- Cisco Systems, Inc. / Juniper Networks, Inc. v. Orckit CorporationSome claims unpatentablePTAB · Oct 22, 2024 · IPR2023-00402 · APJ Kristen L Droesch · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–13 and 17–20 are unpatentable over the Doshi and Guichard grounds; claims 14–16 were not shown unpatentable over Doshi, Guichard, and Xu.
RulingsFinal written decision- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for petitioner
“require “selecting an entity pair from” all of the entity pairs of “said plurality of transport entities.” Contrary to Patent Owner’s arguments addressing the claim language, the plain language of claim 1 does not require the selection to be from all of the entity pairs of the plurality of transport entities for which an overall cost has been determined. The plain language of claim 1 also does not preclude the selection to be from a subset of the entity pairs of the plurality of transport entities for which an overall cost has been determined. Rather, dependent claim 9, through its dependence on claims 1 and 4, explicitly allows for the selection to be from a subset of the entity pairs of the plurality of transport entities. Patent Owner’s arguments advocate for the importation of limitations from the ’821 Patent Specification into the claim––namely the disclosure that all entity pairs of transport entities examined in step 220 of Figure 2 are input to the entity pair selection step 230. See PO Sur-reply 4. It is well settled that it is improper to read an extraneous limitation into a claim from the specification. See e.g., Commark Comm’s Inc. v. Harris Corp., 156 F.2d 1182, 1186 (Fed. Cir. 1998); E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 849 F.2d 1430, 1433 (Fed. Cir. 1988). An extraneous limitation is “a limitation read into a claim from the specification wholly apart from any need to interpret what the patentee meant by particular words or phrases in the claim.” E.I. du Pont de Nemours, 849 F.2d at 1433. Accordingly, we construe “selecting an entity pair from said plurality of transport entities based at least upon said overall cost” according to its plain meaning, the scope of which includes selecting an entity pair from all or a subset of the entity pairs of the plurality of transport entities for which an overall cost has been determined.” slip op. at 11
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached
“As demonstrated in the analysis below, we need not construe “working entity” and “protection entity” in order to resolve the controversy before us. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))). Other Claim Terms and Phrases As demonstrated in our analysis below, we need not construe any other claim terms or phrases to resolve the controversy before us. See, e.g., Realtime, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375.” slip op. at 13
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s level of ordinary skill for purposes of this Patent Owner Response.” PO Resp. 25. We adopt Petitioner’s definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art because it is supported by declaration testimony and is consistent with the level of skill reflected by the ’821 Patent Specification and the asserted prior art. slip op. at 14
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner
“Based on the entire record and after having considered Petitioner’s citations to Doshi, Guichard, and Dr. Houh’s testimony (Ex. 1003) as well as Patent Owner’s citations to Doshi, Guichard and Mr. Gomez’s testimony, we are persuaded Petitioner sets forth sufficient articulated reasoning with rational underpinning to support the conclusion that it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art to combine the teachings of Doshi with Guichard’s teachings of reoptimization of a LSP path triggered by an network change. See Pet. 20–22, 40–45; KSR, 550 U.S. at 418. Petitioner asserts that “[t]he results of the combination would have been predictable and there would have been a reasonable expectation of success since Doshi and Guichard both address the same technology.” Pet. 22 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 63–65). According to Petitioner, “a POSITA would have had a reasonable expectation of success in reoptimizing Doshi’s LSP pair selection because Guichard provides significant implementation details, including when to trigger reoptimization evaluations and how to ‘avoid network instabilities.’” Pet. 22–23 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 63–65; Ex. 1006, 5). Petitioner asserts that a reasonable expectation of success is evidenced by other skilled artisans that reoptimized similar systems. See Pet. 23 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 63–65; Ex. 1009, 136; Ex. 1010, 1; Ex. 1023, 34; Ex. 1034 ¶¶ 27–33, claim 19; Ex. 1035 ¶ 24). In support, Petitioner contends that “the combination would be within a POSITA’s skillset since Doshi already sets forth the calculation and selection techniques that would be utilized during the reoptimization evaluation.” Id. (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 63–65). According to Petitioner, “since Doshi is already ‘monitoring and updating . . . network topology’ . . . event-based reoptimization evaluation per Guichard, would be directly applicable.” Id. (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 63–65; Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 270–281).” slip op. at 38
Patent outcomesUS 8,830,821 mixedClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,830,821 - Cisco Systems, Inc. / Juniper Networks, Inc. v. Orckit CorporationAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Oct 22, 2024 · IPR2024-00026 · APJ Kristen L Droesch · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–31 are unpatentable under § 103(a) over Bruckman; the Board did not reach the additional grounds.
RulingsFinal written decision- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Specification disavowal / 'present invention' languageDisclaimer not foundDecided for petitioner
“We do not agree with Patent Owner’s arguments that the ’740 Patent Specification disavows “any configurations where the user port is fixedly assigned to a specific backplane trace” from the full scope of the claim. Patent Owner’s citations to disclosures in the ’740 Patent Specification do not disparage the prior art, but merely contrast the configurations of the user ports and backplane traces disclosed in the ’740 Patent to “some known network element configurations” and “some conventional network elements.” See Ex. 1001, 1:66–2:4, 5:13–21. We find that the comparison of the disclosed configurations of user ports and backplane traces to that of the prior art in the ’740 Patent Specification does not constitute a clear disavowal of the first physical link fixedly assigned to the second physical link. See Continental Circuits LLC v. Intel Corp., 915 F.3d 788, 798 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“[C]omparing and contrasting the present technique to that of the prior art does not ‘rise to the level of a clear disavowal’ of claim scope.”). Accordingly, we decline to construe “selecting, in a single computation based on at least one of the frame attributes, a first physical link out of the first group and a second physical link out of the second group” as requiring “the first physical link is not fixedly assigned to the second words of the claim their ordinary and customary meanings.” slip op. at 16
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached
“As demonstrated in the analysis below, we need not construe “interface module.” See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 10
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art “(‘POSITA’) in April 2006 would have had a working knowledge of computer networking, including such commonly used technologies as Ethernet and the internet protocol / transmission control protocol (TCP/IP) suite.” Pet. 18 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 7–9). Petitioner further asserts that “[a] POSITA would two years of professional experience in the field of communication networks, including link aggregation in communication networks.” Id. (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 7–9). “For purposes of this Patent Owner Response, Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s level of ordinary skill.” PO Resp. 21. We adopt Petitioner’s definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art because it is supported by declaration testimony and is consistent with the level of skill reflected by the ’740 Patent Specification and the asserted prior art.” slip op. at 19
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingJoinder, grantedGranted
“1 Juniper Networks, Inc. filed a motion for joinder and a petition in IPR20240-00034, which were granted. Accordingly, Juniper Networks, Inc has been joined as a petitioner in this proceeding.” slip op. at 1
Patent outcomesUS 7,545,740 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 7,545,740 - Samsung Electronics America, Inc. / Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. v. Cobblestone Wireless LLCInstitutedPTAB · Jun 24, 2024 · IPR2024-00315 · APJ Barbara A Parvis · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted review of claims 9, 10, 12, 20, 21, and 23 on all petition grounds, granted joinder to IPR2024-00137, and authorized withdrawal of Samsung’s Sotera stipulation.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Decided for petitioner
“Carriers’ parallel district-court case. The arguments and facts are substantively the same as those presented in the T-Mobile IPR, except Petitioner here is not a defendant in the Carriers’ parallel district-court case. In the T-Mobile IPR, we found that factor 1 is neutral, factors 2, 3, and 5 weigh in favor of exercising discretion to deny institution, and factor 4 weighs marginally against exercising discretion to deny institution. T-Mobile 6 See Apple Inc. v. Fintiv, Inc., IPR2020-00019, Paper 11 (PTAB Mar. 20, 2020) (precedential) (“Fintiv”). IPR, Paper 15, 10–14. Because Petitioner in the instant proceeding is not a defendant in the Carriers’ parallel district-court case, we find that factor 5 weighs against exercising discretion to deny institution in the instant proceeding. Regarding the other factors, for the same reasons discussed in the decision to institute in the T-Mobile IPR, we find that factor 1 is neutral, factors 2 and 3 weigh in favor of exercising discretion to deny institution, and factor 4 weighs marginally against exercising discretion to deny institution. T-Mobile IPR, Paper 15, 10–14. We turn to Patent Owner’s arguments based on the Petitioner’s parallel district-court case. Our analysis of factors 1 and 4 is the same as that presented in the T-Mobile IPR because no stay has been requested in Petitioner’s parallel district-court case and Petitioner has agreed to be bound by the same stipulation submitted in the T-Mobile IPR. Joinder Mot. 1. Based on the facts presented by the parties, including the May 5, 2025 trial date, we find that factors 2, 3, and 5 weigh marginally in favor of exercising discretion to deny institution. Taking “a holistic view of whether efficiency and integrity of the system are best served by denying or instituting review” (Fintiv, Paper 11, 6), we conclude that the evidence of record and our analysis of factors 1–5 relating to both district-court cases favors exercising our discretion to deny institution of an inter partes review. Regarding factor 6, for the reasons discussed in our institution decision in the T-Mobile IPR, we determine, on this preliminary record, that the merits here are compelling. Accordingly, we decline to exercise our discretion to deny institution” slip op. at 10
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“unpatentability as the ones on which we instituted review in the T-Mobile IPR. Compare Pet. 3, 21–56, with T-Mobile IPR, Paper 1, 6, 25–60. Indeed, Petitioner contends that “the grounds of challenge in this Petition are a ‘copycat’ of the Petition filed in” the T-Mobile IPR and the “expert declaration filed in this proceeding is substantively identical to the expert declaration in” the T-Mobile IPR and is “signed by the same expert.” Id. at 1. Patent Owner states that its arguments on the merits in its Preliminary Response “are likewise ‘copycat’ of the merits arguments Patent Owner presented in its preliminary response in IPR2024-00137.” Prelim. Resp. 1 n.1. We instituted inter partes review of claims 9, 10, 12, 20, 21, and 23 of the ’888 Patent on May 22, 2024, based on the petition filed in the T-Mobile IPR after consideration of all arguments and evidence presented by the parties including Patent Owner’s arguments in its Preliminary Response. T- Mobile IPR, Paper 15. For the same reasons discussed in the Decision on Institution in the T-Mobile IPR, we find Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of showing at least one claim of the ’888 patent is unpatentable. See id. Accordingly, we find the Petition warrants institution of inter partes review of all challenged claims on all grounds raised.” slip op. at 12
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingJoinder, grantedGranted
“Upon consideration of the parties’ arguments and cited supporting evidence, we are persuaded that Petitioner has met its burden to show that it is appropriate under these circumstances to join Petitioner to the T-Mobile IPR. Petitioner timely filed its Motion for Joinder within one month after 7 Available at https://www.uspto.gov/TrialPracticeGuideConsolidated. institution of trial in the T-Mobile IPR, as required by 37 C.F.R. § 42.122(b). Petitioner challenges the same claims that are challenged in the T-Mobile IPR on the same grounds using the same prior art and evidence. See, e.g., Joinder Mot. 1, 6–7; compare Pet. 3, 12–39, with T-Mobile IPR, Paper 1, 6, 16–41. Petitioner states it will take an “understudy” role in the T-Mobile IPR and only assume a primary role should all Carriers cease participation in the T-Mobile IPR. See Joinder Mot. 6. Petitioner further asserts that joinder will have little to no impact on the trial schedule for the T-Mobile IPR and will simplify briefing and discovery. See Joinder Mot. 6, 9–11. Accordingly, joinder to the T-Mobile IPR would further the goals of a just, speedy, and inexpensive resolution of Petitioner’s challenge. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.1(b). Therefore, for the reasons given, we grant Petitioner’s Motion for Joinder and join Petitioner to the T-Mobile IPR.” slip op. at 13
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 9,094,888 - Samsung Electronics America, Inc. / Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. v. Cobblestone Wireless LLCInstitutedPTAB · Jun 24, 2024 · IPR2024-00317 · APJ Barbara A Parvis · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted review of claims 23–27 on all petition grounds and granted Samsung’s motion to join the T-Mobile IPR.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“B. Institution of Inter Partes Review The Petition in this proceeding asserts the same grounds of unpatentability as the grounds on which we instituted review in the T-Mobile IPR. Compare Pet. 3, 12–39, with T-Mobile IPR, Paper 1, 6, 16–41. Indeed, Petitioner contends that “the grounds of challenge in this Petition are a ‘copycat’ of the Petition filed in T-Mobile USA, Inc. et al. v. Cobblestone Wireless, LLC, IPR2024-00135” and the “expert declaration filed in this proceeding is substantively identical to the expert declaration in IPR2024- 00135 and signed by the same expert.” Id. at 1.” slip op. at 7
- Parallel petitionsDecided for petitioner
“103(a) Chang III. ANALYSIS A. Discretionary Denial Argument Patent Owner asserts “[t]o the extent that the Board institutes review of the First Petition, institution of the Second Petition should be denied as an unnecessary parallel petition.” Prelim. Resp. 3. We denied institution in the first ranked proceeding. See Samsung Electronics America, Inc., v. Cobblestone Wireless LLC, IPR2024-00318, Paper 11 (PTAB June 21, 2024). Accordingly, we decline to exercise our discretion to deny institution under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a).” slip op. at 7
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingJoinder, grantedGranted
“Upon consideration of the parties’ arguments and cited supporting evidence, we are persuaded that Petitioner has met its burden to show that it is appropriate under these circumstances to join Petitioner to the T-Mobile IPR. Petitioner timely filed its Motion for Joinder within one month after institution of trial in the T-Mobile IPR, as required by 37 C.F.R. § 42.122(b). Petitioner challenges the same claims that are challenged in the T-Mobile IPR on the same grounds using the same prior art and evidence. See, e.g., Mot. 1, 6–7; compare Pet. 3, 12–39, with T-Mobile IPR, Paper 1, 6, 16–41. Petitioner states it will take an “understudy” role in the T-Mobile IPR and only assume a primary role should all Carriers cease participation in the T- Mobile IPR. See Mot. 6. Petitioner further asserts that joinder will have little to no impact on the trial schedule for the T-Mobile IPR and will simplify briefing and discovery. See Mot. 6, 9–11. Accordingly, joinder to the T-” slip op. at 11
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 8,554,196 - PTAB · Mar 26, 2024 · IPR2024-00037 · APJ Brent M Dougal · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–9, 12–24, and 27–31 under the stated grounds and granted Juniper’s motion to join the Cisco IPR.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Patent Owner did not file a Preliminary Response. For the same reasons set forth in our institution decision in the Cisco IPR, we determine that Petitioner has shown a reasonable likelihood that at least one claim is unpatentable. We therefore institute trial as to all challenged claims on all grounds stated in the Petition.” slip op. at 3
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingJoinder, grantedGranted
“institution of the Cisco IPR. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.122(b). As noted, the Petition in this case asserts the same unpatentability grounds on which we instituted review in the Cisco IPR. See Mot. 4–5. Petitioner also relies on the same prior art analysis and expert testimony submitted by the Cisco petitioner. See id. at 5. Indeed, the Petition is nearly identical to the petition filed by the Cisco petitioner. See id. Thus, this inter partes review does not present any ground or matter not already at issue in the Cisco IPR. Id. If joinder is granted, Petitioner agrees to assume an “‘understudy’ role” and agrees that this role shall apply unless the Cisco petitioner ceases to participate in the instituted IPR. Id. at 6–7. Petitioner further represents that it will not advance any arguments separate from those advanced by the Cisco petitioner in the consolidated filings. Id. Because Petitioner expects to participate only in a limited capacity, Petitioner submits that joinder will not impact the trial schedule for the Cisco IPR. Id. at 5. Patent Owner did not file an Opposition to the Motion for Joinder. Based on the above, we determine that joinder with the Cisco IPR is appropriate under the circumstances. Accordingly, we grant Petitioner’s Motion for Joinder.” slip op. at 4
NonePatents in suitUS 10,652,111 - PTAB · Feb 27, 2024 · IPR2024-00026 · APJ Kristen L Droesch · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–31 on all petition grounds and granted Juniper’s motion to join the Cisco IPR.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“language of § 315(c) requires two different decisions.” Facebook, Inc. v. Windy City Innovations, LLC, 973 F.3d 1321, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2020). “First, the statute requires that the Director (or the Board acting through a delegation of authority . . . ) determine whether the joinder applicant’s petition for IPR ‘warrants’ institution under § 314.” Id. “Second, to effect joinder, § 315(c) requires the Director to exercise [her] discretion to decide whether to ‘join as a party’ the joinder applicant.” Id. The standard for instituting an inter partes review is set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), which provides that an inter partes review may not be instituted unless the information presented in the petition and any preliminary response shows “there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” The patentability challenges in the Cisco IPR met the “reasonable likelihood” standard of § 314(a). IPR2023-00401, Paper 10, 30–31. The Petition here presents the same patentability challenges as those for which a trial was instituted in the Cisco IPR. See Mot. 4 (“[This] Petition is substantively identical to the Cisco IPR and relies on identical exhibits.”); compare Pet. 1–74, with IPR2023-00401, Paper 2, 9–79. According to Petitioner, the “[t]he same claims of the same patent are challenged under the same unpatentability grounds as the Cisco IPR.” Mot. 4. In the present proceeding, Patent Owner did not file a preliminary response to dispute the merits of Petitioner’s patentability challenges. For the reasons set forth in the Cisco IPR, we conclude that Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of prevailing with respect to the We accordingly determine that the Petition warrants institution under § 314, and turn to Petitioner’s request for joinder.” slip op. at 8
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingJoinder, grantedGranted
“As the moving party, Petitioner has the burden of proof in establishing entitlement to the requested relief. 37 C.F.R. §§ 42.20(c), 42.122(b). Petitioner filed the Motion on October 10, 2023, within one month of institution of the Cisco IPR. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.122(b). Petitioner asserts that the Motion should be granted because the joinder “won’t impact the Cisco IPR trial schedule in any meaningful way.” Mot. 5. Petitioner also agrees to take an “understudy” role in the Cisco IPR. See Mot. 5–7. Specifically, Petitioner agrees to the following: (1) Petitioner “won’t make any substantive filings, and . . . agrees that Cisco alone will be responsible for all substantive petitioner filings in the joined proceeding;” (2) “to be bound by all filings by Cisco in the joined proceeding, except for filings regarding termination and settlement;” (3) Petitioner “must obtain prior Board authorization to file any paper or to take any action on its own in the joined proceeding;” (4) Petitioner “shall not be permitted to raise any new grounds not already instituted by the Board in the Cisco IPR, or introduce any argument or discovery not already introduced by Cisco;” (5) Petitioner “shall be bound by any agreement between Patent Owner and Cisco concerning discovery and depositions;” (6) Petitioner “will not cross-examine or defend any witness at deposition;” (7) “Cisco will be responsible for any oral hearing presentation, including the preparation of demonstrative exhibits”; and (8) “Should Cisco cease participation in the proceeding[, Petitioner] would assume a primary role, meaning it would take over the role previously filled by Cisco.” Mot. 6. As mentioned before, Patent Owner did not file an opposition to the Motion. the Cisco IPR which was instituted on identical grounds, we determine that it is appropriate under these circumstances to join Petitioner as a party to the Cisco IPR.” slip op. at 9
NonePatents in suitUS 7,545,740 - PTAB · Feb 27, 2024 · IPR2024-00034 · APJ Kristen L Droesch · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–20 on all petition grounds and granted Juniper’s motion to join the Cisco IPR.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“The patentability challenges in the Cisco IPR met the “reasonable likelihood” standard of § 314(a). IPR2023-00402, Paper 11, 30. The Petition here presents the same patentability challenges as those for which a trial was instituted in the Cisco IPR. See Mot. 4 (“[This] Petition is substantively identical to the Cisco IPR and relies on identical exhibits.”); compare Pet. 1–80, with IPR2023-00402, Paper 2, 9–85. According to Petitioner, the “[t]he same claims of the same patent are challenged under the same unpatentability grounds as the Cisco IPR.” Mot. 4. In the present proceeding, Patent Owner did not file a preliminary response to dispute the merits of Petitioner’s patentability challenges. For the reasons set forth in the Cisco IPR, we conclude that Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of prevailing with respect to the challenged claims of the ’821 Patent. See IPR2023-00402, Paper 11, 14–39. We accordingly determine that the Petition warrants institution under § 314, and turn to Petitioner’s request for joinder.” slip op. at 7
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingJoinder, grantedGranted
“Because Petitioner will take an understudy role that will not impact the Cisco IPR which was instituted on identical grounds, we determine that it is appropriate under these circumstances to join Petitioner as a party to the Cisco IPR.” slip op. at 9
NonePatents in suitUS 8,830,821 - PTAB · Oct 20, 2021 · IPR2021-00827 · APJ Jameson Lee · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood that claims 1 and 3 were unpatentable over either asserted obviousness combination.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“presented in the petition . . . and any response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Further, a decision to institute may not institute on fewer than all claims challenged in the petition. SAS Inst., Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1359–60 (2018). We determine that Petitioner has not shown a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on any claim.” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Real party in interest / privityNot reached
“Patent Owner contends that the Petition fails to name all real parties- in-interest (“RPIs”) as required by 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(2). Prelim. Resp. 72– Petitioner’s SEP Video Codec Zone members as RPIs. Id. Because we determine Petitioner has not demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of prevailing in establishing the unpatentability of any challenged claim, we do not reach this issue. C.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“On this record, we adopt Petitioner’s articulation of the level of ordinary skill, but delete the qualifier “at least” for the level of education and for the amount of experience, to keep the level from being vague and overbroad and extending into the level of an expert, and delete “or similar advanced post-graduate education in this area” also to keep the level from potentially extending into the realm of an expert. What remains appears consistent with what is reflected by the content of the applied prior art references. Cf. Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1354–55 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the applied prior art may reflect an appropriate level of skill). For purposes of this Decision, we find the level of ordinary skill in the art corresponds to that of one who had, on or about April 9, 2010, the level of: (1) an undergraduate degree in electrical engineering or computer engineering or a closely related scientific field, such as physics or computer science; (2) a working knowledge of video coding techniques; and (3) two years of experience with video processing. B.” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed patent owner constructionGranted
“prediction value” Patent Owner asserts that “prediction value” should be construed to mean “a value generated in an intra-prediction process for determination of a prediction block.” Prelim. Resp. 8. We agree. Claims 1 and 3 each recite: when the intra-prediction for the current block is performed, the processor determines whether to apply a second filter to a prediction value of the current block . . . , and applies the second filter to the prediction value of the current block if, as a result of the determination, the second filter is determined to be applied Ex. 1001, 12:18–25, 12:46–53 (emphasis added). The language links “prediction value” to intra-prediction such that it is a predicted value generated inside an intra-prediction process performed on a current block to determine a prediction block for the current block. slip op. at 10
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,781,448
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.