- Merck Sharp & Dohme LLC v. Halozyme, Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · May 12, 2026 · PGR2025-00003 · APJ Jeffrey N Fredman · PGR · Final written decision
Claims 1–4 and 8–21 are unpatentable for lack of written description and enablement; obviousness over the ’429 patent and Chao was not shown.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level board ownOther
“VII. LEVEL OF ORDINARY SKILL IN THE ART We consider the grounds of unpatentability in view of the” slip op. at 7
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“term “modified PH20 polypeptide” in the ’600 patent supports the understanding that some type of activity is required for a polypeptide to be a “modified PH20 polypeptide”, and that the enzymatic activity of hyaluronidase is the most frequently identified activity recited in the definitions section of the ’600 patent. Id. at 48:38–53, 50:9‒17, 51:15‒18, 52:41–47, 55:9–23, 63:37–44, 64:14–19. In contrast, the discussion regarding the potential use of “modified PH20 polypeptides that are inactive” as antigens in contraception vaccines appears only in a non-definitional section of the ’600 patent. Id. at 75:56–58, 72:60–62. Accordingly, it does not modify the definition’s explicit requirement that the claimed “modified PH20 polypeptide” exhibit hyaluronidase activity. Id. at 48:38–53.” slip op. at 19
- Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Written description inadequateUnpatentable
“been able to use the data in the Specification to make reasonable predictions about the effect of multiple modifications on hyaluronidase activity, we view this testimony to at most describe a research plan (i.e., a “tool to engage in further modification”14) for finding the recited polypeptides rather than demonstrating the inventors were in possession of the full scope claimed. This is particularly so given the limits of the then-available analytical tools noted above and the fact that the structural connections and three dimensional modeling Patent Owner’s experts attempt to make (see, e.g., Ex. 2070 ¶¶ 129–213; Ex. 2068 ¶ 123) do not appear in the written description itself. To the extent the experts disagree on this point, we credit the testimony of Petitioner’s experts over that of Patent Owner’s. For these reasons, we find that a preponderance of the evidence of record better supports a finding that in the 2011–12 timeframe, it would have been unpredictable to identify which multiple mutants retained hyaluronidase activity, even with the single substitution data provided by the ’600 patent.” slip op. at 51
- Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Enablement (Wands, Amgen full scope)Not enabledUnpatentable
“8. Conclusion We find that the balance of evidence supports a finding of undue” slip op. at 101
Patent outcomesUS 11,952,600 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,952,600 - Tableau Software, LLC v. Icharts LLCAll claims unpatentablePTAB · May 7, 2026 · IPR2024-01387 · APJ Iftikhar Ahmed · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–16 are unpatentable under the instituted obviousness grounds, including Becerra, the QlikView Manuals, and combinations with other references.
RulingsFinal written decision- ExcludeMotion to exclude, grantedMotion to exclude, deniedGranted in part
“why it is trustworthy and how it archives dates by which the webpages were accessible, as this is an information resource on which librarians reasonably rely. See FED. R. EVID. 703. We agree with Petitioner that Dr. Hall-Ellis does have personal knowledge of the facts stated in the remaining testimony (e.g., what she actually downloaded from websites), and that FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE 602 is inapplicable to her testimony offered as an expert. See Pet. Opp. 5–6 (citing Ex. 1030 ¶¶ 26, 29–32, 35, 37–39). We find her testimony to be relevant to the issues presented and specifically to whether the QlikView documents were publicly accessible. We also find no danger that the testimony would confuse the issues or mislead the Board or present unfair prejudice to Patent Owner. Accordingly, we deny Patent Owner’s Motion as to the remaining portion of Dr. Hall-Ellis’s declaration.” slip op. at 92
- Strike new argumentNew argument disregardedGranted
“FURTHER ORDERED that Petitioner’s Motion to Strike portions of Patent Owner’s Reply on its Motion to Exclude (Paper 32) is granted; and” slip op. at 102
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundUnpatentable
“1. Motivation to Combine Becerra and Couckuyt Petitioner argues that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to combine the teachings of Becerra and Couckuyt because such a person would have recognized that Couckuyt discloses useful techniques of assigning data to Becerra’s charts, including assigning data to each axis. Pet. 34 (citing Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 19, 52, Fig. 5; Ex. 1003 ¶ 224). Petitioner contends that Couckuyt discloses associating data from a “spreadsheet document” with a chart, such as a “bar graph.” Id. at 35 (citing Ex. 1006, 6:1–37; Figs. 3a, 3c). below. Petitioner’s annotations to Figure 4 identify “Drop Zones” in red and “Data Fields” in Blue. Id. at 36. Petitioner contends Couckuyt discloses a “drag-and-drop user interface (DDUI) . . . associated with a data source, such as the two-dimensional data source 300,” and Figure 4 illustrates the DDUI permitting “value data fields and the characteristic data fields . . . to be dragged and dropped into drop zones.” Id. at 35–36 (citing Ex. 1006, 7:10–13). Petitioner contends that a “primary benefit of the charting DDUI is that the user can quickly change the data that is being presented in the chart,” and using Couckuyt’s techniques, a user can “quickly change the data” and see the desired effects. Id. at 36 (citing Ex. 1006, 1:18–19; Ex. 1003 ¶ 228). Petitioner contends that when Becerra’s control panel includes multiple charts, Couckuyt’s techniques would allow dragging-anddropping data from a data source to multiple charts, and would simplify the process of assigning data to multiple control panel components. Id. at 36–37 skill in the art would have also had a reasonable expectation of success combining Becerra with Couckuyt because the combination would amount to nothing more than incorporating Couckuyt’s well-known drag-and-drop techniques into Becerra’s system. Id. at 37 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 229–231). Patent Owner responds that Couckuyt focuses on selecting a data icon that corresponds to dragging and dropping data fields, not dragging and dropping data, while Becerra teaches that selecting various data ranges from the spreadsheet is desirable. PO Resp. 36–37 (citing Ex. 1004 7:48–52; Ex. 2001 ¶ 146). According to Patent Owner, a person of ordinary skill in the art would not have been motivated to merely select data fields that do not limit the selected data in any way. Id. Patent Owner further argues Becerra’s method of binding components to a spreadsheet range and extracting formulas from a spreadsheet teaches away from the multiple chart generation scheme of Couckuyt that uses drag and dropping of data fields. Id. at 37. According to Patent Owner, Couckuyt is directed to the need for a charting DDUI that can generate multiple charts at the same time and such a need does not exist in Becerra which in turn is focused on creating a control panel that is an interactive graphics simulation. Id. (citing Ex. 1004, 1:66–67, 2:5–8; Ex. 1005 ¶ 11; Ex. 2001 ¶ 148). Based on our review of the complete record, we determine that” slip op. at 31
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityPrinted publication establishedDecided for petitioner
“2. Whether QlikView Manuals Qualify as Prior Art Petitioner argues that “the QlikView Manuals describe a well-known system and are printed publications available to the public at least by July 8, 2008.” Pet. 7–9. Petitioner offers ample evidence to demonstrate the QlikView Manuals were publicly accessible by July 8, 2008. See id. (citing Ex. 1008; Ex. 1009; Ex. 1014–1023; Ex. 1003 ¶ 129–140; Ex. 1030;11 Ex. 1068 ¶¶ 4–7; Ex. 1032; Ex. 1033). Petitioner contends in 2008, QlikView was a well-known software product sold by QlikTech International AB (“QlikTech”). Id. at 8 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 129; Ex. 1030 ¶ 23; Ex. 1068 ¶¶ 4–7). Petitioner asserts that QlikTech announced that QlikView version 8.50 was scheduled for release on June 30, 2008, and QlikTech’s website added the “QlikView 8.50” hyperlink by July 8, 2008. Id. (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 129–131; Ex. 1022, 1; Ex. 1068 ¶ 7). Petitioner contends that, as of July 8, 2008, a person of ordinary skill in the art would have understood that they could view the QlikView Manuals in the installation package. Id. (citing Exs. 1014–1017; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 131–132; Ex. 1068 ¶ 7). Petitioner further contends that the QlikView Manuals were also available on QlikTech’s website as of this 11 As discussed below (see infra § IV.A), we grant Patent Owner’s Motion to Exclude as to certain portions of Exhibit 1030 and do not give them any weight. However, we deny Patent Owner’s Motion as to the remaining portions of Dr. Hall-Ellis’s testimony as well as Ms. Lofton’s testimony and various other exhibits proffered by Petitioner to show public accessibility of the QlikView manuals as of July 8, 2008. QlikView 8.50 was published on July 8, 2008. Id. at 8–9 (citing Exs. 1008, 1009, 1017, 1059, 1060; Ex. 1030 ¶¶ 29, 37). In its Patent Owner Response, Patent Owner does not contest that the QlikView Manuals were published and publicly available by July 8, 2008. PO Resp. 50 n.2 (noting only that Patent Owner intends to move to exclude evidence Petitioner relies on to establish the publication date for QlikView Manuals); Tr. 45:3–19. We are persuaded that Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the QlikView Manuals were publicly available as of July 8, 2008.12” slip op. at 50
Patent outcomesUS 8,271,892 unpatentable§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,271,892 - Yealink (USA) Network Technology Co. Ltd. / Yealink Network Technology Co., Ltd. v. Barco N.V.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Apr 7, 2026 · IPR2024-01439 · APJ Frederick C Laney · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–11 and 13–21 are unpatentable under § 103 based on Ono and Corbett and Uchida and Grimshaw; the Board did not find Ichieda unpatentable.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner contends that a person having ordinary skill in the art would have had at least a Master’s Degree in Electrical Engineering with . . . five years of work experience in computer science and embedded systems, or Master’s Degree in Computer Science with . . . five years of work experience in electrical and computer engineering and embedded systems. Additional educational experience could substitute for some of the work experience. level of skill in the art.” PO Resp. 10. We adopt Petitioner’s proposed definition of a person of ordinary skill in the pertinent art, as it is consistent with the ’951 patent and the asserted prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 7
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“determine that none of the claim terms the parties provide constructions for require an express construction in this proceeding. See Realtime Data LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019). The parties do appear to disagree on the meaning of “trigger,” however. Although neither party actually identifies that term as needing interpretation and neither party actually provides a claim construction analysis to support its respective position, the parties do dispute whether the evidence presented shows a “trigger,” both presumably giving that term its plain and customary meaning. In other words, while both parties appear to agree “trigger” carries its plain meaning, in application, the parties’ dispute regarding the particular limitations including that term appears to turn, not over what the evidence discloses, but only on whether the disclosure satisfies the plain meaning of “trigger” (see infra § II.E.2). Accordingly, while we apply the plain meaning of “trigger” in this proceeding, and in doing so, we address which party has properly applied the plain meaning and, in doing that, we address the scope properly afforded to “trigger.” That analysis, however, is done below in the context of the limitation in which this issue arises (see id.).” slip op. at 8
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner
“has now been developed, and in view of both parties’ arguments, we find Petitioner has persuasively shown that modifying Ono’s peripheral device (i.e., communications module 44) to include an input device/physical actuator like the one described for Ono’s remote controller 69 to control the display of image data from a particular user’s computer would have been obvious to a skilled artisan at the time of the invention. More specifically, Petitioner has shown persuasively Ono shows that the use of an input device/physical actuator to send a signal that causes a participant’s computer to transmit and control the image data presented on a shared display in an image display system was a known technique (see Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 7, 44–48, 66– 71, 77–78, 80–89, 144, Figs. 3, 6, 8, 9; Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 85–100, 121–127) and available location for such an input device/physical actuator to initiate the transmission of data (see Ex. 1007 ¶¶ 6, 18, 20, 22–23, 26, 28, 46, Fig. 1; Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 92–100). Petitioner has also persuasively shown that a skilled artisan recognized benefits to giving a participant the ability to locally control the display of their computer’s image data. See Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 87–91; Ex. 1008 ¶¶ 4, 19–20, 27–28; Ex. 1009 ¶¶ 10–13, 39–10, 70–72. When Ono and Corbett are considered together as a whole from the perspective of a skilled artisan, therefore, it is clear that applying a similar input device/physical actuator to Ono’s peripheral device would have been recognized to result in the benefit of providing a participant with the same ability to send a signal that causes a participant’s computer to transmit and control the image data presented on a shared display from their computer within an image display system. As a result, a motivation has been established because the combination is an application of a known technique to derive a known benefit using prior art elements according to their established functions. Intel Corp. v. PACT XPP Schweiz AG, 61 F.4th 1373, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2023).” slip op. at 24
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for petitioner
“that, from their perspective, the plain meaning of the term “trigger” does not exclude intervening steps between a user’s action on an input device and the ultimate transfer of the user selected arbitrary media content. Pet. Reply 11– 12 (indicating that “trigger” encompasses “a process that begins with and thus is triggered by a user pressing a button followed by an ‘image transfer’ from a PC to a projector”). For its part, Patent Owner maintains (at least implicitly) that intervening steps are excluded from the plain meaning. Neither party addresses with more specificity why, or why not, the scope of “trigger” supports their positions, however. Having now the complete record before us, we find that out preliminary assessment was wrong because the plain meaning of the term “trigger” does not exclude intervening steps between the cause-and-effect relationship of the trigger and the result it is intended to cause. Take, for example, a simple gun. Pulling the “trigger” to fire a gun necessarily includes intervening steps to occur: the trigger releases a hammer that, in turn, contacts a blasting cap within a bullet casing, which is what actually causes the gunpowder to ignite (i.e., fire) and expel the bullet. And there is no evidence in this record to suggest that this customary understanding of the word “trigger” is any different in the electrical arts, other than the trigger and result are generally electrical in nature, rather than mechanical. We find no clear disavowal of claim scope within the intrinsic record of the ’951 patent to indicate that the term “trigger” was intended to be understood any differently to exclude any intervening steps between a user’s action on an input device and the resulting transfer of user selected arbitrary media content. intervening steps would exist because the input device does not actually do the transferring of the media content; instead, the claims recite the transferring is “from the transmitter to the wireless communications network and [then] to the base node.” See Ex. 1001, 11:3–48, 27:62–28:1 (claim 1), 28:62–67 (claim 9), 29:42–46 (claim 16), 30:36–44 (claim 21) (emphasis added). A skilled artisan would have recognized that there would be intervening steps between the input device being acted upon and the content being displayed by base node’s display. See Ex. 1083 ¶¶ 11–12. In the claims, the input device is analogous to a gun’s trigger, the user carrying out a user action on the input device is analogous to pulling a gun’s trigger, and the transfer of user selected arbitrary media content is analogous the gun expelling a bullet. In both cases, there can be, and usually are, intervening steps, moreover, in both cases, inadvertent things can happen that may prevent the intended result (e.g., in the case of a gun, the hammer can jam; in the case of an input device, a connection can be rejected). Nevertheless, in both cases, the trigger is the thing that initiates an automated process that leads to a particular result, unless a conditional error occurs.” slip op. at 31
Patent outcomesUS 11,422,951 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,422,951 - Yealink (USA) Network Technology Co., Ltd. / Yealink Network Technology Co., Ltd. v. Barco N.V.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Apr 7, 2026 · IPR2024-01437 · APJ Meredith C Petravick · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1, 3, 9, 18, and 19 are unpatentable as obvious over Kaplan and Mardiks and over Maeda and Deforche.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner contends that a person having ordinary skill in the art would have had at least a Master’s Degree in Electrical Engineering and five years of work experience in computer science and embedded systems, or a Master’s Degree in Computer Science and five years of work experience in electrical and computer engineering and embedded systems. Additional educational experience could substitute for some of the work experience. Pet. 9 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 36–37). ordinary skill in the art. PO Resp. 10. We adopt Petitioner’s proposed definition of a person of ordinary skill in the pertinent art, as it is consistent with the ’237 patent and the asserted prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 7
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“standard that would be used in a civil action under 35 U.S.C. § 282(b). 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b). In applying this standard, we generally give claim terms their ordinary and customary meaning as would be understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention and in the context of the entire patent disclosure. See id.; Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312–14 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). Petitioner and Patent Owner propose constructions for a number of claim terms. Pet. 9–14; PO Resp. 8–10. Only those terms in controversy, however, need to be construed, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy. Realtime Data LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019). We need not construe explicitly any claim term.” slip op. at 8
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner
“a) Whether Dr. Almeroth’s Testimony should Be Given Little Weight Patent Owner argues that we should give little weigh to the testimony of Dr. Almeroth because Dr. Almeroth’s testimony is allegedly inconsistent across the related inter partes reviews. PO Resp. 11–16; PO Sur-reply 21– 22. We have reviewed the disputed portions of Dr. Almeroth’s testimony and, when read in context, we are not persuaded that the testimony is inconsistent so as to be afforded little weight. As Petitioner points out (Pet. Reply 2), Patent Owner’s arguments do not properly account for the context in which the testimony was given in the related inter partes reviews.” slip op. at 16
- Obviousness (§103) › Analogous artAnalogous artDecided for petitioner
“Two separate tests define the scope of analogous prior art: (1) whether the art is from the same field of endeavor, regardless of the problem addressed and, (2) if the reference is not within the field of the inventor’s endeavor, whether the reference still is reasonably pertinent to the Deutschland Gmbh v. Mylan Pharms. Inc., 66 F.4th 1373, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2023) (quoting In re Bigio, 381 F.3d 1320, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (citations omitted). We are persuaded by Petitioner that Mardiks meets at least the second test because both the ’237 patent and Mardiks “are directed to solving the same problem of using standard, pre-installed generic drivers, such as human interface device (HID) drivers, to access programs stored on peripheral devices.” Pet. Reply. 3–5; See Ex. 1001, 5:38–40; Ex. 1026 ¶¶ 3, 28. We, thus, are not persuaded by Patent Owner that Mardisk is non-analogous art. slip op. at 16
Patent outcomesUS 11,403,237 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,403,237 - Yealink (USA) Network Technology Co., Ltd. / Yealink Network Technology Co., Ltd. v. Barco N.V.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Apr 7, 2026 · IPR2024-01436 · APJ Meredith C Petravick · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–3, 9–11, 19, 21, and 22 are unpatentable as obvious over Kaplan, Ahmed, and Deforche, and over Maeda, Ahmed, and Deforche.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner contends that a person having ordinary skill in the art (POSITA) would have had at least a Master’s Degree in Electrical Engineering and five years of work experience in computer science and embedded systems, or a Master’s Degree in Computer Science and five years of work experience in electrical and computer engineering and embedded systems. the work experience. Pet. 10 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 36–37). Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art. PO Resp. 12. We adopt Petitioner’s proposed definition of a person of ordinary skill in the pertinent art, as it is consistent with the ’002 patent and the asserted prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 7
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Lexicography (patentee as own lexicographer)Term construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“term “pre-installed generic driver.” Pet. 13; PO Resp. 9–10. Those proposed constructions are consistent with the lexicographic definition provided in the ’002 patent. In a section titled “Definitions,” the ’002 patent states: The term “pre-installed generic driver” is intended to mean a driver which is installed on a processing device such as a computer as a standard driver, e.g. is installed with the installation of the operating system. Such a driver is standard for the operating system and can drive a standard class of peripheral devices coupled to or connected to the processing device. Ex. 1001, 14:32–38. We apply this lexicographic definition in our analysis below.” slip op. at 9
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner
“a) Whether Dr. Almeroth’s Testimony should Be Given Little Weight Patent Owner argues that we should give little weigh to the testimony of Dr. Almeroth because Dr. Almeroth’s testimony is allegedly inconsistent across the related inter partes reviews. PO Resp. 13–19; PO Sur-reply 21– 22. We have reviewed the disputed portions of Dr. Almeroth’s testimony and, when read in context, we are not persuaded that the testimony is inconsistent so as to be afforded little weight. As Petitioner points out (Pet. Reply 2–3), Patent Owner’s arguments do not properly account for the context in which the testimony was given in the related inter partes review.” slip op. at 19
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner
“Patent Owner’s arguments are unpersuasive. We are not persuaded that these differences between Kaplan, Ahmed, and Deforche are dispositive. To the contrary, we find the differences establish why a POSITA would have further modified Kaplan and Ahmed with the teachings of Deforche. Deforche expressly teaches that a disadvantage of wireless modems is that they require installation of an appropriate driver before applications running on the computer device can use the functionality of the wireless modem to connect to wireless networks. Ex. 1030 ¶¶ 2–3. Deforche solves this problem by using the processing device’s pre-installed drivers, which can be for a human interface device, to set up a modem/host communication interface for communication. Id. ¶¶ 4, 9. Because “[d]ata traffic from the computer device towards the wireless communication network and vice versa is routed over this modem/host communication interface and uses the generic communication protocol provided by the preinstalled generic driver,” Deforche states this “has the advantage that the need for a specific driver for the communication between the wireless modem device and the computer device can avoided” and “the advantage that a user can use the wireless modem device on a computer device on which he has no administrator rights, i.e. a computer specific driver for the wireless modem device.” Id. ¶ 9. “The motivation-to-combine analysis is a flexible one. Any need or problem known in the field of endeavor at the time of and addressed by the patent can provide a reason for combining the elements in the manner claimed.” Intel Corp. v. PACT XPP Schweiz AG, 61 F.4th 1373, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2023) (internal quotations omitted). As the Federal Circuit held, “[t]here is a motivation to combine when a known technique has been used to improve one device, and a [skilled artisan] would recognize that it would improve similar devices in the same way.” Intel Corp., 61 F.4th at 1380. Here, Deforche establishes that utilizing an operating system’s preinstalled generic driver to provide a generic protocol communications between the processing device and a peripheral device was known for improving wireless modems because it does not require administrator rights and a specific driver to be installed to enable communications between the wireless modem device and the processing device.” slip op. at 20
Patent outcomesUS 10,762,002 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,762,002 - Dr. Squatch, LLC v. The Procter & Gamble CompanyAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Mar 25, 2026 · IPR2024-01498 · APJ Sheridan K Snedden · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–19 are unpatentable as obvious over the Lesniak- and Native-based grounds; the Squatch and Sturgis ground fails because Squatch was not shown to be a printed publication.
RulingsFinal written decision- BurdenDecided for patent owner
“We agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner has not shown sufficiently that Squatch is a printed publication. As described above, Petitioner relies on Squatch as a “website excerpt” placed on its site at the relevant time, but has not produced a screen shot of the website to show that it ever existed. See Ex. 1059. Petitioner provides internal documents that purport to describe what would have been on Dr. Squatch’s website at the relevant time, but falls short of establishing what was on the website for the interested consumer to view. Thus, we determine that this ground fails.” slip op. at 55
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“or “POSITA”) at the time of the invention “would have (1) at least a B.S. or equivalent degree; and (2) at least two years of experience in cosmetics formulations.” Pet. 17 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 26–28). Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s proposal about the POSA’s qualifications at this stage of the proceeding. PO Resp. 10. We adopt and apply Petitioner’s proposed definition of a POSA, which is consistent with the level of skill reflected in the asserted prior art. See e.g., Exs. 1003, 1004.” slip op. at 8
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedPatent owner expert discountedDecided for petitioner
“compositions with the relevant ingredients and achieves stable compositions through the use of a second wax having a melting point of 73 to 90° C. Pet. Reply 6–7 (citing Ex. 1003, 1:39–54). For example, Lesniak’s compositions (nos. 8 and 11) that used such a secondary wax, namely CastorWax MP80, are disclosed as sufficiently stable. Ex. 1003, Table 2. Here, we further credit the testimony of Dr. Michniak-Kohn that Lesniak teaches how to make stable compositions by including a secondary wax, such as castor wax, with a sufficiently high melting point. Ex. 1003, 1:39-54, 5:23-32, Table 2. Both of the compositions (nos. 8 and 11) tested by Lesniak that had such a wax passed the stability tests. Id. Ex. 1086 ¶ 7; see also Pet. Reply 6 (“Lesniak overcame any stability issues, as it expressly discloses compositions that are ‘physically stable at high and low temperatures.’”) (citing Ex. 1003, 5:23–32). Having considered the parties’ positions and evidence of record, summarized above, we determine that Lesniak provides sufficient disclosure to enable a person of ordinary skill in the art to formulate deodorant stick within the parameters of claim 1.” slip op. at 25
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Preamble limiting or notPreamble limitingDecided for patent owner
“Patent Owner asserts that the preamble of independent claims 1, 16, and 19 reciting “a deodorant stick” is limiting as it provides antecedent basis for the recitation of “said deodorant stick being free of an aluminum salt” for each independent claim. PO Resp. 7–10. Patent Owner also points to dependent claims 6–9 as relying on the preamble reciting “a deodorant stick” as antecedent basis for claim elements. Id. at 9. We agree. Petitioner does not argue to the contrary. See, e.g., Pet. 19 (arguing that Lesniak discloses a deodorant stick in the form of an antiperspirant stick).” slip op. at 8
Patent outcomesUS 11,844,752 unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,844,752 - Avanos Medical, Inc. v. Stratus Medical, LLCAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Mar 10, 2026 · IPR2024-01209 · APJ Susan L C Mitchell · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–27 are unpatentable as obvious over the asserted combinations, principally Racz, Fitz, and Lee; both parties’ motions to exclude are dismissed as moot.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“PO Resp. 30 (citing Ex. 2006 ¶ 58). Patent Owner’s proposal is too narrow in two respects. First, it mandates certain education and experience in RF neurotomy specifically. This is too narrow as the description of the scope of the invention set forth in the ’782 patent as described above is not limited to RF neurotomy. Second, it requires the POSA to be both a physician who performs thermal ablation (RF neurotomy specifically) and an engineer with training and experience “in the design and development of devices and methods” for performing the same. Id. This is too narrow because it excludes physicians and other advanced degree holders who research and design devices and methods for performing thermal ablation but do not actually operate on patients. We adopt the Petitioner’s definition of a POSA, quoted above, as it is reflective of the level of skill in the art when viewed in light of the disclosure of the ’782 patent. Supra (quoting Pet. 11).” slip op. at 16
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“With respect to the challenged claims, Petitioner contends that no claim term requires express construction. Pet. 12 (citing Ex. 1031 ¶106 (Dr. Robert D. Tucker’s11 testimony that “the terms in the Challenged Claims would be understood by a POSA to have their plain and ordinary meaning and do not require a special construction or definition”)). In instituting the IPR, we found no need to provide an express construction of any claim term. Inst. Dec. 12. We likewise find no need to do so now, as neither party has proposed a construction for any claim term and none of the parties’ arguments turns on a disputed meaning of any claim language.” slip op. at 11
- Obviousness (§103) › Analogous artAnalogous artDecided for petitioner
“(Fed. Cir. 1985)). “Whether a reference in the prior art is ‘analogous’ is a fact question.” Clay, 966 F.2d at 658. “Two criteria have evolved for determining whether prior art is analogous: (1) whether the art is from the same field of endeavor, regardless of the problem addressed, and (2) if the reference is not within the field of the inventor’s endeavor, whether the reference still is reasonably pertinent to the particular problem with which the inventor is involved.” Id. at 658–59. Patent Owner argues that Lee is not analogous art under the first criterion because “Lee does not relate to neurotomy at all.” PO Resp. 34. However, as discussed above, the field of the invention is not limited to neurotomy. The field of the invention is thermal ablation generally, which encompasses RF neurotomy, but which is not limited to RF neurotomy. Accordingly, we are not persuaded by Patent Owner’s argument. To the contrary, we are persuaded by Petitioner’s argument that Lee is analogous art, under at least the first Clay criterion, because it “discloses various techniques for deploying electrodes from the tip of an RF ablation device.” Pet. 18.” slip op. at 24
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner
“Dr. Tucker’s testimony is not a bald conclusion. His conclusion as to a reasonable expectation of success is set forth in paragraph 148 of his declaration. Ex. 1031 ¶148. It is supported extensively with testimony regarding what the prior art teaches (see id. ¶¶110–117 (Racz), ¶¶118–123 (Fitz), ¶¶124–131 (Lee)) and why and how a POSA would have combined the prior art teachings (see id. ¶¶132–147). Dr. Tucker’s testimony clearly is entitled to weight. Since 1983, he has “been a Professor at the University of Iowa where [he] direct[s] an active research program in radiofrequency electrosurgical procedures and instrumentation.” Ex. 1031 ¶3. He has a Ph.D. in biophysics, and he is also a medical doctor (albeit he is not Board certified as pointed out by Patent Owner19). Id. ¶2. He also has additional training and experience that is relevant, but which is not necessary, but further establishes that he is well qualified to offer the opinions set forth in his declaration. Id. ¶¶2–11. Patent Owner argues that Dr. Tucker is not qualified to testify here because “he is not Board certified” and he is “not a pain-specialist physician and has never performed a neurotomy.” PO Resp. 30. Dr. Tucker explained, however, that he is not Board certified nor does he operate on 19 See PO Resp. 30 (citing Ex. 2020, 10:19–12:20). patients because his work focuses on the development of instrumentation, not the use of it, explaining on cross-examination:” slip op. at 39
Patent outcomesUS 10,966,782 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,966,782 - Avanos Medical, Inc. v. Stratus Medical, LLCAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Mar 6, 2026 · IPR2024-01211 · APJ Michael J Fitzpatrick · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 18–47 and 53–74 are unpatentable as obvious over the asserted combinations of Racz, Fitz, Lee, and the additional references in Grounds 2–8.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“In sum, the field of the invention is thermal ablation. It encompasses RF neurotomy, but it is not limited to RF neurotomy. With that settled, we turn now to the person of ordinary in the field/art (POSITA or POSA).” slip op. at 17
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner
“Dr. Tucker’s testimony is not a bald conclusion. His conclusion as to a reasonable expectation of success is set forth in paragraph 162 of his declaration. Ex. 1033 ¶162. It is supported extensively with testimony regarding what the prior art teaches (see id. ¶¶124–131 (Racz), ¶¶132–137 (Fitz), ¶¶138–145 (Lee)) and why and how a POSA would have combined the prior art teachings (see id. ¶¶146–161). Dr. Tucker’s testimony clearly is entitled to weight. Since 1983, he” slip op. at 39
- Obviousness (§103) › Analogous artAnalogous artDecided for petitioner
“35. “Although § 103 does not, by its terms, define the ‘art to which [the] subject matter [sought to be patented] pertains,’ this determination is frequently couched in terms of whether the art is analogous or not, i.e., whether the art is ‘too remote to be treated as prior art.’” In re Clay, 966 F.2d 656, 658 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (quoting In re Sovish, 769 F.2d 738, 741 (Fed. Cir. 1985)). “Whether a reference in the prior art is ‘analogous’ is a fact question.” Id. at 658. “Two criteria have evolved for determining whether prior art is analogous: (1) whether the art is from the same field of endeavor, regardless of the problem addressed, and (2) if the reference is not within the field of the inventor’s endeavor, whether the reference still is reasonably pertinent to the particular problem with which the inventor is involved.” Id. at 658–59. Patent Owner argues that Lee is not analogous art under the first criterion because “Lee does not relate to neurotomy at all.” PO Resp. 33. However, as discussed above, the field of the invention is not limited to neurotomy. The field of the invention is thermal ablation generally, which encompasses RF neurotomy, but which is not limited to RF neurotomy. Accordingly, we are not persuaded by Patent Owner’s argument. To the contrary, we are persuaded by Petitioner’s argument that Lee is analogous art, under at least the first Clay criterion, because it “discloses various techniques for deploying electrodes from the tip of an RF ablation device.” Pet. 17.” slip op. at 25
- BurdenDecided for petitioner
“Patent Owner does not identify any legal requirement for petitions to illustrate proposed combinations of prior art features. Indeed, the very statute identified by Patent Owner as “requiring petitions to set forth challenge grounds ‘with particularity’” (see PO Resp. 36) calls for the requisite particularity to be “in writing,” not by illustration. See 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3) (“A petition filed under section 311 may be considered only if . . . (3) the petition identifies, in writing and with particularity . . . the grounds on which the challenge to each claim is based.”). Simply put, there is no legal requirement to provide multiple illustrations of a proposed combination of prior art features (as Patent Owner implies), let alone a single illustration (as Petitioner has done).” slip op. at 28
Patent outcomesUS 10,736,688 unpatentable§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,736,688 - Avanos Medical, Inc. v. Stratus Medical, LLCAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Mar 6, 2026 · IPR2024-01210 · APJ Michael J Fitzpatrick · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–17 and 48–52 are unpatentable as obvious over the asserted combinations of prior art, principally Racz, Fitz, and Lee.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“In sum, the field of the invention is thermal ablation. It encompasses RF neurotomy, but it is not limited to RF neurotomy. With that settled, we turn now to the person of ordinary in the field/art (POSITA or POSA).” slip op. at 16
- Obviousness (§103) › Analogous artAnalogous artDecided for petitioner
“F.2d 656, 658 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (quoting In re Sovish, 769 F.2d 738, 741 (Fed. Cir. 1985)). “Whether a reference in the prior art is ‘analogous’ is a fact question.” Id. at 658. “Two criteria have evolved for determining whether prior art is analogous: (1) whether the art is from the same field of endeavor, regardless of the problem addressed, and (2) if the reference is not within the field of the inventor’s endeavor, whether the reference still is reasonably pertinent to the particular problem with which the inventor is involved.” Id. at 658–59.” slip op. at 24
- BurdenDecided for petitioner
“illustrate proposed combinations of prior art features. Indeed, the very statute identified by Patent Owner as “requiring petitions to set forth challenge grounds ‘with particularity’” (see PO Resp. 36) calls for the requisite particularity to be “in writing,” not by illustration. See 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3) (“A petition filed under section 311 may be considered only if . . . (3) the petition identifies, in writing and with particularity . . . the grounds on which the challenge to each claim is based.”). Simply put, there is no legal requirement to provide multiple illustrations of a proposed combination of prior art features (as Patent Owner implies), let alone a single illustration (as Petitioner has done).” slip op. at 26
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner
“a POSA would have had an apparent reason to make Racz’s modified device. Pet. 22–27. We need not address these additional arguments and evidentiary citations, however, as Petitioner has demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that implementing deployable filaments on the distal tip of an RF ablation device was a known technique for expanding and controlling the ablation volume. Thus, so long as there would have been a reasonable expectation of success in making Racz’s modified device (addressed infra), the combination would have been obvious. See Intel Corp., 61 F.4th at 1380 (“[I]f a technique has been used to improve one device, and a person of ordinary skill in the art would recognize that it would improve similar devices in the same way, using the technique is obvious unless its actual application is beyond his or her skill.”); Medichem, 437 F.3d at 1165 (“[A]n obviousness determination requires not only the existence of a motivation to combine elements from different prior art references, but also that a skilled artisan would have perceived a reasonable expectation of success in making the invention via that combination.”).” slip op. at 31
Patent outcomesUS 10,736,688 unpatentable§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,736,688 - Avanos Medical, Inc. v. Stratus Medical, LLCAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Mar 5, 2026 · IPR2024-01212 · APJ Arthur M Peslak · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–29 are unpatentable because Petitioner showed by a preponderance of the evidence that the asserted prior-art combinations rendered them obvious under §103.
RulingsFinal written decision- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundUnpatentable
“improve one device, and a person of ordinary skill in the art would recognize that it would improve similar devices in the same way, using the technique is obvious unless its actual application is beyond his or her skill.” KSR, 550 U.S. at 417. In this case, we must determine whether one of ordinary skill in the art would recognize that applying the teachings of Fitz and Lee of deploying multiple filaments to increase and control the ablation volume to Racz’s distal tip would improve Racz’s device in the same way. For us to resolve this question in Petitioner’s favor, Petitioner must provide “some articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of obviousness.” Id. at 418 (citing In re Kahn, 441 F.3d at 988). However, bodily incorporation, i.e., “an actual physical substitution of” Lee’s filaments into Racz is not required. See In re Mouttet, 686 F.3d 1322, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“It is well-established that a determination of obviousness based on teachings from multiple references does not require an actual, physical substitution of elements.”); In re Nievelt, 482 F.2d 965, 968 (CCPA 1973) (“Combining the teachings of references does not involve an ability to combine their specific structures.”).” slip op. at 30
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“11. Balancing the Graham Factors After weighing all the evidence submitted by the parties in light of the Graham factors, we determine Petitioner has demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that the claims 1, 3–10, 18–26, 28, and 29 would have been obvious over Racz, Fitz, and Lee. As discussed above, Petitioner’s evidence establishes that the combination of Racz, Fitz, and Lee teaches every limitation of claims 1, 3–10, 18–26, 28, and 29 and that an ordinarily skilled artisan would have been motivated to combine Racz, Fitz, and Lee with a reasonable expectation of success. Further, as discussed above, Patent Owner’s evidence of secondary considerations is entitled to little, if any, weight because Patent Owner fails to establish nexus. Consequently, after considering all the evidence in the record both for and against patentability, we determine that Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that claims 1, 3–10, 18–26, 28, and 29 would have been obvious over Racz, Fitz, and Lee. E. Ground B: Obviousness in view of Racz, Fitz, Lee and Young ’965 Petitioner contends that claims 1–10, 18–26, and 28–29 are also obvious over Racz, Fitz, Lee, and Young ’965. Pet. 62–67. Patent Owner argues that Young ’965 does not cure the alleged deficiencies in Ground 1, is directed to tumor ablation not neurotomy, would require a substantial redesign of Racz’s modified device, and there is no motivation to combine. PO Resp. 59–60. We start with a brief overview of Young ’965 and address the parties’” slip op. at 78
- ExcludeMotion to exclude, deniedDenied
“Accordingly, both Motions are dismissed as moot.” slip op. at 94
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“A. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art In determining the level of skill in the art, we consider the type of” slip op. at 12
Patent outcomesUS 10,925,664 unpatentable§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,925,664
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.