- Astronics Test Systems, Inc. v. Teradyne, Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Jul 20, 2022 · IPR2021-00350 · APJ Debra K Stephens · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–8 are unpatentable as obvious over Schinabeck; the Board did not reach the Miyamoto and Frame grounds.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“In our Institution Decision, we adopted Petitioner’s definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art with minor modification (Dec. 8–9; see Pet. 20). In particular, we removed the qualifier “at least” from the education level and from the experience level, because the qualifier introduces ambiguity. Patent Owner does not dispute this determination of the level of a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention (PO Resp. 8). Thus, we determine an ordinarily skilled artisan at the time of the invention would have had (i) a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, or a related field and (ii) one year of experience with testing of electronic equipment. We determine this asserted level of skill comports with the qualifications a person would have needed to understand and implement the teachings of the ’479 Patent and the prior art of record (cf. Okajima, 261 F.3d at 1355 (the prior art itself may reflect an appropriate level of skill in the art)).” slip op. at 10
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Preamble limiting or notPreamble limitingDecided for patent owner
“execute a user program, the test equipment comprising” is the preamble and that it is limiting (Ex. 1003, 13:57–58; PO Resp. 9). In particular, Patent Owner contends, “the preamble of claim 1 [is] limiting because it serves as antecedent basis for multiple terms in the body of the claim, and it supplies ‘essential structure’ of the claimed invention” (PO Resp. 9). Petitioner does not address this contention (see Pet. Reply 4–5). We agree with Patent Owner that the preamble is limiting because the body of the claim refers to the user program as well as the automatic test equipment (Ex. 1003, 13:57–58, 14:14–17; see Catalina Mktg. Int'l, Inc. v. Coolsavings.com, Inc., 289 F.3d 801, 808 (Fed. Cir. 2002) ([D]ependence on a particular disputed preamble phrase for antecedent basis may limit claim scope because it indicates a reliance on both the preamble and claim body to define the claimed invention”)). Patent Owner asserts the following limitation, “a channel circuit having a signal connection point adapted to be coupled to a signal line of a unit under test to receive an input signal having a value” (Ex. 1003, 13:58–61), “although formatted within the same paragraph as the preamble[,] is not actually part of the preamble, but rather part of the body of the claim” (PO Resp. 10). However, further in its argument, Patent Owner flips its statement in arguing “input signal having a value” and contends this is a “requirement[] of the preamble” (id. at 11). Petitioner’s contentions are only directed to the limitation (Pet. Reply 4–5).” slip op. at 12
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for patent owner
“Initially, we note the claim recites “a channel circuit having a signal connection point adapted to be coupled to a signal line of a unit under test to receive an input signal having a value” (Ex. 1003, 13:58–61), Thus, due to the recitation, we determine the input signal could be either that the signal connection point receives an input signal or the channel circuit receives an input signal (id.). The next limitation recites the comparison sub-circuit has “a signal input . . . wherein each of the comparison sub-circuits is adapted to produce a comparison output signal at the comparison output having a value input signal” (id. at 13:62–14:3). The claim does not recite that the “signal input” receives “the input signal.” Nevertheless, in light of the claim language and the Specification and because Petitioner has contended both interpretations are shown, we interpret the recited “input signal” as the signal received from the UUT. The portion of the ’479 Patent describing, in part, Figure 1, cited by Patent Owner discloses ATE 139 includes multiple instruments that may generate and measure signals. A host computer 120 executes a software program that controls operation of each of the instruments. Host computer 120 may be programmed to analyze these outputs to determine whether the system under test 189 is operating properly. Such programming is traditionally a part of a user program and drives programmed values and compares measured values to expected values on one or more signal lines connected to the UUT. These steps may be programmed for multiple lines for multiple test cycles (Ex. 1003, 3:32–51; PO Sur-reply 3). The ’479 Patent further describes an “ATE . . . provide[s] stimulus to . . . the UUT and then measure[s] the output to determine if the UUT has performed to its specifications” (Ex. 1003, 1:30–33; PO Sur-reply 3). Thus, these descriptions support both interpretations. Nevertheless, the ’479 Patent describes a signal being supplied and compared to expected values. Accordingly, we interpret “an input signal” as being the signal received from a unit under test (UUT).” slip op. at 14
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“We determine Schinabeck teaches the structure of the comparison sub-circuits recited in claim element 1a. Indeed, given that switches and comparators were known (Tr. 35:5–8; Ex. 1026, 17:17–18:8, 30:16–22), we determine switching certain switches on or off is a switch performing the same function it had been known to perform, yielding no more than one would expect from such an element (KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 406 (2007)). Thus, turning switches off or on in Schinabeck’s circuitry, would not have been “uniquely challenging or difficult for one of ordinary skill in the art” or “represented an unobvious step over the prior art” (see Leapfrog Enters., Inc. v. Fisher-Price, Inc., 485 F.3d 1157, 1162 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (citing KSR, 550 U.S. at 418-19)). A skilled artisan is “a person of ordinary creativity, not an automaton” (see KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 420-21 (2007)). An ordinarily skilled artisan “must be presumed to know something” about the art “apart from what the references disclose” (In re Jacoby, 309 F.2d 513, 516 (CCPA 1962)). We further credit Dr. Wicker that an ordinarily skilled artisan “would have understood that switch K3a can be opened or closed depending upon the desired test set-up” and “by definition, switches are controlled to be open or closed” (Ex. 1001 ¶ 90). And again, Schinabeck contemplates use of the circuitry as recited, as described in claim 10 discussed supra. We thus are persuaded that Schinabeck teaches or at least suggests limitation 1a). We are also not persuaded Petitioner used impermissible hindsight reconstruction as the circuitry elements in Schinabeck are being used as was known to be used for the purpose of “monitoring response signals during automated testing of any other circuit elements –– Petitioner is relying on closing switches in the disclosed circuity of Schinabeck (Pet. 25–27). Additionally, Schinabeck discloses coupling comparison circuits to the same response signal (Ex. 1008, 11:49–53, 12:56–13:7, 4:49–66 and thus, Patent Owner’s contention that this grouping is “not any ‘desired’ configuration for functional or parametric testing” in Schinabeck is not supported by Schinabeck’s disclosure.” slip op. at 31
Patent outcomesUS 7,395,479 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 7,395,479 - PTAB · Apr 19, 2022 · IPR2022-00035 · APJ Debra K Stephens · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted inter partes review of claim 1 on both § 103 grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would show the claim unpatentable over each asserted combination.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“(Pet. 11). Generally, Patent Owner contends that the Petition should be denied (see Prelim. Resp.). Based on our review of the record, we conclude that Petitioner is reasonably likely to prevail in demonstrating that at least one of the challenged claims is not patentable.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSITA”) in July 2003 would have had a working knowledge of the network communications art that is pertinent to the ’066 Patent, including network security. A POSITA would have had a bachelor’s degree in computer science, computer engineering, or an equivalent, and two years of professional experience relating to network communications. Lack of professional experience can be remedied by additional education, and vice versa (Pet. 9 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 17–19)). Patent Owner agrees with Petitioner’s assertion and further asserts a “higher level of education (e.g., a Master’s degree) may make up for less work experience, and additional work experience may make up for less education” (Prelim. Resp. 14 (citing Ex. 2001 ¶¶ 14–22)).” slip op. at 11
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for patent owner
“We disagree with Patent Owner’s construction. Patent Owner’s arguments ignore significant claim language of claim 1 that contradicts Patent Owner’s proposed construction, instead focusing on tying to equate broad, ordinary terms — “utilization” with “applying” and “across” with “to” (see id. at 16–21). In particular, Patent Owner ignores the portion of the limitation which recites “cause utilization of different occurrence mitigation actions of diverse occurrence mitigation types, including a firewall-based occurrence mitigation type and a other occurrence mitigation type, across the plurality of devices” (emphasis added). To aid in understanding the meaning of “a firewall-based occurrence mitigation type,” we turn to the disclosure of the ’066 Patent (see Ex. 1001). The ’066 Patent includes a detailed disclosure which contradicts Patent Owner’s argument that the limitation at issue excludes mitigation actions of a network defense system providing firewall functionality.” slip op. at 16
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Instituted
“intrusion functionality 116 detects . . .an attempt from outside the network 14 to exploit [a] noted vulnerability (for example, a certain IP address is noted as being a source of traffic relating to the IIS buffer overflow vulnerability as detected by the code red signature)” (Ex. 1005, 14:59–64; see Pet. 37). Willebeek-LeMair further teaches, in step 312, “[t]his is reported back to the agent 126” which “responds in step 314 by reporting . . . that an attempt to exploit has occurred” (Ex. 1005 14:64–67; see Pet. 37). Willebeek-LeMair discloses the agent 126 additionally “instructs the firewalling functionality 118 in step 316 to drop the packet traffic relating to the attempted exploitation” and “in step 318 instruct[s] the firewall to block all traffic originating from the noted IP address of the attacker” (Ex. 1005 14:67–15:6, 1:7–10; see Pet. 37). Thus, because Willebeek-LeMair discloses a firewalling functionality, at this juncture, we determine Willebeek-LeMair teaches the recited “firewall-based occurrence mitigation type.” Additionally, because Willebeek-LeMair discloses instructing the firewall to block all traffic from the attacker (an occurrence mitigation action), based on the record before us, we determine Willebeek-LeMair teaches the recited “firewall-based occurrence mitigation type,” as recited in claim 1. and specifically, “a terminate action [ ] taken by the intrusion detector functionality 116 to terminate any session associated with a possible attack” (Ex. 1005, 12:40–43; see Pet. 38). Willebeek-LeMair also teaches the intrusion detector functionality generates alerts from its analysis of the network traffic content (Ex. 1005, 9:34–27, 1:7–10; see Pet. 38). Based on the record before us, we determine this intrusion detector functionality is an occurrence mitigation action that is different than the firewall-based occurrence mitigation type. Accordingly, based on the record before us, we determine Willebeek-LeMair teaches the recited “a other occurrence mitigation type,” as recited in claim 1. In combination of these two functionalities, we determine on the current record, Willebeek-LeMair teaches the recited “cause utilization of different occurrence mitigation actions of diverse occurrence mitigation types, including a firewall-base occurrence mitigation type and a other occurrence mitigation type” (see Pet. 38 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 97)).” slip op. at 26
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,893,066 - Cisco Systems, Inc. v. Securityprofiling, LLCInstitution deniedPTAB · Mar 14, 2022 · IPR2021-01428 · APJ Debra K Stephens · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution on claims 1 and 5 because Patent Owner had statutorily disclaimed all challenged claims before institution.
RulingsInstitution decision- Adverse judgmentDecided for patent owner
“With respect to Petitioner’s contention that the disclaimer “must––by rule–be ‘construed to be a request for adverse judgment,’” we are not persuaded (see Pet. Reply 2). Rather, the rule states “[a] party may request judgment against itself” (37 C.F.R. § 42.73(b) (emphasis added)). Thus, the rule does not require adverse judgment. Additionally, we do not read Arthrex as requiring adverse judgment be entered (see Arthrex, Inc., 880 F.3d 1345). Rather, we read Arthrex as permitting, but not requiring, adverse judgment when a patent owner cancels all claims at issue prior to institution (id. at 1350). The statutory disclaimer was filed before institution. In view of this disclaimer, consistent with 37 C.F.R. § 42.107(e) and the Board’s precedential General Electric decision, we determine a denial of institution is sufficient to dispose of this case (see Gen. Elec. Co., IPR2017-00491, Paper 9). Thus, we decline to institute an inter partes review.” slip op. at 7
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied
“The statutory disclaimer was filed before institution. In view of this disclaimer, consistent with 37 C.F.R. § 42.107(e) and the Board’s precedential General Electric decision, we determine a denial of institution is sufficient to dispose of this case (see Gen. Elec. Co., IPR2017-00491, Paper 9). Thus, we decline to institute an inter partes review. III. CONCLUSION Based on the review of Exhibit 2003 and Office public records, we conclude that a disclaimer of claims 1 and 5 of the ’063 Patent under 35 U.S.C. § 253(a) has been recorded in the Office as of December 16, 2021 (Ex. 2003). Because all the claims challenged by Petitioner have been disclaimed under 35 U.S.C. § 253(a), no inter partes review is instituted in this proceeding (37 C.F.R. § 42.107(e)).” slip op. at 7
NonePatents in suitUS 10,609,063 - DISH Network L.L.C. / DISH Technologies L.L.C. et al. v. Sound View Innovations, LLCNo claims unpatentablePTAB · Feb 8, 2022 · IPR2020-01276 · APJ John A Hudalla · IPR · Final written decision
The Board held claims 1–3, 5–7, 13–15, 18, 20, 21, 24, 25, 27, and 29 not unpatentable over either asserted obviousness combination.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“After institution, neither party put forth arguments related to the level of ordinary skill. We discern no reason to change the level of ordinary skill in the art applied in this Final Written Decision. Thus, a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had either (1) a Bachelor of Science in Electrical Engineering, Computer Engineering, Computer Science, or a related field, as well as three to four years of experience in implementing protocols and/or equipment for streaming multimedia data; or (2) a Master’s degree in Electrical Engineering, or an equivalent field, as well as two years of experience in implementing protocols and/or equipment for streaming multimedia data. We are satisfied that this definition comports with the level of skill necessary to understand and implement the teachings of the ’796 patent and the asserted prior art.” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Preamble limiting or notPreamble limitingDecided for patent owner
“independent claims 1, 15, 20, and 27 are limiting. Dec. on Inst. 10–11. Petitioner does not take an express position on whether the preambles of the challenged claims are limiting. See Pet. 21 (stating that Geagan teaches the preamble “to the extent it is limiting”). Patent Owner supports our preliminary determination that the preambles are limiting. PO Resp. 37–41. Given this posture, we discern no reason to change our initial determination that the preambles are limiting. Thus, even though the disposition of this case does not turn on any particular limitation in the preamble, we maintain our determination that the preambles of claims 1, 15, 20, and 27 are limiting to the extent they color our analysis of Petitioner’s rationale for combining various prior art references.” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“We determine that no terms require explicit construction.2 See, e.g., Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“[W]e need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy’ . . . .” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 10
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“Petitioner attempts to decouple these central control aspects from the functionality of sliding windows. In particular, Petitioner argues that “[t]he majority of the functionality for implementing the sliding window buffers is found in Vishlitzky’s stream servers themselves” and that Patent Owner has not established “that the controller servers of Vishlitzky exercise control over the playout history, the buffers, or sliding window functionality of Vishlitzky’s stream servers.” Pet. Reply 8–9. Yet Petitioner expressly relies on Vishlitzky’s admission control program, which runs on controller servers 28, 29, to teach the “determining” step of claim 1. Pet. 35–36, 40–41; Pet. Reply 21–22. Petitioner has not explained how the admission control program’s centralized function of choosing an appropriate stream server to service a request (see Ex. 1010, 7:62–8:3) would be implemented in the stream servers themselves. In addition, Petitioner’s analogy between Vishlitzky’s controller servers and the memory controllers used with Geagan’s proxy (Pet. 63; Pet. Reply 9) does not detail how and whether Petitioner proposes to modify Vishlitzky’s centralized controller functions such that they might be compatible with “the distributed nature of Geagan’s proxy approach,” as Petitioner characterizes it. Pet. Reply 10. At the oral hearing, Petitioner also suggested that a controller within a single proxy from Geagan could allocate incoming requests to multiple of Vishlitzky’s stream servers within that same proxy. Tr. 55:1–57:21; see also PO Sur-reply 23–24 (discussing this potential argument). In other words, Petitioner seemed to suggest that multiple stream servers from Vishlitzky’s stream server architecture in Figure 16, along with controller servers from Figure 2, could be replicated in each of Geagan’s proxies. Yet Petitioner disavows such a mapping in its Reply: “[T]he Petition does not propose that a POSITA would have bodily incorporated the entirety of Vishlitzky’s hardware control structure when implementing Geagan’s system using Vishlitzky’s ‘sliding window’ to store cached streaming content.” Pet. Reply 6. Nor was this the combination described in the Petition. Instead, Petitioner proposed “to implement the buffer of Geagan as a ‘pre-configured playout history (PH) buffer’ . . . because Vishlitzky teaches that it is advantageous to pre-configure a playout buffer.” Pet. 34; see also id. at 62–63 (“[A] POSITA would have had a reasonable expectation of success in implementing details of the ATM-based stream server of Vishlitzky in Geagan’s proxy . . . .”). Petitioner further characterizes this as “[t]he buffer of Geagan’s proxy, as implemented as a pre-configured PH buffer per Vishlitzky.” Pet. 39. And, importantly, Petitioner cites the creation of another proxy device in Geagan for teaching the recited “non pre-configured PH buffer”: “Geagan in view of Vishlitzky discloses ‘servicing the first request from a non pre-configured PH buffer,’ such as by live-streaming content using a buffer at the proxy device that is created at the time of the request for an unpopular live stream.” Pet. 42 (emphasis added). Finally, even if Petitioner’s papers had proposed a combination where Vishlitzky’s entire stream server and controller architecture is incorporated in each of Geagan’s proxies, Petitioner has failed to articulate reasons with some rational underpinning why an ordinarily skilled artisan would have made this combination. Thus, we are not persuaded by Petitioner’s arguments. At the very least, Petitioner has not explained where Vishlitzky’s controller servers would be disposed in the combined system and how they” slip op. at 28
Patent outcomesUS 6,757,796 not shown unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 6,757,796 - Cisco Systems, Inc. v. Securityprofiling, LLCInstitution deniedPTAB · Jan 21, 2022 · IPR2021-01242 · APJ Sharon Fenick · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood that claims 19 and 20 were obvious over Willebeek-LeMair.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“review. 35 U.S.C. § 314 (2018); 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2021). The standard for instituting an inter partes review is set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), which provides that an inter partes review may not be instituted “unless the Director determines . . . there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” For the reasons that follow, we do not institute an inter partes review.” slip op. at 2
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot reached
“However, unaddressed is the claim’s requirement that each of the two of the plurality of mitigation techniques be automatically applied “to the at least one device.” Throughout the discussion of the limitations of claim 14, and again with respect to remaining challenged claim 19, Petitioner only describes the mitigation techniques to be taught by the application of signatures to the intrusion detector functionality and the firewalling defense system. However, Petitioner also asserts that the “plurality of devices” of the claim are the devices within the network being protected. See Pet. 26 (in arguing that Willebeek-LeMair teaches “code for: receiving information in connection with at least one of a plurality of devices,” (14.4) citing network discovery functionality to discover vulnerabilities in a scan of “machines” in protected network 14). Thus, Petitioner fails to show how Willebeek-LeMair teaches or suggests “automatically applying at least two of the plurality of mitigation techniques . . . to the at least one device,” that is, to a device in network 14.” slip op. at 20
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Neither Petitioner nor Patent Owner explicitly requests claim construction. Pet. 10–11; see Prelim. Resp. Patent Owner’s Preliminary Response raises certain implicit claim construction issues. Additionally, we acknowledge that, in a related litigation, a district court has issued a Markman order construing certain claims of the ’431 patent. Ex. 1016. However, in this instance, no resolution of claim construction issues is necessary to resolve the controversy, and thus, we do not construe any claim terms. See Nidec Motor Corp., 868 F.3d at 1017.” slip op. at 11
- Adverse judgmentOther
“requesting inter partes review of claims 1, 2, 4–12, and 14–20 of U.S. Patent No. 9,100,431 B2. Ex. 1001 (“the ’431 patent”). After the Petition was filed, SecurityProfiling, LLC (“Patent Owner”) filed a Statutory Disclaimer of claims 1, 2, 4–12, and 14–18. See Ex. 2002. Thus, claims 19 and 20 for our consideration.1 Patent Owner also filed a Preliminary Response opposing institution of review as to the remaining challenged claims 19 and 20. Paper 6 (“Prelim. Resp.”).” slip op. at 1
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,100,431 - DISH Network L.L.C. / DISH Technologies L.L.C. et al. v. Sound View Innovations, LLCNo claims unpatentablePTAB · Jan 18, 2022 · IPR2020-01041 · APJ Debra K Stephens · IPR · Final written decision
DISH failed to prove claim 13 unpatentable as obvious over either Durand and Bennett or Goyal and Bennett.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“We regard Petitioner’s formulation of the level of skill as consistent with the prior art before us (see Okajima 261 F.3d 1355). Based on the present record, including the disclosure in the ’456 Patent, we apply Petitioner’s definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art. We determine Petitioner’s asserted level of skill comports with the qualifications a person would have needed to understand and implement the teachings of the ’456 Patent and the prior art of record (cf. Okajima, 261 F.3d at 1355 (the prior art itself may reflect an appropriate level of skill in the art)). As we determine the four instances of “at least” in Petitioner’s formulation introduce ambiguity, we remove these terms from our definition. Accordingly, we determine an ordinarily skilled artisan would have a Bachelor of Science in one of Electrical Engineering, Computer Engineering, Computer Science, or a related field, as well as three to four years of experience in implementing resource reservations for UNIX-based computing systems, or a Master’s degree in Electrical Engineering, or an equivalent field, as well as two years of experience in implementing resource reservations for UNIX-based computing systems.” slip op. at 7
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“We determine that it is not necessary to provide an express interpretation of any terms of claim 13 (Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (only terms that are in controversy need to be construed, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy); Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (applying Vivid Techs. in the context of an inter partes review)).” slip op. at 9
- BurdenNot shown unpatentable
“However, Petitioner has not set forth with specificity where Bennett teaches the request uses the one or more object references. Indeed, Petitioner has not explained how these two teachings of Bennett disclose the recited limitations with sufficient specificity or how one of ordinary skill in the art would modify Durand with these teachings of Bennett to achieve the recited limitations. Accordingly, Petitioner has not established that the combination of Durand and Bennet teaches the subject matter of claim 13. Therefore, based on the entire trial record, we determine Petitioner has not established by a preponderance of the evidence that the subject matter of claim 13 would have been obvious over Durand and Bennet under 35 U.S.C. § 103.” slip op. at 19
- Strike new argumentNew argument disregardedDecided for patent owner
“In its Reply, as noted by Patent Owner (PO Sur-reply 11), Petitioner offers a new theory, pointing to a different system call of Goyal (Pet. Reply 19–20 (citing Ex. 1090 ¶ 144 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 352–354))). Petitioner contends this new argument is to address Patent Owner’s alleged contention that “‘quality of service’ must already be ‘provided’ at the same time when the correspondence to the ‘reference to an object’ is created (Pet. Reply 19 (citing Ex. 1090 ¶ 141)). Thus, in Dr. Negus’ Reply Declaration, Dr. Negus asserts Goyal teaches the recited “quality of service guarantees that correspond to a reference to an object” relying on the “int hsfq_move (int from, int to, .....)” which “is used to move a thread from one leaf node to another”1 (Ex. 1090 ¶ 144). Petitioner’s alleged reliance on the hsfq_move (int from, int to, …….) system call instead of the int hsfq_mknod (char *name, int parent, int weight, int flag, scheduler_id side) system call represents a change in Petitioner’s unpatentability contentions that is presented for the first time in Petitioner’s Reply (see Pet. Reply 19–20). We acknowledge that the Petition mentions a “move” function: “Additionally, system calls are used to remove, move, and administer nodes in the scheduling structure. Goyal also discloses several additional functions to manage the scheduling structure, including removing, moving, and administering nodes.” (Pet. 61 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 350–352 (citing Ex. 1007 § 4))). But the cited portion of Dr. Negus’ Declaration simply states that there are other system calls, including “int hsfq_parse(char *name, int hint),” “int hsfq_rmnod(int id, int 1 We note Dr. Negus refers to the system call as “int hsfq_move” (see e.g., Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 144, 352) although Goyal discloses the system call as “hsfq_move” (Ex. 1007 § 4). We consider Dr. Negus’ naming to refer to the same system call as disclosed in Goyal. mode),” and “int hsfq_admin(int node, int cmd, void *args)” and the system call “‘int hsfq_move(int from, int to, .....)’ which ‘is used to move a thread from one leaf node to another’” (Ex. 1002 ¶ 352; see also id. ¶ 144 (repeating the same information as paragraph 352)). Additionally, these teachings of Goyal are discussed in conjunction with the limitation “utilizing an application programming interface . . . to establish one or more quality of service guarantees” (id. ¶¶ 356, 359). Thus, Dr. Negus’ initial Declaration does not elaborate on the move function, and the Petition does not rely on the “hsfq_move” system call to teach the limitations of claim 13. Petitioner asserts that this argument in reply is to address “Patent Owner’s new claim construction position” (Pet. Reply 19). We disagree. As outlined above, the Petition does not identify where an object reference is “used in the request,” as specifically recited in claim 13. Petitioner’s new reply argument, therefore, attempts to fill in a gap in Petitioner’s unpatentability contentions from the Petition that was pointed out by Patent Owner. Under the circumstances here, we do not consider this a permissible reply argument (see Patent Trial and Appeal Board Consolidated Trial Practice Guide 73 (Nov. 2019), available at https://www.uspto.gov/sites/ default/files/documents/tpgnov.pdf (“Petitioner may not submit new evidence or argument in reply that it could have presented earlier, e.g. to make out a prima facie case of unpatentability.”)). Thus, we do not consider Petitioner’s newly presented contentions.” slip op. at 26
Patent outcomesUS 6,725,456 not shown unpatentableClaim constructioncites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 6,725,456 - PTAB · Dec 22, 2021 · IPR2021-01055 · APJ Kevin F Turner · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR of claims 1–5 and 9–19 on five § 103 grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that at least one challenged claim is unpatentable.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“An inter partes review may be instituted only if “the information presented in the petition . . . and any [preliminary] response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2018). For the reasons given below, Petitioner has established a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in showing the unpatentability of at least one of the challenged claims of the ’766 Patent. Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review of claims 1–5 and 9–19 of the ’766 Patent on the grounds of unpatentability raised in the Petition.” slip op. at 2
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityPrinted publication establishedDecided for petitioner
“For a reference to qualify as a printed publication, “before the critical date the reference must have been sufficiently accessible to the public interested in the art.” Constant v. Advanced Micro-Devices, Inc., 848 F.2d 1560, 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1988). “When there is an established publisher there is a presumption of public accessibility as of the publication date.” VidStream LLC v. Twitter, Inc., 981 F.3d 1060, 1065 (Fed. Cir. 2020); see also Hulu, LLC v. Sound View Innovations, LLC, Case IPR2018-01039, Paper 29 (PTAB Dec. 20, 2019) (precedential) (determining that, based on the totality of the evidence, a reference bearing a copyright date, a printing date, and an ISBN date all earlier than the critical date of the challenged patent, and the reference was a “textbook from an established publisher” provided sufficient indicia at the institution state).” slip op. at 15
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner
“configuration error” With respect to the limitation “configuration error,” Patent Owner asserts that configuration error means “either (1) the condition that occurs when ‘a rule or series of rules is not properly defined and produces an undesired effect’ or (2) ‘a series of improperly defined rules causes a part to be in more than one state at the same time.’” Prelim. Resp. 10 (citing Ex. 1001, 1:54–61; Ex. 2001 ¶ 40). At this stage of the proceeding, we find that Patent Owner’s proposed construction is supported by the ’766 Patent specification, and adopt Patent Owner’s proposed meaning of “configuration error,” with the following remarks with respect to Patent Owner’s additional arguments regarding the claim construction. Patent Owner, however, also argues that “the specification concerns errors internal to the configuration engine and not ‘errors’ that prevent product configurator users from making their desired but impermissible selections.” Prelim. Resp. 10. We do not agree with Patent Owner’s argument because the first part of the construction, namely rules not being properly defined and “produc[ing] an undesired effect,” does not specify anything about an error being “internal” to the configuration engine. The specification provides that such a configuration error “may occur when a rule or series of rules is not properly defined and produces an undesired effect, such as the exclusion of a part that should be selectable” (Ex. 1001, 1:54–61, emphasis added), but the latter clause provides only one example of the undesired effect. We are not persuaded, based on our review of the Specification of the ’766 Patent that “an undesired effect” should be limited to the exclusion of a part. Thus, although Patent Owner argues that “a configuration error is not a condition that occurs when a user attempts to make a choice that is prohibited by a rule” (Prelim. Resp. 11 (citing Ex. 2001 ¶ 43)), at this juncture, we are not persuaded that such a condition would not be an undesired effect, according to the adopted construction. Therefore, we do not further limit the construction of “configuration error.” slip op. at 7
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“II. ANALYSIS Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner, supported by Dr. Wood’s testimony, proposes that a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention would have had “a Bachelor’s degree in Computer Science, Computer or Electrical Engineering, Engineering Science, an engineering major with a significant computational component, or a similar discipline, or with at least two years of research or experience in configurable systems including testing.” Pet. 8 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 53–55). Patent Owner argues that “[t]here may be some differences between this and the correct level of skill in the art but those differences will not affect this case at this stage,” such that Patent Owner applies the proposed level of skill in the art without agreeing to it. Prelim. Resp. 10 (citing Ex. 2001 ¶¶ 35–37). At this stage of the proceeding, we find Petitioner’s proposal consistent with the level of ordinary skill in the art reflected by the prior art of record, see Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001); In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995); In re Oelrich, 579 F.2d 86, 91 (CCPA 1978), and, therefore, we adopt Petitioner’s unopposed position as to the level of ordinary skill in the art for purposes of this decision.” slip op. at 6
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 6,836,766 - Polygroup Services N.A., Inc. v. Willis Electric Co., Ltd.Adverse judgmentPTAB · Dec 17, 2021 · IPR2021-00489 · APJ Jeffrey W Abraham · IPR · Adverse judgment
The Board granted Patent Owner’s unopposed request for adverse judgment and terminated the IPR.
RulingsAdverse judgment- Adverse judgmentAdverse judgmentGranted
“II. DISCUSSION Under 37 C.F.R. § 42.73(b), “[a] party may request judgment against itself at any time during a proceeding.” As permitted by this Rule, Patent Owner has explicitly asked the Board to enter adverse judgment against Patent Owner under 37 C.F.R. § 42.73(b). Paper 11, 1. Having reviewed Patent Owner’s unopposed request for adverse judgment, we determine that entry of judgment against Patent Owner is appropriate. Thus, we grant the request for adverse judgment pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 42.73(b). III. ORDER Accordingly, it is ORDERED that adverse judgment is entered against Patent Owner and this inter partes review is terminated pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 42.73(b).” slip op. at 2
NonePatents in suitUS 9,671,097 - Bright Data Ltd. v. Metacluster LT, UabInstitution deniedPTAB · Dec 1, 2021 · IPR2021-00983 · APJ Debra K Stephens · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because the petition did not show a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on any challenged claim under the asserted anticipation or obviousness grounds.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“(a) THRESHOLD.—The Director may not authorize an inter partes review to be instituted unless the Director determines that the information presented in the petition filed under section 311 and any response filed under section 313 shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level board ownOther
“Patent Owner does not contest Petitioner’s assertion (see generally Prelim. Resp.). The prior art itself demonstrates the level of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention (see Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (explaining that specific findings regarding ordinary skill level are not required “where the prior art itself reflects an appropriate level and a need for testimony is not shown”) (quoting Litton Indus. Prods., Inc. v. Solid State Sys. Corp., 755 F.2d 158, 163 (Fed. Cir. 1985))). in light of Petitioner’s definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art, we determine an ordinarily skilled artisan is: an individual who had (1) a bachelor’s degree or equivalent in the field of Electrical Engineering, Computer Engineering, or Computer Science, or in an equivalent field that includes network engineering as a topic of study (hereinafter, “technical study”), plus at least one year of industry technical experience in the computer network field, such as serving as an engineer for an Internet service provider performing network design, development, or configuration tasks, or as a software developer for network communications software or related utility software, or (2) three years of full-time technical experience in the field of electrical engineering, computer engineering, or computer science or in an equivalent field that includes network engineering or network communications software (hereinafter, “technical fields”), or (3) an equivalent combination of academic study in technical study and work experience in the technical fields.” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Lexicography (patentee as own lexicographer)Term construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner
“Proxy Rotator’ as ‘a system coupled of separate components implementing a specific method and responsible for collecting statistical data, proxy control, rotation, maintenance, and reporting’” (Prelim. Resp. 15 (citing Ex. 1001, 5:4–7)). of separate components implementing a specific method and responsible for collecting statistical data, proxy control, rotation, maintenance, and reporting” (id. at 5:4–7). In accordance with the Specification’s “general terminology description,” we construe the term “Smart Proxy Rotator” as a system coupled of separate components implementing a specific method and responsible for collecting statistical data, proxy control, rotation, maintenance, and reporting.” slip op. at 11
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for patent owner
“construed as “‘the portion of all proxy requests received by the SPR during a time period that the SPR will refer to a particular proxy provider,’ which may be equal to the weight assigned to that particular proxy provider divided by the sum of weights assigned to all proxy providers during the same time period” (Prelim. Resp. 20 (citing Ex. 2003 ¶ 56)). Patent Owner’s definition requiring a “utilization threshold” to be a “portion of all proxy requests received by the SPR during a time period that the SPR will refer to a particular proxy provider” is too narrow. The ’948 Patent does not expressly define the term “utilization threshold,” and, instead, describes utilization thresholds using an example (id. at 8:1–8). The ’948 Patent states [o]ne of the usage examples can be the following: if one provider has a weight equal to 10, and the other provider has a weight equal to 20, the proxy rotator should use the second provider 66.6% of the time and the first provider 33.3% of the time, when no changes to the default providers’ weights have been introduced. These percentages are the utilization thresholds of each provider. threshold is a goal amount of use, not an actual amount of use. A utilization threshold may represent a desired maximum percentage (i.e., proportion), of proxy requests to be referred to a particular proxy provider. Based on the Specification’s use of a “utilization threshold,” we construe the term to mean “a maximum percentage of use assigned to a particular proxy provider that is equal to a weight for the particular proxy provider divided by the sum of respective weights assigned to all proxy providers during the same time period.”” slip op. at 14
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,601,948 - Google LLC / Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. et al. v. Parus Holdings, Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Oct 19, 2021 · IPR2020-00846 · APJ David C Mckone · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1, 2, 4–7, 9, 10, 13, and 14 are unpatentable as obvious over the stated prior-art combinations.
RulingsFinal written decision- BurdenNew argument disregardedDecided for petitioner
“According to our rules, “[a]rguments must not be incorporated by reference from one document into another document.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.6(a)(3). For example, the Board has explained that “parties that incorporate expert testimony by reference in their petitions, motions, or replies without providing explanation of such testimony risk having the testimony not considered by the Board.” Patent Trial and Appeal Board Consolidated Trial Practice Guide 35–36 (November 2019) (“TPG”)3 (citing Cisco Systems, Inc. v. C-Cation Techs., LLC, IPR2014-00454 (PTAB Aug. 29, 2014) (Paper 12) (informative)).” slip op. at 14
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner, relying on the testimony of Mr. Lipoff, contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have had a Bachelor’s Degree in electrical engineering, computer science or a related field, and at least two years of experience with voice interfaces and information processing,” and that “[m]ore education could substitute for less experience, and vice versa.” Pet. 5 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 41–48). Patent Owner does not contest Petitioner’s proposal or offer an alternative. On the complete record, we are persuaded that Petitioner’s proposal is consistent with the technology 7 The complete record does not include allegations or evidence of objective indicia of nonobviousness. described in the Specification and the cited prior art and adopt Petitioner’s proposed level of skill.” slip op. at 26
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of success › Teaching awayTeaching away not foundDecided for petitioner
“proposed combination with Kovatch. PO Resp. 37. According to the Federal Circuit, “[a] reference may be said to teach away when a person of ordinary skill, upon reading the reference, would be discouraged from following the path set out in the reference, or would be led in a direction divergent from the path that was taken by the applicant.” In re Mouttet, 686 F.3d 1322, 1333–34 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting In re Gurley, 27 F.3d 551, 553 (Fed. Cir. 1994)) (alteration in original). However, “the ‘mere disclosure of alternative designs does not teach away.’” Id. at 1334 (quoting In re Fulton, 391 F.3d 1195, 1201 (Fed. Cir. 2004)). Indeed, “just because better alternatives exist in the prior art does not mean that an inferior combination is inapt for obviousness purposes.” Id. (citing Gurley, 27 F.3d at 553). Specifically, Patent Owner (PO Resp. 37), points to disclosure in Neal describing disadvantages of a keyword search strategy (e.g., “users must be familiar with the appropriate key word terms that are likely to yield the desired data records”) and disadvantages of a classification search strategy (e.g., “users may not always anticipate the proper classification of certain records, and may search the wrong categories for their desired database record”). Ex. 1007, 2:16–65. Neal then describes a “preferred embodiment” in which “the system manager will expand the scope of the search strategies from ‘exact’ string matches, along a continuum of search methodologies, including perhaps fuzzy logic strategies.” Id. at 7:14–17. According to Neal, “[t]he purpose of expanding the search strategies is to avoid the situation wherein the search fails to identify the desired item from any data set, and thereby drops into logical block 222 a negative search result is reported to the user.” Id. at 7:28–32. Patent Owner argues that “Neal advocates for employing a sequence of search algorithms from the narrowest to the most broad.” PO Resp. 38 (citing Ex. 1007, 7:56–58; Ex. 2059 ¶ 124). Patent Owner contends that Neal teaches away from a combination “that employs a single keyword matching search strategy.” Id. Patent Owner argues that Petitioner’s combination of Kovatch and Neal results in a system that only sequentially searches datasets using a single keyword matching search strategy, and not the cascading sequence of search methodologies described by Neal. Id. at 37–39. We do not agree with Patent Owner that Neal teaches away from a system that employs a single keyword matching search strategy. Indeed, Neal’s preferred embodiment expressly contemplates such a system. For example, Neal describes employing a first “exact string search” methodology to search a first data set (Figure 2, block 206). Ex. 1007, 6:34– 46. This appears to be what Patent Owner considers a “single keyword matching search strategy.” PO Resp. 37–38. Neal describes that if this search of the first data set does not yield a match, the system searches a second data set using a second search methodology (Figure 2, block 210). Ex. 1007, 6:47–52. However, in the preferred embodiment there is no requirement that the second search methodology in 210 must be different from the first search methodology in 206. For example, if the first preferred supplier did not yield an exact string match to the input search term, the same search methodology could be applied to a second preferred supplier’s catalog. Id. at 6:59–65. Thus, Neal expressly teaches using a single keyword search strategy on a first dataset and the same keyword search strategy on a second dataset, without necessarily employing a cascading sequence of different search methodologies. See Reply 19.” slip op. at 39
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner
“advertisements while waiting for information to be retrieved; rather, it first retrieves the requested information and then generates an audio stream with both the commercials and retrieved information. Reply 22–23 (citing Ex. 1005, 14:1–8, 18:1–15; Ex. 1057 ¶ 18). Petitioner’s characterization of Kovatch is correct (and Patent Owner’s incorrect). Kovatch’s system first navigates to a destination and retrieves requested information (step 6), then generates commercials (step 8), then intermixes the commercials and information (step 9), and finally returns speech to the user (step 10). Ex. 1005, 14:1–8. We find unavailing Patent Owner’s argument that, when combined, Neal’s teachings would have an adverse impact on Kovatch’s generation and presentation of advertisements.” slip op. at 45
Patent outcomesUS 7,076,431 unpatentable§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips · GrahamPatents in suitUS 7,076,431
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.