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  • PTAB · Sep 1, 2026 · IPR2023-00220 · APJ Jo-Anne M Kokoski · IPR · Final written decision

    Claims 1–5, 7–13, and 16 are unpatentable as obvious over the asserted prior art; a separate ground was not reached because those claims were shown obvious on other grounds.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • Skill levelSkill level board ownDecided for patent owner

      “had a bachelor’s degree in a pertinent discipline, such as mechanical engineering, physics, applied physics, product design, or a related field, and would also have had 2–4 years of experience working with electronic displays, including the thermal management, product design issues, and failure modes associated with such displays, or 5–7 years of experience in the field working with electronic displays and would have developed a similar understanding of thermal management, product design issues, and failure modes associated with electronic displays. Dec. 7–8. The parties’ positions have not changed from those we considered in the Institution Decision, and neither party argues that the outcome of this case would differ based on our adoption of a particular level of ordinary skill in the art. Thus, we apply the same definition in this Decision. Our determination regarding Petitioner’s challenge does not turn on the differences between Petitioner’s and Patent Owner’s proposed definitions, however, and we note that our conclusion would be the same under either definition.” slip op. at 8

    • ExcludeMotion to exclude, deniedDenied

      “new evidence filed by Patent Owner with its Sur-reply in contravention of 37 C.F.R. § 42.23(b). Paper 47, 1–5. We do not rely on either of these exhibits in rendering this Decision. Accordingly, we dismiss as moot Petitioner’s Motion to Strike.” slip op. at 73

    • Obviousness (§103) › Objective indicia / secondary considerations › NexusObjective indicia no nexusDecided for petitioner

      “that Patent Owner fails to adduce evidence showing how the claimed invention satisfied the alleged need for effective outdoor cooling. See Sjolund v. Musland, 847 F.2d 1573, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (holding that a proponent of objective evidence of long-felt need must show that “the claimed invention satisfied a long felt need”). Patent Owner states in conclusory fashion that “[d]espite the demand for outdoor displays, no one (including Samsung, despite having attempted to develop outdoor displays at least by 2005) was successful until Mr. Dunn conceived of his invention.” PO Resp. 75. Patent Owner cites no evidence for this proposition, so Patent Owner’s assertions regarding Mr. Dunn’s invention satisfying the alleged need are based on unsupported attorney argument. Accordingly, “we conclude that the nexus between the claimed invention and the purported long-felt, unmet need is too attenuated to provide a persuasive rationale for nonobviousness.” In re Karpf, 758 F. App’x 960, 965 (Fed. Cir. 2019).” slip op. at 64

    • Obviousness (§103) › Objective indicia / secondary considerationsObjective indicia outweighedDecided for petitioner

      “objective indicia of nonobviousness (i.e., secondary considerations) may lead to a conclusion that the challenged claims would not have been obvious. See, e.g., Stratoflex, Inc. v. Aeroquip Corp., 713 F.2d 1530, 1538–39 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (instructing that evidence of secondary considerations, when present, must always be considered in determining obviousness). Objective evidence of nonobviousness may include evidence of commercial success, licensing, copying, praise by others, long felt but unresolved need, and” slip op. at 58

    Patent outcomesUS 9,173,322 unpatentable
    § 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR
    Patents in suitUS 9,173,322
  • PTAB · Aug 31, 2026 · IPR2023-00254 · APJ Jameson Lee · IPR · Final written decision

    Claims 1–3, 5–9, 11–13, 15–18, and 20 are unpatentable as obvious over Karppanen and over Yare.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “art. This determination of the level of ordinary skill in the art is consistent with what is reflected by the content of the applied prior art references. Cf. Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1354–55 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the applied prior art may reflect an appropriate level of skill). Further, our obviousness conclusions would be no different even if Patent Owner’s articulation of the level of ordinary skill in the art is adopted. B.” slip op. at 15

    • Expert testimonyPatent owner expert creditedDecided for patent owner

      “Accordingly, we do not discount Mr. Smith-Gillespie’s testimony” slip op. at 33

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

      “1. “closed loop” The term “closed loop” is recited in each independent claim. Petitioner asserts that in the Delaware action , the district court construed “closed loop” as “gas pathway within a display housing containing gas that is essentially isolated from external air.” Pet. 11 (citing Ex. 1026, 1). Petitioner asserts that the district court’s construction is the proper construction, in light of the specification and the prosecution history of the ’740 patent. Id. at 11–12. Petitioner explains: The ’740 patent refers to the gas/air, circulating through a closed loop as the circulating gas/air and also as the “isolated gas.” (Ex. 1001, 9:64–10:3, 10:7–9, 10:56–58, 11:30–12:6 (claims reciting circulating gas/air), 3:30–[39], 3:50–52 (specification referring to gas in the closed loop as “circulating gas” and “isolated gas”), FIG. 1.) Moreover, as noted above, the Applicant distinguished the claims from the Thielemans prior art based on the argument that the closed loop must be separate from and in addition to the open loop. (Ex. [1031], pp. 44-45, 160 (Responses filed on 01/07/2019 and 08/15/2019).) The Court’s “closed loop” construction should apply here, though Applicant notes that this claim construction does not affect the applicability of the prior art in this Petition because the art teaches the separate loops. Id. at 12. Petitioner’s characterization of the prosecution history with respect to the Thielemans reference is inaccurate. Our review of the cited portions of the prosecution history reveals that the Applicants did not argue to the Examiner that the closed loop and the open loop must be isolated from each other and cannot mix. Rather, the Applicants argued that Thielemans discloses having an open loop or a closed loop, not both an open loop and a closed loop. Ex. 1031, 44–45, 160. The Applicants also argued that Thielemans’s closed loop is not “about” and is not “encircling” the electronic image assembly. Id. at 160. The cited prosecution history does not support Petitioner’s assertion. Patent Owner explains that the ITC in the related investigation” slip op. at 16

    • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable

      “whether there was an apparent reason to combine the known elements in the fashion claimed by the patent at issue.” KSR, 550 U.S. at 418 (citing In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006)). “[T]here must be some articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of obviousness.” Kahn, 441 F.3d at 988.” slip op. at 34

    Patent outcomesUS 10,506,740 unpatentable
    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 10,506,740
  • PTAB · Aug 31, 2026 · IPR2023-00221 · APJ Jameson Lee · IPR · Final written decision

    Claims 1–15 are unpatentable as obvious over Karppanen and Larson; the Board found the evidence of obviousness outweighed the evidence of nonobviousness.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “art. This determination of the level of ordinary skill in the art is consistent with what is reflected by the content of the applied prior art references. Cf. Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1354–55 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the applied prior art may reflect an appropriate level of skill). Further, our obviousness conclusions would be no different even if Patent Owner’s articulation of the level of ordinary skill in the art is adopted. B.” slip op. at 15

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

      “1. “closed loop” The term “closed loop” is recited in each independent claim.” slip op. at 16

    • Obviousness (§103) › Objective indicia / secondary considerations › NexusObjective indicia no nexusDecided for petitioner

      “for outdoor displays, no one (including Samsung, despite having begun attempting to develop outdoor displays at least by 2005) was successful until Mr. Dunn and Mr. Hubbard conceived of their invention.” PO Resp. 65. Patent Owner cites no evidence for this proposition. Thus, Patent Owner’s assertions regarding Mr. Dunn’s and Mr. Hubbard’s invention satisfying the alleged need are based on unsupported attorney argument. Accordingly, “we conclude that the nexus between the claimed invention and the purported long-felt, unmet need is too attenuated to provide a persuasive rationale for nonobviousness.” In re Karpf, 758 F. App’x 960, 965 (Fed. Cir. 2019).” slip op. at 62

    • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableObjective indicia outweighedUnpatentable

      “and against obviousness, and weighed the evidence accordingly. The evidence of obviousness outweighs the evidence of nonobviousness. Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that claim 1 would have been obvious over Karppanen and Larson.” slip op. at 74

    Patent outcomesUS 11,013,142 unpatentable
    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 11,013,142
  • PTAB · Aug 31, 2026 · IPR2023-00199 · APJ John A Hudalla · IPR · Final written decision

    Claims 1, 4, 7, and 8 are unpatentable as obvious over Na and Kim (claim 1) and Na and Hong (claims 4, 7, and 8); other grounds were not reached.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “Manufacturing Resources International, Inc. (“Patent Owner” or “MRI”) filed a Preliminary Response. Paper 7 (“Prelim. Resp.”). Taking into account the arguments presented by Patent Owner in the preliminary record, we determined that the information presented in the Petition established that there was a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail with respect to its unpatentability challenges. Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 314, we instituted this proceeding on June 20, 2023, as to all challenged claims and all grounds of unpatentability presented in the Petition. Paper 9 (“Dec. on Inst.”).” slip op. at 2

    • ExcludeMotion to exclude, deniedDenied

      “Petitioner’s Motion to Strike Petitioner moves to strike Exhibits 2055, 2056, and 2058–2061 as being improper new evidence filed by Patent Owner with its Sur-reply in contravention of 37 C.F.R. § 42.23(b). Exclude Mot. 1–5. We have not relied on any of these exhibits in rendering this Decision. Accordingly, we dismiss as moot Petitioner’s Motion to Strike.” slip op. at 73

    • Skill levelSkill level board ownDecided for patent owner

      “record, we adopted the following definition of the level of ordinary skill in our Decision on Institution: [A] POSITA would have had a bachelor’s degree in a pertinent discipline, such as mechanical engineering, physics, applied physics, product design, or a related field, and would also have had 2–4 years of experience working with electronic displays, including the thermal management, product design issues, and failure modes, associated with such displays, or 5–7 years of experience in the field working with electronic displays and would have developed a similar understanding of thermal management, product design issues, and failure modes, associated with electronic displays. Dec. on Inst. 11. The parties’ positions have not changed since the time of institution, and we discern no reason to change the definition. Thus, we apply the same definition. We are satisfied that this definition comports with the level of skill necessary to understand and implement the teachings of the ’595 patent and the asserted prior art. Notwithstanding, we note that our analysis would not change if we adopted either party’s proposed definition in toto.” slip op. at 12

    • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedPatent owner expert discountedDecided for petitioner

      “appear nowhere outside of the claims in the ’595 patent. This fact alone tends to undermine Patent Owner’s suggestion that the “posterior surface” must be distinct from the “rear side.” In addition, Patent Owner’s cited portions of the Specification merely refer to the “posterior surface” as being the surface opposite that on which the LEDs are mounted to which heat from the LEDs is transferred. See Ex. 1001, 4:53–55, 4:57–60. They are inconclusive as to whether the “posterior surface” must be distinct from the “rear side.” Further, Mr. Gershowitz’s testimony in support of a “distinct” construction is based on his interpretation of the words “on the” in claim 4’s recited “posterior surface on the rear side of the PCB.” Ex. 2006 ¶ 128. Specifically, he testifies that “[i]f the posterior surface was the rear side of the PCB, the claim would have said so.” Id. He does not cite any support in the Specification of the ’595 patent for his interpretation. See id. Given that his testimony amounts to speculation divorced from the context of the Specification, Mr. Gershowitz’s testimony is entitled to little weight. We also have considered Mr. Smith-Gillespie’s testimony in support of Petitioner’s contention that an ordinarily skilled artisan “would have understood that the rear outermost surface of the PCB is the recited ‘posterior surface.’” Pet. Reply 20 (citing Pet. 83; Ex. 1002 ¶ 243). He cites a passage in the Specification of the ’595 patent that states: “The PCB may comprise a metal core PCB and the posterior surface of the PCB may be metallic so that air within the constricted convection channel may cool the metallic posterior surface (and subsequently the backlight assembly) more easily and efficiently.” Ex. 1002 ¶ 243 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Ex. 1001, 4:60–65). We accord Mr. Smith-Gillespie’s testimony more weight than Mr. Gershowitz’s testimony given that Mr. Smith-Gillespie’s testimony is rooted in disclosures about metal core PCBs in the ’595 patent. It also gives some credence to the notion that the “posterior surface” and the “rear side” could be one and the same. Based on the record before us, we do not agree with Patent Owner that” slip op. at 19

    Patent outcomesUS 8,854,595 unpatentable
    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 8,854,595
  • PTAB · Jul 27, 2026 · IPR2025-00308 · APJ Aaron W Moore · IPR · Final written decision

    The Board held claim 1 unpatentable as obvious over Darnell and Kim, and over Dasgupta and Darnell; Judge Moore dissented as to the Dasgupta and Kim ground.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Decided for patent owner

      “2. “Real Time” – The Parties’ Positions In the preliminary phase of this proceeding, the principal claim term” slip op. at 9

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundUnpatentable

      “1. Rationale to Combine Darnell and Kim Petitioner contends that “Darnell and Kim address similar problems of” slip op. at 35

    • Expert testimonyOther

      “form of storage or minimal time delay, and Patent Owner concedes as much in this proceeding. See, e.g., Ex. 1082, 125:19–22, 126:3–10; Tr. 41:26– 42:14, 53:20–25. Accordingly, the mere fact that Darnell’s system may aggregate content feeds or content items on a server, merge content, store content, and then deliver content to a user interface, does not preclude it from being done in “real time” as that term would be understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art reading the ’654 patent in its entirety.” slip op. at 48

    Patent outcomesUS 10,334,068 unpatentable
    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 10,334,068
  • PTAB · Jul 27, 2026 · IPR2025-00307 · APJ Kevin C Trock · IPR · Final written decision

    Claims 1–18 are unpatentable: the majority finds them obvious over the asserted prior-art combinations, including Darnell and Kim and Dasgupta-based combinations.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • BurdenFwd all claims unpatentableUnpatentable

      “§ 6. This Final Written Decision issues pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 318(a) (2018) and 37 C.F.R. § 42.73 (2019). For the reasons discussed herein, we determine that Petitioner, Twitch Interactive, Inc., has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that claims 1–18 (the “challenged claims”) of U.S. Patent No. 9,729,658 B2 (Ex. 1001, “the ’658 patent”) are unpatentable. See 35 U.S.C. § 316(e) (2018); 37 C.F.R. § 42.1(d) (2019).” slip op. at 2

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Plain and ordinary meaningDecided for petitioner

      “2. “Real Time” – The Parties’ Positions In the preliminary phase of this proceeding, the principal claim term” slip op. at 10

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundUnpatentable

      “1. Rationale to Combine Darnell and Kim Petitioner contends that “Darnell and Kim address similar problems of” slip op. at 37

    Patent outcomesUS 9,729,658 unpatentable
    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 9,729,658
  • PTAB · Jul 22, 2026 · IPR2024-01095 · APJ Garth D Baer · IPR · Remand

    On remand, the Board maintained its finding that claims 2 and 17 are unpatentable under §103 over Diekmann and Ma, and Suzuki and Ma.

    RulingsRemand decision
    • RemandDecided for petitioner

      “that is both n-doped and comprised of 8-hydroxy-quinolinolato-lithium (Liq). The district-court defendant’s first invalidity challenge relied primarily on Clix2, which lacked an n-doped ETL. Paper 48, 2, Paper 50, 3. Thus, the asserted combination required modifying Clix2’s non-doped ETL by adding an n-dopant. Clix2’s missing n-doped ETL appeared to be a focus at trial. See Ex. 2034, 917:1–18, 920:8–14. Here, in contrast, Petitioner proposed a more modest modification to materially different primary references, Suzuki and Diekmann, which both already have n-doped ETLs. See Paper 50, 2–3; Paper 54 8–9. As we explained in our Final Written Decision, because Patent Owner did not contest that Liq acts as an n-dopant in Ma, Petitioner’s combinations were obvious because they merely “substitute one known n-dopant for another to further the same goal of improving ETL conductivity.” Paper 54, 12. That simple-substitution analysis would not be the same when n-doping Clix2’s non-doped ETL. For this reason, we agree with Petitioner that the district-court Clix2-based combination “is a different combination with a materially different motivation-to-combine analysis,” as compared to the Diekmann/Suzuki and Ma combinations that are at issue here. Paper 50, 3.” slip op. at 2

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successUnpatentableMotivation foundUnpatentable

      “Dependent claims 2 and 17 require an electron transport layer (ETL) that is both n-doped and comprised of 8-hydroxy-quinolinolato-lithium (Liq). The district-court defendant’s first invalidity challenge relied primarily on Clix2, which lacked an n-doped ETL. Paper 48, 2, Paper 50, 3. Thus, the asserted combination required modifying Clix2’s non-doped ETL by adding an n-dopant. Clix2’s missing n-doped ETL appeared to be a focus at trial. See Ex. 2034, 917:1–18, 920:8–14. Here, in contrast, Petitioner proposed a more modest modification to materially different primary references, Suzuki and Diekmann, which both already have n-doped ETLs. See Paper 50, 2–3; Paper 54 8–9. As we explained in our Final Written Decision, because Patent Owner did not contest that Liq acts as an n-dopant in Ma, Petitioner’s combinations were obvious because they merely “substitute one known n-dopant for another to further the same goal of improving ETL conductivity.” Paper 54, 12. That simple-substitution analysis would not be the same when n-doping Clix2’s non-doped ETL. For this reason, we agree with Petitioner that the district-court Clix2-based combination “is a different combination with a materially different motivation-to-combine analysis,” as compared to the Diekmann/Suzuki and Ma combinations that are at issue here. Paper 50, 3.” slip op. at 2

    • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable

      “that is both n-doped and comprised of 8-hydroxy-quinolinolato-lithium (Liq). The district-court defendant’s first invalidity challenge relied primarily on Clix2, which lacked an n-doped ETL. Paper 48, 2, Paper 50, 3. Thus, the asserted combination required modifying Clix2’s non-doped ETL by adding an n-dopant. Clix2’s missing n-doped ETL appeared to be a focus at trial. See Ex. 2034, 917:1–18, 920:8–14. Here, in contrast, Petitioner proposed a more modest modification to materially different primary references, Suzuki and Diekmann, which both already have n-doped ETLs. See Paper 50, 2–3; Paper 54 8–9. As we explained in our Final Written Decision, because Patent Owner did not contest that Liq acts as an n-dopant in Ma, Petitioner’s combinations were obvious because they merely “substitute one known n-dopant for another to further the same goal of improving ETL conductivity.” Paper 54, 12. That simple-substitution analysis would not be the same when n-doping Clix2’s non-doped ETL. For this reason, we agree with Petitioner that the district-court Clix2-based combination “is a different combination with a materially different motivation-to-combine analysis,” as compared to the Diekmann/Suzuki and Ma combinations that are at issue here. Paper 50, 3.” slip op. at 2

    Patent outcomesUS 11,828,425 unpatentable
    § 103 obviousness
    Patents in suitUS 11,828,425
  • Apple Inc. v. Memoryweb, LLCAll claims unpatentable
    PTAB · Jul 8, 2026 · PGR2022-00006 · APJ Jason M Repko · PGR · Remand

    On remand, the Board held claims 1–59 unpatentable: claims 1–6, 8–37, 40–44, and 49–59 over A3UM under §103, and claims 6, 7, 38, and 39 for lack of written description under §112.

    RulingsRemand decision
    • RemandOther

      “On remand, the Board is to determine “[w]hether the alleged inconsistency in [Petitioner’s] treatment of map images compared to other first/second versions of claim elements supports rejecting [Petitioner’s] theory on claim-construction or other merits grounds is a matter for the Board to consider in the first instance on remand, constrained by any relevantly similar now-final findings of fact and conclusions of law in the ’020 PGR and related proceedings” (CAFC Dec. 16). Thus, the two issues on remand are (1) the construction of the second map image and (2) whether A3UM teaches or suggests the claimed “second map image” under that construction.” slip op. at 10

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “A person of ordinary skill in the art in 2011 would have had (1) at least a bachelor’s degree in computer science, computer engineering, or electrical engineering, and (2) at least one year of experience designing graphical user interfaces for applications such as photo management systems. Pet. 12 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 44–46). In the Institution Decision and Final Written Decision, we applied Petitioner’s proposed definition. Inst. Dec. 12; FWD 30–31. Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art. PO Resp. 7. We continue to find that the skill level identified by Petitioner (Pet. 12) is consistent with the record. Thus, we use the same definition here that we used in the Institution Decision and Final Written Decision.” slip op. at 6

    • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

      “c. Analysis We agree with Petitioner that the “second map image” should be construed as the map image in the second person view. Reply 5. Under Petitioner’s proposed construction, the terms “first” and “second” identify which person view that the map image is within. Id. The map image’s connection to the person view is important to how the user interacts with the interface because selecting the map image in one view does something different than selecting the map image in another, as recited in claims 14 and 46.” slip op. at 12

    • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable

      “Here, we disagree with Patent Owner’s argument because it is based on the premise that the second map image is different from the first in a way that is not reflected in the claims. See Section II.C.3 supra. Even if “the claims consistently use the terms ‘first’ and ‘second’ to refer to separate and distinct elements,” A3UM’s first and second map images are separate and distinct elements for at least the reason they are included in separate and distinct views in the interface. See Pet. 63; Reply 5. As discussed in Section II.C.3, the second map image is the map image in the second person view. Here, Petitioner sufficiently shows that A3UM provides the same functionality for each person, including displaying the person in the Faces view with their name within A3UM’s overall user interface. See Pet. 62 (citing Ex. 1003, ¶215; Ex. 1005, 418–420). Patent Owner does not dispute this. See PO Resp.; Sur-reply. For the same reasons why A3UM teaches the “first map image” with respect to a first person view recited in claims 1 and 31, Petitioner has shown that A3UM also teaches the “second map image” in the second person view. See FWD 53–56. In sum, Patent Owner’s arguments are unpersuasive because they are based on an incorrect claim construction, and Petitioner has shown that claims 13 and 45 are unpatentable. 5. Claims 14–16 and 46–48 Apart from the arguments analyzed above, Patent Owner does not present separate arguments directed to the subject matter of claims 14–16 burden to show that the challenged claims are unpatentable. See Dynamic Drinkware, LLC v. Nat’l Graphics, Inc., 800 F.3d 1375, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2015). We have reviewed Petitioner’s arguments and evidence submitted in connection with the remaining limitations and find them persuasive as they are consistent with and supported by the evidence of record. See Pet. 63–64. Thus, Petitioner has shown that claims 14–16 and 46–48 are unpatentable over A3UM.” slip op. at 14

    Patent outcomesUS 11,017,020 unpatentable
    Claim construction§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosure
    Patents in suitUS 11,017,020
  • PTAB · Jun 10, 2026 · IPR2025-00350 · APJ Jason M Repko · IPR · Final written decision

    Claims 7–12 were held unpatentable over Wannamaker alone or with Avellan; claims 1–6 and 13 were not shown unpatentable because Avellan did not teach the claimed screen-capture sequence and assembly.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • Skill levelSkill level board ownDecided for petitioner

      “Patent Owner submits a similar definition and does not take issue with the Petition’s characterization of the level of ordinary skill in the art. PO Resp. 17. We determine that no express finding is necessary and that the level of ordinary skill in the art is reflected by the prior art of record. Any perceived difference in how each party characterizes a POSITA’s education, knowledge, and work experience does not change our analysis or conclusions.” slip op. at 5

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

      “Neither party has offered any claim construction arguments, relying on ordinary and customary meaning. Pet. 19–20; PO Resp. 18. We determine that construction of claim terms is not necessary to resolve the disputes raised by the parties in this proceeding.” slip op. at 5

    • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner

      “Yet paragraph 122 of Mr. Lipoff’s declaration merely repeats the Petition’s argument almost verbatim. Compare Ex. 1007 ¶ 122, with Pet. 28. Mr. Lipoff does not add any citation to Avellan or any other source that supports his testimony. See Ex. 1007 ¶ 122. Nor does Mr. Lipoff offer any additional technical reasoning than what is stated in the Petition. Testimony may be entitled to little weight if it merely restates the petition’s unsupported, conclusory assertions without adding supporting evidence or technical reasoning. Xerox Corp. v. Bytemark, Inc., IPR2022-00624, Paper 9 at 15 (PTAB Aug. 24, 2022) (precedential). That is the case here.” slip op. at 8

    • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

      “We are persuaded by Patent Owner’s argument that claim 1 is not obvious over Avellan because it does not assemble a media stream of multimedia items using the recited screen captures. See PO Resp. 21–23. We agree with Patent Owner that the plain language of the claim requires more than transmitting individual media items. PO Sur-reply 20. To the extent that Avellan captures images, those images do not meet the claimed requirements for a “temporal sequence of screen captures” in the independent claims, which must (1) be of the web page rendered by a browser, (2) “define all the content of the web page at a given time,” (3) “illustrate a dynamic change of at least a portion of the content over time” when two of them are compared, and (4) used to assemble “the at least one media stream.” Rather, the record better supports Patent Owner’s argument that Avellan transmits the multimedia items separate from any media stream assembled from screen captures. PO Resp. 21–23; PO Sur-reply 20.” slip op. at 7

    Patent outcomesUS 10,524,002 mixed
    Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR
    Patents in suitUS 10,524,002
  • PTAB · Jun 3, 2026 · IPR2022-00981 · APJ Jameson Lee · IPR · Remand

    On remand, claims 8–11, 13, 17, and 19 were held unpatentable over Rautiola, Regnier, and Sainton; claim 15 was not shown unpatentable.

    RulingsRemand decision
    • RemandMixed

      “8–11, 13, 15, 17, and 19, and remanded “for consideration of the patentability of those claims.” Id. at 14. We understand both the reversal and vacature are with respect to Ground 1 of alleged unpatentability, not Ground 2, because the Federal Circuit’s decision did not discuss anything relating to Ground 2. Paper 43. The parties agreed. Paper 44. In this remand proceeding, neither party requested the filing of additional briefing or evidence. In a telephone conference call, both parties expressed agreement with the Board (1) that “there is no issue regarding collateral estoppel or issue preclusion with respect to dependent claims 8– 11, 13, 15, 17, and 19, and (2) that the remand proceeding would not involve the Board revisiting any matter or issue concerning alleged obviousness of claims 1, 8, 9, 11, 13, 17, and 19 over Ground 2.4 Papers 43, 44. The parties also agreed that the remand proceeding would only involve the Board reviewing the alleged obviousness of dependent claims 8–11, 13, 15, 17, and 19 as obvious over Rautiola, Regnier, and Sainton. Id. We have authority to conduct this inter partes review under 35 U.S.C. § 6. This Final Written Decision on Remand is issued pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 318(a) and 37 C.F.R. § 42.73. On the record before us, which is the same as the record before us at the time we issued the first final written decision (Paper 34), we determine that Petitioner has proved by a preponderance of the evidence that claims 8– 11, 13, 17, and 19, but not claim 15, of the ’936 patent are unpatentable over Rautiola, Regnier, and Sainton.” slip op. at 3

    • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for patent owner

      “5. Petitioner’s Request to Discredit Dr. Cooklev’s Declaration Petitioner makes several arguments discrediting Dr. Cooklev’s declaration (Ex. 2031) and asserts that Dr. Cooklev’s declaration should be accorded little to no weight. Reply 13–14. We have already considered and rejected this request in the Final Written Decision issued on November 7, 2023. Paper 34, 21–23. Our reasoning need not be reiterated here. Petitioner does not persuade us that Dr. Cooklev’s declaration testimony should be accorded little to no weight.” slip op. at 15

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “Patent Owner does not dispute Petition’s definition of level of ordinary skill. See generally PO Resp. Patent Owner’s expert, Dr. Cooklev, accepts Dr. Kotzin’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art. Ex. 2031 ¶ 24. We adopt Petitioner’s proposal regarding the level of ordinary skill in the art. This level of ordinary skill in the art is supported by the testimony of Dr. Kotzin (Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 20–22) and is consistent with the level reflected in the ’936 patent and the prior art of record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 9

    • Obviousness (§103) › Analogous artAnalogous artDecided for petitioner

      “only when it is analogous to the claimed invention.” Airbus S.A.S. v. Firepass Corp., 941 F.3d 1374, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2019). A prior art reference constitutes analogous art if it is “from the same field of endeavor” or “reasonably pertinent to the particular problem with which the inventor is involved.” In re Bigio, 381 F.3d 1320, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2004). The petitioner bears the burden of establishing that a reference is analogous art. See Sanofi-Aventis Deutschland GmbH v. Mylan Pharms. Inc., 66 F.4th 1373, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2023).” slip op. at 16

    Patent outcomesUS 8,472,936 mixed
    § 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 8,472,936
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