- Viant Techology LLC v. Intent Iq, LLCAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Oct 14, 2025 · IPR2024-00422 · APJ Scott B Howard · IPR · Final written decision
The Board held claims 1–152 unpatentable based on the asserted obviousness grounds and struck Section II of Petitioner’s reply claim-construction brief.
RulingsFinal written decision- BurdenFwd all claims unpatentableUnpatentable
“Decision issues pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 318(a). For the reasons that follow, we determine that Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the challenged claims are unpatentable.” slip op. at 2
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for petitioner
“1. “Contracted to Display a TV Ad Petitioner argues that the term means “contracted to display any form” slip op. at 14
- Strike new argumentGranted
“FURTHER ORDERED that Section II of Petitioner’s Reply Claim Construction Brief is stricken from the record; and” slip op. at 80
Patent outcomesUS 7,861,260 unpatentableClaim constructioncites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 7,861,260 - Viant Technology, Inc. v. Intent Iq, LLCAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Oct 14, 2025 · IPR2025-00128 · APJ Scott B Howard · IPR · Final written decision
The Board held claims 1–152 unpatentable based on obviousness grounds and struck Section II of Petitioner’s Reply Claim Construction Brief.
RulingsFinal written decision- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner
“1. “Contracted to Display a TV Ad Petitioner argues that the term means “contracted to display any form” slip op. at 14
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successUnpatentableUnpatentable
“d) Conclusion Regarding Claim 1 For the reasons set forth above, Petitioner has demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that the subject matter of claim 1 would have been obvious over Baig, Costa, and Zwicky. 5. Analysis of Claims 2–5, 7–9, 12, 15, 17, 21, 22, 24, 26–28, 31, 32, 34, 37, 42, 44, 53, 54–58, 61, 62, 69, 71–80, 83, 84, 86–88, 91, 94, 96, 100, 101, 103, 106, 116–119, 122, 125, 128, 135, 137– 145, 147, 148, 151, and 152 Petitioner argues that the combination of Baig, Costa, and Zwicky teaches the limitations recited in claims 2–5, 7–9, 12, 15, 17, 21, 22, 24, 26–28, 31, 32, 34, 37, 42, 44, 53, 54–58, 61, 62, 69, 71–80, 83, 84, 86–88, 91, 94, 96, 100, 101, 103, 106, 116–119, 122, 125, 128, 135, 137–145, 147, 148, 151, and 152 and that a person having ordinary skill in the art would have combined the teachings with a reasonable expectation of success. Pet. 28–60; 422Pet. 29–51. Petitioner’s arguments are supported by citations to the prior art and the testimony of Mr. Lett. See Pet. 28–60; 422Pet. 29–51. We have reviewed Petitioner’s arguments and evidence, agree with them, and, therefore, adopt Petitioner’s arguments and evidence as our own. Patent Owner does not separately address those claims. See PO Resp.; 422PO Resp. Instead, Patent Owner only relies on the arguments discussed above for claim 1. See PO Resp. 13–16; 422PO Resp. 13–16. For the same reason as discussed above in Section II.D.4(b), we do not agree with Patent Owner’s arguments regarding the reason to combine the references. Accordingly, Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence” slip op. at 50
- Strike new argumentNew argument disregardedGranted
“F. Sua Sponte Striking Section II of Petitioner’s Reply Claim Construction Brief Our order allowing post-hearing claim construction briefing stated that “[t]he parties may not address any issues besides claim construction.” Paper 38, 1. Despite that order, Section II of Petitioner’s Reply Claim Construction Brief addresses obviousness under Patent Owner’s proposed construction. See Pet. Reply Post-hearing Br. 2–3 (Titled: “The Petition’s Obviousness Theory Renders Claims 121 and 146 Obvious Even Under Patent Owner’s Improper Construction.”). Because the section is in violation of our order, we sua sponte strike that section. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.12.” slip op. at 74
Patent outcomesUS 7,861,260 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 7,861,260 - Viant Techology LLC v. Intent Iq, LLCAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Oct 14, 2025 · IPR2024-00421 · APJ Scott B Howard · IPR · Final written decision
The Board held claims 1–152 unpatentable over the asserted prior art and struck Section II of Petitioner’s reply claim construction brief.
RulingsFinal written decision- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“d) Conclusion Regarding Claim 1 For the reasons set forth above, Petitioner has demonstrated by a” slip op. at 50
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed board ownOther
“1. “Contracted to Display a TV Ad Petitioner argues that the term means “contracted to display any form” slip op. at 14
- Strike new argumentGranted
“F. Sua Sponte Striking Section II of Petitioner’s Reply Claim Construction Brief Our order allowing post-hearing claim construction briefing stated that “[t]he parties may not address any issues besides claim construction.” Paper 38, 1. Despite that order, Section II of Petitioner’s Reply Claim Construction Brief addresses obviousness under Patent Owner’s proposed construction. See Pet. Reply Post-hearing Br. 2–3 (Titled: “The Petition’s Obviousness Theory Renders Claims 121 and 146 Obvious Even Under Patent Owner’s Improper Construction.”). Because the section is in violation of our order, we sua sponte strike that section. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.12.” slip op. at 74
Patent outcomesUS 7,861,260 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 7,861,260 - Ascend Elements, Inc. v. Duesenfeld GmbHInstitution deniedPTAB · Oct 10, 2025 · PGR2025-00037 · APJ Kevin W Cherry · PGR · Institution
The Board denied institution of PGR on claims 1–14 because Petitioner did not show that any challenged claim was more likely than not unpatentable.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“information presented in the petition filed under [35 U.S.C. §] 321 . . . demonstrates that it is more likely than not that at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition is unpatentable.” 35 U.S.C. § 324(a). For the reasons set forth below, we determine that Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that it is more likely than not that at least one of claims 1–14 of the ’463 patent is unpatentable. Accordingly, we deny institution of a postgrant review of claims 1–14 based on the grounds set forth in the Petition.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner contends that one of ordinary skill in the art “would have had at least a Bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, material science, chemical engineering, or an equivalent field, as well as at least 2 to 3 years of academic or industry experience in the recycling or processing of lithiumion batteries. Additional formal education focusing on processing of lithium batteries may substitute for practical experience and additional practical experience can substitute for less education.” Pet. 10–11. Patent Owner does not contest this definition of a person of skill in the art. See Prelim. Resp. 11. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s assessment of the level of ordinary skill in the art, as, on the present record, it appears consistent with the ’463 patent and the asserted prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 8
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedPatent owner expert creditedDecided for patent owner
“distinct from “comminute[ion],” Petitioner offers only the testimony of its expert, Mr. Juzkow, who equates Tomioka’s “cutting” with “comminute[ion].” See Ex. 1003 ¶ 121. However, Mr. Juzkow provides insufficient reasoning to support his conclusion, particularly given the intrinsic and extrinsic evidence discussed above. In contrast, Patent Owner’s expert, Mr. Dantam, provides extensive reasoning, supported by citations to other evidence, to support his conclusion that Tomioka’s “dismantling” is not the claimed “comminution.” Thus, we give more weight to Mr. Dantam’s testimony than Mr. Juzkow’s testimony. Weighing this evidence all together, we find that Petitioner has failed to show that it is more likely than not that Tomioka’s teaches the claimed comminution under Petitioner’s first theory.” slip op. at 15
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundTeaching away not foundNot shown unpatentable
“obvious. Pet. 34–35. However, we agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner has also failed to show that it is more likely than not that Tomioka renders this limitation obvious. See Prelim. Resp. 28–31. To begin with, Petitioner’s contentions lack sufficient reasoning explaining why a person of ordinary skill would have modified Tomioka in the manner proposed. “[R]ejections on obviousness grounds cannot be sustained by mere conclusory statements; instead, there must be some articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of obviousness.” In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006). Petitioner merely asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art could use the roller system in place of the dismantling disclosed for the embodiments in Figures 19 and 20. On this record, we find this bare contention insufficient. actual disclosure of Tomioka. The rollers in Tomioka are used to separate the “battery body” from the “resin package enclosing the battery body,” and Tomioka specifically discloses that this technique is designed to “avoid damaging the battery body.” Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 25, 26, 29; Ex. 2011 ¶¶ 72–73. Thus, there is a significant difference between what Tomioka teaches and what Petitioner proposes to use the roller system to do. In addition, as Patent Owner points out, Tomioka specifically discloses there are risks associated with mechanically crushing battery packs, such as “risk of sparking due to residual voltage if the battery units are damaged in the process.” Ex. 1005 ¶ 5. Although we do not agree with Patent Owner that this amounts to a “teaching away,” see In re Gurley, 27 F.3d 551, 553 (Fed. Cir. 1994), we do believe that this teaching suggests a trade off that should be weighed in determining whether to make the modification, see Medichem S.A. v. Rolabo S.L., 437 F.3d 1157, 1165 (Fed. Cir. 2006). However, Petitioner has failed to account adequately, if at all, for this trade off. Thus, we find that Petitioner has failed to show that it is more likely than not that Tomioka accounts for the claimed “comminuting.”” slip op. at 15
§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips · Graham · NautilusPatents in suitUS 12,119,463 - Google LLC v. Ecofactor, Inc.Adverse judgmentPTAB · Oct 1, 2025 · IPR2025-00097 · APJ Brent M Dougal · IPR · Adverse judgment
The Board granted EcoFactor’s request for adverse judgment after it disclaimed claims 1–18 and terminated the proceeding.
RulingsAdverse judgment- Adverse judgmentAdverse judgmentGranted
“A party before the Board “may request judgment against itself at any time during a proceeding.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.73(b). “Cancellation or disclaimer of a claim such that the party has no remaining claim in the trial” constitutes a request for adverse judgment. 37 C.F.R. § 42.73(b)(2). As all claims of the ’394 Patent have been disclaimed, Patent Owner’s request for adverse judgment is granted, and the proceeding is terminated.” slip op. at 2
NonePatents in suitUS 11,835,394 - Google LLC / Cellco Partnership D/B/A Verizon Wireless et al. v. Headwater Research LLCAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Oct 1, 2025 · IPR2024-00943 · APJ Scott B Howard · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 2–23, 26, 41–60, 63, 64, 91–152, and 155–171 are unpatentable; Rao anticipates some claims, and the stated Rao combinations render the remaining claims obvious.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner argues that a person having ordinary skill in the art “would have at least a bachelor’s degree in computer science, computer engineering, or a similar field, and approximately two years of industry or academic experience in a field related to computer software development and/or computer networking.” Pet. 2 (citing Ex. 1015 ¶¶ 50–52). Petitioner further argues that “[w]ork experience can substitute for education, and additional education can substitute for work experience.” Id. at 2–3 (citing Ex. 1015 ¶¶ 50–52). Because Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art is consistent with the field of the invention of the ’541 patent and not disputed by Patent Owner (see PO Resp.), we adopt Petitioner’s formulation of the person having ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 12
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached
“Petitioner states “[n]o terms require construction to resolve this Petition.” Pet. 3. Patent Owner does not propose any claim constructions. See PO Resp. For the purposes of this Decision, we need not expressly construe any claim terms. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (noting that “we need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 13
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableNot shown unpatentableMixed
“preponderance of the evidence that claim 3 was anticipated by Rao.” slip op. at 25
Patent outcomesUS 8,589,541 unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,589,541 - Google LLC / Cellco Partnership D/B/A Verizon Wireless et al. v. Headwater Research LLCAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Oct 1, 2025 · IPR2024-00942 · APJ Scott B Howard · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 2–23, 26, 41–60, 63, 64, 91–152, and 155–171 are unpatentable; Rao anticipates some claims, and Rao-based combinations render the others obvious.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner argues that a person having ordinary skill in the art “would have at least a bachelor’s degree in computer science, computer engineering, or a similar field, and approximately two years of industry or academic experience in a field related to computer software development and/or computer networking.” Pet. 2 (citing Ex. 1015 ¶¶ 50–52). Petitioner further argues that “[w]ork experience can substitute for education, and additional education can substitute for work experience.” Id. at 2–3 (citing Ex. 1015 ¶¶ 50–52). Because Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art is consistent with the field of the invention of the ’541 patent and not disputed by Patent Owner (see PO Resp.), we adopt Petitioner’s formulation of the person having ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 12
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Petitioner states “[n]o terms require construction to resolve this Petition.” Pet. 3. Patent Owner does not propose any claim constructions. See PO Resp. For the purposes of this Decision, we need not expressly construe any claim terms. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (noting that “we need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 13
- Expert testimonyOther
“157, and 171 are anticipated by Rao. Pet. 1, 19–39, 42. Petitioner’s arguments are supported by citations to the prior art and the testimony of Dr. Wolfe. See id. We have reviewed Petitioner’s arguments and evidence, agree with them, and, therefore, adopt Petitioner’s arguments and evidence as our own.” slip op. at 26
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableNot shown unpatentableMixed
“anticipated by Rao. Pet. 1, 30–31, 33–42. We have reviewed Petitioner’s arguments for each of those dependent claims. See Pet. 30–31, 33–42. For each of those dependent claims, the Petition appears to only argue a theory of obvious. That is, the Petition never states that the additional limitation is disclosed by Rao. See id. For example, claim 26 depends from claim 1 and further recites “wherein the policy is based on a background service class.” Ex. 1001, 112:49–52. We reproduce Petitioner’s arguments directed to claim 26 below: Rao’s policies 520 may “define prioritization” for network packets “based on whether an application is running in the foreground or the background.” [Ex. 1002] ¶ 182; id. ¶¶ 38–43, 180, 182, 188–89, 193, Figs. 5A, 5B. Each packet “may be placed and arranged in a priority order respective to all other . . . packets to provide a packet by packet prioritization across all applications 338a-338n and . . . network packets.” Id. ¶ 191. It would have been obvious to determine and apply a policy assigning a specific priority to packets associated with background applications, supra [1e]-[1f], and Rao thus discloses or renders obvious assigning a priority to network communications based on whether they are characterized as background services (class of services associated with application(s) running in the background of client 105), EX-1015 ¶¶195-96; supra [1e], [1f]. Pet. 33–34. Although the Petition sets forth why the claim limitation would have been obvious, there is no discussion as to how the additional limitation of claim 26—policy based on background class—is disclosed in Rao. See id. Similar arguments are presented for the other claims. See Pet. 30–31, 35–42. Because the Petition does not sufficiently show how the additional limitations recited in claims 20, 26, 58, 64, 165, and 169 were disclosed by Rao, Petitioner has not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that claims 20, 26, 58, 64, 165, and 169 were anticipated by Rao.” slip op. at 28
Patent outcomesUS 8,589,541 unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,589,541 - Commscope Technologies LLC v. Belden Canada UlcAdverse judgmentPTAB · Sep 8, 2025 · IPR2024-01382 · APJ Kimberly Mcgraw · IPR · Adverse judgment
The Board granted Patent Owner’s withdrawal of its motion to amend and entered adverse judgment against all challenged claims after their statutory disclaimer, terminating the IPR.
RulingsAdverse judgment- PTAB / AIA Trials › Motions to amend / substitute claimsMotion to amend, grantedGranted
“In view of the facts presented, including that no decision as to the patentability of the proposed substitute claims has yet been made and Petitioner does not oppose the withdrawal, we grant Patent Owner’s Motion to Withdraw its Motion to Amend.” slip op. at 2
- Adverse judgmentAdverse judgmentGranted
“Under our rules, a party may request adverse judgment against itself at any time during a proceeding, including by disclaiming all claims involved in a trial. 37 C.F.R. §42.73(b). Because Patent Owner’s request to withdraw its Motion to Amend has been granted and Patent Owner has disclaimed all Challenged Claims such that no claims remain in the trial, we grant Patent Owner’s Motion to Terminate by Adverse Judgment.” slip op. at 3
NonePatents in suitUS 11,740,423 - Commscope Technologies LLC v. Belden Canada UlcAdverse judgmentPTAB · Sep 8, 2025 · IPR2024-01228 · APJ Kimberly Mcgraw · IPR · Adverse judgment
The Board granted Patent Owner’s withdrawal of its motion to amend and entered adverse judgment on the disclaimed challenged claims, terminating the IPR.
RulingsAdverse judgment- PTAB / AIA Trials › Motions to amend / substitute claimsMotion to amend, grantedGranted
“In view of the facts presented, including that no decision as to the patentability of the proposed substitute claims has yet been made and Petitioner does not oppose the withdrawal, we grant Patent Owner’s Motion to Withdraw its Motion to Amend.” slip op. at 2
- Adverse judgmentAdverse judgmentGranted
“Under our rules, a party may request adverse judgment against itself at any time during a proceeding, including by disclaiming all claims involved in a trial. 37 C.F.R. §42.73(b). Because Patent Owner’s request to withdraw its Motion to Amend has been granted and Patent Owner has disclaimed all Challenged Claims such that no claims remain in the trial, we grant Patent Owner’s Motion to Terminate by Adverse Judgment.” slip op. at 3
NonePatents in suitUS 11,656,422 - Commscope Technologies LLC v. Belden Canada UlcAdverse judgmentPTAB · Sep 8, 2025 · IPR2024-01227 · APJ Christopher M Kaiser · IPR · Adverse judgment
The Board granted Patent Owner’s withdrawal of its motion to amend and entered adverse judgment after it disclaimed challenged claims 1–5 and 8–13, terminating the IPR.
RulingsAdverse judgment- Adverse judgmentAdverse judgmentGranted
“Under our rules, a party may request adverse judgment against itself at any time during a proceeding, including by disclaiming all claims involved in a trial. 37 C.F.R. §42.73(b). Because Patent Owner’s request to withdraw its Motion to Amend has been granted and Patent Owner has disclaimed all Challenged Claims such that no claims remain in the trial, we grant Patent Owner’s Motion to Terminate by Adverse Judgment.” slip op. at 3
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Motions to amend / substitute claimsMotion to amend, grantedGranted
“In view of the facts presented, including that no decision as to the patentability of the proposed substitute claims has yet been made and Petitioner does not oppose the withdrawal, we grant Patent Owner’s Motion to Withdraw its Motion to Amend.” slip op. at 2
NonePatents in suitUS 11,435,542
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.