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  • PTAB · May 13, 2026 · IPR2025-01082 · APJ David C Mckone · IPR · Adverse judgment

    The Board granted Patent Owner’s request for adverse judgment after it disclaimed the entire patent term, entering judgment against claims 1–10.

    RulingsAdverse judgment
    • Adverse judgmentAdverse judgmentGranted

      “A party may request entry of adverse judgment against itself at any time during an inter partes review proceeding. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.73(b). In addition, “[a]ctions construed to be a request for adverse judgment include: (1) Disclaimer of the involved application or patent; [and] (2) Cancellation or disclaimer of a claim such that the party has no remaining claim in the trial.” Id. Because Patent Owner has explicitly requested adverse judgment against itself pursuant to Rule 42.73(b), and has disclaimed the entire term of the ’181 patent, Patent Owner’s request for adverse judgment is granted.” slip op. at 3

    None
    Patents in suitUS 6,888,181
  • PTAB · May 12, 2026 · IPR2025-01524 · APJ John A Squires · IPR · Director review

    Director Review was granted, institution was vacated, and IPR was denied because Petitioner advanced broader indefiniteness arguments in related litigation.

    RulingsDirector review decision
    • Director reviewDirector review, grantedGranted

      “As I recently explained, it is appropriate to deny institution when a Petitioner’s conduct demonstrates that the dispute “is less about a litigation alternative and more about inconsistent positions to gain an upper hand in the overall litigation.” Terumo BCT Inc. v. Haemonetics Corp., IPR2025- 01374, Paper 20 (Director May 12, 2026). Here, as in Terumo, Petitioner advanced indefiniteness contentions in the co-pending district court litigation at its first opportunity to do so after institution was granted. See Paper 15, 1–2 (listing seven allegedly indefinite terms and phrases impacting all challenged claims). Although Petitioner contends that its unpatentability arguments for the “and/or” and “one or more” claim limitations fit within the Tesla framework, i.e., that the prior art discloses the claimed features regardless of how those limitations are construed, Petitioner’s indefiniteness contentions are broader than those two limitations. See, e.g., Paper 15, 1–2; IPR2025-01383, Paper 9 at 8–10. Thus, it is appropriate to deny institution of these IPRs for the same reasons as articulated in Terumo.” slip op. at 3

    • Other 314aInstitution denied discretionary otherInstitution denied

      “As I recently explained, it is appropriate to deny institution when a Petitioner’s conduct demonstrates that the dispute “is less about a litigation alternative and more about inconsistent positions to gain an upper hand in the overall litigation.” Terumo BCT Inc. v. Haemonetics Corp., IPR2025- 01374, Paper 20 (Director May 12, 2026). Here, as in Terumo, Petitioner advanced indefiniteness contentions in the co-pending district court litigation at its first opportunity to do so after institution was granted. See Paper 15, 1–2 (listing seven allegedly indefinite terms and phrases impacting all challenged claims). Although Petitioner contends that its unpatentability arguments for the “and/or” and “one or more” claim limitations fit within the Tesla framework, i.e., that the prior art discloses the claimed features regardless of how those limitations are construed, Petitioner’s indefiniteness contentions are broader than those two limitations. See, e.g., Paper 15, 1–2; IPR2025-01383, Paper 9 at 8–10. Thus, it is appropriate to deny institution of these IPRs for the same reasons as articulated in Terumo. In its briefing, Petitioner states that it will stipulate to withdraw all indefiniteness arguments against the challenged patents from the related litigation if the Board agrees to maintain and not vacate institution of these IPRs. Paper 16, 2. This stipulation, which Petitioner offered only after Petitioner’s actions ran afoul of Revvo and Tesla and only after Patent Owner brought those actions to the Office’s attention, is insufficient.” slip op. at 3

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied discretionary otherInstitution denied

      “Accordingly, the appropriate course of action is to grant Director Review, vacate the Notices granting institution, and deny institution.3 It is: ORDERED that Director Review is granted; FURTHER ORDERED that the Notices granting institution of inter partes review (Paper 11; IPR2025-01383, Paper 12; IPR2025-01524, Paper 10) are vacated; and FURTHER ORDERED that the Petitions are denied, and no trials are instituted.” slip op. at 4

    Discretionary denial
    Patents in suitUS 9,123,186
  • PTAB · May 12, 2026 · IPR2025-01383 · APJ John A Squires · IPR · Director review

    Director review was granted, the institution notices were vacated, and institution was denied because Petitioner advanced inconsistent claim positions in parallel litigation.

    RulingsDirector review decision
    • Other 314aInstitution denied discretionary otherInstitution denied

      “As I recently explained, it is appropriate to deny institution when a Petitioner’s conduct demonstrates that the dispute “is less about a litigation alternative and more about inconsistent positions to gain an upper hand in the overall litigation.” Terumo BCT Inc. v. Haemonetics Corp., IPR2025- 01374, Paper 20 (Director May 12, 2026). Here, as in Terumo, Petitioner advanced indefiniteness contentions in the co-pending district court litigation at its first opportunity to do so after institution was granted. See Paper 15, 1–2 (listing seven allegedly indefinite terms and phrases impacting all challenged claims). Although Petitioner contends that its unpatentability arguments for the “and/or” and “one or more” claim limitations fit within the Tesla framework, i.e., that the prior art discloses the claimed features regardless of how those limitations are construed, Petitioner’s indefiniteness contentions are broader than those two limitations. See, e.g., Paper 15, 1–2; IPR2025-01383, Paper 9 at 8–10. Thus, it is appropriate to deny institution of these IPRs for the same reasons as articulated in Terumo. In its briefing, Petitioner states that it will stipulate to withdraw all indefiniteness arguments against the challenged patents from the related litigation if the Board agrees to maintain and not vacate institution of these IPRs. Paper 16, 2. This stipulation, which Petitioner offered only after Petitioner’s actions ran afoul of Revvo and Tesla and only after Patent Owner brought those actions to the Office’s attention, is insufficient.” slip op. at 3

    • Director reviewDirector review, grantedGranted

      “Accordingly, the appropriate course of action is to grant Director Review, vacate the Notices granting institution, and deny institution.3 It is: ORDERED that Director Review is granted; FURTHER ORDERED that the Notices granting institution of inter partes review (Paper 11; IPR2025-01383, Paper 12; IPR2025-01524, Paper 10) are vacated; and FURTHER ORDERED that the Petitions are denied, and no trials are instituted.” slip op. at 4

    Discretionary denial
    Patents in suitUS 9,290,153
  • PTAB · May 12, 2026 · IPR2025-01342 · APJ John A Squires · IPR · Director review

    Director Review was granted, the institution notices were vacated, and institution was denied because Ford advanced broader indefiniteness positions in related litigation.

    RulingsDirector review decision
    • Other 314aInstitution denied discretionary otherInstitution denied

      “As I recently explained, it is appropriate to deny institution when a Petitioner’s conduct demonstrates that the dispute “is less about a litigation alternative and more about inconsistent positions to gain an upper hand in the overall litigation.” Terumo BCT Inc. v. Haemonetics Corp., IPR2025- 01374, Paper 20 (Director May 12, 2026). Here, as in Terumo, Petitioner advanced indefiniteness contentions in the co-pending district court litigation at its first opportunity to do so after institution was granted. See Paper 15, 1–2 (listing seven allegedly indefinite terms and phrases impacting all challenged claims). Although Petitioner contends that its unpatentability arguments for the “and/or” and “one or more” claim limitations fit within the Tesla framework, i.e., that the prior art discloses the claimed features regardless of how those limitations are construed, Petitioner’s indefiniteness contentions are broader than those two limitations. See, e.g., Paper 15, 1–2; IPR2025-01383, Paper 9 at 8–10. Thus, it is appropriate to deny institution of these IPRs for the same reasons as articulated in Terumo. In its briefing, Petitioner states that it will stipulate to withdraw all indefiniteness arguments against the challenged patents from the related litigation if the Board agrees to maintain and not vacate institution of these IPRs. Paper 16, 2. This stipulation, which Petitioner offered only after Petitioner’s actions ran afoul of Revvo and Tesla and only after Patent Owner brought those actions to the Office’s attention, is insufficient.” slip op. at 3

    • Director reviewDirector review, grantedGranted

      “Accordingly, the appropriate course of action is to grant Director Review, vacate the Notices granting institution, and deny institution.3 It is: ORDERED that Director Review is granted; FURTHER ORDERED that the Notices granting institution of inter partes review (Paper 11; IPR2025-01383, Paper 12; IPR2025-01524, Paper 10) are vacated; and FURTHER ORDERED that the Petitions are denied, and no trials are instituted.” slip op. at 4

    Discretionary denial
    Patents in suitUS 9,020,697
  • PTAB · May 12, 2026 · IPR2025-01391 · APJ John A Squires · IPR · Director review

    Director Review was granted, the institution notice vacated, and institution denied because Petitioner took inconsistent claim-construction positions in the IPR and district court.

    RulingsDirector review decision
    • Director reviewDirector review, grantedGranted

      “For the reasons below, Patent Owner’s requests for Director Review are granted.” slip op. at 3

    • Other 314aInstitution denied discretionary otherInstitution denied

      “Petitioner’s conduct, which ensued following institution, demonstrates that this dispute is less about a litigation alternative, as Congress intended, and more about inconsistent positions to gain an upper hand in the overall litigation. See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 112-98, at 48 (2011) (explaining that IPRs were intended to provide “quick and cost effective alternatives to litigation”). Such conduct has negative consequences: It multiplies litigation expense, reduces patent value, discourages innovation, diminishes the integrity of the patent system, and depletes the Office’s resources. Discretion is afforded to the USPTO Director to ensure fairness, efficiency, and predictability in patent disputes in a focused inter partes context—as Congress envisioned—as distinct from the broad adversarial context in district court litigation. The Office’s review under Article I is ultimately regulatory; proceedings under Article III are adjudicatory. I would not have instituted these IPRs in the first instance had Petitioner engaged in this strategic litigation-style behavior before institution. Accordingly, the appropriate course of action is to grant Director Review, vacate the Notice granting institution of these IPRs, and deny institution.” slip op. at 4

    • Strike new argumentOther

      “Petitioner’s assertion that the term “controller” is not in controversy in these IPRs and so it was not required to construe the term in the Petitions is an inadequate justification for the different positions. As I have stated repeatedly, a petitioner should present a single construction and apply that construction consistently before the Board and the district court. See, e.g., Infineon Techs. Am. Corp. v. Mosaid Techs. Corp., IPR2025-01456, Paper 27 at 3–4 (Director Mar. 17, 2026) (“[A] petitioner should pick one [construction], and one consistent with its asserted District Court position.”). Failure to do so detracts from the Office’s goal of “providing greater predictability and certainty in the patent system.” Revvo, Paper 20 at 4–5. I also disagree with Petitioner’s assertion that these IPRs do not implicate Rule 42.104(b)(3). Rule 42.104(b)(3) requires a petition to “[p]rovide a statement of the precise relief requested for each claim challenged,” and to identify how each challenged claim is to be construed. The rule continues to state that “[w]here the claim to be construed contains a means-plus-function or step-plus-function limitation as permitted under 35 U.S.C. 112(f), the construction of the claim must identify the specific portions of the specification that describe the structure, material, or acts corresponding to each claimed function.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(3). Petitioner’s position in the district court that the term “controller” is a means-plus-function limitation undercuts its position that Rule 42.104(b)(3) does not apply here. Further, Petitioner’s citation to Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) as support for its position is inapposite, as the holding in that case addresses when the Board is required to construe a claim term, not when a party is required to follow Board rules. DR Response 7–8.” slip op. at 3

    Discretionary denial
    Patents in suitUS 10,758,652
  • PTAB · May 12, 2026 · IPR2025-01374 · APJ John A Squires · IPR · Director review

    Director Review was granted, the institution notice was vacated, and institution was denied because Petitioner took inconsistent claim-construction positions.

    RulingsDirector review decision
    • Other 314aInstitution denied discretionary otherInstitution denied

      “Petitioner’s conduct, which ensued following institution, demonstrates that this dispute is less about a litigation alternative, as Congress intended, and more about inconsistent positions to gain an upper hand in the overall litigation. See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 112-98, at 48 (2011) (explaining that IPRs were intended to provide “quick and cost effective alternatives to litigation”). Such conduct has negative consequences: It multiplies litigation expense, reduces patent value, discourages innovation, diminishes the integrity of the patent system, and depletes the Office’s resources. Discretion is afforded to the USPTO Director to ensure fairness, efficiency, and predictability in patent disputes in a focused inter partes context—as Congress envisioned—as distinct from the broad adversarial context in district court litigation. The Office’s review under Article I is ultimately regulatory; proceedings under Article III are adjudicatory. I would not have instituted these IPRs in the first instance had Petitioner engaged in this strategic litigation-style behavior before institution. Accordingly, the appropriate course of action is to grant Director Review, vacate the Notice granting institution of these IPRs, and deny institution.” slip op. at 4

    • Director reviewDirector review, grantedGranted

      “Petitioner knew that, consistent with Board precedent, it cannot take different positions on claim construction in the district court and at the Board without an adequate explanation. Nonetheless, Petitioner did not heed that caution. Instead, at its first opportunity after institution was granted in these IPRs, Petitioner—whom I note is represented by the same counsel here and in district court—advanced indefiniteness contentions in the district court litigation that are different from Petitioner’s proposed “plain and ordinary meaning” constructions in these IPRs. See, e.g., DR Request 1; Ex. 2022, 21–42; Paper 2, 2 (counsel information); IPR2025- 01391, Paper 19, 1. Specifically, Petitioner argued in its district court contentions that “‘at least claims 11–20 of the ’124 patent are indefinite’ because the ‘controller [is/further] configured to’ terms are governed by means-plus-function interpretation pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 112(f) and fail to recite sufficient structure.” DR Request 1 (quoting Pet. 20 and Ex. 2022 (Joint Disputed Claim Chart), 21–42); see also IPR2025-01391, Paper 19, 1 (“Petitioner now argues that ‘at least claims 11–19 of the ’652 patent are indefinite.’”).” slip op. at 3

    Discretionary denial
    Patents in suitUS 11,738,124
  • PTAB · May 7, 2026 · IPR2024-01387 · APJ Iftikhar Ahmed · IPR · Final written decision

    Claims 1–16 are unpatentable under the instituted obviousness grounds, including Becerra, the QlikView Manuals, and combinations with other references.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • ExcludeMotion to exclude, grantedMotion to exclude, deniedGranted in part

      “why it is trustworthy and how it archives dates by which the webpages were accessible, as this is an information resource on which librarians reasonably rely. See FED. R. EVID. 703. We agree with Petitioner that Dr. Hall-Ellis does have personal knowledge of the facts stated in the remaining testimony (e.g., what she actually downloaded from websites), and that FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE 602 is inapplicable to her testimony offered as an expert. See Pet. Opp. 5–6 (citing Ex. 1030 ¶¶ 26, 29–32, 35, 37–39). We find her testimony to be relevant to the issues presented and specifically to whether the QlikView documents were publicly accessible. We also find no danger that the testimony would confuse the issues or mislead the Board or present unfair prejudice to Patent Owner. Accordingly, we deny Patent Owner’s Motion as to the remaining portion of Dr. Hall-Ellis’s declaration.” slip op. at 92

    • Strike new argumentNew argument disregardedGranted

      “FURTHER ORDERED that Petitioner’s Motion to Strike portions of Patent Owner’s Reply on its Motion to Exclude (Paper 32) is granted; and” slip op. at 102

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundUnpatentable

      “1. Motivation to Combine Becerra and Couckuyt Petitioner argues that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to combine the teachings of Becerra and Couckuyt because such a person would have recognized that Couckuyt discloses useful techniques of assigning data to Becerra’s charts, including assigning data to each axis. Pet. 34 (citing Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 19, 52, Fig. 5; Ex. 1003 ¶ 224). Petitioner contends that Couckuyt discloses associating data from a “spreadsheet document” with a chart, such as a “bar graph.” Id. at 35 (citing Ex. 1006, 6:1–37; Figs. 3a, 3c). below. Petitioner’s annotations to Figure 4 identify “Drop Zones” in red and “Data Fields” in Blue. Id. at 36. Petitioner contends Couckuyt discloses a “drag-and-drop user interface (DDUI) . . . associated with a data source, such as the two-dimensional data source 300,” and Figure 4 illustrates the DDUI permitting “value data fields and the characteristic data fields . . . to be dragged and dropped into drop zones.” Id. at 35–36 (citing Ex. 1006, 7:10–13). Petitioner contends that a “primary benefit of the charting DDUI is that the user can quickly change the data that is being presented in the chart,” and using Couckuyt’s techniques, a user can “quickly change the data” and see the desired effects. Id. at 36 (citing Ex. 1006, 1:18–19; Ex. 1003 ¶ 228). Petitioner contends that when Becerra’s control panel includes multiple charts, Couckuyt’s techniques would allow dragging-anddropping data from a data source to multiple charts, and would simplify the process of assigning data to multiple control panel components. Id. at 36–37 skill in the art would have also had a reasonable expectation of success combining Becerra with Couckuyt because the combination would amount to nothing more than incorporating Couckuyt’s well-known drag-and-drop techniques into Becerra’s system. Id. at 37 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 229–231). Patent Owner responds that Couckuyt focuses on selecting a data icon that corresponds to dragging and dropping data fields, not dragging and dropping data, while Becerra teaches that selecting various data ranges from the spreadsheet is desirable. PO Resp. 36–37 (citing Ex. 1004 7:48–52; Ex. 2001 ¶ 146). According to Patent Owner, a person of ordinary skill in the art would not have been motivated to merely select data fields that do not limit the selected data in any way. Id. Patent Owner further argues Becerra’s method of binding components to a spreadsheet range and extracting formulas from a spreadsheet teaches away from the multiple chart generation scheme of Couckuyt that uses drag and dropping of data fields. Id. at 37. According to Patent Owner, Couckuyt is directed to the need for a charting DDUI that can generate multiple charts at the same time and such a need does not exist in Becerra which in turn is focused on creating a control panel that is an interactive graphics simulation. Id. (citing Ex. 1004, 1:66–67, 2:5–8; Ex. 1005 ¶ 11; Ex. 2001 ¶ 148). Based on our review of the complete record, we determine that” slip op. at 31

    • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityPrinted publication establishedDecided for petitioner

      “2. Whether QlikView Manuals Qualify as Prior Art Petitioner argues that “the QlikView Manuals describe a well-known system and are printed publications available to the public at least by July 8, 2008.” Pet. 7–9. Petitioner offers ample evidence to demonstrate the QlikView Manuals were publicly accessible by July 8, 2008. See id. (citing Ex. 1008; Ex. 1009; Ex. 1014–1023; Ex. 1003 ¶ 129–140; Ex. 1030;11 Ex. 1068 ¶¶ 4–7; Ex. 1032; Ex. 1033). Petitioner contends in 2008, QlikView was a well-known software product sold by QlikTech International AB (“QlikTech”). Id. at 8 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 129; Ex. 1030 ¶ 23; Ex. 1068 ¶¶ 4–7). Petitioner asserts that QlikTech announced that QlikView version 8.50 was scheduled for release on June 30, 2008, and QlikTech’s website added the “QlikView 8.50” hyperlink by July 8, 2008. Id. (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 129–131; Ex. 1022, 1; Ex. 1068 ¶ 7). Petitioner contends that, as of July 8, 2008, a person of ordinary skill in the art would have understood that they could view the QlikView Manuals in the installation package. Id. (citing Exs. 1014–1017; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 131–132; Ex. 1068 ¶ 7). Petitioner further contends that the QlikView Manuals were also available on QlikTech’s website as of this 11 As discussed below (see infra § IV.A), we grant Patent Owner’s Motion to Exclude as to certain portions of Exhibit 1030 and do not give them any weight. However, we deny Patent Owner’s Motion as to the remaining portions of Dr. Hall-Ellis’s testimony as well as Ms. Lofton’s testimony and various other exhibits proffered by Petitioner to show public accessibility of the QlikView manuals as of July 8, 2008. QlikView 8.50 was published on July 8, 2008. Id. at 8–9 (citing Exs. 1008, 1009, 1017, 1059, 1060; Ex. 1030 ¶¶ 29, 37). In its Patent Owner Response, Patent Owner does not contest that the QlikView Manuals were published and publicly available by July 8, 2008. PO Resp. 50 n.2 (noting only that Patent Owner intends to move to exclude evidence Petitioner relies on to establish the publication date for QlikView Manuals); Tr. 45:3–19. We are persuaded that Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the QlikView Manuals were publicly available as of July 8, 2008.12” slip op. at 50

    Patent outcomesUS 8,271,892 unpatentable
    § 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 8,271,892
  • Ipr2026-00100Instituted
    PTAB · Apr 22, 2026 · IPR2026-00100 · APJ John A Squires · IPR · Director review

    The Director granted institution of IPR2026-00100 after finding a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on at least one challenged claim and no other basis to deny institution.

    RulingsDirector review decision
    • Director reviewDirector review, grantedGranted

      “petitioner has shown a reasonable likelihood of prevailing with respect to at least one of the claims challenged in the petition, and no other non- discretionary considerations warrant denial of institution. Accordingly, institution of inter partes review is granted in the following proceedings: IPR2026-00095 IPR2026-00121 IPR2026-00130 IPR2026-00100 IPR2026-00124” slip op. at 1

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “petitioner has shown a reasonable likelihood of prevailing with respect to at least one of the claims challenged in the petition, and no other non- discretionary considerations warrant denial of institution. Accordingly, institution of inter partes review is granted in the following proceedings: IPR2026-00095 IPR2026-00121 IPR2026-00130 IPR2026-00100 IPR2026-00124” slip op. at 1

    None
    Patents in suitUS 10,117,290
  • PTAB · Apr 6, 2026 · IPR2025-00016 · APJ Zhenyu Yang · IPR · Final written decision

    The Board found claims 1–3, 5–12, and 14–19 not shown unpatentable because Meyer did not disclose the claimed enrichment, which the obviousness grounds did not supply.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • Skill levelSkill level board ownDecided for patent owner

      “for purposes of this Decision, we find a POSA would have had a Ph.D. in the field of chemistry, molecular biology, or biochemistry. Alternatively, a POSA would have had a B.S. or M.S. degree with three to five years of experience working in any of those fields. Additionally, the POSA would have had knowledge of how those methods functioned. Id. at 12.” slip op. at 8

    • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner

      “As an initial matter, we acknowledge that the definition “to process so as to add or increase the proportion of a desirable ingredient” has two possible interpretations. In the first interpretation, “add or increase” shares the same object “the proportion of a desirable ingredient.” When the proportion of one ingredient goes higher, the proportion of at least another ingredient would necessarily go lower. Thus, the enrichment process under this interpretation results in a higher proportion of the desirable ingredient relative to other ingredients. Patent Owner adopts this interpretation. See PO Resp. 17 (“In the context of preparing a sequencing library, [Patent Owner] Tecan proposes that a nucleic acid sequence of interest is ‘enriched’ when the proportion of nucleic acid fragments containing the sequence of interest is increased relative to other nucleic acid fragments in the sample.”). According to Patent Owner, “amplifying the one or more oligonucleotide extension products . . . thereby enriching the nucleic acid sequence of interest, by generating amplified products comprising the enriched nucleic acid sequence of interest” in step (c) means “increas[ing] the proportion of the nucleic acid sequence of interest relative to the nucleic acid fragments in the solution not containing the sequence of interest by amplifying the oligonucleotide extension product and its complement.” Id. at 19–20. Under the second interpretation, the object for “add” is “a desirable ingredient,” whereas the object for “increase” is “the proportion of a desirable ingredient.” This interpretation is broader than the first one in that the result of the enrichment process not only encompasses a higher proportion of the desirable ingredient relative to other ingredients, but also more desirable ingredient in raw number.” slip op. at 11

    • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

      “We agree with Dr. Sims. As explained above, the amplification step must result in at least some enrichment of the sequence of interest, even though it does not have to be the only cause. See supra Section II.C.2.b. Indeed, Petitioner acknowledges that “at least some of the enrichment must result from the recited steps.” Reply 12. Because Meyer’s enrichment for mRNA using the SMART protocol occurred before any recited steps of claim 1, we find it does not meet the claimed “enrichment” under our construction.” slip op. at 22

    • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

      “shown that Meyer discloses step (c) of claim 1, and Petitioner does not address that limitation in this ground, we find Petitioner has not met its burden to show that claims 8, 17, and 18 would have been obvious over Meyer. F. Alleged Obviousness over Meyer and Siebert Claim 2 depends from claim 1, and further recites “the nucleic acid fragment comprises genomic DNA.” Petitioner asserts that claim 2 would have been obvious over the combination of Meyer and Siebert. Pet. 62–65. Petitioner relies on Siebert for teaching the additional limitation recited in claim 2 only. Id. Because Petitioner has not shown that Meyer discloses step (c) of claim 1, and Petitioner does not rely on Siebert for teaching that limitation, we find Petitioner has not met its burden to show that claim 2 would have been obvious over the combination of Meyer and Siebert.” slip op. at 34

    Patent outcomesUS 10,876,108 not shown unpatentable
    Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 10,876,108
  • PTAB · Apr 6, 2026 · IPR2025-00015 · APJ Zhenyu Yang · IPR · Final written decision

    Claims 1–3 and 5–22 were not shown unpatentable because Meyer does not disclose the claimed enrichment, and the other grounds rely on Meyer for that limitation.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • Skill levelSkill level board ownDecided for patent owner

      “for purposes of this Decision, we find a POSA would have had a Ph.D. in the field of chemistry, molecular biology, or biochemistry. Alternatively, a POSA would have had a B.S. or M.S. degree with three to five years of experience working in any of those fields. Additionally, the POSA would have had experience with NGS sequencing methods and a working knowledge of how those methods functioned. Id. at 14. After institution, Patent Owner states that, for purposes of this proceeding, it adopts the Board’s definition of a POSA. PO Resp. 18. After reviewing the record developed during trial, we see no reason to change our finding on this issue. As we stated in the DI, our “definition of a POSA is consistent with the skill level reflected in the disclosures of the ’012 patent and prior art.” DI 14.” slip op. at 11

    • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner

      “to “enrich” means to “increase[] relative to the rest of the fragments.” Tr. 12:25–26. The panel asked: “In the starting material, there are three components, A, B, C, that say it’s 30 percent, 50 percent and 20 percent. You do PCR and it -- they all get amplified and the end result is still 30 percent, 50 percent, and 20 percent. Anything got enriched?” Id. at 12:18–21. Petitioner responded that “petitioner’s position is that in that situation, there is no enrichment.” Id. at 12:22–23. In other words, Petitioner does not disagree with Patent Owner that mere increase in the raw number is not enrichment. See also id. at 13:7–9 (“[W]e would agree that if it is truly unbiased amplification, that does not result in an increase in the proportion, and so that does not meet the plain meaning of enrich.”). We find the record, including the testimony from all three declarants, supports Patent Owner’s argument. See Sur-reply 1–5 (citing Ex. 1125, 283:1–6, 286:22–287:14; Ex. 1126, 170:18–171:1; Ex. 2037, 150:18–22, 173:15–17; Ex. 2038 ¶ 95), 8 (citing Ex. 1125, 271:10–15; Ex. 2037, 188:22–189:1). Thus, we adopt Patent Owner’s proposal that “a nucleic acid sequence of interest is ‘enriched’ when the proportion of nucleic acid fragments containing the sequence of interest is increased relative to other nucleic acid fragments in the sample.”9 See PO Resp. 19.” slip op. at 15

    • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

      “We agree with Dr. Sims. As explained above, the amplification step must result in at least some enrichment of the sequence of interest, even though it does not have to be the only cause. See supra Section II.C.2.b. Indeed, Petitioner acknowledges that “at least some of the enrichment must result from the recited steps.” Reply 12. Because Meyer’s enrichment for mRNA using the SMART protocol occurred before any recited steps of claim 1, we find it does not meet the claimed “enrichment” under our construction.” slip op. at 27

    • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

      “F. Alleged Obviousness over Meyer and Siebert Claim 2 depends from claim 1, and further recites “the nucleic acid fragment comprises genomic DNA.” Petitioner asserts that claim 2 would have been obvious over the combination of Meyer and Siebert. Pet. 69–72. Petitioner relies on Siebert for teaching the additional limitation recited in claim 2 only. Id. Because Petitioner has not shown that Meyer discloses step (d) of claim 1, and Petitioner does not rely on Siebert for teaching that limitation, we find Petitioner has not met its burden to show that claim 2 would have been obvious over the combination of Meyer and Siebert. G. Alleged Obviousness over Meyer and Kelley Claim 9 depends from claim 1, and further recites “the barcode sequence is 12 nucleotides in length.” Petitioner asserts that claim 9 would have been obvious over the combination of Meyer and Kelley. Pet. 72–74. Petitioner relies on Kelley for teaching the additional limitation recited in claim 9 only. Id. Because Petitioner has not shown that Meyer discloses step (d) of claim 1, and Petitioner does not rely on Kelley for teaching that limitation, we find Petitioner has not met its burden to show that claim 9 would have been obvious over the combination of Meyer and Kelley. H. Alleged Obviousness over Meyer, Caruccio, and Bronner Each of claims 15 and 17–19 depends from claim 1. Claim 15 further recites “the second strand of the partial duplex adaptor is ligated to a 3′ end of the nucleic acid fragment.” Claim 17 recites “[t]he method of claim 1, further comprising performing bridge amplification of the annealed strand after step e).” Claim 18 further recites “the sequencing comprises use of four labeled reversible terminators.” And claim 19 further recites “the sequencing comprises semiconductor sequencing.” Petitioner asserts that claims 15 and 17–19 would have been obvious over the combination of Meyer, Caruccio, and Bronner. Pet. 75–80. Petitioner relies on Caruccio and Bronner for teaching the additional limitation recited in claims 15 and 17–19 only. Id. Because Petitioner has not shown that Meyer discloses step (d) of claim 1, and Petitioner does not rely on Caruccio and Bronner for teaching that limitation, we find Petitioner has not met its burden to show that claims 15 and 17–19 would have been obvious over the combination of Meyer, Caruccio, and Bronner.” slip op. at 38

    Patent outcomesUS 10,036,012 not shown unpatentable
    Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 10,036,012

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.