- Tanklogix, LLC v. Sitepro, Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Oct 10, 2025 · IPR2025-00653 · APJ Bart A Gerstenblith · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution on all claims because the Petition did not show a reasonable likelihood that any challenged claim was unpatentable over the asserted grounds.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“An inter partes review may be instituted only if “the information presented in the petition . . . and any [preliminary] response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2024). For the reasons given below, on this record Petitioner has not established a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in showing the unpatentability of any of the Challenged Claims. Accordingly, we do not institute an inter partes review.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner
“The parties’ proposed levels of ordinary skill in the art are similar, although Patent Owner proposes two years of experience along with a bachelor’s degree whereas Petitioner proposes “significant” experience. Patent Owner also proposes an alternative with more extensive experience in lieu of a bachelor’s degree. Although we find Petitioner’s proposed qualifications acceptable, we adopt Patent Owner’s proposed qualifications for the purposes of this Decision because they offer a wider range of qualifications that nonetheless comport with the level of ordinary skill necessary to understand and implement the teachings of the ’504 patent and the asserted prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001); In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995); In re Oelrich, 579 F.2d 86, 91 (CCPA 1978). Our analysis and findings herein, however, do not turn on any differences in the parties’ proposed qualifications.” slip op. at 12
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Additionally, only terms that are in controversy need to be construed, and these need be construed only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). The parties assert that each claim term should be construed in accordance with its plain and ordinary meaning. Pet. 9; Prelim. Resp. 4 (citing Ex. 2009 ¶ 72); see Ex. 1002 ¶ 22 (opining the same). And, in the respective claim construction sections of their briefs, the parties do not propose any claim terms for express construction. We agree with the parties that no claim terms require express construction to resolve the controversy before us. See Realtime Data, 912 F.3d at 1375.” slip op. at 13
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner
“Ex. 1002 ¶ 47. As reflected above, Dr. Wooley’s testimony as to element [1.2] does not even assert that Cardamone discloses a tank, let alone one or more sensors disposed at a tank as recited in element [1.2]. Thus, Dr. Wooley’s testimony does not support Petitioner’s argument on this issue.” slip op. at 18
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,726,504 - Tanklogix, LLC v. Sitepro, Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Oct 10, 2025 · IPR2025-00652 · APJ Bart A Gerstenblith · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood that claims 1–23 and 25–30 were unpatentable over the asserted grounds.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsDenied
“presented in the petition . . . and any [preliminary] response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2024). For the reasons given below, on this record Petitioner has not established a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in showing the unpatentability of any of the Challenged Claims. Accordingly, we do not institute an inter partes review.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner
“The parties’ proposed levels of ordinary skill in the art are similar, although Patent Owner proposes two years of experience along with a bachelor’s degree whereas Petitioner proposes “significant” experience. Patent Owner also proposes an alternative with more extensive experience in lieu of a bachelor’s degree. Although we find Petitioner’s proposed qualifications acceptable, we adopt Patent Owner’s proposed qualifications for the purposes of this Decision because they offer a wider range of qualifications that nonetheless comport with the level of ordinary skill necessary to understand and implement the teachings of the ’403 patent and the asserted prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001); In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995); In re Oelrich, 579 F.2d 86, 91 (CCPA 1978). Our analysis and findings herein, however, do not turn on any differences in the parties’ proposed qualifications.” slip op. at 12
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“The parties assert that each claim term should be construed in accordance with its plain and ordinary meaning. Pet. 10; Prelim. Resp. 4 (citing Ex. 2009 ¶ 73); see Ex. 1002 ¶ 22 (opining the same). And, in the respective claim construction sections of their briefs, the parties do not propose any claim terms for express construction. We agree with the parties that no claim terms require express construction to resolve the controversy before us. See Realtime Data, 912 F.3d at 1375.” slip op. at 13
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“We agree with Patent Owner that the Petition fails to demonstrate that Kahn discloses element [1.2] because the evidence cited does not disclose a “first computer system being configured to provide remote control of the first pump or first valve” (i.e., a fluid-handling device). Kahn is directed to providing access to fluid sensing data and analyzing and providing visual information on that data, but Petitioner has not identified any disclosure of the capability to remotely control fluid-handling devices. See, e.g., Ex. 1005, code (54), 1:27–36, 2:50–3:2. More specifically, Kahn’s disclosures that Petitioner relies on for allegedly teaching remote control are deficient. We discuss each. First, Petitioner points to the following, “[f]or instance, as illustrated in FIG. 1C, a fluid control device such as a valve 15A is located on the input side of a sen[s]or unit 110.” Ex. 1005, 8:19–21, cited in Pet. 13. This portion of Kahn, however, does not disclose remote control. Second, Petitioner cites to the following: Finally, or in addition to, the communication unit 112B can include on-site alerts such as optical (indicator lights), audible alerts (e.g., alarm sounds), tactile (e.g., vibration of the unit) or can be interfaced to an appropriate control valve for simply shutting off the supply of fluid upon the detection of emergency events, for instance. Pet. 13 (citing Ex. 1005, 10:62–67). We agree with Patent Owner that this portion of Kahn teaches on-site alerts and local control of the fluid-handling device. See Prelim. Resp. 7. This portion of Kahn does not disclose remote control.” slip op. at 18
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,294,403 - Tanklogix, LLC v. Sitepro, Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Oct 10, 2025 · IPR2025-00651 · APJ Bart A Gerstenblith · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood that claims 1–3, 6, 7, and 9–20 were unpatentable over any asserted ground.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsDenied
“presented in the petition . . . and any [preliminary] response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2024). For the reasons given below, on this record Petitioner has not established a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in showing the unpatentability of any of the Challenged Claims. Accordingly, we do not institute an inter partes review.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner
“The parties’ proposed levels of ordinary skill in the art are similar, although Patent Owner proposes two years of experience along with a bachelor’s degree whereas Petitioner proposes “significant” experience. Patent Owner also proposes an alternative with more extensive experience in lieu of a bachelor’s degree. Although we find Petitioner’s proposed qualifications acceptable, we adopt Patent Owner’s proposed qualifications for the purposes of this Decision because they offer a wider range of qualifications that nonetheless comport with the level of ordinary skill necessary to understand and implement the teachings of the ’680 patent and the asserted prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001); In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995); In re Oelrich, 579 F.2d 86, 91 (CCPA 1978). Our analysis and findings herein, however, do not turn on any differences in the parties’ proposed qualifications.” slip op. at 11
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner
“target value” is part of a command that is sent from a computing device to a server and then to a controller. The controller then receives a measurement of the fluid by a sensor and determines whether the measurement satisfies the “target value.” If the measurement does not satisfy the “target value,” further operations are undertaken. The recited operation sequence makes clear that the plain and ordinary meaning of “target value” is not as Dr. Wooley opines because the particular operating condition that a device is in at a particular time is represented by the measurement taken by the sensor, 11 Some claim language less relevant to construing “target value” was omitted for ease of reference. which the controller then uses to determine whether the measurement satisfies the “target value.” Additionally, claim 1 recites that the “target value” is sent as part of a command to the controller. The “target value” is not sent to the controller from the sensor, as might be expected if the plain and ordinary meaning of “target value” were as Dr. Wooley opines. Petitioner and Dr. Wooley’s construction would also result in “target value” meaning effectively the same thing as the measurement of the fluid by the sensor, a concept that is separately recited in claim 1 and to which the “target value” is compared. The Specification of the ’680 patent does not support Petitioner’s understanding of the plain and ordinary meaning of “target value.” Although the Specification does not recite “target value,” it recites “target state,” and describes “target state” sufficiently to understand the plain and ordinary meaning of “target” as used in “target value” and “target state.” In particular, the ’680 patent explains that “[i]n some embodiments, the process 104 includes receiving, via a network interface, from a remote user device, (e.g., via a command-center server) a command to change a state of a fluid-handling device to a target state.” Ex. 1001, 11:48–51. This portion reflects that the command is seeking to change a state of a fluid-handling device to a target state. In other words, the “target value” or “target state” is not generally “the particular operating condition that a device is in at a particular time”; rather, it is a value or state that the fluid-handling device is desired to be in, as Patent Owner and Dr. Durham explain. Additionally, just as claim 1 recites a directional component for the “target value” to be sent to the controller in a command, so too does the Specification describe a “target state” as being sent in a command from a remote user device. Thus, the Specification clearly supports the plain and ordinary meaning proposed by Patent Owner and Dr. Durham and not the plain and ordinary meaning proposed by Petitioner and Dr. Wooley. slip op. at 14
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“time-stamped process data, report exception therein to the remote host, and extract and transmit time-stamped process data to the remote host.” Ex. 1005, Abst. (emphases added). Almadi explains that its remote field systems must include a plurality of controller units “to issue commands to, and gather and process data from a plurality of field devices, including remote systems and instruments, . . . [and] a database server for the storage of process data retrieved from the remote subsystems and instruments.” Id. at 2:22–30 (emphases added). Based on these disclosures, we agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner has not established that Almadi discloses element [1.4]. Specifically, the teachings from Almadi identified by Petitioner refer to process data, which is data retrieved from the remote subsystems/field devices. Thus, we understand that Almadi’s teaching—of using an Ethernet switch to transmit “process data”—describes transmitting data from the remote subsystems/field devices. See Ex. 1005, 3:13–17, cited in Pet. 15. But claim 1 and particularly element [1.4], recites “sending, with the server, the target value to the network address [which identifies a controller of the fluid-handling device13] via the network,” which is different than sending process data from the field devices to the remote host or database server for storage.” slip op. at 19
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,175,680 - Microchip Technology Inc. v. Aptiv Technologies AGSome claims unpatentablePTAB · Aug 18, 2025 · IPR2024-00495 · APJ Terrence W Mcmillin · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 13 and 14 are unpatentable as obvious over Chang and Chang II; claims 18–20 were not shown unpatentable.
RulingsFinal written decision- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner
“Accordingly, in the context of Chang, a POSITA would have been motivated to implement dual-role ports by including a switch (e.g., multiplexer or crossbar) that connects the dual-role port(s) directly to the hub’s upstream port (when the consumer product is configured as a device, i.e., path 48) or to the hub through the bridge (when the consumer product is configured as host, i.e., path 54. Id. at 40–41 (citing Ex. 1013 ¶¶ 182–187). Petitioner’s argument that a skilled artisan would have been motivated to modify Chang to include switching functionality as taught by Chang II and supported by other substantial evidence appears well-reasoned and well-supported. Petitioner argues that “[a] POSITA would have been further motivated to improve Chang in view of Chang II, because Chang II expressly states its relevance to USB hubs.” Pet. 41 (citing Ex. 1013 ¶ 181; Ex. 1015 ¶¶ 27, 40). And, Petitioner argues that “while Chang discloses little regarding its bridge (EX1014, [0020]), Chang II details various aspects of its bridge (EX1015, Title, Figs. 1-2 and 5).” Id. In support of this argument, the Petition provides: Importantly, Chang II further details exemplary switching for either a host- or device-product: “the main feature is the provision of two different transmission paths, so that by automatically detecting the type of device connected (host or slave) the present invention can switch to the proper transmission path.” EX1015, [0021]. In other words, Chang II describes “switch[ing]” to connect a “bridge” transmission path (when the product is host) or “bypass” path (when the product is device). Id., Figs. 1, 5, [0013]. And Chang II further discloses “detection unit 134” for detecting whether the consumer product is host or device. Id., [0038]. Id. (bracketed material in original, footnote omitted). Petitioner contends that “[a]ccordingly, a POSITA would have been motivated, with a high expectation of success, to route the dual-role ports (and products attached thereto) to the appropriate path using a switch.” Id. at 41–42. We determine that this contention is well-reasoned and well-supported. Patent Owner challenges on several grounds the showing regarding” slip op. at 51
- Obviousness (§103) › Objective indicia / secondary considerations › NexusObjective indicia no nexusDecided for petitioner
“Id. As discussed above, we determine that any alleged commercial success secondary consideration evidence has not been established to have a nexus to the claimed invention. Accordingly, we consider the evidence of commercial success but accord it little weight in our overall obviousness determination.” slip op. at 60
- Obviousness (§103) › Objective indicia / secondary considerationsNot shown unpatentableDecided for petitioner
“Id. As discussed above, we determine that any alleged commercial success secondary consideration evidence has not been established to have a nexus to the claimed invention. Accordingly, we consider the evidence of commercial success but accord it little weight in our overall obviousness determination.” slip op. at 60
- Strike new argumentDenied
“because the Reply improperly presents new theories of unpatentability with belated supporting evidence that could have been present in the Petition itself.” Paper 37, 1. Patent Owner contends that, in response to an argument Patent Owner made in the Response that “Petitioner’s proposed prior art combination features a structural flaw” (id. at 2), Petitioner’s Reply improperly presents a new argument not found in the Petition (id. at 3–6). As discussed supra (section II.E.3.a.), we determine that, because Patent Owner’s structural flaw argument fails, we do not reach the alleged new argument and evidence that Patent Owner seeks to strike. Accordingly, this motion is moot.” slip op. at 77
Patent outcomesUS 9,619,420 mixed§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,619,420 - Microchip Technology Inc. v. Aptiv Technologies AGAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Jul 30, 2025 · IPR2024-00230 · APJ John D Hamann · IPR · Final written decision
Claim 1 is unpatentable as obvious over Chang and Chang II; the Board did not reach the Chang, Chang II, and Chutorash ground.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner
“We agree with Patent Owner and find that “computer network protocols” is correct in light of the ’072 patent’s disclosure and claim 1. In particular, the ’072 patent teaches that it “generally relates to [USB] connectivity between, for example, mobile consumer devices and vehicle electronic systems.” Ex. 1009, 1:21–23. And the ’072 patent’s teachings focus on common network components (e.g., hub, bridge, ports) and common networking concepts (e.g., master/slave network architecture and bridging) which are used in the USB context, rather than detailed aspects (e.g., signal timing, signal levels, power levels) of the USB protocol. See generally Ex. 1009; see also Ex. 1084, 103:21–104:2, 104:24–105:4; Pet. Reply 4 (citing Ex. 1084,7 100:17–101:12 (acknowledging that Dr. Houh testifies that one of ordinary skill in the art “would know basic USB concepts like bridging, master/slave architecture, etc.”), 102:3–8, 103:21– 104:2, 104:24–105:4). Likewise, claim 1 repeatedly recites “USB,” but does so to identify that all of the components of the data system (i.e., USB ports, USB hub, USB bridge, USB host, USB multiplexing switches) employ the USB protocol. Ex. 1009, 9:15–10:18. As the ’072 patent teaches, “USB 7 Houh Deposition Tr. (2024/12/18, Day 1). technology . . . [wa]s commonly available, familiar to the end user, cost effective and ubiquitous.” Id. at 1:35–37. Thus, although the ’072 patent is taught in the USB context, “computer network protocols” concepts are the focus. For these same reasons, we find unavailing Petitioner’s argument that one of ordinary skill in the art “would have been well-versed in USB standards (including the USB 2.0 and 3.0 Specifications and the OTG Supplement) and the design/deployment of USB hosts, USB devices, and USB hubs, including suitable environments for USB systems.” Pet. 26.” slip op. at 11
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedOther
“Lastly, we give little weight to Mr. Welch’s testimony regarding the level of one of ordinary skill as he does not indicate what precisely constitutes the basis of his testimony on this issue. See Ex. 1013 ¶ 47.” slip op. at 12
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Here, Petitioner argues that “embedded USB host” means “USB host physically embedded in a vehicle.” See Pet. 27–28. “Patent Owner does not contend that any claim construction is required.” PO Resp. 5. We agree with Patent Owner that we do not need to construe any term to resolve the disputes between the parties. See, e.g., Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)) (“[W]e need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”). And we afford the claim terms their plain and ordinary meaning.” slip op. at 13
- Obviousness (§103) › Objective indicia / secondary considerations › NexusObjective indicia no nexusDecided for petitioner
“that the asserted objective evidence is tied to a specific product that ‘embodies the claimed features, and is coextensive with them.’” Id. (quoting Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Philip Morris, Inc., 229 F.3d 1120, 1130 (Fed. Cir. 2000)). In other words, “[a] presumption of nexus requires both that the product embodies the invention and is coextensive with it.” Id. at 1211 (citing Brown, 229 F.3d at 1130). Patent Owner fails to show either of these requirements. First, Patent Owner argues that in his Supplemental Declaration, Dr. Houh “provides on a per limitation basis how [Patent Owner]’s dual role hub meets all limitations of claim 1.” PO Resp. 73 (citing Ex. 2019 ¶ 136). Notably, Patent Owner cites to a single paragraph in this declaration, without providing any specific arguments in its Response that its product practices claim 1. Id. Rather, Patent Owner incorporates its arguments by reference, which is not permitted. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.6(a)(3) (“Arguments must not be incorporated by reference from one document into another document.”). Thus, we do not consider these arguments, and we are not persuaded that Patent Owner’s product practices claim 1. Consolidated Trial Practice Guide November 2019,8 35–36 (citing Cisco Systems, Inc. v. C-Cation Techs., LLC, IPR2014-00454, Paper 12 (PTAB Aug. 29, 2014) (informative)) (“[P]arties that incorporate expert testimony by reference in their petitions . . . without providing explanation of such testimony risk having the testimony not considered by the Board.”).” slip op. at 16
Patent outcomesUS 11,176,072 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,176,072 - Tesla, Inc. v. Iqar Inc.Some claims unpatentablePTAB · Jul 25, 2025 · IPR2024-00545 · APJ Sean P O’Hanlon · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–6, 8–15, 17, and 18 are unpatentable as obvious over Neiss or Neiss and Hirasago; claims 7 and 16 were not shown unpatentable.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner contends that a person having ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention (“POSITA”) would have had “a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, mechanical engineering (including automotive engineering), civil engineering (transportation systems), physics, or a related field, and at least four years of experience (or the academic equivalent) in the field of transportation systems.” Pet. 2–3. Petitioner contends that “[a]dditional education could substitute for professional experience, and vice versa.” Id. at 3 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 1–19, 24–26; Ex. 1004). Patent Owner “does not dispute” Petitioner’s definition of the level of ordinary skill. See generally PO Resp. We find Petitioner’s definition to be consistent with the problems and solutions disclosed in the patent and prior art of record, and adopt it as our own for purposes of this Decision. See, e.g., In re GPAC, 57 F.3d at 1579 (approving the determination of the level of ordinary skill in the art by appeal to the references of record).” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for petitioner
“We disagree with Patent Owner’s interpretation of column 13, lines 40–44 of the ’161 patent to mean that a route may not have both an ending position or an intermediate position, but will have at least one of these positions. See PO Resp. 21. Patent Owner interprets “typically” in “[t]he route used by the power management device typically includes a starting position . . . , an ending position, . . . , and any intermediate positions between the initial and the final positions” to apply to either “an ending position” or “any intermediate positions” (that is, an intermediate destination) but not to both. We see no grammatical reason to limit “typically” in this manner. Rather, the plain meaning of the quoted sentence suggests that, although not typical, a route may not contain an ending position, be that a final position or an intermediate position.” slip op. at 17
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“We agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner has not explained adequately how a driver’s previously driven speed or the speed limit is an efficient speed. Rather than explaining how the Schramm-Clapper system would sum efficient speeds, Petitioner merely asserts that “the set speeds for the energy-optimum route’s segments correspond to a plurality of efficient speeds.” Pet. 78 (emphasis omitted). Petitioner’s witness, Dr. Papanikolopoulos, makes substantially the same assertion. See Ex. 1003 ¶ 263. But neither Petitioner nor its witness explains adequately how a previously driven speed or the speed limit is an efficient speed. Patent Owner presents persuasive arguments as to why these speeds are not efficient. See PO Resp. 32–33 (citing Ex. 2003 ¶¶ 198–204, 208–214). Patent Owner’s contentions are supported by Dr. Hoff’s testimony. See, e.g., Ex. 2003 ¶¶ 211–218. Stated differently, although Petitioner explains how the Schramm-Clapper system would select the best summation of calculated energy values required to travel at selected speeds from among Schramm’s routes, Petitioner has not explained sufficiently how the selected speeds are efficient speeds. For the foregoing reasons, on this record, Petitioner has not shown, by a preponderance of the evidence, that claim 1 or its dependent claims 3 and 6–9 would have been obvious in view of the combination of Schramm and Clapper. Petitioner relies on the same contentions regarding the identical language recited in independent claim 10 (see Pet. 93), and so, for the same reasons, has failed to show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that claim 10 or its dependent claims 12, 13, and 15–18 would have been obvious in view of the combination of Schramm and Clapper.” slip op. at 36
- Expert testimonyPatent owner expert creditedDecided for patent owner
“We agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner has not explained adequately how a driver’s previously driven speed or the speed limit is an efficient speed. Rather than explaining how the Schramm-Clapper system would sum efficient speeds, Petitioner merely asserts that “the set speeds for the energy-optimum route’s segments correspond to a plurality of efficient speeds.” Pet. 78 (emphasis omitted). Petitioner’s witness, Dr. Papanikolopoulos, makes substantially the same assertion. See Ex. 1003 ¶ 263. But neither Petitioner nor its witness explains adequately how a previously driven speed or the speed limit is an efficient speed. Patent Owner presents persuasive arguments as to why these speeds are not efficient. See PO Resp. 32–33 (citing Ex. 2003 ¶¶ 198–204, 208–214). Patent Owner’s contentions are supported by Dr. Hoff’s testimony. See, e.g., Ex. 2003 ¶¶ 211–218. Stated differently, although Petitioner explains how the Schramm-Clapper system would select the best summation of calculated energy values required to travel at selected speeds from among Schramm’s routes, Petitioner has not explained sufficiently how the selected speeds are efficient speeds.” slip op. at 36
Patent outcomesUS 8,972,161 mixedClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,972,161 - PTAB · Jul 24, 2025 · IPR2025-00339 · APJ Kristen L Droesch · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–3, 10–12, 22–25, 28, 30, 32, and 33 on all petitioned grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that at least one challenged claim is obvious.
RulingsInstitution decision- Director reviewOther
“Memorandum (“Memorandum”) issued on March 26, 2025, Patent Owner filed its Discretionary Denial Brief on March 28, 2025. Paper 7. Petitioner filed its Opposition Brief on May 20, 2025. Paper 9. On June 13, 2025, Acting Director Stewart issued a decision determining that discretionary denial of institution is not appropriate in this case and referring the Petition to us for merits and other non-discretionary statutory considerations. Paper 10.” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“For the reasons provided below, we determine, based on the record before us, there is a reasonable likelihood Petitioner would prevail in showing at least one of the challenged claims is unpatentable.” slip op. at 3
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached
“We do not agree with Patent Owner’s proposed claim construction because, as pointed out by Petitioner, claim 1 does not recite limitations directed to the resolution of the source data of a frame that is to be combined “to provide an image having a relatively high resolution.” We also do not agree with Patent Owner’s arguments that claims should not be read to encompass prior art distinguished in the specification based on Patent Owner’s citations to the Background passages of the ’180 Patent. The cited passages disclose foveal image sensors for acquiring both a wide and narrow field of view and having smaller pixel sizes arranged in the central foveal region and larger pixel sizes arranged in peripheral rings about the central region, resulting in sensors that have a high resolution only in the narrow field of view. Consistent with Petitioner’s observation (see Prelim. Reply 2–3), this cited passage at best distinguishes prior art foveal sensors with smaller pixel sizes arranged in the central foveal region and larger pixel sizes arranged in peripheral rings about the central region. See Ex. 1001, 2:10–24. Finally, we do not agree with Patent Owner’s arguments regarding the prosecution history. Patent Owner does not direct us to persuasive absent any statements by the Applicant regarding that applied prior art, amounts to prosecution history disclaimer. Aside from declining to adopt Patent Owner’s proposed construction, for the purpose of institution we need not explicitly construe “combine data of a frame from at least one of the plurality of channels to provide an image having relatively high resolution,” as recited in claim 1. See Realtime, 912 F.3d at 1375. 3. Other claim terms and phrases Petitioner also proposes a construction for “data of a frame,” recited in claim 1. See Pet. 8. Patent Owner does not specifically address this claim construction. See Prelim. Resp. 23–30. For the purpose of institution, we need not explicitly construe “data of a frame” or any other claim term or phrase. See Realtime, 912 F.3d at 1375.” slip op. at 12
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have had a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or a related field and 2-3 years of experience in digital imaging systems,” and that “[l]ess experience may be necessary with additional education, and likewise, less education may be necessary with additional work experience.” Pet. 6 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 16–19). Patent Owner proposes a similar level of skill in the art as Petitioner, namely, that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have had a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer science, computer engineering, physics, or a related subject, and two to three years of work experience in digital imaging.” Prelim. Resp. 31 (citing Ex. 2013 ¶ 80). person of ordinary skill in the art because it is consistent with the level of skill reflected by the ’180 Patent Specification and the asserted prior art.” slip op. at 13
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 7,916,180 - Tesla, Inc. v. The United States Of America As Represented By The Secretary Of The Navy (Intellectual Ventures II LLC)Institution deniedPTAB · Jul 24, 2025 · IPR2025-00341 · APJ Aaron W Moore · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because Tesla had not shown a reasonable likelihood that claims 10, 11, 14, 16, and 18 were unpatentable over the asserted obviousness grounds.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“Institution of an inter partes review is authorized when “the information presented in the petition . . . and any response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a); see 37 C.F.R. § 42.108. Having considered the Petition, the Preliminary Response, the Reply, and the Sur-reply, as well as the evidence of record, we conclude that Petitioner has not shown a reasonable likelihood that it will prevail in establishing the unpatentability of claims 10, 11, 14, 16, and 18 of the ’743 patent. We accordingly do not institute inter partes review. A.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have “been someone knowledgeable and familiar with the areas of networking and distributed computing that are pertinent to the ’743 patent,” would “have a bachelor’s degree in computer science, computer engineering, electrical engineering, or equivalent training, and approximately 2-3 years of professional experience relating to distributed computing,” and that a “[l]ack of professional experience can be remedied by additional education, and vice versa.” Pet. 17 (citing Ex.1003, ¶¶ 32-34). Patent Owner does not address this issue in the Preliminary Response. As Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s characterization of the level of skill in the art, we adopt it for purposes of this analysis. B.” slip op. at 7
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner
“of “event,” in which Petitioner argued that the term should be broad enough to include “processing radar sensor data, performing radar tracking initialization and refinement, and distributing radar tracking information to other modules,” and Patent Owner argued that the specification uses the term as “as an umbrella term to cover various types of ‘internal event and performance data’ such as ‘application statuses, states, performance, and internally detected errors.’” Reply 1; Sur-reply 2. We agree with Patent Owner that that claimed “events” must concern “application statuses, states, performance, and internally detected errors.” See Ex. 1001, 7:44–45. The patent explains that function group 2 collects that type of information from applications using an API and then “correlate[es], combin[es], and reformat[s] [the] application data into higherlevel metrics (composite events) for use by displays or other Resource Management components.” Id. at 7:52–54. The middleware described and claimed in the ’743 is concerned with how applications are performing, not what they doing.” slip op. at 13
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“This claim limitation, however, also requires “event correlation capabilities.” For that, Petitioner asserts that “Welch’s metrics calculation component (part of the ‘second function group’) provides ‘event correlation capabilities’ because the QoS management software “implementation includes the following capabilities: . . . (2) track correlation and filtering algorithms.” Pet. 44–45 (citing Ex. 1003, 4). This, we find, mischaracterizes Welch’s disclosure, because Welch’s metrics calculation component does not perform the identified “correlation.” The language quoted by Petitioner comes from the experimental results section of Welch, which describes how the implementation of the NSWC HiPer-D testbed, the system that was used test Welch’s QoS middleware, included “track correlation and filtering algorithms.” Ex. 1005, 4. Welch is not explaining that the middleware correlates the QoS system level events that Petitioner has identified as the claimed “events,” but, instead, that the NSWC HiPer-D system that was used to test the middleware included the ability to correlate radar data in a shipboard anti-air-warfare system.6 The correlating mentioned in Welch occurs at the application level, not in the middleware.” slip op. at 12
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 7,181,743 - PTAB · Jul 22, 2025 · IPR2025-00342 · APJ Jason W Melvin · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR of claims 1, 2, and 6–11 based on the asserted obviousness grounds over Broggi, Huttenlocher, and Brady, with or without Bertozzi.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“An inter partes review may not be instituted unless “the information presented in the petition . . . and any response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). For the reasons set forth below, we institute review.” slip op. at 2
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“We agree with Petitioner. The specification broadly states that the invention is “for assisting a motor vehicle guidance on the basis of image data” and raises “maneuvering trucks toward docking stations” as a “particular” application. E.g., Ex. 1001, 1:6–8. Similarly, it refers to a docking station for trucks as a “typical destination” used only “for example.” Id. at 3:43–44. Patent Owner does not point to anything in the prosecution history that would inform the construction of “potential destination.” The intrinsic record does not support Patent Owner’s narrow construction. Thus, for purposes of this decision, we do not construe “potential destination” as limited to a fixed location. No other aspect of the construction affects our determination whether to institute.” slip op. at 8
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundInstituted
“Petitioner reasons that skilled artisans would have been motivated to use Huttenlocher’s pattern-matching technique as part of Broggi’s vehicle-detection method because Broggi suggests using a “traditional pattern matching technique.” Pet. 16–17. Further, Petitioner reasons, the combination would result in “improved vehicle detection and efficient use of processing resources.” Id. at 18 (citing Ex. 1006, 23; Ex. 1003 ¶ 62). For the claimed storing step, Petitioner relies additionally on Brady. Id. at 54–56. Brady discloses a visual vehicle-tracking system that keeps “a vehicle log 102 of all vehicles currently within the scene, including vehicles’ associated track histories, inertial history 104 of the scene . . . and potential future track positions.” Ex. 1007, 11:21–26. Petitioner reasons that skilled artisans would have had reason to use Brady’s teachings as asserted because “Broggi omits implementation details how the associated data is processed and stored” and because the combination “would improve Broggi’s platooning through accurate and consistent tracking of the preceding vehicle positions used in the associated vehicle path determinations, thereby improving the user experience during platooning.” Pet. 20–21 (citing Ex. 1007, 11:21–25; Ex. 1003 ¶ 67).” slip op. at 13
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableInstituted
“Patent Owner challenges Petitioner’s reliance on Broggi as relating to platooning rather than guidance to a fixed endpoint. Prelim. Resp. 21–38. All of Patent Owner’s arguments in that regard depend on us adopting Patent Owner proposed construction for “potential destination.” Id. As discussed above, we do not agree that the claimed potential destinations should be limited to fixed locations. See supra at 7–8 (§ II.B.1). Accordingly, we do not agree with Patent Owner’s arguments regarding platooning rather than guidance to a fixed endpoint. Although Patent Owner asserts that Broggi also does not calculate an “optimized path” as claimed (Prelim. Resp. 29–33), that argument similarly depends on a construction for “potential destination” that is limited to fixed locations. See id. at 31 (arguing that the “car taught in Broggi cannot calculate an ‘optimized path’” because it “has absolutely no knowledge of the destination for the platoon”), 32 (“[I]n Broggi, the ARGO does not calculate a path to a destination because it doesn’t have any knowledge regarding the destination of the preceding car.”). We do not agree with Patent Owner’s argument because, as discussed, the challenged claims do not require an optimized path to a fixed location, but instead read on an optimized path to a transitory location, such as the location of Broggi’s preceding vehicle at a given time. We agree with Petitioner that Broggi teaches an optimized path because it generates steering commands that lead toward the preceding vehicle and because those commands consider the steered vehicle’s capabilities. See Pet. 34–35. Additionally, Patent Owner challenges Petitioner’s reliance on Huttenlocher as failing to disclose the claimed “mathematical tree structure.” Prelim. Resp. 38–62. All of Patent Owner’s arguments in that regard depend on us adopting Patent Owner’s proposed construction for “mathematical tree structure.” Id. As discussed above, we do not agree that the claimed mathematical tree structure is limited to a single tree. See supra at 8–10 (§ II.B.2). Accordingly, we do not agree with Patent Owner’s arguments regarding Huttenlocher’s tree structure. Patent Owner does not otherwise challenger Petitioner’s contentions based on Broggi, Huttenlocher, and Brady. We have reviewed Petitioner’s contentions and evidence, and conclude on the present record that Petitioner is likely to prevail with the unpatentability of claims 6–8 and 11. D. OBVIOUSNESS OVER BROGGI, HUTTENLOCHER, BRADY, AND BERTOZZI” slip op. at 14
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 7,336,805 - Tesla, Inc. v. Iqar Inc.Some claims unpatentablePTAB · Jul 21, 2025 · IPR2024-00543 · APJ Sean P O’Hanlon · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–7, 9–17, 19, and 20 are unpatentable as obvious; claims 8 and 18 were not shown unpatentable because Newstrom’s database was not shown to be remote.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level board ownDecided for petitioner
“Patent Owner does not contest Dr. Morellas’s proposed definition or proffer a definition of its own. See generally PO Resp.; see also Ex. 2007 ¶ 43 (setting forth a substantially similar definition as Dr. Morellas). We find Dr. Morellas’s unopposed definition to be consistent with the problems and solutions disclosed in the patent and prior art of record, and adopt it as our own for purposes of this Decision. See, e.g., In re GPAC, 57 F.3d at 1579 (approving the determination of the level of ordinary skill in the art by appeal to the references of record).” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for patent owner
“We disagree with Patent Owner’s assertion that claim 1 requires that a route from the vehicle’s current position to a final destination must be known. See PO Resp. 7. Initially, claim 1 does not recite “destination.” Instead, claim 1 recites only “determining a segment of a vehicle route.” Ex. 1001, 27:44 (emphasis added). Nor does the ’399 patent specification require the interpretation proffered by Patent Owner. Notably, the ’399 patent discloses that the power management device may rely on historical route information to optimize the energy used to travel each segment of a route. Ex. 1001, 17:39–43, 17:64–67. Such reliance on historical data beneficially reduces the amount of required computing power. Id. at 18:5–9. Under this approach, “the location of the vehicle is periodically determined” and “used to determine[] a historical segment corresponding to the current location.” Id. at 18:30–33 (emphasis added). If the vehicle has moved into a new route segment, the historical data is queried to determine the most efficient speed to travel for the current segment. Id. at 18:39–56. Thus, the ’399 patent explicitly discloses calculating and applying power to a vehicle based on the route segment in which the vehicle is currently traveling. See id. at 18:64–67 (“The flowchart shown in FIG. 5 illustrates a continuous process, in which the power management device can determine a probable optimal speed as the current segment changes (e.g., as the vehicle moves).”), Fig. 5. Furthermore, the ’399 patent explains that “[t]he route used by the power management device typically includes a starting position . . . , an ending position, . . . , and any intermediate positions between the initial and the final positions.” Id. at 14:6–10 (emphasis added). Notably, the ’399 patent sometimes refers to the “entire route,” indicating that use of “route” in the claims does not necessarily mean the entire route. Indeed, the ’399 patent explains that, “[i]n some variations, the entire route (or the entire predicted route) may be divided up into N segments” and “[i]n some variations, probable optimal speeds may be identified for the entire route.” Ex. 1001, 14:38–39, 19:1–2 (emphases added). This strongly suggests that, in some other variations, the entire route is not divided into segments and optimal speeds are not identified for the entire route, further indicating that the recited “route” is not the entire path the vehicle will take. Therefore, we find that the ’399 patent contemplates routes that, although not typical, do not include an ending position. Moreover, to the extent a destination is required, the ’399 patent discloses that the destination can be derived based on the vehicle’s location or driving history, and there can be multiple “likely destinations” and the system can “continuously infer the vehicle’s destination” and the probable destination “may constantly change to revise the destination” while the vehicle is traveling along the route. Ex. 1001, 12:16–59. Contrary to Patent Owner’s arguments, neither the claim language nor the specification of the ’399 patent requires the route be predetermined or extend from the vehicle’s current position to a final destination.” slip op. at 16
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“have been obvious in view of Hongo, Obradovich, and Niki. Pet. 4–62. In support of its showing, Petitioner relies upon the Morellas Declaration. Id. (citing Ex. 1003). We have reviewed the parties’ briefs and the evidence of record and determine that, for the reasons explained below, Petitioner has shown, by a preponderance of the evidence, that claims 1, 2, 5, 6, 9–12, 15, 16, 19, and 20 would have been obvious in view of Hongo, Obradovich, and Niki and that Petitioner has set forth reasoning with rational underpinning why it would have been obvious to combine the teachings of these references.” slip op. at 10
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner
“limiting, Hongo and Niki support Petitioner’s contentions. We determine that Petitioner sets forth reasoning with rational underpinning as to why a person having ordinary skill in the art would have combined the teachings of Hongo and Niki. See, e.g., Pet. 21–23 (arguing that the modification “would have involved choosing from a finite number of identified, predictable solutions, with a reasonable expectation of success” and “Niki’s teachings and/or suggestions improve vehicle control in the Hongo vehicle”).” slip op. at 14
Patent outcomesUS 10,882,399 mixedClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,882,399
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.