- PTAB · Dec 4, 2025 · IPR2025-01103 · APJ Brian P Murphy · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 7–12 on all grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that Lamkin and the asserted combinations render the claims obvious.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 314, which provides that an inter partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” Under § 314, the Board may not institute review on fewer than all claims challenged in the petition. SAS Inst., Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1359–60 (2018). If the Board institutes a review, it unpatentability asserted for each claim.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a). Upon consideration of the Petition, the Preliminary Response, and the evidence of record, for the reasons set forth below, we conclude the Petition demonstrates a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail in showing the unpatentability of at least one challenged claim in the ’101 patent. Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review of claims 7–12 of the ’101 patent.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“(“POSITA”), various factors may be considered, including the “type of problems encountered in the art; prior art solutions to those problems; rapidity with which innovations are made; sophistication of the technology; and educational level of active workers in the field.” In re GPAC, Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (citing Custom Accessories, Inc. v. Jeffrey- not exhaustive but are merely a guide to determining the level of ordinary skill in the art.” Daiichi Sankyo Co. v. Apotex, Inc., 501 F.3d 1254, 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2007). There is uncontested evidence in the record before us that reflects the knowledge and experience of a POSITA. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt the Petition’s formulation of the level of ordinary skill in the art, which is consistent with the description in the ’101 patent, the prior art of record, and the testimony of Dr. Zadok.” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Other
“Petitioner contends that no claim terms need construction, but also contends that “claim interpretations on which this Petition depends are incorporated in and apparent from the prior art mapping analysis below.” Pet. 5. Patent Owner contends that Petitioner’s position contradicts the position Petitioner took in related district court litigation, particularly Petitioner’s district court constructions of means-plus-function limitations” slip op. at 10
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundInstituted
“Fiechter (Ground 1B) in the manner claimed in the ’101 patent with a reasonable expectation of success, which we find sufficient to satisfy the reasonable likelihood standard on the present record. Pet. 42–45 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 360–362, 372–382). The Petition also offers several motivations to combine Lamkin and Ito (Ground 1C) in the manner claimed in the ’101 patent with a reasonable expectation of success, which we also find sufficient on the present record. Pet. 49–52 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 383–401). The Preliminary Response does not challenge the Petition’s asserted motivations to combine Lamkin-Fiechter or Lamkin-Ito. Prelim. Resp. generally. On the present record at this stage of the proceeding, we determine the Petition sufficiently supports a motivation to combine Lamkin-Fiechter and Lamkin-Ito with a reasonable expectation of success for the reasons articulated in the Petition and Dr. Zadok’s cited declaration paragraphs.” slip op. at 21
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,230,101 - Apple Inc. v. Proxense, LLCAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Nov 12, 2025 · IPR2024-01399 · APJ Thu A Dang · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–6, 8–15, and 17–20 are unpatentable under § 103, based on Buer alone or in the combinations listed.
RulingsFinal written decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingJoinder, grantedGranted
“1 Apple Inc. filed a motion for joinder and a petition in IPR2024-01399, which were granted, and, therefore, Apple Inc. has been joined as petitioner in this proceeding. We also granted a Joint Motion to Terminate Inter Partes Review Proceeding as to the other petitioner, leaving Apple Inc. as the sole petitioner.” slip op. at 1
- Claim Construction › Functional claiming / §112(f) means-plus-function › Whether §112(f) applies (Williamson, nonce words)§112(f) does not applyDecided for petitioner
“Here, as Petitioner points out, “[n]one of the elements of the Challenged Claims . . . use the word ‘means,’” similar to the challenged claims in the previous related proceedings. Pet. Reply 2–3; see also IPR2024-00405, Ex. 1001, 22:43–60; IPR2024-00407, Ex. 1001, 22:36–49; IPR2024-00573, Ex. 1001, 21:51–65. As the Federal Circuit stated, when a disputed claim limitation does not employ “means for” language, the presumption is that each of the terms conveys sufficiently definite structure or act and, thus, is not subject to § 112 ¶ 6. See Dyfan, 28 F.4th at 1367. Based on the record before us, this presumption that each of the terms is not subject to § 112 ¶ 6 is not overcome.” slip op. at 17
- Prior constructionPrior construction adoptedDecided for patent owner
“invoke 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 6. See PO Resp. 4; Pet. Reply 2; PO Sur-reply 8. However, we addressed similar arguments with respect to this issue in previous related proceedings. See IPR2024-00405, Paper 24 at 8–25; IPR2024-00407, Paper 25 at 8–26; IPR2024-00573, Paper 27 at 8–29. In fact, during Oral Argument in this proceeding, Patent Owner acknowledged that “this panel construed the claims at issue in [previous proceedings,] IPR2024-573 and 2024-407.” Tr. 20:3–5. In particular, Patent Owner acknowledged that “the Board would rely on and import the construction from those IPRs, . . . 2024-407 and ’573 for the sake of consistent office determination.” Id. at 20:9–11. That is, Patent Owner agreed that the Board should use the prior constructions for the same claim terms at issue in this proceeding. Id. at 26:12–16 (“JUDGE MCKONE: -- it sounds like everybody agrees, that we should use the prior claim constructions from [the] other proceedings . . . Do you agree? MR. HECHT: -- if the Board agrees, absolutely.”). Petitioner also agreed that the Board should use the prior constructions. See id. at 31:23–32:3 (“JUDGE MCKONE: And so I assume you want us to use the same claim construction in this case as the previous case[s]; is that correct? MR WOO: That is correct, Your Honor.”). We agree with the parties that, for the sake of consistency, we apply our claim constructions from the previous proceedings. Tr. 20:22–25. As set forth in the previous related proceedings, we determined that the claims do not invoke 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 6. See IPR2024-00405, Paper 24 at 8–25; IPR2024-00407, Paper 25 at 8–26; IPR2024-00573, Paper 27 at 8–29. Thus, for consistency, and for the reasons given in the previous related proceedings, in this proceeding, we also determine that the claims do not invoke 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 6, as discussed below.” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for petitioner
“We find Patent Owner’s arguments unavailing. In particular, we disagree with Patent Owner’s contention that the District Court provided a construction for “one or more of the integrated RDC and integrated PDK enabling one or more of an application, a function, and a service,” as recited in claim 1. Although Patent Owner points to the District Court’s Memorandum in Support of Claim Construction Order (id. at 32 (citing Ex. 2002, 26)) to support its contention that the District Court construed the term “enabled,” as we determined in the Decision to Institute, this portion of the District Court’s Memorandum merely discusses that “hybrid device” is not indefinite, and discusses exemplary operations of the “hybrid device” from which a POSITA “could reasonably ascertain the scope of the claim.” See Dec. Inst. 9. As we explained, a determination of whether a term is indefinite is not the same thing as construing a claim term. Id. Thus, as we previously explained, by determining that “hybrid device” is not indefinite, the District Court did not construe the term “enabled.” Id.; see also Ex. 2002, 26. Accordingly, nothing in the Memorandum provides a construction of “enabled” as Patent Owner contends. Id. Thus, we find unavailing Patent Owner’s contention that Buer does not disclose the “enabled” limitation because, in Buer, “no key is provided in exchange for the information.” PO Resp. 33. That is, we decline to adopt Patent Owner’s proposed construction that an application, function or service is “enabled” by a PDK “when it receives information from a PDK in exchange for an access key.” Id. at 32. Here, as Petitioner points out, Buer discloses an authentication component for providing credentials to a service provider to authenticate access to secured services, wherein the authentication component generates an RF signal providing the necessary authentication information to a service provider. Pet. 45; see Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 152, 174. Buer further discloses a mobile device with an RFID client to authenticate a user to another processing system, the mobile device transmitting an enablement signal to a computer with a point-of-sale device. Pet. 47; see Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 192–195. We find availing Petitioner’s contention that Buer’s authentication component “enables” a wide variety of applications, functions, or services. Pet. 56. Petitioner’s contention is supported by Dr. Wolfe’s testimony and is consistent with the teachings of Buer. See Ex. 1003 ¶ 229. Based on the complete record presented, we determine that Petitioner has persuasively shown that Buer teaches “one or more of the integrated RDC and integrated PDK enabling one or more of an application, a function, and a service on one or more of the hybrid device and a device associated with the external RDC,” as recited in claim 1.” slip op. at 39
Patent outcomesUS 8,646,042 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,646,042 - Apple Inc. v. Proxense, LLCAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Nov 12, 2025 · IPR2024-00782 · APJ Thu A Dang · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–6, 8–15, and 17–20 are unpatentable under § 103 over the stated prior-art grounds.
RulingsFinal written decision- Claim Construction › Functional claiming / §112(f) means-plus-function › Whether §112(f) applies (Williamson, nonce words)§112(f) does not applyDecided for petitioner
“Here, as Petitioner points out, “[n]one of the elements of the Challenged Claims . . . use the word ‘means,’” similar to the challenged claims in the previous related proceedings. Pet. Reply 2–3; see also IPR2024-00405, Ex. 1001, 22:43–60; IPR2024-00407, Ex. 1001, 22:36–49; IPR2024-00573, Ex. 1001, 21:51–65. As the Federal Circuit stated, when a disputed claim limitation does not employ “means for” language, the presumption is that each of the terms conveys sufficiently definite structure or act and, thus, is not subject to § 112 ¶ 6. See Dyfan, 28 F.4th at 1367. Based on the record before us, this presumption that each of the terms is not subject to § 112 ¶ 6 is not overcome.” slip op. at 17
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for petitioner
“We find Patent Owner’s arguments unavailing. In particular, we disagree with Patent Owner’s contention that the District Court provided a construction for “one or more of the integrated RDC and integrated PDK enabling one or more of an application, a function, and a service,” as recited in claim 1. Although Patent Owner points to the District Court’s Memorandum in Support of Claim Construction Order (id. at 32 (citing Ex. 2002, 26)) to support its contention that the District Court construed the term “enabled,” as we determined in the Decision to Institute, this portion of the District Court’s Memorandum merely discusses that “hybrid device” is not indefinite, and discusses exemplary operations of the “hybrid device” from which a POSITA “could reasonably ascertain the scope of the claim.” See Dec. Inst. 9. As we explained, a determination of whether a term is indefinite is not the same thing as construing a claim term. Id. Thus, as we previously explained, by determining that “hybrid device” is not indefinite, the District Court did not construe the term “enabled.” Id.; see also Ex. 2002, 26. Accordingly, nothing in the Memorandum provides a construction of “enabled” as Patent Owner contends. Id. Thus, we find unavailing Patent Owner’s contention that Buer does not disclose the “enabled” limitation because, in Buer, “no key is provided in exchange for the information.” PO Resp. 33. That is, we decline to adopt Patent Owner’s proposed construction that an application, function or service is “enabled” by a PDK “when it receives information from a PDK in exchange for an access key.” Id. at 32.” slip op. at 39
- Skill levelOther
“B. Principles of Law A patent claim is unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) if the differences between the claimed subject matter and the prior art are such that the subject matter, as a whole, “would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains.” KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 406 (2007). The question of obviousness is resolved on the basis of underlying factual determinations including: (1) the scope and content of the prior art; (2) any differences between the claimed subject matter and the prior art; (3) the level of ordinary skill in the art; and (4) objective evidence of non-obviousness.10 See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1966).” slip op. at 24
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“We find Patent Owner’s arguments unavailing. In particular, we disagree with Patent Owner’s contention that the District Court provided a construction for “one or more of the integrated RDC and integrated PDK enabling one or more of an application, a function, and a service,” as recited in claim 1. Although Patent Owner points to the District Court’s Memorandum in Support of Claim Construction Order (id. at 32 (citing Ex. 2002, 26)) to support its contention that the District Court construed the term “enabled,” as we determined in the Decision to Institute, this portion of the District Court’s Memorandum merely discusses that “hybrid device” is not indefinite, and discusses exemplary operations of the “hybrid device” from which a POSITA “could reasonably ascertain the scope of the claim.” See Dec. Inst. 9. As we explained, a determination of whether a term is indefinite is not the same thing as construing a claim term. Id. Thus, as we previously explained, by determining that “hybrid device” is not indefinite, the District Court did not construe the term “enabled.” Id.; see also Ex. 2002, 26. Accordingly, nothing in the Memorandum provides a construction of “enabled” as Patent Owner contends. Id. Thus, we find unavailing Patent Owner’s contention that Buer does not disclose the “enabled” limitation because, in Buer, “no key is provided in exchange for the information.” PO Resp. 33. That is, we decline to adopt Patent Owner’s proposed construction that an application, function or service is “enabled” by a PDK “when it receives information from a PDK in exchange for an access key.” Id. at 32. Here, as Petitioner points out, Buer discloses an authentication component for providing credentials to a service provider to authenticate access to secured services, wherein the authentication component generates an RF signal providing the necessary authentication information to a service provider. Pet. 45; see Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 152, 174. Buer further discloses a mobile device with an RFID client to authenticate a user to another processing system, the mobile device transmitting an enablement signal to a computer with a point-of-sale device. Pet. 47; see Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 192–195. We find availing Petitioner’s contention that Buer’s authentication component “enables” a wide variety of applications, functions, or services. Pet. 56. Petitioner’s contention is supported by Dr. Wolfe’s testimony and is consistent with the teachings of Buer. See Ex. 1003 ¶ 229. Based on the complete record presented, we determine that Petitioner has persuasively shown that Buer teaches “one or more of the integrated RDC and integrated PDK enabling one or more of an application, a function, and a service on one or more of the hybrid device and a device associated with the external RDC,” as recited in claim 1. v. Claim 1 Conclusion Based on the complete record presented, Petitioner has shown that Buer teaches all limitations of claim 1. Thus, we determine that Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the subject matter of claim 1 would have been obvious over Buer.” slip op. at 39
Patent outcomesUS 8,646,042 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,646,042 - Apple Inc. v. Proxense, LLCAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Nov 12, 2025 · IPR2025-00075 · APJ Thu A Dang · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–20 are unpatentable under § 103 over the asserted combinations of Dua, Giobbi ’157, Kotola, Buer, and Nishikawa.
RulingsFinal written decision- Claim Construction › Functional claiming / §112(f) means-plus-function › Whether §112(f) applies (Williamson, nonce words)§112(f) does not applyDecided for petitioner
“Challenged Claims. . . use the word ‘means,’” similar to the challenged claims in the previous related proceedings. Pet. Reply 3; see also IPR2024- 00405, Ex. 1001, 22:43–60; IPR2024-00407, Ex. 1001, 22:36–49; IPR2024- 00573, Ex. 1001, 21:51–65. As the Federal Circuit stated, when a disputed claim limitation does not employ “means for” language, the presumption is that each of the terms conveys sufficiently definite structure or act and, thus, is not subject to § 112 ¶ 6. See Dyfan, 28 F.4th at 1367. Based on the record before us, this presumption that each of the terms is not subject to § 112 ¶ 6 is not overcome.” slip op. at 18
- Prior constructionPrior construction adoptedDecided for patent owner
“invoke 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 6. See PO Resp. 4; Pet. Reply 2; PO Sur-reply 10. However, we addressed similar arguments with respect to this issue in previous related proceedings. See IPR2024-00405, Paper 24 at 8–25; IPR2024-00407, Paper 25 at 8–26; IPR2024-00573, Paper 27 at 8–29. In fact, during Oral Argument in this proceeding, Patent Owner acknowledged that “this panel construed the claims at issue in [previous proceedings,] IPR2024-573 and 2024-407.” Tr. 20:3–5. In particular, Patent Owner acknowledged that “the Board would rely on and import the construction from those IPRs, . . . 2024-407 and ’573 for the sake of consistent office determination.” Id. at 20:9–11. That is, Patent Owner agreed that the Board should use the prior constructions for the same claim terms at issue in this proceeding. Id. at 26:12–16 (“JUDGE MCKONE: -- it sounds like everybody agrees, that we should use the prior claim constructions from the other proceedings . . . Do you agree? MR. HECHT: -- if the Board agrees, absolutely.”). Petitioner also agreed that the Board should use the prior constructions. See id. at 31:23–32:3 (“JUDGE MCKONE: And so I assume you want us to use the same claim construction in this case as the previous case[s]; is that correct? MR WOO: That is correct, Your Honor.”). We agree with the parties that, for the sake of consistency, we apply our claim constructions from the previous proceedings. Tr. 20:22–25. As set forth in the previous related proceedings, we determined that the claims do not invoke 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 6. See IPR2024-00405, Paper 24 at 8–25; IPR2024-00407, Paper 25 at 8–26; IPR2024-00573, Paper 27 at 8–29. Thus, for consistency, and for the reasons given in the previous related proceedings, in this proceeding, we also determine that the claims do not invoke 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 6, as discussed below.” slip op. at 9
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner
“would have found it obvious to combine the teachings of Dua and Giobbi ’157 (Pet. 31), citing Dr. Wolfe’s supporting testimony (Ex. 1003). In particular, Petitioner posits that POSITA would have been motivated and found it obvious to “securely store the financial information in its tamper-resistant tag ‘to prevent hackers from retrieving confidential information’” (Pet. 31 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 105, 109)), as disclosed by Giobbi ’157. As Petitioner points out, Giobbi ’157 teaches “credit/debit card information” that is stored in a “profile memory field 232” in the “physical access secured and tamperproof” memory (id.; see Ex. 1006 ¶¶ 36, 42, 63), and we find persuasive Petitioner’s contention that a POSITA would have reasonably expected to succeed in “storing the ‘credit card profile or other payment information’ in Dua’s tamper resistant tag memory,” wherein such combination “would have been no more than combining prior art elements according to known methods to yield predictable results.” Id. (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 158).” slip op. at 40
- Skill levelOther
“Principles of Law B. A patent claim is unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) if the differences between the claimed subject matter and the prior art are such that the subject matter, as a whole, “would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains.” KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 406 (2007). The question of obviousness is resolved on the basis of underlying factual determinations including: (1) the scope and content of the prior art; (2) any differences between the claimed subject matter and the prior art; (3) the level of ordinary skill in the art; and (4) objective evidence of non-obviousness.9 See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1966).” slip op. at 25
Patent outcomesUS 9,679,289 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,679,289 - Google LLC / Apple Inc. v. Proxense, LLCAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Nov 12, 2025 · IPR2024-00783 · APJ Thu A Dang · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–20 are unpatentable under § 103 over the listed combinations of Dua, Giobbi ’157, Kotola, Buer, and Nishikawa.
RulingsFinal written decision- Claim Construction › Functional claiming / §112(f) means-plus-function › Whether §112(f) applies (Williamson, nonce words)§112(f) does not applyDecided for petitioner
“Challenged Claims. . . use the word ‘means,’” similar to the challenged claims in the previous related proceedings. Pet. Reply 3; see also IPR2024- 00405, Ex. 1001, 22:43–60; IPR2024-00407, Ex. 1001, 22:36–49; IPR2024- 00573, Ex. 1001, 21:51–65. As the Federal Circuit stated, when a disputed claim limitation does not employ “means for” language, the presumption is that each of the terms conveys sufficiently definite structure or act and, thus, is not subject to § 112 ¶ 6. See Dyfan, 28 F.4th at 1367. Based on the record before us, this presumption that each of the terms is not subject to § 112 ¶ 6 is not overcome.” slip op. at 18
- Prior constructionPrior construction not adoptedDecided for petitioner
“construction for “enabling one or more of an application, a function, and a service,” as recited in claim 1. Although Patent Owner points to the District Court’s Memorandum in Support of Claim Construction Order (id. at 32 (citing Ex. 2002, 26)) to support its contention that the District Court construed the term “enabling,” as we determined in the Decision to Institute, this portion of the District Court’s Memorandum merely discusses that “hybrid device” is not indefinite, and discusses exemplary operations of the “hybrid device” from which a POSITA “could reasonably ascertain the scope of the claim.” See Dec. Inst. 9. As we explained, a determination of whether a term is indefinite is not the same thing as construing a claim term. Id. Thus, as we previously explained, by determining that “hybrid device” is not indefinite, the District Court did not construe the term “enabling.” Id.; see also Ex. 2002, 26. Accordingly, nothing in the Memorandum provides a construction of “enabling” as Patent Owner contends. Id. Thus, we find unavailing Patent Owner’s contention that “nowhere does Dua teach or describe . . . providing an access key in exchange for information held locally in the PDK’s service blocks.” PO Resp. 33. That is, we decline to adopt Patent Owner’s proposed construction that an application, function or service is “enabled” by a PDK “when it receives information from a PDK in exchange for an access key.” Id. at 32.” slip op. at 39
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“We find Patent Owner’s arguments unavailing, as they rely on Patent Owner’s arguments that “the specification defines ‘local, secured information’ as information stored within a service block of a PDK and unlocked with a corresponding access key provided to the PDK” (PO Resp. 30), with which, as discussed above, we do not agree. Dua discloses an “RFID Tag-Reader Module” which includes “Tag Memory 322” that may be tamper resistant. See Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 105, 109. Thus, we find persuasive Petitioner’s reliance on Dua’s Tag Memory 322, which locally stores information in a tamper-resistant manner, for teaching an integrated, secure memory for storing information locally, wherein the information is secured. Id. Based on the complete record presented, we determine that Petitioner has persuasively shown that the proposed combination of Dua and Giobbi ’157 teaches “an integrated, secure memory storing local, secured information,” as recited in claim 1.” slip op. at 34
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner
“would have found it obvious to combine the teachings of Dua and Giobbi ’157 (Pet. 31), citing Dr. Wolfe’s supporting testimony (Ex. 1003). In particular, Petitioner posits that POSITA would have been motivated and found it obvious to “securely store the financial information in its tamper-resistant tag ‘to prevent hackers from retrieving confidential information’” (Pet. 31 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 105, 109)), as disclosed by Giobbi ’157. As Petitioner points out, Giobbi ’157 teaches “credit/debit card information” that is stored in a “profile memory field 232” in the “physical access secured and tamperproof” memory (id.; see Ex. 1006 ¶¶ 36, 42, 63), and we find persuasive Petitioner’s contention that a POSITA would have reasonably expected to succeed in “storing the ‘credit card profile or other payment information’ in Dua’s tamper resistant tag memory,” wherein such combination “would have been no more than combining prior art elements according to known methods to yield predictable results.” Id. (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 158). Patent Owner does not address Petitioner’s positions on combining the teachings of Dua and Giobbi ’157 and thus Petitioner’s positions stand unopposed as a part of this trial. We have reviewed Petitioner’s explanations and supporting evidence regarding Petitioner’s proffered reasoning to combine the references, and we agree with and adopt them as our own. Based on the complete record presented, we determine that Petitioner has persuasively shown that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have combined Dua and Giobbi ’157 as proffered in the Petition.” slip op. at 40
Patent outcomesUS 9,679,289 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,679,289 - PLR Worldwide Sales Ltd. v. Flip Phone Games Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Nov 5, 2025 · IPR2024-00133 · APJ Scott B Howard · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–10 are unpatentable as obvious over Sturman and Ho; the Board found the Ho/Jiau/Choi grounds, with and without Ellis, insufficient.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner
“We see very little difference between the parties’ respective proposals. We adopt Patent Owner’s marginally more specific proposal as it better reflects the ’089 patent. Additionally, because we would reach the same conclusions under Petitioner’s proposal, we agree with Patent Owner that this does not affect our analysis.” slip op. at 10
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed board ownDecided for patent owner
“Consistent with Phillips, we begin with the “ordinary and customary meaning” of the words of the claims. Phillips, 415. F.3d at 1312–13 (quoting Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996)). The parties agree that the ordinary and customary meaning of the phrase “background object” is consistent with the dictionary definition and means an object that is “not in the foreground.” Tr. 8:10–16; PO Resp. 8–9; Ex. 2008 (AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 2006); see also Ex. 2009 (“the scenery or ground behind something,” “the part of a painting representing what lies behind objects in the foreground”) (MERRIAM- WEBSTER DICTIONARY 2007); Ex. 2010 (“the part of a picture or pattern that is behind the main people or things in it” (MACMILLIAN ENGLISH DICTIONARY 2007); Ex. 2011 (“the ground or parts, as of a scene, situated in the rear (opposed to foreground)”) (RANDOM HOUSE WEBSTER’S COLLEGE DICTIONARY 2005). Having determined the ordinary and customary meaning, we need only look to see if there is some reason—such as the applicant acting as a lexicographer or the ordinary and customary meaning being improperly subjective—why the ordinary and customary meaning is not controlling.” slip op. at 15
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for patent owner
“We do not find that the prosecution history demonstrates that the applicant acted as a lexicographer by “clearly set forth a definition of the disputed claim term,” or “clearly express[ing] an intent to define the term” as required by Thorner, 669 F.3d at 1365. Instead, the language in the prosecution history is consistent with the ordinary and customary meaning. That is, the applicant focuses on the location of the object relative to the area of game play, i.e., the foreground. For example, the applicant distinguishes Chu’s object as not being “background objects” because they “are featured in the forefront of [the] game play as primary objects to be manipulated or used during game play (see Chu at ¶¶ [0063]–[0065]).” Ex. 1002, 85 (emphasis added).12 The applicant continued by arguing that Chu’s objects “exist in the background, outside of the primary focus of game play and as unexpectedly interactive components, and are not themselves needed or required in order to play the game.” Id. If anything, this demonstrates an intent of the applicant to use the customary and ordinary meaning—not in the foreground—and not act as a lexicographer.” slip op. at 17
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner
“We do not agree with Patent Owner’s argument. Under our rules, “[e]xpert testimony that does not disclose the underlying facts or data on which the opinion is based is entitled to little or no weight.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.65(a). We have reviewed Dr. Zagal’s testimony on this subject (see Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 156–160, 163, 166, 172, 177–178) and find that it complies with our requirements. Specifically, Dr. Zagal provides his opinion and identifies specific evidence in the record that supports it. We do not find MarkForged, a nonprecedential decision, persuasive. Although MarkForged cites 37 C.F.R. § 42.65(a) as support for the proposition that expert testimony “is entitled to little to no weight [if] it merely parrots the Petition,” the rule is silent on that point. Patent Owner has not directed us to any rule or precedential decision that says that non- 17 The decision was affirmed by the Director. Xerox Corp. v. Bytemark, Inc., IPR2022-00624, Paper 12 (PTAB Aug. 24, 2022). conclusory testimony which cites underlying factual support, such as Dr. Zagal gives in this proceeding, is entitled to no weight.” slip op. at 49
Patent outcomesUS 8,688,089 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,688,089 - Microsoft Corporation v. Proxense, LLCAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Oct 17, 2025 · IPR2024-00846 · APJ David C Mckone · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–29 are unpatentable: claims 1, 2, 4, 5, 7–13, 15, 16, 18–24, and 26–29 as obvious over Burger; claims 3, 14, and 17 over Burger and Robinson; claims 6 and 25 over Burger and …
RulingsFinal written decision- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner
“For the same reasons, and based on the same evidence, given in the ’233 FWD, we maintain our construction of “a third party that operates a trusted authority,” namely, “a trusted authority that is an entity separate from the parties to a transaction,” and make clear that such a transaction is not limited to those in which the principal parties are the user being allowed access and the application being accessed. Based on the complete record, we do not find it necessary to provide express claim constructions for any other terms. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (noting that “we need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 11
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundUnpatentable
“Petitioner contends that “it would have been obvious to a [person of ordinary skill in the art] to incorporate the age verification method of Robinson in Burger so that Burger’s system can be used by businesses interested in conducting transactions that require age-verification.” Pet. 93. Petitioner argues that it would have been predictable to include Robinson’s age-verification feature in Burger’s system in light of Robinson’s explanation that merchants and their employees face penalties if they sell age-restricted goods (e.g., alcohol or tobacco) to underage individuals. Id. at 94–95 (citing Ex. 1006 ¶ 5; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 79–80). Dr. Traynor testifies that there would have been “a reasonable expectation of success because it merely involves combining known elements in a manner that would have been easily implemented and obvious to” a skilled artisan. Ex. 1003 ¶ 80. We credit Dr. Traynor’s uncontroverted testimony and find that a skilled artisan would have had reasons, with rational underpinning, to combine the teachings of Burger and Robinson. As to claims 3, 14, and 17, Robinson describes a user registering a biometric sample, identity-verifying information (SID), and age-verifying information with a database of an age-verification system. Pet. 95–96 (citing Ex. 1006 ¶¶ 14–15, 28, 43, 48; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 175–178). We find that a skilled artisan would have combined the teachings of Burger and Robinson, such that Robinson’s age-verifying information would have been stored in the database of Burger’s network server 114. Id. at 95 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 176). Patent Owner does not provide separate arguments for claims 3, 14, and 17. PO Resp. 22. limitations of claims 3, 14, and 17, and that a skilled artisan would have had reasons, with rational underpinning, for combining Burger and Robinson. The record does not contain evidence of objective indicia of nonobviousness. Upon consideration of all the evidence, we conclude that Petitioner has proved by a preponderance of the evidence that claims 3, 14, and 17 would have been obvious over Burger and Robinson.” slip op. at 36
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“We find that, after Burger’s network server 114 authenticates a user’s pocket vault ID, the user is granted access to pocket vault 102 and can select a transaction from a displayed menu, including use of a credit card. subsequent access to that credit card information, either by displaying it or through token 102a, is because network server 114 sent a communication to pocket vault 102 indicating that it successfully authenticated the pocket vault. Ex. 1003 ¶ 115. This is the obvious inference a skilled artisan would have drawn from Burger’s description of authenticating the pocket vault and subsequently allowing credit card information to be used. Thus, we find that, in this example, the operator of network server 114 is a third party that operates a trusted authority, the principle parties to the transaction are the user of pocket vault 102 and the retailer, and a message from network server 114 to pocket vault 102 allowing the credit card to be used (displayed or encoded in the token) is an access message allowing the user access to the application (file with credit card information). Accordingly, we find that this example of Burger teaches claim limitations 1.4 and 1.5.” slip op. at 22
Patent outcomesUS 8,886,954 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,886,954 - Yealink (USA) Network Technology Co., Ltd. / Yealink Network Technology Co., Ltd. v. Barco NVInstitutedPTAB · Oct 7, 2025 · IPR2025-00598 · APJ David C Mckone · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted inter partes review of claims 1–31 on all petitioned grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on obviousness over Beel and Dinka and over van de Laar and Kaplan.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“We have authority to determine whether to institute an inter partes review. See 35 U.S.C. § 314; 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a). The standard for instituting an inter partes review is set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), which provides that an inter partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” For the reasons explained below, we institute an inter partes review of the ’347 patent.” slip op. at 2
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner
“Patent Owner argues that Dr. Almeroth does not provide a reason why a skilled artisan would have been motivated to combine Beel and Dinka, and that, instead, he “summarily concludes that Skype’s status as ‘well-known’ somehow would have motivated the combination of Dinka with Beel.” Prelim. Resp. 15–16. We disagree. Dr. Almeroth testifies that Skype, as taught in Dinka, would have been an example of the type of application that would have run on Beel’s system and that applying Dinka’s teachings would have improved Beel’s similar system in the same manner as it improved Dinka’s, with predictable results. Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 103, 129. See also KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 417 (2007) (“[W]hen a patent ‘simply arranges old elements with each performing the same function it had been known to perform’ and yields no more than one would expect from such an arrangement, the combination is obvious.” (quoting Sakraida v. Ag Pro, Inc., 425 U.S. 273, 282 (1976))). On the current record, including Dr. Almeroth’s testimony, Petitioner’s proposed reasons to combine the teachings of Beel and Dinka have rational underpinning.” slip op. at 21
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of success › Teaching awayTeaching away not foundDecided for petitioner
“A reference may be said to teach away when a person of ordinary skill, upon reading the reference, would be discouraged from following the path set out in the reference, or would be led in a direction divergent from the path that was taken by the applicant.” In re Gurley, 27 F.3d 551, 553 (Fed. Cir. 1994). Patent Owner’s argument is unpersuasive at least because Dinka expressly describes using VoIP technology on computer terminals 102. Ex. 1006, 5:45–48 (“A plurality of computer terminals 102 are shown coupled to the Internet 101, each comprising a network interface for communicating over the Internet.”), 6:7–8 (“Each computer terminal 102 is installed with a communication client application 110.”), 6:23–26 (“The communication client applications 110 [of computer terminals 102] and 113 [of television sets 103] are preferably peer-to-peer clients for setting-up and conducting VoIP calls according to peer-to-peer principles as discussed above.”). Thus, Dinka does not lead a skilled artisan in a direction divergent from the path taken in the ’347 patent. Moreover, “[a] reference may be read for all that it teaches, including uses beyond its primary purpose.” In re Mouttet, 686 F.3d 1322 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2012). Thus, even though Dinka expresses a preference for conducting VoIP calls using a television set, a skilled artisan still would have considered Dinka’s teaching of using computers for such calls. See id. at 1334 (“This court has further explained that just because better alternatives exist in the prior art does not mean that an inferior combination is inapt for obviousness purposes.”). Patent Owner’s teaching-away argument is unpersuasive. slip op. at 22
- Expert testimonyOther
“a skilled artisan would have been motivated to combine Beel and Dinka, and that, instead, he “summarily concludes that Skype’s status as ‘well-known’ somehow would have motivated the combination of Dinka with Beel.” Prelim. Resp. 15–16. We disagree. Dr. Almeroth testifies that Skype, as taught in Dinka, would have been an example of the type of application that would have run on Beel’s system and that applying Dinka’s teachings would have improved Beel’s similar system in the same manner as it improved Dinka’s, with predictable results. Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 103, 129. See also KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 417 (2007) (“[W]hen a patent ‘simply arranges old elements with each performing the same function it had been known to perform’ and yields no more than one would expect from such an arrangement, the combination is obvious.” (quoting Sakraida v. Ag Pro, Inc., 425 U.S. 273, 282 (1976))). On the current record, including Dr. Almeroth’s testimony, Petitioner’s proposed reasons to combine the teachings of Beel and Dinka have rational underpinning.” slip op. at 21
§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,966,347 - Yealink (USA) Network Technology Co., Ltd. / Yealink Network Technology Co., Ltd. v. Barco NVInstitutedPTAB · Oct 7, 2025 · IPR2025-00597 · APJ David C Mckone · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted review of claims 1–22 on all asserted grounds after finding a reasonable likelihood that claims 1–22 would have been obvious over Beel and Dinka.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“In sum, on the current record, Petitioner has shown a reasonable likelihood that claim 1 would have been obvious over Beel and Dinka. f) Claims 2–22 The parties present their arguments for independent claim 11 along with those for claim 1. Pet. 44–45; Prelim. Resp. 19, 23. Claims 2–10 and 22 depend, directly or indirectly, from claim 1. Claims 12–21 depend, directly or indirectly, from claim 11. Patent Owner does not present separate arguments for claim 11 or the dependent claims. We have analyzed Petitioner’s arguments and evidence for claims 2–22 (Pet. 36–46) and, on the current record, conclude that Petitioner has shown sufficiently that claims 2–22 would have been obvious over Beel and Dinka.” slip op. at 25
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“III. ANALYSIS A. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner, relying on the testimony of Dr. Almeroth and alleged admissions by Patent Owner in litigation, contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had “a Master of Science (M.S.) degree in electrical engineering or computer science, and five years of work experience in a related field” and that “[a]dditional educational experience could substitute for some of the work experience.” Pet. 8 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 36–37). “Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s proposed level of skill in the art at this time.” Prelim. Resp. 6. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s description of the level of ordinary skill in the art, as it is consistent with the technology described in the ’346 patent and the asserted prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 7
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed petitioner constructionNo construction neededOther
“Patent Owner accepts the Petition’s claim construction for the purposes of” the Preliminary Response. Prelim. Resp. 5–6. In light of Patent Owner’s acceptance, and because the proposed constructions are, on this record, consistent with the evidence cited by Petitioner, we, too, accept Petitioner’s proposals for “providing simulations or translations, as required,” and “data transformations,” as recited in claim 1, for purposes of this Decision. Based on the record before us, we do not find it necessary to provide express claim constructions of any other claim terms. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (noting that “we need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). slip op. at 8
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner
“Patent Owner argues that Dr. Almeroth does not provide a reason why a skilled artisan would have been motivated to combine Beel and Dinka, and that, instead, he “summarily concludes that Skype’s status as ‘well-known’ somehow would have motivated the combination of Dinka with Beel.” Prelim. Resp. 16. We disagree. Dr. Almeroth testifies that Skype, as taught in Dinka, would have been an example of the type of application that would have run on Beel’s system and that applying Dinka’s teachings would have improved Beel’s similar system in the same manner as it improved Dinka’s, with predictable results. Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 117, 132. See also KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 417 (2007) (“[W]hen a patent ‘simply arranges old elements with each performing the same function it had been known to perform’ and yields no more than one would expect from such an arrangement, the combination is obvious.” (quoting Sakraida v. Ag Pro, Inc., 425 U.S. 273, 282 (1976))). On the current record, including Dr. Almeroth’s testimony, Petitioner’s proposed reasons to combine the teachings of Beel and Dinka have rational underpinning.” slip op. at 17
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,966,346 - Apple Inc. v. Proxense, LLCInstitutedPTAB · Oct 2, 2025 · IPR2025-00562 · APJ Thu A Dang · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted review of claims 1–20 on all three § 103 grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that at least one challenged claim is unpatentable.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“whether to institute an inter partes review. Applying the standard set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), which requires demonstration of a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail with respect to at least one challenged claim, we grant Petitioner’s request and institute an inter partes review of all challenged claims.” slip op. at 2
- Prior constructionPrior construction not adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Court provided a construction for “one or more of the integrated RDC and integrated PDK enabling one or more of an application, a function, and a service,” as recited in claim 1, and “enablement signal enabling one or more of an application, a function and a service.” Prelim. Resp. 1–6. Although Patent Owner points to the District Court’s Memorandum in Support of Claim Construction Order (id. (citing Ex. 2001, 25–26)) to support its contention that the District Court construed the term “enabled,” as we determined in the prior proceedings, this portion of the District Court’s Memorandum merely discusses that “hybrid device” is not indefinite, and discusses exemplary operations of the “hybrid device” from which a POSITA “could reasonably ascertain the scope of the claim.” See Ex. 2001, 26; see also IPR2024-00405, Paper 8 at 11–12; IPR2024-00407, Paper 8 at 12–13; IPR2024-00784, Paper 12 at 10–11. That is, a determination of whether a term is indefinite is not the same thing as construing a claim term. Thus, as we previously explained, by determining that “hybrid device” is not indefinite, the District Court did not construe the term “enabled.” Ex. 2001, 26. Accordingly, although the referenced portion of the District Court’s Memorandum indicates that a POSITA could reasonably ascertain the scope of the claim (id.), nothing in the Memorandum provides a construction of “enabled” as Patent Owner contends. Prelim. Resp. 5. That is, we are unpersuaded that the District Court construed that “‘[a]n application, function, or service is ‘enabled’ by a PDK when it receives information from a PDK in exchange for an access key” or that “hybrid device” includes “an RDC that ‘enable[es] one or more of an application, a function, and a service’ when it forwards such a message to the application, function, or service.” Id. (emphasis omitted, alteration in original). Thus, as in the prior proceedings, we determine that “enabl[ing] one or more of an application a function, and a service” does not require receiving information from a PDK in exchange for an access key or forwarding a message to the application, function, or service.” Id.; see also IPR2024-00405, Paper 8 at 11–12; IPR2024-00407, Paper 8 at 12–13; IPR2024-00784, Paper 12 at 10–11.” slip op. at 10
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Only those terms in controversy need to be construed, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))). Petitioner proposes claim construction for “Personal Digital Key (PDK).” Pet. 8–9. Patent Owner does not take issue with Petitioner’s proposed construction for “PDK” but instead requests that we “follow the District Court’s construction” for “one or more of the integrated RDC and integrated PDK enabling one or more of an application, a function, and a service,” as recited in claim 1, and “enablement signal enabling one or more of an application, a function and a service,” with respect to claim 10. Prelim. Resp. 1–2. Because the parties do not take issue with each other’s proposed claim constructions, there is no term of the challenged claims that is in controversy, and thus, we determine that no term requires explicit construction. See Realtime, 912 F.3d at 1375. However, although it is not necessary to construe the term to resolve the disputed issues before us, we note that Patent Owner provides arguments with respect to “enabling one or more of an application, a function, and a service” recited in claims 1 and 10. Prelim. Resp. 1–2. We addressed similar arguments with respect to these terms in previous proceedings with related patents (see IPR2024-00405, Paper 8 at 11–12; IPR2024-00407, Paper 8 at 12–13; IPR2024-00784, Paper 12 at 10–11), and we similarly address Patent Owner’s contention in this proceeding.” slip op. at 7
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundInstituted
“have been motivated to integrate an RDC into Giobbi ’157’s hybrid device for communication with external PDKs based, in part on the teachings of Giobbi ’139.” Pet. 27. In particular, Petitioner contends that Giobbi ’139 “expressly teaches integrating an RDC into the same type of hybrid device disclosed in Giobbi ’157, a cell phone,” wherein “a ‘Personal Digital Key Digital Content Security System (PDK-DCSS) is used to protect computers from unauthorized use and protect the digital content stored on computers from being wrongfully accessed, copied, and/or distributed.’” Id. at 28 (citing Ex. 1005, Abstract). According to Petitioner, “Giobbi ’139 teaches that RDCs should be incorporated into hybrid devices like cell phones because these devices ‘commonly included’ data storage,” wherein “Giobbi ’139 identified such a configuration as an ‘enhancement.” Pet. 29 (citing Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 87–88). Further, according to Petitioner, “Giobbi ’157 teaches that it is advantageous to incorporate PDKs into ‘commonly carried items,’ like phone, since it would eliminate the need for a user to carry a separate PDK device and would reduce the risk of loss.” Id. at 30 (citing Ex. 1005 ¶ 35; Ex. 1003 ¶ 48). In addition, Petitioner contends that “the Dua patent’s RFID system configuration also provides motivation to integrate and RDC into Giobbi ’157’s hybrid device.” Id. In particular, according to Petitioner, “Dua teaches a hybrid device—e.g., a cell phone—which establishes wireless connections with other devices to enable functions and exchange data.” Id. (citing Ex. 1006, 6:46–65).” slip op. at 18
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 9,049,188
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.