• Samsung Display Co., Ltd. v. Pictiva Displays International Ltd.Some claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jan 22, 2026 · IPR2024-01094 · APJ Grace Karaffa Obermann · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1, 2, 6, and 8–14 are unpatentable as obvious over Ma; claims 3 and 4 were not shown unpatentable over Werner.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner contends: A person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSA”) at the time of the alleged invention of the ’223 patent would have had a university degree in chemistry and additional expertise or a second university degree in the field of electrical engineering, particularly optoelectronics, or alternatively a university degree in electrical engineering and additional expertise or a second university degree in the field of chemistry. The person of ordinary skill in the art has spent several years studying the structure and function of organic optoelectronic components, in particular OLEDs, and has detailed knowledge of the chemical structure of light-emitting organic layers and the transport of charge carriers to these layers. In this respect, the person of ordinary skill in the art works at the interface between electrical engineering/physics (charge carrier transport and light emission processes in optoelectronic components) and chemistry, in particular organic chemistry (materials and layer stack combinations suitable). Pet. 14 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 46–47). Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s contention. See generally Resp. Neither party indicates that the result would change depending on the definition selected. We adopt Petitioner’s uncontested proposed definition, because it is consistent with the disclosures of the asserted prior art references. See Ex. 1005, (code 57); Ex. 1007, 8107 (abstracts of the references asserted in the patentability challenges).” slip op. at 8

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “history pertaining to the patent.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b). Under that standard, claim terms generally are given their plain and ordinary meaning as would have been understood by the ordinarily skilled artisan at the time of the invention and within the context of the entire patent disclosure. See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). We construe claim terms only as relevant to the parties’ contentions and only to the extent necessary to resolve the issues in dispute. See Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999); Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017). Neither party indicates that an express construction for any claim term is necessary to resolve the disputes at hand. Pet. 15; see generally Resp. On this record, we determine that no claim term requires express construction for purposes of this Decision. In our analysis of the challenges, however, we discuss the meaning of the terms “metal complex” and “central metal atom,” which appear in claim 1 (Ex. 1001, 19:19–20) to the extent necessary to resolve Patent Owner’s contention that Petitioner fails to establish that Ma invalidates claim 1. See Resp. 53, 56–58.” slip op. at 9

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityPrinted publication establishedDecided for petitioner

    “Whether Ma qualifies as a “printed publication” involves an inquiry into the facts and circumstances surrounding the reference’s disclosure to members of the public. In re Klopfenstein, 380 F.3d 1345, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2004). A reference is considered “publicly accessible” upon a satisfactory showing that the document has been “disseminated or otherwise made available to the extent that persons interested and ordinarily skilled in the subject matter or art exercising reasonable diligence[] can locate it.” Kyocera Wireless Corp. v. ITC, 545 F.3d 1340, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2008); see Hulu, LLC v. Sound View Innovations, LLC, IPR2018-01039, Paper 29, 10– 11 (PTAB Dec. 20, 2019) (precedential).” slip op. at 10

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundUnpatentable

    “Based on the information presented, we find Petitioner has the better position. Patent Owner admits that joint vaporization means “two materials vaporize together.” Reply 21 (quoting Resp. 54). As Petitioner argues, “This is what Ma discloses.” Id. We agree with Petitioner that Ma describes a “two-component” electron transport layer having a “thickness with one value.” Id.; see Ex. 1007, 811 (reporting a “co-deposited” application of “BPhen:LiQ” that is “50 nm thick”). Ma’s disclosure, thereby, strongly “indicates that the two components were vaporized together––as opposed to creating a ‘macroscopically homogenous form’” prepared by sequentially vaporizing the individual components as Patent Owner “hypothesizes.” Reply 21 (citing Ex. 1020 ¶¶ 42–44; Ex. 2041 ¶¶ 155–157); see Resp. 54– 55; see also Ex. 1007, 811 (Ma’s description of its device fabrication, appearing in the third paragraph of the experiments section). Petitioner further advances evidence that “[p]reparing a layer that is ‘macroscopically homogeneous’ but potentially microscopically heterogeneous,” as Patent Owner postulates, “would introduce excessive variability and render the data noncomparable and unreliable, thus undermining the experiment’s purpose.” Reply 21 (citing Ex. 1020 ¶ 44); see Resp. 54–55. Patent Owner presents no counterargument or evidence that is persuasive to undercut Petitioner’s reasoning or evidence on that point. See Sur-reply 19–22. Petitioner also argues that an ordinarily skilled artisan would have recognized “that vaporizing materials together would best achieve Ma’s objective of assessing the current density using different Liq doping percentages.” Reply 22 (citing Ex. 1007, 811; Ex. 1020 ¶ 51). Here again, Petitioner’s evidence on point stands uncontested. See Sur-reply 19–22 (declining to contest that point). On this record, therefore, we agree with Petitioner that, as to the relevant disclosure in Ma, “the most natural interpretation of ‘co-deposition’ for forming a layer, particularly when there is nothing to indicate that the materials” are “vaporized sequentially,” is that the materials are co-deposited by joint vaporization. Reply 22 (citing Ex. 1020 ¶ 46–51). We further agree that, “[u]nder a preponderance standard, Ma’s disclosures are sufficient to render joint vaporization at least obvious.” Id. For the above reasons, we determine that Petitioner demonstrates by a preponderance of the evidence that Ma discloses joint vaporization as required by the challenged claims.” slip op. at 15

  Patent outcomesUS 8,558,223 mixed
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,558,223
• Samsung Display Co., Ltd. v. Pictiva Displays International Ltd.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jan 22, 2026 · IPR2024-01093 · APJ Grace Karaffa Obermann · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–16 are unpatentable: claims 1–13 and 15–16 on anticipation and obviousness grounds, and claim 14 on obviousness over Choulis.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “A person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSITA”) at the time of the alleged invention of the ’164 patent would have had a Bachelor’s degree in chemistry, physics, or a comparable field of study, and at least three years of research or industrial experience with organic optoelectronic light-emitting devices. An individual with additional education could have less research or industrial experience and vice versa. Pet. 12. Patent Owner repeatedly refers to “a POSITA” without addressing the definition of that term or contesting Petitioner’s proposed definition. See Resp. 1, 2 n.1, 3, 8, 9, 15–21, 23, 26, 29, 32–33, 35, 37, 38, 40, 41, 44–49, 51–57, 61, 62 (bare references to “a POSITA”). Neither party indicates that the ultimate result on patentability would change depending on the definition selected. We adopt Petitioner’s proposed definition, which is not contested, because it is consistent with the disclosures of the asserted prior art. See Ex. 1004, (code 57); Ex. 1006, code (57); Ex. 1008, code (57); Ex. 1009, code (57) (abstracts of the references asserted in the patentability challenges).” slip op. at 7

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Specification disavowal / 'present invention' languageDisclaimer not foundTerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner

    “because no information raised during the trial phase of this review changes the calculus: First and foremost, the plain terms of claim 1 include no language from which we reasonably can impose limits on the phrase “matrix material” as urged by Patent Owner. In addition, the specification includes no special definition of that phrase that supports importing Patent Owner’s proposed narrowing limitation into the claim. Furthermore, we are directed to no disclaimer of claim scope during patent prosecution that would support Patent Owner’s twice-rejected argument that the phrase “matrix material” in claim 1 excludes embedded dopants and dispersed agglomerations. And the extrinsic evidence advanced by Patent Owner during this review is ineffective to override the clear interpretation of “matrix material” that is established by the intrinsic evidence. Reply 1–7.10” slip op. at 8

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableNot shown unpatentableMixed

    “We find that Petitioner establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that Choulis anticipates claim 13. We agree with Petitioner, in that regard, that Choulis explicitly teaches “using spin-coating as a method for depositing materials, which involves a simultaneous application process” as required by claim 13. Reply 16 (citing Pet. 40–41; Ex. 1044 ¶ 45).16 We 15 Petitioner raises Djobo as a background reference supporting that Choulis anticipates deposition of PVK by evaporation. Pet. 41. Patent Owner counters that Djobo, to the contrary, shows that Choulis does not teach deposition of PVK by evaporation. Resp. 48. In other words, both parties cite Djobo in connection with the ground based on anticipation by Choulis. Against that backdrop, we determine that Patent Owner waives any argument that Petitioner improperly cites Djobo as a background reference in support of the anticipation challenge, which is based on Choulis alone. Resp. 48 (nowhere asserting that the challenge is deficient on that basis). That waiver arises because no argument, in that regard, is raised in Patent Owner’s Response see Inst. Dec. 34 (“The Board shall deemed waived any issue not raised by Patent Owner in a timely response to the Petition . . . .”). 16 Patent Owner’s statement that “spin coating tends to cause phase separation” is not developed adequately on this record and, therefore, is further agree with Petitioner that Patent Owner “has not contested this point.” Resp. 48. “Therefore, there is no genuine dispute regarding the unpatentability of claim 13,” although Patent Owner raises “arguments concerning evaporation, which is a distinct process from spin-coating” relevant to the additional limitations of claim 14. Reply 16. We determine that Petitioner establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that Choulis anticipates claim 13. Patent Owner, however, has the better position on whether Choulis anticipates claim 14, which “includes the requirement of applying matrix materials via evaporation coating.” Reply 16. Petitioner seems to abandon that challenge in the Reply by raising arguments that appear, on this record, to bear exclusively on whether the subject matter of claim 14 would have been obvious over Choulis.17 Id. at 16–17. Those arguments are insufficient to counter Patent Owner’s reasons why Choulis does not anticipate the “evaporation coating” limitation of claim 14. Compare id., with Resp. 48. On this record, therefore, we determine that Petitioner does not establish by a preponderance of the evidence that Choulis anticipates claim 14. unpersuasive to persuade us “that Choulis does not have three matrix materials.” Sur-reply 15. That argument runs counter to Choulis’s explicit, intrinsic disclosures, which illustrate (Ex. 1004, Fig. 4) and describe (id. ¶ 30) an organic light emitting layer composed of three matrix materials. See Pet. 24–25 (citing Ex. 1004, Fig. 4, ¶ 30); see also Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 85–88 (persuasive declaration testimony of Dr. Holmes, cited at Pet. 24–25). 17 There is some confusion on this point, given that both parties sometimes collapse, into a single argument, whether Choulis anticipates or renders obvious claim 1. Compare Resp. 48, with Reply 16–17.” slip op. at 35

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successUnpatentableMotivation foundUnpatentable

    “On this record, therefore, we determine that Choulis, at minimum, suggests that a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention would have recognized PMMA as a suitable alternative to PVK in Choulis’s Figure 4 embodiment, notwithstanding any differences raised by Patent Owner. Ex. 1004 ¶ 44. Patent Owner’s argument that no disclosure in Choulis suggests that an ordinarily skilled artisan “would have found it desirable to use PMMA in place of PVK in Choulis’s devices” misses the mark, where Choulis includes both PMMA and PVK in lists of materials suitable for use as host or matrix materials. Resp. 38; Ex. 1004 ¶ 44. “Our caselaw is clear. It’s not necessary to show that a combination is ‘the best option, only that it is a suitable option.’” Intel Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 21 F.4th 784, 800 (Fed. Cir. 2021). Even if Choulis does not expressly disclose substituting PMMA for PVK in the Figure 4 embodiment, “an ordinarily skilled artisan would have found it obvious to make that substitution.” Reply 10 (citing Pet. 31 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 100; Ex. 1044 ¶ 23)). The suggestion for that substitution is set forth unambiguously in Choulis’s listing of both “PVK” and “PMMA” as materials suitable for use as a first “host” material in Choulis’s organic functional layer; that is, “the light emitting layer” that is “described above” in Figure 4. Ex. 1004 ¶ 44. ii. Alternative Reasoning for Replacing PVK with PMMA Patent Owner counterargues that using PPMA in place of PVK would have been understood to “upset the hole and electron balance,” as well as “affect hole-charge recombination,” and “degrade the performance of the resulting OLED system.” Resp. 37. Petitioner responds with evidence that “it would have been a routine task for” an ordinarily skilled artisan “to optimize the composition of each component within the light-emitting layer to achieve the desired charge balance.” Reply 11 (citing Ex. 1004 ¶ 24). Petitioner’s response brings to light a second reason why an ordinarily” slip op. at 40

  Patent outcomesUS 8,723,164 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,723,164
• Samsung Display Co., Ltd. v. Pictiva Displays International Ltd.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jan 22, 2026 · IPR2024-01095 · APJ Garth D Baer · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 2, 4, 9–12, and 17 are unpatentable under § 103 over the Diekmann- and Suzuki-based combinations with the respective secondary references.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “had a Bachelor’s degree in chemistry, physics, or a comparable field of study, and at least three years of research or industrial experience with organic optoelectronic light-emitting devices.” Pet. 10. Further, “[a]n individual with additional education could have less research or industrial experience and vice versa.” Id. Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s formulation. See generally PO Resp. We adopt Petitioner’s uncontested proposed definition because it is consistent with the disclosures of the asserted prior art. See, e.g., Ex. 1006, code (57); Ex. 1011, code (57).” slip op. at 7

  • BurdenUnpatentable

    “III. OBVIOUSNESS ANALYSIS Petitioner contends that claims 2, 4, 9–12, and 17 are unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103. For the reasons explained below, we find that Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of evidence that these claims are unpatentable over the asserted prior art.” slip op. at 7

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityPrinted publication establishedDecided for petitioner

    “Resp. 16–24. We addressed this same issue in our Final Written Decision in IPR2024-01094. IPR2024-01094, Paper 42 at 9–13. As we explained there, Ma qualifies as prior art printed publication because the record evidence supports what Ma says on its face—that it was published online on August 29, 2008 by an Elsevier, an established publisher, in Synthetic Metals, which is a reputable journal. Id. For the same reason explained in IPR2024-01094, we agree with Petitioner that Ma qualifies as a prior art printed publication.” slip op. at 11

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner

    “additional feature in claims 2 and 12, Patent Owner raises a number of challenges to Petitioner’s asserted rationale for combining Ma. See PO Resp. 27–47. First, Patent Owner asserts that skilled artisans would not have used Ma’s Liq dopant in Diekmann/Suzuki because both employ electron-donor dopants that operate differently from Liq’s electron-hopping dopant. Id. at 28–31. We disagree with Patent Owner’s argument because it highlights a difference in the references’ dopants without identifying any incompatibility. Even if Diekmann and Suzuki teach electron-donor type ndopants as Patent Owner asserts, neither precludes or disparages Ma’s electron-hopping dopant. See In re Fulton, 391 F.3d 1195, 1201 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“The prior art’s mere disclosure of more than one alternative does not constitute a teaching away from . . . alternatives because such disclosure does not criticize, discredit, or otherwise discourage the solution claimed.”). As Petitioner explains, “Liq acts as an n-dopant in Ma,” which “increases ETL conductivity.” Pet. Reply 10. Patent Owner does not contest that Liq acts as an n-dopant in Ma. See Pet. Reply 30. Thus, Petitioner’s proposed combinations “substitute one known n-dopant for another to further the same goal of improving ETL conductivity.” Pet. Reply 10. Next, Patent Owner faults Petitioner for failing to show that using Ma’s Liq dopant in Diekmann’s/Suzuki’s ETL would result in lower diffusion or higher efficiencies as compared to Diekmann’s/Suzuki’s preferred n-dopants, which included cesium, barium, or lithium fluoride. PO Resp. 31–35; see PO Sur-reply 4–5. We disagree with Patent Owner’s argument because Petitioner does not need to show that Ma’s Liq n-dopant “was an improvement in a categorical sense” over Diekmann’s/Suzuki’s n-dopants, so long as Ma’s n-dopant was known and one skilled in the art would understand that implementing it had advantages. See Intel Corp. v. Pact XPP Schweiz AG, 61 F.4th 1373, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2023) (quotation marks omitted); In re Fulton, 391 F.3d 1195, 1200 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“[O]ur case law does not require that a particular combination must be the preferred, or the most desirable, combination described in the prior art.”). Petitioner does not assert skilled artisans would have used Liq because it was a superior to Diekmann’s/Suzuki’s preferred dopants, but because doping ETLs with Liq had known benefits including lower driving voltage and enhanced power efficiency from enhanced carrier injection increased transport conductivity, as compared to an undoped device. Pet. 37 (citing Ex. 1010, 813). That other potentially suitable or even superior n-dopants were also known does not make Liq nonobvious. Given Liq’s benefits outlined above, Petitioner has articulated sufficient reasoning with rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion that its proffered combination of Ma’s known dopant in Diekmann’s/Suzuki’s device would have been obvious to one skilled in the art. See KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418 (2007).” slip op. at 11

  Patent outcomesUS 11,828,425 unpatentable
  § 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness
  Patents in suitUS 11,828,425
• Facebook, Inc. / SAP America, Inc. et al. v. Express Mobile, Inc.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jan 16, 2026 · IPR2022-00518 · APJ Jeffrey S Smith · IPR · Remand

  Claims 1–4 and 6 are unpatentable under §103 because the prior-art combinations teach limitations 1(c) and 1(g) under the proper construction of “style.”

  RulingsRemand decision

  • RemandOther

    “As directed by the Federal Circuit, we determine whether the prior art combination teaches limitations 1(c) and 1(g) under the proper construction of “style,” but otherwise do not revisit our analysis of claim 1. Remand Opinion 7, 13–14. The Federal Circuit construed “style” to mean “a collection of one or more settings that is defined separately from any single object but can be associated with one or more objects,” with the understanding that “associated with one or more” means capable of being associated with both one object and more than one object. Id. at 14.” slip op. at 4

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for petitioner

    “Because the Specification discloses that data defines an object, we construe the plain meaning of the claimed “object,” read in light of the Specification of the ’168 patent, as encompassing data that defines the object. See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (The “specification . . . is the single best guide to the meaning of a disputed term.”); Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1996); (Excluding an embodiment in the specification from “the scope of the patent claim . . . is rarely, if ever, correct.”). Further, because the Specification discloses that data defines image objects, and that objects include images, we construe the plain meaning of the claimed “image object,” read in light of the Specification, as encompassing data that defines an image, such as one of the 12 different pocket watch images of Lemay Web.” slip op. at 9

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “We agree with Petitioner. As discussed above, the plain meaning of an “image object” read in light of the Specification encompasses data that defines an image, such as each of the 12 different pocket watch images of Lemay Web. Ex. 1004, 89–90. Therefore, the HTML file of Lemay Web, which specifies attributes including width, height, pause value, and repeat value of the pocket watch image objects, is “capable of being applied to more than one” image object, such as each of the 12 different pocket watch image objects described by Lemay Web. Id.” slip op. at 11

  • Strike new argumentNew argument consideredDecided for petitioner

    “We agree with Petitioner. The Board and Petitioner understood the meaning of “or” in the phrase “one or more objects” in Patent Owner’s proposed construction of style as meaning that “a style . . . can be associated with just one object.” Dec. 22; see Reply 4–5. The Federal Circuit “ultimately conclude[d] that Express Mobile’s proposed construction, with ‘or’ properly interpreted,” means “that the claimed ‘style’ must be capable of being applied to both one and more than one ‘object,’” and “remand[ed] for further proceedings in view of the correct claim construction.” Remand Opinion 13. In doing so, the Federal Circuit stated that “[i]t may be that under the correct claim construction, the Board finds that Lemay Web teaches the claimed ‘style’; however, that is still an open fact question for the Board to decide in the first instance.” Id. at n.6. Given that the Federal Circuit has ordered the Board to determine whether the prior art teaches the claimed “style” under the proper construction, we find that Petitioner’s arguments on this issue are timely.” slip op. at 6

  Patent outcomesUS 7,594,168 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips
  Patents in suitUS 7,594,168
• Facebook, Inc. / SAP America, Inc. et al. v. Express Mobile, Inc.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jan 16, 2026 · IPR2022-00572 · APJ Jeffrey S Smith · IPR · Remand

  Claims 1–4 and 6 are unpatentable under §103 because the prior-art combinations teach the limitations at issue under the Federal Circuit’s construction of “style.”

  RulingsRemand decision

  • RemandDecided for petitioner

    “We agree with Petitioner. Lemay Web discloses that the style settings of width, height, pause, and repeat for the pocket watch images can be changed by changing the values for width, height, pause, and repeat in the HTML file. Ex. 1004, 89–90. This results in changing the size, duration, and frequency of the display of the multiple pocket watch image objects without changing the image files or the Java applet. Id. That is, the 12 image objects of Lemay Web can be uniformly formatted by applying and altering the style settings of the HTML file, which is stored separately from the image objects and the Java applet. Id. at 88– 89. In our Final Written Decision, we wrote that “Lemay Web discloses that the image files that are displayed as the animation object are separate from the HTML.” Ex. 1004, 88–89.” Dec. 22. The Federal Circuit wrote that “how the Board evaluated what constitutes separateness in the prior art software is less than clear.” Opinion, 13 n.7. To be clear, the animation of Lemay Web comprises 12 different pocket watch image objects. Ex. 1004, 89. The HTML file that contains the style settings for the 12 different pocket watch image objects is stored separately from the 12 different pocket watch image objects. Id. at 88–91. The style of the 12 different pocket watch image objects can be altered by changing the values of the style settings in the separate HTML file, thus allowing the style to be uniformly applied to each of the associated 12 pocket watch image objects when the pocket watch image objects are created on the web page. Id.; see Ex. 1030 ¶¶ 28–29; Dec. 21–22. In conclusion for issue (B), we find that Lemay Web teaches applying the style located in the separate HTML file to the pocket watch image objects when creating the pocket watch image objects on the web page. Therefore, Lemay Web’s style is “defined separately from any single object” as claimed. Because Lemay Web’s style can be applied to one object and more than one object and Lemay Web’s style is defined separately from any single object, we find that the prior art combination teaches limitations 1(c) and 1(g) under the proper construction of “style.”” slip op. at 12

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot reached

    “As directed by the Federal Circuit, we determine whether the prior art combination teaches limitations 1(c) and 1(g) under the proper construction of “style,” but otherwise do not revisit our analysis of claim 1. Remand Opinion 7, 13–14. The Federal Circuit construed “style” to mean “a collection of one or more settings that is defined separately from any single object but can be associated with one or more objects,” with the understanding that “associated with one or more” means capable of being associated with both one object and more than one object. Id. at 14.” slip op. at 4

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner

    “Because the Specification discloses that data defines an object, we construe the plain meaning of the claimed “object,” read in light of the Specification of the ’168 patent, as encompassing data that defines the object. See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (The “specification . . . is the single best guide to the meaning of a disputed term.”); Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1996); (Excluding an embodiment in the specification from “the scope of the patent claim . . . is rarely, if ever, correct.”). Further, because the Specification discloses that data defines image objects, and that objects include images, we construe the plain meaning of the claimed “image object,” read in light of the Specification, as encompassing data that defines an image, such as one of the 12 different pocket watch images of Lemay Web.” slip op. at 9

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner

    “What you see in the bottom right is an excerpt from the Lemay Web book . . . [y]ou can still use the Java applet just by putting this applet code into your HTML file. So this shows the animator class is going to be run within height or how big a window within the browser should be allocated in this applet. You can . . . tell the animator class how long to pause in between each image. So that’s a style that’s being applied to all of the multiple images that make up this animation. Ex. 2029, 746:23–747:7. Patent Owner then asked GoDaddy’s expert “for each unique animation you want to create with this animator class that’s shown here, you’re going to have to have a unique set of HTML code with the settings along with any of the images you’ll want to associate with the animator class, right?” Ex. 2030, 793:7–11. GoDaddy’s expert testified, with reference to Exhibit 2027, 80, that “Yeah. I’m not a hundred percent sure I understand your question, but yes, if you had six animations on a page, for example, you’d have six blocks of markup that looked like the markup at the bottom right of that slide, starting with applet.” Id. at 793:12–16. In addressing Patent Owner’s question about “each unique animation,” GoDaddy’s expert provided a hypothetical example of a web page having six animations, and explained that the six animations have six blocks of markup. Ex. 2030, 793:13–16. We find that this testimony means that if a web page has six unique animations, then for each unique animation, a corresponding HTML file contains the style settings for the image objects of that animation, such that the “six animations on a page . . . have six blocks of markup.” Id. We find that the subsequent testimony of GoDaddy’s expert cited by Patent Owner is consistent with the expert’s initial testimony that Lemay Web’s style is “applied to all of the multiple images that make up this animation.” Ex. 2029, 747:5–7. We also find that the subsequent testimony is consistent with and supported by the disclosure of Lemay Web, which teaches that an animation has a set of image files and is added to a Web page using the Animator applet. Ex. 1004, 88 (“[Y]ou’ll learn just enough about Java applets to set up animation on your Web page. . . . To create animation using Java and the Animator applet, you’ll need . . . [a] set of image files . . . that make up your animation.”); see id. at 88–91. That is, Lemay Web, consistent with the testimony of GoDaddy’s expert, discloses that the style settings for the animation of the pocket watch in the HTML file are uniformly applied to the 12 pocket watch image objects. Id. at 88–91.” slip op. at 17

  Patent outcomesUS 7,594,168 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips
  Patents in suitUS 7,594,168
• Facebook, Inc. / SAP America, Inc. et al. v. Express Mobile, Inc.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jan 16, 2026 · IPR2022-00597 · APJ Jeffrey S Smith · IPR · Remand

  Claims 1–4 and 6 are unpatentable under §103 over both listed prior art combinations; Lemay Web teaches the claimed style under the Federal Circuit’s construction.

  RulingsRemand decision

  • RemandOther

    “As directed by the Federal Circuit, we determine whether the prior art combination teaches limitations 1(c) and 1(g) under the proper construction of “style,” but otherwise do not revisit our analysis of claim 1. Remand Opinion 7, 13–14. The Federal Circuit construed “style” to mean “a collection of one or more settings that is defined separately from any single object but can be associated with one or more objects,” with the understanding that “associated with one or more” means capable of being associated with both one object and more than one object. Id. at 14.” slip op. at 4

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “We agree with Petitioner. As discussed above, the plain meaning of an “image object” read in light of the Specification encompasses data that defines an image, such as each of the 12 different pocket watch images of Lemay Web. Ex. 1004, 89–90. Therefore, the HTML file of Lemay Web, which specifies attributes including width, height, pause value, and repeat value of the pocket watch image objects, is “capable of being applied to more than one” image object, such as each of the 12 different pocket watch image objects described by Lemay Web. Id.” slip op. at 11

  • Strike new argumentNew argument consideredDecided for petitioner

    “We agree with Petitioner. The Board and Petitioner understood the meaning of “or” in the phrase “one or more objects” in Patent Owner’s proposed construction of style as meaning that “a style . . . can be associated with just one object.” Dec. 22; see Reply 4–5. The Federal Circuit “ultimately conclude[d] that Express Mobile’s proposed construction, with ‘or’ properly interpreted,” means “that the claimed ‘style’ must be capable of being applied to both one and more than one ‘object,’” and “remand[ed] for further proceedings in view of the correct claim construction.” Remand Opinion 13. In doing so, the Federal Circuit stated that “[i]t may be that under the correct claim construction, the Board finds that Lemay Web teaches the claimed ‘style’; however, that is still an open fact question for the Board to decide in the first instance.” Id. at n.6. Given that the Federal Circuit has ordered the Board to determine whether the prior art teaches the claimed “style” under the proper construction, we find that Petitioner’s arguments on this issue are timely.” slip op. at 6

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownOther

    “Contrary to Patent Owner’s contention, the Specification discloses, “Data that defines text button, image, paragraph, or other parent objects . . . can be stored in two-dimensional arrays (by web page and by object number).” Ex. 1001, 22:11–13 (emphasis added). The Specification further discloses that “objects . . . include colors, fonts, images, audio clips, video clips, text areas, URLs and thread objects.” Id. at 2:16–17 (emphasis added); see id. at 8:40. We highlight that the Specification’s use of “object” is consistent with a definition of “object” in the computing art at the time of the invention, which is “(2) A passive entity that contains or receives data; for example, bytes, blocks, clocks fields, files . . . .” George McDaniel, IBM Dictionary of Computing, McGraw-Hill, Inc. 1994, p. 471 (Ex. 3001). Because the Specification discloses that data defines an object, we construe the plain meaning of the claimed “object,” read in light of the Specification of the ’168 patent, as encompassing data that defines the object. See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (The “specification . . . is the single best guide to the meaning of a disputed term.”); Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1996); (Excluding an embodiment in the specification from “the scope of the patent claim . . . is rarely, if ever, correct.”). Further, because the Specification discloses that data defines image objects, and that objects include images, we construe the plain meaning of the claimed “image object,” read in light of the Specification, as encompassing data that defines an image, such as one of the 12 different pocket watch images of Lemay Web.” slip op. at 8

  Patent outcomesUS 7,594,168 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips
  Patents in suitUS 7,594,168
• Facebook, Inc. / SAP America, Inc. et al. v. Express Mobile, Inc.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jan 16, 2026 · IPR2021-01226 · APJ Jeffrey S Smith · IPR · Remand

  Claims 1–4 and 6 are unpatentable under § 103 over the asserted combinations because the prior art teaches the limitations under the proper construction of “style.”

  RulingsRemand decision

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for petitioner

    “Contrary to Patent Owner’s contention, the Specification discloses, “Data that defines text button, image, paragraph, or other parent objects . . . can be stored in two-dimensional arrays (by web page and by object number).” Ex. 1001, 22:11–13 (emphasis added). The Specification further discloses that “objects . . . include colors, fonts, images, audio clips, video clips, text areas, URLs and thread objects.” Id. at 2:16–17 (emphasis added); see id. at 8:40. We highlight that the Specification’s use of “object” is consistent with a definition of “object” in the computing art at the time of the invention, which is “(2) A passive entity that contains or receives data; for example, bytes, blocks, clocks fields, files . . . .” George McDaniel, IBM Dictionary of Computing, McGraw-Hill, Inc. 1994, p. 471 (Ex. 3001). Because the Specification discloses that data defines an object, we construe the plain meaning of the claimed “object,” read in light of the Specification of the ’168 patent, as encompassing data that defines the object. See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (The “specification . . . is the single best guide to the meaning of a disputed term.”); Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1996); (Excluding an embodiment in the specification from “the scope of the patent claim . . . is rarely, if ever, correct.”). Further, because the Specification discloses that data defines image objects, and that objects include images, we construe the plain meaning of the claimed “image object,” read in light of the Specification, as encompassing data that defines an image, such as one of the 12 different pocket watch images of Lemay Web.” slip op. at 8

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successUnpatentableMotivation foundUnpatentable

    “We agree with Petitioner. As discussed above, the plain meaning of an “image object” read in light of the Specification encompasses data that defines an image, such as each of the 12 different pocket watch images of Lemay Web. Ex. 1004, 89–90. Therefore, the HTML file of Lemay Web, which specifies attributes including width, height, pause value, and repeat value of the pocket watch image objects, is “capable of being applied to more than one” image object, such as each of the 12 different pocket watch image objects described by Lemay Web. Id.” slip op. at 11

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner

    “Ex. 2030, 793:7–11. GoDaddy’s expert testified, with reference to Exhibit 2027, 80, that “Yeah. I’m not a hundred percent sure I understand your question, but yes, if you had six animations on a page, for example, you’d have six blocks of markup that looked like the markup at the bottom right of that slide, starting with applet.” Id. at 793:12–16. In addressing Patent Owner’s question about “each unique animation,” GoDaddy’s expert provided a hypothetical example of a web page having six animations, and explained that the six animations have six blocks of markup. Ex. 2030, 793:13–16. We find that this testimony means that if a web page has six unique animations, then for each unique animation, a corresponding HTML file contains the style settings for the image objects of that animation, such that the “six animations on a page . . . have six blocks of markup.” Id. We find that the subsequent testimony of GoDaddy’s expert cited by Patent Owner is consistent with the expert’s initial testimony that Lemay Web’s style is “applied to all of the multiple images that make up this animation.” Ex. 2029, 747:5–7. We also find that the subsequent testimony is consistent with and supported by the disclosure of Lemay Web, which teaches that an animation has a set of image files and is added to a Web page using the Animator applet. Ex. 1004, 88 (“[Y]ou’ll learn just enough about Java applets to set up animation on your Web page. . . . To create animation using Java and the Animator applet, you’ll need . . . [a] set of image files . . . that make up your animation.”); see id. at 88–91. That is, Lemay Web, consistent with the testimony of GoDaddy’s expert, discloses that the style settings for the animation of the pocket watch in the HTML file are uniformly applied to the 12 pocket watch image objects. Id. at 88–91. Contrary to Patent Owner’s contention, the testimony of GoDaddy’s expert further supports our finding that the style settings in the HTML file of Lemay Web are applied to the multiple image objects that make up the animation. Patent Owner does not identify anything else from the district court trial connected to the “style” issue raised by the Federal Circuit. We conclude that the jury verdict does not change our decision here. IV. CONCLUSION” slip op. at 18

  Patent outcomesUS 7,594,168 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips
  Patents in suitUS 7,594,168
• Reolink Innovation Inc. / Shenzhen Reolink Technology Co., Ltd. v. Throughtek Technology (Shenzhen) Co., Ltd. And Throughtek Co., Ltd.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Dec 15, 2025 · IPR2024-01193 · APJ David C Mckone · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–3, 5, 7–13, 15–19, and 23–25 are unpatentable: claims 1, 7, 8, 10, 11, 15, 16, 18, 19, and 23–25 as anticipated by Zhang; all challenged claims also as obvious over at least one …

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “person of ordinary skill in the art “would have had a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering and two years of work experience with network and communication technologies.” Pet. 5 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 13–15). Patent Owner does not contest Petitioner’s proposal or provide a proposal of its own. On the complete record, we adopt Petitioner’s description of the level of ordinary skill in the art, as it is consistent with the technology described in the ’448 patent and the asserted prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 11

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededTerm construed board ownMixed

    “construction of “feature flag” is inconsistent with the language of claim 8, which states that “the feature flag indicates that the running state of the second apparatus is the sleep state.” Petitioner also argues that Patent Owner’s proposal is not supported by claim 24, which depends from claim 23 and states that “the feature flag is located at a header of the sleep login packet.” Id. at 3. We agree with Petitioner. The plain language of claim 8 states what a feature flag indicates. Claim 24 recites where the feature flag is located. Neither claim suggests any of Patent Owner’s additional limitations.” slip op. at 13

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner
  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “[A] prior art reference will anticipate if it ‘disclose[s] each and every element of the claimed invention . . . arranged or combined in the same way as in the claim.’” Blue Calypso, LLC v. Groupon, Inc., 815 F.3d 1331, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (quoting In re Gleave, 560 F.3d 1331, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (alteration by Federal Circuit)). “However, a reference can anticipate a claim even if it ‘d[oes] not expressly spell out’ all the limitations arranged or combined as in the claim, if a person of skill in the art, reading the reference, would ‘at once envisage’ the claimed arrangement or combination.” Id. (quoting Kennametal, Inc. v. Ingersoll Cutting Tool Co., 780 F.3d 1376, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (alteration by Federal Circuit); In re Petering, 301 F.2d 676, 681 (CCPA 1962)). For the reasons explained below, we are persuaded that Petitioner has shown, by a preponderance of the evidence, that claims 1, 7, 8, 10, 11, 15, 16, 18, 19, and 23–25 are anticipated by Zhang. slip op. at 16

  Patent outcomesUS 10,602,448 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,602,448
• Reolink Innovation Inc. / Shenzhen Reolink Technology Co., Ltd. v. Throughtek Co. Ltd.Instituted
  PTAB · Dec 12, 2025 · IPR2025-01327 · APJ Sheila F Mcshane · IPR · Institution

  The Board instituted IPR of claims 1–19 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on the Schwan-Lee and Schwan-Lee-Strickland obviousness grounds.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

    “partes review. See 35 U.S.C. § 314; 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a). Under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), we may not authorize an inter partes review unless the information in the petition and the preliminary response “shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” For the reasons stated below, we determine that Petitioner has established a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail with respect to at least one claim. We therefore institute inter partes review as to all of the challenged claims of the ’655 patent and all of the asserted grounds of unpatentability in the Petition.” slip op. at 2

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “III. ANALYSIS A. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art: would have had a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or equivalent, and two years of work experience with network devices and communication technologies. EX1003, ¶¶17–19. Additional education might compensate for less experience, and vice versa. Pet. 4 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 17–19).” slip op. at 6

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Lexicography (patentee as own lexicographer)Term construed board ownDecided for petitioner

    “The ’655 patent Specification states that: The topology data table 21 of the online server 20 is mainly recorded with a link data 49 between each of the P2P devices 41– 46 within the P2P device community. The link data 49 refers to the connection relationship between the P2P devices 41–46, which includes, but is not limited to, the connection structure, connection data and/or locations of connection. Ex. 1001, 4:51–57. On this preliminary record, we agree with Petitioner that the term “link data” is a “connection relationship between the P2P devices.” This meaning is consistent with the ordinary meaning of the term within the context of the claim, that is, “link data” means data on the links (connections) between each of the P2P devices, where the Specification provides a more fulsome meaning that the term includes, at least, “the connection structure, connection data and/or locations of connection.” See id. at 4:55–57. We invite the parties to provide additional briefing on the construction of this term during trial.” slip op. at 8

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner

    “Lee discloses that the P2P overlay is generated with the overlay generation unit 220 that generates the P2P overlay by analyzing information regarding “the corresponding application service, the peer, and the network,” where the network information “may include a network topology, a maximum bandwidth, a current network usage, [and] a transmission delay time, and the like.” Ex. 1005 ¶ 54. We determine that this disclosure provides support for Mr. Lett’s testimony that “Lee describes techniques for changing an overlay in response to changing network characteristics,” which could be beneficial. Ex. 1003 ¶ 48. Accordingly, on this preliminary record, we find this evidence is sufficient to support a rationale to combine Schwan and Lee. See KSR, 550 U.S. at 401 (“[I]f a technique has been used to improve one device, and a person of ordinary skill in the art would recognize that it would improve similar devices in the same way, using the technique is obvious.”).” slip op. at 13

  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 9,727,655
• Toyota Motor Corp. v. Emerging Automotive LLCAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Nov 19, 2025 · IPR2024-00814 · APJ Frances L Ippolito · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1, 2, and 4–20 are unpatentable as obvious over the stated combinations of Rector, Kleve, and, for certain claims, additional references.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSITA” or “POSA”) at the time of the invention of the ’244 patent “would have had at least a Bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer science, or closely related field, with at least two-to-four years’ experience in cloud services for settings customization” and that computer science, or equivalent) could substitute for professional experience and vice-versa.” Pet. 12 (citing Ex. 1005 ¶ 89). Patent Owner does not address the level of ordinary skill in the art. See, generally PO Resp. Patent Owner’s Declarant, Dr. Malek, adopts the definition proffered by Petitioner and its Declarant, Dr. Almeroth. Ex. 2001 ¶ 37. We adopt Petitioner’s proposal as it is reasonable and consistent with the prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the prior art may reflect an appropriate level of skill in the art).” slip op. at 8

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for patent owner

    “Patent Owner asserts that the term “transferring is configured to instruct” should be construed according to its plain and ordinary meaning – the limitation.” PO Resp. 11. Patent Owner contends that the challenged claims require more than that the server is capable of the recited transferring (e.g., claims 1 and 17), and must be configured to accomplish the specific purpose of the claims. Id. at 12–17. Our analysis and the outcome of this dispute, however, would not change even if we were to adopt Patent Owner’s construction. Therefore, upon review of the entire record, including arguments by the parties and the relied upon evidence, we determine no terms require express construction to reach our decision. See Realtime Data LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 9

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedPatent owner expert discountedDecided for petitioner

    “With regard to this testimony, we note that Dr. Malek does not provide an underlying basis for these statements to support his conclusion that it is “common knowledge” that distributed software systems are less secure than local software systems. Id. In fact, when viewed with Kleve, Dr. Malek’s testimony appears to contradict Kleve’s express teaching that the “system may be further extended to facilitate the virtual key with additional security by requiring remote credential verification at the vehicle . . . by the VCS, using a server, or allowing the Owner to verify the Temporary User’s request.” Ex. 1007 ¶ 49 (emphases added). With regard to Kleve’s disclosure, Dr. Malek further testifies that [a] POSITA would understand that in Kleve credential authorization can be performed by: (1) VCS, (2) server, or (3) owner . . . . While Kleve discloses the verification can be performed by any of these entities, it states the client-side verification at the vehicle using VCS provides additional security. A POSITA would not have been motivated to modify side verification. Rector already uses the more secure client-side verification. Ex. 2003 ¶ 79 (emphases added). Dr. Malek, however, does not explain how Kleve’s express teachings limit “additional security” to client-side verification with VCS. Id. In fact, Kleve expressly discloses the opposite. Kleve teaches that the additional security may be provided by a remote credential certification that “may be done by the VCS, using a server, or allowing the Owner to verify the Temporary User’s request.” Ex. 1007 ¶ 49 (emphasis added). Kleve further teaches that the Temporary User may enter “a credential verification password at the vehicles touchscreen visual display while having the VCS, server, or owner compare and verify authorization.” Id. (emphasis added). Even Dr. Malek acknowledges that the verification can be performed by “any of these entities,” including the server. Id. We further note Dr. Almeroth testifies that “[t]he server-side verification may be done above and beyond any verification that takes place locally. The server-side verification could also be done as a check on local verification.” Ex. 1005 ¶ 122. This testimony is consistent with and supported by Kleve’s disclosure, which expressly states that “additional security” includes remote credential verification at the vehicle using a server. Ex. 1007 ¶ 49. As such, we credit Dr. Almeroth’s testimony as his testimony better supported by prior art disclosure.” slip op. at 28

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner

    “With regard to this testimony, we note that Dr. Malek does not provide an underlying basis for these statements to support his conclusion that it is “common knowledge” that distributed software systems are less secure than local software systems. Id. In fact, when viewed with Kleve, Dr. Malek’s testimony appears to contradict Kleve’s express teaching that the “system may be further extended to facilitate the virtual key with additional security by requiring remote credential verification at the vehicle . . . by the VCS, using a server, or allowing the Owner to verify the Temporary User’s request.” Ex. 1007 ¶ 49 (emphases added). With regard to Kleve’s disclosure, Dr. Malek further testifies that [a] POSITA would understand that in Kleve credential authorization can be performed by: (1) VCS, (2) server, or (3) owner . . . . While Kleve discloses the verification can be performed by any of these entities, it states the client-side verification at the vehicle using VCS provides additional security. A POSITA would not have been motivated to modify side verification. Rector already uses the more secure client-side verification. Ex. 2003 ¶ 79 (emphases added). Dr. Malek, however, does not explain how Kleve’s express teachings limit “additional security” to client-side verification with VCS. Id. In fact, Kleve expressly discloses the opposite. Kleve teaches that the additional security may be provided by a remote credential certification that “may be done by the VCS, using a server, or allowing the Owner to verify the Temporary User’s request.” Ex. 1007 ¶ 49 (emphasis added). Kleve further teaches that the Temporary User may enter “a credential verification password at the vehicles touchscreen visual display while having the VCS, server, or owner compare and verify authorization.” Id. (emphasis added). Even Dr. Malek acknowledges that the verification can be performed by “any of these entities,” including the server. Id. We further note Dr. Almeroth testifies that “[t]he server-side verification may be done above and beyond any verification that takes place locally. The server-side verification could also be done as a check on local verification.” Ex. 1005 ¶ 122. This testimony is consistent with and supported by Kleve’s disclosure, which expressly states that “additional security” includes remote credential verification at the vehicle using a server. Ex. 1007 ¶ 49. As such, we credit Dr. Almeroth’s testimony as his testimony better supported by prior art disclosure.” slip op. at 28

  Patent outcomesUS 11,396,244 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,396,244

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.