- Volkswagen Group Of America, Inc. / Porsche Cars North America, Inc. v. Yechezkal Evan SperoAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Jun 20, 2024 · IPR2023-00197 · APJ Aaron W Moore · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 20–25 and 59–64 are unpatentable as obvious over Karlsson and Harbers, with claims 21–23 and 60–62 also relying on Gotou.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“At institution, we adopted Petitioner’s proposal, except that we omitted the qualifier “at least” and set the level of experience at two years. See Ins. Dec. 7. In its Response, Patent Owner stated that it “does not dispute the Board’s reframing of Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill” and asserts that “the modification should have no effect on the analysis.” See PO Resp. 14. We accordingly maintain the level of ordinary skill in the art we adopted in the institution decision. B.” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached
“At institution, we interpreted the term “light source” as the Specification defines it: “any system that is capable of receiving an electrical signal and producing light in response to the signal.” Ex. 1001, 17:7–10 (“As used herein, the term ‘light source’, LED or ‘solid state light source’ means any system that is capable of receiving an electrical signal and producing light in response to the signal.”). Patent Owner agrees with that construction. See PO Resp. 14. However, the reason we interpreted “light source” in the institution decision was that there was a question about whether the individual “microbeams” described in the Beam reference were “light sources.” See Inst. Dec. 11. Because, as explained below, we do not reach the Beam grounds, we need not construe “light source” in this final decision. We further find that that no other express claim construction is necessary. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (explaining that construction is needed only for terms that are in dispute, and only as necessary to resolve the controversy). C.” slip op. at 9
- BurdenDecided for patent owner
“‘selectively adjust[s] . . . spotlight beam[s] 34, in response to a control signal from sensor means 23 . . . [to] provide a desired lighting pattern’ in ‘given directions,’” “recognizes ‘[w]hen taking a bend . . . [that] the road ahead . . . is insufficiently lit,’” and “discloses using additional sensors, for example, ‘direction sensor 54 . . . for determining when the car 56 is taking a bend, so that the light beam 7 can be adapted,’ and acknowledges the safety benefits of those systems.” Pet. 114–115 (citing Ex. 1010, 1:35–2:1, 6:26–33, 9:23–25, 11:25–28, 14:26–30, 20:22–32, Figs. 3, 6, 14; 16; Ex. 1003 ¶ 452) (emphasis omitted). We have reviewed the portions of Karlsson cited by Petitioner and find them insufficient to teach or suggest the subject matter of claims 21–23 and 60–62. Although they disclose direction sensors and controlling the light in response to sensors, the direction sensors are used “for determining when the car . . . is taking a bend, so that the light beam . . . can be adapted to prevent the traffic on the other side of the road from being blinded as much as possible.” Ex. 1010, 20:29–32. This suggests that the direction sensors are used to decrease illumination in the direction of the curve or turn, not to increase the illumination, as claimed.” slip op. at 29
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner
“The Petition asserted that “[h]aving multiple directional beam segments with different angles/aimings as in Harbers, implemented with Karlsson’s control means 14/spotlight beams 34 (including light modulator means 3), would have provided Karlsson’s system with different spatial distributions for different driving situations beyond reducing glare for drivers, thereby improving safety.” Pet. 84 (emphasis added, citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 350). Petitioner thus relied on Harbers’ “beam segments” with “different angles/aimings” that produce the pattern shown in Figure 1B. We agree that the advantages Harbers attributes to its spatial distribution scheme would have provided a sufficient motivation to use it in the combination, and that it would include the differently angled light sources present in both the flat and curved substrate embodiments of Harbers. Because all embodiments of Harbers’ illumination method require that the light sources be arranged at different angles, we need not conclude that it would have been obvious to use Harbers’ curved substrate in place of Karlsson’s flat substrate. However, were inclusion of Harbers’ curved substrate necessary for a finding of obviousness, we conclude that Harbers’ explanation of how the non-curved and curved embodiments are simply alternative means of producing differently angled beams would be sufficient to show that use of the curved substrate in place of a flat substrate would have been a simple substitution of a known element (a curved substrate) for another (a flat substrate), yielding the predictable results described in Harbers (differently angled light sources capable of producing the designed light pattern), and that this would be, therefore, an obvious modification. See Pet. 86 (asserting that use of the curved substrate would have been a simple and predictable substitution). We find that the skilled artisan would have known to use either a flat or curved substrate to achieve Harbers’ multi-directional lighting scheme as appropriate for a given application. Patent Owner suggests that Virtek Vision Intl. ULC v. Assembly Guidance Sys., Inc., 97 F.4th 882 (Fed. Cir. 2024), supports its position that it would not have been obvious to use the curved substrate in the combination. See Trans. 101, 127. In that case, the issue was whether it would have been obvious to modify the primary references, which used an angular direction system, to instead use a 3D coordinate system that was also known in the art. See id. at 886. The Federal Circuit found a lack of motivation to combine because “[t]he mere fact that . . . possible arrangements existed in the prior art” was insufficient. Id. at 887. Here, however, there is a motivation––the advantages of Harbers’ spatial lighting scheme––and Harbers teaches that those advantages may be achieved with differently directed light sources on either a flat substrate or a curved substrate. We find this to provide a sufficient motivation under the controlling law. See KSR Intern. Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 417 (2007) (explaining that to be non-obvious a change must be “more than the predictable use of prior art elements according to their established functions”).” slip op. at 17
Patent outcomesUS 10,894,503 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSRPatents in suitUS 10,894,503 - PTAB · Jun 18, 2024 · IPR2024-00221 · APJ Jon M Jurgovan · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on all challenged claims, 1–7, 15–23, and 25–30, on all asserted §103 obviousness grounds.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), an inter partes review may not be instituted unless the information presented in a petition and the preliminary response “shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” Upon consideration of the Petition and Preliminary Response, and accompanying exhibits and evidence, we determine Petitioner has established a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail with respect to at least one challenged claim in the inter partes review. Therefore, we grant institution of an inter partes review as to all of the challenged claims of the ’720 patent on all challenges in the Petition.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner contends as follows: A person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the alleged invention (“POSITA”) would have had at least a bachelor’s degree in computer science, electrical engineering, or a related subject, and at least two years of experience working with databases, computer networks, and related web technologies. A more advanced degree can substitute for less work experience and vice versa. Pet. 17 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 57–61). Petitioner’s proposed level of skill in the art is consistent with the prior art references asserted by Petitioner. Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1354–55 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the applied prior art may reflect an appropriate level of skill). Accordingly, we will use Petitioner’s proposed level for purposes of this Decision.” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Only claim terms in controversy need to be construed, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy. See Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999). Petitioner contends that the challenged claims’ terms “can be afforded their plain and ordinary meaning.” Pet. 17. As there is no dispute of any claim term at this time, we do not expressly construe any claim term, and will apply the ordinary and customary meaning consistent with 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b).” slip op. at 10
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundInstituted
“Specifically, Petitioner contends that “Cochran endeavors to ‘provide an efficient and user-friendly method of searching computer databases’ using ‘a search system that efficiently displays information to users.’” Pet. 55 (citing Ex. 1005, 4:4–19). Petitioner asserts that Cochran acknowledges that “it may need to display more items than a pick box can display simultaneously, forcing a user to scroll through options.” Id. (citing Ex. 1006, 10:58–65). Petitioner argues that a “POSITA would have appreciated that certain lists in Cochran are extremely voluminous and would benefit from improved navigation methods.” Id. at 55–56 (citing Ex. 1006, Fig. 4e; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 482–485). Petitioner contends that “Zellweger sought to remedy th[e] same problem.” Id. at 56. According to Petitioner, a “POSITA would have recognized that it is difficult for users to scroll through Cochran’s long pick box lists” and “would have looked to Zellweger to improve the usability of the pick boxes” by using Zellweger’s Alphabet or Content Lists instead of Cochran’s scroll bars when the number of entries exceeds what can be presented on a screen. Id. at 56–57 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 485). Petitioner contends that the combination is “nothing more than using one known method (Zellweger) to improve another known method (Cochran) according to the express teachings of Zellweger to yield predictable results.” Id. at 57. Petitioner further alleges that other methods for implementing pick boxes for use with “wide ranges” of terms were known in the art. Id. (citing Ex. 1006, 10:61–65). Petitioner contends that Cochran and Zellweger are analogous art because they are “directed to the same field (accessing information in databases), and address similar concepts (making information more easily accessible using graphical interfaces)” and teach several of the same concepts (e.g., GUIs to access databases) and are both implemented as computer software.” Id. (citing Ex. 1006, code (57), 1:14–20, 4:2–57; Ex. 1007, code (57), 1:35–40, 2:30–43; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 480–481). Petitioner contends that a “POSITA would have appreciated that Cochran’s and Zellweger’s teachings were well-known and complementary to one another.” Id. Petitioner alleges that a “POSITA would have had a high expectation” slip op. at 15
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 6,760,720 - Volkswagen Group Of America, Inc. / Porsche Cars North America, Inc. v. Yechezkal Evan SperoSome claims unpatentablePTAB · Jun 18, 2024 · IPR2023-01225 · APJ Jason W Melvin · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 24, 26, 28–32, 34, 36–40, 42, and 44–47 are unpatentable as obvious; claims 25, 27, 33, 35, 41, 43, and 48–55 were not shown unpatentable.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for patent owner
“F. LEVEL OF ORDINARY SKILL IN THE ART Petitioner submits that an ordinarily skilled artisan “would have had a bachelor’s degree (B.S.) in mechanical engineering, electrical engineering, optical engineering, applied physics, or an equivalent field, as well as at least 2 years of industry experience in the area of automotive lighting and lighting-control systems.” Pet. 7 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 44–46, 67). Petitioner adds that such artisans “may work as part of a team, for example, with computer engineers to 3 Beam, U.S. Patent No. 6,144,158, issued Nov. 7, 2000. Ex. 1005, code (45). 4 English translation of Satonaka et al., Japan Patent Publication No. H7-101291, published Apr. 18, 1995. Ex. 1014, 0001, code (43). 5 Kobayashi, U.S. Patent No. 6,049,749, issued Apr. 11, 2000. Ex. 1008, code (45). 6 Karlsson, WIPO Patent Publication No. 98/54030, published December 3, 1998. Ex. 1010, code (43). 7 English translation of Nakamura et al., Japan Patent Publication No. H7-65603, published Mar. 10, 1995. Ex. 1013, 0001, code (43). 8 Gotou, U.S. Patent No. 5,588,733, issued Dec. 31, 1996. Ex. 1012, code (45). integrate/program controllers and various control inputs to affect control of a given light source.” Id. Patent Owner does not dispute that proposed level of skill (PO Resp. 9), and we adopt it here.” slip op. at 6
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached
“Petitioner notes that, during reexamination of the ’551 patent, the Office interpreted “electronic circuitry apparatus for the controlled powering of the LEDs” as a means-plus-function limitation and identified the corresponding structure as “logic control electronics unit 7.” Id. at 8 (citing Ex. 1002, 929–39; Ex. 1001, 25:34–52). Patent Owner asserts that “[n]o claim construction is necessary because Patent Owner’s arguments do not hinge on the outcome of an actual controversy about claim interpretation.” PO Resp. 9. As to the “electronic circuitry apparatus,” Patent Owner does not dispute that the claim language reads on the asserted prior art under any construction. Thus, we need not address the construction of that term. Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms that . . . are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 7
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner
“As to the advantages of Karlsson’s lamp-located sensor, nothing about that arrangement would have changed in the proposed combination. As described, Petitioner proposes using aspects of Nakamura’s processing in combination with Karlsson’s physical system. See Pet. 54–58. Thus, the combination preserves any advantages Karlsson obtains by locating a sensor with each illumination system. As to a change of perspective, the record does not support that Nakamura’s processing relies on a single, unchangeable perspective. Rather, Nakamura discloses identifying relevant image regions through reference markers such as “white lines of the lane” and adjustments such as “correction amount α” to accommodate the reference markers. Ex. 1013 ¶¶ 36–46; see Pet. Reply 58 (“Nakamura explains how to implement the coordinate mapping of the pixels received by a camera.”). Thus, Nakamura’s approach is already suitable to a changed perspective and Petitioner did not have to explain further details of the required adaption. See also Ex. 1052 ¶¶ 125 (“Wherever the camera is located on the vehicle, a simple calibration for camera location versus driver’s viewpoint would be conducted to carry on the image processing.”), 168 (noting that the same reasoning applies to the Karlsson–Nakamura combination as the Beam–Satonaka combination). Additionally, Patent Owner has not persuasively supported its assertion that the changed perspective—locating sensors at the headlamps rather than centered at the top of the windshield—would impair the system’s ability to detect other vehicles. See PO Resp. 57–59. Patent Owner’s expert could not testify as to the camera locations used to generate the images that form the basis for Patent Owner’s argument, as he was not present at the test that generated those images. Ex. 1053, 104:22–105:14, 106:16–107:6, 109:17–110:4. It is inapposite that “Nakamura does not contemplate LEDs and therefore does not control light in a similar fashion” as Patent Owner argues (PO Resp. 60), because Nakamura’s teachings relate to identifying regions in the illuminated field that should be dimmed. Ex. 1013 ¶ 45. Such a determination aligns with Karlsson’s own similar determination, and would be implemented by Karlsson’s system. See, e.g., Ex. 1010, 9:18–26. Having considered the full record, we find that skilled artisans would have” slip op. at 14
- Obviousness (§103) › Objective indicia / secondary considerations › NexusObjective indicia no nexusDecided for patent owner
“As to independent claims 24 and 32, Patent Owner does not assert any “unique characteristics that are novel and nonobvious over the asserted art.” See PO Resp. 70–71. Patent Owner asserts that claim 40 includes “adapting light emission to provide at least two dark zones with ‘light in-between’” and that the Stam declaration correlates that characteristic with the objective evidence. Id. The Stam declaration addresses claim language reciting illumination “that preserves a first level of illumination illuminating past the other vehicle while preventing glare to a driver of the other vehicle” and asserts that an article discussing that a commercial product’s “[i]ndividually controlled LEDs also provide two or more dark zones with ‘light in-between,’ allowing continuous use of a vehicle’s high-beams to maximize visibility and provide a safer driving experience.” Ex. 2023, 734 (Stam declaration ¶ 117) (quoting Ex. 2023, 182) (emphasis omitted). Patent Owner does not explain and we do not understand the connection between the claim language recited in the declaration and that of claim 40. But even accepting that the reexamination exhibit shows industry praise for a system with claim 40’s feature, Patent Owner has not shown that the feature was novel. As discussed above, we conclude that Karlsson discloses that aspect of claim 40 without modification. See supra at 16 (§ II.B.5). Accordingly, even viewing Patent Owner’s evidence as credible and appropriate, we conclude that it would not establish the required nexus for claim 40. To be clear, Patent Owner’s asserted evidence would not establish nexus for any aspect of the independent claims, because each element is found in the prior art and the only elements for which Petitioner asserts a combination of prior-art teachings—those relating to image coordinates—are not those that Patent Owner relies on for a unique characteristic of the claimed invention. Patent Owner asserts further that industry praise was directed at the “Predictive Curve Illumination feature” recited by dependent claims that require the ability to “accommodate the upcoming road curvature” by adapting the light. PO Resp. 8, 70–71. Patent Owner relies on a report of a new lighting system used by BMW that states, “[t]he benefit of a glare-free function is not only to shadow out other cars but also to provide visibility for upcoming curves and dangerous situations; there is a clear safety gain by illuminating this curve in front of the driver.” Ex. 2023, 727 (quoting Ex. 2023, 177) (emphasis omitted). That statement does not itself establish a nexus to the “Predictive Curve Illumination” claims. Patent Owner asserts that the reexamination declaration correlated objective evidence with the “Predictive Curve Illumination” claims (PO Resp. 70–71), but cited portion of the declaration does not address that claim feature (see Ex. 2023, 728–34). Accordingly, Patent Owner has not established a nexus with the dependent claims. That the praised characteristics were found in the prior art is consistent with Patent Owner’s asserted evidence, which largely pertains to efforts to change U.S. regulations to permit the use of adaptive headlight technology. See Pet. Reply 28; Ex. 1053 ¶¶ 198–199. Thus, Patent Owner’s evidence does not support nonobviousness.” slip op. at 22
Patent outcomesUS 9,955,551 mixedClaim construction§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 9,955,551 - Volkswagen Group Of America, Inc. / Porsche Cars North America, Inc. v. Yechezkal Evan SperoSome claims unpatentablePTAB · Jun 18, 2024 · IPR2023-00315 · APJ Jason W Melvin · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 24, 26, 28–32, 34, 36–40, 42, and 44–47 are unpatentable as obvious; claims 25, 27, 33, 35, 41, 43, and 48–55 were not shown unpatentable.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“bachelor’s degree (B.S.) in mechanical engineering, electrical engineering, optical engineering, applied physics, or an equivalent field, as well as at least 2 years of industry experience in the area of automotive lighting and lighting-control systems.” Pet. 7 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 44–46, 67). Petitioner adds that such artisans “may work as part of a team, for example, with computer engineers to 3 Beam, U.S. Patent No. 6,144,158, issued Nov. 7, 2000. Ex. 1005, code (45). 4 English translation of Satonaka et al., Japan Patent Publication No. H7-101291, published Apr. 18, 1995. Ex. 1014, 0001, code (43). 5 Kobayashi, U.S. Patent No. 6,049,749, issued Apr. 11, 2000. Ex. 1008, code (45). 6 Karlsson, WIPO Patent Publication No. 98/54030, published December 3, 1998. Ex. 1010, code (43). 7 English translation of Nakamura et al., Japan Patent Publication No. H7-65603, published Mar. 10, 1995. Ex. 1013, 0001, code (43). 8 Gotou, U.S. Patent No. 5,588,733, issued Dec. 31, 1996. Ex. 1012, code (45). integrate/program controllers and various control inputs to affect control of a given light source.” Id. Patent Owner does not dispute that proposed level of skill (PO Resp. 9), and we adopt it here.” slip op. at 6
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached
“Petitioner notes that, during reexamination of the ’551 patent, the Office interpreted “electronic circuitry apparatus for the controlled powering of the LEDs” as a means-plus-function limitation and identified the corresponding structure as “logic control electronics unit 7.” Id. at 8 (citing Ex. 1002, 929–39; Ex. 1001, 25:34–52). Patent Owner asserts that “[n]o claim construction is necessary because Patent Owner’s arguments do not hinge on the outcome of an actual controversy about claim interpretation.” PO Resp. 9. As to the “electronic circuitry apparatus,” Patent Owner does not dispute that the claim language reads on the asserted prior art under any construction. Thus, we need not address the construction of that term. Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms that . . . are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 7
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner
“As to the advantages of Karlsson’s lamp-located sensor, nothing about that arrangement would have changed in the proposed combination. As described, Petitioner proposes using aspects of Nakamura’s processing in combination with Karlsson’s physical system. See Pet. 54–58. Thus, the combination preserves any advantages Karlsson obtains by locating a sensor with each illumination system. As to a change of perspective, the record does not support that Nakamura’s processing relies on a single, unchangeable perspective. Rather, Nakamura discloses identifying relevant image regions through reference markers such as “white lines of the lane” and adjustments such as “correction amount α” to accommodate the reference markers. Ex. 1013 ¶¶ 36–46; see Pet. Reply 58 (“Nakamura explains how to implement the coordinate mapping of the pixels received by a camera.”). Thus, Nakamura’s approach is already suitable to a changed perspective and Petitioner did not have to explain further details of the required adaption. See also Ex. 1052 ¶¶ 125 (“Wherever the camera is located on the vehicle, a simple calibration for camera location versus driver’s viewpoint would be conducted to carry on the image processing.”), 168 (noting that the same reasoning applies to the Karlsson–Nakamura combination as the Beam–Satonaka combination). Additionally, Patent Owner has not persuasively supported its assertion that the changed perspective—locating sensors at the headlamps rather than centered at the top of the windshield—would impair the system’s ability to detect other vehicles. See PO Resp. 57–59. Patent Owner’s expert could not testify as to the camera locations used to generate the images that form the basis for Patent Owner’s argument, as he was not present at the test that generated those images. Ex. 1053, 104:22–105:14, 106:16–107:6, 109:17–110:4. It is inapposite that “Nakamura does not contemplate LEDs and therefore does not control light in a similar fashion” as Patent Owner argues (PO Resp. 60), because Nakamura’s teachings relate to identifying regions in the illuminated field that should be dimmed. Ex. 1013 ¶ 45. Such a determination aligns with Karlsson’s own similar determination, and would be implemented by Karlsson’s system. See, e.g., Ex. 1010, 9:18–26. Having considered the full record, we find that skilled artisans would have” slip op. at 14
- Obviousness (§103) › Objective indicia / secondary considerations › NexusObjective indicia no nexusDecided for patent owner
“however, has not presented Mr. Stam’s declaration as a declaration in this case, instead relying on its expert, Dr. Turk, who “reviewed the objective evidence statements in the Stam declaration.” PO Resp. 68 (citing Ex. 2006 ¶¶ 215–216). Dr. Turk, however, was not able to recall the meaning of multiple terms he used in his declaration (Ex. 1053, 124:5–135:18) and asserted that he determined that ADB technology falls within the claims by looking at the Stam declaration, without independently verifying statements in the Stam declaration or reviewing the documents upon which those statements were based (id. at 135:19–137:16). Dr. Turk’s declaration addressing secondary considerations is not credible as to the substance of the asserted secondary considerations, and Patent Owner’s asserted secondary considerations are not persuasive for that reason alone. Additionally, Petitioner asserts that Patent Owner has not shown any evidence that is “the direct result of the unique characteristics of the claimed invention.” Pet. Reply 25 (quoting Fox Factory, Inc. v. Sram, LLC, 944 F.3d 1366, 1373–74 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (internal quotations omitted)). In particular, Petitioner asserts that all the elements of the claimed invention were known in the prior art, and thus that Patent Owner cannot show a nexus between any long-felt need or industry praise and the challenged claims. Id. at 25–26. As to independent claims 24 and 32, Patent Owner does not assert any “unique characteristics that are novel and nonobvious over the asserted art.” See PO Resp. 70–71. Patent Owner asserts that claim 40 includes “adapting light emission to provide at least two dark zones with ‘light in-between’” and that the Stam declaration correlates that characteristic with the objective evidence. Id. The Stam declaration addresses claim language reciting illumination “that preserves a first level of illumination illuminating past the other vehicle while preventing glare to a driver of the other vehicle” and asserts that an article discussing that a commercial product’s “[i]ndividually controlled LEDs also provide two or more dark zones with ‘light in-between,’ allowing continuous use of a vehicle’s high-beams to maximize visibility and provide a safer driving experience.” Ex. 2023, 734 (Stam declaration ¶ 117) (quoting Ex. 2023, 182) (emphasis omitted). Patent Owner does not explain and we do not understand the connection between the claim language recited in the declaration and that of claim 40. But even accepting that the reexamination exhibit shows industry praise for a system with claim 40’s feature, Patent Owner has not shown that the feature was novel. As discussed above, we conclude that Karlsson discloses that aspect of claim 40 without modification. See supra at 16 (§ II.B.5). Accordingly, even viewing Patent Owner’s evidence as credible and appropriate, we conclude that it would not establish the required nexus for claim 40. To be clear, Patent Owner’s asserted evidence would not establish nexus for any aspect of the independent claims, because each element is found in the prior art and the only elements for which Petitioner asserts a combination of prior-art teachings—those relating to image coordinates—are not those that Patent Owner relies on for a unique characteristic of the claimed invention. Patent Owner asserts further that industry praise was directed at the “Predictive Curve Illumination feature” recited by dependent claims that require the ability to “accommodate the upcoming road curvature” by adapting the light. PO Resp. 8, 70–71. Patent Owner relies on a report of a new lighting system used by BMW that states, “[t]he benefit of a glare-free function is not only to shadow out other cars but also to provide visibility for upcoming curves and dangerous situations; there is a clear safety gain by illuminating this curve in front of the driver.” Ex. 2023, 727 (quoting Ex. 2023, 177) (emphasis omitted). That statement does not itself establish a nexus to the “Predictive Curve Illumination” claims.” slip op. at 22
Patent outcomesUS 9,955,551 mixedClaim construction§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 9,955,551 - Keysight Technologies, Inc. v. Centripetal Networks, LLCSome claims unpatentablePTAB · Jun 3, 2024 · IPR2023-00448 · APJ Steven M Amundson · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–5, 7–13, 15–21, 23–29, 31, and 32 are unpatentable under § 103; claims 6, 14, 22, 30, and 33 were not shown unpatentable.
RulingsFinal written decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“In the Institution Decision, we instituted review based on all challenged claims and all challenges included in the Petition. Paper 7 (“Inst. Dec.”). We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6. We issue this Final Written Decision under 35 U.S.C. § 318(a) and 37 C.F.R. § 42.73. For the reasons explained below, Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that claims 1–5, 7–13, 15–21, 23–29, 31, and 32 are unpatentable but has not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that claims 6, 14, 22, 30, and 33 are unpatentable. See 35 U.S.C. § 316(e) (2018).” slip op. at 2
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableNot shown unpatentableMixed
“Conclusion About Obviousness for Claim 1 For the reasons discussed above, the combined disclosures in Law and” slip op. at 86
Patent outcomesUS 11,012,474 mixed§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,012,474 - Volkswagen Group Of America, Inc. / Porsche Cars North America, Inc. v. Yechezkal Evan SperoSome claims unpatentablePTAB · May 22, 2024 · IPR2023-01122 · APJ Jason W Melvin · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–8, 10–19, 21–30, 32, and 33 are unpatentable over Gotou and Karlsson; claims 9, 20, and 31 were not shown unpatentable under either asserted ground.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level board ownDecided for petitioner
“bachelor’s degree (B.S.) in mechanical engineering, electrical engineering, optical engineering, applied physics, or an equivalent field, as well as at least 2 years of industry experience in the area of automotive lighting and lighting-control systems” and “may work as part of a team” listing an example. Pet. 10 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 41–43). In its Response, Patent Owner “does not dispute Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill.” PO Resp. 21 (citing Pet. 10). Following Petitioner’s assertion in the Reply that Patent Owner’s declarant does not satisfy the agreed level of ordinary skill (see Pet. Reply 2–5), Patent Owner relies on Petitioner’s expert’s statement that “a higher level of education or skill might make up for less experience” to argue that the level of skill does not require specific industry experience and instead encompasses work in optics and imaging systems. PO Sur-Reply 1–9 (quoting Ex. 1003 ¶ 42). We proceed with the agreed level of ordinary skill. We note that the parties’ belated dispute regarding the level of skill does not affect our analysis, as further discussed below regarding Petitioner’s Motion to Exclude.” slip op. at 7
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner
“solution for vehicle headlamps because, at the time of invention, LEDs produced output levels far below “typical tungsten halogen” bulbs. PO Resp. 39. Thus, argues Patent Owner, using Karlsson’s LEDs would render Gotou unsuitable for its intended purpose of adjusting illumination direction. Id. at 39–40. We do not agree. Most significantly, Karlsson is specifically directed to a motor vehicle headlight capable of varying its emitted beam. E.g., Ex. 1010, 1:3–7. And Karlsson expressly discloses that LEDs are appropriate options for its headlamp. Id. at 4:32–5:1, 14:1–4, 19:34–36, 21:13–17. In addition, Petitioner cites to multiple exhibits that support its contention that skilled artisans would have recognized the benefits of LEDs as light sources for headlamps. Pet. 56 (citing Ex. 1005, 4:9–15, 6:9–12, Claims 4 and 5; Ex. 1006 ¶¶ 5, 7, 8, 20, 27; Ex. 1009, 19:27–29, 20:9–12, 23:8–12; Ex. 1010, 4:25–35, 13:24–29, 11:29–32; Ex. 1011, 1:18–2:3, 3:18–26, 8:13–20, 10:6–11, 10:21–22). Patent Owner counters that evidence by pointing to its expert’s declaration and to the industry’s recognition that LEDs provided less illumination than incandescent bulbs. PO Resp. 39 (citing Ex. 2006 ¶¶ 25–38; Ex. 2012, 3). Of course, evidence about an individual LED’s output does not undermine Petitioner’s combination because headlamps using LEDs, such as Karlsson’s, used many individual devices. E.g., Ex. 1010, 13:24–14:4, Fig. 6. We conclude that the weight of evidence establishes that Karlsson’s LED-based light source would have been sufficient to implement a vehicle headlamp, as disclosed in Karlsson. For the same reasons as illumination level, Patent Owner’s arguments regarding heat management and packaging are not persuasive. See PO Resp. 44–45. Because (1) Karlsson discloses a system using LEDs and (2) the challenged claims impose no specific requirements regarding Patent Owner’s asserted characteristics, we conclude that those characteristics would not have counseled against the proposed combination. See Ex. 1010, 3:34–35 (“[I]t is furthermore possible to comply with relevant national and international regulations.”).” slip op. at 14
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableDecided for patent owner
“We agree with Patent Owner. Claim 9 recites “the control of the second plurality of LED light sources, which naturally and logically refers to claim 8’s “control . . . a second plurality of LED light sources providing light directed towards an area including at least a portion of the other vehicle to diminish glare to a driver of the other vehicle.” Thus, the claim language’s antecedent basis establishes that claim 9’s control must also be “to diminish glare to a driver of the other vehicle.” The Petition does not identify teachings in the prior art that render claim 9’s limitation obvious under the correct claim interpretation. Nor does Petitioner’s Reply explain how the asserted combination satisfies Patent Owner’s construction, which we adopt. See Pet. Reply 23–24. Therefore, Petitioner has failed to carry its burden for claims 9, 20, and 31.” slip op. at 22
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner
“We agree with Patent Owner. Claim 9 recites “the control of the second plurality of LED light sources, which naturally and logically refers to claim 8’s “control . . . a second plurality of LED light sources providing light directed towards an area including at least a portion of the other vehicle to diminish glare to a driver of the other vehicle.” Thus, the claim language’s antecedent basis establishes that claim 9’s control must also be “to diminish glare to a driver of the other vehicle.” The Petition does not identify teachings in the prior art that render claim 9’s limitation obvious under the correct claim interpretation. Nor does Petitioner’s Reply explain how the asserted combination satisfies Patent Owner’s construction, which we adopt. See Pet. Reply 23–24. Therefore, Petitioner has failed to carry its burden for claims 9, 20, and 31.” slip op. at 22
Patent outcomesUS 11,208,029 mixedClaim construction§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 11,208,029 - Volkswagen Group Of America, Inc. / Porsche Cars North America, Inc. v. Yechezkal Evan SperoSome claims unpatentablePTAB · May 22, 2024 · IPR2022-01586 · APJ Jason W Melvin · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–8, 10–19, 21–30, 32, and 33 are unpatentable over Gotou and Karlsson; claims 9, 20, and 31 were not shown unpatentable under either asserted ground.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level board ownDecided for petitioner
“bachelor’s degree (B.S.) in mechanical engineering, electrical engineering, optical engineering, applied physics, or an equivalent field, as well as at least 2 years of industry experience in the area of automotive lighting and lighting-control systems” and “may work as part of a team” listing an example. Pet. 10 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 41–43). In its Response, Patent Owner “does not dispute Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill.” PO Resp. 21 (citing Pet. 10). Following Petitioner’s assertion in the Reply that Patent Owner’s declarant does not satisfy the agreed level of ordinary skill (see Pet. Reply 2–5), Patent Owner relies on Petitioner’s expert’s statement that “a higher level of education or skill might make up for less experience” to argue that the level of skill does not require specific industry experience and instead encompasses work in optics and imaging systems. PO Sur-Reply 1–9 (quoting Ex. 1003 ¶ 42). We proceed with the agreed level of ordinary skill. We note that the” slip op. at 7
- Expert testimonyOther
“Considering Karlsson’s statement that its emitted light beam may be produced from a “window which can shift . . . from the left to the right,” we conclude that the record better supports Petitioner’s position. In that regard, we credit Dr. Jiao’s testimony that skilled artisans would understand Karlsson to disclose a device capable of adapting its beam shape to myriad possible situations, rather than a device that illuminates all possible light sources unless detecting an oncoming vehicle. Ex. 1036 ¶¶ 51–64.” slip op. at 13
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction needed
“B. CLAIM CONSTRUCTION The parties agree that no express claim construction is required. Pet. 10–11; PO Resp. 21–22. Other than two disputes discussed below regarding dependent claims, we agree that the claims do not require express construction. Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms that . . . are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). As to the two disputes that implicate claim scope, we discuss the relevant issues in context below. See infra at 21 (§ II.C.7), 22 (§ II.C.8).” slip op. at 7
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner
“to the dispute here, claim 1 requires capability to “determine a light change . . . to increase light in a direction of road curvature” and control a first plurality of LEDs “to provide light based at least in part on the determined light change.” Ex. 1001, 95:66–96:8. Claim 8 requires capability to control a second plurality of light sources “to diminish glare to a driver of the other vehicle.” Id. at 97:5–14. Claim 9 recites “the control of the second plurality of LED light sources is based at least in part on third data received from a non-camera sensor of the motor vehicle.” Id. at 97:18–20. Petitioner asserts that “Gotou’s map data is not from a camera sensor” and therefore satisfies claim 9’s language. Pet. 88. Patent Owner disputes that assertion, arguing that claim 9’s control of the second plurality takes its antecedent basis from claim 8, which requires that the control be to diminish glare. PO Resp. 36. Because Gotou’s map data is used to accommodate road curvature, not to diminish glare to oncoming vehicles, Patent Owner submits that Petitioner’s proof is inadequate. Id. Petitioner responds that claim 9 recites “additional control,” not the same control from claim 8 that is limited in purpose. Pet. Reply 23–24. We agree with Patent Owner. Claim 9 recites “the control of the second plurality of LED light sources, which naturally and logically refers to claim 8’s “control . . . a second plurality of LED light sources providing light directed towards an area including at least a portion of the other vehicle to diminish glare to a driver of the other vehicle.” Thus, the claim language’s antecedent basis establishes that claim 9’s control must also be “to diminish glare to a driver of the other vehicle.” The Petition does not identify teachings in the prior art that render claim 9’s limitation obvious under the correct claim interpretation. Nor does Petitioner’s Reply explain how the asserted combination satisfies Patent Owner’s construction, which we adopt. See Pet. Reply 23–24. Therefore, Petitioner has failed to carry its burden for claims 9, 20, and 31.” slip op. at 21
Patent outcomesUS 11,208,029 mixedClaim construction§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 11,208,029 - PTAB · May 20, 2024 · IPR2024-00114 · APJ Jon M Jurgovan · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–8 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that at least one claim would have been obvious over DiPerna964 and Strack.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Denied
“We determine below that Fintiv factors 1–5 do not favor discretionary denial. Thus, we do not reach the issue of whether the merits are compelling. CommScope Techs. LLC v. Dali Wireless, Inc., IPR2022- 01242, Paper 23 at 4–5 (PTAB Feb. 27, 2023) (precedential) (Board must first address Fintiv factors 1–5, and should engage the compelling merits question only if that analysis favors discretionary denial) (“CommScope”). 7. Balancing the Fintiv Factors Weighing against exercising our discretion to deny institution is factor 3 involving the parties’ limited investment and lack of substantive orders in the District Court litigation. Factor 4 concerning the limited overlap of the issues in the two cases also weighs against discretionary denial. Only factor 5, that Petitioner and the defendant in the District Court litigation are the same party, weighs in favor of discretionary denial. Factor 1 concerning the absence of a stay in the District Court litigation, and factor 2 concerning the close proximity between the start of trial in the District Court litigation and the estimated deadline for the final written decision, are neutral on the facts of this case. We therefore determine that the balance of factors 1–5 weighs against discretionary denial. Accordingly, we do not consider the issue of whether compelling merits have been shown under factor 6. See CommScope, Paper 23 at 4–5.2” slip op. at 13
- Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Not entitled to earlier dateDecided for petitioner
“Pet. 9 (citing Ex. 1006, 23) (emphasis added). From this passage, we understand the “safety” switch to be “separate” from the panic button, not a part of it. This understanding is reinforced by claim 7 which depends from claim 1 and recites that the mobile device “further compris[es] a safety switch,” meaning it is a separate element from the panic button. Ex. 1001, 9:3–4. Thus, moving the safety switch into position readies the panic button, which is not the same as the panic button readying itself to perform functions in claims 1–8 of the ’404 patent. Patent Owner does not sufficiently address this issue in its assertions. See Prelim. Resp. 5–7. Patent Owner’s reliance on disclosures elsewhere in the ’404 patent is likewise not persuasive. Prelim. Resp. 5–6. For example, the ’353 application mentions “ready” in relation to using a self-defense mechanism such as pepper spray, which has not been shown to be related to the panic button. Ex. 1006, 5, 9–10. Although Patent Owner relies on the ’353 application’s description of voice activation using a codeword, voice activation does not ready the panic button for activation to perform functions, but actually activates the panic button to perform those functions. Prelim. Resp. 6 (citing Ex. 1006, 17). Petitioner thus met its burden here to demonstrate that claims 1–8 of the ’404 patent lack written description support for a panic button adapted to “ready itself” to perform the recited functions because the limitation is not present in the ’353 application to which the ’404 patent claims priority. Pet. 8–10. The burden of production thus shifted to Patent Owner to demonstrate that the ’353 application has written description support for this limitation, which it has not done on this record. Prelim. Resp. 5–7.” slip op. at 17
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“of the proceeding, we are persuaded that Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on its assertions that at least one of claims 1–8 of the ’404 patent would have been obvious under 35 U.S.C. § 103 based on the ground set forth in the Petition. Accordingly, we institute trial for all challenged claims on all grounds asserted by Petitioner. See SAS Institute Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348 (2018). Our factual findings, conclusions of law, and determinations at this stage of the proceeding are preliminary, and based on the evidentiary record developed thus far. At this stage of the proceeding, we have not made a final determination with respect to the patentability of the challenged claims or to the construction of any claim term. V. ORDER For the foregoing reasons, it is ORDERED that, pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), an inter partes review of claims 1–8 of the ’404 patent is hereby instituted on all challenges to patentability set forth in the Petition; and” slip op. at 31
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundInstituted
“Petitioner has shown sufficiently that a POSITA would have combined DiPerna964 and Strack with a reasonable expectation of success. Pet. 16–18. DiPerna964 and Strack are directed to similar mobile devices for use in security and emergency situations. Id. at 16–17. Petitioner demonstrates sufficiently that a POSITA would have regarded Strack’s arming and timer technique as an improvement that would have been useful with DiPerna964’s mobile device (at least in some circumstances) to provide the user with additional time to evaluate whether triggering the 911 call is warranted. Id. at 17–18. This amounts to the use of a known technique to improve similar devices in the same way, which is a recognized rationale for combining prior art references. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 401, 417 (2007). Accordingly, on this record, Petitioner has presented a reasonable likelihood that a POSITA would have combined DiPerna964 and Strack with a reasonable expectation of success. Pet. 16–18.” slip op. at 22
Claim construction§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosureDiscretionary denialcites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,265,404 - PTAB · May 20, 2024 · IPR2024-00113 · APJ Jon M Jurgovan · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 9–15 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that at least one challenged claim would have been obvious.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Denied
“We do not agree with Patent Owner’s argument that Petitioner wrongly considered the parties’ investment in the parallel litigation as of when the Petition was filed as opposed to when the institution decision is made. Prelim. Resp. 21. Petitioner indicated that “investment in the parallel litigation will have remained low at the time of institution,” thus indicating the proper timeframe for consideration of this factor. Pet. 69. Although the parties have expended some resources in the District Court litigation, the evidence shows that the District Court has not issued any substantive orders, a Markman hearing has not yet been conducted, and expert reports have not been exchanged. Id. (citing Ex. 1035). Accordingly, this factor weighs against exercising our discretion to deny institution. Fintiv at 10; NHK Spring Co. v. Intri-Plex Techs., Inc., IPR2018-00752, Paper 8 at 20 (PTAB Sept. 12, 2018) (precedential, designated May 7, 2019) (determining that “the advanced state of the district court proceeding is an additional factor that weighs in favor of denying the Petition,” where the district court proceeding was “nearing its final stages, with expert discovery ending” soon).” slip op. at 10
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“IV. CONCLUSION In light of the foregoing, based on the current record and at this stage of the proceeding, we are persuaded that Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on its assertions that at least one of claims 9–15 of the ’404 patent would have been obvious under 35 U.S.C. § 103 based on the grounds set forth in the Petition. Accordingly, we institute trial for all challenged claims on all grounds asserted by Petitioner. See SAS Institute Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348 (2018); 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a) (“When instituting . . . review, the Board will authorize the review to proceed on all of the challenged claims and on all grounds of unpatentability asserted for each claim”). Our factual findings, conclusions of law, and determinations at this stage of the proceeding are preliminary, and based on the evidentiary record developed thus far. At this stage of the proceeding, we have not made a final determination with respect to the patentability of the challenged claims or to the construction of any claim term. V. ORDER For the foregoing reasons, it is ORDERED that pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), an inter partes review of claims 9–15 of the ’404 patent is hereby instituted on all challenges to patentability set forth in the Petition; and FURTHER ORDERED that pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 314(c) and 37 C.F.R. § 42.4, notice is hereby given of the institution of a trial and that the trial will commence on the entry date of this decision.” slip op. at 46
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner contends as follows: A person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSITA”) at the time of the ’404 patent’s priority date would have had at least a Bachelor’s of Science Degree (or equivalent) in an academic area emphasizing electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or a related technical field, and about 1-2 years of experience working with telematics systems (e.g. familiarity with wireless communications, geolocation systems, and human-computer interfaces). A greater amount of education in an academic area emphasizing electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or a related technical field, would compensate for fewer years of work experience, and more years of work experience would compensate for less education. This is the appropriate level of skill, whether the claims are entitled to priority as of January 2005 or January 2019. Pet. 7–8 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 14–16). At this stage of the proceeding, Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s proposed level of skill in the art, which is consistent with the prior art references asserted by Petitioner. Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1354–55 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the applied prior art may reflect an appropriate level of skill). Accordingly, we will use Petitioner’s proposed level for purposes of this Decision.” slip op. at 15
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededPlain and ordinary meaningOther
“Only claim terms in controversy need to be construed, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy. See Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999). Petitioner contends that “no express constructions of the claims are necessary to assess whether the prior art reads on the [challenged claims]” and that “the claims should be given their plain and ordinary meaning.” Pet. 8. Patent Owner states that “at this stage in the proceeding, Patent Owner will apply the ordinary and customary meaning to the ’404 patent’s claim terms.” Prelim. Resp. 4. As Petitioner and Patent Owner do not dispute the meaning of any claim term at this time, we decline to expressly construe any claim term, and instead apply the ordinary and customary meanings consistent with 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b). We address claim interpretation to the extent necessary in our obviousness analysis below.” slip op. at 16
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,265,404 - PTAB · Mar 13, 2024 · IPR2023-01353 · APJ Kevin F Turner · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted review of claims 1–20 on all Petition grounds and granted Palo Alto Networks’ motion to join the Keysight IPR.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Because the issues presented in the instant Petition are identical to those in the Keysight IPR, we determine for the same reasons that there is a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail in showing that at least one of claims 1–20 of the ’343 Patent is unpatentable under the grounds of the Petition. Therefore, we institute inter partes review for the same reasons stated in our Decision on Institution in the Keysight IPR. See IPR2023- 00446, Paper 9.” slip op. at 3
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingJoinder, grantedGranted
“appropriate; (2) identify any new grounds of unpatentability asserted in the petition; (3) explain what impact (if any) joinder would have on the trial schedule for the existing review; and (4) address specifically how briefing and discovery may be simplified. See Kyocera Corp. v. Softview LLC, IPR2013-00004, Paper 15 at 4 (PTAB Apr. 24, 2013); Patent Trial and Appeal Board, Consolidated Trial Practice Guide, 76 (Nov. 2019), https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/tpgnov.pdf. Petitioner’s Motion addresses each of these considerations. Mot. 1–8.” slip op. at 4
NonePatents in suitUS 10,567,343
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.