- PTAB · Nov 21, 2025 · IPR2025-01055 · APJ Stephen E Belisle · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because the Petition did not show a reasonable likelihood that claims 1–18 were unpatentable as obvious over the asserted combinations.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“review. 35 U.S.C. § 314(b) (2024); 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2024). We may not institute an inter partes review “unless . . . there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). The “reasonable likelihood” standard is “a higher standard than mere notice pleading” but “lower than the ‘preponderance’ standard to prevail in a final written decision.” Hulu, LLC v. Sound View Innovations, LLC, IPR2018-01039, Paper 29 at 13 (PTAB Dec. 20, 2019) (precedential). When instituting inter partes review, the Board will authorize the review to proceed on all of the challenged claims and on all grounds of unpatentability asserted for each claim. 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a). Applying those standards, and based on the record before us, we determine that Petitioner has not demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of success in proving that any one of the Challenged Claims is unpatentable. See 35 U.S.C. § 314; 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a). Accordingly, we deny institution of an inter partes review of the ’326 patent.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“In determining the level of ordinary skill in the art, various factors may be considered, including the “type of problems encountered in the art; prior art solutions to those problems; rapidity with which innovations are made; sophistication of the technology; and educational level of active workers in the field.” In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (citation omitted). The level of ordinary skill in the art also may be reflected by the prior art of record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001). Neither party argues that the outcome of this case would differ based on our adoption of any particular definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art. Considering the subject matter of the ’326 patent, the background technical field, the prior art, and Petitioner’s unopposed definition of the skilled artisan, which is supported with testimony of Dr. Easttom (Ex. 1004 ¶ 22–23), we apply the level of skill set forth above.” slip op. at 10
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for patent owner
“Claim 1 explicitly recites “partially,” not “fully” or “completely.” On its face, “partially” appears to have its plain and ordinary meaning, i.e., not completely. The use of “partially” in the subject limitation shows or at least strongly suggests that the claimed invention contemplates at least some frequency gap to remain between the first channel and the second channel. In addition, as argued persuasively by Patent Owner, this interpretation is further supported by claim 1’s requirement of “transmitting data subcarriers occupying the first channel, the second channel, and the frequency gap in parallel to a receiver”: [T]he “transmitting” step in claim 1 requires that the frequency gap be included in the transmitted signal. Inclusion of the frequency gap in the transmitted signal necessarily requires that the frequency gap be only partially filled -- but not fully filled -- with added data subcarriers at the time of transmission, because if the frequency gap were fully filled it would no longer exist at the time of signal transmission. Prelim. Resp. 23. Petitioner offers no explanation for how the language of claim 1 itself would allow for “partially” to encompass “completely.”” slip op. at 15
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“For all but one sentence of Petitioner’s arguments for how each of the subject combinations allegedly would have taught the Partially Filling Limitation as variously recited in claims 1, 16, and 18, Petitioner relies (implicitly) on a construction of “partially” that allows for completely filling the frequency gap between the first channel and the second channel, and alleges that the asserted combinations teach completely filling such gap. See Pet. 26–28 (Gardner and Mori), 64–67 (Mori, Lu, and Williams); Prelim. Resp. 25–29, 38–40 (Patent Owner agreeing that the asserted combinations teach only completely or fully filling the frequency gap.). We reject such a construction of “partially” as discussed above in Section III.C.2, and thus find Petitioner’s arguments unpersuasive.” slip op. at 18
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,027,326 - PTAB · Nov 21, 2025 · IPR2025-00931 · APJ Georgianna W Braden · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution on claims 1–27 because the Petition did not show a reasonable likelihood that any challenged claim would be unpatentable over the asserted obviousness combinations.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“review. 35 U.S.C. § 314(b) (2024); 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2024). We may not institute an inter partes review “unless . . . there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). The “reasonable likelihood” standard is “a higher standard than mere notice pleading” but “lower than the ‘preponderance’ standard to prevail in a final written decision.” Hulu, LLC v. Sound View Innovations, LLC, IPR2018-01039, Paper 29 at 13 (PTAB Dec. 20, 2019) (precedential). When instituting inter partes review, the Board will authorize the review to proceed on all of the challenged claims and on all grounds of unpatentability asserted for each claim. 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a). Applying those standards, and based on the record before us, we determine Petitioner has not demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of success in proving that any one of the Challenged Claims is unpatentable. See 35 U.S.C. § 314; 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a). Accordingly, we deny institution of an inter partes review of the ’844 patent.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedOther
“critical time. See generally Prelim. Resp. Patent Owner’s Declarant, Dr. Newman, states that for his analysis he uses the definition provided by Dr. Zadok. Ex. 2014 ¶ 13. We discern no meaningful difference between the definitions proffered by Petitioner or its Declarant. Neither party argues that the outcome of this case would differ based on our adoption of any particular definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art. Considering the subject matter of the ’844 patent, the background technical field, the prior art, and Dr. Zadok’s unopposed definition of the ordinarily skilled artisan (Ex. 1003 ¶ 35), which is adopted by Dr. Newman (Ex. 2014 ¶ 13) and is consistent with the asserted prior art references, we apply the level of skill set forth by Dr. Zadok.” slip op. at 13
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Only those claim terms that are in controversy need to be construed, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (stating that “we need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))). Petitioner contends “that the challenged claims are obvious under any reasonable interpretation under the Phillips standard, and thus Petitioners submit that the Board need not resolve any express constructions.” Pet. 11 Patent Owner asserts “the Board should resolve this IPR under the plain-and ordinary-meaning standard without adopting any special constructions beyond what is necessary to address a concrete dispute.” Prelim. Resp. 11. Based on our review of the current record, we agree with parties that no express construction of any term is necessary to resolve this case.” slip op. at 14
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“We agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner fails to offer sufficient explanation as to why a person of ordinary skill in the art would have combined the teachings of Sapuntzakis and Holzmann. Rather, Petitioner appears to argue that, based on the advantages described by Holzmann (Ex. 1007 ¶ 33), and using well-known techniques with unspecified predictable results, a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had sufficient reason to combine these disparate elements taught in the prior art references to render the challenged claims obvious. Pet. 23–24, 33. Yet, other than Petitioner’s cursory assertion of advantageously incorporating the memory module from Holzmann to provide a caching mechanism (Pet. 33), which cites equally cursory and unsupported testimony by Dr. Zadok (Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 329, 333, 336–355), Petitioner fails to identify what particular advantages or efficiencies would have prompted a person of ordinary skill in the art to combine Holzmann’s memory module with Sapuntzakis’s system.” slip op. at 29
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,332,844 - PTAB · Nov 18, 2025 · IPR2025-00782 · APJ Ken B Barrett · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood that any challenged claim was unpatentable over the asserted grounds.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“An inter partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . the information presented in the petition . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Having considered the arguments and evidence presented by Petitioner and Patent Owner, we determine that Petitioner has not demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on at least one of the challenged claims of the ’469 patent. Accordingly, we do not institute an inter partes review of the challenged claims.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner contends that: [A] POSITA would have had at least a bachelor’s degree in computer science, computer engineering, business information systems, software engineering, or systems engineering and at least two years of experience in computer networking or telecommunications. Ex.1002 ¶21; see also Ex.1001 (1:14-31). Additional education could substitute for professional experience. Ex.1002 ¶21. Significant work experience could substitute for formal education. Ex.1002 ¶21. Pet. 7–8. Patent Owner, at this stage, does not disagree or propose a different definition of the person of ordinary skill in the art. Petitioner’s definition is consistent with the level of ordinary skill reflected in the prior art references of record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (recognizing that the prior art itself may reflect an appropriate level of skill in the art). For purposes of this decision, we apply Petitioner’s definition of the person of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Petitioner states that it “do[es] not believe explicit construction is required to resolve this Petition.” Pet. 7. Patent Owner proposes constructions for “Internet,” “access the Internet,” “subscriber access website.” Prelim. Resp. 12–15. On this record and for purposes of this decision, we determine that no claim terms require express construction. D. Alleged Anticipation of Claims 1, 2, 10, 11, and 24–28 by Bruner and” slip op. at 10
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentable
“We find Patent Owner’s argument to be persuasive. Petitioner does not explain adequately how Bruner discloses the positional requirement of a subscriber access unit being coupled between the satellite dish and the router. Accordingly, Petitioner has not shown sufficiently for purposes of institution that Bruner anticipates independent claim 24. Although, for the obviousness challenge, Petitioner contends that Clark discloses a wireless router (for limitation 24c), Petitioner relies solely on Bruner for the “between” limitation. See Pet. 17 (“Bruner and/or Bruner in view of Clark both disclose each limitation of claim 24c, including a router (e.g., Bruner’s ‘ADS’ and Clark’s ‘wireless router’)”); id. at 18–19 (the discussion of the “between” limitation 24d asserting that “Bruner discloses claim 24d,” with no mention of Clark). Furthermore, Petitioner merely asserts that both Bruner and Clark disclose a router. See id. at 17–18. Petitioner, however, does not indicate clearly which is used in the proposed combination, does not describe the configuration of a proposed combination or a proposed modification of Bruner’s system, and fails to set forth an adequate and persuasive reason with rational underpinning as to why a person of ordinary skill in the art would have modified Bruner’s system to arrive at the positional requirement of the subscription access unit being coupled between the satellite dish and a router. See id. at 13–14 (motivation section for this ground); id. at 18–19 (addressing the “between” limitation 24d). Accordingly, Petitioner has not shown a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on its challenge to independent claim 24 as obvious over Bruner in view of Clark.” slip op. at 14
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 7,324,469 - PTAB · Nov 7, 2025 · IPR2025-00988 · APJ Terrence W Mcmillin · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution of IPR on claims 1–14 because Samsung took alternative claim-construction positions in the Board and district court without explaining why.
RulingsInstitution decision- Other 314aInstitution denied discretionary otherInstitution denied
“decision in Revvo Technologies, Inc. v. Cerebrum Sensor Technologies, Inc., IPR2025-00632, Paper 20 (Nov. 3, 2025 (“Revvo”)).12 Revvo provides that “when a petitioner takes alternative positions [on claim construction] before the Board and a district court, that petitioner should, at a minimum, explain why alternative positions are warranted.” Revvo at 3–4. On November 5, 2025, the Director of the Office issued an informative decision in Tesla, Inc. v. Intellectual Ventures II LLC, IPR2025- 00340, Paper 18 (Nov. 5, 2025) (“Tesla”)). Tesla provides that: “Allowing a petitioner to advance a claim construction before the Board when that petitioner has made inconsistent indefiniteness arguments in district court fails to further, but instead detracts from, the Office’s goal of ‘providing greater predictability and certainty in the patent system.’” Id. at 4 (citing Revvo at 4–5). Tesla further provides that when a petitioner raises inconsistent invalidity challenges in two forums, “that petitioner is required to explain why those different positions are warranted.” Id. at 3 (citing Revvo at 3–5). In this proceeding, Petitioner takes alternative positions on claim construction before the Board and a district court, but fails to explain why alternative positions are warranted. Therefore, in accordance with Revvo and Tesla, we deny institution.” slip op. at 6
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied
“CONCLUSION For the foregoing reason, we determine that trial should not be instituted on claims 1–14 of the ’281 patent. ORDER Upon consideration of the record before us, it is ORDERED that an inter partes review is not instituted.” slip op. at 7
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Not reached
“In the Petition, “Petitioner submits that no formal claim constructions are necessary.” Pet. 3. Petitioner does not discuss its position on claim construction in district court nor why alternative positions before the Board and the district court are warranted. See id.” slip op. at 7
Claim constructionDiscretionary denialPatents in suitUS 10,687,281 - PTAB · Nov 7, 2025 · IPR2025-00933 · APJ Terrence W Mcmillin · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution of review of claims 1–12 because Samsung advanced alternative claim-construction positions without explaining why they were warranted.
RulingsInstitution decision- Other 314aInstitution denied discretionary otherInstitution denied
“IPR2025-00632, Paper 20 (Nov. 3, 2025 (“Revvo”)).10 Revvo provides that “when a petitioner takes alternative positions [on claim construction] before the Board and a district court, that petitioner should, at a minimum, explain why alternative positions are warranted.” Revvo at 3–4.” slip op. at 6
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 11,470,595 - PTAB · Nov 5, 2025 · IPR2025-00786 · APJ Ken B Barrett · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood that any challenged claim was obvious over either asserted combination.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“An inter partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . the information presented in the petition . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Having considered the arguments and evidence presented by Petitioner and Patent Owner, we determine that Petitioner has not demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on at least one of the challenged claims of the ’785 patent. Accordingly, we do not institute an inter partes review of the challenged claims.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner contends that: A person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSITA”) relevant to this patent at the time of its invention would’ve had a bachelor’s degree in computer science, computer engineering, or a related technical field, combined with approximately two years of practical experience in fields of networking such as network virtualization, security, or management. Additional professional experience might substitute for less education and vice versa. Pet. 10–11 (citing Ex. 1011 ¶¶ 33–35). Patent Owner, at this stage, does not disagree or propose a different definition of the person of ordinary skill in the art. However, Patent Owner’s proffered declarant, Dr. Noubir, opines that “a person of ordinary skill in the art in March 2003 would have a bachelor’s degree in computer science or electrical engineering, and would have one or two years of experience in computer networking or equivalent educational and professional experience.” Ex. 2008 ¶ 53. We discern no material difference between the two definitions. Petitioner’s definition is consistent with the level of ordinary skill reflected in the prior art references of record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (recognizing that the prior art itself may reflect an appropriate level of skill in the art). For purposes of this decision, we apply Petitioner’s definition of the person of ordinary skill in the art. We note, however, that were we to apply Patent Owner’s witness’s assessment, the outcome of this Decision would be the same.” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner
“name.” See Pet. 11–16 (claim construction section). Patent Owner asserts that “a person of ordinary skill would read ‘a domain name’ in its ordinary networking sense: an ASCII string label used with the Domain Name System (DNS) to resolve to an IP address.” Prelim. Resp. 16 (citing Ex. 1001, 1:47–48; Ex. 2008 ¶ 37). This is consistent with the Specification, which explains: Users and software applications do not always refer to hosts or other resources by their numerical IP address. Instead of using numbers, they use ASCII strings called domain names. The Internet uses a Domain Name System (DNS) to convert a domain name to an IP address. Ex. 1001, 1:45–50. According to the Patent Owner, the network in the Specification of the ’785 patent is defined by the domain name X.VCN. Id. at 33 (citing Ex. 1001, 9:18–19, 9:28–31). Patent Owner further contends that “[t]he use of a domain name to define the virtual network in the ‘785 Patent’s claims provides more than an identifier of the virtual network or even a plain language identification of an IP address – it signifies a hierarchical structure for the virtual network that enables [certain functions].” Prelim. Resp. 33–34 (citing Ex. 2008 ¶¶ 83–84; Ex. 1001, 14:29–38).” slip op. at 12
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundReasonable expectation not foundNot shown unpatentable
“We agree with Patent Owner, however, that Petitioner has not explained adequately why a person of ordinary skill in the art would have further modified the Caronni-I/Caronni-II combination to have DNS capability or why a person of ordinary skill in the art would have combined the three references to have a system that returned the three specific addresses recited in the challenged independent claims. Rather than explaining the “why,” the Petition’s motivation argument focuses on the purported capabilities of the resulting combination and implying, but not explicitly stating, that the combination results in the claimed subject matter; this indicates impermissible hindsight. See, e.g., id. at 29 (“This integration would leverage Hipp’s DNS capability for virtual hostnames to return multiple address records from a single query, aligning with the dual addressing requirements of hybrid virtual/physical networks. The combination creates a cohesive system where DNS resolution triggers context-aware routing decisions—using virtual addresses for internal Supernet traffic and NAT-translated addresses for cross-boundary communication.”). We determine that Petitioner has failed to set forth an adequate and persuasive reason with rational underpinning as to why a person of ordinary skill in the art would have combined the three references’ teachings to arrive at the claimed subject matter where the three recited addresses are returned in response to a DNS request.” slip op. at 21
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 7,949,785 - PTAB · Nov 4, 2025 · IPR2025-00785 · APJ Stephen E Belisle · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood that claims 1–14 were unpatentable over either asserted § 103 combination.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“review. 35 U.S.C. § 314(b) (2024); 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2024). We may not institute an inter partes review “unless . . . there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). The “reasonable likelihood” standard is “a higher standard than mere notice pleading” but “lower than the ‘preponderance’ standard to prevail in a final written decision.” Hulu, LLC v. Sound View Innovations, LLC, IPR2018-01039, Paper 29 at 13 (PTAB Dec. 20, 2019) (precedential). When instituting inter partes review, the Board will authorize the review to proceed on all of the challenged claims and on all grounds of unpatentability asserted for each claim. 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a).” slip op. at 2
- BurdenDenied
“Petitioner’s single-reference allegations do not align with its two “combination” challenges identified above. As for its “combination” allegations, Petitioner does not identify, for example: (1) which limitations in claim 1 are missing in any of Chow, Reiffin, and Kurowski; (2) which aspects of any of these references requires modification to achieve the invention of claim 1; (3) which specific reference Petitioner posits to teach any such missing limitation in another reference or as the basis to modify a specific feature in a given reference; or (4) a rational reason as to why the skilled artisan would have combined particular teachings from one of Chow, Reiffin, and Kurowski with particular teachings of another such reference to achieve the invention of claim 1 as a whole.5 Instead, Petitioner improperly punts its burden to define its obviousness challenges to the Board (and Patent Owner). See, e.g., Pet. 38 (“To the extent the Board disagrees that [any particular] limitation is disclosed by the Chow/Reiffin combination 4 See, e.g., Pet. 16, 19 (“Thus, Chow and Reiffin both disclose or suggest claim [1b].” “Therefore, claim 1 was obvious over Chow and Reiffin separately and over their combination.”); see also id. at 12–19, 37–42. 5 Petitioner argues that the skilled artisan would have combined Reiffin with Chow for “increased computational power and the ability to solve larger problems.” Pet. 11. These generic “reasons” to combine the alleged teachings of Chow and Reiffin (and Kurowski) lack rational underpinning, particularly because Petitioner does not even identify which teachings of which references are being combined to achieve any particular limitation in claim 1. See Prelim. Resp. 40 (“[Petitioner’s] ‘spaghetti on the wall’ approach fails [to] explain how Petitioners’ purported motivation for combining Chow and Reiffin fits with each of the at least 64 different possibilities for combining Chow and Reiffin.”).” slip op. at 14
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“and quotes various passages in Chow. Pet. 13–14. For example, Petitioner identifies that, under “Description of the Related Art,” Chow states: “Typically, workload is apportioned by somehow logically dividing the data to be processed. For example, a block of data might be divided evenly into a number of parts equal to the number of available threads, so that each thread can independently process a separate portion of the data. This is called ‘static’ or ‘a priori’ partitioning.” Pet. 13 (citing Ex. 1003, 1:38–42; Ex. 1022 ¶ 144). Petitioner also identifies that Chow describes “aggregate tasks” divisible into “multiple sub-tasks,” and “multiple task execution units are independently operated on-demand to sequentially self-allocate and execute sub-tasks of the aggregate task.” Pet. 13–14 (citing Ex. 1003, 1:66–2:15). After presenting such quoted passages from Chow, Petitioner proffers the conclusion that Chow discloses the Partitioning Limitation, but does so without sufficiently explaining why such passages allegedly teach or suggest the features of the Partitioning Limitation not only within the context of claim 1 as a whole, but given that Chow itself disparages such “static” or “a priori” partitioning as posing “a significant problem” (Ex. 1003, 1:52–58). Patent Owner persuasively responds (and we agree for the same” slip op. at 19
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable
“combination” challenges identified above. As for its “combination” allegations, Petitioner does not identify, for example: (1) which limitations in claim 1 are missing in any of Chow, Reiffin, and Kurowski; (2) which aspects of any of these references requires modification to achieve the invention of claim 1; (3) which specific reference Petitioner posits to teach any such missing limitation in another reference or as the basis to modify a specific feature in a given reference; or (4) a rational reason as to why the skilled artisan would have combined particular teachings from one of Chow, Reiffin, and Kurowski with particular teachings of another such reference to achieve the invention of claim 1 as a whole.5 Instead, Petitioner improperly punts its burden to define its obviousness challenges to the Board (and Patent Owner). See, e.g., Pet. 38 (“To the extent the Board disagrees that [any particular] limitation is disclosed by the Chow/Reiffin combination 4 See, e.g., Pet. 16, 19 (“Thus, Chow and Reiffin both disclose or suggest claim [1b].” “Therefore, claim 1 was obvious over Chow and Reiffin separately and over their combination.”); see also id. at 12–19, 37–42. 5 Petitioner argues that the skilled artisan would have combined Reiffin with Chow for “increased computational power and the ability to solve larger problems.” Pet. 11. These generic “reasons” to combine the alleged teachings of Chow and Reiffin (and Kurowski) lack rational underpinning, particularly because Petitioner does not even identify which teachings of which references are being combined to achieve any particular limitation in claim 1. See Prelim. Resp. 40 (“[Petitioner’s] ‘spaghetti on the wall’ approach fails [to] explain how Petitioners’ purported motivation for combining Chow and Reiffin fits with each of the at least 64 different possibilities for combining Chow and Reiffin.”). slip op. at 14
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 7,257,582 - PTAB · Oct 23, 2025 · IPR2025-00987 · APJ Stephen E Belisle · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood that any of claims 1–37 was unpatentable under the asserted obviousness grounds.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“review. 35 U.S.C. § 314(b) (2024); 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2024). We may not institute an inter partes review “unless . . . there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). The “reasonable likelihood” standard is “a higher standard than mere notice pleading” but “lower than the ‘preponderance’ standard to prevail in a final written decision.” Hulu, LLC v. Sound View Innovations, LLC, IPR2018-01039, Paper 29 at 13 (PTAB Dec. 20, 2019) (precedential). When instituting inter partes review, the Board will authorize the review to proceed on all of the challenged claims and on all grounds of unpatentability asserted for each claim. 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a). Applying those standards, and based on the record before us, we determine that Petitioner has not demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of success in proving that any one of the Challenged Claims is unpatentable. See 35 U.S.C. § 314; 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a). Accordingly, we deny institution of an inter partes review of the ’722 patent.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“In determining the level of ordinary skill in the art, various factors may be considered, including the “type of problems encountered in the art; prior art solutions to those problems; rapidity with which innovations are made; sophistication of the technology; and educational level of active workers in the field.” In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (citation omitted). The level of ordinary skill in the art also may be reflected by the prior art of record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001). Neither party argues that the outcome of this case would differ based on our adoption of any particular definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art. Considering the subject matter of the ’722 patent, the background technical field, the prior art, and Petitioner’s proposed definition of the skilled artisan, which is supported with testimony of Dr. Easttom (Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 22–23), we apply the level of skill set forth above.” slip op. at 13
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Petitioner submits a proposed construction for the term “activation module” implicated in dependent claims 17–19, 23–25, 29–31, and 35–37. Pet. 10–12. Petitioner otherwise argues, “[n]o express construction of the other challenged claims is necessary in this IPR because the prior art renders these claims obvious under any reasonable construction.” Pet. 12. Patent Owner argues that “the Board should apply the plain and ordinary meaning to all challenged claim terms under the Phillips standard.” Prelim. Resp. 9. We find that no express construction of any term is necessary to resolve this case.” slip op. at 15
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of success › HindsightMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable
“generic “reasons” to combine the alleged teachings of Lawson and Choquier lack rational underpinning, particularly for the specific and substantial modifications of Lawson necessary to reach the subject Mapping Limitation, and are beset with impermissible hindsight. The Board must “recognize that we cannot allow hindsight bias to be the thread that stitches together prior art patches into something that is the claimed invention.” Metalcraft of Mayville, Inc. v. The Toro Co., 848 F.3d 1358, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“Without any explanation as to how or why the references would be combined to arrive at the claimed invention, we are left with only hindsight bias that KSR warns against.”); see KSR, 550 U.S. at 421 (2007) (“A factfinder should be aware, of course, of the distortion caused by hindsight bias and must be cautious of arguments reliant upon ex post reasoning.”). “Any judgment on obviousness is in a sense necessarily a reconstruction based upon hindsight reasoning, but so long as it takes into account only knowledge which was within the level of ordinary skill at the time the claimed invention was made and does not include knowledge gleaned only from applicant’s disclosure, such a reconstruction is proper.” In re McLaughlin, 443 F.2d 1392, 1313–14 (CCPA 1971). In this case, Petitioner does not show sufficiently how or why an alleged desire to “increase efficiency, redundancy, and scalability of Lawson’s routing network” would have led the ordinarily skilled artisan specifically to the subject Mapping Limitation, but for using claim 1 as a roadmap. Indeed, as Patent Owner persuasively argues: The Petition fails to tie these generic design goals to the specific functionality that the Petition seeks to cherry-pick from Choquier and import into Lawson. Put another way, the Petition does not explain what about Choquier’s scalability, load balancing and redundancy techniques would have motivated [the skilled artisan] to have configured Lawson’s servers to “determine which server groups (node types) should receive an event update based on this server groups to event producer mapping.” Prelim. Resp. 26–27. Petitioner never identifies how Lawson’s registries of servers/consumers become the claimed gateway-kept category→node-type mapping (EX1005, 10:63–67; 12:36–43). Nor does Petitioner show that Choquier’s service map—not keyed by message category and used for CPU-based server selection—somehow supplies the missing category→node-type routing rule that controls update-message traffic through routing nodes (EX1007, 11:2–22; 12:33–36; 12:56–61). To the contrary, Choquier’s update path increases processing by replicating each update to every server in the service group (EX1007, 21:27–50), which is the opposite of the claim’s mapping-based control that limits which nodes must process a given update. Id. at 30–31. We find this context shows that Petitioner’s reasons for combining Lawson and Choquier (and Tsutsumitake) to achieve the subject Mapping Limitation lack rational underpinning, and that Petitioner’s proposed combination of teachings is based on impermissible hindsight.” slip op. at 27
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,407,722 - Tanklogix, LLC v. Sitepro, Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Oct 10, 2025 · IPR2025-00653 · APJ Bart A Gerstenblith · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution on all claims because the Petition did not show a reasonable likelihood that any challenged claim was unpatentable over the asserted grounds.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“An inter partes review may be instituted only if “the information presented in the petition . . . and any [preliminary] response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2024). For the reasons given below, on this record Petitioner has not established a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in showing the unpatentability of any of the Challenged Claims. Accordingly, we do not institute an inter partes review.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner
“The parties’ proposed levels of ordinary skill in the art are similar, although Patent Owner proposes two years of experience along with a bachelor’s degree whereas Petitioner proposes “significant” experience. Patent Owner also proposes an alternative with more extensive experience in lieu of a bachelor’s degree. Although we find Petitioner’s proposed qualifications acceptable, we adopt Patent Owner’s proposed qualifications for the purposes of this Decision because they offer a wider range of qualifications that nonetheless comport with the level of ordinary skill necessary to understand and implement the teachings of the ’504 patent and the asserted prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001); In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995); In re Oelrich, 579 F.2d 86, 91 (CCPA 1978). Our analysis and findings herein, however, do not turn on any differences in the parties’ proposed qualifications.” slip op. at 12
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Additionally, only terms that are in controversy need to be construed, and these need be construed only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). The parties assert that each claim term should be construed in accordance with its plain and ordinary meaning. Pet. 9; Prelim. Resp. 4 (citing Ex. 2009 ¶ 72); see Ex. 1002 ¶ 22 (opining the same). And, in the respective claim construction sections of their briefs, the parties do not propose any claim terms for express construction. We agree with the parties that no claim terms require express construction to resolve the controversy before us. See Realtime Data, 912 F.3d at 1375.” slip op. at 13
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner
“Ex. 1002 ¶ 47. As reflected above, Dr. Wooley’s testimony as to element [1.2] does not even assert that Cardamone discloses a tank, let alone one or more sensors disposed at a tank as recited in element [1.2]. Thus, Dr. Wooley’s testimony does not support Petitioner’s argument on this issue.” slip op. at 18
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,726,504 - Tanklogix, LLC v. Sitepro, Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Oct 10, 2025 · IPR2025-00652 · APJ Bart A Gerstenblith · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood that claims 1–23 and 25–30 were unpatentable over the asserted grounds.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsDenied
“presented in the petition . . . and any [preliminary] response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2024). For the reasons given below, on this record Petitioner has not established a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in showing the unpatentability of any of the Challenged Claims. Accordingly, we do not institute an inter partes review.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner
“The parties’ proposed levels of ordinary skill in the art are similar, although Patent Owner proposes two years of experience along with a bachelor’s degree whereas Petitioner proposes “significant” experience. Patent Owner also proposes an alternative with more extensive experience in lieu of a bachelor’s degree. Although we find Petitioner’s proposed qualifications acceptable, we adopt Patent Owner’s proposed qualifications for the purposes of this Decision because they offer a wider range of qualifications that nonetheless comport with the level of ordinary skill necessary to understand and implement the teachings of the ’403 patent and the asserted prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001); In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995); In re Oelrich, 579 F.2d 86, 91 (CCPA 1978). Our analysis and findings herein, however, do not turn on any differences in the parties’ proposed qualifications.” slip op. at 12
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“The parties assert that each claim term should be construed in accordance with its plain and ordinary meaning. Pet. 10; Prelim. Resp. 4 (citing Ex. 2009 ¶ 73); see Ex. 1002 ¶ 22 (opining the same). And, in the respective claim construction sections of their briefs, the parties do not propose any claim terms for express construction. We agree with the parties that no claim terms require express construction to resolve the controversy before us. See Realtime Data, 912 F.3d at 1375.” slip op. at 13
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“We agree with Patent Owner that the Petition fails to demonstrate that Kahn discloses element [1.2] because the evidence cited does not disclose a “first computer system being configured to provide remote control of the first pump or first valve” (i.e., a fluid-handling device). Kahn is directed to providing access to fluid sensing data and analyzing and providing visual information on that data, but Petitioner has not identified any disclosure of the capability to remotely control fluid-handling devices. See, e.g., Ex. 1005, code (54), 1:27–36, 2:50–3:2. More specifically, Kahn’s disclosures that Petitioner relies on for allegedly teaching remote control are deficient. We discuss each. First, Petitioner points to the following, “[f]or instance, as illustrated in FIG. 1C, a fluid control device such as a valve 15A is located on the input side of a sen[s]or unit 110.” Ex. 1005, 8:19–21, cited in Pet. 13. This portion of Kahn, however, does not disclose remote control. Second, Petitioner cites to the following: Finally, or in addition to, the communication unit 112B can include on-site alerts such as optical (indicator lights), audible alerts (e.g., alarm sounds), tactile (e.g., vibration of the unit) or can be interfaced to an appropriate control valve for simply shutting off the supply of fluid upon the detection of emergency events, for instance. Pet. 13 (citing Ex. 1005, 10:62–67). We agree with Patent Owner that this portion of Kahn teaches on-site alerts and local control of the fluid-handling device. See Prelim. Resp. 7. This portion of Kahn does not disclose remote control.” slip op. at 18
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,294,403
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.