- PTAB · Mar 15, 2017 · IPR2016-00999 · APJ Jeffrey S Smith · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied rehearing, leaving in place its denial of institution for claims 1–28 because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood that steered planar-array beams are necessarily asymmetrical.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“II. STANDARD OF REVIEW Under 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c), “[w]hen rehearing a decision on petition, a panel will review the decision for an abuse of discretion.” An abuse of discretion may be determined if a decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of law, if a factual finding is not supported by substantial evidence, or if the decision represents an unreasonable judgment in weighing relevant factors. See Star Fruits S.N.C. v. United States, 393 F.3d 1277, 1281 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Arnold P’ship v. Dudas, 362 F.3d 1338, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2004); In re Gartside, 203 F.3d 1305, 1315–16 (Fed. Cir. 2000). The request must identify, with specificity, all matters that the moving party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). Section 42.71(d) further provides that the request must identify where each matter was previously addressed.” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“Lastly, Petitioner contends the Decision overlooked or “misapprehended the facts showing that all steered planar array antennas inherently result in radiation patterns having at least one asymmetrical beam.” Req. 13–15. According to Petitioner, Figure 4 of U.S. Patent No. 5,929,823 (Exhibit 2010) and Figure 3 of U.S. Patent No. 6,198,434 (Exhibit 2011), relied upon in Patent Owner’s Preliminary Response as describing remedies for distortion effects due to asymmetrical beams (Prelim. Resp. 47–48), do not eliminate the inherent asymmetry of the main beam. Req. 14. However, our Decision relies on Paragraphs 151 to 156 of Mr. Cosgrove’s testimony (Ex. 2001), which cite additional sections of Exhibits 2010 and 2011, to determine that the steered beams of a planar array are not necessarily asymmetrical. Dec. 21–23 (citing Ex. 2001 ¶¶ 151–156). For example, Mr. Cosgrove addresses the asymmetric bulge shown in Figure 4 of Exhibit 2010 by citing to a description of Figure 6, which describes a lobe symmetry of main lobe 610 that presents a more slender beam mid-section than that of main lobe 410 of Figure 4. Ex. 2001 ¶ 152 (citing Ex. 2010, 7:65–8:6). Mr. Cosgrove also addresses the asymmetric bulge shown in Figure 3 of Exhibit 2011 by citing to a description of Figure 6, which describes main lobe 610 as substantially symmetric, and more suited than lobe 310 of Figure 3 to provide communications within a defined subsection of an area to be served. Ex. 2001 ¶ 156 (citing Ex. 2011, 10:13–16). Accordingly, the Decision did not misapprehend or overlook any arguments or evidence presented by Petitioner. We did not abuse our discretion in determining that the Petitioner did not adequately establish a reasonable likelihood that a steered beam of a planar array is necessarily asymmetrical.” slip op. at 5
NonePatents in suitUS 8,311,582 - Apple Inc. v. Fastvdo LLCRehearing deniedPTAB · Mar 15, 2017 · IPR2016-01203 · APJ Jeffrey S Smith · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied FastVDO’s rehearing request, leaving institution of review of claims 7–11 and 22–26 in place because no overlooked or misapprehended matter was shown.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“argue that Petitioner provided a “sole theory” for the claimed “error protection means” based on indefiniteness. Rather, Patent Owner argued generally that “Petitioner does not describe the structure, materials, or acts corresponding to the terms that Petitioner contends are in means-plus-function format.” Prelim. Resp. 11. Because Patent Owner did not present its “sole theory” argument in the Preliminary Response, the Board could not have misapprehended or overlooked this argument. Even considering this argument, we are not persuaded. In our Decision, we disagreed with Petitioner’s indefiniteness arguments, but nonetheless found that the Petition identifies sufficient structure to support constructions of the means-plus-function limitations. Dec. 10–16. Rather than misapprehend or overlook Patent Owner’s arguments, we found that the Specification of the ’482 patent “discloses enough of an algorithm to allow a person of ordinary skill to discern the necessary structure for performing the claimed function of the ‘error protecting means.’” Dec. 12.” slip op. at 4
NonePatents in suitUS 5,850,482 - Amazon.Com, Inc. / Blizzard Entertainment, Inc. v. Ac Technologies S.A.Some claims unpatentablePTAB · Mar 6, 2017 · IPR2015-01802 · APJ Matthew R Clements · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1, 3, 5, and 7–15 are unpatentable as anticipated by Rabinovich; Petitioner did not prove claims 1–15 obvious over Rabinovich.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner
“Electrical Engineering, and two to three years of experience working in the field, or an equivalent level of experience.” Ex. 1005 ¶ 17; Pet. 16. Patent Owner does not challenge this definition or present its own. Accordingly, we credit the testimony of Dr. Ratner regarding the level of ordinary skill in the art, and find that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had an undergraduate degree in Computer Science or a related field, such as Electrical Engineering, and two to three years of experience working in the field, or an equivalent level of experience. This level of ordinary skill is reflected not only by the information presented by the parties, but also by the prior art of record. Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the prior art itself can reflect the appropriate level of ordinary skill in the art).” slip op. at 9
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityPrinted publication establishedDecided for petitioner
“We agree with and adopt Petitioner’s reasoning and determine Rabinovich to be a printed publication. We credit the unrebutted testimony of Dr. Rabinovich regarding the consistency of his professional practice in 1998 for republication of his AT&T technical memoranda on a webpage that he managed on AT&T’s publicly accessible website. Furthermore, we find the December 1998 IEEE article corroborates the public availability of Rabinovich on that website, and would have been a roadmap, for one of ordinary skill in the art of data management and optimized access to data, to be guided to Rabinovich. See Reply 19–22. As Petitioner points out, Patent Owner’s own declarant states that Rabinovich and the December 1988 IEEE article “are ‘similar[]’ in that they both address ‘problems in network connectivity caused by multiple clients accessing servers.’ (Ex. 2006 at 12).” Id. at 21. Additionally, the passage in the December 1998 IEEE article that cites to Rabinovich refers to an algorithm in Rabinovich for optimizing access to data in order to increase performance. Id. Accordingly, we find that footnote 16 of the IEEE article, which contains the URL to Rabinovich, would have guided one of ordinary skill directly to Rabinovich. We are, therefore, persuaded, that Rabinovich is a printed publication under 35 U.S.C. § 102.” slip op. at 12
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“object xs. Rabinovich defines cnt(s,xs) as the “total access count for xs,” which is equal to cnt(xs). Ex. 1006, 11. According to Dr. Ratner, “[t]he metric cnt(s,xs) measures the total number of times in that window that replica xs has been served to a client computer.” Ex. 1005 ¶ 253. As Patent Owner points out, Rabinovich teaches replicating object xs if the ratio of cnt(s,xs) over aff(xs) is greater than m, i.e., a non-zero value. PO Resp. 34; Ex. 1006, 12, Fig. 4. In view of this, we agree with Patent Owner that if cnt(s,xs) has a value of zero, meaning that object x has not been served to any client computer, then the ratio of cnt(s,xs) to aff(xs) will be zero, i.e., less than m, and Rabinovich will not carry out its replication step. This means that Rabinovich will not replicate object xs until xs has been accessed by a client computer at least once, such that the access count for xs is greater than zero. In this regard, we agree with Patent Owner that Rabinovich object xs is not “sen[t], from the at least one data storage device to the another data storage device . . . independently of an access of the at least one client computer” because Rabinovich teaches explicitly that object xs is not sent unless there has been at least one access from the client computer. We are not persuaded by Petitioner’s argument that Rabinovich” slip op. at 18
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner
“pieces” Claim 1 recites “each file including a plurality of individual pieces, the pieces containing parts of the files.” Ex. 1002, 25:67–26:1. The other independent claims recite limitations commensurate in scope. Neither party proposes explicitly a construction of the term “piece.” Petitioner argues that “files are inherently composed of pieces in the form of bits that make up bytes, the bytes themselves being pieces of the file.” Pet. 32. Patent Owner argues that construing “piece” to cover “bits and bytes” of a file “would read out the ‘pieces’ limitation from the claim entirely” (PO Resp. at 29–30) and that “one of ordinary skill in the art would not read the ‘pieces’ limitation of the claim to include bits and bytes” (id. at 30). The claims themselves define “piece” by requiring that a “file” have a “plurality of individual pieces,” but do not establish a lower bound—i.e., a minimum number of bits or bytes—to qualify as a “piece.” Patent Owner identifies no support in the ’680 patent for its contention that “piece” or “pieces” excludes a byte or bytes of a file, relying instead solely on the testimony of Dr. Paul S. Jacobs. Id. (citing Ex. 2006 ¶¶ 38, 39). We are not persuaded by Dr. Jacobs’s conclusory testimony. Because “piece” and “pieces” are limited by the claims only to being a subset of a file and because a byte or collection of bytes of a file is a subset of that file, we are persuaded that the broadest reasonable interpretation of “piece” and “pieces” in light of the Specification of the ’680 patent encompasses a byte or bytes. slip op. at 7
Patent outcomesUS 7,904,680 mixedClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 7,904,680 - Sandisk Corporation v. Netlist, Inc.Rehearing deniedPTAB · Mar 6, 2017 · IPR2015-01020 · APJ Peter P Chen · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied Patent Owner’s rehearing requests, finding no misapprehension or oversight in its decisions rejecting the challenge to claims 1–20 as obvious.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“II. STANDARD OF REVIEW Under 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d), the request for rehearing “must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked.” See 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). Section 42.71(d) further provides that the request must identify where each matter was previously addressed.” slip op. at 2
- Strike new argumentNew argument consideredDecided for petitioner
“Patent Owner’s second argument is that Petitioner’s theory of the chip select signal generating another logic signal, as presented in its Reply, was an “entirely new rationale.” Req. Reh’g 4–7. We disagree. As noted above, there was no new rationale presented, and we found that Petitioner did not assert a new theory. Petitioner’s Reply was based on the same ground of obviousness, involving the same combination of references (Takeda, JEDEC, and Connolly), and proffering the same particular application of the Takeda reference, as set forth in the Petition. Therefore, we determine that we did not misapprehend or overlook the nature of Petitioner’s arguments in its Reply.” slip op. at 4
NonePatents in suitUS 7,881,150 - Sandisk Corporation v. Netlist, Inc.Rehearing deniedPTAB · Mar 6, 2017 · IPR2015-01021 · APJ Peter P Chen · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied Patent Owner’s rehearing requests, finding no overlooked or misapprehended evidence or arguments in the Final Written Decisions.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“II. STANDARD OF REVIEW Under 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d), the request for rehearing “must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked.” See 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). Section 42.71(d) further provides that the request must identify where each matter was previously addressed.” slip op. at 2
- Strike new argumentNew argument consideredDecided for petitioner
“Patent Owner’s second argument is that Petitioner’s theory of the chip select signal generating another logic signal, as presented in its Reply, was an “entirely new rationale.” Req. Reh’g 4–7. We disagree. As noted above, there was no new rationale presented, and we found that Petitioner did not assert a new theory. Petitioner’s Reply was based on the same ground of obviousness, involving the same combination of references (Takeda, JEDEC, and Connolly), and proffering the same particular application of the Takeda reference, as set forth in the Petition. Therefore, we determine that we did not misapprehend or overlook the nature of Petitioner’s arguments in its Reply.” slip op. at 4
NonePatents in suitUS 8,081,536 - Sandisk Corporation v. Netlist, Inc.Rehearing deniedPTAB · Dec 12, 2016 · IPR2015-01020 · APJ Peter P Chen · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied Patent Owner’s rehearing requests, finding no overlooked or misapprehended evidence or arguments in the final written decisions.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“II. STANDARD OF REVIEW Under 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d), the request for rehearing “must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked.” See 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). Section 42.71(d) further provides that the request must identify where each matter was previously addressed.” slip op. at 2
NonePatents in suitUS 7,881,150 - Sandisk Corporation v. Netlist, Inc.Rehearing deniedPTAB · Dec 12, 2016 · IPR2015-01021 · APJ Peter P Chen · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied Patent Owner’s rehearing requests in IPR2015-01020 and IPR2015-01021, finding no overlooked or misapprehended evidence or arguments.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“106 of the first Jagannathan declaration, filed concurrently with the Petition, he testified, “[t]hus, when a chip-select output from the bank control unit is used to enable a particular DDR SDRAM device, it is also used to enable the bit switch.” Final Dec. 23 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 106) (emphasis added). This described Petitioner’s evidence on the chip select signal, namely, that Dr. Jagannathan did not testify that the chip select signal “is also the bit switch enable signal,” but rather, that the chip select signal “is used to” generate the enable signals to the bit switch. In Petitioner’s post-hearing brief (Paper 30), Petitioner cited to pages 35 and 36 of the Petition, and to Dr. Jagannathan’s deposition testimony: Q. So what I’m trying to understand is, in that paragraph, it seems that you’re saying it’s the same signal that’s being used. A. No, I don’t -- I disagree with that. What I am trying to say here is the chip select signal -- those signals that I talked about earlier in the sentence, they’re effectively being used to generate the enable signals. Paper 30 (citing Ex. 2002, 218:6–17). Petitioner asserted in its post-hearing brief, “[w]hen taken as a whole, in context, Dr. Jagannathan’s testimony supports the rationale in the Petition.” Paper 30, 4. As set forth in the Final Written Decision, we agree. Nothing argued by Patent Owner persuades us that in the Final Written Decision we misapprehended or overlooked the nature of Dr. Jagannathan’s testimony in his first declaration.” slip op. at 3
NonePatents in suitUS 8,081,536 - Sandisk Corp. v. Netlist, Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Sep 28, 2016 · IPR2015-01021 · APJ Bryan F Moore · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1, 16, 17, 24, 30, and 31 are unpatentable as obvious over Takeda, JEDEC, and Connolly.
RulingsFinal written decision- Prior constructionPrior construction adoptedDecided for patent owner
“1. “Rank” In the Decision to Institute, we construed the term “rank” as “a block or area that is created using some or all of the memory chips on a memory module.” Dec. to Inst. 8–9. In their papers, neither party challenged our constructions of these claim terms. Thus, for the term “rank,” we see no reason to alter the construction of this claim term as set forth in the Decision to Institute as recited above, and we incorporate our previous analysis for purposes of this decision.” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for patent owner
“2. All Other Claim Terms We determine that no explicit construction is necessary for any other terms in the challenged claims. B.” slip op. at 8
- Skill levelSkill level board ownOther
“would understand basic memory and data communication concepts, with a bachelor’s degree in any of electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or related field. Course work for one of ordinary skill in the art would have included a course on computer organization, principles of digital design, or computer architecture. One of ordinary skill in the art would also have around one year of experience related to computer memory systems. For example, such experience may include experience in DRAM memory technology and related industry standards such as JEDEC standards for DRAM memories and memory modules. Ex. 1002 ¶ 53. Patent Owner’s Declarant, Carl Sechen, Ph.D. (“Dr. Sechen”), testifies that one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the ’536 Patent would have had an undergraduate degree in electrical engineering or computer engineering, at least two years of professional experience in the design of memory systems, familiarity with the latest JEDEC standard specifications for memory devices and modules, and familiarity with the latest DRAM (dynamic random access memory) memory devices widely available in the market. Ex. 2001 ¶ 14. Dr. Sechen further testifies that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have design proficiency in memory modules comprising DDR memory technology, such as memory modules with JEDEC standard DDR SDRAM (synchronous DRAM) devices. Id. ¶ 15. Based on our review of the ’536 Patent and the types of problems and solutions described in the ’536 Patent and cited prior art, we conclude a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the ’536 Patent would have a Bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or related field, and at least one year of work experience, including familiarity with computer memory systems and related industry standards such as JEDEC standards for DRAM memories and memory modules. We further note that the applied prior art reflects the appropriate level of skill at the time of the claimed invention. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001). D.” slip op. at 10
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner
“To testify as an expert under Federal Rule of Evidence 702, a person need not be a person of ordinary skill in the art, but rather must be “qualified in the pertinent art.” Sundance, Inc. v. DeMonte Fabricating Ltd., 550 F.3d 1356, 1363–64 (Fed. Cir. 2008); see SEB S.A. v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 594 F.3d 1360, 1372–73 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (upholding a district court’s ruling to allow an expert to provide testimony at trial because the expert “had sufficient relevant technical expertise” and the expert’s “knowledge, skill, experience, training [and] education . . . [wa]s likely to assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence”); Mytee Prods., Inc. v. Harris Research, Inc., 439 F. App’x 882, 886–87 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (non-precedential) (upholding admission of the testimony of an expert who “had experience relevant to the field of the invention,” despite admission that he was not a person of ordinary skill in the art). As noted above, Dr. Jagannathan has designed and implemented hardware virtual memory caches, and researched theoretical performance measures of various cache coherency protocols, and has experience in the design of memory systems. We find that Dr. Jagannathan is qualified sufficiently to testify about memory systems and memory modules. E.” slip op. at 12
Patent outcomesUS 8,081,536 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,081,536 - Sandisk Corp. v. Netlist, Inc.Some claims unpatentablePTAB · Sep 28, 2016 · IPR2015-01020 · APJ Peter P Chen · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 17, 22, 24, 26, and 33 are unpatentable as obvious over Takeda, JEDEC, and Connolly; claims 15, 16, 31, and 32 were not shown unpatentable over Takeda and JEDEC.
RulingsFinal written decision- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“We are unpersuaded by Patent Owner’s position. First, the claim language does not recite any physical or structural connection, rather, only “electrically coupling.” Pet. Reply 3, 8–9. In addition, the specification of the ’150 patent does not define explicitly the term “selectively electrically coupling.” Therefore, as in IPR2014-00882 and IPR2014-01011, we refer to its ordinary and customary meaning, as would be understood by one of ordinary skill in the art in the context of the entire disclosure. Translogic Tech., 504 F.3d at 1257. A technical dictionary, the IEEE Dictionary,4 defines “electrical coupling” as “[e]lectrical charges in conductors of a disturbed circuit formed by electrical induction.” Ex. 3001. The IEEE Dictionary explains that “[s]ince the ratio of a conductor’s electrostatic charge to the potential difference between conductors (required to maintain that charge) is the general definition of capacitance, electrical coupling is also called capacitive coupling.” Id. The IEEE Dictionary defines” slip op. at 9
- Skill levelSkill level board ownOther
“Based on our review of the ’150 patent and the types of problems and solutions described in the ’150 patent and cited prior art, we conclude a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the ’150 patent would have a Bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or related field, and at least one year of work experience, including familiarity with computer memory systems and related industry standards such as JEDEC standards for DRAM memories and memory modules. We further note that the applied prior art reflects the appropriate level of skill at the time of the claimed invention. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001). D. Declarant Testimony” slip op. at 13
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner
“To testify as an expert under Federal Rule of Evidence 702, a person need not be a person of ordinary skill in the art, but rather must be “qualified in the pertinent art.” Sundance, Inc. v. DeMonte Fabricating Ltd., 550 F.3d 1356, 1363–64 (Fed. Cir. 2008); see SEB S.A. v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 594 F.3d 1360, 1372–73 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (upholding a district court’s ruling to allow an expert to provide testimony at trial because the expert “had sufficient relevant technical expertise” and the expert’s “knowledge, skill, experience, training [and] education . . . [wa]s likely to assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence”); Mytee Prods., Inc. v. Harris Research, Inc., 439 F. App’x 882, 886–87 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (non-precedential) (upholding admission of the testimony of an expert who “had experience relevant to the field of the invention,” despite admission that he was not a person of ordinary skill in the art). As noted above, Dr. Jagannathan has designed and implemented hardware virtual memory caches, and researched theoretical performance measures of various cache coherency protocols, and has experience in the design of memory systems. We find that, although Dr. Jagannathan may be less experienced than Dr. Sechen in the area of memory module design, he is nonetheless qualified sufficiently to testify about memory systems and memory modules. E. Asserted Obviousness of Claims 15, 16, 31, and 32 in view of Takeda” slip op. at 14
- ExcludeMotion to exclude, deniedDenied
“We have reviewed the parties’ contentions on this issue, and exercise our discretion to determine that Petitioner’s Reply and the Jagannathan Supplemental Declaration will not be excluded. We find that, although they may be “inartfully” drafted, the first Jagannathan declaration and Petition sufficiently outlined Petitioner’s position on the function of the chip select signal, namely, that the chip select signal was not itself the logic signal enabling operation of bit-switches. We further find that Petitioner’s Reply and the Supplemental Jagannathan Declaration did not present an entirely new rationale of unpatentability based on Takeda, JEDEC, and Connolly. Cf. Intelligent Bio-Sys., Inc. v. Illumina Cambridge Ltd., 821 F.3d 1359, 1369–70 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (affirming Board’s exclusion of reply brief and declaration that changed unpatentability theory to “an entirely new rationale”). Moreover, there is no dispute that Patent Owner was aware of Petitioner’s position by no later than the Jagannathan deposition, which preceded Patent Owner’s Response by ten days. Patent Owner could have addressed Petitioner’s chip select signal contention, procedurally or substantively, in its Response, but chose to raise the issue only after Petitioner filed its Reply and Supplemental Jagannathan Declaration. Accordingly, Patent Owner had notice of Petitioner’s position and an opportunity to refute that position in its Response.” slip op. at 24
Patent outcomesUS 7,881,150 mixedClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 7,881,150 - PTAB · Aug 30, 2016 · IPR2014-01448 · APJ Debra K Stephens · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied rehearing of its final written decision, leaving claims 1 and 7 unpatentable over He and Korodi under § 103.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“decision should be modified, and “[t]he request must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed in a motion, an opposition, or a reply.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d).” slip op. at 4
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot reached
“pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 318(a) and 37 C.F.R. § 42.73, concluding Petitioner had shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the challenged claims are unpatentable. Specifically, we determined Petitioner had established by a preponderance of the evidence claims 1 and 7 are unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) over He and Korodi (Final Dec. 11–25). In light of our determination that Petitioner had established by a preponderance of the evidence that claims 1 and 7 of the ’279 Patent are unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as obvious over He and Korodi, we took no position on whether the same claims are also obvious over the combination of the teachings and suggestions of Gustafsson and He (id. at 25).” slip op. at 3
§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 7,671,279
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.