• Lenovo (United States) Inc. / Motorola Mobility LLC v. Theta IP, LLCNo claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Oct 16, 2024 · IPR2023-00697 · APJ Barbara A Benoit · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1, 3, 4, and 8 were not proven unpatentable: Rauhala does not disclose the required simultaneous signal-strength determinations, and Masaaki does not cure the deficiency for claim 4.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Following institution, Patent Owner maintained the same level of ordinary skill proposed in its preliminary response and did not address our discussion of the level of ordinary skill in the art in the Institution Decision. PO Resp. 24–25; see also Prelim. Resp. 24. For the reasons discussed in the Institution Decision, we adopt and apply for this Decision the level of ordinary skill articulated by Petitioner and used previously in our Institution Decision. See Dec. 8–10. In light of our review of the complete record, we find that this formulation is consistent with the ’825 patent, the prior art of record, and is supported by the testimony of Dr. Baker. See Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 27– 31. Our decision would not change, however, if we had applied Patent Owner’s proposed level of ordinary skill.” slip op. at 12

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner

    “We agree with Patent Owner that the desired signal and interferer signal must be received at the same time. The plain language of the claim requires the wireless transceiver to “receiv[e] a wireless signal having a desired signal and an interferer signal,” the determining of a signal strength of the interferer signal and the determining of a signal strength of the desired signal must be performed at the same time; otherwise, the determinations of signal strengths would not be of the same wireless signal. The specification supports this understanding. “When a receiver is actively receiving a desired signal, each block in the signal path has at its input the desired signal as well as noise and possibly interfering signals.” Ex. 1001, 5:20–22; see also id. at 5:31–33 (“FIGS. 2A and 2B illustrate examples of desired signals, interferers, and noise that may be received by one of the various circuits in a” slip op. at 21

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “We agree with Patent Owner that Rauhala does not state that the signal strengths are measured simultaneously or at the same time. Indeed, as discussed above, Rauhala indicates unequivocally in the same paragraph the opposite—that detector DET provides to control unit 42 “an indication about either the receive channel signal strength RSS or the strength of any signal on the reception band.” Ex. 1004 ¶ 17. Rauhala describes that “control unit 42 provides two one-bit control signals cA and cM” based on indications received from detector DET. Id. Importantly, Rauhala indicates that “at the same time as” describes how the control unit 42 uses the received inputs RSS and RSSn shown in Figure 4, which are described earlier in paragraph 17 as indications of either RSS or RSSn from detector DET. Id. (“Signal cA is 0 when signal RSS is greater than S4 and signal RSSn is at the 11 Dr. Baker’s reply declaration correctly quotes Rauhala paragraph 17 but cites to paragraph 18. We deem this harmless error. same time smaller than Sn. . . . Signal cM is 1 when signal RSS is not greater than S4 and signal RSSn is at the same time at least Sn. Otherwise, signal cM is 0.”). The burden remains on Petitioner to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that Rauhala discloses the disputed limitations as arranged or combined in the claim. Petitioner does not persuasively reconcile these “either/or” statements regarding the functioning of detector DET with the “at the same time as” statements regarding control signals output by control unit 42 in paragraph 17. We do not find persuasive Petitioner counsel’s position expressed at the hearing that Rauhala’s “either/or” statements are “simply an imprecise description” (Tr. 16:22–24). We do not see a lack of precision in Rauhala’s “either/or” statements.” slip op. at 30

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedPatent owner expert creditedDecided for patent owner

    “When asked at his deposition to explain Rauhala’s use of the word “or” regarding the functioning of detector DET, Dr. Baker asserted that “[detectors] can be designed to determine RSS or RSSn.” Ex. 2016, 85:5– 12. We find Dr. Baker’s testimony that “it’s reasonable that if you can design . . . the detector to detect one or the other, you can also design it to detect both” to be without factual support. Id. at 85:13–16. He points to no textbook or other independent evidence to support that would have led one of ordinary skill to design such a detector or to support that one of ordinary skill would have understood Rauhala’s detector to be so designed. Furthermore, Dr. Baker recognizes that “Rauhala doesn’t teach the details of what’s in the detector.” Id. at 91:6–7. We give little weight to Dr. Baker’s unsupported testimony that one could design a detector to detect both RSS and RSSn from the same wireless signal. See 37 C.F.R. 42.65(a) (“Expert testimony that does not disclose the underlying facts or data on which the opinion is based is entitled to little or no weight.”); see also Xerox Corp. v. Bytemark, Inc., No. IPR2022-00624, 2022 WL 3648989, at *6 (PTAB 2022) (precedential) (Director affirming because “the cited declaration testimony is conclusory and unsupported, adds little to the conclusory assertion for which it is offered to support, and is entitled to little weight”).” slip op. at 31

  Patent outcomesUS 10,129,825 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,129,825
• Lenovo (United States) Inc. / Motorola Mobility LLC v. Theta IP, LLCNo claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Oct 16, 2024 · IPR2023-00698 · APJ Thomas L Giannetti · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 7–11, 13, and 19–21 were not shown unpatentable because Rauhala does not disclose simultaneous desired and interferer signal-strength determinations, defeating anticipation and the obviousness combination.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “The two proposals are materially similar in the education requirement, but differ marginally in professional experience required (three versus five years). See supra. While we were persuaded, on the preliminary record, that both Petitioner’s and Patent Owner’s proposals were consistent with the problems and solutions in the ’202 patent and the prior art of record, on balance, we determined that Petitioner’s proposal was a better reflection of the level of skill in the prior art, and we therefore adopted it for our Institution Decision. See Institution Dec. 12–13. For this Decision, we adopt the description of the person of ordinary skill articulated by Petitioner and used previously in our Institution Decision. In light of our review of the complete record, we find that this formulation is consistent with the ’202 patent, the prior art of record, and is supported by the testimony of Dr. Baker. See Baker I Decl. ¶¶ 28–32. Our Decision would not change, however, if we had applied Patent Owner’s proposed level of ordinary skill.” slip op. at 12

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner

    “85:13–16. He admits that “Rauhala doesn’t teach the details of what’s in the detector.” Id. at 91:6–7. He points to no textbook or other independent evidence that would have led a person of ordinary skill to design such a detector. Our Trial Practice Guide cautions against crediting such unsupported testimony: The Board has broad discretion to assign weight to be accorded expert testimony. Yorkey v. Diab, 601 F.3d 1279, 1284 (Fed. Cir. 2010). However, the testimony must be based on sufficient facts and data. Fed. R. Evid. 702(b). “Expert testimony that does not disclose the underlying facts or data on which the opinion is based is entitled to little or no weight.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.65(a). Patent Trial and Appeal Board Consolidated Trial Practice Guide 35 (Nov. 2019).7 We therefore give Dr, Baker’s unsupported testimony on this issue little weight.” slip op. at 24

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached

    “We construe claim terms only as relevant to the parties’ contentions and only to the extent necessary to resolve the issues in dispute. See Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999); Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co. Matal, 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017). Having considered the positions of the parties, we find that for the purpose of this decision, we do not need to construe these terms to resolve a dispute.” slip op. at 9

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “requirement.” Pet. Reply 5. We do not agree with Petitioner. We find that the language of the claims supports Patent Owner’s argument that the desired signal and the interferer signal are received together. As discussed infra, claim limitations 7.7 and 7.8 recite determining a signal strength of the interferer signal and determining a signal strength of the desired signal. These determinations must be performed at the same time; otherwise, the determinations of signal strengths would not be of the same wireless signal. See Larson II Decl. ¶ 70; Baker II Decl. ¶¶ 48–49 (explaining that consideration of signal strengths detected at the same time would be “essential”). The specification of the ’202 patent further supports this finding: “When a receiver is actively receiving a desired signal, each block in the signal path has at its input the desired signal as well as noise and possibly interfering signals.” Ex. 1001, 5:22–24; see also Figs. 2A, 2B (showing interferer signals and desired signals together).” slip op. at 17

  Patent outcomesUS 10,524,202 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,524,202
• Intuit Inc. v. Samesurf, Inc.No claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jun 25, 2024 · IPR2023-00341 · APJ Barbara A Benoit · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–16 were not shown unpatentable over Lebrun and Wang or over Prajapat and Wang because the combinations did not teach key invitation and webpage retrieval limitations.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for patent owner

    “of the parties, we found that a person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSITA”) “would have had (1) at least a bachelor’s degree in computer science, 7 Patent Owner has not offered objective evidence of non-obviousness. See generally PO Resp.; PO Sur-reply; see also Pet. 21 (indicating Petitioner is not aware of any evidence of secondary considerations). least two years of work experience in software development and/or web-based software,” which reflected Petitioner’s proposal. Dec. 12; see Dec. 10–12 (discussing the respective proposals and level of ordinary skill reflected in the challenged patent and asserted prior art). Patent Owner accepts this level of ordinary skill in the art. PO Resp. 37. Accordingly, we apply this determination of the level of ordinary skill in the art for purposes of this Decision.” slip op. at 12

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedPatent owner expert creditedDecided for patent owner

    “Petitioner’s citations in this regard to Dr. Lieberman’s declaration do not adequately support Petitioner’s “forwarding” contention. Pet. Reply 8 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 37, 149); Ex. 1003 ¶ 37 (indicating the challenged patent describes the invitation as being sent by email, instant message, or social network communication); Ex. 1003 ¶ 149 (describing the group-surfing server receiving the session-creation message, creating the group-surfing session, and “inform[ing] the participants in the group-surfing session”). Petitioner does not identify any testimony from Dr. Lieberman that supports Petitioner’s Reply position that Lebrun’s group-surfing server “forwards” the session-creation message to the group-surfing session participants, nor are we aware of any such testimony. See, e.g., Ex. 1003 ¶ 149 (The group-surfing server “responds to the group session request ‘by (1) creating a group-surfing session, and (2) informing the participants [web clients] in the group-surfing session.”); see generally Ex. 1034. Petitioner cannot satisfy its burden of proving obviousness by employing “mere conclusory statements.” In re Magnum Oil Tools Int’l, Ltd., 829 F.3d 1364, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2016).” slip op. at 29

  • Strike new argumentNew argument disregardedGranted in part

    “surfing server as forwarding the session-creation message to the invited web client. PO Sur-reply 12. Although Lebrun describes the group-surfing server as “informing the participants in the group-surfing server session” after receiving the session-creation message and creating the group-surfing session, Lebrun does not describe forwarding or otherwise sending the session-creation message to the participants. Ex. 1005, 32:26–28, 44:12–14. Petitioner’s citations in this regard to Dr. Lieberman’s declaration do not adequately support Petitioner’s “forwarding” contention. Pet. Reply 8 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 37, 149); Ex. 1003 ¶ 37 (indicating the challenged patent describes the invitation as being sent by email, instant message, or social network communication); Ex. 1003 ¶ 149 (describing the group-surfing server receiving the session-creation message, creating the group-surfing session, and “inform[ing] the participants in the group-surfing session”). Petitioner does not identify any testimony from Dr. Lieberman that supports Petitioner’s Reply position that Lebrun’s group-surfing server “forwards” the session-creation message to the group-surfing session participants, nor are we aware of any such testimony. See, e.g., Ex. 1003 ¶ 149 (The group-surfing server “responds to the group session request ‘by (1) creating a group-surfing session, and (2) informing the participants [web clients] in the group-surfing session.”); see generally Ex. 1034. Petitioner cannot satisfy its burden of proving obviousness by employing “mere conclusory statements.” In re Magnum Oil Tools Int’l, Ltd., 829 F.3d 1364, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2016).” slip op. at 29

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “receive webpage content from the website server in particular ways as identified in limitations [1e] and [1g]. Similarly, claim 1 requires the invitee device to retrieve data from the website server in response to receiving “the information related to the shared web browsing interaction from the synchronization server” (limitation [1f.iii]). For the reasons discussed above, Petitioner has not shown by a preponderance of the evidence its combination of Lebrun and Wang does so. For the required website server interaction, in its Petition, Petitioner relies on Lebrun’s description of an alternative embodiment applicable only when no cookies or other identity information are involved (Ex. 1005, 35:17–19). See, e.g., Pet. 30 (citing Ex. 1005, 35:17–19). As Patent Owner indicates, this alternative is not relevant to the subject matter recited in claim 1 which requires identity information. PO Resp. 45. Petitioner does not address this shortcoming in its Reply. See generally Pet. Reply. Rather, in its Reply, for website server interaction, Petitioner relies on Lebrun’s functionality of sending a web page from the web server to the web client as shown in Lebrun’s Figure 1. See, e.g., Pet. Reply 11 (citing Ex. 1005, 32:21–24, 31:27–30, Fig. 1). Specifically, Petitioner contends that Lebrun discloses that (i) a URL for the initial web page is included in session-creation message 151 (Ex. 1005, 32:21–24), (ii) the web site sends a web page directly to the web client (Fig. 1), and (iii) the web site delivers information 132 to web clients or the group-surfing server 140 “in response Pet. Reply 11. Although this shows the web site sending a web page directly to a web client, the prior art of Lebrun does not do so in the manner required by the claims (limitations [1e], [1f.i], [1f.iii], [1g]).” slip op. at 46

  Patent outcomesUS 9,483,448 not shown unpatentable
  § 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 9,483,448
• Google LLC v. Touchstream Technologies, Inc.No claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Oct 2, 2023 · IPR2022-00794 · APJ Daniel J Galligan · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1, 2, and 6–8 were not shown unpatentable because the prior art combinations did not establish the claimed messaging through the server system.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level board ownDecided for patent owner

    “Tr. 78:6–10. Patent Owner responded “I don’t think it makes any difference for this panel’s determination.” Tr. 78:13–14. We agree and determine that the differences in the level of skill offered by the parties are not so significant as to warrant any changes to the definition set forth in the Decision to Institute. Therefore, we maintain our determination that an ordinarily skilled artisan would have had “a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering or computer science (or equivalent experience) and two years of experience designing or implementing interactive systems with networked media or media playback systems.” See Inst. Dec. 10. We determine this level of skill comports with the qualifications a person would have needed to understand and implement the teachings of the ʼ289 Patent and the prior art of record. Cf. Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (noting that the prior art itself may reflect an appropriate level of skill in the art).” slip op. at 9

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed board ownDecided for patent owner

    “1. media player Patent Owner contends that, based on the “intrinsic record . . . an ordinary artisan would have understood the ordinary and customary meaning of ‘media player’ in the ’289 patent refers to application software and does not encompass hardware devices.” PO Resp. 14 (citing Ex. 2022 ¶¶ 92–93). Petitioner asserts that it “has not alleged any hardware device is a ‘media player’” and thus, “the Board need not resolve whether ‘hardware devices’ are encompassed by ‘media player.’” Pet. Reply 1. Rather, Petitioner states the media players relied upon in the Petition are all application software. Pet. Reply 1–2. Petitioner specifically states, “Petitioner has identified three ‘media players’ in the prior art. Two of these—Muthukumarasamy’s ‘Video Player[s]’ and Hayward’s ‘media players’ (Petition, 24–27)—are application software. The third ‘media player’ is likewise not a hardware device.” Pet. Reply 2 (alteration in original). Thus, the parties agree that the term “media player” refers to software and not to a hardware device, and we apply this interpretation in our patentability analysis.” slip op. at 11

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner

    “Muthukumarasamy “controls delivery of selected media content and selects and controls the media devices that deliver the selected media content according to a media type of the selected media content.” Because Muthukumarasamy teaches that the media device displays media content from various disparate sources depending on the media type and media source, a [person of ordinary skill in the art] would have understood the media device loads an appropriate media player depending on the media type and source. Pet. 23–24 (citing Ex. 1008 ¶ 47; Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 66–67). Petitioner, however, proffers insufficient evidence or argument that the content choices described in paragraph 47 of Muthukumarasamy would have led an ordinarily skilled artisan to understand a media player is obtained and loaded in the content presentation device. Rather, Dr. Bederson makes conclusory statements without providing evidence to support the assertions (Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 66–67).” slip op. at 33

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “Muthukumarasamy discussed above. In particular, Petitioner has not explained how Hayward teaches receiving the one or more messages in a system server. Rather, Petitioner relies on Hayward to teach “identify a particular media player for playing content from the file,” and “identify a location of the particular media player.” Pet. 41–45. More specifically, Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have been motivated by and found it obvious from Hayward to implement the DBCS (e.g., the RCIBS) to facilitate control of internet content presented at the content presentation device using any number of media players through embedded media player pages, as described in Hayward.” Pet. 65. However, to the extent Petitioner’s assertions rely on “implement[ing] the DBCS (e.g., the RCIBS) to facilitate presentation of internet content at the content presentation device” (Pet. Reply 22), we determine Petitioner has not shown the combined process of Muthukumarasamy and Hayward would include the required messages being received by the server (e.g., zHub/zNode), as opposed to directly by the RCIBS as discussed above. Additionally, Petitioner has not shown, for the zHub/zNode process, that Hayward cures the deficiencies of Muthukumarasamy as set forth above. Accordingly, Petitioner has not shown that the combination of Muthukumarasamy and Hayward teaches “receiving, in a server system, one or more messages from a personal computing device . . . wherein the one or more messages, . . . identify a particular media player for playing content from the file wherein the media player is a computer application operable to present content and control presentation of the content,” as recited in claim 1 and commensurately recited in independent claim 6. Additionally, because claim 2 depends from claim 1 and claims 7 and 8 depend from claim 6, we conclude that Petitioner has not established by a preponderance of evidence that the subject matter of claims 2, 7, and 8 would have been obvious over the combination of Muthukumarasamy and Hayward.” slip op. at 37

  Patent outcomesUS 8,904,289 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,904,289
• Google LLC v. Touchstream Technologies, Inc.No claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Sep 27, 2023 · IPR2022-00795 · APJ Debra K Stephens · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1, 2, and 5–9 were not shown unpatentable over Muthukumarasamy alone or with Hayward because the claimed signals identifying a media player were not shown to pass through the asserted server system.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level board ownDecided for petitioner

    “(Tr. 78:6–10). Patent Owner responded: “I don’t think it makes any difference for this panel’s determination” (Tr. 78:13–14). We agree and determine that the differences in the level of skill offered by the Parties are not so significant as to warrant any changes to the definition set forth in the Decision to Institute. Therefore, we maintain our determination that an ordinarily skilled artisan would have had “a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering or computer science (or equivalent experience) and two years of experience designing or implementing interactive systems with networked media or media playback systems” (see Inst. Dec. 10). We determine this level of skill comports with the qualifications a person would have needed to understand and implement the teachings of the ʼ251 Patent and the prior art of record (cf. Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (noting that the prior art itself may reflect an appropriate level of skill in the art)).” slip op. at 11

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner

    “1. Media player Patent Owner contends, based on the “intrinsic record . . . an ordinary artisan would have understood the ordinary and customary meaning of ‘media player’ in the ’251 Patent refers to application software and does not encompass hardware devices” (PO Resp. 13 (citing Ex. 2022 ¶¶ 81–92, 95)). Petitioner asserts that it “has not alleged any hardware device is a ‘media player’” and thus, “the Board need not resolve whether ‘hardware devices’ are encompassed by ‘media player’” (Pet. Reply 1). Rather, Petitioner states the media players relied upon in the Petition are all software (Pet. Reply 1–2). Petitioner specifically states, “Petitioner has identified three ‘media players’ in the prior art. Two of these—Muthukumarasamy’s ‘Video Player[s]’ and Hayward’s ‘media players’ (Petition, 23–26)—are application software. The third ‘media player’ is likewise not a hardware device” (Pet. Reply 1–2). Thus, the parties agree that the term “media player” refers to software and not to a hardware device, and we apply this interpretation in our patentability analysis.” slip op. at 12

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for patent owner

    “2. Additional Terms In light of the record and our findings, reasonings, and conclusions discussed below, we determine that no other terms or phrases in the claims require express construction (see Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)))).” slip op. at 13

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot shown unpatentableMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable

    “We determine that Hayward does not cure the deficiencies of Muthukumarasamy discussed supra. In particular, Petitioner has not explained how Hayward teaches receiving the one or more signals in a system server. Rather, Petitioner relies on Hayward to teach “identify a particular media player for playing the video content” (Pet. 38–41). More specifically, Petitioner contends “a [person of ordinary skill in the art] would have been motivated by and found it obvious from Hayward to implement the DBCS (e.g., the RCIBS) to facilitate presentation of internet content at the display device using any number of media players through embedded media player pages, as described in Hayward” (Pet. 15, 40 (citing Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 60, 102)). However, to the extent Petitioner’s assertions rely on “implement[ing] the DBCS (e.g., the RCIBS) to facilitate presentation of internet content at the display device . . .” (Pet. Reply 22 (emphasis omitted)), we determine Petitioner has not shown the combined process of Muthukumarasamy and Hayward would include the required signals being received by the server (e.g., zHub/zNode), as opposed to directly by the RCIBS as discussed above. Additionally, Petitioner has not shown, for the zHub/zNode process, that Hayward cures the deficiencies of Muthukumarasamy as set forth above.” slip op. at 39

  Patent outcomesUS 8,356,251 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,356,251
• Google LLC v. Touchstream Technologies, Inc.No claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Sep 27, 2023 · IPR2022-00793 · APJ Debra K Stephens · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–5, 8, 11, 12, 14, 15, 27, and 28 were not shown unpatentable as obvious over Muthukumarasamy alone or with Hayward.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level board ownDecided for patent owner

    “(Tr. 78:6–10). Patent Owner responded: “I don’t think it makes any difference for this panel’s determination” (Tr. 78:13–14). We agree and determine that the differences in the level of skill offered by the Parties are not so significant as to warrant any changes to the definition set forth in the Decision to Institute. Therefore, we maintain our determination that an ordinarily skilled artisan would have had “a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering or computer science (or equivalent experience) and two years of experience designing or implementing interactive systems with networked media or media playback systems” (see Inst. Dec. 10). We determine this level of skill comports with the qualifications a person would have needed to understand and implement the teachings of the ʼ528 Patent and the prior art of record (cf. Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (noting that the prior art itself may reflect an appropriate level of skill in the art)).” slip op. at 10

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner

    “‘media player’ in the ’528 patent refers to application software and does not encompass hardware devices” (PO Resp. 16 (citing Ex. 2022 ¶¶ 83–91, 94)). Petitioner asserts that it “has not alleged any hardware device is a ‘media player’” and thus, “the Board need not resolve whether ‘hardware devices’ are encompassed by ‘media player’” (Pet. Reply 1). Rather, Petitioner states the media players relied upon in the Petition are all application software (Pet. Reply 1–2). Petitioner specifically states, “Petitioner has identified three ‘media players’ in the prior art. Two of these—Muthukumarasamy’s ‘Video Player[s]’ and Hayward’s ‘media players’ (Petition, 21–24)—are application software. The third ‘media player’ is likewise not a hardware device” (Pet. Reply 1–2). Thus, the parties agree that the term “media player” refers to software and not to a hardware device, and we apply this interpretation in our patentability analysis.” slip op. at 12

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for patent owner

    “2. Additional Terms In light of the record and our findings, reasonings, and conclusions discussed below, we determine that no other terms or phrases in the claims require express construction (see Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)))).” slip op. at 12

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “We are not persuaded. Even if the zHub and the zNode would be used to control the volume on the TV on which the streamed content is displayed, this device cooperation does not show the particular messaging recited in the claim. More specifically, even under Petitioner’s scenario that the “Volume Up” command flows from the IED (“personal computing device”) through the zHub/zNode (“server system”) to the TV (“content presentation device”), this command does not “identify a particular media player for playing content from the file.” Petitioner has not shown any messages in Muthukumarasamy that “identify a particular media player for playing content from the file” and flow from the IED through the zHub/zNode to the content presentation device. Thus, Petitioner’s assertions about devices working together fall short of proving by preponderant evidence that Muthukumarasamy discloses the particular messaging contents and path recited in claim 1.” slip op. at 30

  Patent outcomesUS 8,782,528 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,782,528
• Platinum Optics Technology Inc. v. Viavi Solutions Inc.No claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Oct 3, 2022 · IPR2021-00631 · APJ Patrick M Boucher · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–3, 5–8, 10–12, 14, 16–21, and 23 were not shown unpatentable because the asserted combinations did not establish the claimed hydrogenated silicon properties.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Supported by Mr. Willey’s testimony, Petitioner proposes that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had “a Bachelor’s degree or equivalent in physics, or in a related science or engineering field, along with at least 5 years of experience in optical coating design and the manufacturing of optical filters, including various deposition techniques.” Pet. 13 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 66–68). According to Petitioner, “[a]dditional education (e.g., a Master’s degree with exposure to coating design and manufacturing) may substitute for some industrial experience in optical thin film design, and more industrial experience can substitute for a different educational background. Id. (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 66). Patent Owner neither directly addresses Petitioner’s proposal nor provides its own proposal. See Tr. 35:15–18 (Patent Owner confirming for the record that it has not proposed a different level of ordinary skill than Petitioner’s proposal). Petitioner’s proposal is reasonable and consistent with the prior art presented. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the prior art may reflect an appropriate level of skill in the art). We accordingly adopt Petitioner’s proposal.” slip op. at 11

  • Expert testimonyPatent owner expert creditedDecided for patent owner

    “Based on the statements Dr. Clemens made under oath in his Declaration, we find that he qualifies as a person having at least ordinary skill in the art according to our adopted definition. The questions Petitioner raises about Dr. Clemens’s qualifications were insufficiently explored on cross-examination to impeach that testimony. With respect to Petitioner’s further complaint that Dr. Clemens “did not review all the evidence in rendering his opinions, did not select the materials he reviewed, and did no independent research on the question of enablement,” we agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner cites no authority for the propositions that expert witnesses must review all exhibits or perform independent research. Sur-reply 27. Indeed, we do not find it particularly unusual for an expert witness to focus his analysis and opinions on specific issues identified by counsel, and Dr. Clemens properly discloses the underlying facts and data upon which his opinions are based. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.65(a). We thus accord due weight to Dr. Clemens’s testimony.” slip op. at 15

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “Petitioner contends that “the claims do not need an express construction to resolve the issues presented in this proceeding” but nevertheless “provides its proposed interpretations of two terms [namely, ‘center wavelength’ and ‘passband’] to clarify how Petitioner is applying the prior art to the claims.” Pet. 13. Patent Owner does not directly address Petitioner’s proposed constructions for these terms, and appears generally to treat the terms in a manner consistent with Petitioner’s proposals. We conclude that no express claim construction is necessary for any claim term. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“[W]e need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 16

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot shown unpatentableMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable

    “One difficulty with Petitioner’s position is that it treats the refractive index and extinction coefficient as independent variables in its argument. But the prior art is clear that the adjusting the hydrogen content of Si:H to achieve a desired extinction coefficient necessarily affects the refractive index—and, as we discuss above, that such adjustments do so in a direction counterproductive to the combination of parameters the inventors sought. And we agree with Patent Owner that the refractive index and extinction coefficient “are not parameters subject to simple adjustment, but properties resulting from the parameters of the fabrication process.” PO Resp. 52 (citing Ex. 2001 ¶¶ 121–122; Ex. 1016, Figs. 2–3). At the Oral Hearing, Petitioner conceded that Patent Owner’s characterization is accurate when considering the hydrogenated silicon material. See Tr. 65:7– 12. When Petitioner refers to the refractive index and extinction coefficient as result-effective variables, Petitioner means that those parameters are variables that can affect the properties of the claimed optical filter. See id. at 64:6–65:12. As we note above, Petitioner’s argument thus presumes that the refractive index and extinction coefficient can be independently adjusted to achieve desired filter properties—but the asserted prior art teaches against such independence because the known method of adjusting the hydrogen content of Si:H not only affects both the refractive index and extinction coefficient, but does so in a manner counterproductive to the inventors’ objective.” slip op. at 35

  Patent outcomesUS 9,354,369 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 9,354,369
• DISH Network L.L.C. / DISH Technologies L.L.C. et al. v. Sound View Innovations, LLCNo claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Feb 8, 2022 · IPR2020-01276 · APJ John A Hudalla · IPR · Final written decision

  The Board held claims 1–3, 5–7, 13–15, 18, 20, 21, 24, 25, 27, and 29 not unpatentable over either asserted obviousness combination.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “After institution, neither party put forth arguments related to the level of ordinary skill. We discern no reason to change the level of ordinary skill in the art applied in this Final Written Decision. Thus, a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had either (1) a Bachelor of Science in Electrical Engineering, Computer Engineering, Computer Science, or a related field, as well as three to four years of experience in implementing protocols and/or equipment for streaming multimedia data; or (2) a Master’s degree in Electrical Engineering, or an equivalent field, as well as two years of experience in implementing protocols and/or equipment for streaming multimedia data. We are satisfied that this definition comports with the level of skill necessary to understand and implement the teachings of the ’796 patent and the asserted prior art.” slip op. at 8

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Preamble limiting or notPreamble limitingDecided for patent owner

    “independent claims 1, 15, 20, and 27 are limiting. Dec. on Inst. 10–11. Petitioner does not take an express position on whether the preambles of the challenged claims are limiting. See Pet. 21 (stating that Geagan teaches the preamble “to the extent it is limiting”). Patent Owner supports our preliminary determination that the preambles are limiting. PO Resp. 37–41. Given this posture, we discern no reason to change our initial determination that the preambles are limiting. Thus, even though the disposition of this case does not turn on any particular limitation in the preamble, we maintain our determination that the preambles of claims 1, 15, 20, and 27 are limiting to the extent they color our analysis of Petitioner’s rationale for combining various prior art references.” slip op. at 9

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “We determine that no terms require explicit construction.2 See, e.g., Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“[W]e need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy’ . . . .” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 10

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “Petitioner attempts to decouple these central control aspects from the functionality of sliding windows. In particular, Petitioner argues that “[t]he majority of the functionality for implementing the sliding window buffers is found in Vishlitzky’s stream servers themselves” and that Patent Owner has not established “that the controller servers of Vishlitzky exercise control over the playout history, the buffers, or sliding window functionality of Vishlitzky’s stream servers.” Pet. Reply 8–9. Yet Petitioner expressly relies on Vishlitzky’s admission control program, which runs on controller servers 28, 29, to teach the “determining” step of claim 1. Pet. 35–36, 40–41; Pet. Reply 21–22. Petitioner has not explained how the admission control program’s centralized function of choosing an appropriate stream server to service a request (see Ex. 1010, 7:62–8:3) would be implemented in the stream servers themselves. In addition, Petitioner’s analogy between Vishlitzky’s controller servers and the memory controllers used with Geagan’s proxy (Pet. 63; Pet. Reply 9) does not detail how and whether Petitioner proposes to modify Vishlitzky’s centralized controller functions such that they might be compatible with “the distributed nature of Geagan’s proxy approach,” as Petitioner characterizes it. Pet. Reply 10. At the oral hearing, Petitioner also suggested that a controller within a single proxy from Geagan could allocate incoming requests to multiple of Vishlitzky’s stream servers within that same proxy. Tr. 55:1–57:21; see also PO Sur-reply 23–24 (discussing this potential argument). In other words, Petitioner seemed to suggest that multiple stream servers from Vishlitzky’s stream server architecture in Figure 16, along with controller servers from Figure 2, could be replicated in each of Geagan’s proxies. Yet Petitioner disavows such a mapping in its Reply: “[T]he Petition does not propose that a POSITA would have bodily incorporated the entirety of Vishlitzky’s hardware control structure when implementing Geagan’s system using Vishlitzky’s ‘sliding window’ to store cached streaming content.” Pet. Reply 6. Nor was this the combination described in the Petition. Instead, Petitioner proposed “to implement the buffer of Geagan as a ‘pre-configured playout history (PH) buffer’ . . . because Vishlitzky teaches that it is advantageous to pre-configure a playout buffer.” Pet. 34; see also id. at 62–63 (“[A] POSITA would have had a reasonable expectation of success in implementing details of the ATM-based stream server of Vishlitzky in Geagan’s proxy . . . .”). Petitioner further characterizes this as “[t]he buffer of Geagan’s proxy, as implemented as a pre-configured PH buffer per Vishlitzky.” Pet. 39. And, importantly, Petitioner cites the creation of another proxy device in Geagan for teaching the recited “non pre-configured PH buffer”: “Geagan in view of Vishlitzky discloses ‘servicing the first request from a non pre-configured PH buffer,’ such as by live-streaming content using a buffer at the proxy device that is created at the time of the request for an unpopular live stream.” Pet. 42 (emphasis added). Finally, even if Petitioner’s papers had proposed a combination where Vishlitzky’s entire stream server and controller architecture is incorporated in each of Geagan’s proxies, Petitioner has failed to articulate reasons with some rational underpinning why an ordinarily skilled artisan would have made this combination. Thus, we are not persuaded by Petitioner’s arguments. At the very least, Petitioner has not explained where Vishlitzky’s controller servers would be disposed in the combined system and how they” slip op. at 28

  Patent outcomesUS 6,757,796 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 6,757,796
• DISH Network L.L.C. / DISH Technologies L.L.C. et al. v. Sound View Innovations, LLCNo claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jan 18, 2022 · IPR2020-01041 · APJ Debra K Stephens · IPR · Final written decision

  DISH failed to prove claim 13 unpatentable as obvious over either Durand and Bennett or Goyal and Bennett.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “We regard Petitioner’s formulation of the level of skill as consistent with the prior art before us (see Okajima 261 F.3d 1355). Based on the present record, including the disclosure in the ’456 Patent, we apply Petitioner’s definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art. We determine Petitioner’s asserted level of skill comports with the qualifications a person would have needed to understand and implement the teachings of the ’456 Patent and the prior art of record (cf. Okajima, 261 F.3d at 1355 (the prior art itself may reflect an appropriate level of skill in the art)). As we determine the four instances of “at least” in Petitioner’s formulation introduce ambiguity, we remove these terms from our definition. Accordingly, we determine an ordinarily skilled artisan would have a Bachelor of Science in one of Electrical Engineering, Computer Engineering, Computer Science, or a related field, as well as three to four years of experience in implementing resource reservations for UNIX-based computing systems, or a Master’s degree in Electrical Engineering, or an equivalent field, as well as two years of experience in implementing resource reservations for UNIX-based computing systems.” slip op. at 7

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “We determine that it is not necessary to provide an express interpretation of any terms of claim 13 (Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (only terms that are in controversy need to be construed, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy); Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (applying Vivid Techs. in the context of an inter partes review)).” slip op. at 9

  • BurdenNot shown unpatentable

    “However, Petitioner has not set forth with specificity where Bennett teaches the request uses the one or more object references. Indeed, Petitioner has not explained how these two teachings of Bennett disclose the recited limitations with sufficient specificity or how one of ordinary skill in the art would modify Durand with these teachings of Bennett to achieve the recited limitations. Accordingly, Petitioner has not established that the combination of Durand and Bennet teaches the subject matter of claim 13. Therefore, based on the entire trial record, we determine Petitioner has not established by a preponderance of the evidence that the subject matter of claim 13 would have been obvious over Durand and Bennet under 35 U.S.C. § 103.” slip op. at 19

  • Strike new argumentNew argument disregardedDecided for patent owner

    “In its Reply, as noted by Patent Owner (PO Sur-reply 11), Petitioner offers a new theory, pointing to a different system call of Goyal (Pet. Reply 19–20 (citing Ex. 1090 ¶ 144 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 352–354))). Petitioner contends this new argument is to address Patent Owner’s alleged contention that “‘quality of service’ must already be ‘provided’ at the same time when the correspondence to the ‘reference to an object’ is created (Pet. Reply 19 (citing Ex. 1090 ¶ 141)). Thus, in Dr. Negus’ Reply Declaration, Dr. Negus asserts Goyal teaches the recited “quality of service guarantees that correspond to a reference to an object” relying on the “int hsfq_move (int from, int to, .....)” which “is used to move a thread from one leaf node to another”1 (Ex. 1090 ¶ 144). Petitioner’s alleged reliance on the hsfq_move (int from, int to, …….) system call instead of the int hsfq_mknod (char *name, int parent, int weight, int flag, scheduler_id side) system call represents a change in Petitioner’s unpatentability contentions that is presented for the first time in Petitioner’s Reply (see Pet. Reply 19–20). We acknowledge that the Petition mentions a “move” function: “Additionally, system calls are used to remove, move, and administer nodes in the scheduling structure. Goyal also discloses several additional functions to manage the scheduling structure, including removing, moving, and administering nodes.” (Pet. 61 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 350–352 (citing Ex. 1007 § 4))). But the cited portion of Dr. Negus’ Declaration simply states that there are other system calls, including “int hsfq_parse(char *name, int hint),” “int hsfq_rmnod(int id, int 1 We note Dr. Negus refers to the system call as “int hsfq_move” (see e.g., Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 144, 352) although Goyal discloses the system call as “hsfq_move” (Ex. 1007 § 4). We consider Dr. Negus’ naming to refer to the same system call as disclosed in Goyal. mode),” and “int hsfq_admin(int node, int cmd, void *args)” and the system call “‘int hsfq_move(int from, int to, .....)’ which ‘is used to move a thread from one leaf node to another’” (Ex. 1002 ¶ 352; see also id. ¶ 144 (repeating the same information as paragraph 352)). Additionally, these teachings of Goyal are discussed in conjunction with the limitation “utilizing an application programming interface . . . to establish one or more quality of service guarantees” (id. ¶¶ 356, 359). Thus, Dr. Negus’ initial Declaration does not elaborate on the move function, and the Petition does not rely on the “hsfq_move” system call to teach the limitations of claim 13. Petitioner asserts that this argument in reply is to address “Patent Owner’s new claim construction position” (Pet. Reply 19). We disagree. As outlined above, the Petition does not identify where an object reference is “used in the request,” as specifically recited in claim 13. Petitioner’s new reply argument, therefore, attempts to fill in a gap in Petitioner’s unpatentability contentions from the Petition that was pointed out by Patent Owner. Under the circumstances here, we do not consider this a permissible reply argument (see Patent Trial and Appeal Board Consolidated Trial Practice Guide 73 (Nov. 2019), available at https://www.uspto.gov/sites/ default/files/documents/tpgnov.pdf (“Petitioner may not submit new evidence or argument in reply that it could have presented earlier, e.g. to make out a prima facie case of unpatentability.”)). Thus, we do not consider Petitioner’s newly presented contentions.” slip op. at 26

  Patent outcomesUS 6,725,456 not shown unpatentable
  Claim constructioncites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 6,725,456
• Apple Inc. / HTC Corporation et al. v. Invt Spe LLCNo claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Mar 25, 2020 · IPR2018-01473 · APJ Thu A Dang · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–3, 5–9, and 11 were not shown unpatentable under § 103 over Keskitalo and Lindell because Petitioner did not adequately explain why a skilled artisan would combine their teachings.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Claim Construction › Functional claiming / §112(f) means-plus-function › Whether §112(f) applies (Williamson, nonce words)§112(f) appliesDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner contends that “[c]laim 1 includes limitations in means-plus[-]function format, which creates a rebuttable presumption that the [Applicant] intended to invoke 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6.”3 Pet. 7; see also Altiris Inc. v. Symantec Corp., 318 F.3d 1363, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2003). In the Decision on Institution, we addressed Petitioner’s proposed constructions of the means-plus-function terms (Pet. 10–12), and we determined that Petitioner has set forth proposed structures that support these limitations. Dec. on Inst. 8–12; see 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(3) (2018).” slip op. at 9

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached

    “As for the other claim limitations of independent claims 1, 6, and 7, and claims 2, 3, 5, 8, 9 and 11 depending therefrom, neither party has proposed a construction of any other term. See Pet. 6–7; PO Resp. 12–13. We determine that we need not further construe expressly any other claim terms to resolve the arguments before us. See Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (explaining that only claim terms that are in controversy need to be construed and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy); see also Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (applying Vivid Techs. to an inter partes review).” slip op. at 13

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “may be considered, including the “type of problems encountered in the art; prior art solutions to those problems; rapidity with which innovations are made; sophistication of the technology; and educational level of active workers in the field.” In re GPAC, Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (citation omitted). In that regard, Petitioner’s expert, Andrew C. Singer, Ph.D., testifies that a POSITA at the time of the invention would have been a person having a Bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering or the equivalent plus three years of experience working with digital communication systems or in network engineering or a Master’s degree in electrical engineering with an emphasis on communication systems or the equivalent plus one year of experience working with digital communication systems or in network engineering. Pet. 4–5; Ex. 1003 ¶ 35. Patent Owner does not dispute Dr. Singer’s assessment of the level of ordinary skill in the art. See generally PO Resp. We adopt and apply Dr. Singer’s assessment of the level of ordinary skill in the art, which is consistent with the level of ordinary skill reflected by the prior art of record. Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1354–55 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (holding that absent evidence to the contrary, “the prior art itself [may] reflect[] an appropriate level” of ordinary skill in the art).” slip op. at 15

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundReasonable expectation not foundNot shown unpatentable

    “position of Patent Owner. In particular, we are unpersuaded by Petitioner’s contention that it would have been obvious to modify Keskitalo such that its predetermined thresholds for transmission power are average transmission power values in accordance with the teachings of Lindell. Pet. 26. That is, we are not persuaded that Petitioner has demonstrated by the preponderance of the evidence that it would have been obvious to have used Lindell’s average transmission power values as Keskitalo’s predetermined thresholds for transmission power. See Harmonic, 815 F.3d at 1363 (citing 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3) as requiring inter partes review petitions to identify “with particularity . . . the evidence that supports the grounds for the challenge to each claim”); Magnum Oil Tools, 829 F.3d at 1380 (holding that Petitioner cannot satisfy its burden of proving obviousness by employing “mere conclusory statements”).” slip op. at 24

  Patent outcomesUS 6,611,676 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 6,611,676

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.