary reference may be bodily incorporated into the structure of the primary reference [but rather] what the combined teachings of those references would have suggested to those of ordinary skill in the art.” Facebook, Inc. v. Windy City Innovations, LLC, 973 F.3d 1321, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (“KSR does not support [the] theory that a person of ordinary skill can only perform combinations of a puzzle element A with a perfectly fitting puzzle element B”). Here, Petitioner’s combination provides for a pre-call transmission of local telephone number #βr, and would logically provide advantage in those situations in which a long distance number was originally used for the connection; i.e., those situations for which Winbladh is purposed. We further note that a combination need not work in all situations for a person having ordinary skill in the art to find it advantageous. See Intel tradeoffs should be weighed when a benefit occurs during only some operating conditions).” slip op. at 39

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner

    “4 Patent Owner argues that we should still address its proposed construction of the term “channel” because it “significantly impacts the credibility” of Petitioner’s declarant, Dr. Bill Lin. Tr. 68:3–24; PO Sur-reply 3 n.1. We disagree. The portions of the Lin Declaration that we rely on in this Decision are credible because those portions are consistent with and supported by the other evidence of record. See Sections II.D–II.E.” slip op. at 9

  Patent outcomesUS 10,051,105 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,051,105
• Google LLC v. Flypsi, Inc. (D/B/A Flyp)All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jul 26, 2024 · IPR2023-00359 · APJ James J Mayberry · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–4 are unpatentable: claims 1, 2, and 4 over Backhaus and Taylor, and claim 3 over Backhaus, Taylor, and Saksena.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “A person of ordinary skill in the art . . . at the time of the alleged invention of the ’554 patent would have had an undergraduate degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science or a related field along with two years of work experience in the field of telecommunication . . . More education can supplement practical experience and vice versa. Pet. 4–5 (referencing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 17–18). Patent Owner does not dispute the level of ordinary skill in the art. PO Resp. 5. For the purposes of this Decision, we apply Petitioner’s undisputed definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art. We find that this definition is consistent with the prior art of record and the skill reflected in the Specification of the ’554 patent.” slip op. at 13

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “challenged claims to resolve the underlying controversy.” Pet. 8. Patent Owner proposes construing the term “channel” in all challenged claims to refer to “[a] channel [that] does not have to be fully connected on both ends or actually transmitting a particular type of information to qualify as a channel.” PO Resp. 6. Petitioner asserts that Backhaus teaches transmitting an access telephone number via a data channel in two ways. Pet. 22–26. As will be evident from our analysis below, we rely only on the “second way” for purposes of this Decision. Patent Owner’s proposed construction of the term “channel” does not impact the parties’ dispute about the “second way” that Backhaus teaches transmitting an access telephone number via a data channel. PO Resp. 21–22; Pet. Reply 3 (“Flyp does not even allege that its construction is relevant to the ‘second way’ the Petition addresses limitation [1.b].”); PO Sur-reply 11; Tr. 10:2–11, 68:3–24.5 Therefore, we determine that the term “channel” does not require an express construction to resolve the parties’ disputes regarding the asserted grounds of unpatentability. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms that . . . are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). Also, we determine that we need not expressly construe any other claim terms to resolve the parties’ disputes. To the extent that the scope of any particular claim term requires discussion, however, we provide it in our assessment of the challenges, which we turn to next.” slip op. at 13

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedPatent owner expert discountedMixed

    “suggest that we categorially disregard Dr. Lin’s declaration. As a general point, our precedential decision in Xerox does not provide a blank condemnation of declaration testimony that is identical or virtually identical to language in a paper. Xerox found that the “cited declaration testimony is conclusory and unsupported, adds little to the conclusory assertion for which it is offered to support, and is entitled to little weight.” Xerox at 15; see also 37 C.F.R. § 42.65(a) (“Expert testimony that does not disclose the underlying facts or data on which the opinion is based is entitled to little or no weight.”). Here, Dr. Lin cites to evidence to support certain testimony. See, e.g., Ex. 1003 ¶ 73 (citing to Ex. 1007 and Ex. 1011). Also, we do not rely on the Lin Declaration as evidence of any legal standard or for Dr. Lin’s legal conclusions. Rather, we rely on the Lin Declaration to support our factual determinations regarding the teachings of Backhaus, Saksena, and Taylor, as well as why and how a person of ordinary skill in the art would have combined those teachings. Finally, Patent Owner’s arguments go to the weight of Dr. Lin’s testimony. We assess the appropriate weight to give the testimony in our analyses below.” slip op. at 15

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner

    “provided a motivation to combine the teachings of a PSTN interface in Backhaus’s system, even though Backhaus discloses interfacing with the PSTN. Backhaus is silent as to how its system interfaces with the PSTN. As such, we agree with Petition that a person having ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to connect SLS platform 115 with the PSTN and to also include a PSTN interface in order to facilitate such an connection when implementing Backhaus’s system and processes—such that SLS platform 115 could provide the disclosed second line services to many device users connected to the PSTN that is known to provide reliable communications. Pet. 50. Indeed, Patent Owner’s argument that Backhaus discloses interacting with the PSTN strengthens Petitioner’s position, demonstrating that a person having ordinary skill in the art, when considering Backhaus’s and Taylor’s teachings together, would have used a PSTN interface to ensure a connection with a PSTN. Cf. Pet. Reply 19 (“Rather, it shows that a [person having ordinary skill in the art] would have been motivated to ‘include a PSTN interface similar to that discussed in Taylor when implementing Backhaus’s telephony service system.’” (citing Pet., 49–51)).” slip op. at 32

  Patent outcomesUS 11,012,554 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,012,554
• Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC v. Yechezkal Evan SperoInstituted
  PTAB · Jan 17, 2024 · IPR2023-01027 · APJ Aaron W Moore · IPR · Institution

  The Board instituted review of all challenged claims on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that at least one claim is unpatentable over the cited prior art.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

    “We may institute an inter partes review if “the information presented in the petition . . . and any response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2018). For the reasons provided below, and based on the record as it now stands, we determine that Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood that it will prevail in showing the unpatentability of at least one challenged claim. Accordingly, we institute inter partes review. B.” slip op. at 2

  • BurdenMixed

    “Regarding the claimed “predefined threshold value” or “predefined illuminance,” Petitioner asserts that “Alden’s system can ‘provide illumination to independently controlled segments [e.g., ‘subsections’] each operable within a range of intensities between the high and the low beam state” and that Alden’s “intensities in between high beam and low beam (e.g., medium) are the claimed ‘predefined threshold value’ which the low beam would be below and the high beam would be above.” Pet. 25. We tend to disagree with this analysis, as it does not appear that a “range of intensities” is a “predefined threshold value” or “predefined illuminance,” if those terms are given their ordinary meaning. We thus conclude that, on this record at least, Petitioner has not shown a reasonable likelihood that Alden anticipates these claims. Regarding obviousness in view of Alden alone, Patent Owner argues that Petitioner has “failed to establish or demonstrate multiple elements that are required to support an obviousness conclusion, including explaining how Alden must be modified (i.e., identifying the differences between the claimed invention and Alden) and explaining why a POSA would be motivated to so modify Alden (i.e., providing some articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to support an obviousness conclusion).” Prelim. Resp. 37. We agree. It does not appear that Petitioner has provided any basis on which to account for differences between Alden and the challenged claims based on Alden’s disclosures alone.” slip op. at 9

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “of the alleged invention “would have had an undergraduate degree in mechanical engineering, electrical engineering, automotive engineering, optical engineering, applied physics, computer science, or similar disciplines, along with two years of experience working with intelligent vehicle systems, automotive control systems, or lighting control systems” and that more education could compensate for less experience and vice versa. See Pet. 8–9 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 33). Patent Owner “does not dispute Petitioner’s proposed skill level for a person of ordinary skill in the art” (Prelim. Resp. 7), and, as we generally agree that it is consistent with the subject matter disclosed in the ’503 patent and the prior art, we adopt it for purposes of this decision. B.” slip op. at 8

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “Petitioner does not seek construction of any claim terms and asserts that “all claim terms [discussed in the Petition] are given [their] ordinary and customary meaning.” Petition 8. Patent Owner asserts that “[n]o claim construction is necessary” at this time because its “arguments for denial do not hinge on the outcome of an actual controversy about claim interpretation.” Prelim. Resp. 7. There being no present dispute about the meaning of any claim term, we find that no express claim construction is necessary to resolve the issues addressed in this decision. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (explaining that construction is needed only for terms that are in dispute, and only as necessary to resolve the controversy). C.” slip op. at 8

  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness
  Patents in suitUS 10,894,503

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.