- PTAB · Feb 26, 2016 · IPR2015-01047 · APJ Stephen C Siu · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied Patent Owner’s rehearing request, leaving institution of IPR2016-00063 and its joinder with IPR2015-01047 in place.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“We have considered Patent Owner’s arguments in the Request but find them unpersuasive to demonstrate that we misapprehended or overlooked any points.” slip op. at 3
- PTAB / AIA Trials › §315(b) time barNot time barredDecided for petitioner
“Patent Owner argues that we incorrectly granted institution of IPR2016-00062 under 35 U.S.C. § 315(b). See, e.g., Req. Reh’g 6–10. Contrary to Patent Owner’s contention, our granting of institution of IPR2016-00063 is in accordance with 35 U.S.C. § 315(b) for at least the reasons previously discussed. Decision 4. Patent Owner reiterates that an alternative interpretation of 35 U.S.C. § 315(b) should be adopted to permit denial of institution of IPR2016-00063. See, e.g., Req. Reh’g 6–10. In support of this contention, Patent Owner continues to cite the dissent in Target Corp. v. Destination Maternity Corp., Case IPR2014-00508, dissent slip op. at 18 (PTAB Feb. 12, 2015) (Fitzpatrick, Bisk, & Weatherly, A.P.JJ., dissenting) (Paper 28) but does not explain why a dissent in this cited matter should compel us to adopt an alternate interpretation of 35 U.S.C. § 315(b). We therefore continue not to do so.” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsInstitution denied 325dDenied
“Patent Owner argues that “Apple’s past conduct and the numerous challenges to the ’151 patent nonetheless compel that the Petition be denied under § 325(d).” Req. Reh’g 10. According to 35 U.S.C. § 325(d), “the Director may take into account whether, and reject the petition or request, because the same or substantially the same prior art or arguments previously were presented to the Office.” Having carefully considered Patent Owner’s arguments (Req. Reh’g 10–12), we decline to exercise our discretion to reject the petition or request because the same or substantially the same prior art or arguments previously were presented (allegedly) to the Office, even assuming that the same or substantially the same prior art or arguments were, in fact, previously presented to the Office.” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingJoinder, grantedDecided for petitioner
“DISCUSSION In the Decision dated January 25, 2016, Paper 29 (“Decision”), we granted institution of IPR2016-00063 (filed by Apple Inc.) and joined IPR2016-00063 with the instant matter (i.e., IPR2015-01047). Decision 7.” slip op. at 2
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 7,490,151 - PTAB · Feb 26, 2016 · IPR2015-01047 · APJ Stephen C Siu · IPR · Rehearing
The Board granted Patent Owner limited additional discovery about Ward Dietrich’s involvement in preparing or controlling the Petition and denied discovery of other requested materials.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, grantedGranted in part
“We have considered Patent Owner’s arguments in the Request but, with the exception noted below, find them unpersuasive to demonstrate that we misapprehended or overlooked any points. For example, we disagree with Patent Owner that “[t]he Motion certainly met this standard [of showing beyond speculation that something useful would be uncovered as to RPI issues]” for at least the reasons previously detailed in the Decision. See Decision 1–5. However, Patent Owner argues that “Ward Dietrich is Chief Operating Officer of the Mangrove Partners Master Fund” and “has no public role in petitioner” (Motion 3 (citing Ex. 2002 at 2)) and that “Ward Dietrich held himself out as an ‘authorized person’ to sign the Power of Attorney on behalf of Petitioner” (Req. Reh’g 6 (quoting Motion 3)). Petitioner does not appear to refute this contention. Patent Owner further requests “[c]ommunications and documents or things . . . including assistance with identification of prior art, filing, funding, compensation, and/or preparation of any papers related to the Mangrove IPRs” and the identification of “persons and entities . . . involved in the preparation and filing of the petitions” and “persons and entities . . . who controlled or had the ability to control the preparation and filing of the petitions in the Mangrove IPRs.” Ex. 2034, 3; Ex. 2035, 3. In view of Ward Dietrich’s alleged role as an officer of Mangrove Partners and the named Petitioner, we grant Patent Owner’s motion for additional discovery for the limited purpose of providing communications and/or agreements pertaining to Ward Dietrich’s involvement in the preparation and filing of the Petition and/or control or ability to control the preparation and filing of the Petition.” slip op. at 2
- Additional discoveryAdditional discovery, grantedAdditional discovery, deniedGranted in part
“However, Patent Owner argues that “Ward Dietrich is Chief Operating Officer of the Mangrove Partners Master Fund” and “has no public role in petitioner” (Motion 3 (citing Ex. 2002 at 2)) and that “Ward Dietrich held himself out as an ‘authorized person’ to sign the Power of Attorney on behalf of Petitioner” (Req. Reh’g 6 (quoting Motion 3)). Petitioner does not appear to refute this contention. Patent Owner further requests “[c]ommunications and documents or things . . . including assistance with identification of prior art, filing, funding, compensation, and/or preparation of any papers related to the Mangrove IPRs” and the identification of “persons and entities . . . involved in the preparation and filing of the petitions” and “persons and entities . . . who controlled or had the ability to control the preparation and filing of the petitions in the Mangrove IPRs.” Ex. 2034, 3; Ex. 2035, 3. In view of Ward Dietrich’s alleged role as an officer of Mangrove Partners and the named Petitioner, we grant Patent Owner’s motion for additional discovery for the limited purpose of providing communications and/or agreements pertaining to Ward Dietrich’s involvement in the preparation and filing of the Petition and/or control or ability to control the preparation and filing of the Petition.” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Other PTAB motions (exclude, strike, seal, additional discovery, rehearing)Denied
“Patent Owner requests an “expanded panel that includes the Chief Judge” because, according to Patent Owner, an expanded panel “is necessary to secure and maintain uniformity” and to “clarify the standard for additional discovery.” Req. Reh’g 1–2, 8–9. Discretion to expand a panel rests with the Chief Judge, who, on behalf of the Director, may act to expand a panel on a suggestion from a judge or panel. AOL Inc. v. Coho Sicensing LLC, Case IPR2014-00771, slip op. at 2 (PTAB Mar. 24, 2015)(Paper 12)(informative). Patent Owner’s suggestion was considered by the Acting Chief Administrative Patent Judge, who declined to expand the panel.” slip op. at 3
NonePatents in suitUS 7,490,151 - 10x Genomics, Inc. v. Raindance Technologies, Inc.Rehearing deniedPTAB · Feb 24, 2016 · IPR2015-01558 · APJ Elizabeth M Roesel · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied Patent Owner’s rehearing request, leaving instituted review of claims 1–17 in place, including the implicitly raised obviousness ground for claims 1–7 and 12–17.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“decision for an abuse of discretion. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c). The party requesting rehearing bears the burden of showing that the decision should be modified, and “[t]he request must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d).” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“The Director may not authorize an inter partes review to be instituted unless the Director determines that the information presented in the petition filed under section 311 and any response filed under section 313 shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” slip op. at 2
- BurdenDecided for petitioner
“respond to Petitioner’s implicitly raised obviousness challenge. The obviousness ground that is instituted as to claims 1–7 and 12–17 is based upon the same arguments and evidence that Petitioner presents with respect to anticipation of these claims and obviousness of claims 10 and 11. Dec. 17. Patent Owner addressed these arguments in its Preliminary Response, Prelim. Resp. 4, 16, 17, 21–27, 30–33, and the Board considered Patent Owner’s arguments before instituting inter partes review, Dec. 8–18. Patent Owner will have another full and fair opportunity to respond to these challenges in its Patent Owner Response. 35 U.S.C. § 316(a)(8). By instituting review based on Petitioner’s implicitly raised obviousness ground, the Decision does not shift the burden of proof to Patent Owner. The burden remains with Petitioner to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the challenged claims are unpatentable. 35 U.S.C. § 316(e).” slip op. at 4
NonePatents in suitUS 8,658,430 - Sure-Fire Electrical Corporation v. Yongjiang Yin And Shenzhen El Lighting Co. Ltd.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Feb 22, 2016 · IPR2014-01448 · APJ Debra K Stephens · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1 and 7 are unpatentable as obvious over He and Korodi; the Board did not reach the Gustafsson and He ground.
RulingsFinal written decision- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for petitioner
“its claims, but instead, recited only “emits.” Patent Owner has not proffered any evidence or argument as to why “emits and dies” used in the ’279 Patent Specification, would have been abbreviated to “emits” in recitation of the claims. Nor is the term “emits” defined explicitly in the ’279 Patent Specification. Thus, we begin with the assumption that the term “emits” does not include “and dies,” as that comports with the plain and ordinary meaning of the word “emits” Thus, taking the plain and ordinary meaning at the time of the invention, we interpret “emits light in sequence” as “throws off or gives off or out light in a continuous or connected series” and interpret “emits in sequence” as “throws off or gives off or out, in a continuous or connected series” (see e.g., Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 377, 1065 (10th ed. 2000)). Patent Owner has not proffered sufficient evidence or argument that “emits light in sequence” and “emits in sequence” should be read more narrowly than the plain and ordinary meaning as suggested by Patent Owner. Specifically, Patent Owner’s assertion that the Specification supports the proposed interpretation of “emits light in sequence” as “emits and dies light in sequence” is misplaced. The Specification of the ’279 Patent does not explicitly define “emits light in sequence” as “emits and dies light in sequence.” Nor is any explicit definition provided for “emits light in sequence” or “emits in sequence.” Patent Owner would have us import limitations disclosed in several of the embodiments, including Embodiment 1, to interpret “emits” as “emits and dies light in sequence” or “emits and” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Prosecution history disclaimer / disavowalDisclaimer not foundDecided for petitioner
“Patent Owner additionally asserts “Patent Owner specifically disclaimed emission of light over the full length of the cable, but rather limited the patent to segment by segment illumination along the length of the cable,” thereby limiting the phrase “emits light in sequence” (PO Resp. 43). Patent Owner identified pages 9–10 of the Response to Office Action filed September 18, 2009 (Ex. 1002, 25–26), as providing this disclaimer (PO Resp. 48–49). However, we agree with Petitioner that the statements in the Response to Office Action do not disclaim subject matter, nor do these statements provide an explicit definition of “emits,” “emits light in sequence, and “emits in sequence.” Indeed, the discussion, limited to claim 7, discusses the object of the invention and distinguishes the invention as recited in claim 7 over the cited prior art, Baumberg et al. (US 5,869,930) (Resp. to OA 9–10). This discussion does not qualify as “clear and unmistakable” disavowing statements as required to meet the “demanding standard for finding a disclaimer.” Avid Tech., Inc. v. Harmonic, Inc., No. 2015-1246, 2016 WL 363410, at *4 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 29, 2016). We, therefore, determine the term “emits light in sequence” and “emits in sequence” used in the claims, should not be interpreted as “emits and dies light of each electroluminescent cored bar or cord in succession, one after the other,” but instead, should be interpreted giving the terms their ordinary and customary meaning as understood by an ordinarily skilled artisan at the time of the invention, in light of the Specification.” slip op. at 10
- Obviousness (§103) › Analogous artAnalogous artDecided for petitioner
“(PO Resp. 37–40). A reference qualifies as prior art for an obviousness determination under § 103 only when it is analogous to the claimed invention. Innovention Toys, LLC, v. MGA Entm’t, Inc., 637 F.3d 1314, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2011); In re Bigio, 381 F.3d 1320, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2004); In re Clay, 966 F.2d 656, 658 (Fed. Cir. 1992). “Two separate tests define the scope of analogous prior art: (1) whether the art is from the same field of endeavor, regardless of the problem addressed and, (2) if the reference is not within the field of the inventor’s endeavor, whether the reference still is reasonably pertinent to the particular problem with which the inventor is involved.” Bigio, 381 F.3d at 1325 (citations omitted).” slip op. at 18
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner
“Nonetheless, we find Petitioner has articulated reasoning with a rational underpinning as to why an ordinarily skilled artisan would have been motivated to combine the teachings (Pet. 34–36; Ex. 1008 ¶¶ 98–104). Specifically, Petitioner contends an ordinarily skilled artisan would have been motivated to combine the teachings of He and Korodi because “such a modification is both a predictable variation and an incremental improvement” (Pet. 35). According to Petitioner, an ordinarily skilled artisan would have found it obvious and “straight-forward” to replace the aluminum core wire in He with a power cord to create an improved illuminated cable using electroluminescent wires that light in sequence (id. at 36). Petitioner further asserts combining the teachings would “involve the merger of familiar elements according to their established functions, known methods, and predictable results” (id.). We agree with the Petitioner that an ordinarily skilled artisan would have been motivated to replace the core wire at the center of He’s cable with a power cord as taught by Korodi to create an improved illuminated cable. We find the combination of He and Korodi unites old elements with no change in their respective functions. Indeed, we agree that combining the teachings would be a merger of familiar elements, Korodi’s power cord and He’s electroluminescent cable, that perform their ordinary functions to predictably result in the recited cable which includes a main power cord and a plurality of electroluminescent cords which emit light in sequence when the main cord and the driver are live. To be nonobvious, an improvement must be “more than the predictable use of prior art elements according to their established functions.” KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 417 (2007). Additionally, as further support, we credit Petitioner’s Declarant’s, Dr. Mark Horenstein’s, testimony that replacing the aluminum core wire in He for the power cord in Korodi would have been a merger of familiar elements according to their established functions, known methods, and predictable results that an ordinarily skilled artisan would have found obvious (Ex. 1008 ¶¶ 99, 102, 103).” slip op. at 20
Patent outcomesUS 7,671,279 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSRPatents in suitUS 7,671,279 - Arista Networks, Inc. v. Cisco Systems, Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Feb 16, 2016 · IPR2015-01710 · APJ Bryan F Moore · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution on all challenged claims under § 325(d), finding the petition presented substantially the same art and arguments as the earlier IPR.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsInstitution denied 325dInstitution denied
“Habraken, which was not stated with specificity. “The [’974 IPR] Petition, therefore, fails to identify with sufficient specificity the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art.” ’974 Dec. 17. While the current Petition apparently attempts to provide such specificity (See Pet. 28–31), Patent Owner, nonetheless, has been forced to address a similar ground with similar arguments in two separate Petitions. Prelim Resp. 9, 10; ’974 Prelim. Resp. 22–25, 49–52; see Biodelivery Sciences International, Inc. v. RB Pharmaceuticals Limited, Case IPR2014-00998, slip op. at 7–8 (PTAB December 19, 2014) (Paper 12) (determining, in exercising § 325(d) discretion with respect to a ground in the second-filed petition that was based on a reference not formally included in the ground from the first-filed petition and which the prior DI merely acknowledged as a citation in a claim chart, that the ground in the second-filed petition presented was “the same arguments and relies substantially on the same prior art that the same Petitioner relied upon in its earlier Petition regarding the same claims of the same patent”). Allowing similar, serial challenges to the same patent, by the same petitioner, risks harassment of patent owners and frustration of Congress’s intent in enacting the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act. See H.R. Rep. No. 112-98, pt.1, at 48 (2011) (“While this amendment is intended to remove current disincentives to current administrative processes, the changes made by it are not to be used as tools for harassment or a means to prevent market entry through repeated litigation and administrative attacks on the validity of a patent. Doing so would frustrate the purpose of the section as providing quick and cost effective alternatives to litigation.”). For these reasons, we conclude that the instant Petition advances “the same or substantially the same prior art or arguments [that] previously were presented to the Office” in the ’974 IPR, and, therefore, we have discretion under § 325(d) to deny institution of the obviousness ground based on Frazier and Habraken.” slip op. at 10
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 7,224,668 - Great West Casualty Company / Bitco General Insurance Corporation et al. v. Intellectual Ventures II LLCInstitution deniedPTAB · Feb 9, 2016 · CBM2015-00171 · APJ Michael W Kim · CBM · Institution
The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show that any existing claim qualified as a covered business method patent under AIA § 18(d)(1).
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“that the patent for which review is sought is a covered business method patent.” The AIA defines “covered business method patent” as “a patent that claims a method or corresponding apparatus for performing data processing or other operations used in the practice, administration, or management of a financial product or service, except that the term does not include patents for technological inventions.” AIA § 18(d)(1); see 37 C.F.R. § 42.301(a).” slip op. at 6
- Adverse judgmentAdverse judgmentOther
“disclaimer under 37 C.F.R. § 1.321(a) of claims 1–10. Prelim. Resp. 13 (citing Ex. 2002). Thus, the question is whether we should consider now-statutorily disclaimed claims 1–10 in determining whether or not the ’177 patent is a covered business method patent for the purposes of instituting a covered business method patent review. We determine that we should not. 37 C.F.R. § 1.321(a) is the rule promulgated by the Office for creating a procedure for a patentee to avail itself of the provisions of 35 U.S.C. § 253. See Manual of Patent Examining Procedure § 1490. Our reviewing court has held that a patent with a statutory disclaimer is to be treated as though the disclaimed claims never existed. See Guinn v. Kopf, 96 F.3d 1419, 1422 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (“A statutory disclaimer under 35 U.S.C. § 253 has the effect of canceling the claims from the patent and the patent is viewed as though the disclaimed claims had never existed in the patent.”). Accordingly, for the purposes of whether or not to institute a covered business method patent review, we treat claims 1–10 as never having existed. See Google Inc. v. SimpleAir, Inc., CBM2015-00019 slip op. at 14– 15 (PTAB May 19, 2014) (Paper 11); but see J.P. Morgan Chase v. Intellectual Ventures, Case CBM2014-00157 slip op. at 12–15 (PTAB Jan. 12, 2016) (Paper 40) (although the panel states that “petitioner’s standing to file a petition for covered business method patent review is evaluated based on the time the petition was filed,” in this proceeding, Patent Owner” slip op. at 7
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“unexpired patent are interpreted according to their broadest reasonable construction in light of the specification of the patent in which they appear. 37 C.F.R. § 42.300(b); Versata Dev. Grp., Inc. v. SAP Am., Inc., 793 F.3d 1306, 1328 (2015) (affirming use of the broadest reasonable construction standard in a covered business method patent review). Under that standard, and absent any special definitions, we give claim terms their ordinary and customary meaning, as would be understood by one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention. In re Translogic Tech., Inc., 504 F.3d 1249, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2007).” slip op. at 5
Claim constructionPatents in suitUS 7,516,177 - Alliance Of Rare-Earth Permanent Magnet Industry v. Hitachi Metals, Ltd.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Feb 8, 2016 · IPR2014-01266 · APJ Michelle R Osinski · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–4, 11, 12, and 14–16 are unpatentable under § 103: claims 1–4, 14, and 16 over Ohashi and Hasegawa; claims 11–12 with Yamamoto; and claim 15 with Kishimoto.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level board ownDecided for petitioner
“To determine the level of ordinary skill in the art in this case, we consider the type of problems encountered in the art, the prior art solutions to those problems, and the sophistication of the technology. Custom Accessories, Inc. v. Jeffrey-Allan Indus. Inc., 807 F.2d 955, 962 (Fed. Cir. 1986). We are also guided by the level of ordinary skill in the art as reflected by the prior art of record. Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001). The ’765 patent indicates that the material alloy can be produced by ingot casting or rapid cooling methods typified by strip casting and centrifugal casting (Ex. 1001, 1:36–41, 12:24–29), and refers to a “known strip casting method” (Id. at 5:37–38). The prior art of record also describes differences between the resulting alloy obtained by ingot casting methods and the resulting alloy obtained by strip casting methods. See, e.g., Ex. 1007, 1:15–2:3. Thus, a skilled artisan would have some knowledge of strip casting methods and how such methods would affect the resulting alloy as compared to an alloy produced by ingot casting methods. The prior art of record also describes various mechanical pulverization techniques, as well as a hydrogen pulverization process. See, e.g., Ex. 1005 ¶ 2. The prior art of record also compares the resulting fine powder of the hydrogen pulverization process to that produced by mechanical pulverization. Id. A skilled artisan, therefore, would also need some knowledge of hydrogen pulverization methods and how they differ from mechanical pulverization. We acknowledge the sophistication of the rare earth magnet technology, but consider that one of ordinary skill in the art would be aware of all the pertinent prior art. Based on all of the evidence, we conclude that a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the ’765 patent, through education or experience, would have knowledge of various methods to produce the material alloy (e.g., ingot casting and strip casting) and various pulverization techniques (e.g., mechanical pulverization and hydrogen pulverization), and would have knowledge of the differences between the methods and techniques, as the resulting material alloys.” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed board ownDecided for petitioner
“In the Decision to Institute, we interpreted “particle quantity” as “amount of particles,” without considering whether any particular common metrics should be excluded. Dec. Inst. 7. The parties do not dispute this interpretation in the Patent Owner Response or in the Petitioner Reply. We adopt the above claim construction based on our previous analysis, and see no reason to deviate from that construction for purposes of this Decision.” slip op. at 6
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundUnpatentable
“between a crushing apparatus and the alloy to be crushed, resulting in random pulverization of the alloy.” Id. at 8. Although there can be no doubt that mechanical pulverization is different than chemical pulverization, simply because there are differences between two references is insufficient to establish that such references teach away from any combination thereof. See In re Beattie, 974 F.2d 1309, 1312–13 (Fed. Cir. 1992). Petitioner’s reasoning to utilize hydrogen pulverization in place of mechanical pulverization to more easily crush the material alloy, and that the combination of known prior art elements achieves a predictable result, is not negated by the differences between mechanical and chemical pulverization. To the extent Patent Owner is arguing that the utilization of hydrogen pulverization in place of mechanical pulverization is not predictable (See Tr. 40:20–41:2 (citing Ex. 2002 ¶ 90)), Patent Owner has merely pointed out that one of ordinary skill in the art would have to account for differences between the two pulverization mechanisms. Patent Owner, however, has not explained persuasively that such an accounting for differences between the two pulverization mechanisms would have been beyond the capability of one of ordinary skill in the art. See KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 421 (2007) (“A person of ordinary skill is also a person of ordinary creativity, not an automaton.”). Although Patent Owner argues that “if you make a change in any part of this total process, then you are going to have to look and investigate to see do you need to make compensations in other parts of the process as well . . .[a]nd that simply is going to be beyond what one of ordinary skill in the art would be able to do here” (Tr. 62:20–25), Patent Owner again only points to expert testimony that explains that one would need to change the composition of the alloy to compensate for differences between the pulverization mechanisms (Id. at 63:1–6 (citing Ex. 2002 ¶ 90)), not that such changes would have been beyond the level of ordinary skill in the art. Moreover, as described above, we have concluded that a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the ’765 patent would have knowledge of the differences between mechanical and hydrogen pulverization techniques, and the resulting material alloys.” slip op. at 13
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of success › Teaching awayTeaching away not foundDecided for petitioner
“The word “oxidize” means “[1] To combine with oxygen; make into an oxide. [2] To increase the positive charge or valence of (an element) by removing electrons.” American Heritage Dictionary, Houghton Mifflin Company (2000, 2003), available at http://literature.proquestlearning.com/home.do (last visited Feb. 3, 2016) (Ex. 3001). We determine that, considering the context of the patent, it is more likely than not than Ohashi’s reference to a “non-oxidizing gas” refers to a gas that does not cause an element to combine with oxygen or be made into an oxide (in accordance with the first definition cited above), rather than a gas that does not increase the positive charge or valence of an element by removing electrons (in accordance with the second cited definition). Our determination is based on Ohashi’s statements that “a magnetic alloy powder containing extremely fine particles are highly susceptible to the oxidation by the atmospheric oxygen” (Ex. 1004, 3:41–43 (emphasis added)), “the adverse influences due to the increased oxygen content in the alloy powder can be overcome when the alloy powder does not contain extremely fine particles” (id. at 3:45–48 (emphasis added)), “fine particles in a powder of neodymimum-iron-boron magnet alloys are rapidly oxidized by the atmospheric oxygen already in the course of pulverization in a non-oxidizing atmosphere and there-after to greatly increase the oxygen content in the alloy powder” (id. at 3:51–56 (emphasis added)), “a great improvement could be obtained in the magnetic properties of the permanent magnets as a result of the decrease in the oxygen content of the alloy powder” (id. at 3:61–64 (emphasis added)), “it is essential that the alloy under pulverization is strictly prevented against oxidation by the atmospheric oxygen” (id. at 4:45–47 (emphasis added)), and “Table 1 . . . shows the oxygen contents and the magnetic properties of the thus obtained sintered permanent magnets” (id. at 7:19–21 (emphasis added)). These statements demonstrate that Ohashi is concerned with the oxygen content of the alloy, rather than whether the alloy has undergone a removal of electrons. Petitioner has shown sufficiently that the hydrogen gas of the hydrogen pulverization method is a non-oxidizing gas in that it does not cause an element of the magnet alloy to combine with oxygen or be made into an oxide. Pet. Reply 4–5 (citing Ex. 1012, 77:9–13). The hydrogen pulverization method of Hawegawa, therefore, is in accordance with Ohashi’s teachings of conducting the pulverization in an atmosphere of a non-oxidizing or inert gas.6 Accordingly, we are not persuaded that 6 We agree with Patent Owner that the hydrogen gas of Hasegawa’s hydrogen pulverization method “is certainly a non-inert gas.” PO Resp. 9. We determine, however, that Ohashi requires the pulverization be conducted in the atmosphere of a non-oxidizing gas or inert gas, but not necessarily both. Because we have found the hydrogen gas of Hasegawa’s hydrogen pulverization method to be a non-oxidizing gas, it is immaterial whether or not it is inert. modification of Ohashi to utilize a hydrogen pulverization method as taught by Hasegawa is contrary to the teachings of Ohashi.” slip op. at 14
Patent outcomesUS 6,491,765 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSRPatents in suitUS 6,491,765 - Dynamic Drinkware, LLC v. National Graphics, Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Jan 27, 2016 · IPR2014-01162 · APJ Michael P Tierney · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–46 are unpatentable: claims 1, 2, 23, 24, and 27–29 as anticipated by Quadracci ’995; the remaining claims as obvious over the stated combinations.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level board ownDecided for patent owner
“in the lenticular art “is one who has several years of work experience in the lenticular industry.” Ex. 1013 ¶ 11. Patent Owner’s declarant, Dr. Garcia, testifies that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have five or more years of experience in the lenticular lens industry or have an understanding of optical engineering including first and higher order geometric and physical optics principles. Ex. 2001 ¶ 13. The parties’ definitions of one of ordinary skill in the art are substantially the same and neither party states how any difference in the parties’ articulated levels of skill impacts the proceeding. For purpose of this decision, we hold that the level of ordinary skill in the art is reflected by the prior art of record, such that one of skill in the art would have had years of experience in the lenticular lens industry or had an understanding of optical engineering, including higher order geometric and physical optics principles. Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the prior art itself can reflect the appropriate level of ordinary skill in the art).” slip op. at 6
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed petitioner constructionOther
“Patent Owner does not dispute the proposed constructions, except to state that, consistent with Petitioner’s definition of focal length, one of ordinary skill in the art would have understood that focal length in the ’467 refers to the “effective focal length” of the lens. PO Resp. 3–4. We adopt Petitioner’s proposed claim constructions as they are consistent with the Patent Owner’s use of the terms in the ’467 patent Specification. For example, the term gauge thickness is defined in the ’467 patent with reference to g2 of Fig. 1A and states that the thickness is measured from the outermost edge of the curved surface of the lens to the flat back surface of the lens. Ex. 1001, 2:27–33.” slip op. at 7
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“describe . . . each and every claim limitation and enable one of skill in the art to practice an embodiment of the claimed invention without undue experimentation.” Am. Calcar, Inc. v. Am. Honda Motor Corp., 651 F.3d 1318, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (citing In re Gleave, 560 F.3d 1331, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2009)).” slip op. at 8
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedPetitioner expert creditedDecided for patent owner
“Based on the evidence of record, we credit the ray tracing testimony of Mr. Raymond and are persuaded that the lenticular lens disclosure of Quadracci ’995 is enabling. Specifically, Dr. Garcia acknowledges that focal length formulas other than those recited in the ’467 patent were known in the art and Mr. Raymond demonstrates that, consistent with the teachings of Quadracci ’995, one of ordinary skill in the art could make the described lenses. c. Mr. Raymond’s Gauge Thickness and Focal Length Calculations Patent Owner states that Mr. Raymond’s thickness calculation in his first declaration is either wrong, or it uses an unacceptable index of refraction. Mr. Raymond, in his first declaration, testifies that using the general lens formulas described in the ’467 patent, he arrived at a gauge thickness of 3.4 mils. Ex. 1013 ¶¶ 26–28. Mr. Raymond, however, does not disclose the index of refraction that he used to determine the gauge thickness. Expert testimony that does not disclose the underlying data on which the opinion is based is entitled to little or no weight. 37 C.F.R. 42.65(a). As Mr. Raymond failed to disclose the index of refraction used in his calculations and provide support for his selected refraction index, we do not credit Mr. Raymond’s gauge thickness calculation in his first declaration with respect to Quadracci ’995. As discussed below, however, Mr.” slip op. at 14
Patent outcomesUS 6,424,467 unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 6,424,467 - Ocean Tomo, LLC v. Patent Ratings, LLCInstitution deniedPTAB · Jan 26, 2016 · CBM2015-00157 · APJ Peter P Chen · CBM · Institution
The Board denied institution of CBM review of claims 1, 9, 16, 18–25, 34, 49, 50–52, and 57 because Ocean Tomo failed to establish standing.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied rpiInstitution denied
“must set forth the petitioner’s grounds for standing. 37 C.F.R. § 42.304(a). Rule 42.304(a) states it is Petitioner’s burden to “demonstrate that the patent for which review is sought is a covered business method patent, and that the petitioner meets the eligibility requirements of § 42.302.” Id.” slip op. at 3
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Real party in interest / privityInstitution denied rpiDenied
“this issue, and agree with Patent Owner. This case is factually distinguishable from MedImmune for the reasons described by Patent Owner. We are not persuaded any of the evidence herein sufficiently demonstrates a charge by Patent Owner of Petitioner’s infringement of the ’849 patent. For example, the parties’ amended pleadings in the Illinois action total 15 causes of action, spanning 71 pages and 280 paragraphs of allegations, yet there is no mention of the ’849 patent, or patent infringement, or non-infringement of patents, or charges of patent infringement. Exs. 1004, 1005. The parties’ contract, tort, and related causes of action concern and arise from the fractured employment and business relationship between Petitioner and Mr. Barney and Patent Owner, not from charges of infringement of the ’849 patent.” slip op. at 9
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 9,075,849 - Ericsson Inc. / Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson v. Intellectual Ventures II LLCAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Jan 21, 2016 · IPR2014-01185 · APJ Peter P Chen · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–10 and 17 are unpatentable: claims 1–3 and 5 as obvious over Schmidl and Arslan; claims 4 and 6–10 over those references and Kim; claim 17 over those references and Heiskala.
RulingsFinal written decision- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner
“Our interpretation of the disputed term begins with the language of the claim. See Microsoft Corp. v. Proxyconn Inc., 789 F.3d 1292, 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2015). Claim 1 recites that pilot symbols are inserted “into data blocks.” We construe claim 1’s plain language using the plural form of “data blocks” to mean that pilot symbols may be inserted not only within a single data block, as Patent Owner contends, but also between one data block and another data block, as Petitioner contends. Claims should also be read in light of the specification and teachings in the underlying patent. Cuozzo, 793 F.3d at 1280; Microsoft, 789 F.3d at 11 1298. Here, the specification also uses the plural form of data blocks in explaining that “[t]ypically, pilot symbols may be inserted at any point in the data blocks.” Ex. 1001, 16:55–56, 7:28–29. There is no language in the specification disclaiming the insertion of pilot symbols between data blocks. We are persuaded that based on the claim’s usage of the plural “data blocks,” which is supported by the description in the specification, the broadest reasonable construction is “pilot/training symbol inserter configured to insert pilot symbols within, or between, one or more data blocks,” and accordingly, does not exclude the insertion of pilot symbols between two data blocks that are in a group of data blocks.” slip op. at 11
- Skill levelSkill level board ownOther
“We determine that an express definition of the level of ordinary skill is not required. The level of ordinary skill in the art can be reflected in the 13 cited prior art references. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“[T]he absence of specific findings on the level of skill in the art does not give rise to reversible error where the prior art itself reflects an appropriate level and a need for testimony is not shown.”) (internal quotations omitted); In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995). Therefore, we find the level of ordinary skill in the art to be reflected in the cited references.” slip op. at 13
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundUnpatentable
“that “both Schmidl and Arslan are directed at improving synchronization between a wireless transmitter and a wireless receiver, and disclose frame structures including information for the same.” Pet. 16. In particular, Schmidl discloses an encoder that inserts training symbols in the frequency domain, to form training symbols in the time domain. Pet. Reply 13, 17 (citing Ex. 1036 ¶ 21); see Ex. 1002, 2:7–17. Arslan discloses a frame structure in the time domain containing pilot symbols interspersed among data symbols. Pet. Reply 16–17 (citing Ex. 1036 ¶¶ 20, 22). Petitioner further states: [I]t would have been obvious to use pilot symbols as separate time domain symbols for tracking time variations to calibrate or synchronize the receiver to the transmitter by using time-domain pilot symbols in Schmidl’s system. . . [citing to Supplemental Declaration of Dr. Zygmunt Haas ¶ 22.] As discussed above, Schmidl discloses inserting symbols in the frequency domain for an OFDM system, for calibration and synchronization. See id. It would have been obvious to create those time-domain pilot symbols in the same manner as the time-domain training symbols are created in Schmidl’s encoder – that is, by inserting blocks of known pilot symbols in the frequency domain that would result in time-domain pilot symbols. See id. It would be obvious to a POSA that the same circuitry in Schmidl’s encoder 14 used to insert training symbols would be used to insert pilot symbols, resulting in the claimed “pilot/training symbol inserter configured to insert pilot symbols into data blocks.” See id. Pet. Reply 17–18; see Pet. 16, 29–30.” slip op. at 22
Patent outcomesUS 7,269,127 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSRPatents in suitUS 7,269,127
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.