- ROKU, Inc. v. Universal Electronics Inc.Adverse judgmentPTAB · Dec 28, 2023 · IPR2021-00263 · APJ Russell E Cass · IPR · Adverse judgment
The Board entered adverse judgment against Patent Owner on claims 1–11 because Patent Owner cancelled all challenged claims in a co-pending reexamination.
RulingsAdverse judgment- RehearingRehearing, grantedGranted
“After our Denial Decision, the Director issued an Interim Procedure for Discretionary Denials in AIA Post-Grant Proceedings with Parallel District Court Litigation (“Interim Fintiv Guidance”)1, directing that “[t]he PTAB will not discretionarily deny petitions based on applying Fintiv to a 1 The Interim Fintiv Guidance is available at https://www.uspto.gov/ sites/default/files/documents/interim_proc_discretionary_denials_ aia_parallel_district_court_litigation_memo_20220621_.pdf. parallel ITC proceeding.” Interim Fintiv Guidance, 7. Following the Federal Circuit’s decision, we conducted a conference call with counsel for the parties and allowed the parties to submit additional briefing to address the status of the case, the status of any related proceedings, the Interim Fintiv Guidance, and any actions that should be taken by the panel at this point concerning this proceeding. Papers 16–18. After considering the parties’ arguments, we granted Petitioner’s Request for Rehearing on February 8, 2023, concluding that, in light of the Interim Fintiv Guidance, exercising discretion to deny institution under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) was not warranted in this case. Paper 19, 5–12. We also determined that Petitioner had demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of success in proving that the challenged claims were unpatentable, and instituted an inter partes review of claims 1–11 of the ’317 patent with respect to all grounds set forth in the Petition. Id. at 12–37.” slip op. at 2
- Adverse judgmentAdverse judgmentGranted
“(b) Request for adverse judgment. A party may request judgment against itself at any time during a proceeding. Actions construed to be a request for adverse judgment include: . . . (2) Cancellation or disclaimer of a claim such that the party has no remaining claim in the trial. 37 C.F.R. § 42.73(b). In the ’074 Reexam, Patent Owner cancelled all of challenged claims 1–11, and the USPTO has issued a Reexamination Certificate indicating that these claims are cancelled. Ex. 2100, 2; Ex. 1046, 1:15. The Board has previously construed a patent owner’s cancellation in a reexamination of all claims challenged in a pending IPR as a request for adverse judgment under § 42.73(b). See Tarsco Bolted Tank Inc. v. Tank Connection, LLC, IPR2016-01634, Paper 16 at 2 (PTAB Aug. 24, 2017) (“Cancellation of claims 1–11” in an ex parte reexamination “is construed as a request for adverse judgment” in the corresponding IPR proceeding.); Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC v. Signal IP, Inc., IPR2015-00941, Paper 21 at 2–3 (PTAB Apr. 14, 2016) (“Pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 42.73(b), we construe cancellation of all claims involved in this proceeding” in “a concurrent Reexamination of the” patent at issue “as a request for adverse judgment.”). We agree with the prior decisions in Tarsco and Mercedes-Benz that a patent owner’s cancellation of all challenged claims in an IPR in a co-pending ex parte reexamination is properly construed as a request for adverse judgment under 37 C.F.R. § 42.73(b). Consequently, we construe Patent Owner’s cancellation of all of the claims challenged in this IPR in the ’074 Reexam as a request for adverse judgment.” slip op. at 5
NonePatents in suitUS 10,600,317 - Unified Patents, LLC v. VL Collective IP LLCSome claims unpatentablePTAB · Dec 18, 2023 · IPR2022-01086 · APJ Patrick M Boucher · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1, 3, 5, 9, 12, 13, and 15 are unpatentable over Sonohara; claims 20 and 21 were not shown unpatentable because Sonohara’s assignment rule is based on timestamps.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Patent Owner’s expert, Dr. Goodrich, proposes what Patent Owner characterizes as “a somewhat different level,” namely “an individual with at least a bachelor’s degree in Computer Science or related area and two years of experience developing software tools and/or computer systems for use in the area of audio or video creation, encoding, and/or distribution.” PO Resp. 13; Ex. 2007 ¶ 50. Although we agree that the respective articulations are “somewhat different,” they are generally similar, and our Decision does not depend on nuanced distinctions regarding the level of ordinary skill. Indeed, Dr. Goodrich describes his proposed articulation as “approximate,” such that “more work experience could compensate for less education or more education could compensate for less work experience.” Ex. 2007 ¶ 50. Because we find Petitioner’s proposal reasonable, consistent with the level of skill reflected by the prior art, and supported by Dr. Freedman’s testimony, we adopt it for this Decision. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the prior art may reflect an appropriate level of skill in the art). We nevertheless note that we would reach the same ultimate conclusion that claims 1, 3, 5, 9, 12, 13, and 15 (but not claims 20 and 21) have been shown to be unpatentable by a preponderance of the evidence were we to adopt Patent Owner’s proposal. See PO Resp. 13 (“this Response establishes that Petitioner’s arguments fail even under its preferred definition of the level of ordinary skill”).” slip op. at 12
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Preamble limiting or notNot reached
“We need not resolve this dispute because we reach the same ultimate conclusion that Petitioner shows, by a preponderance of the evidence, that claims 1, 3, 5, 9, 12, 13, and 15 are unpatentable, but not that claims 20 and 21 are unpatentable, even if we apply Patent Owner’s proposed construction that the preambles are limiting and the first and second data files must be different. See Reply 15 (Petitioner asserting that “there is no need to construe the preambles as the prior art meets them even if construed”); Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“[W]e need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))). For purposes of this Decision, we accordingly treat the preambles of independent claims 1 and 9 as limiting, and with the recited “first data file” and “second data file” as distinct data files.4” slip op. at 14
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Lexicography (patentee as own lexicographer)Term construed board ownDecided for patent owner
“We agree with Patent Owner’s contention that the emphasized sentence defines the term “content-related.” See PO Resp. 15–16 (Patent Owner arguing that “[t]here are thus three strong indications of lexicography: (1) ‘content-related’ is set off by quotation marks; (2) the patentee used the word ‘is’ to describe the term ‘content-related’; and (3) the patentee states what ‘content-related’ is ‘understood to mean.’” Nor does Petitioner disagree that the sentence is definitional. See Tr. 8:15–16 (referring to the “term content-related as it’s defined in the specification”). Indeed, in the Starz litigation, the district court also treated the sentence as definitional, a fact that we find significant as a matter of comity. See Ex. 1018, 111:24–112:1 (district court judge stating at Markman hearing, “I’m going to adopt . . . the express definition provided in the specification”). But like the district court, we discern insufficient reason to adopt the additional gloss that Patent Owner seeks to apply to the definition of “content-related.” That is, Patent Owner proposes that we additionally construe the phrase “syntactical meaning” within the definitional statement to arrive at Patent Owner’s proposed construction. PO Resp. 16–20. According to Patent Owner, “[t]he specification makes clear, through its use of consistent and repeated examples, that ‘syntactical meaning’ requires a specific relationship between the data segments within a data file: succeeding data segments within a data file must be ordered so as to present the content in its intended sequence when rendered.” Id. at 17 (citing VirnetX Inc. v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 767 F.3d 1308, 1317–19 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Alloc, Inc. v. ITC, 342 F.3d 1361, 1368–71 (Fed. Cir. 2003)). Patent Owner adds that the claims, the context provided by the problems solved by the ’794 patent, and the cross-examination testimony of Petitioner’s expert, Dr. Freedman, all support this additional aspect of Patent Owner’s proposed construction. Id. at 18–20. Relying on additional direct testimony by Dr. Freedman, Petitioner counters this position as “improperly import[ing] limitations from the specification that are not required by the claims” and “render[ing] other portions of claim 1 superfluous.” Reply 3 (citing Ex. 1016 ¶ 22); see Tr. 10:18–20 (Petitioner explaining at oral hearing that “the syntax information is simply just identification information which is used to find out what the order of the files is. But the identification information does not by itself indicate the order. It’s just an identifier.”). We agree with Petitioner that it would be imprudent to adopt Patent Owner’s additional gloss because, “[w]hile claims must be construed in light of the specification, . . . limitations from the specification are not to be read into the claims, . . . for ‘[i]t is the claims that measure the invention.’” Golight, Inc. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 355 F.3d 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (quoting SRI Int’l v. Matsushita Elec. Corp. of Am., 775 F.2d 1107, 1121 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (other citations omitted). It is apparent that the Applicant for the ’794 patent understood how to define terminology recited in the claims, but chose to limit its definition of “content-related” in terms of the broader phrase “syntactical meaning” rather than through narrower specific reference to presentation order. In addition, claims 1 and 9 already specify “sequentially outputting the first and second data segments according to their chronological sequence,” which supports Petitioner’s observation that requiring an additional sequential order to “content-related . . . data segments” renders other portions of claim 1 superfluous. See Reply 3. We accordingly adopt the definitional construction provided by the” slip op. at 16
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Prosecution history disclaimer / disavowalDisclaimer not foundDecided for petitioner
“As a basic principle of claim interpretation, prosecution disclaimer promotes the public notice function of the intrinsic evidence and protects the public’s reliance on definitive statements made during prosecution.” Omega Engineering, Inc. v. Raytek Corp., 334 F.3d 1314, 1323 (Fed Cir. 2003) (citing Digital Biometrics, Inc. v. Identix, Inc., 149 F.3d 1335, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 1998)) (emphasis added). As such, a statement during prosecution qualifies as a disavowal of claim scope only if it is “so clear as to show reasonable clarity and deliberateness” and “so unmistakable as to be unambiguous evidence of disclaimer.” Id. at 1325 (citations omitted). “Consequently, for prosecution disclaimer to attach, [Federal Circuit] precedent requires that the alleged disavowing actions or statements made during prosecution be both clear and unmistakable.” Id. at 1325–26. “The party seeking to invoke prosecution history disclaimer bears the burden of proving the existence of a clear and unmistakable disclaimer that would have been evident to one skilled in the art.” Mass. Inst. of Tech. v. Shire Pharms., Inc., 839 F.3d 1111, 1119 (Fed. Cir. 2016). And “[s]tatements by the patent owner are not considered in a vacuum; rather, the skilled artisan would look at the record as a whole in assessing claim scope.” Galderma Lab’s v. Amneal Pharma, 806 F. App’x 1007, 1010 (Fed. Cir. 2022) (citing Wang Labs., Inc. v. Toshiba Corp., 993 F.2d 858, 867 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (“The prosecution history must be examined as a whole in determining whether estoppel applies.”)). We have reviewed the prosecution history, which we summarize supra § I.A.3., and we have particularly reviewed those portions highlighted by Patent Owner. See PO Resp. 32–40. We reach the same conclusion as the district court in the Starz litigation that the standard for attachment of prosecution disclaimer is not met. See Ex. 1018, 109:15–22 (district court stating at Markman hearing, “I’ve also carefully reviewed the portions of the prosecution history relied on by VideoLabs, including the patentee’s arguments regarding the Shin and Rosenau references, and I’m up [sic: not6] persuaded there was a clear and unmistakable disclaimer of all assignment rules that perform assignments by using exact timing information”). slip op. at 20
Patent outcomesUS 8,605,794 mixedClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,605,794 - Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. / Micron Technology, Inc. et al. v. Netlist, Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Dec 6, 2023 · IPR2023-00406 · APJ Jon M Jurgovan · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–30 are unpatentable as obvious over Grounds 1–3; the Board did not reach Grounds 4–5 and dismissed Petitioner’s motion to exclude as moot.
RulingsFinal written decision- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner
“e) Conclusion on Motivation to Combine Harris and the FBDIMM Standards On this record, Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have combined Harris and the FBDIMM standards since Harris states that its memory module may include fully buffered DIMMs (FBDs). Ex. 1023 ¶ 9. We agree that one of ordinary skill in the art would have recognized Harris’s mention of FBDIMMs as a standard and looked to the FBDIMM Standards for information concerning the voltage values standardized for use in an FBDIMM. Ex. 1027, 83; Ex. 1028, 9. For these reasons and others set forth above, we determine that one of ordinary skill in the art would have combined Harris and the FBDIMM Standards with a reasonable expectation of success.” slip op. at 41
- ExcludeMotion to exclude, deniedDenied
“H. Motion to Exclude Petitioner seeks to exclude materials referenced in three URLs submitted with Patent Owner’s Sur-Reply on August 4, 2023. Paper 33 (citing Paper 31, 1 n.2, 24, 26). Because we do not rely on any of these URLs in a manner adverse to Petitioner, we dismiss the Motion to Exclude as moot.” slip op. at 89
Patent outcomesUS 11,016,918 unpatentable§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,016,918 - Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. / Micron Technology, Inc. et al. v. Netlist, Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Dec 6, 2023 · IPR2022-00996 · APJ Jon M Jurgovan · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–30 are unpatentable as obvious over Grounds 1–3; Grounds 4–5 were not reached because those claims were already shown unpatentable.
RulingsFinal written decision- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner
“e) Conclusion on Motivation to Combine Harris and the FBDIMM Standards On this record, Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have combined Harris and the FBDIMM standards since Harris states that its memory module may include fully buffered DIMMs (FBDs). Ex. 1023 ¶ 9. We agree that one of ordinary skill in the art would have recognized Harris’s mention of FBDIMMs as a standard and looked to the FBDIMM Standards for information concerning the voltage values standardized for use in an FBDIMM. Ex. 1027, 83; Ex. 1028, 9. For these reasons and others set forth above, we determine that one of ordinary skill in the art would have combined Harris and the FBDIMM Standards with a reasonable expectation of success.” slip op. at 41
- ExcludeMotion to exclude, deniedDenied
“H. Motion to Exclude Petitioner seeks to exclude materials referenced in three URLs submitted with Patent Owner’s Sur-Reply on August 4, 2023. Paper 33 (citing Paper 31, 1 n.2, 24, 26). Because we do not rely on any of these URLs in a manner adverse to Petitioner, we dismiss the Motion to Exclude as moot.” slip op. at 89
- BurdenFwd all claims unpatentableUnpatentable
“a preponderance of the evidence that claims 1–30 of the ’918 patent are unpatentable. V. ORDER Accordingly, it is: ORDERED that claims 1–30 of the ’918 patent have been shown to be unpatentable;” slip op. at 89
Patent outcomesUS 11,016,918 unpatentable§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,016,918 - Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. / Micron Technology, Inc. et al. v. Netlist, Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Dec 5, 2023 · IPR2023-00405 · APJ Jon M Jurgovan · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–30 are unpatentable as obvious over Harris, the FBDIMM Standards, and Amidi; the Board did not reach the Spiers grounds.
RulingsFinal written decision- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedOther
“the combination of Harris and FBDIMM Standards and relies on the Declaration of Dr. Andrew Wolfe (Ex. 1003) in support. Pet. 14–40. For the reasons that follow, we are persuaded that the evidence, including Dr. Wolfe’s testimony, supports Petitioner’s showing and establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that these claims are unpatentable.” slip op. at 17
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner asserts a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have had an advanced degree in electrical or computer engineering, or a related field, and two years working or studying in the field of design or development of memory systems, or a bachelor’s degree in such engineering disciplines and at least three years working in the field.” Pet. 7–8 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 61). Petitioner contends that additional training can substitute for educational or research experience, and vice versa. Id. at 8. Petitioner asserts that such a hypothetical person would have been familiar with the JEDEC industry standards, and knowledgeable about the design and operation of standardized DRAM and SDRAM memory devices and memory modules and how they interacted with a memory controller and other parts of a computer system, including standard communication busses and protocols, such as PCI and SMBus busses and protocols. Id. Petitioner further contends that such “a hypothetical person would also have been familiar with the structure and operation of circuitry used to access and control computer memories, including sophisticated circuits such as ASICs, FPGAs, and CPLDs, and more low-level circuits such as tri-state buffers.” Id. Petitioner further asserts that such “a hypothetical person would further have been familiar with voltage supply requirements of such structures (e.g., memory modules, memory devices, memory controller, and associated access and control circuitry), including voltage conversion and voltage regulation circuitry.” Id. Patent Owner indicates “[f]or the purposes of this [Response], Patent Owner is applying the level of ordinary skill in the art proposed by Petitioner.” Resp. 2. The evidence that Petitioner presents mostly applies to the educational level and experience of workers in the field, but also touches upon other factors as well, including problems and solutions in the prior art and complexity of the technology. See Pet. 7–8. We find Petitioner’s proposal is consistent with the level of skill in the art reflected by the ’054 patent and the prior art of record, and, therefore, we adopt Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art, with the exception of the open-ended language “at least,” which introduces ambiguity and may encompass skill levels beyond ordinary.” slip op. at 11
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Preamble limiting or notPreamble limitingDecided for patent owner
“The District Court’s Claim Construction Order (Ex. 2032) issued after our Institution Decision (Paper 11). Although Petitioner argued in the District Court litigation that the claim preambles were not limiting, Petitioner does not appear to maintain that argument here following the District Court’s determination that the preambles are limiting. Ex. 2032, 35. Since the term is recited in both the preambles and bodies of these claims, there is evidence that the inventors of the ’054 patent intended the term to limit the claim, as the District Court determined. See Catalina Mktg. Int’l., Inc. v. Coolsavings,com, Inc., 289 F.3d 801, 808 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (citing Bell Commc’ns Rsch., Inc. v. Vitalink Communications Corp., 55 F.3d 615, 620 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (“dependence on a particular disputed preamble phrase for antecedent basis may limit claim scope because it indicates a reliance on both the preamble and claim body to define the claimed invention.”)).” slip op. at 16
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for patent owner
“We agree with Petitioner’s contention that “memory module” is not limited to “main memory modules . . . designed to connect to the primary memory controller.” See Reply 2. The ’054 patent states In certain embodiments, the device contains a high density Flash memory with a low density DRAM, wherein the DRAM is used as a data buffer for read/write operation. The Flash serves as the main memory. Ex. 1001, 11:3–6 (emphases added). This is the only mention of “main memory” in the ’054 patent. That the Flash memory serves as “main memory” in “certain embodiments” implies that there may be other embodiments in which this is not the case. Accordingly, we agree with Petitioner that the term “memory module” is not limited to “main memory modules . . . designed to connect to the primary memory controller.” We agree with Patent Owner that the “memory module” includes structure to connect with a “host system” including its memory controller. See, e.g., Ex. 1001, code (57), 12:52–59. The claims do not mention a “memory controller,” but they do mention that the “memory module” has an “interface” to connect with a “host system.” Ex. 1001, 38:20–25 (claim 1), 39:63–65 (claim 16), 41:6–8 (claim 24). That the “memory module” has structure for connecting to the host system’s memory controller may thus be implied from the claims. We agree with Petitioner that the District Court’s determination was that the preambles (presumably of claims 1, 4, 6, 11, 16 and 25) are limiting. Ex. 2032, 35. To the extent that the District Court’s determination construed “memory module” to include structure necessary to connect to a memory controller, our construction of “memory module” is consistent.” slip op. at 16
Patent outcomesUS 11,232,054 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,232,054 - Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. / Micron Technology, Inc. et al. v. Netlist, Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Dec 5, 2023 · IPR2022-00999 · APJ Jon M Jurgovan · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–30 are unpatentable as obvious over Harris, the FBDIMM Standards, and Amidi, with Hajeck also supporting Ground 3; Grounds 4 and 5 were not reached.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“art include “(1) the educational level of the inventor; (2) type of problems encountered in the art; (3) prior art solutions to those problems; (4) rapidity with which innovations are made; (5) sophistication of the technology; and (6) educational level of active workers in the field.” Envtl. Designs, Ltd. v. Union Oil Co. of Cal., 713 F.2d 693, 696 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (citing Orthopedic Equip. Co. v. All Orthopedic Appliances, Inc., 707 F.2d 1376, 1381–82 (Fed. Cir. 1983)). “Not all such factors may be present in every case, and one or more of these or other factors may predominate in a particular case.” Id. at 696–97. The prior art may reflect an appropriate level of skill. Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1354–55 (Fed. Cir. 2001). Petitioner asserts a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have had an advanced degree in electrical or computer engineering, or a related field, and two years working or studying in the field of design or development of memory systems, or a bachelor’s degree in such engineering disciplines and at least three years working in the field.” Pet. 7–8 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 61). Petitioner contends that additional training can substitute for educational or research experience, and vice versa. Id. at 8. Petitioner asserts that such a hypothetical person would have been familiar with the JEDEC industry standards, and knowledgeable about the design and operation of standardized DRAM and SDRAM memory devices and memory modules and how they interacted with a memory controller and other parts of a computer system, including standard communication busses and protocols, such as PCI and SMBus busses and protocols. Id. Petitioner further contends that such “a hypothetical person would also have been familiar with the structure and operation of circuitry used to access and control computer memories, including sophisticated circuits such as ASICs, FPGAs, and CPLDs, and more low-level circuits such as tri-state buffers.” Id. Petitioner further asserts that such “a hypothetical person would further have been familiar with voltage supply requirements of such structures (e.g., memory modules, memory devices, memory controller, and associated access and control circuitry), including voltage conversion and voltage regulation circuitry.” Id. Patent Owner indicates “[f]or the purposes of this [Response], Patent Owner is applying the level of ordinary skill in the art proposed by Petitioner.” Resp. 2. The evidence that Petitioner presents mostly applies to the educational level and experience of workers in the field, but also touches upon other factors as well, including problems and solutions in the prior art and complexity of the technology. See Pet. 7–8. We find Petitioner’s proposal is consistent with the level of skill in the art reflected by the ’054 patent and the prior art of record, and, therefore, we adopt Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art, with the exception of the open-ended language “at least,” which introduces ambiguity and may encompass skill levels beyond ordinary.” slip op. at 11
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Preamble limiting or notPreamble limitingDecided for patent owner
“The District Court’s Claim Construction Order (Ex. 2032) issued after our Institution Decision (Paper 11). Although Petitioner argued in the District Court litigation that the claim preambles were not limiting, Petitioner does not appear to maintain that argument here following the District Court’s determination that the preambles are limiting. Ex. 2032, 35. Since the term is recited in both the preambles and bodies of these claims, there is evidence that the inventors of the ’054 patent intended the term to limit the claim, as the District Court determined. See Catalina Mktg. Int’l., Inc. v. Coolsavings,com, Inc., 289 F.3d 801, 808 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (citing Bell Commc’ns Rsch., Inc. v. Vitalink Communications Corp., 55 F.3d 615, 620 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (“dependence on a particular disputed preamble phrase for antecedent basis may limit claim scope because it indicates a reliance on both the preamble and claim body to define the claimed invention.”)).” slip op. at 16
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for patent owner
“We agree with Patent Owner that the “memory module” includes structure to connect with a “host system” including its memory controller. See, e.g., Ex. 1001, code (57), 12:52–59. The claims do not mention a “memory controller,” but they do mention that the “memory module” has an “interface” to connect with a “host system.” Ex. 1001, 38:20–25 (claim 1), 39:63–65 (claim 16), 41:6–8 (claim 24). That the “memory module” has structure for connecting to the host system’s memory controller may thus be implied from the claims. We agree with Petitioner that the District Court’s determination was that the preambles (presumably of claims 1, 4, 6, 11, 16 and 25) are limiting. Ex. 2032, 35. To the extent that the District Court’s determination construed “memory module” to include structure necessary to connect to a memory controller, our construction of “memory module” is consistent.” slip op. at 17
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner
“conversion for double-rank DIMMs can be accommodated with a form factor design of approximately about one square inch (both sides of the printed circuit board).” Ex. 1023 ¶ 13. Thus, Harris indicates that the VRM circuitry to generate two regulated voltages can fit within this space. Patent Owner argues that Petitioner’s evidence shows that each ADP1821 converter package would be about 0.193 by 0.236 inches. Sur-Reply 12 (citing Ex. 1078, 20–23). This means three ADP1821 converters would occupy about 40% of the available space. Patent Owner does not demonstrate that the remaining 60% of available space would have been insufficient to accommodate the additional components required for three voltage converters. Id. at 12–13. In any case, we do not view Harris’s disclosure of “approximately about one square inch” to limit the applicability of its teachings to a person of ordinary skill in the art. In the same paragraph, Harris states that the form factor “may be suitably modified.” Ex. 1023 ¶ 13. Patent Owner further argues that “independent voltage sources for different voltages would require specific control circuitry to delay and more precisely control each voltage source’s ramping rate, adding complexity and cost without commensurate benefits.” Sur-Reply 14 (citing Ex. 2061 ¶ 90). However, Dr. Wolfe states that it is simpler to use multiple regulators for multiple voltages since a single regulator that generates multiple voltages is more complicated than multiple regulators. Ex. 2060, 53:16–54:14, 89:1–21, cited in Reply 14. Dr. Wolfe further indicates that buck converters can be in some applications “extremely small.” Ex. 2060, 89:11–15. Dr. Wolfe further testifies that multiple smaller converters may be less costly than a larger single converter because of component costs, separated spaces available for converters on circuit board, and other “ordinary engineering factors.” Id. at 45:21–46:10. Although Patent Owner may be correct that individual control of multiple voltage regulators would have required additional control circuitry, this does not meaningfully undermine the benefits that Petitioner mentions including permitting power sequencing, independent control of voltages, improved efficiency without generating excess heat or requiring cooling devices, and saving power. Pet. 29–30 (citing id. at 14–19; Ex. 1028, 17–20; Ex. 1026, 2–3, 9; Ex. 1028, 30–32; Ex. 1040, 1, 23–24 (Figs. 22–25); Ex. 1041, 1, 13; Ex. 1048, 3; Ex. 1058, 5; Ex. 1059, 5:23–30; Ex. 1062, 11, 13; Ex. 1064 ¶ 101; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 240, 255). Dr. Wolfe testified that, in at least some circumstances, multiple converters may be less complicated, less costly, and take up less space. Ex. 2060, 45:21–46:10, 89:11–15. Patent Owner’s argument that a single converter generating multiple voltages would be better in some circumstances does not negate that Petitioner’s proposed use of multiple converters for multiple voltages would have been preferred in other circumstances that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have recognized. See Intel Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 21 F.4th 784, 800 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (“Our caselaw is clear. It’s not necessary to show that a combination is ‘the best option, only that it be a suitable option.’” quoting PAR Pharm., Inc. v. TWI Pharms., Inc., 773 F.3d 1186, 1197–98 (Fed. Cir. 2014)). Thus, Patent Owner’s argument does not undermine Petitioner’s showing of a motivation to combine Harris and the FBDIMM Standards.” slip op. at 25
Patent outcomesUS 11,232,054 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,232,054 - Infinera Corporation v. Alexander Soto And Walter SotoInstitution deniedPTAB · Dec 4, 2023 · IPR2023-00834 · APJ Thu A Dang · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood that claims 1–3, 5, 10–14, and 16–21 were obvious over the cited combinations.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“We accordingly determine that Petitioner does not sufficiently show that Vrazel meets the requirements of the recited step of “converting the first electrical binary data signal in the pluggable optical transceiver module to a first electrical m-ary modulation signal.” We therefore conclude that Petitioner does not demonstrate a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on its challenge of independent claim 1 as unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) over Pang and Vrazel. Each of claims 2, 3, 5, 10, 13, 14, and 16–21 depends directly or indirectly from independent claim 1, and Petitioner challenges these claims as unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) over Pang and Vrazel. Ex. 1001, 15:23–28, 32–35, 16:9–11, 16:18–25, 16:30–43; Pet. 46–56. The deficiency in Petitioner’s analysis of independent claim 1 also applies to each of these dependent claims. We accordingly conclude that Petitioner does not demonstrate a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on its challenge of dependent claims 2, 3, 5, 10, 13, 14, and 16–21. 3. Asserted Obviousness of Claims 11 and 12 over Pang, Vrazel and Yee (Ground 2). Claims 11 and 12 depend directly from claim 1. Petitioner does not rely on Yee to remedy the deficiencies discussed above concerning the “converting” to “m-ary modulation” signal step, but rather relies on its arguments associated with claim 1. See Pet. 59–60. We already addressed those arguments, and we find those arguments unavailing for the reasons stated above. We accordingly conclude that Petitioner does not demonstrate a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on its challenge of dependent claims 11 and 12.” slip op. at 21
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Not reached
“III CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, we deny institution of an inter partes review.2 IV, ORDER In consideration of the foregoing, it is hereby: ORDERED that the Petition is denied, and no trial is instituted. 2 Because we deny the Petition on the merits, we do not reach Patent Owner’s request that we exercise our discretion to deny the Petition under Apple Inc. v. Fintiv, Inc., IPR2020-00019, Paper 11 at 13–14 (PTAB Mar. 20, 2020) (precedential) or under 35 U.S.C. § 325(d). See Prelim. Resp. 33– 54.” slip op. at 23
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsNot reached
“III CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, we deny institution of an inter partes review.2 IV, ORDER In consideration of the foregoing, it is hereby: ORDERED that the Petition is denied, and no trial is instituted. 2 Because we deny the Petition on the merits, we do not reach Patent Owner’s request that we exercise our discretion to deny the Petition under Apple Inc. v. Fintiv, Inc., IPR2020-00019, Paper 11 at 13–14 (PTAB Mar. 20, 2020) (precedential) or under 35 U.S.C. § 325(d). See Prelim. Resp. 33– 54.” slip op. at 23
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“C. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner asserts that a POSITA would have “at least a Bachelor’s degree in Computer Science, Computer Engineering, Electrical Engineering, or a similar degree and at least two years of professional experience with optical communications, networking, and signal processing,” wherein “[m]ore experience can supplement less education and vice versa.” Pet. 6 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 38). Patent Owner does not contest Petitioner’s proposal or offer an alternative. On this record, we are persuaded that Petitioner’s proposal is consistent with the technology described in the Specification and the cited prior art. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposed level of skill.” slip op. at 9
§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,887,795 - Infinera Corporation v. Alexander Soto And Walter SotoInstitution deniedPTAB · Dec 4, 2023 · IPR2023-00838 · APJ Patrick M Boucher · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show that Vrazel’s encoder or encoder and pre-distorter provided the claimed m-ary modulator for claims 1–3, 5, 6, 8, 10–17, 22, and 23.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“We accordingly determine that Petitioner does not sufficiently show that Vrazel meets the requirements of the recited “m-ary modulator” in any of the challenged independent claims. We therefore conclude that Petitioner does not demonstrate a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on its challenge of independent claims 1, 22, or 23 as unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) over Pang and Vrazel.” slip op. at 20
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot reached
“Because it is dispositive, we focus our analysis on each independent claim’s recitation of “an m-ary modulator for increasing the number of bits per symbol in the first electrical data signal to produce a first m-ary modulation signal.” Ex. 1001, 15:6–8 (claim 1), 17:13–15 (claim 22), 18:9– 11 (claim 23). In addressing this limitation, Petitioner relies solely on Vrazel, which Petitioner contends “discloses this limitation in at least two ways.” Pet. 28 (addressing claim 1), 64 (addressing claim 22 by referring to analysis for claim 1), 66 (addressing claim 23 by referring to analysis for claim 1).” slip op. at 16
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“used to construe the claim in a civil action under 35 U.S.C. 282(b), including construing the claim in accordance with the ordinary and customary meaning of such claim as understood by one of ordinary skill in the art and the prosecution history pertaining to the patent.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b) (2019); see Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312–13 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). “Petitioner proposes that each claim term in the Challenged Claims be given its plain and ordinary meaning in this proceeding, and that no specific construction of any claim term is required.” Pet. 6. Patent Owner similarly does not propose any explicit construction of any claim term in its Preliminary Response. On the record before us, we do not find it necessary to construe any term for this Decision. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“[W]e need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 9
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,771,181 - Infinera Corporation v. Alexander Soto And Walter SotoInstitution deniedPTAB · Dec 4, 2023 · IPR2023-00835 · APJ Patrick M Boucher · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because the Petition did not show a reasonable likelihood that claims 1–3, 5–7, 9, and 11–20 were unpatentable over Pang and Vrazel.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“We accordingly determine that Petitioner does not sufficiently show that the Vrazel meets the requirements of the recited “m-ary modulator.” We therefore conclude that Petitioner does not demonstrate a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on its challenge of independent claim 1 as unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) over Pang and Vrazel. F. Dependent Claims Each of claims 2, 3, 5–7, 9, and 11–20 depends directly or indirectly from independent claim 1, and Petitioner challenges those claims as unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) over Pang and Vrazel. Ex. 1001, 15:29–16:33; Pet. 53–67. The deficiency in Petitioner’s analysis of independent claim 1 also applies to each of the dependent claims. We accordingly conclude that Petitioner does not demonstrate a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on its challenge of dependent claims 2, 3, 5–7, 9, and 11–20.” slip op. at 19
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedOther
“Petitioner proposes that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have had at least a Bachelor’s degree in Computer Science, Computer Engineering, Electrical Engineering or a similar degree and at least two years of professional experience with optical communications, networking, and signal processing.” Pet. 7. Petitioner adds that “[m]ore experience can supplement less education and vice versa,” and supports its proposal with testimony by Dr. Min. Id.; Ex. 1003 ¶ 41. Patent Owner does not specifically address the level of ordinary skill in its Preliminary Response. Because we find Petitioner’s proposal reasonable, consistent with the level of skill reflected by the prior art, and supported by Dr. Min’s testimony, we adopt it for purposes of this Decision. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the prior art may reflect an appropriate level of skill in the art).” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“used to construe the claim in a civil action under 35 U.S.C. 282(b), including construing the claim in accordance with the ordinary and customary meaning of such claim as understood by one of ordinary skill in the art and the prosecution history pertaining to the patent.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b) (2019); see Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312–13 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). “Petitioner proposes that each claim term in the Challenged Claims be given its plain and ordinary meaning in this proceeding, and that no specific construction of any claim term is required.” Pet. 6–7. Patent Owner similarly does not propose any explicit construction of any claim term in its Preliminary Response. On the record before us, we do not find it necessary to construe any term for this Decision. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“[W]e need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 9
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot reached
“We accordingly determine that Petitioner does not sufficiently show that the Vrazel meets the requirements of the recited “m-ary modulator.” We therefore conclude that Petitioner does not demonstrate a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on its challenge of independent claim 1 as unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) over Pang and Vrazel. F. Dependent Claims Each of claims 2, 3, 5–7, 9, and 11–20 depends directly or indirectly from independent claim 1, and Petitioner challenges those claims as unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) over Pang and Vrazel. Ex. 1001, 15:29–16:33; Pet. 53–67. The deficiency in Petitioner’s analysis of independent claim 1 also applies to each of the dependent claims. We accordingly conclude that Petitioner does not demonstrate a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on its challenge of dependent claims 2, 3, 5–7, 9, and 11–20.” slip op. at 19
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,263,723 - ROKU, Inc. v. Universal Electronics, Inc.Some claims unpatentablePTAB · Nov 28, 2023 · IPR2022-00943 · APJ Sharon Fenick · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–7, 9–13, 15, and 16 are unpatentable as obvious; claims 8 and 14 were not shown unpatentable.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner argues that: On or before 7/12/2017, [one of ordinary skill in the art] would have had a bachelor’s degree in computer science, in electrical engineering, or a related field, and approximately three years of experience or equivalent study in voice-controlled devices in smart home systems. Additional graduate education could 2 Neither party presents arguments or evidence relating to such objective evidence of nonobviousness. in the field could substitute for formal education. Pet. 18. We adopted this definition for the purposes of the Decision on Institution. Dec. on Inst. 8–9. Patent Owner adopts Petitioner’s definition. PO Resp. 4. We again adopt Petitioner’s definition, which is consistent with the level of skill as reflected in the prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner
“Absent a recitation of order, or an order mandated by grammar or logic, the steps of a method claim are not construed to require a particular order. See, e.g., Altiris, Inc. v. Symantec Corp., 318 F.3d 1363, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2003). Patent Owner argues that the steps of claim 1, a method claim, must be performed in sequential order. PO Resp. 13–16. Without commenting on or conceding Patent Owner’s proposal, Petitioner contends that “the trial grounds meet this proposed construction.” Pet. Reply 24–25; Tr. 8:25–11:16. Our record does not reflect any indication that Patent Owner’s proposed construction requiring the sequential ordering of the method steps is not at least encompassed by the correct construction of claim 1. Because of this, and because Petitioner agrees that the arguments in the Petition meet this construction, we accept Patent Owner’s construction as correct for the purposes of this Decision.” slip op. at 10
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableNot shown unpatentableMixed
“We do not agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner’s showing uses the same sound data to teach the “first sound data” of limitation 1.a and the “second sound data” of limitation 1.c. Patent Owner is correct that Rosenberg’s claim 5 describes the determination of a volume threshold based on the volume of the ambient audio signal in which characteristic form(s) (e.g., the name of the user of the media player) are present. Ex. 1006, 13:66–21, 14:28–30. However, the Petition describes using Fu’s “predetermined threshold” in combination with Hart-787’s device, which attenuates audio output of a device upon detecting a user’s utterance intended to gain the attention of the device, in order to “include adjusting the audio output volume of a wirelessly-linked audio-producing device when the voice-controlled device determines that the ambient noise level at the time a Ex. 1004, 2:22–37, 5:61–6:10, 9:18–25; Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 24, 32, 54; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 88–89). Petitioner further proposes including a threshold that is advantageously based on the environment in which the device is operating as described in Fu, for example to respond to differing levels of noise at different times of day. Id. at 26, 29–30, 40 (citing Ex. 1006, 10:42–67, 14:28–30; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 48–53, 55, 58, 87, 91, 107–109). We agree with Petitioner that Patent Owner’s arguments address the references individually instead of addressing the combination of the teachings proposed in the Petition. See Pet. Reply 8, 13–14; see also Dec. on Inst. 21–22, 23–24, 25–26. The Petition relies upon a combination of elements of Hart-787 with the predetermined threshold as taught in Fu and with establishing such a threshold based on the operating environment of a device as in Rosenberg. Pet. 26–31, 34–41. Patent Owner is correct that Rosenberg’s threshold is set at the time of the utterance in Rosenberg’s claim 5 and cites Petitioner’s declarant as “conceding” issues regarding how “Rosenberg’s volume threshold is determined.” PO Resp. 20–21. But this argument and the ostensible concession do not squarely address the proposed combination, which combines Fu’s teaching of an adjustment unit that “compares the volume of the ambient noise received . . . to a predetermined threshold” with Rosenberg’s teaching that such “a threshold may be ‘determined based on the volume of [an] ambient audio signal.’” Pet. 39, 40 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Ex. 1006, 14:28–30). While Patent Owner argues that “Petitioner has not proposed using a predetermined/pre-set threshold or a previously established threshold based on environmental noise in the combination of Hart-787 with F[u] and Rosenberg” (PO Resp. 46), we find, on the contrary, that the Petition describes a combination based predetermined threshold” and on a threshold “determined according to an environmental noise level.” Pet. 29–30. Thus, we find Petitioner’s unpatentability grounds do not suffer from the issues Patent Owner argues are a consequence of the purported use of the same sound data for the “first sound data” of claim limitation 1.a and for the “second sound data” of claim limitation 1.c. We do not agree with Patent Owner’s arguments regarding Fu’s teachings with respect to limitation 1.e’s “transition from a first state having a first volume level to a second state having a second volume level that is less than the first volume level” because these arguments similarly do not address the proposed combination. See PO Resp. 26–30. The Petition cites Hart-787 for attenuating the volume of an audio-producing device when a wake word is issued. Pet. 32–34, 43–44. The Petition cites Fu for adjusting volume of an audio-producing device if the level of ambient noise exceeds a predetermined threshold. Id. at 36–39, 44–45. Thus, even if Fu teaches only increasing the volume of an audio-producing device if the predetermined threshold is exceeded, the Petition relies on the combination of teachings of Hart-787 and Fu, and Patent Owner’s argument that neither reference teaches “decreasing a controllable appliance’s volume output when a previously established volume threshold is exceeded” (PO Resp. 30) does not address the combination proposed. Patent Owner’s argument that “Petitioner has not proposed modifying Fu to decrease a controllable appliance’s volume output when a volume threshold is exceeded” (PO Resp. 30) similarly does not address the combination proposed in the Petition. We also find that the preponderance of the evidence supports Petitioner’s showing regarding the motivation to combine the references.” slip op. at 23
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner
“We also find that the preponderance of the evidence supports Petitioner’s showing regarding the motivation to combine the references. transmitted volume down control signals as the means for attenuating audio output, Petitioner contends that Hart-787 “broadly teaches” that a device transmits control command signals to the audio-producing device, relying on the testimony of its declarant. See Pet. 23 (citing Ex. 1004, 5:47–51; Ex. 1003 ¶ 82), 43–44 (citing Ex. 1004, 1:67–2:7, 2:26–27, 5:47–51; Ex. 1003 ¶ 118). In addition, Petitioner shows that these control signals were well-known in the art and would have been known to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention, supporting its showing with additional testimony from its declarant. Id. at 44 (citing Ex. 10183, 2:39–47, 5:35–38; Ex. 10194 ¶¶ 3, 13; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 44–45, 118). We conclude Petitioner’s evidence regarding the showing in Hart-787 is sufficient with respect to this point. Hart-787 describes altering a signal sent to the speaker to attenuate the audio from that speaker. Ex. 1004, 1:67– 2:1. Petitioner’s declarant testifies that using transmitted control signals to do this would have been known to one of ordinary skill. Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 44–45, 82, 118. We consider Petitioner’s evidence regarding what one of ordinary skill in the art would have understood from Hart-787’s disclosure to be sufficient for the showing regarding the “causing one or more commands to be automatically issued to the controllable appliance to thereby cause” that appliance to transition to a lower volume level, as required in limitation 1.e. While Patent Owner argues that Petitioner’s declarant “concede[s] that Hart- 787 does not disclose or teach how its voice-controlled device decreases the audio output of the controllable appliance,” the cited portion of the” slip op. at 25
Patent outcomesUS 10,930,276 mixedClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,930,276
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.