- Ascend Elements, Inc. v. Duesenfeld GmbHInstitution deniedPTAB · Oct 10, 2025 · PGR2025-00037 · APJ Kevin W Cherry · PGR · Institution
The Board denied institution of PGR on claims 1–14 because Petitioner did not show that any challenged claim was more likely than not unpatentable.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“information presented in the petition filed under [35 U.S.C. §] 321 . . . demonstrates that it is more likely than not that at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition is unpatentable.” 35 U.S.C. § 324(a). For the reasons set forth below, we determine that Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that it is more likely than not that at least one of claims 1–14 of the ’463 patent is unpatentable. Accordingly, we deny institution of a postgrant review of claims 1–14 based on the grounds set forth in the Petition.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner contends that one of ordinary skill in the art “would have had at least a Bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, material science, chemical engineering, or an equivalent field, as well as at least 2 to 3 years of academic or industry experience in the recycling or processing of lithiumion batteries. Additional formal education focusing on processing of lithium batteries may substitute for practical experience and additional practical experience can substitute for less education.” Pet. 10–11. Patent Owner does not contest this definition of a person of skill in the art. See Prelim. Resp. 11. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s assessment of the level of ordinary skill in the art, as, on the present record, it appears consistent with the ’463 patent and the asserted prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 8
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedPatent owner expert creditedDecided for patent owner
“distinct from “comminute[ion],” Petitioner offers only the testimony of its expert, Mr. Juzkow, who equates Tomioka’s “cutting” with “comminute[ion].” See Ex. 1003 ¶ 121. However, Mr. Juzkow provides insufficient reasoning to support his conclusion, particularly given the intrinsic and extrinsic evidence discussed above. In contrast, Patent Owner’s expert, Mr. Dantam, provides extensive reasoning, supported by citations to other evidence, to support his conclusion that Tomioka’s “dismantling” is not the claimed “comminution.” Thus, we give more weight to Mr. Dantam’s testimony than Mr. Juzkow’s testimony. Weighing this evidence all together, we find that Petitioner has failed to show that it is more likely than not that Tomioka’s teaches the claimed comminution under Petitioner’s first theory.” slip op. at 15
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundTeaching away not foundNot shown unpatentable
“obvious. Pet. 34–35. However, we agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner has also failed to show that it is more likely than not that Tomioka renders this limitation obvious. See Prelim. Resp. 28–31. To begin with, Petitioner’s contentions lack sufficient reasoning explaining why a person of ordinary skill would have modified Tomioka in the manner proposed. “[R]ejections on obviousness grounds cannot be sustained by mere conclusory statements; instead, there must be some articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of obviousness.” In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006). Petitioner merely asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art could use the roller system in place of the dismantling disclosed for the embodiments in Figures 19 and 20. On this record, we find this bare contention insufficient. actual disclosure of Tomioka. The rollers in Tomioka are used to separate the “battery body” from the “resin package enclosing the battery body,” and Tomioka specifically discloses that this technique is designed to “avoid damaging the battery body.” Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 25, 26, 29; Ex. 2011 ¶¶ 72–73. Thus, there is a significant difference between what Tomioka teaches and what Petitioner proposes to use the roller system to do. In addition, as Patent Owner points out, Tomioka specifically discloses there are risks associated with mechanically crushing battery packs, such as “risk of sparking due to residual voltage if the battery units are damaged in the process.” Ex. 1005 ¶ 5. Although we do not agree with Patent Owner that this amounts to a “teaching away,” see In re Gurley, 27 F.3d 551, 553 (Fed. Cir. 1994), we do believe that this teaching suggests a trade off that should be weighed in determining whether to make the modification, see Medichem S.A. v. Rolabo S.L., 437 F.3d 1157, 1165 (Fed. Cir. 2006). However, Petitioner has failed to account adequately, if at all, for this trade off. Thus, we find that Petitioner has failed to show that it is more likely than not that Tomioka accounts for the claimed “comminuting.”” slip op. at 15
§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips · Graham · NautilusPatents in suitUS 12,119,463 - Cipla Limited v. Gilead Sciences, Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · May 15, 2025 · IPR2025-00033 · APJ Susan L C Mitchell · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution of IPR on claims 1–13 under § 314(a), finding the Fintiv factors favored denial and the petition did not present compelling merits.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Institution denied fintivDenied
“We determine that this factor weighs heavily in favor of exercising discretion to deny the Petition. The trial date in the district court litigation is scheduled for October 6, 2025. See Prelim. Resp. 16 (citing Ex. 2010). This date is at least six months before our projected statutory deadline should we go forward in this case. Patent Owner points out that this trial date is nine months later than the median time to trial in the District of Delaware, and in Patent Owner’s view, the parties are on track to satisfy the current schedule. Id. at 16–17 (citing Ex. 2011).” slip op. at 9
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsNot reached
“1 Patent Owner also asserts that the Petition should be denied under 35 U.S.C. § 325(d), but we need not reach this issue because we are exercising discretion under Section 314(a) to deny the Petition. See Prelim. Resp. 2–3.” slip op. at 2
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 11,744,802 - Cargill, Incorporated v. Bunge Loders Croklaan USA, LLCInstitution deniedPTAB · Mar 19, 2025 · IPR2024-01360 · APJ Debra L Dennett · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because the petition did not show a reasonable likelihood that claims 1, 6–9, and 11–24 were unpatentable as obvious.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“institute review. The standard for instituting an inter partes review is set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), which provides that an inter partes review may not be instituted unless the information presented in the Petition shows “there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” Having considered the arguments and the associated evidence, we determine that Petitioner does not meet the reasonable likelihood standard, and we do not institute inter partes review.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“For purposes of this institution decision, and based on the present record including the disclosure in the ʼ473 patent, we apply Petitioner’s definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art at the time the invention was made, consistent with pre-AIA section 103(a). See Pet. 9–10. We determine this level of skill comports with the qualifications a person would have needed to understand and implement the teachings of the ʼ473 patent and the prior art of record. Cf. Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (noting that the prior art itself may reflect an appropriate level of skill in the art).” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Petitioner proposes constructions for several terms, all such constructions based on statements in the ’473 patent. See Pet. 10–12. Patent Owner presents no claim construction issues. Prelim. Resp. 8 n.3. For purposes of this Decision, we determine that no claim term requires express interpretation at this time. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (per curiam) (claim terms need to be construed “only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 9
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of success › HindsightMotivation not foundDecided for patent owner
“Petitioner’s representation of the problem as merely converting Petrauskaite’s disclosed mol% of triglycerides into wt% of triglycerides with simple calculations represents a form of prohibited reliance on hindsight. See Mintz v. Dietz & Watson, Inc., 679 F.3d 1372, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (hindsight to use the invention to define the problem the invention solves); see also Ecolochem, Inc. v. Southern Cal. Edison Co., 227 F.3d 1361, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (”Defining the problem in terms of its solution reveals improper hindsight in the selection of the prior art relevant to obviousness.”). “[W]hen someone is presented with the identical problem and told to make the patented invention, it often becomes virtually certain that the artisan will succeed in making the invention.” Mintz, 679 F.3d at 1377. Here, Petitioner urges that one of ordinary skill in the art need merely convert mol% of triglycerides in a specific fat blend into wt% of triglycerides in the specific fat blend. See Pet. 14–15 (“[T]he wt% of Petrauskaite’s fat blends can easily be calculated based on the generally available prior art knowledge of fatty acid compositions of palm stearin and soybean oil.”). Petitioner’s reasoning says no more than that a skilled artisan, once presented with Petrauskaite and prior art knowledge, “would have understood that they could be combined, but that is not enough.” PersonalWeb Techs., LLC, v. Apple, Inc., 848 F.3d 987, 993 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (that two references could be combined does not imply a motivation to pick out those two references and combine them to arrive at the claimed invention). Our reviewing court instructs that indicating that a skilled artisan could have made modifications to arrive at the claimed invention does not establish that a person of ordinary skill would have made such modifications. See Belden Inc. v. Berk-Tek LLC, 805 F.3d 1064, 1073 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“obviousness concerns whether a skilled artisan not only could have made but would have been motivated to make the combinations or modifications of prior art to arrive at the claimed invention.” (citing InTouch Technologies, Inc. v. VGO Communications, Inc., 751 F.3d 1327, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2014)). Petitioner attempts to check the “would have been motivated to modify Petrauskaite” box with testimony from its declarant, Dr. Maragoni. See Pet. 37–38. Such testimony includes [C]ombining such prior art elements according to known methods would have yielded nothing more than predictable results. A POSITA would naturally have turned to these references to understand Petrauskaite’s references better. Ex. 1003 ¶ 178. [T]he corresponding wt% of Petrauskaite’s fat blends] was readily-available and well-known in the art. Id. at ¶ 181. [T]he available information [on characterizations of oils and fats] is voluminous. Id. at ¶ 182. See Pet. 38. We find that such testimony fails to explain why the skilled artisan would have been motivated, without hindsight, to take the steps to reproduce the claimed invention, and to be conclusory, at best. On this record, we detect the taint of impermissible hindsight bias in” slip op. at 14
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · GrahamPatents in suitUS 7,645,473 - Ningbo Linhua Plastic Co., Ltd. v. Converter Manufacturing, LLCInstitution deniedPTAB · Mar 10, 2025 · IPR2024-01435 · APJ James A Tartal · IPR · Institution
Institution was denied for claims 6–10 and 21 because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood that Portelli or Meadors rendered the claims obvious.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“review. 35 U.S.C. § 314(b) (2018); 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2023). An inter partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . the information presented in the petition . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Upon consideration of the Petition, the Preliminary Response, and the evidence of record, we conclude that the information does not demonstrate a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Id. Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill. See generally Prelim. Resp. For purposes of this Decision, we find that the ’222 patent and the cited prior art references reflect the appropriate level of skill at the time of the claimed invention and that the level of appropriate skill reflected in these references and the ’222 patent is consistent with the definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art proposed by Petitioner. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001). Accordingly, we adopt Petitioner’s asserted level of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 10
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Plain and ordinary meaningNo construction neededOther
“Petitioner argues that “the challenged claims are invalid under their plain and ordinary meaning.” Pet. 5. Petitioner further contends that “[t]he scope of the plain and ordinary meaning of certain claim terms must at least encompass the disclosure and accompanying illustrations in the ’222 patent.” Id. at 6 (citing no legal support for its proposition). Petitioner also refers to how Patent Owner applied certain “terms” and “other features to Petitioner’s product” in its district court complaint against Petitioner. See id. at 7–8 (citing Ex. 1007, 7–8; Ex. 1003, ¶¶ 53–57). Patent Owner does not address claim construction and does not dispute the meaning of any claim term in regard to Petitioner’s contentions. See generally Prelim. Resp. Accordingly, in view of the issues we address below, we apply the plain and ordinary meaning of claim terms and further determine that it is not necessary to address the express interpretation of any claim term. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017); Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“[O]nly those terms need be construed that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.”).” slip op. at 11
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“Figure 13 of Portelli, however, does not show the profile of an article prior to a method step of impinging to further shape it, but instead shows “a schematic sectional view of the edge of the tray . . . after it has been deformed out of the wrap path in accordance with the invention [of Portelli].” Ex. 1004, 8:11–13 (emphasis added). Petitioner fails to show any method taught by Portelli that further alters the configuration of the profile of the tray shown in Figure 13 of Portelli by, for example, an additional method step of impingement.” slip op. at 18
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,562,222 - ROKU, Inc. v. Anonymous Media Research Holdings, LLCInstitution deniedPTAB · Feb 12, 2025 · IPR2024-01058 · APJ Frederick C Laney · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because Roku did not show a reasonable likelihood that any challenged claim was unpatentable over the asserted § 103 combinations.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“arguments presented by both parties, we find Petitioner’s evidence to be insufficient to carry its burden of showing Wang777 discloses or suggests claim elements 1.3, 6.3, and 10.3. More specifically, we find that Petitioner does not present persuasive evidence that Wang777 discloses or suggests the use of “a sequential order of at least two different obtained content identifiers in the play stream to identify a channel corresponding to the data samples.” Furthermore, Petitioner’s declarant, Dr. Russ, adds little, if any, persuasive value because his testimony is almost indistinguishable from Petitioner’s argument in the Petition and, as such, incorporates the same flaws. Compare Pet. 52–56 with Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 137–144. The reason Petitioner’s reliance on paragraph 72 of Wang777 is unavailing is because we are not persuaded that it discloses or suggests using two different content identifiers to identify a channel. When viewing the cited portions of that paragraph in the proper context of what Wang777 teaches as a whole (as we are required to do), we are not persuaded a skilled artisan would understand that the disclosed additional and different content identifiers in the alleged play stream are being used to identify a channel.” slip op. at 21
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsDenied
“claims issued in the ’849 patent. Pet. 40–103. Patent Owner contends that 35 U.S.C. § 325(d) applies to this case and that we should discretionarily deny institution. Prelim. Resp. 7–19. Patent Owner also asserts that Petitioner’s challenges are deficient under § 314(a); in particular, Patent Owner disputes the sufficiency of Petitioner’s evidence to show the prior art discloses or suggests claim elements 1.3, 6.3, and 10.3 of the independent claims. Id. at 20–62. Although Patent Owner’s arguments applying § 325(d) and Advanced Bionics, 4 U.S. Patent Application Publication No. US 2004/0260682 A1, published December 23, 2004 (“Herley”) (Ex. 1011). 5 U.S. Patent Application Publication No. US 2005/0193016 A1, published September 1, 2005, filed February 17, 2005 (“Seet”) (Ex. 1012). 6 U.S. Patent Application Publication No. US 2002/0116195 A1, published August 22, 2002 (“Pitman”) (Ex. 1013). 7 U.S. Patent Application Publication No. US 2003/0018709 A1, published January 23, 2003 (“Schrempp”) (Ex. 1014). 8 U.S. Patent Application Publication No. US 2003/0086341 A1, published May 8, 2003 (“Wells”) (Ex. 1015). Paper 6, (PTAB Feb. 13, 2020) (precedential) are sound, we decline to exercise our discretion. Nevertheless, as discussed below, our merits analysis also leads to denial of the Petition because the cited evidence fails to persuade us that Petitioner is reasonably likely to prevail on any claim challenged.” slip op. at 7
- Skill levelSkill level board ownOther
“We agree with Patent Owner that a person can qualify as a skilled artisan based on relevant industry experience in lieu of a formal degree. We also agree that ACR systems are relevant to the subject matter of the ’849 patent. We disagree, however, that industry experience with ACR systems is required to qualify as a skilled artisan. The ’849 patent describes a media usage monitoring and measurement method that relies on “known content recognition methods,” including known ACR. Ex. 1001, code (54), 5:48–54. The claimed invention relates to analyzing sample sequence data to enhance content identification and to establish channel identification. Id. at code (57), 15:14–32 (claim 1). The ’849 patent relies upon known ACR systems, but does not claim a new method of content recognition such that industry experience designing or implementing ACR systems is required. We accept that such experience may assist in providing relevant industry experience. For these reasons, we determine that a skilled artisan would have had a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or an equivalent degree, with two years of relevant industry experience in digital media content delivery or designing or implementing ACR systems. A person may qualify as a skilled artisan based on more than two years of relevant industry experience in lieu of a bachelor’s degree.” slip op. at 10
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedOther
“arguments presented by both parties, we find Petitioner’s evidence to be insufficient to carry its burden of showing Wang777 discloses or suggests claim elements 1.3, 6.3, and 10.3. More specifically, we find that Petitioner does not present persuasive evidence that Wang777 discloses or suggests the use of “a sequential order of at least two different obtained content identifiers in the play stream to identify a channel corresponding to the data samples.” Furthermore, Petitioner’s declarant, Dr. Russ, adds little, if any, persuasive value because his testimony is almost indistinguishable from Petitioner’s argument in the Petition and, as such, incorporates the same flaws. Compare Pet. 52–56 with Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 137–144.” slip op. at 21
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,719,849 - ROKU, Inc. v. Anonymous Media Research Holdings, LLCInstitution deniedPTAB · Feb 12, 2025 · IPR2024-01055 · APJ Frederick C Laney · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood that any challenged claim was unpatentable over the asserted obviousness combinations.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsDenied
“partes review. 35 U.S.C. § 314 (2024); 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2024). An inter partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . the information presented in the petition . . . and any response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). For the reasons that follow, we do not institute an inter partes review because the information presented in the Petition, in view of the Preliminary Response, does not show that Petitioner is reasonably likely to prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level board ownOther
“We agree with Patent Owner that a person can qualify as a skilled artisan based on relevant industry experience in lieu of a formal degree. We also agree that ACR systems are relevant to the subject matter of the ‘622 patent. We disagree, however, that industry experience with ACR systems is required to qualify as a skilled artisan. The ‘622 patent describes a media usage monitoring and measurement method that relies on “known content recognition methods,” including known ACR. Ex. 1001, code (54), 5:38–44, 5:59–6:13. The claimed invention relates to analyzing sample sequence data to enhance content identification and to establish channel identification. Id. at code (57), 14:37–51 (claim 1). The ‘622 patent relies upon known ACR systems, but does not claim a new method of content recognition such that industry experience designing or implementing ACR systems is required. We accept that such experience may assist in providing relevant industry experience. For these reasons, we determine that a skilled artisan would have had a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or an equivalent degree, with two years of relevant industry experience in digital media content delivery or designing or implementing ACR systems. A person may qualify as a skilled artisan based on more than two years of relevant industry experience in lieu of a bachelor’s degree.” slip op. at 10
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedOther
“arguments presented by both parties, we find Petitioner’s evidence to be insufficient to carry its burden of showing Wang777 discloses or suggests claim elements 1.3, 6.3, and 10.3. More specifically, we find that Petitioner does not present persuasive evidence that Wang777 discloses or suggests the use of “a sequential order of at least two different obtained content identifiers in the play stream to identify a channel corresponding to the data samples.” Furthermore, Petitioner’s declarant, Dr. Russ, adds little, if any, persuasive value because his testimony is almost indistinguishable from Petitioner’s argument in the Petition and, as such, incorporates the same flaws. Compare Pet. 52–56 with Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 135–142. The reason Petitioner’s reliance on paragraph 72 of Wang777 is unavailing is because we are not persuaded that it discloses or suggests using two different content identifiers to identify a channel. When viewing the cited portions of that paragraph in the proper context of what Wang777 teaches as a whole (as we are required to do), we are not persuaded a skilled artisan would understand that the disclosed additional and different content identifiers in the alleged play stream are being used to identify a channel.” slip op. at 21
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Petitioner contends that “none of the claim terms require explicit constructions” and “all claim terms have been given their plain and ordinary meaning, in the context of the ’622 patent specification, under the Phillips standard.” Pet. 20. Patent Owner does not dispute this contention (see generally Prelim. Resp.) and its declarant, Mr. Hoarty, states that he “applied the plain and ordinary meaning of all claim terms at issue” (Ex. 2001 ¶ 52). are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). Here, both parties rely on the plain and ordinary meaning for all of the terms used in the claims challenged in the Petition and neither party suggests a particular meaning beyond what is clearly conveyed by the claim terms in the context of the ’622 patent. Therefore, we need not construe expressly any of the claim terms.” slip op. at 11
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,756,622 - ROKU, Inc. v. Anonymous Media Research Holdings, LLCInstitution deniedPTAB · Feb 10, 2025 · IPR2024-01054 · APJ Michael T Cygan · IPR · Institution
Institution denied for claims 1–15 because Petitioner did not show Seet was prior art, defeating the reasonable-likelihood showing for every asserted obviousness ground.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“review. See 35 U.S.C. § 314 (2018); 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2023). The standard for instituting an inter partes review is set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), which provides that an inter partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” For the reasons given below, on this record, Petitioner has not established a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in showing the unpatentability of any one of claims 1–15 of the ’768 patent. Accordingly, we do not institute an inter partes review of the ’768 patent.” slip op. at 2
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Patents / published applications (effective date, provisional support)Reference not prior artDecided for patent owner
“Petitioner fails to show that the full scope of claim 9 of Seet is described in the Seet provisional. Seet expressly defines the claim term “media,” stating that, as it is “used herein,” “media” includes audio, video, software, and pictures. Ex. 1006 ¶ 50 (“Media content may include one . . . of audio . . ., video . . ., software . . ., and pictures”). Such a statement provides a clear definition of the term “media” that includes video, software, and pictures, in addition to audio. In addition to the express definition, Seet elsewhere indicates that its media includes video and other non-audio signals and databases. See, e.g., Ex. 1006 ¶¶ 26 (“if the media stream 102 is a video broadcast, each media item may comprise a television show or segment, an advertisement, or any other type of video”), 42–46 (creating databases of “videos,” “faces,” and “files”), 49 (“any signal that contains repeating content over any broadcast medium can benefit from the procedure described herein.”). Accordingly, the use of media in claim 9 for its claimed “media content database” and “media stream[s]” also includes both audio and non-audio media.” slip op. at 14
- Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Not entitled to earlier dateNot shown unpatentable
“We agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner has not met its burden to show that Seet is prior art. Seet is not entitled to the benefit of its provisional filing date unless a claim in Seet has written description support in the Seet provisional. See Dynamic Drinkware, 800 F.3d at 1381–82. As the “‘hallmark’ of written description, . . . the disclosure must be considered as a whole, as the person of ordinary skill in the art would read it to determine if it reasonably conveys possession” of the claimed invention. Allergan USA, Inc. v. MSN Laboratories Private Ltd., 111 F.4th 1358, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2024) (citation and emphasis omitted).” slip op. at 12
- Skill levelSkill level board ownDecided for patent owner
“B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art [“POSITA”] at the critical time would have had “a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or equivalent degree with at least two years of relevant industry experience, including in digital media content delivery.” Pet. 2 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 32). Patent Owner argues that the level of ordinary skill should include persons lacking a formal degree but possessing considerable industry experience designing and implementing automated content recognition systems, and that such systems are the relevant industry experience. Prelim. Resp. 6–7. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill, modified by the more inclusive standards of Patent Owner, as it appears to be consistent with the specification of the ’768 patent and the prior art of record.” slip op. at 7
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,510,768 - ROKU, Inc. v. Anonymous Media Research Holdings, LLCInstitution deniedPTAB · Feb 10, 2025 · IPR2024-01057 · APJ Michael T Cygan · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because Roku did not show a reasonable likelihood of proving claims 1–15 unpatentable; Seet was not shown to be prior art.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“Without the benefit of its provisional filing date, Seet, filed on February 17, 2005, is not prior art to the ’848 patent, having an uncontested benefit to the May 27, 2004 filing date of its provisional. Because each of Petitioner has not shown a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on any of its unpatentability assertions. III. CONCLUSION For the reasons discussed above, we conclude Petitioner has not shown a reasonable likelihood of prevailing with respect to any of claims 1–15. We determine that the record does not support institution. Accordingly, no inter partes review is instituted.” slip op. at 16
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Priority / effective filing date / continuation supportPriority date, deniedDecided for patent owner
“Petitioner fails to show that the full scope of claim 9 of Seet is described in the Seet provisional. Seet expressly defines the claim term “media,” stating that, as it is “used herein,” “media” includes audio, video, software, and pictures. Ex. 1006 ¶ 50 (“Media content may include one . . . of audio . . ., video . . ., software . . ., and pictures”). Such a statement provides a clear definition of the term “media” that includes video, software, and pictures, in addition to audio. In addition to the express definition, Seet elsewhere indicates that its media includes video and other non-audio signals and databases. See, e.g., Ex. 1006 ¶¶ 26 (“if the media stream 102 is a video broadcast, each media item may comprise a television show or segment, an advertisement, or any other type of video”), 42–46 (creating databases of “videos,” “faces,” and “files”), 49 (“any signal that contains repeating content over any broadcast medium can benefit from the procedure described herein.”). Accordingly, the use of media in claim 9 for its claimed “media content database” and “media stream[s]” also includes both audio and non-audio media. The disclosure of the Seet provisional, however, is more limited and defines the term media exclusively as audio. Ex. 1019, 4 (“Media will be defined as any streaming audio source in any form, be it radio, television, cable, satellite, internet stream, or the like.”). This definition does not include the full scope of “media” as that term is used in claim 9 of Seet because it does not include video, software, and pictures.” slip op. at 14
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“at the critical time would have had “a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or equivalent degree with at least two years of relevant industry experience, including in digital media content delivery.” Pet. 2 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 32). Patent Owner argues that the level of ordinary skill should include persons lacking a formal degree but possessing considerable industry experience designing and implementing automated content recognition systems, and that such systems are the relevant industry experience. Prelim. Resp. 6–8. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill, modified by the more inclusive standards of Patent Owner, as it appears to be consistent with the specification of the ’848 patent and the prior art of record.” slip op. at 7
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached
“Here, neither party sets forth any explicit claim construction. Pet. 14; Prelim. Resp. Although Patent Owner analyzes the term “media monitoring device” in its arguments (Preliminary Response 37–43), our ultimate determination on institution does not turn on that construction. We determine that no need exists to determine a particular construction for purposes of this institution decision, and instead construe the claims pursuant to § 42.100(b).” slip op. at 8
Claim construction§ 102 anticipationcites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,719,848 - ROKU, Inc. v. Anonymous Media Research Holdings, LLCInstitution deniedPTAB · Feb 5, 2025 · IPR2024-01056 · APJ Elizabeth M Roesel · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because the Petition did not show a reasonable likelihood that claims 1–11 were unpatentable over the asserted prior-art combinations.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“We have authority to determine whether to institute an inter partes review. 35 U.S.C. § 314 (2024); 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2024). An inter partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . the information presented in the petition . . . and any response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). For the reasons that follow, we determine that Petitioner does not meet the reasonable likelihood standard, and we do not institute an inter partes review.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level board ownDecided for patent owner
“We agree with Patent Owner that a person can qualify as a POSA based on relevant industry experience in lieu of a formal degree. We also agree that ACR systems are relevant to the subject matter of the ’896 Patent. We disagree, however, that industry experience with ACR systems is required to qualify as a POSA. The ’896 Patent describes a media usage monitoring and measurement method that relies on “known content recognition methods.” Ex. 1001, code (54), 5:48–52. The claimed invention using certain data, including content identification results. Id. at code (57), 15:12–35. The ’896 Patent does not claim a new method of content recognition. For these reasons, we determine that a POSA would have had a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or an equivalent degree, with two years of relevant industry experience in digital media content delivery or designing or implementing ACR systems. A person may qualify as a POSA based on more than two years of relevant industry experience in lieu of a bachelor’s degree.” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner
“The claims and Specification are consistent with defining “offset” as relative, rather than absolute. Claim elements 1.4 and 9.5 each recite: “a content offset indicating a time position of a content identification result within identified content.” Ex. 1001, 15:24–26, 16:25–27 (emphasis added). In our view, “a time position . . . within identified content” means the time position is relative to a reference point within the identified content. Our understanding of the claim language is reinforced by the Specification. According to the ’896 Patent, content offset data are shown in Figure 5, but not Figure 4. Ex. 1001, 9:22–26. Figures 4 and 5 both show a series of log times and corresponding content IDs, where the log time indicates when a sample began to be captured. Id. at 9:29–32, 9:40–45, 11:32–35, Figs. 4, 5. Figure 5 additionally includes a “content offset” column, as illustrated below. Id. at Fig. 5 (excerpt). According to the ’896 Patent, Each content offset value represents a time offset from the beginning of a particular piece of content. For example, row 8 of Play Stream 510 corresponds to a sample whose beginning is located 9 time units from the beginning of TV program 27, thus the content offset is referenced as (0)+9. Id. at 11:41–46. Although both the log time and content offset are expressed in relative terms in the Figure 5 example, only the content offset is relative to a reference point within the identified content, in this case the beginning of the content. Id. at 9:40–45, 11:41–46.” slip op. at 12
- Expert testimonyOther
“We have considered Dr. Russ’s testimony pertaining to claim elements 1.1 and 9.1 and Feininger. Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 136–142, 179. Dr. Russ testifies that Feininger’s “[p]resentation time retriever 56 . . . retrieves a ‘program identifier [(content identification results)] from the packet header of the section of the recorded program currently being played back and store[s] that identifier in one or more program identification fields 68.’” Ex. 1003 ¶ 137 (citing Ex. 1005, 5:28–42). Like Petitioner, Dr. Russ does not take into account the description of “content identification” provided earlier in his testimony. Ex. 1003 ¶ 41 (citing Ex. 1001, 5:48–66). Dr. Russ does not assert that Feininger discloses content identification. Without content identification, there can be no content identification results. Dr. Russ further testifies that Feininger’s apparatus 50 “generates the ‘play stream of content identification results’ based on the data samples submitted to data logging device 26.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 139 (citing Ex. 1005, 4:4–13). Missing from this testimony is any opinion about whether Feininger’s apparatus 50 or data logging device 26 performs content identification. Dr. Russ does not point to any teaching or suggestion in Feininger that extracted program identifiers 68 result from content identification.” slip op. at 19
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,572,896 - ROKU, Inc. v. Anonymous Media Research Holdings, LLCInstitution deniedPTAB · Feb 5, 2025 · IPR2024-01053 · APJ Elizabeth M Roesel · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because Roku did not show a reasonable likelihood of proving any challenged claim unpatentable over the asserted obviousness combinations.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“review. 35 U.S.C. § 314 (2024); 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2024). An inter partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . the information presented in the petition . . . and any response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). For the reasons that follow, we determine that Petitioner does not meet the reasonable likelihood standard, and we do not institute an inter partes review.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level board ownDecided for patent owner
“We agree with Patent Owner that a person can qualify as a POSA based on relevant industry experience in lieu of a formal degree. We also agree that ACR systems are relevant to the subject matter of the ’791 Patent. We disagree, however, that industry experience with ACR systems is required to qualify as a POSA. The ’791 Patent describes a media usage monitoring and measurement method that relies on “known content recognition methods.” Ex. 1001, code (54), 5:38–42. The claimed invention using certain data, including content identification results. Id. at code (57), 14:38–59 (claim 1). The ’791 Patent does not claim a new method of content recognition. For these reasons, we determine that a POSA would have had a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or an equivalent degree, with two years of relevant industry experience in digital media content delivery or designing or implementing ACR systems. A person may qualify as a POSA based on more than two years of relevant industry experience in lieu of a bachelor’s degree.” slip op. at 9
- Expert testimonyOther
“We have considered Dr. Russ’s testimony pertaining to claim elements 1.1 and 9.1 and Feininger. Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 135–141, 170. Dr. Russ testifies that Feininger’s “[p]resentation time retriever 56 . . . retrieves a ‘program identifier [(content identification results)] from the packet header of the section of the recorded program currently being played back and store[s] that identifier in one or more program identification fields 68.’” Ex. 1003 ¶ 137 (citing Ex. 1005, 5:28–42). Like Petitioner, Dr. Russ does not take into account the description of “content identification” provided earlier in his testimony. Ex. 1003 ¶ 41 (citing Ex. 1001, 5:38–55). Dr. Russ does not assert that Feininger discloses content identification. Without content identification, there can be no content identification results. Dr. Russ further testifies that Feininger’s apparatus 50 “generates the ‘play stream of content identification results’ based on the data samples submitted to data logging device 26.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 139 (citing Ex. 1005, 4:4–13). Missing from this testimony is any opinion about whether Feininger’s apparatus 50 or data logging device 26 performs content identification. Dr. Russ does not point to any teaching or suggestion in Feininger that extracted program identifiers 68 result from content identification.” slip op. at 19
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner
“The claims and Specification are consistent with defining “offset” as relative, rather than absolute. Claim elements 1.4 and 9.5 each recite: “a content offset indicating a time position of a content identification result within identified content.” Ex. 1001, 14:51–53, 16:7–9 (emphasis added). In our view, “a time position . . . within identified content” means the time position is relative to a reference point within the identified content. Our understanding of the claim language is reinforced by the Specification. According to the ’791 Patent, content offset data are shown in Figure 5, but not Figure 4. Ex. 1001, 9:22–26. Figures 4 and 5 both show a series of log times and corresponding content IDs, where the log time indicates when a sample began to be captured. Id. at 9:16–19, 9:27–31, 11:10–22, Figs. 4, 5. Figure 5 additionally includes a “content offset” column, as illustrated below. Id. at Fig. 5 (excerpt). According to the ’791 Patent, Each content offset value represents a time offset from the beginning of a particular piece of content. For example, row 8 of Play Stream 510 corresponds to a sample whose beginning is located 9 time units from the beginning of TV program 27, thus the content offset is referenced as (0)+9. Id. at 11:22–26. Although both the log time and content offset are expressed in relative terms in the Figure 5 example, only the content offset is relative to a reference point within the identified content, in this case the beginning of the content. Id. at 9:27–31, 11:22–26.” slip op. at 12
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,296,791
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.