• Micron Technology, Inc. v. Yangtze Memory Technologies Company, Ltd.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jul 20, 2026 · IPR2025-00228 · APJ Michael T Cygan · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–18 are unpatentable: claims 1, 2, 4, 5, and 9–18 as obvious over Kim; claims 1–18 over Kim and Fang; claims 1–15 over Han and Fang; and claims 17–18 over Han, Fang, and Chen.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSITA”) at the critical time “would have had a bachelor of science degree in electrical engineering or a similar discipline, along with 2-3 years of professional experience working with (e.g., researching, designing, or teaching) monolithic 3D structures and NAND flash memory devices, or an equivalent level of skill, knowledge, and experience (e.g., an advanced degree may replace some of the professional experience).” Pet. 26 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶42). Petitioner further asserts that a POSITA “would have been aware of and generally knowledgeable about 3D NAND’s structure, how it is manufactured, and its component parts.” Id. Patent Owner does not dispute this assessment. PO Resp. 7–8. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill, as it appears to be consistent with the specification of the ’276 patent and the prior art of record.” slip op. at 6

  • Expert testimonyPatent owner expert creditedDecided for patent owner

    “Dr. Campbell has a Ph.D. in physics, supplying the advanced degree that Petitioner’s definition of a person having ordinary skill in the art accepts as a replacement for some experience. Ex. 2006 ¶ 2. Dr. Campbell has significant experience in semiconductor technology, including in process technologies for submicron CMOS, years of research in semiconductor processing, materials, and device structures, and authored “[t]he leading textbook on semiconductor technology.” Id. ¶¶ 2–4. Dr. Campbell qualifies as a person of ordinary skill in the art under the parties’ agreed definition.” slip op. at 7

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “Patent Owner proposed that the terms “exposing portions” and “etching the exposed portions” require two different steps performed in that order. PO Resp. 7–10. Petitioner does not contest this characterization. Pet. Reply 1– 2. Patent Owner also proposes that this requires the exposure step not to perform any etching of the newly exposed layer. PO Resp. 10–12 (citing Ex. 1001, 10:2–5, 10:15–17 (stating that the etch-stop layer “protects the underlying structure until all the VIA openings 640 are formed” and that it “[t]he essence of an etch-stop layer dictates that contact-hole etching stops or slows down upon contact, i.e., exposing without penetrating it.” Pet. Reply 11. Based on the record before us, we determine that no claim term requires express construction for purposes of this Decision.” slip op. at 7

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundUnpatentable

    “described in earlier embodiments would not be consistent with Kim’s statement that previously described elements are “omitted” in the Figures 17A to 22B section “for concise description.” As admitted by Patent Owner, it would be a “reasonable inference” that materials described in a first embodiment for a particular hypothetical layer L would also be used for that layer L in later embodiments absent an express statement to the contrary “because you have just omitted that sort of duplicative description.” Tr. 37:9–38:12. Kim’s Figures 17A–22B do not further address the underlying staircase structure that was detailed in the descriptions of the Figures 4–15 embodiments. Thus, it would similarly be a “reasonable inference” that aspects of the stack structure would be understood to apply to the same stack in the embodiments of Figures 17A–22B, which rely upon, in unaltered form, the earlier-described elements of the stack. stack on bottom, they “replace” and “exclude” any prior description of a gate-stack-on-top. PO Resp. 18–19 (citing Ex. 2019 ¶¶ 40–41; Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 185–187 (describing the etch-stop layer as covering the sacrificial layers only at their end portions)). However, as admitted by Patent Owner, all of Kim’s Figures show only a gate-stack-on-bottom structure. Tr. 41:6–7 (“For the first embodiment, it is true that figures show the gate stack on bottom.”). The fact that Kim’s Figures 17A–22B, which add etch-stop and barrier layers to the gate stack, are shown only as gate stack on bottom is merely consistent with the uniform use of gate-stack-on-bottom in Kim’s Figures, which show the layer-by-layer construction of its device. Like Figures 4–15, Figures 17A–22B exemplify rather than limit the description of the previously described memory stack, and do not exclude the gate-stack-onbottom description of the memory stack. Kim can be used for all it realistically teaches, including descriptions in its disclosure that are not represented by specific Figures. See In re Chapman, 357 F.2d 418, 424 (C.C.P.A. 1966) (stating that a reference “is not limited to the disclosures in its specific illustrative examples.”). Accordingly, the record supports Petitioner’s assertion that Kim’s teaching of a gate-stack-on-top alternative for the memory stack would be understood by a POSITA as a memory stack option applicable to its other embodiments having that same memory stack.” slip op. at 11

  Patent outcomesUS 11,101,276 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,101,276
• Posco Co., Ltd. v. ArcelormittalAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jul 16, 2026 · IPR2025-00371 · APJ Brian D Range · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–25 are unpatentable as obvious under § 103 over the asserted combinations of Takagi, Cornette, Suehiro, GMW14400, Laurent, and Vaissiere.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art (POSITA) “would have had an undergraduate degree in materials science, manufacturing engineering, mechanical engineering, or equivalent knowledge, training, or experience, with two years of experience working in metallurgy.” Pet. 6 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 15). Patent Owner does not challenge Petitioner’s definition of a POSITA for this proceeding. PO Resp. 8. Because the parties agree and because Petitioner’s proposal is reasonable and consistent with the ’227 patent specification and the prior art, we adopt Petitioner’s proposal. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the prior art may reflect an appropriate level of skill in the art).” slip op. at 8

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for patent owner

    “1. superficial layer The only independent claim at issue, claim 1, recites a “Superficial layer.” Ex. 1001, 15:6. Patent Owner argues that, based on plain and ordinary meaning, the term “superficial layer” refers to a “surface layer” or “top layer.” PO Resp. 8–9. Petitioner does not dispute this construction. See Pet. Reply 21–22 (arguing that the relevant layer of the Suehiro reference is a superficial layer because it is outermost and present at the surface). Because the parties are in agreement and because that agreement is consistent with plain language, claim language, and the ’227 specification, we construe “superficial layer” as referring to a surface layer or top layer.” slip op. at 10

  • Claim Construction › Extrinsic evidence (dictionaries, experts)Term construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

    “defined stoichiometry” (Ex. 2037, 527) but the word may also be a “generic term for phases . . . which may have a narrow or extended compositional stability range” (id.). The first glossary meaning is consistent with Patent Owner’s position. The second, broader, glossary meaning is consistent with Petitioner’s position. Some of the extrinsic sources before us support the broad definition, and some support the narrow definition. See PO Sur-Reply 3–4 (arguing that Dr. Miles admitted that various treatises distinguish intermetallic compounds from alloys and solid solutions). Thus, neither Dr. Miles or Dr. Raabe is “wrong scientifically” in how they use the term “intermetallic” in this proceeding. Id. at 2 (noting that Dr. Miles agreed that Dr. Raabe’s construction is not wrong scientifically). As explained below, however, only one of these meanings is appropriate here. To decide which possible meaning applies to the ’227 patent, we focus on the patent claims and specification. Claim 1 indicates that the intermetallic layer has a “mean composition” (emphasis added). Ex. 1001, 15:1–10. This indicates, albeit weakly, that iron composition across the layer may vary rather than having ordered stoichiometry—consistent with Petitioner’s position. The specification also indicates that “intermetallic alloying” is a possibility—again, consistent with Petitioner’s position. Ex. 1001, 2:47–50. Meanwhile, nothing in the ’227 specification explicitly (or implicitly) suggests that “intermetallic layer” must be limited to elements atomically joined with defined stoichiometry in an ordered crystal structure. We also find that Dr. Miles’s testimony regarding the meaning of “intermetallic” is more credible than Dr. Rabbe’s testimony. Dr. Rabbe, in deposition, stated that Figure 2 of the challenged patent “does not show a layer that meets [his] construction of intermetallic.” Ex. 1078, 129:21–24. The ’227 patent, however, states that Figure 2 includes an “Al-rich Intermetallic layer.” Ex. 1001, Fig. 2, 3:60–64 (“FIG 2. Illustrates a coating … which does not correspond to the invention. This succession of layers (interdiffusion layer and intermetallic layer) yields inferior results in resistance spot welding.”). Also, Dr. Raabe previously referred to a layer of Takagi as having “intermetallic phase layering and structure.” Pet. Reply 4 (citing Ex. 1076 ¶ 166; Ex ¶ 1075, 17) (emphasis omitted). Thus, Dr. Raabe’s construction of “intermetallic” for this proceeding does not fully account for the ’227 patent usage of the word “intermetallic” and does not fully account for Dr. Raabe’s prior usage of the word “intermetallic.” Patent Owner argues that Petitioner’s construction “erases the meaningful distinction” between the claimed layers. PO Resp. 11. Patent Owner further argues that Petitioner’s construction renders the word “intermetallic” superfluous because allowing the intermetallic layer to be “merely a multi-element alloy erases the meaningful distinction among these layers.” Id. We disagree. The word intermetallic serves to require that the layer be composed of two or more metals or a metal and a metalloid. The word intermetallic also serves as a label to differentiate each of the four claimed layers. For example, in claim 1, the word “intermetallic” is used much like the words “interdiffusion” and “intermediate” to give each of the four layers (each having differently mean compositions) different labels.” slip op. at 16

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityPrinted publication establishedDecided for petitioner

    “Because IHS was a company that created an online database with the purpose of providing (selling) standards including General Motors standards to the public, we determine that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have known to look to this database and would have been able to find GMW14400. Patent Owner presents no evidence to the contrary. Because a preponderance of the evidence supports Petitioner, we determine Petitioner establishes GMW14400 is qualifies as prior art.” slip op. at 21

  Patent outcomesUS 11,326,227 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,326,227
• Posco Co., Ltd. v. ArcelormittalAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jul 16, 2026 · IPR2025-00370 · APJ Brian D Range · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–30 are unpatentable as obvious under § 103 over the asserted combinations of prior art.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art (POSITA) “would have had an undergraduate degree in materials science, manufacturing engineering, mechanical engineering, or equivalent knowledge, training, or experience, with two years of experience working in metallurgy.” Pet. 6 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 13–16). Patent Owner does not challenge Petitioner’s definition of a POSITA for this proceeding. PO Resp. 8. Because the parties agree and because Petitioner’s proposal is reasonable and consistent with the ’602 patent specification and the prior art, we adopt Petitioner’s proposal. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the prior art may reflect an appropriate level of skill in the art).” slip op. at 8

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for patent owner

    “1. superficial layer All independent claims at issue, claims 1, 21, and 24, recite a “superficial layer.” Ex. 1001, 15:11, 16:60, 17:21. Patent Owner argues that, based on plain and ordinary meaning, the term “superficial layer” refers to a “surface layer” or “top layer.” PO Resp. 8–9. Petitioner does not dispute this construction. See Pet. Reply 21–22 (arguing that the relevant layer of the Suehiro reference is a superficial layer because it is outermost and present at the surface). Because the parties are in agreement and because that agreement is consistent with plain language, claim language, and the ’602 specification, we construe “superficial layer” as referring to a surface layer or top layer.” slip op. at 10

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

    “defined stoichiometry” (Ex. 2037, 527) but the word may also be a “generic term for phases . . . which may have a narrow or extended compositional stability range” (id.). The first glossary meaning is consistent with Patent Owner’s position. The second, broader, glossary meaning is consistent with Petitioner’s position. Some of the sources before us support the broad definition, and some support the narrow definition. See PO Sur-Reply 3–4 (arguing that Dr. Miles admitted that various treatises distinguish intermetallic compounds from alloys and solid solutions) Thus, neither Dr. Miles or Dr. Raabe is “wrong scientifically” in how they use the term “intermetallic” in this proceeding. Id. at 2 (noting that Dr. Miles agreed that Dr. Raabe’s construction is not wrong scientifically). As explained below, however, only one of these meanings is appropriate here. To decide which possible meaning applies to the ’602 patent, we focus on the patent claims and specification. The claims indicate that the intermetallic layer has a “mean iron composition” (emphasis added). Ex. 1001, 15:6–10. This indicates, albeit weakly, that the iron composition across the layer may vary rather than having ordered stoichiometry— consistent with Petitioner’s position. The specification also indicates that “intermetallic alloying” is a possibility—again, consistent with Petitioner’s position. Id. at 2:50–54. Meanwhile, nothing in the ’602 specification explicitly (or implicitly) suggests that “intermetallic layer” must be limited to elements atomically joined with defined stoichiometry in an ordered crystal structure. We also find that Dr. Miles’s testimony regarding the meaning of “intermetallic” is more credible than Dr. Raabe’s testimony. Dr. Raabe, in deposition, stated that Figure 2 of the challenged patent “does not show a layer that meets [his] construction of intermetallic.” Ex. 1078, 129:21–24. The ’602 patent, however, states that Figure 2 includes an “Al-rich Intermetallic layer.” Ex. 1001, Fig. 2, 3:57–61 (“FIG 2. Illustrates a coating . . . which does not correspond to the invention. This succession of layers (interdiffusion layer and intermetallic layer) yields inferior results in resistance spot welding.”). Also, Dr. Raabe previously referred to a layer of Takagi as having “intermetallic phase layering and structure.” Pet. Reply 4 (citing Ex. 1076, 166; Ex. 1075, 17) (emphasis omitted). Thus, Dr. Raabe’s definition of “intermetallic” does not fully account for the ’602 patent usage of the word “intermetallic” and does not fully account for Dr. Raabe’s prior usage of the word “intermetallic.” Patent Owner argues that Petitioner’s construction “erases the meaningful distinction” between the claimed layers. PO Resp. 11. Patent Owner further argues that Petitioner’s construction renders the word “intermetallic” superfluous because allowing the intermetallic layer to be “merely a multi-element alloy erases the meaningful distinction among these layers.” Id. We disagree. The word intermetallic serves to require that the layer be composed of two or more metals or a metal and a metalloid. The word intermetallic also serves as a label to differentiate each of the four claimed layers. For example, in claim 1, the word “intermetallic” is used much like the words “interdiffusion” and “intermediate” to give each of the four layers (each having differently defined mean iron compositions) different labels.” slip op. at 16

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner

    “have had reason to combine teachings of Takagi and Cornette with a reasonable expectation of success. Pet. 11–20 (citing, e.g., Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 28– 42; Ex. 1016 ¶ 35; Ex. 1014, 9; Ex. 1025, 5:17–20; Ex. 1026, 7; Ex. 1034 ¶ 13). In particular, Petitioner argues that Takagi discloses a pre-coating thickness of 10–20 µm but does not explicitly disclose a post hot-stamping coating thickness corresponding to the pre-coating thickness. Pet. 11. Cornette teaches that the hot-stamping thickness causes coating expansion from 25 µm to about 40 µm, an increase of 60%. Id. (citations omitted). Petitioner and Dr. Miles reason that, when hot stamping Takagi’s product, the thickness would be 32 µm. Id. (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 32); see also Pet. Reply 20–21. Thus, Patent Owner argues that Cornette evidences Takagi’s finally coating thickness without requiring modification of Takagi. Petitioner further argues that Takagi and Cornette teach that post hot- stamping thickness could be varied and optimized as a result effective variable. Id. at 12–13; see also Pet. Reply 17–18. Cornette teaches, for example, that “[t]he average [pre-coating] layer thickness showing the best compromise between corrosion protection and weldability is 25 µm” and links this pre-coating thickness to a final thickness of “about 40 µm at the steel surface.” Ex. 1014, 9. Petitioner also argues that it would have been obvious to fill in other details of Takagi including, for example, selecting USIBOR 1500 steel, based on the teachings of Cornette. Pet. 14. Patent Owner argues that there is no reason to combine Takagi with the teachings of Cornette. PO Resp. 26. Patent Owner makes seven related arguments. Patent Owner first argues that the Petitioner’s position is speculative and lacks basis. Id. at 26–27. We disagree. Cornette evidences a final coating thickness for Takagi, and the references also suggest that final coating thickness is result effective. Second, Patent Owner argues that there would have been no incentive to seek a motivation to seek a thicker coating post-hot stamping. Id. at 28– 35. This argument does not undermine Petitioner’s position that Takagi, by itself, would have reached a thicker coating after stamping as evidenced by Cornette. Pet. 11–12. Petitioner takes the position, with evidence, that practice of Takagi alone would reach the recited thickness. No motivation to modify Takagi is required under this position.” slip op. at 25

  Patent outcomesUS 10,961,602 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,961,602
• Tesla, Inc. v. Charge Fusion Technologies, LLCAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jul 13, 2026 · IPR2025-00153 · APJ Carl M Defranco · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–30 are unpatentable as obvious under § 103 over the asserted combinations of prior art.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “understanding of one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention. Tesla submits that one of ordinary skill in the art would have had at least a bachelor’s degree in electrical or mechanical engineering (or an equivalent field) and at least two years of work experience involving automotive systems, including electric vehicle power management. . . . Additional industry 1 US 2009/0313034 A1, pub. Dec. 17, 2009 (Ex. 1004, “Ferro”). 2 EP 1,920,968 A1, pub. May 14, 2008 (Ex. 1005, “Oyobe”). 3 US 7,124,691 B2, iss. Oct. 24, 2006 (Ex. 1006, “Donnelly”). 4 Steven E. Letendre, The V2G Concept: A New Model for Power? PUBLIC UTILITIES FORTNIGHTLY, Feb. 15, 2002, at 16 (Ex. 1007, “Letendre”). 5 US 5,654,621, iss. Aug. 5, 1997 (Ex. 1078, “Seelig”). 6 US 6,662,083 B1, iss. Sep. 16, 2003 (Ex. 1010, “Knockeart”). experience or technical training may offset less formal education, while advanced degrees or additional formal education may offset lesser levels of industry experience. Pet. 2 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 14–15). Charge Fusion “takes no position with respect to Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill.” PO Resp. 17. For purposes of our analysis, we apply Tesla’s proposed level of ordinary skill, which we find to be consistent with the problems addressed in the ’987 patent and the prior art. B. Claim Interpretation” slip op. at 6

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “1. “dynamic attribute of an electric charge provider” In the Petition, Tesla proposes that we construe “dynamic attribute of an electric charge provider,” as recited in every independent claim, to mean “a changing or otherwise fluctuating cost (or price) of electricity for purchase from an electric charge provider.” Pet. 4–5. Charge Fusion responds that Tesla improperly narrows the meaning of this claim limitation. PO Resp. 15 (arguing this claim term “is not just limited to ‘changing or otherwise fluctuating cost (or price)’ as alleged by the Petition” (emphasis added)). Although we consider Tesla’s proposed construction to identify an exemplary “dynamic attribute of an electric charge provider,” we see no need to limit the meaning of this limitation as proposed by Tesla. Indeed, Tesla agrees. See Pet. Reply. 7 (arguing only that this claim limitation “at least includes” such an example). And Charge Fusion does not contend otherwise. See PO Resp 15 (arguing only that this limitation “is not just limited to” cost fluctuations). As such, we see no need to further construe this claim limitation. 2. “determine . . . a charging schedule for the vehicle” Limitation 1[g] recites “determine, based at least on the one or more charging preferences and at least one current value of a dynamic attribute of an electric charge provider, a charging schedule for the vehicle.” Independent claim 8, 15, and 22 recite a materially identical limitation. Tesla submits that this limitation should not be construed as a means-plus- function limitation under 35 U.S.C. § 112(6). See Pet. 5. Charge Fusion agrees that “nothing in the claim invokes [§] 112(6).” PO Resp. 16. As such, we discern no dispute regarding the meaning of this claim limitation.” slip op. at 8

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner

    “Initially, we note that, as claimed, there is no express restriction on the manner in which the “amount” or “charge” is specified or otherwise expressed. Indeed, the Specification uses both “desired charge percent level” and “desired charge range level” as alternative ways for a user to specify an “amount of charge.” Ex. 1001, 14:53–15:8 (emphases added). The Specification defines “desired charge range level” as meaning “a desired distance to travel.” Id. at 15:3–8. Elsewhere, the Specification describes that a user may specify the amount of charge as follows: “the user may indicate a desired charging level (and/or a desired charging level may be automatically calculated) based on a desired distance of travel.” Id. at 19:49–57 (emphasis added). More specifically, annotated Figure 7 of the ’987 patent, reproduced below, demonstrates how a user may select “amount of charge” in terms of a desired mileage range 720 or a percentage level 718. See Pet. Reply 2. As shown in red, annotated Figure 7 illustrates that a user selects “desired charge level 720” on “vehicle charge indicator 714” by moving a slider to a value specified in “miles” (e.g., 110 miles). The Specification, after discussing selecting a desired charge percent level 718, explains: The user may also or alternatively view and/or change the desired charge range level 720. An estimate of how far the vehicle can travel on a given charge amount (which may be a general average and/or may be computed based on a specific itinerary and/or past driving habits) can be determined, for example, and utilized to express the desired charge level in terms of distance capable of being traveled. In such a manner, for example, a user may determine a desired distance to travel (e.g., how far it is from home to work or vice versa) and may set the desired charge range level 720 to match the desired distance. Ex. 1001, 14:65–15:8. Thus, the Specification confirms that “amount of charge” may be expressed in terms of a desired mileage as well as a desired percentage level.” slip op. at 11

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of success › HindsightMotivation foundDecided for petitioner

    “We disagree. Charge Fusion’s reliance on Wonderland is misplaced and does not support the proposition for which it is cited. In Wonderland, the district court denied the accused infringer’s motion for summary judgment of invalidity, in part, because genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether there was sufficient motivation to combine the prior art. Wonderland, 988 F. Supp. 2d at 511. As such, the district court’s Wonderland decision does not constitute a final ruling on the motivation to combine issue, and the Federal Circuit’s summary affirmance of the district court’s ruling neither addresses the issue nor reflects how the issue was resolved at trial. See Wonderland NurseryGoods Co. v. Thorley Indus., LLC, 644 F. App’x 1011 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Moreover, contrary to Charge Fusion’s assertion, Tesla correctly notes that although Ferro refers to wireless charging, it provides no implementation details. Ex. 1004 ¶ 36; Ex. 2006, 54:8–55:9. Nonetheless, Ferro does describe manual options for initiating charging, and Tesla’s expert credibly testifies that one of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to apply Oyobe’s vehicle sensor to allow a user to initiate Ferro’s charging methods more easily without having to leave the vehicle. See Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 146, 151, 152 (citing Ex. 1004 ¶ 109). Accordingly, we find that Tesla establishes that one of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to incorporate Oyobe’s use of a sensor to establish presence of a vehicle near a charging station into Ferro’s system.” slip op. at 17

  Patent outcomesUS 11,631,987 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips
  Patents in suitUS 11,631,987
• Tesla, Inc. v. Charge Fusion Technologies, LLCAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jul 13, 2026 · IPR2025-00152 · APJ Carl M Defranco · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–17 are unpatentable as obvious: claims 1–4, 6–9, and 11–14 over Sutardja, Donnelly, and Letendre; claims 5, 10, and 15 with Seelig; claims 16 and 17 with Knockeart.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “understanding of one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention. Tesla submits that one of ordinary skill in the art would have had at least a bachelor’s degree in electrical or mechanical engineering (or an equivalent field) and at least two years of work experience involving automotive systems, including electric vehicle power management. . . . Additional industry experience or technical training may offset less formal education, 1 US 2008/0136371 A1, pub. Jun. 12, 2008 (Ex. 1011, “Sutardja”). 2 US 7,124,691 B2, iss. Oct. 24, 2006 (Ex. 1006, “Donnelly”). 3 Steven E. Letendre, The V2G Concept: A New Model for Power? PUBLIC UTILITIES FORTNIGHTLY, Feb. 15, 2002, at 16 (Ex. 1007, “Letendre”). 4 US 5,654,621, iss. Aug. 5, 1997 (Ex. 1078, “Seelig”). 5 US 6,622,083 B1, iss. Sep. 16, 2003 (Ex. 1010, “Knockeart”). while advanced degrees or additional formal education may offset lesser levels of industry experience. Pet. 2–3 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 29). Charge Fusion “takes no position with respect to Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art.” PO Resp. 9. For purposes of our analysis, we apply Tesla’s proposed level of ordinary skill, which we find to be consistent with the problems addressed in the ’788 patent and the prior art. B. Claim Interpretation” slip op. at 6

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for patent owner

    “shown in Figure 7 of the ’788 patent. Pet. 4–5. Charge Fusion responds that Tesla’s proposed construction should be rejected because it “wrongly import[s] embodiments from the specification.” PO Resp. 14–16. We discern no dispute over the meaning of “unitary vehicle charge indicator” because, contrary to what Charge Fusion argues, Tesla does not contend that this limitation is “required to be limited to” the bar graph embodiment of Figure 7, only that it “at least includes” that embodiment. Compare Pet. 5, with PO Resp. 14–16. Tesla also argues that the “first” and “second” portions of the unitary vehicle charge indicator—which indicate the charged and uncharged capacities of the battery—recite merely “communicative content,” and thus, are “not entitled to any patentable weight” because they are directed to nonfunctional printed matter. Pet. 5–7 (citing various case law). At the same time, however, Tesla maintains that “[r]egardless, Donnelly teaches a bar graph indicating the amount of charge and uncharged capacity.” Pet. Reply 11–12 (citing Pet. 33–34); see also Hrg. Tr. 74:22–25, 75:9–11. For reasons expressed below, we agree that Tesla persuasively demonstrates that the asserted combination teaches the “unitary vehicle charge indicator element” as claimed and construed by Charge Fusion. Accordingly, we need not decide the printed matter issue.” slip op. at 8

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

    “Initially, we note that, as claimed, there is no express restriction on the manner in which the “amount” or “charge” is specified or otherwise expressed. Indeed, the Specification uses both “desired charge percent level” and “desired charge range level” as alternative ways for a user to specify an “amount of charge.” Ex. 1001, 14:63–15:18 (emphases added). In particular, the Specification defines “desired charge range level” as meaning “a desired distance to travel.” Id. at 15:8–18. Elsewhere, the Specification describes that a user may specify the amount of charge as follows: “the user may indicate a desired charging level (and/or a desired charging level may be automatically calculated) based on a desired distance of travel.” Id. at 19:59–67 (emphasis added).” slip op. at 9

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “full charge” for the battery, and thus, Tesla fails to explain how the combination of Sutardja with Donnelly’s battery bar graph image “would allow a user to select a specific amount of charge or how this would result in a unitary vehicle charge indicator,” as claimed. PO Resp. 30. According to Charge Fusion, “[l]imiting the single option of ‘full charge’ as described in Sutardja would defeat the purpose of implementing a slider” as taught by Donnelly. Id. (citing Ex. 2008 ¶ 72). We disagree. Charge Fusion’s argument rests on the mistaken premise that Sutardja only contemplates selecting a full amount of charge for the battery and not an amount below a full charge, i.e., a partial charge. But that is not what Sutardja says. More accurately, Sutardja teaches that the user specifies the amount of charge—"The user interface module 108 may comprise a key pad, a display, a microphone, and/or a speaker (all not shown). A user of the vehicle 102-1 may use the user interface module 108 to set charging parameters for charging the battery 14.” Ex. 1011 ¶ 243. Elsewhere, Sutardja teaches that the user may set a “predetermined level” of charge— The charge monitoring module 150 may inform the control module 112 when the battery 14 is charged to a predetermined level (e.g., full charge) that may be indicated in the charging parameters. Subsequently, the charge monitoring module 150 may stop charging the battery 14 by deactivating the converter 156 and the charging module 152. The power meter 24 may measure the amount of power received from the utility company 23 during the charging operation. Id. ¶ 270 (emphases added). Although that passage indicates that a “full charge” is an example of a “predetermined level” of charge, nowhere does it exclude the selection of a lesser amount. Indeed, the passage contemplates the ability to “stop charging the battery,” which indicates that selection of the predetermined level may be less than a full charge. Id. Thus, we are not persuaded by Charge Fusion’s argument to the contrary. Rather, in our view, Tesla demonstrates by a preponderance of the evidence that the Sutardja-Donnelly combination teaches a “unitary vehicle charge indicator” that includes at least “first” and “second” portions and that one of ordinary skill in the art would have had reason to successfully combine their respective teachings in a manner that allows a user to predetermine, i.e., specify, an amount of charge. slip op. at 17

  Patent outcomesUS 11,990,788 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips
  Patents in suitUS 11,990,788
• Klipsta Pty Ltd v. Lindsay AlbaneseSome claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jul 10, 2026 · IPR2025-00346 · APJ Annette R Reimers · IPR · Final written decision

  Claim 16 is unpatentable as obvious over the asserted grounds; claims 1–15, 17, and 18 were not shown unpatentable.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “may be considered, including the “type of problems encountered in the art; prior art solutions to those problems; rapidity with which innovations are made; sophistication of the technology; and educational level of active workers in the field.” In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995). Petitioner contends that a person having ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention (“POSITA”) “would be a regular consumer/shopper with a rudimentary knowledge of the use of magnetic clips and a basic understanding of clip construction.” Pet. 13. We find that the ’047 patent and the cited prior art references reflect the appropriate level of skill at the time of the claimed invention and that the level of skill reflected in these references and in the ’047 patent is consistent with the definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art proposed by Petitioner. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 10

  • BurdenMixed

    “Petitioner’s mapping of the components of KR ’458’s fastening device is insufficient. Although Petitioner maps the center line of fastening member 115 to the recited second end, Petitioner fails to adequately map the recited first end of the second strap or explain why one of skill in the art would consider the second ferromagnetic member (convex member 117) to be disposed at the first end of the second strap as required by claim 1. that the first end is “upward to connector 117.” Pet. 24. This is not the end of the second strap. As discussed above, the end of the second strap wraps around rectangular ring 210 and is then secured to itself.7 Connector 117 is positioned below the true end of the strap, more in the middle of this segment of the strap. In other words, Petitioner arbitrarily defines the strap as only the portion of hat holder 110 between the center line and connector 117, in contradiction to what KR ’458 actually discloses. Nowhere does Petitioner explain why connector 117 is disposed at the first end of the second strap. Neither does Petitioner explain why we should disregard the true end of the strap, nor why one of skill in the art would consider only a middle portion of the strap to be the second strap. Thus, Petitioner has not satisfied its burden in this regard. Therefore, Petitioner has not shown that KR ’458 discloses “a second strap having a first end and a second end, the second strap joined to the first strap,” with “a second ferromagnetic member disposed at the first end of the second strap.” For the foregoing reasons, we determine that a preponderance of the evidence does not support that claim 1 is anticipated by KR ’458.” slip op. at 23

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

    “The ’047 patent discloses that in addition to being separate straps, the rear strap and the front strap “can be formed from a single piece of material.” Ex. 1001, 3:40–44, 5:24–32, 10:18–25. In particular, Figures 5A–5B of the ’047 patent illustrate rear strap 510 and front strap 520 as being “formed from a single piece of material that is folded approximately in half where a first half can be the rear strap 510 and a second half can be the front strap 520.” Id. at 10:18–21, Figs. 5A–5B. Indeed, Patent Owner acknowledges “[i]t should be noted that forming the first and second straps from a single piece of material is well within the scope of the claimed invention.” Ex. 1007, 5 (citing the ’047 patent at 3:37–44). Moreover, we note the positions taken by the parties are consistent with the fact that claim second strap are formed from a single folded strap.” Ex. 1001, 14:47–48. We, therefore, adopt Petitioner’s construction of “the second strap joined to the first strap” to include “a single piece of material.”” slip op. at 11

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITADecided for patent owner

    “Petitioner’s construction of a “hook” to include a “structure that serves to attach the hat holder to another object” is based on function, rather embodiments in the Specification of the ’047 patent. Although strap-style hook 340 of Figures 3A–3C is a flexible component rather than a more rigid component like hook 140 shown in Figures 1A–1C , both can be considered types of hooks. All of the embodiments, whether rigid or flexible, can be considered to have a hook-like structure when serving the function of attaching the hat holder to another object. Petitioner’s proposed construction would render the term “hook” meaningless, as various types of structures could be used to attach the hat holder to another object, that would not reasonably be considered to be a “hook.” For example, a snap, safety pin, ring, or button could be used to attach a hat holder to another object. Petitioner’s identification of different embodiments in the ’047 patent of hook-like structures does not show why one of skill in the art would consider almost any structure to be considered a “hook.” We, therefore, reject Petitioner’s construction of a “hook” as a “structure that serves to attach the hat holder to another object.” “wherein the first strap and the second strap are configured to retain a” slip op. at 12

  Patent outcomesUS 10,413,047 mixed
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,413,047
• Globus Medical, Inc. v. Spinelogik, Inc.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jul 10, 2026 · IPR2025-00226 · APJ Matthew S Meyers · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–5, 7, and 9 are unpatentable under §103 over Moskowitz and Steffee; the Board did not reach the Moskowitz-only ground and rejected the Hess ground.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner asserts that one of ordinary skill in the art would have had a bachelor’s or equivalent degree in mechanical engineering or a related discipline (e.g., biomedical or metals and materials engineering), and at least five years of experience consisting of (a) designing, developing, evaluating and/or using spine devices, (b) anatomy, physiology and biology of soft and calcified tissues including bone healing and fusion, and (c) biomechanical and functional loading of orthopedic implants. Pet. 17 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 49). Petitioner also asserts that “[m]ore education can supplement practical experience and vice versa.” Id. (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 49). “Patent Owner does not dispute the proffered definition for a POSA.” PO Resp. 9. Based on the full record, we determine that Petitioner’s undisputed proposed level of skill is reasonable and consistent with the ’385 patent and the asserted prior art. Thus, for these reasons, we adopt Petitioner’s level of skill in the art.” slip op. at 8

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

    “1. “channel” Throughout the challenged claims, “channel” appears together with “curved” in the term “curved channel.” For example, claim 1 recites “the fusion member comprising a first curved channel and a second curved channel,” “a first anchoring member configured to insert through the first curved channel,” and “second anchoring member configured to insert through the second curved channel.” Ex. 1001, 26:58–59, 26:60–61, 26:65– 66. Prior to institution, Petitioner asserted that one of ordinary skill in the art would “understand the claim term ‘channel’ to refer to a passage through which something moves or is conveyed.” Pet. 18 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 54). And, for purposes of our Decision on Institution, we adopted Petitioner’s proposed construction as being “consistent with the intrinsic record.” Institution Dec. 10. the ’385 [p]atent is readily understood by a POSA in context without needing explicit construction” and the plain and ordinary meaning should apply. PO Resp. 9–10. According to Patent Owner, the ’385 patent “consistently uses ‘channel’ to refer to a pathway within the fusion member through which an anchoring member traverses” and “explicitly states that channels may have different shapes and sizes and need not have a constant diameter, indicating the patentee did not intend to narrow the term beyond its common understanding.” Id. Petitioner replies noting that Patent Owner’s understanding “is substantively identical to Petitioner’s construction (‘a passage through which something moves or is conveyed’), specifically applied to an anchoring member.” Pet. Reply 6 (Pet. 18; PO Resp. 9–10). Thus, Petitioner concludes that “[t]he parties thus agree with the Board’s construction.” Id. Based on the full record, we agree with Petitioner that the parties’ positions on the meaning of the term “channel” are “substantively identical.” Because we see no difference between the parties’ position on the meaning of “channel,” we continue to adopt Petitioner’s proposed construction as it is consistent with the plain language of the claims and Specification. See Pet. 18 (citing Ex. 1001, 9:42–44, 9:53–55, 10:63–66, 11:47–63, 14:25–31, 14:65–67, 16:32–35, 22:51–57, 24:55–67) (The Specification uniformly refers to a “channel” as “a passage through which something (e.g., an anchoring member) traverses.”).” slip op. at 9

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “between the spinous processes in order to decompress the spinal canal, and thus, “relieve pressure on the spinal cord and nerves by increasing the area of the spinal canal.” Ex. 1006, 1:32–34, 1:50–52, 2:1–6. In contrast, the ’385 patent identifies that “the goal is to achieve solid bony fusion between the involved endplates and eliminate the symptoms caused by motion and associated degenerative and other reactive changes between these unstable vertebral segments.” Ex. 1001, 1:53–57. Thus, Hess’s disclosed implant is designed to distract and stabilize the spinous processes, not to promote solid bony fusion between adjacent vertebral bodies. Consequently, we agree with Patent Owner that “converting Hess for intervertebral fusion would require eliminating its core dynamic stabilization functionality—directly contradicting Hess’s stated design objectives.” PO Resp. 42 (citing Ex. 1006, 2:5–26, 7:43–45). We also are not persuaded that Petitioner adequately explains why a person of ordinary skill would have modified Hess’s implant in the manner proposed. Petitioner contends that only “minimal modifications” to Hess’s shell dimension and shape would be required for intervertebral use. Pet. 61–67; Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 122–128. However, simply modifying the shape and size of Hess’s shell does not, without more, support a motivation to redesign Hess’s device from a posterior interspinous implant engaging spinous processes to an interbody implant positioned between vertebral bodies and anchored into vertebral bodies. Here, Hess discloses that modifying its dimensions serves to “preserv[e] mobility and alignment.” Ex. 1006, 7:5–7. Conversely, the ’385 patent’s fusion implant serves to limit mobility between vertebrae by achieving “solid bony fusion between the fusion member and the adjacent vertebral bodies.” Ex. 1001, 24:67–25:3. spinal fusion procedures” (id. at 6:49–52), we do not find that statement, without more, to disclose or suggest reconfiguring Hess’s interspinous implant as an “a fusion member configured to position between first and second vertebral bodies,” as required by limitation [1.1]. At most, Hess’s “adjunct to” statement suggests that the interspinous implant may be used in connection with, or in support of, a fusion procedure. It does not explain how or why Hess’s implant would be redesigned for placement between two adjacent vertebral bodies, nor does it teach that Hess’s locking wings would be reoriented or adapted to anchor into vertebral bodies rather than spinous processes. On this point, Mr. Culbert states that “[t]he only changes required to modify Hess for use as an intervertebral implant would be to modify the dimensions of Hess’s shell, which was ‘dimensioned and configured for placement between the spinous processes’” (Ex. 1002 ¶ 126 (citing Ex. 1006, 7:3–4)), but Mr. Culbert does not explain how Hess’s locking wings and guide tracks would be reoriented or adapted to function as anchoring members that are inserted into adjacent vertebral bodies rather as opposed to spinous processes. Instead, Mr. Culbert simply states that “Hess’s locking wings would engage and at least partially penetrate the superior and inferior adjacent vertebrae” (emphasis added) (Ex. 1002 ¶ 135) without explaining how or why one of ordinary skill in the art would have made the modification with a reasonable expectation of success.” slip op. at 17

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner

    “modify Hess for use as an intervertebral implant would be to modify the dimensions of Hess’s shell, which was ‘dimensioned and configured for placement between the spinous processes’” (Ex. 1002 ¶ 126 (citing Ex. 1006, 7:3–4)), but Mr. Culbert does not explain how Hess’s locking wings and guide tracks would be reoriented or adapted to function as anchoring members that are inserted into adjacent vertebral bodies rather as opposed to spinous processes. Instead, Mr. Culbert simply states that “Hess’s locking wings would engage and at least partially penetrate the superior and inferior adjacent vertebrae” (emphasis added) (Ex. 1002 ¶ 135) without explaining how or why one of ordinary skill in the art would have made the modification with a reasonable expectation of success. Hess’s disclosure that its shell may have shape variations to match adjacent bone (Ex. 1006, 7:7–13) also does not adequately explain why a person of ordinary skill would have had a reason to redesign Hess’s device for a different intervertebral environment, or why such a redesign would and “anchoring members,” i.e., locking wings. And, to the extent Hess discloses matching the shell to “the profile of the adjacent bone when deployed” (Ex. 1006, 7:11–13), Hess never suggests adapting the shell for placement between two adjacent vertebral bodies or for use as a fusion cage, it discloses that the “shell 12 is dimensioned and configured for placement between the spinous processes of symptomatic disc levels” (id. at 7:2–4). Thus, we agree with Patent Owner that the proposed modification “minimizes the structural differences and conflicting functional objectives inherent in modifying a device intended for the posterior elements of the spine for use in the anterior load-bearing column” (emphasis omitted). PO Resp. 41. For the reasons discussed above, we determine that Petitioner’s reliance on Mr. Culbert’s testimony amounts to more than just providing a motivation to modify Hess. Here, it amounts to relying on expert testimony to supply a missing limitation. As such, Petitioner’s arguments are not persuasive to demonstrate that the prior art teaches the limitations of the claim by a preponderance of the evidence. See Xerox Corp. v. Bytemark, Inc., IPR2022-00624, Paper 9, 16 (PTAB Aug. 24, 2022) (precedential) (explaining that relying on expert testimony “is particularly problematic in cases where, like here, expert testimony is offered not simply to provide a motivation to combine prior-art teachings, but rather to supply a limitation missing from the prior art.”).” slip op. at 18

  Patent outcomesUS 8,460,385 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,460,385
• Globus Medical, Inc. v. Spinelogik, Inc.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jul 10, 2026 · IPR2025-00225 · APJ Matthew S Meyers · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–6, 11, 12, and 15–17 are unpatentable: claims 1–4, 6, 11, 12, 15, and 17 over Blain; claims 5 and 16 over Blain, Bray, and Steffee.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner asserts that one of ordinary skill in the art would have had a bachelor’s or equivalent degree in mechanical engineering or a related discipline (e.g., biomedical engineering, metals and materials engineering), and at least five years of experience with a) designing, developing, evaluating and/or using spine devices, b) anatomy, physiology and biology of soft and calcified tissues including bone healing and fusion, and c) biomechanical and functional loading of orthopedic implants. Pet. 18–19 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 77–78). Petitioner also asserts that “[m]ore education can supplement practical experience and vice versa.” Id. (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 78). “Patent Owner does not dispute the proffered definition for a POSA.” PO Resp. 10. proposed level of skill is reasonable and consistent with the ’805 patent and the asserted prior art. Thus, for these reasons, we adopt Petitioner’s level of skill in the art.” slip op. at 8

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed board ownDecided for petitioner

    “Based on the full record, we determine that “housing,” as it appears in the context of the term “delivery housing” is a component that is a part of the delivery mechanism (see Ex. 1001, 11:27–31) and that simply contains and guides another component during delivery. See Ex. 1001, 13:25–27, 21:30–50. Thus, we apply the ordinary meaning of “housing,” as it appears in the context of the term “delivery housing,” and address in the context of “delivery housing,” as recited by claims 2 and 4.” slip op. at 12

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

    “understanding of plain and ordinary meaning as set forth in the litigation.” Pet. Reply 13 (citing Ex. 1022, 2 (“channel . . . [that] has a curved path”)). Thus, Petitioner concludes that the parties agree on construction of “curved channel.” Id. at 13–14.10 9 Although the parties refer to “curved” alone or to a “curved channel,” we understand the parties to be referring to a “channel of the fusion member [that] is curved,” as recited in claims 5 and 16. 10 At oral argument, the parties confirmed that there was no dispute as to the meaning of “curved channel.” See Tr. 15:12–14 (Petitioner stating that “the term “curved channel” appears consistent with the plain language of the claims and Specification. Thus, we adopt the parties’ agreed-upon construction and construe a channel that is “curved” to mean a channel following a curved trajectory.” slip op. at 13

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “We have considered Petitioner’s arguments and evidence, and Patent Owner’s counterarguments and find, on the complete trial record, that Petitioner demonstrates, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Blain discloses “a fusion member for positioning between two vertebral bodies, the fusion member having a first plurality of channels, each channel of the first plurality of channels having an opening on a same side of the fusion member,” as recited by limitation 1.1. At the outset, we find Patent Owner fails to establish that any of the alleged differences between Blain’s “apertures and the ’805 [p]atent’s internal channel geometry” relate to any particular recitation in argued limitation 1.1. Although we acknowledge that claims 5 and 16 each requires curved trajectories (see, e.g., claim 5 reciting “each channel of the fusion member is curved”), limitation 1.1 does not recite such a feature. As Petitioner correctly notes, “[n]othing in the claim requires a special ‘internal channel geometry,’ ‘shaped block,[’] ‘curved tubular channels,’ non ‘straight-through’ apertures, or ‘flexible’ anchors.” Pet. Reply 14 (footnote omitted). See In re Self, 671 F.2d 1344, 1348 (CCPA 1982) (rejecting arguments “not based on limitations appearing in the claims”). Therefore, after reviewing the arguments and evidence, we determine that Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that Blain discloses the subject matter of limitation 1.1.” slip op. at 19

  Patent outcomesUS 9,730,805 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 9,730,805
• Apple Inc. v. Memoryweb, LLCAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jul 8, 2026 · PGR2022-00006 · APJ Jason M Repko · PGR · Remand

  On remand, the Board held claims 1–59 unpatentable: claims 1–6, 8–37, 40–44, and 49–59 over A3UM under §103, and claims 6, 7, 38, and 39 for lack of written description under §112.

  RulingsRemand decision

  • RemandOther

    “On remand, the Board is to determine “[w]hether the alleged inconsistency in [Petitioner’s] treatment of map images compared to other first/second versions of claim elements supports rejecting [Petitioner’s] theory on claim-construction or other merits grounds is a matter for the Board to consider in the first instance on remand, constrained by any relevantly similar now-final findings of fact and conclusions of law in the ’020 PGR and related proceedings” (CAFC Dec. 16). Thus, the two issues on remand are (1) the construction of the second map image and (2) whether A3UM teaches or suggests the claimed “second map image” under that construction.” slip op. at 10

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “A person of ordinary skill in the art in 2011 would have had (1) at least a bachelor’s degree in computer science, computer engineering, or electrical engineering, and (2) at least one year of experience designing graphical user interfaces for applications such as photo management systems. Pet. 12 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 44–46). In the Institution Decision and Final Written Decision, we applied Petitioner’s proposed definition. Inst. Dec. 12; FWD 30–31. Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art. PO Resp. 7. We continue to find that the skill level identified by Petitioner (Pet. 12) is consistent with the record. Thus, we use the same definition here that we used in the Institution Decision and Final Written Decision.” slip op. at 6

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

    “c. Analysis We agree with Petitioner that the “second map image” should be construed as the map image in the second person view. Reply 5. Under Petitioner’s proposed construction, the terms “first” and “second” identify which person view that the map image is within. Id. The map image’s connection to the person view is important to how the user interacts with the interface because selecting the map image in one view does something different than selecting the map image in another, as recited in claims 14 and 46.” slip op. at 12

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “Here, we disagree with Patent Owner’s argument because it is based on the premise that the second map image is different from the first in a way that is not reflected in the claims. See Section II.C.3 supra. Even if “the claims consistently use the terms ‘first’ and ‘second’ to refer to separate and distinct elements,” A3UM’s first and second map images are separate and distinct elements for at least the reason they are included in separate and distinct views in the interface. See Pet. 63; Reply 5. As discussed in Section II.C.3, the second map image is the map image in the second person view. Here, Petitioner sufficiently shows that A3UM provides the same functionality for each person, including displaying the person in the Faces view with their name within A3UM’s overall user interface. See Pet. 62 (citing Ex. 1003, ¶215; Ex. 1005, 418–420). Patent Owner does not dispute this. See PO Resp.; Sur-reply. For the same reasons why A3UM teaches the “first map image” with respect to a first person view recited in claims 1 and 31, Petitioner has shown that A3UM also teaches the “second map image” in the second person view. See FWD 53–56. In sum, Patent Owner’s arguments are unpersuasive because they are based on an incorrect claim construction, and Petitioner has shown that claims 13 and 45 are unpatentable. 5. Claims 14–16 and 46–48 Apart from the arguments analyzed above, Patent Owner does not present separate arguments directed to the subject matter of claims 14–16 burden to show that the challenged claims are unpatentable. See Dynamic Drinkware, LLC v. Nat’l Graphics, Inc., 800 F.3d 1375, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2015). We have reviewed Petitioner’s arguments and evidence submitted in connection with the remaining limitations and find them persuasive as they are consistent with and supported by the evidence of record. See Pet. 63–64. Thus, Petitioner has shown that claims 14–16 and 46–48 are unpatentable over A3UM.” slip op. at 14

  Patent outcomesUS 11,017,020 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosure
  Patents in suitUS 11,017,020
• Micron Technology, Inc. v. Yangtze Memory Technologies Company, Ltd.Some claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jul 6, 2026 · IPR2025-00191 · APJ Michael T Cygan · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 3, 8, 11, 12, and 19 are unpatentable under §103; Petitioner did not show claims 6, 9, 10, 13–18, and 20 unpatentable.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “at the critical time “would have had a Bachelor of Science degree in electrical engineering or a similar discipline, along with 2–3 years of professional experience working with (e.g., researching, designing, or teaching) monolithic 3D structures and NAND memory devices, or an equivalent level of skill, knowledge, and experience (e.g., an advanced degree may replace some of the professional experience).” Pet. 27 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶34–38). Petitioner further asserts that a POSITA “would have been aware of and generally knowledgeable about 3D NAND’s structure, how it is manufactured, and its component parts.” Id. Patent Owner does 5 Neither party presents evidence or arguments regarding objective evidence of non-obviousness. Pet. 100; PO. Resp. circuit design. PO Resp. 9–10 (citing Ex. 2021 ¶ 35). Neither Patent Owner nor Dr. Campbell considers the obviousness of the claims to turn on the precise definition of the level or ordinary skill in the art. PO Resp. 10; Ex. 2021 ¶ 35. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill, as it appears to be consistent with the specification of the ’322 patent and the prior art of record.” slip op. at 7

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for petitioner

    “C. Claim Construction Neither party proposes any express claim construction. Pet. 27 (stating claims should receive their “plain and ordinary meaning”); PO Resp. 10 (stating that Petitioner’s challenges fail “under any reasonable construction”). In an inter partes review, we construe a patent claim “using the same claim construction standard that would be used to construe the claim in a civil action under 35 U.S.C. [§] 282(b).” 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b). Under this standard, the words of a claim generally are given their “ordinary and customary meaning,” which is the meaning the term would have to a person of ordinary skill at the time of the invention, in the context of the entire patent including the specification. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312–13 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). We determine no terms require express construction for purposes of this Decision.” slip op. at 8

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner

    “We determine that such a configuration would be neither inoperable nor significantly undesirable. Dr. Campbell testified that he does not argue that this configuration would be inoperable. Ex. 1106, 74:12–17; Ex. 2021 ¶60. Dr. Lee testifies that this configuration is “consistent with Nishikawa[123]’s Figure 14B.” Ex. 1105 ¶ 13. Dr. Lee further testifies that this configuration would not necessarily require a larger footprint, but instead, “could simply replace the trenches, abutting the device edge.” Id. Dr. Campbell testified that if the circular TAC replaced the rectangular trench, “I don’t know what it would be or exactly where it would be,” and therefore, “I can’t say what the size of the red circle would have to be.” Ex. 1106, 83:19–84:3. Therefore, the record does not support finding a circular TAC to have a larger footprint. Absent a larger footprint, there is no evidence that the end-connected TAC would be undesirable.” slip op. at 15

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedPatent owner expert discountedMixed

    “nor significantly undesirable. Dr. Campbell testified that he does not argue that this configuration would be inoperable. Ex. 1106, 74:12–17; Ex. 2021 ¶60. Dr. Lee testifies that this configuration is “consistent with Nishikawa[123]’s Figure 14B.” Ex. 1105 ¶ 13. Dr. Lee further testifies that this configuration would not necessarily require a larger footprint, but instead, “could simply replace the trenches, abutting the device edge.” Id. Dr. Campbell testified that if the circular TAC replaced the rectangular trench, “I don’t know what it would be or exactly where it would be,” and therefore, “I can’t say what the size of the red circle would have to be.” Ex. 1106, 83:19–84:3. Therefore, the record does not support finding a circular TAC to have a larger footprint. Absent a larger footprint, there is no evidence that the end-connected TAC would be undesirable.” slip op. at 15

  Patent outcomesUS 11,581,322 mixed
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,581,322

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.