- Apple Inc. v. Smart Mobile Technologies LLCNo claims unpatentablePTAB · Sep 25, 2024 · IPR2022-01223 · APJ Hyun J Jung · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–3 and 5 were not shown unpatentable over Yegoshin, Bernard, Johnston, and Preiss under § 103 because the evidence did not establish multiplexing signals.
RulingsFinal written decision- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for patent owner
“communication device for multiplexing signals.” Ex. 1001, 12:2–3 (emphasis added). The language in the preamble does not support adopting Petitioner’s proposed interpretation of “multiplexing” to mean that “the connections may be used simultaneously or sequentially for combining multiple data paths into a single path,” because signals are being multiplexed, not connections or data paths. Pet. Reply 10. No connection is recited in the preamble with regard to multiplexing.” slip op. at 13
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Preamble limiting or notPreamble limitingDecided for patent owner
“Resp. 9–10 (citing Ex. 1002 (file history of the ’075 patent), 12; Ex. 2003 (Defendants’ Opening Claim Construction Brief from related litigation), 40–41; Ex. 2023 (Claim Construction Order from related litigation), 7). “Petitioner does not dispute that the preamble of claim 1 is limiting.” Pet. Reply 9 (citing PO Resp. 9–10; Ex. 2003, 45–46). Based on the full record, we adopt the parties’ agreement that the preamble is limiting. See also Ex. 2003, 45–46; Ex. 2023, 7.” slip op. at 9
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“show by a preponderance of the evidence that Yegoshin teaches or would have been understood to reasonably suggest “multiplexing signals” and that Bernard “includes or operates as a multiplexer for combining the data packets.” See Pet. 32–40. Because Petitioner does not show multiplexing signals in any of the asserted references, Petitioner does not show by a preponderance of the evidence that its proposed combination of Yegoshin, Bernard, Johnston, and Preiss would have rendered obvious “[a]n IP-enabled communication device for multiplexing signals,” as recited by claim 1. Also, because Petitioner fails to show Yegoshin teaches or would have been understood to reasonably suggest multiplexed signals and fails to show that Bernard “includes or operates as a multiplexer for combining the data packets,” Petitioner’s asserted motivation to modify Yegoshin in view of Bernard for “multiplexing signals” lacks rational underpinning. Weighing the underlying factual determinations, a preponderance of the evidence does not persuade us that claim 1 of the ’075 patent is unpatentable over Yegoshin, Bernard, Johnston, and Preiss. Arctic Cat, 876 F.3d at 1361.” slip op. at 44
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedPatent owner expert creditedDecided for patent owner
“We do not credit Petitioner’s cited testimonial evidence because, for the reasons above, Yegoshin and the full record do not support it. Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 79, 80. We, instead, credit Patent Owner’s cited testimonial evidence because Yegoshin and the full record better support it. Ex. 2018 ¶¶ 50, 51, 55–56, 58–61; see also Ex. 2025, 65:19–66:4.” slip op. at 26
Patent outcomesUS 9,319,075 not shown unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,319,075 - Cisco Systems, Inc. / Juniper Networks, Inc. v. Orckit CorporationNo claims unpatentablePTAB · Sep 17, 2024 · IPR2024-00037 · APJ Brent M Dougal · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–9, 12–24, and 27–31 were not shown unpatentable because Petitioner did not prove either asserted obviousness combination taught the claimed controller or packet-applicable criterion.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“understanding of a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention. Id. at 13, 17. Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art (POSA): would have had a bachelor’s degree in computer science, computer engineering, or an equivalent, and two years of professional experience, and a POSA would have had a working knowledge of hardware and software for packet-switched networking. EX1004, ¶¶48-49. Lack of work experience can be remedied by additional education and vice versa. Id., ¶48. Pet. 5. “Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s level of ordinary skill.” PO Resp. 16. We are persuaded that Petitioner’s proposal is consistent with the problems and solutions in the ’111 patent and prior art of record. We adopt Petitioner’s definition of the level of skill for the purposes of this Decision.” slip op. at 6
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Both parties agree that the ultimate analysis “remains the same” under either construction. Id. at 2; PO Sur-reply 2. We likewise agree that we do not need to decide between the two constructions. At the same time, consistent with parties’ positions, we construe “controller” to mean an entity that is either 1) configured to 2 Though Patent Owner does not provide a citation in support, Petitioner does not disagree that this is consistent with what occurred in the parallel district court proceeding. See Reply 1. perform deep packet inspection on packets, or 2) that is capable of controlling deep packet inspection. We determine that no other terms need to be construed. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 7
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“Though Petitioner asserts that there are a “limited number of design options” and that it would have been obvious to combine the different components of Lin, Petitioner does not establish that a controller configured to perform DPI analysis on packets was a known solution, and thus one of the limited design options. As discussed in KSR: When there is a design need or market pressure to solve a problem and there are a finite number of identified, predictable solutions, a person of ordinary skill has good reason to pursue the known options within his or her technical grasp. If this leads to the anticipated success, it is likely the product not of innovation but of ordinary skill and common sense. In that instance the fact that a combination was obvious to try might show that is was obvious under § 103. KSR, 550 U.S. at 421. Besides asserting the combination would have been “obvious to try,” Petitioner provides no other analysis or reason why one of skill in the art would have modified the teachings of Lin to obtain the claimed controller. Thus, Petitioner has not established by a preponderance of the evidence that the teachings of Lin render obvious all of the features of claim 1.” slip op. at 18
- Expert testimonyPatent owner expert creditedPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner
“Further, we find the testimony of Patent Owner’s declarant more persuasive based at least on his consideration of Swenson as a whole and his more detailed analysis and explanations. For example, Patent Owner’s declarant explains in detail why, “[i]n the context of a HTTP GET request and response, as disclosed in Swenson, the message does not constitute a single packet but a flow of packets:” Furthermore, Swenson discloses that the steering device 130 “sends an ICAP request message 516 comprising [a] HTTP GET request header and a portion of the [HTTP] response payload to the network controller 140, which inspects the message to determine whether to monitor the flow or optimize the video.” Ex. 1007 [0065]. In the context of a HTTP GET request and response, as disclosed in Swenson, the message does not constitute a single packet but a flow of packets. The reference to a HTTP request and response “header” and “payload” are thus not references to the header and payload of a packet. A POSA would know that despite common parlance references to “HTTP packets,” HTTP does not pertain to individual packets, whereas packet transmission is governed by the TCP protocol. HTTP utilizes TCP to exchange data such that information may be used by an end user (e.g., a video or audio stream). Even assuming that Swenson’s controller were analyzing the header and payload of an HTTP request/response, a POSA would understand that this analysis is not at the packet but at the flow level and thus does not constitute deep packet inspection. Ex. 2025 ¶ 69. Petitioner’s declarant merely responds by reiterating what was previously stated: Swenson is explicit in stating that its inspection techniques include inspection of “a portion of the [HTTP] response payload.” . . . A POSA would have understood the analysis of the “response payload” to be DPI by a DPI-capable controller, as DPI refers to monitoring the payload of a packet.” slip op. at 15
Patent outcomesUS 10,652,111 not shown unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,652,111 - Cisco Systems, Inc. / Juniper Networks, Inc. v. Orckit CorporationNo claims unpatentablePTAB · Sep 17, 2024 · IPR2023-00554 · APJ Brent M Dougal · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–9, 12–24, and 27–31 were not shown unpatentable because neither asserted obviousness combination established all limitations of claim 1.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“understanding of a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention. Id. at 13, 17. Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art (POSA): would have had a bachelor’s degree in computer science, computer engineering, or an equivalent, and two years of professional experience, and a POSA would have had a working knowledge of hardware and software for packet-switched networking. EX1004, ¶¶48-49. Lack of work experience can be remedied by additional education and vice versa. Id., ¶48. Pet. 5. “Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s level of ordinary skill.” PO Resp. 16. We are persuaded that Petitioner’s proposal is consistent with the problems and solutions in the ’111 patent and prior art of record. We adopt Petitioner’s definition of the level of skill for the purposes of this Decision.” slip op. at 6
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownOther
“We likewise agree that we do not need to decide between the two constructions. At the same time, consistent with parties’ positions, we construe “controller” to mean an entity that is either 1) configured to 2 Though Patent Owner does not provide a citation in support, Petitioner does not disagree that this is consistent with what occurred in the parallel district court proceeding. See Reply 1. perform deep packet inspection on packets, or 2) that is capable of controlling deep packet inspection. We determine that no other terms need to be construed. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 7
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“We agree with Patent Owner that DPI and DFI would have been understood to be different processes – That DPI inspects the detailed contents of individual packets in a granular, thorough manner; and, in contrast, DFI focuses on the broader patterns of network traffic flows by looking at aggregate data flow characteristics. As discussed above, the testimony of Patent Owner’s declarant as to the understanding of DPI is largely uncontested. Further, the testimony of Patent Owner’s declarant as to the understanding of DFI is supported by Swenson when considered as a whole as well as supported by Exhibit 2027.” slip op. at 13
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundReasonable expectation not foundNot shown unpatentable
“a POSA would have understood that one of the limited number of design options would have been to implement the security service as part of a controller configured to perform DPI analysis on packets, and a POSA would have had a reasonable expectation that the controller would have been successful in performing DPI analysis. Id. at 18–19 (citing Ex. 1004 ¶ 79 (making an identical statement)). No additional discussion, explanation, or evidence on these points were provided at the Petition stage. Patent Owner argues that: The mere fact that the security service may share certain common technical characteristics with the controller (i.e., its connection to the network switch and the hardware in which these two separate entities are implemented) cannot in and of itself suggest to a POSA that the function carried out by the security service should also be performed by the controller or that the controller should be configured to perform that function (i.e., deep packet inspection). PO Resp. 21–22 (citing Ex. 2025 ¶¶ 54–55). We agree. Though Petitioner asserts that there are a “limited number of design options” and that it would have been obvious to combine the different components of Lin, Petitioner does not establish that a controller configured to perform DPI analysis on packets was a known solution, and thus one of the limited design options. As discussed in KSR: When there is a design need or market pressure to solve a problem and there are a finite number of identified, predictable solutions, a person of ordinary skill has good reason to pursue the known options within his or her technical grasp. If this leads to the anticipated success, it is likely the product not of innovation but of ordinary skill and common sense. In that instance the fact that a combination was obvious to try might show that is was obvious under § 103. KSR, 550 U.S. at 421. Besides asserting the combination would have been “obvious to try,” Petitioner provides no other analysis or reason why one of skill in the art would have modified the teachings of Lin to obtain the claimed controller. Thus, Petitioner has not established by a preponderance of the evidence that the teachings of Lin render obvious all of the features of claim 1.” slip op. at 17
Patent outcomesUS 10,652,111 not shown unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,652,111 - Cisco Systems, Inc. v. Corrigent CorporationNo claims unpatentablePTAB · Aug 6, 2024 · IPR2023-00447 · APJ Nathan A Engels · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–26 were not shown unpatentable because the Petition did not establish the claimed port assignment and packet labeling under Raz or adequately explain the Raz–Ferguson combination.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“packet-switched networking, MPLS and LAG.” Pet. 6 (citing Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 57–58). Petitioner also states that a lack of work experience can be remedied by additional education, and vice versa. Pet. 6 (citing Ex. 1004 ¶ 57). Patent Owner “uses the same definition.” PO Resp. 4. We apply Petitioner’s level of ordinary skill, which is undisputed and is consistent with the level reflected by the ’602 patent and the asserted prior art.” slip op. at 6
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached
“We construe claims using the principles set forth in Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312–17 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) and related cases. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b) (2022). Under that precedent, the words of a claim are generally given their “ordinary and customary meaning,” which is the meaning the term would have to a person of ordinary skill at the time of the invention, in the context of the entire patent including the specification. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312–13. Neither party proposes any express claim constructions. Pet. 6–7; see PO Resp. 4. To the extent that the parties dispute the meaning of certain claim terms, we address those issues below, but we determine it is unnecessary to expressly construe any terms. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 6
- BurdenNot shown unpatentable
“Patent Owner argues, and we agree, that the cited portions of Raz do not disclose a LAG between two switches. PO Resp. 8–9. Petitioner acknowledges this; as stated in Petitioner’s Reply, “Petitioner has always acknowledged that Raz addresses the use of subports within an LSR, but a [person of ordinary skill in the art] would have found it obvious from Raz to use Ethernet physical data ports of a router or switch in an Ethernet LAG to communicate high-speed packet streams in [an] MPLS network.” Pet. Reply 2 (citing Pet. 15, 19, 22–25; Ex. 1021 ¶ 13; Ex. 1006, 1:16–19, 2:23– 31, 7:7–29, 11:3–12, 13:16–19, 14:42–44, 15:56–58, 17:7–9). Petitioner argues that LAGs were well known and, “[w]hile PO argues that Raz teaches the use of a single high-speed link to communicate between LSRs, that is merely a design choice.” Pet. Reply 3 (citing Ex. 1021 ¶¶ 15–17; PO Resp. 8–9). Further, Petitioner argues “[i]t would have been obvious to a [person of ordinary skill in the art] that high-speed packet streams could be communicated between switches or routers through a physical tunnel port of a LAG.” Pet. Resp. 3 (citing Ex. 1021 ¶¶ 15–17) (emphasis added). Among other problems, though, those arguments were not in the Petition; the Petition does not describe modifications of Raz’s teachings, much less establish those modifications as a “design choice.” See Pet. 25; see also PO Sur-reply 3. Further, we agree with Patent Owner that Raz is fundamentally different with its teachings of multiplexing the outputs of multiple slow- speed subports/processors into a single stream for transmission across a single high-speed link. PO Resp. 7–9, 12–13, 15–16; PO Sur-reply 4–5. As stated in Raz, “[t]he present invention provides a subport forwarding and provisioning mechanism whereby a plurality of subports comprising slower speed processors are used to perform the packet processing for a higher speed packet stream.” Ex. 1006, 6:24–27. Additionally, where Raz describes communication between two LSRs, Petitioner acknowledges that Raz teaches that its cited second LSR assigns the port on which it will receive a data packet. Pet. Reply 4; Ex. 1021 ¶ 20 (“in Raz, the second LSR chooses the subport that will be used to transmit the data packet from the first LSR and receive the data packet at the second LSR”). According to Petitioner, Raz teaches that “a first LSR generates a data packet label in which a port serial number is encoded and sends the label to a preceding LSR. Subsequently, the preceding LSR sends a data packet to the proper subport for processing. The process is then repeated in sending the data packet from the first LSR to a second LSR.” Pet. Reply 4 (citations omitted). “This technique just as easily could have been implemented to identify a single physical tunnel port through which a data packet in a first router or switch would be communicated to a second router or switch via a LAG.” Pet. Reply 4 (emphasis added) (citing Ex. 1006, 2:23–25, 7:7–16, 7:22–26, 11:3–29, Fig. 5; Ex. 1021 ¶ 18). Again, these arguments were not made in the Petition (see Pet. 22–25), and Petitioner’s assertions that Raz’s teachings “just as easily could have been implemented” in the manner claimed is improper hindsight and inconsistent with the fundamental differences between Raz’s multiplexing within an LSR and the claimed link aggregation and port assignment between MPLS/LAG switches.” slip op. at 8
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable
“[c]laims 1–13, 15–24 and 26 set forth above in Ground 1.” Pet. 52. Further, Petitioner states that “[f]or independent [c]laims 1, 15, and 26, Ferguson builds on the previous analysis of Raz by disclosing a system for communicating packets between switches and routers in an MPLS network.” Pet. 52; see Pet. 52–55. Critically, though, Petitioner does not specifically explain how the combined teachings of Raz and Ferguson would satisfy individual claim elements. Among other problems with Petitioner’s proposed combination, Petitioner does not adequately explain how or why a person of ordinary skill would have combined the references to include the claimed port assignment and packet labeling for transmission of a packet from a preceding node and then between a first and second MPLS switch. See Pet. 56–59. Instead, Petitioner generally advocates for the combination of Raz and Ferguson, arguing for example that “both Raz and Ferguson are directed to solving the problem of ensuring enough bandwidth is available to communicate high-speed packet streams through an MPLS network.” Pet. 57 (citing Ex. 1006, 10:60–11:12, 14:33–41, 15:47–55, 17:1–9, Fig. 5; Ex. 1007, 1:28–42, 2:54–57, 4:55–60; Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 247–249). Further, Petitioner contends a person of ordinary skill “would have understood from the disclosures in Ferguson that techniques for utilizing an Ethernet physical data port in a LAG to communication data packets between routers or switches in an MPLS network are also applicable to the use of subports transmitting the data packets within the routers or switches, and vice versa.” Pet. 59 (citing Ex. 1004 ¶ 250; Ex. 1007, 5:61–6:6); see Pet. 56–59; Pet. Reply 20. But Petitioner does not adequately explain how the proposed combination of Raz and Ferguson would cure the deficiencies addressed above in Petitioner’s analysis of Raz for Ground 1. Among other problems, none of Petitioner’s arguments adequately address port assignment and labeling in the proposed combination, much less adequately explain why the proposed combination would satisfy the challenged claims. See Pet. 55–56. As Petitioner does not adequately explain how the teachings of Raz and Ferguson might be combined to cure the deficiencies addressed above, we additionally determine Petitioner’s arguments and evidence advanced for the combination of Raz and Ferguson do not establish obviousness by a preponderance of the evidence for any of claims 1–26.” slip op. at 11
Patent outcomesUS 9,118,602 not shown unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 9,118,602 - Apple Inc. v. Smart Mobile Technologies LLCNo claims unpatentablePTAB · Jan 26, 2024 · IPR2022-01222 · APJ Hyun J Jung · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–12, 14, 19, and 24 were not shown unpatentable because the evidence did not establish a distinct server and network switch box in the asserted combinations.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“We preliminarily adopted Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art. Inst. Dec. 8. Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s proposal and does not propose its own level of ordinary skill in the art. See generally Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art). Based on the full record, we maintain and affirm that one of ordinary skill in the art “would have had a working knowledge of the wireless communication arts pertinent to the ’863 patent” and “a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or a related field, and at least two years of experience related to the design or development of wireless communication systems, or the equivalent” and that “[l]ack of work experience can be remedied by additional education, and vice versa.” Pet. 9–10 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 27–28).” slip op. at 7
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Petitioner argues that “said server configured with a controller in communication with a plurality of network devices” recited by claim 1 “should be understood to recite that a server is ‘configured with a controller’ and that it is the server that is ‘in communication with a plurality of network devices.’” Pet. 11 (citing Ex. 1001, 12:1–4; Ex. 1003 ¶ 54). We preliminarily adopted Petitioner’s understanding of the phrase. Inst. Dec. 9. “Patent Owner does not concede that Petitioner’s construction [of a ‘server configured with a controller in communication with a plurality of under any construction so it is not necessary to construe the term to resolve this IPR.” PO Resp. 14 n.1. Based on the full record, we determine that “said server configured with a controller in communication with a plurality of network devices” does not require express interpretation to resolve the parties’ dispute. Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms that . . . are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 8
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“We find that the cited portions of Ahopelto describe a GRPS GSN or GGSN connects to data networks, such as an inter-operator backbone IP network, X.25 network, and IP network. Ex. 1005, code (57), 6:16–19, Fig. 1. Based on the portions relied upon by Petitioner, we find that Ahopelto does not describe expressly that its GGSN is “a server” and a separate and distinct “network switch box.” Ex. 1005, code (57), 6:16–19, 7:35–42, 8:40–41, 10:22–23, 10:48–50, 10:56–59; Ex. 1003 ¶ 78 (“Ahopelto does not describe any details about a GGSN’s hardware/software”). We also find that Ahopelto does not describe expressly that a GGSN has separate and distinct functionalities (1) for receiving a packet and determining the protocol of the encapsulated packet is separate and (2) for connecting to data networks. Ex. 1005, code (57), 6:16–19, 7:35–42, 8:40–41, 10:22–23, 10:48–50, 10:56–59; Ex. 1003 ¶ 78; Ex. 2008 ¶ 39 (“Ahopelto never mentions the term ‘server functionality’ or the term ‘routing functionality.’”).” slip op. at 25
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner
“Petitioner’s declarant also opines that the asserted server functionality includes controlling where a packet is routed. See Ex. 1003 ¶ 77 (“A [person of ordinary skill in the art] would have recognized that Ahopelto’s GGSN exercises control over how a packet is routed, based on the protocol type (the ‘server functionality’ herein for simplicity of reference).”), ¶ 78 (“[T]he GGSN’s server functionality would exercise the disclosed control (the platform implementing the GGSN).”); Ex. 2005, 46:22–47:4 (Petitioner’s declarant answering “Yes” and “Routing is about where to send a packet,” in response to whether it was correct that “deciding where to send a packet is an essential part of routing”). According to Petitioner’s declarant, the asserted server functionality includes, or overlaps with, aspects of a “GGSN routing process.” Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 77, 78; Ex. 1013, 14:1– 3; Ex. 2005, 46:22–47:4. Petitioner’s testimonial evidence does not show a clear distinction between the asserted server and routing functionalities to support that one of ordinary skill in the art would have recognized a server functionality separate and distinct from a routing functionality in Ahopelto’s GGSN.” slip op. at 26
Patent outcomesUS 8,982,863 not shown unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,982,863 - Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. / Apple Inc. et al. v. Smart Mobile Technologies LLCNo claims unpatentablePTAB · Nov 30, 2023 · IPR2022-01002 · APJ Nathan A Engels · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–9 and 12–20 were not shown unpatentable under § 103 over Paulraj and Heath because the combination did not teach or suggest the claimed plurality of antennas.
RulingsFinal written decision- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner
“Although we do not understand the claims to require both transmission and reception “via all antennas” all of the time, we determine the claims require a set of antennas in which at least some of the antennas are for both transmitting and receiving. We disagree with Petitioner that two separate sets of antennas—one set of transmitting antennas and a separate, nonoverlapping set of receiving antennas—fall within the scope of the challenged claims.” slip op. at 13
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“Although we do not understand the claims to require both transmission and reception “via all antennas” all of the time, we determine the claims require a set of antennas in which at least some of the antennas are for both transmitting and receiving. We disagree with Petitioner that two separate sets of antennas—one set of transmitting antennas and a separate, nonoverlapping set of receiving antennas—fall within the scope of the challenged claims.” slip op. at 13
- Strike new argumentNew argument disregardedDecided for patent owner
“We determine these arguments are not grounded in or supported by the Petition or within the scope of reasonable reply arguments. Nothing in the Petition maps any limitations of the challenged claims to alleged teachings in Paulraj of antennas that perform both transmission and reception. Thus, we agree with Patent Owner (Sur-Reply, 7) that this argument in Petitioner’s Reply would improperly recast Petitioner’s reliance on Paulraj and is therefore untimely. Moreover, we agree with Dr. Cooklev (Ex. 2004 ¶ 37) that Paulraj is consistent in describing separate transmit units and receive units throughout its disclosure, and without an appropriate mapping of Paulraj’s alleged teachings of transmit/receive antennas to the challenged claims in the Petition, Petitioner has not carried its burden to show unpatentability under such a theory, even if it were timely.” slip op. at 16
Patent outcomesUS 9,191,083 not shown unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,191,083 - Apple Inc. / Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. et al. v. Smart Mobile Technologies LLCNo claims unpatentablePTAB · Nov 7, 2023 · IPR2022-00981 · APJ Jameson Lee · IPR · Final written decision
The Board held claims 1, 8–11, 13, 15, 17, and 19 not unpatentable because neither asserted obviousness ground accounted for the required dynamic configuration without user intervention.
RulingsFinal written decision- Expert testimonyPatent owner expert creditedPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner
“declaration (Ex. 2031) and asserts that Dr. Cooklev’s declaration should be accorded little to no weight. Reply 13–14. For reasons discussed below, we are unpersuaded that Dr. Cooklev’s declaration should be accorded little to no weight. First, Petitioner asserts: “Dr. Cooklev’s declaration merely repeats the same arguments of Patent Owner’s Preliminary Response. Indeed, Dr. Cooklev even testified in deposition: ‘ultimately counsel formulated my opinions.’” Reply 13 (quoting Ex. 1065, 14:1–3). We are not persuaded that the testimony of Dr. Cooklev does not reflect the opinion of Dr. Cooklev such that it constitutes mere attorney argument. With respect to the above-noted testimony, Dr. Cooklev explained: THE WITNESS: Well, maybe I misspoke. To begin with, these are my opinions. And I also testified, I believe, that I had communicated my opinions to counsel. Ultimately, counsel helped format those opinions, I mean put them in a format that is appropriate. So maybe that is the – that’s how I would clarify my – the answer that I gave earlier in the morning. Ex. 1065, 96:5–14. Dr. Cooklev further explained: “These opinions do not come from counsel. They come from me.” Id. at 96:20–21.” slip op. at 21
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“[a] Person of Ordinary Skill in The Art (“POSITA”) in December of 1996 would have a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, or equivalent training, and approximately two years of experience working in the field of networking and wireless devices. Lack of work experience can be remedied by additional education, and vice versa. Pet. 10 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 20–22). Patent Owner does not dispute Petition’s definition of level of ordinary skill. See generally PO Resp. We adopt Petitioner’s proposal regarding the level of one of ordinary skill in the art. This level of ordinary skill in the art is supported by the testimony of Dr. Kotzin (Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 20–22) and is consistent with the level reflected in the ’936 patent and the prior art of record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 7
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Specification disavowal / 'present invention' languageTerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner
“As Patent Owner has noted (PO Resp. 16), the Specification of the ’936 patent repeatedly and consistently states that the mobile device is able to “switch itself” or “switches itself.” Ex. 1001, 5:1–4, 8:9–12, 8:36–39. The Specification of the ’936 patent also describes that the device “can decide the preferred mode to be in.” Id. at 4:8–9 (emphasis added). The Specification of the ’936 patent further states that the device “is dynamically software reconfigurable for the various environments.” Id. at 2:35–36 (emphasis added). In contrast, there is not any description, none, in the Specification of the ’936 patent of the user of the device issuing a command to the device at the time of making a functional switch to cause the device to switch function.11 In light of such disclosures, we agree with Patent Owner that a fundamental aspect of the invention of the ’936 patent is that dynamic configuration occurs without user intervention, i.e., without user command at the time of the change in configuration. PO Resp. 13. In our view, it is not consistent with the Specification of the ’936 patent to read “dynamically configurable” as encompassing manual reconfiguration by user intervention, i.e., user command at the time of reconfiguring. Reading “dynamically configurable” as encompassing manual reconfiguration by user intervention, i.e., user command at the time of reconfiguring, is also contrary to the prosecution history of the ’936 patent.” slip op. at 16
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“We have construed “dynamically configurable” as “configurable when and as needed and in real time, without the need for user intervention,” and explained that “without the need for user intervention” means absent user command at the time of dynamic configuring. See Section II.C.2., supra. Based on that construction, we are not persuaded by Petitioner that Regnier dynamically configures its device from a first function to a second function, as Petitioner asserts. As explained by Petitioner, Regnier’s device reconfigures its functionality in response to user selection of the desired application program, to provide the functionality corresponding to the user selected application program. Pet. 51–52. Patent Owner notes that Petitioner’s rationale “relies on manual, user- initiated conversions.” PO Resp. 36. Patent Owner explains: Petitioners argue that Rautiola in view of Regnier “describes that the client device dynamically converts between functions by downloading a client portion of an application and converting between different application services that are allowed by a server on a dynamic basis and chosen dynamically by a user.” Pet. 48. These allegations combine two distinct parts: (1) providing a client portion of an application for download; and (2) determining whether to allow the client device to use a different application service each time the client requests converting from a first to second application. Ex. 2031, ¶74. According to Petitioners’ own arguments, both parts depend on manual user requests. For providing a client portion, the Petition states that “Regnier teaches that “client portion 291” 130 upon a request from the user.” Pet. 49 (quoting Ex. 1006, 5:52-5:54) (emphasis added). The Petition also repeatedly acknowledges that a user request initiates Regnier’s process to determine whether to allow a client device to use an application. Id., 49 (alleging that Regnier’s server maintains user profiles that determines whether users can execute applications), id., 51-52 (alleging that “Regnier further explains that each time a user selects an application . . . ”); id., 53 (alleging the server’s resource manager allows “users to choose dynamically among shared resources”). PO Resp. 36–37. Patent Owner further notes that Petitioner also cites to passages from Regnier that describe updating menu items in a spreadsheet for use by an application. Id. at 37 (citing Pet. 51). In that regard, Patent Owner explains:” slip op. at 33
Patent outcomesUS 8,472,936 not shown unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,472,936 - Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson / Ericsson Inc. et al. v. K.Mizra LLCNo claims unpatentablePTAB · Oct 26, 2023 · IPR2022-00730 · APJ Iftikhar Ahmed · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 22, 23, 30, 32, and 33 were not shown unpatentable because Pakzad did not disclose the claimed combined macro and femto timing information, and the obviousness grounds did not address that limitation.
RulingsFinal written decision- Expert testimonyPatent owner expert creditedPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner
“information from all three types of sources together or at the same time. Patent Owner argues that “a [person of ordinary skill in the art] would understand that this passage in Pakzad ‘any one of several sources’ confirms that Pakzad only uses a single signal source at a time.” PO Resp. 34 (citing Ex. 2002 ¶ 69). Dr. Chrissan testifies that he understands this disclosure to mean that “Pakzad teaches a single signal source at a time, not more than one.” Ex. 2002 ¶ 70 (emphasis added). We find Patent Owner’s interpretation, supported by Dr. Chrissan’s testimony, to be a reasonable reading of Pakzad’s disclosure. Dr. Chrissan further testifies that “Pakzad’s invention is about using both a course [sic] routing graph and fine routing graph to make computation of a motion model (e.g., a particle filter) more efficient,” and “Pakzad was not directed to leveraging a heterogenous network by incorporating both macro and femto cells concurrently.” Id. ¶ 68. We agree with Dr. Chrissan’s explanation for the lack of clear disclosure in Pakzad about which measurements Pakzad uses with its particle filter.” slip op. at 25
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“understanding of a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention. Graham, 383 U.S. at 17. Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have been someone with at least (1) a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering/science, or a related scientific field, and (2) either (a) a master’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering/science, or a related filed, or (b) two or more years of work or research experience in wireless networking and/or computing.” Pet. 21 (citing Ex. 1009 ¶ 23). Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s definition for a person of ordinary skill in the art, but adds that the person of ordinary skill in the art “may alternatively have additional years of practical and relevant work or research experience as substitution for less or different technical education, and vice versa.” See PO Resp. 17. We determine that the level of ordinary skill proposed by Petitioner is consistent with the ’819 patent and the asserted prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001); In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995); In re Oelrich, 579 F.2d 86, 91 (CCPA 1978). We adopt Petitioner’s proposed level in deciding the patentability of the challenged claims.” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner
“claim 30 should be construed “to refer to the previously recited ‘femto base station timing information,’ ‘macro base station timing information,’ and ‘femto base station position information.’” PO Resp. 18. Patent Owner argues that its proposed construction is “based on at least three aspects of the intrinsic record: (1) the claim language itself; (2) guidance from the specification defining the disputed term; and (3) illustrative embodiments confirming the meaning of the disputed term.” Id. (citing Ex. 2002 ¶ 47). Specifically, Patent Owner contends that “the specification describes two embodiments that further confirm to a [person of ordinary skill in the art] that ‘the base station information’ consists of the [three types of information previously] recited.” Id. at 19–23 (citing Ex. 1001, 19:29–33, 20:50–54, Figs. 8, 9; Ex. 2002 ¶¶ 47–55).” slip op. at 10
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“More importantly, anticipation requires that the four corners of a single, prior art document describe every element of the claimed invention, and we are not persuaded that Pakzad describes the combinational use of the two different types of timing information as claimed. See Xerox Corp. v. 3Com Corp., 458 F.3d 1310, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (citing Advanced Display Sys., Inc. v. Kent State Univ., 212 F.3d 1272, 1282 (Fed. Cir. 2000)). The Federal Circuit has made it clear that “it is not enough that the prior art reference discloses part of the claimed invention, which an ordinary artisan might supplement to make the whole, or that it includes multiple, distinct teachings that the artisan might somehow combine to achieve the claimed invention.” Net MoneyIN, 545 F.3d at 1371 (citation omitted) (emphasis added). In Net MoneyIN, although a prior art reference described two protocols, which when taken together, disclosed “all five links arranged or combined in the same way as claimed,” the Federal Circuit determined that the reference did not anticipate the claim. See id. Rather, the Federal” slip op. at 28
Patent outcomesUS 8,958,819 not shown unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Enfish · Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,958,819 - Kinaxis Inc. / Kinaxis Corp. v. Blue Yonder Group, Inc.No claims unpatentablePTAB · Feb 6, 2023 · IPR2021-01302 · APJ Paul J Korniczky · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–3 and 5–20 were not shown unpatentable because Petitioner did not establish an adequate skill level, Eicher enablement, or a reasonable expectation of success combining the prior art.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelDecided for patent owner
“In light of the significant computer-implemented systems and methods described in the ’145 patent and the cited prior art, Petitioner’s definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art as a person having “a formal collegiate education in an academic area emphasizing operations or supply chain management, and at least five years of experience” is inadequate for its challenges. Pet. 9. Although knowledge of operations or supply chain management is relevant, the evidence of record indicates that implementing the claimed invention would have required significant computer programming skills. Further, contrary to Petitioner’s arguments (Reply 8–10), the evidence of record does not show that a person of ordinary skill having a college degree in operations or supply chain management and five years of experience working with supply chains would have had the requisite level of computer-programming skills as described in Eicher and Perry. Petitioner’s argument that the skilled artisan would have been “familiar” with programming is also undercut by Petitioner’s concession that (1) a person of ordinary skill in the art “would not have been expected to personally write computer code because, as Dr. Handfield explains, anyone seeking to make Perry’s [sic, Eicher’s] supply chain management system would simply employ professional computer programmers to do so” (id. at 9), and (2) would have simply purchased commercially available software (id. at 9–10). There is insufficient evidence to show that Petitioner’s skilled artisan, even with familiarity and use of database systems, has the type of computer programming experience or knowhow suggested by Eicher and Perry.” slip op. at 17
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner
“Petitioner’s declarant, Mr. Handfield, testified about whether a skilled artisan would have had a reasonable expectation of success in combining Petitioner’s prior art references. As to Eicher/IBM, he conceded that modifying Eicher’s system to include the SCS functionality would require software engineers. Ex. 2011, 174:9–175:11; see also Carter Decl. ¶ 157; Ex. 2011, 152:9–14, 161:19–22 (IBM does not include source code for SCS). Mr. Handfield also testified that the skilled artisan would need to work with a team of programmers or a software engineer to combine Eicher with Perry. Ex. 2011, 187:10–15. And while he suggested that Perry’s system could be “bolted on” to Eicher’s system (Ex. 2011, 188:10–22), he admitted a supply chain management professional would require a “team” of “IT professionals or programmers” or a “third-party consulting firm” to create that bolt-on system. Ex. 2010, 60:21–61:19. As another example, Petitioner does not explain how a skilled artisan lacking meaningful computer programming skills could have reasonably expected to combine Perry’s and Yablonski’s two technically complex software systems –– “Perry’s center hub” with “Yablonski’s ability to communicate with a scheduling/planning engine” (Pet. 38) –– so that they operate in concert or modify one software system to implement the functionalities of another. Petitioner concedes that Yablonski offers only a “high-level description” of how its system works and does not show how to generate its visual displays, let alone how to implement the planning/scheduling engines. Ex. 2011, 194:4–8; PO Resp. 52–53; Carter Decl. ¶ 185. Petitioner also concedes that the skilled artisan would need to seek out “expanded discussion” beyond the Perry-Yablonski combination. Reply 15. Indeed, Perry also warns of the perils of such modification projects:” slip op. at 27
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successReasonable expectation not foundNot shown unpatentable
“Petitioner Does Not Show the Skilled Artisan Would Have Had a Reasonable Expectation of Success of Combining its Prior Art “An obviousness determination requires finding that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to combine or modify the teachings in the prior art and would have had a reasonable expectation of success in doing so.” Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Broad Inst., Inc., 903 F.3d 1286, 1291 (Fed. Cir. 2018). The “factual inquiry” into the reasons for “combin[ing] references must be thorough and searching,” and “the need for specificity pervades.” In re NuVasive, Inc., 842 F.3d 1376, 1381-82 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Here, Petitioner obviousness challenges are based on a combination of (1) Eicher with IBM or Perry (Grounds 1B-1C) and (2) Perry with Yablonski/Bellini (Grounds 2A and 2B). Pet. 1. Even assuming that Petitioner provides an adequate motivation to combine these four prior art references, it provides a cursory and inadequate explanation as to why a skilled artisan would have had a reasonable expectation of success in doing so. We treat below the combinations of Eicher/IBM, Eicher/Perry, Perry/Yablonski, and Perry/Yablonski/Bellini.” slip op. at 24
- ExcludeMotion to exclude, deniedDenied
“Patent Owner’s Motion to Exclude In view of the discussion above, we deny Patent Owner’s Motion to Exclude (Paper 29) as moot.” slip op. at 29
Patent outcomesUS 7,788,145 not shown unpatentable§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 7,788,145 - Kinaxis Inc. / Kinaxis Corp. v. Blue Yonder Group, Inc.No claims unpatentablePTAB · Jan 19, 2023 · IPR2021-01247 · APJ Nathan A Engels · IPR · Final written decision
Petitioner did not prove claims 1–30 unpatentable because it did not apply an adequately supported level of ordinary skill or show Perry enabled a POSITA to practice the claims.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner
“Thus, we disagree with Petitioner’s definition of a POSITA in the Petition as a person having “at least a Bachelor’s degree in an academic area emphasizing operations or supply chain management, or a similar discipline, and at least five years of experience in the field working with supply chains.” Pet. 6. Although knowledge of operations or supply chain management is relevant, the evidence of record indicates that implementing the claimed invention would have required significant computer-programming skills. Further, contrary to Petitioner’s arguments (Reply 10–13), the evidence of record does not show that a person of ordinary skill having a bachelor’s degree in operations or supply chain management and five years of experience working with supply chains would have had the requisite level of computer-programming skills. There is insufficient evidence to show that Petitioner’s POSITA, even with familiarity and use of database systems, has the type of computer programming experience or knowhow suggested by Perry.” slip op. at 10
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“We do not decide whether Dr. Carter’s POSITA is an appropriate articulation of the level of ordinary skill. Even if we were to determine that Dr. Carter’s POSITA is correct or that some other level of skill is from the perspective of that POSITA. Among other problems, Petitioner does not apply Dr. Carter’s POSITA in its Grounds and we would be required to speculate regarding which arguments and testimony might still apply. Similarly, though Dr. Handfield agrees with Dr. Carter’s expression of a POSITA (Ex. 1029 ¶ 45), he does not provide testimony concerning obviousness based on Dr. Carter’s POSITA (see generally, Ex. 1029). These problems apply to each of Petitioner’s asserted grounds, each of which requires assessing obviousness from the perspective of a POSITA. Accordingly, Petitioner has not carried its burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that any of claims 1–30 of the ’383 patent is unpatentable. C. Petitioner Does Not Show that Perry Enables a POSITA to Practice the Challenged Claims “Although published subject matter is ‘prior art’ for all that it discloses, in order to render an invention unpatentable for obviousness, the prior art must enable a person of ordinary skill to make and use the invention.” In re Kumar, 418 F.3d 1361, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2005). “In general, a prior art reference asserted under § 103 does not necessarily have to enable its own disclosure,” but “a standalone § 103 reference must enable the portions of its disclosure being relied upon.” Raytheon Techs. Corp. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 993 F.3d 1374, 1380–81 (Fed. Cir. 2021). Here, to prevail on its four Grounds, which rely on Perry, Petitioner must show that Perry enables the portions of its disclosure relied upon in Petitioner’s mapping of Perry to the challenged claims and based on Petitioner’s definition of a POSITA.” slip op. at 10
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot reached
“We do not decide whether Dr. Carter’s POSITA is an appropriate articulation of the level of ordinary skill. Even if we were to determine that Dr. Carter’s POSITA is correct or that some other level of skill is from the perspective of that POSITA. Among other problems, Petitioner does not apply Dr. Carter’s POSITA in its Grounds and we would be required to speculate regarding which arguments and testimony might still apply. Similarly, though Dr. Handfield agrees with Dr. Carter’s expression of a POSITA (Ex. 1029 ¶ 45), he does not provide testimony concerning obviousness based on Dr. Carter’s POSITA (see generally, Ex. 1029). These problems apply to each of Petitioner’s asserted grounds, each of which requires assessing obviousness from the perspective of a POSITA. Accordingly, Petitioner has not carried its burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that any of claims 1–30 of the ’383 patent is unpatentable. C. Petitioner Does Not Show that Perry Enables a POSITA to Practice the Challenged Claims “Although published subject matter is ‘prior art’ for all that it discloses, in order to render an invention unpatentable for obviousness, the prior art must enable a person of ordinary skill to make and use the invention.” In re Kumar, 418 F.3d 1361, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2005). “In general, a prior art reference asserted under § 103 does not necessarily have to enable its own disclosure,” but “a standalone § 103 reference must enable the portions of its disclosure being relied upon.” Raytheon Techs. Corp. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 993 F.3d 1374, 1380–81 (Fed. Cir. 2021). Here, to prevail on its four Grounds, which rely on Perry, Petitioner must show that Perry enables the portions of its disclosure relied upon in Petitioner’s mapping of Perry to the challenged claims and based on Petitioner’s definition of a POSITA.” slip op. at 10
- ExcludeMotion to exclude, deniedDenied
“In view of the discussion above, we deny Patent Owner’s Motion to Exclude (Paper 31) as moot.” slip op. at 15
Patent outcomesUS 7,574,383 not shown unpatentable§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 7,574,383
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.