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  • PTAB · Jan 22, 2024 · IPR2022-01318 · APJ Jason W Melvin · IPR · Final written decision

    Claims 1, 2, 6 are unpatentable as obvious over Duan; claims 5, 8 are unpatentable as obvious over Duan and Wu.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “II. ANALYSIS A. LEVEL OF ORDINARY SKILL IN THE ART Petitioner proposes that a person of ordinary skill would have been knowledgeable regarding liquid cooling systems for computer systems, would have had a Bachelor of Science (B.S.) in electrical or mechanical engineering, or similar advanced post-graduate education in this area, or would have possessed at least 2–3 years of experience in liquid cooling systems for computer systems or similar systems. A POSITA would be knowledgeable of the concepts, components, and their functions described as “prior art” in the ’355 patent such as, e.g., pumps, radiators, fans, reservoirs, and other techniques of heat dissipation and liquid cooling. (Ex- 1001,1:11–47.) In addition, a POSITA would be knowledgeable about electric motors and their components (e.g., electromagnetic coils, rotors, stators, AC/DC motors, etc.) Pet. 6–7 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 13–18). Patent Owner has not proposed a level of ordinary skill in the art. We adopt Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill as it appears to be consistent with the level of skill reflected by the specification and in the asserted prior art references.” slip op. at 9

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

      “Based on our analysis of the proceeding, we conclude that no claim term requires express construction. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017).” slip op. at 9

    • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable

      “disclosures. Pet. 17–45. Petitioner maps the claimed reservoir to Duan’s “structure formed by an accommodation chamber 21, lower cover 225, cap 3, and cooling plate 1.” Id. at 18. Petitioner maps the claimed double-sided chassis to Duan’s accommodation chamber 21 and the claimed impeller cover to Duan’s lower cover 225. Id. at 22–27. Petitioner maps the claimed thermal-exchange chamber to Duan’s cap 3 and cooling plate 1, with heat-absorbing face 11 and cooling plate 1 corresponding to the claimed heat exchanging interface. Id. at 27–36. Petitioner maps the claimed radiator to Duan’s cooling stage 53. Id. at 36–39. Petitioner asserts that Duan’s inlet is “below a center of the impeller” because it is along the axis about which the impeller rotates. Id. at 39–41. Petitioner asserts that Duan’s lower cover 225 defines an outlet tangential to the impeller’s circumference. Id. at 41–45. In summary, Petitioner asserts that Duan, without modification, discloses all of claim 1’s limitations. Patent Owner does not challenge Petitioner’s contentions, as it has filed no Patent Owner Response. We have reviewed Petitioner’s contentions and conclude that they show by a preponderance of the evidence that claim 1’s subject matter would have been obvious over Duan. See Pet. 17– 45. We adopt Petition’s unchallenged contentions as our analysis.” slip op. at 11

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundUnpatentable

      “As to claim 5, Petitioner asserts that it would have been obvious to use Wu’s approach to securing chassis and heat-exchanging interface to the heat generating component, because Duan discusses the need to assemble its components but does not provide detailed instruction. Id. Thus, the modification would provide the benefit of securing Duan’s cooling plate module and cooling plate to the CPU. Id. at 72. For claim 8, Petitioner asserts that it would have been obvious to use Wu’s approach to blowing air through the radiator using a fan driven by a motor separate from the pump’s motor. Id. at 72–73. Petitioner reasons that doing so would improve Duan’s performance by increasing heat dissipation. Id. at 74. We agree that Petitioner’s contentions support the modification with rational underpinning.” slip op. at 12

    Patent outcomesUS 10,078,355 unpatentable
    Claim construction§ 103 obviousness
    Patents in suitUS 10,078,355
  • PTAB · Feb 6, 2023 · IPR2022-01318 · APJ Jason W Melvin · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted inter partes review of claims 1, 2, 5, 6, and 8 based on a reasonable likelihood of unpatentability over Duan, and Duan with Wu.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › General Plastic (serial petitions)Denied

      “involved two petitioners accused of infringement based on the same product—made by one petitioner and incorporating technology licensed from the other. Valve I, at 9–10 (finding a significant relationship between the two petitioners “with respect to Patent Owner’s assertion” of the challenged patent); Valve II, at 10 (same); see Prelim. Reply 3. Patent Owner has asserted no such relationship here, and we conclude that Patent Owner has failed to establish that Petitioner has a significant relationship with the -522 IPR petitioner. Representation by the same counsel and being accused of infringing the same patent does not create a relationship that justifies discretionarily denying institution. Accordingly, Factor 1 weighs strongly against denying institution.” slip op. at 10

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “presented in the petition . . . and any response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). For the reasons set forth below, we conclude that Petitioner has shown a reasonable likelihood it will prevail in establishing the unpatentability of at least one challenged claim, and we institute inter partes review.” slip op. at 2

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “B. LEVEL OF ORDINARY SKILL IN THE ART Petitioner proposes that a person of ordinary skill would have been knowledgeable regarding liquid cooling systems for computer systems, would have had a Bachelor of Science (B.S.) in electrical or mechanical engineering, or similar advanced post-graduate education in this area, or would have possessed at least 2-3 years of experience in liquid cooling systems for computer systems or similar systems. A POSITA would be knowledgeable of the concepts, components, and their functions described as “prior art” in the ’355 patent such as, e.g., pumps, radiators, fans, reservoirs, and other techniques of heat dissipation and liquid cooling. (Ex-1001,1:11-47.) In addition, a POSITA would be knowledgeable about electric motors and their components (e.g., electromagnetic coils, rotors, stators, AC/DC motors, etc.) Pet. 6–7 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 13–18). Patent Owner does not dispute this definition of a person of ordinary skill. See generally Prelim. Resp. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill as it appears to be consistent with the level of skill reflected by the specification and in the asserted prior art references.” slip op. at 13

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for petitioner

      “Based on our analysis of the issues in dispute at this stage of the proceeding, we conclude that no claim term requires express construction at this time. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017).” slip op. at 14

    Claim constructionDiscretionary denial
    Patents in suitUS 10,078,355
  • PTAB · Aug 25, 2022 · PGR2016-00012 · APJ Sheldon M Mcgee · PGR · Remand

    Claims 1–20 are unpatentable under § 102(a) for prior public use; the Board did not reach the remaining anticipation, obviousness, and enablement grounds.

    RulingsRemand decision
    • RemandOther

      “On October 1, 2019, the Federal Circuit held that we “abused [our] discretion by assuming the authority that 35 U.S.C. § 255 expressly delegates to the Director: to determine when a Certificate of Correction is appropriate,” and vacated our Final Written Decision. Honeywell Int’l Inc. v. Arkema Inc., 939 F.3d 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2019). The Federal Circuit instructed us to “authorize Honeywell to file a motion seeking leave to petition the Director for a Certificate of Correction.” Id. at 1351. Pursuant to the Federal Circuit’s mandate, we gave our authorization, and Patent Owner filed its Motion for Leave to Request a Certificate of Correction. PGR11 Paper 61; PGR12 Paper 41. After additional briefing from the parties was complete, we granted Patent Owner’s Motion. PGR11 Paper 77; PGR12 Paper 57. Patent Owner filed its Request for a Certificate of Correction, as well as a Petition to Accept [Unintentionally] Delayed Claim to Priority under 35 U.S.C. § 120 and 37 C.F.R. § 1.78. PGR11 Ex. 2174; PGR12 Ex. 2172.” slip op. at 3

    • Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Not entitled to earlier dateDecided for petitioner

      “Synthes USA, LLC v. Spinal Kinetics, Inc., 734 F.3d 1332, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2013). And, although there are no bright-line rules for the amount of disclosure needed in an unpredictable art, that amount “necessarily changes with each invention” and “changes with progress in the field.” Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1351. Here, we find that the art of AAC was unpredictable and that a heat-transfer composition for AAC required specific technical features that were unpredictable and unexpected. Thus, we conclude that the ’525 application requires a more-detailed disclosure than would be required in a predictable field to adequately demonstrate possession of a heat-transfer composition consisting essentially of HFO-1234yf and PAG for use in AAC. (iii) Disclosure in the ’525 Application With these background findings in mind, we now turn to the four corners of the ’525 application—and we find that the ’525 application does not contain the detailed disclosure needed in this case to reasonably convey possession of a heat-transfer composition consisting essentially of HFO- 1234yf and PAG for use in AAC.” slip op. at 37

    • Skill levelSkill level board ownDecided for patent owner

      “develops new refrigerants for use as heat transfer fluids. Ex. 1002 ¶ 149. Such a person would have had a Ph.D. in Chemistry, Chemical Engineering, Mechanical Engineering, Material Science, or a related field or discipline and at least 3 to 5 years of experience, or alternatively an M.S. degree and 5 to 10 years of experience. Id. Patent Owner’s Declarant, Dr. Bivens, provides a similar description of the person of ordinary skill in the art, stating that such a person would have a B.S. degree in Chemical Engineering or Chemistry, and five years of work experience, or a Ph.D. or M.S. degree and 2–3 years of experience. Ex. 2001 ¶ 23. Based on these descriptions, we find that the parties’ definitions of ordinary skill in the art are substantially the same, and agree with the parties that an ordinarily skilled artisan would be educated in the Chemical and Chemical Engineering arts or related disciplines. We also agree with the parties that a person having less formal education, such as a B.S. or M.S. degree, would require more years of experience than a person with more formal education, such as a Ph.D., to qualify as an ordinarily skilled artisan. We also find that neither party states how any difference in the parties’ articulated levels of skill impacts this proceeding. Thus, our analysis would be the same regardless of any minor differences between the parties’ respective articulations. Finally, we note that the level of ordinary skill in the art is reflected by the prior art of record. Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the prior art itself can reflect the appropriate level of ordinary skill in the art).” slip op. at 20

    • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › On-sale bar (Pfaff, Helsinn)UnpatentableUnpatentable

      “Tr. 114:15–115:18 (emphases added). Thus, we find that Patent Owner does not contest that a heat-transfer composition consisting essentially of HFO- 1234yf and PAG for AAC was in public commercial use before the March 26, 2014, filing date of the ’017 patent. Accordingly, we find that Petitioner’s evidence, together with Patent Owner’s concessions, demonstrates by a preponderance of evidence that the claimed subject matter of the ’017 patent was in commercial use before its March 26, 2014, effective filing date. See Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 399–409. In particular, as to claims 1, 3–10, 12, 13, and 15–20, we credit Dr. Brown’s uncontested testimony that the refrigerant-lubricant AAC composition of the Ford Transit Custom Bus, the Mazda CX 5 (2.0i and 2.2D), and the Opel Mocca used HFO-1234yf and a PAG lubricant as early as 2012. Ex. 1002 ¶ 399 (citing Ex. 101324, 2, 38, 55, 70). We also credit Dr. Brown’s 24 Behr Hella Services, Refrigerant and Oil Filling Quantities Passenger Cars & Commercial Vehicles 2014–15. PGR12 Ex. 1013. (“Service Guide”). PGR12 Ex. 1013. The Service Guide provides tables setting forth specifications for refrigerant type, refrigerant quantity, vehicle manufacturers’ original equipment compressor oil type, and oil filling quantity for the air-conditioning system of each vehicle listed in the tables. Id. at 2–3. Petitioner and Dr. Brown direct us to the Sevice Guide’s entries calculations, which show that the Ford Transit Custom Bus had an AAC refrigerant-lubricant composition of 26.7% of PAG lubricant and 73.3% of HFO-1234yf (Ex. 1002 ¶ 401 (citing Ex. 1013, 38)); the Mazda CX 5 2.0i had 16.7% PAG lubricant and 83.3% HFO-1234yf (Ex. 1002 ¶ 402 (citing Ex. 1013, 55)); the Mazda CX 5 2.2D had a 17.5% PAG lubricant and 82.5% HFO-1234yf (id.); and the Opal Mocca had 11.6% PAG lubricant and 88.4% HFO-1234yf (Ex. 1002 ¶ 402 (citing Ex. 1013, 70)). As to dependent claims 2, 11, and 14, which all require that the lubricant is present “in an amount from about 30% to about 50% weight,” we credit Dr. Brown’s uncontested testimony that the refrigerant-lubricant composition of the Ford Transit Custom Bus recited lubricant amount. Ex. 1002 ¶ 403. In particular, we agree with Dr. Brown that, because the lubricant accounts for 26.7% of the AAC refrigerant-lubricant composition in the Ford Transit Custom Bus, the lubricant makes up “about 30%” of the refrigerant-lubricant composition as claimed. Id. For these reasons, we find that Petitioner has met its burden to show that claims 1–20 are unpatentable for anticipation under § 102(a)(1).” slip op. at 55

    Patent outcomesUS 9,157,017 unpatentable
    § 102 anticipation§ 112 disclosure
    Patents in suitUS 9,157,017
  • PTAB · Aug 25, 2022 · PGR2016-00011 · APJ Grace Karaffa Obermann · PGR · Remand

    Claims 1–20 are unpatentable under § 102(a) for prior public use; the Board did not reach the other anticipation, obviousness, and enablement grounds.

    RulingsRemand decision
    • RemandOther

      “On October 1, 2019, the Federal Circuit held that we “abused [our] discretion by assuming the authority that 35 U.S.C. § 255 expressly delegates to the Director: to determine when a Certificate of Correction is appropriate,” and vacated our Final Written Decision. Honeywell Int’l Inc. v. Arkema Inc., 939 F.3d 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2019). The Federal Circuit instructed us to “authorize Honeywell to file a motion seeking leave to petition the Director for a Certificate of Correction.” Id. at 1351. Pursuant to the Federal Circuit’s mandate, we gave our authorization, and Patent Owner filed its Motion for Leave to Request a Certificate of Correction. PGR11 Paper 61; PGR12 Paper 41. After additional briefing from the parties was complete, we granted Patent Owner’s Motion. PGR11 Paper 77; PGR12 Paper 57. Patent Owner filed its Request for a Certificate of Correction, as well as a Petition to Accept [Unintentionally] Delayed Claim to Priority under 35 U.S.C. § 120 and 37 C.F.R. § 1.78. PGR11 Ex. 2174; PGR12 Ex. 2172.” slip op. at 3

    • Skill levelSkill level board ownDecided for petitioner

      “develops new refrigerants for use as heat transfer fluids. Ex. 1002 ¶ 149. Such a person would have had a Ph.D. in Chemistry, Chemical Engineering, Mechanical Engineering, Material Science, or a related field or discipline and at least 3 to 5 years of experience, or alternatively an M.S. degree and 5 to 10 years of experience. Id. Patent Owner’s Declarant, Dr. Bivens, provides a similar description of the person of ordinary skill in the art, stating that such a person would have a B.S. degree in Chemical Engineering or Chemistry, and five years of work experience, or a Ph.D. or M.S. degree and 2–3 years of experience. Ex. 2001 ¶ 23. Based on these descriptions, we find that the parties’ definitions of ordinary skill in the art are substantially the same, and agree with the parties that an ordinarily skilled artisan would be educated in the Chemical and Chemical Engineering arts or related disciplines. We also agree with the parties that a person having less formal education, such as a B.S. or M.S. degree, would require more years of experience than a person with more formal education, such as a Ph.D., to qualify as an ordinarily skilled artisan. We also find that neither party states how any difference in the parties’ articulated levels of skill impacts this proceeding. Thus, our analysis would be the same regardless of any minor differences between the parties’ respective articulations. Finally, we note that the level of ordinary skill in the art is reflected by the prior art of record. Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the prior art itself can reflect the appropriate level of ordinary skill in the art).” slip op. at 20

    • Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Not entitled to earlier dateNot shown unpatentable

      “We agree with Petitioner that the ’525 application’s statement that the compounds are “adaptable for use” weighs against a finding of adequate written description. First, “adaptable for use” is vague, as Dr. Bivens acknowledges. See Ex. 1177, 151:15 (testifying that “adaptable for use can have a wide range of meaning”). Second, the ’525 application gives no direction on how a skilled artisan would need to adapt any particular composition for use in AAC, or even if any “adaptation” was necessary. We find that such a teaching is important in this case to show that the inventors had possession of the claimed invention, given our findings above that the art of AAC was unpredictable and that a heat-transfer composition for AAC required specific technical features that were unpredictable and unexpected. For completeness, we again reject Patent Owner’s argument that “[t]o show the inventors possessed claim 1 requires no more” than the statement in the written description that “‘the compositions of the present invention are believed to be adaptable . . . with or without system modification.’” PGR12 Resp. 27–28 (quoting Ex. 1001, 7:4–8). Regardless of the exact wording of claim 1, the inventors “still [had to have] describe[d] some way of performing the claimed methods.” Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1355. And here, with merely a passing reference to AAC, the ’525 application fails to provide any credible “technologic knowledge” to demonstrate to an ordinarily skilled artisan that Patent Owner “was in possession of the invention that is claimed.” Id.” slip op. at 43

    • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › On-sale bar (Pfaff, Helsinn)UnpatentableUnpatentable

      “unless . . . the claimed invention was . . . in public use . . . before the effective filing date of the claimed invention.” 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1). “The proper test for the public use prong . . . is whether the purported use was accessible to the public or was commercially exploited.” Delano Farms Co. v. Cal. Table Grape Comm’n, 778 F.3d 1243, 1247 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (quotation omitted). “Commercial exploitation is a clear indication of public use . . . .” Invitrogen Corp. v. Biocrest Mfg., L.P., 424 F.3d 1374, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2005).” slip op. at 53

    Patent outcomesUS 9,157,017 unpatentable
    § 102 anticipation§ 112 disclosure
    Patents in suitUS 9,157,017
  • PTAB · Dec 28, 2021 · IPR2021-01195 · APJ Jason W Melvin · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted IPR on claims 1, 6, 7, 11, and 12, finding a reasonable likelihood that the Batchelder-based obviousness grounds would prevail.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Real party in interest / privityNot reached

      “Under the Board’s precedential decision in SharkNinja Operating LLC v. iRobot Corp., when no time-bar or estoppel would apply once determining Petitioner did not name all RPIs, the Board need not address the issue. IPR2020-00734, Paper 11 (Oct. 6, 2020) (precedential); see also Lumentum Holdings, Inc. v. Capella Photonics, Inc., IPR2015-00739, Paper 38 at 6 (PTAB Mar. 4, 2016) (precedential) (“[O]ur jurisdiction to consider a petition does not require a ‘correct’ identification of all RPIs in a petition.”); Mayne Pharma Int’l Pty. Ltd. v. Merck Sharp & Dohme Corp., 927 F.3d 1232, 1240 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“[I]f a petition fails to identify all real parties in” slip op. at 8

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Denied

      “the ’354 patent, the overlap in the asserted prior art, and our prior determination of unpatentability regarding the ’354 patent, we conclude that the merits of Petitioner’s case in this proceeding are substantively strong. Thus, this factor weighs strongly in favor of institution. 7. Holistic assessment of factors and conclusion We consider the above factors and take “a holistic view of whether efficiency and integrity of the system are best served by denying or instituting review.” Fintiv, Paper 11 at 6. In weighing the totality of the evidence, we decide not to exercise discretion under § 314(a) to deny institution.” slip op. at 14

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “C. LEVEL OF ORDINARY SKILL IN THE ART Petitioner proposes that a person of ordinary skill would have been knowledgeable regarding liquid cooling systems for computer systems, would have earned at least a bachelor’s degree, such as a B.S. (bachelor of science), or equivalent thereof, in electrical or mechanical engineering or a closely related field, and would have possessed at least two or three years of experience in liquid cooling systems for computer systems or in similar systems. Pet. 7–8 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 23–26). Patent Owner does not dispute this definition of a person of ordinary skill. See generally Prelim. Resp. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill as it appears to be consistent with the level of skill reflected by the specification and in the asserted prior art references. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the prior art itself can reflect the appropriate level of ordinary skill in the art).” slip op. at 14

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction needed

      “construe claim terms “using the same claim construction standard that would be used to construe the claim in a civil action under 35 U.S.C. 282(b).” 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b) (2019). The parties stipulated to constructions of “reservoir” and “chamber” in the district-court litigation. Ex. 1005, 2. Petitioner proposes additional constructions for “impeller” and “radiator.” Pet. 8–10. Patent Owner does not dispute those constructions. See generally Prelim. Resp. Based on our analysis of the issues in dispute at this stage of the proceeding, we conclude that none of the claim terms identified by the parties require express construction at this time. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017).” slip op. at 15

    Claim constructionDiscretionary denial
    Patents in suitUS 10,613,601
  • PTAB · May 24, 2019 · IPR2016-01201 · APJ Scott R Boalick · IPR · Rehearing

    The Board denied Apple’s rehearing request, leaving intact the finding that the challenged claims were not shown obvious over the asserted Chu and Chen combinations.

    RulingsRehearing decision
    • RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied

      “At the outset, we note that in a request for rehearing we do not review the merits of the Final Written Decision de novo. Instead, we consider whether Petitioner has met its burden of showing that a matter has been misapprehended or overlooked in the Final Written Decision. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d) (“The burden of showing a decision should be modified lies with the party challenging the decision. The request must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed in a motion, an opposition, or a reply.”). We conclude that Petitioner has not met this burden in its Request for Rehearing.” slip op. at 2

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot reached

      “view of Chu ’684. See Reh’g Opp’n 7–10 (relying on its declarant to argue that Chu ’684 does not operate as asserted by Petitioner, undermining Petitioner’s justification for the combination); PO Resp. 70 (citing Ex. 2016 ¶ 66). Petitioner contends that Dr. Mangione-Smith’s testimony did not address the asserted combination and therefore provided no need for a reply declaration. Reh’g Reply 7–8. We do not agree with Petitioner’s position, for the reasons stated above. Petitioner does not raise any basis on which we should discount the panel’s reliance on Dr. Mangione-Smith’s testimony regarding the reason to combine.7 We conclude that the panel did not misapprehend Chu ’684’s operation when it concluded that the Petition failed to show Chu ’684 is deficient and ripe for improvement. Instead, it resolved a factual dispute in Patent Owner’s favor based on record evidence.” slip op. at 9

    • Expert testimonyPatent owner expert creditedDecided for patent owner

      “evidence that, in Chu ’684, users would dial according to the dialing conventions of their geographic area. Reh’g Opp’n 8 (citing Ex. 2016 ¶ 66). Patent Owner’s expert witness, Dr. Mangione-Smith, testified that “in Chu ’684, the users would dial PSTN ‘public numbers’ based on the location of the customer premises.” Ex. 2016 ¶ 66 (citing Ex. 1006, Fig. 2). Figure 2 of Chu ’684 supports Dr. Mangione-Smith’s testimony, in that Figure 2 of Chu ’684 illustrates customer premises 105 (which includes IP phones) as connected to a service provider central office 205. See Ex. 1006, Fig. 2; Reh’g Opp’n 9 (contrasting Petitioner’s assertion” slip op. at 4

    § 103 obviousness
    Patents in suitUS 8,542,815
  • PTAB · May 24, 2019 · IPR2016-01198 · APJ Scott R Boalick · IPR · Rehearing

    The Board denied Apple’s rehearing request, leaving intact the finding that challenged claims of the ’005 and ’815 patents were not shown obvious over the asserted combinations.

    RulingsRehearing decision
    • RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied

      “At the outset, we note that in a request for rehearing we do not review the merits of the Final Written Decision de novo. Instead, we consider whether Petitioner has met its burden of showing that a matter has been misapprehended or overlooked in the Final Written Decision. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d) (“The burden of showing a decision should be modified lies with the party challenging the decision. The request must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed in a motion, an opposition, or a reply.”). We conclude that Petitioner has not met this burden in its Request for Rehearing.” slip op. at 2

    • Expert testimonyPatent owner expert creditedDecided for patent owner

      “view of Chu ’684. See Reh’g Opp’n 7–10 (relying on its declarant to argue that Chu ’684 does not operate as asserted by Petitioner, undermining Petitioner’s justification for the combination); PO Resp. 70 (citing Ex. 2016 ¶ 66). Petitioner contends that Dr. Mangione-Smith’s testimony did not address the asserted combination and therefore provided no need for a reply declaration. Reh’g Reply 7–8. We do not agree with Petitioner’s position, for the reasons stated above. Petitioner does not raise any basis on which we should discount the panel’s reliance on Dr. Mangione-Smith’s testimony regarding the reason to combine.7 We conclude that the panel did not misapprehend Chu ’684’s operation when it concluded that the Petition failed to show Chu ’684 is deficient and ripe for improvement. Instead, it resolved a factual dispute in Patent Owner’s favor based on record evidence.” slip op. at 9

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

      “view of Chu ’684. See Reh’g Opp’n 7–10 (relying on its declarant to argue that Chu ’684 does not operate as asserted by Petitioner, undermining Petitioner’s justification for the combination); PO Resp. 70 (citing Ex. 2016 ¶ 66). Petitioner contends that Dr. Mangione-Smith’s testimony did not address the asserted combination and therefore provided no need for a reply declaration. Reh’g Reply 7–8. We do not agree with Petitioner’s position, for the reasons stated above. Petitioner does not raise any basis on which we should discount the panel’s reliance on Dr. Mangione-Smith’s testimony regarding the reason to combine.7 We conclude that the panel did not misapprehend Chu ’684’s operation when it concluded that the Petition failed to show Chu ’684 is deficient and ripe for improvement. Instead, it resolved a factual dispute in Patent Owner’s favor based on record evidence.” slip op. at 9

    • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

      “testimony by Dr. Mangione-Smith—when rejecting Petitioner’s view of the prior art and reason for the combination. See FWD 19 (citing Ex. 2016 ¶¶ 65–67); Reh’g Opp’n 6. Thus, when the panel concluded that Petitioner had not shown that Chu ’684’s method would apply to a number reformatted by the secondary references (see FWD 22–23), it relied on record evidence supporting its conclusion. We determine that the panel did not misapprehend the nature of the proposed combination; rather, based on the record, it resolved a factual dispute and concluded that Petitioner failed to show the proposed combination would operate as asserted.” slip op. at 5

    § 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness
    Patents in suitUS 9,179,005
  • PTAB · Aug 18, 2017 · IPR2015-01340 · APJ Rama G Elluru · IPR · Final written decision

    Petitioners failed to prove claims 1, 2, 4, 6–22, 25–30, 32–37, and 39–42 unpatentable under the instituted §103 grounds, chiefly because the proposed modifications lacked a reasonable expectation of success.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • Expert testimonyPatent owner expert creditedPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner

      “C. Credibility of the Experts We give more weight to the testimony of Patent Owner’s expert, Dr. Weber, over that of Petitioners’ expert, Dr. Rotella, with respect to testimony that is in direct conflict. We favor Dr. Weber’s testimony because of her extensive experience in the design and development of DP 4 inhibitors for type-2 diabetes treatment. See Ex. 2056 ¶¶ 9–12; Ex. 2210, 1– 2. Moreover, Dr. Weber entered the DP 4 field at the relevant time, i.e., the time of invention, around 2000. Ex. 1073, 108:16–21; Tr. 35:16–22. We find that her testimony has been consistent, not just throughout this proceeding, but also with evidence predating this proceeding. See, e.g., Ex. 2056 ¶¶ 88, 115–118; 154–162; Ex. 1073, 51:2–54:14, 113:6–16, 119:19– 121:9; Ex. 2161, 558.” slip op. at 9

    • Skill levelSkill level board ownOther

      “The parties’ formulations as to the level of ordinary skill in the art are similar, and neither side identifies with specificity an error in the opposing side’s formulation. See PO Resp. 21; Pet. Reply 10. On the record presented, we hold that the cited prior art is representative of the level of ordinary skill in the art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the level of ordinary skill in the art may be evidenced by the cited references themselves). Specifically, the references are consistent with the parties’ formulations and demonstrate the level of skill in the art. Our determinations regarding the patentability of the challenged claims would remain the same under either side’s proposed formulation.” slip op. at 8

    • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

      “On the full record before us, we determine that Petitioners have not demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that a skilled artisan would have chosen Ashworth I’s compound 25 as a “lead compound.” Although Ashworth I indicates that compounds 24–29 were non-toxic in T cell assays up to 72 hours, and further indicates compound 25 was one among four compounds that were comparable to boroprolines, no further data is provided to guide the skilled artisan to select compound 25 among the other 2-cyanopyrrolidides as a lead compound for further modification to develop a DP 4 inhibitor. Ex. 1007, 1165–66. More importantly, the data reported in Ashworth I was based on in vitro data at room temperature, not in vivo data. PO Resp. 25 (citing Ex. 2174, 82:23–83:11). Indeed, Dr. Rotella states, “those studies were carried out at room temperature, which is roughly 20 degrees [Celsius]. I’ll point out that body temperature is higher than that, and that temperature has a direct effect on half-life. As you elevate temperature, you can expect half-life to decrease.” Ex. 2174, 82:23-83:11. Dr. Rotella further admits that he is not aware of any disclosure describing testing of Ashworth compounds in humans. Ex. 2174, 60:23-61:9. In addition, Ashworth I acknowledged that these compounds exhibited an intramolecular cyclization problem and that further work on optimization of the pyrrolidine ring was necessary and would be reported shortly. Ex. 1007, 1163–65. Others in the prior art also continued to seek solutions to the problem of intramolecular cyclization, such as those posed by Ashworth I compounds. See PO Resp. 27–28.” slip op. at 16

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundReasonable expectation not foundNot shown unpatentable

      “(4) No Reasonable Expectation of Increasing Stability We are not persuaded that the skilled artisan would have had a reasonable expectation of success in achieving increased stability of Ashworth I’s compound 25 based on Hanessian I’s teachings concerning the cyclopropanation of proline. See Pet. 29. There was no disclosure in the prior art of cylopropanating the pyrrolidine ring of compound 25, or any similar compound. Indeed, Dr. Rotella admitted “that there wasn’t anything in the literature prior to the invention of saxagliptin that actually suggested that cyclopropanation of an Ashworth-One type DPP4 inhibitor would improve its stability.” Ex. 2174, 142:3-9. In addition, there is not sufficient evidence as to how the modified cyano-moiety would have been understood to affect compound 25’s stability. Given the structural differences, we find there is insufficient evidence suggesting that the skilled artisan could have reasonably predicted how cyclopropanating compound 25’s P1 group (as opposed to the proline compound discussed in Hanessian I) would have affected the cyano moiety’s (as opposed to the substituent in Hanessian I) orientation in space. Furthermore, there is insufficient evidence as to whether that modified orientation would have sufficiently decreased intramolecular cyclization. Indeed, Dr. Rotella testified that: [I]n the process of that modification of orientation in space [when you fuse two rings together], you may observe effects on potency, you may observe effects on solution stability, you may observe other effects on other properties that one might measure in connection with a drug discovery project. Ex. 2174, 119:10–120:2. When asked, “[a]nd those effects might be either positive or negative; correct?” Dr. Rotella replied, “[t]hey might be, yes.” Ex. 2174, 120:3–5. Dr. Rotella also testified that at the time of the invention, the objective of adding a cyclopropyl substituent to the pyrrolidine ring of compound 25 would have been exploratory. He testified: Q. Well, what is the objective of putting the cyclopropane on the molecule, in your opinion? A. There are two possible objectives based on the data -- there are at least two possible objectives based on the data available surrounding compound 25. Q. And what are they? A. One would be to explore whether or not you could improve potency. A second would be whether or not you could improve solution stability. One might also explore how that -- those changes, either by themselves or in combination with two changes, might also improve or change -- sorry -- to improve solid-state stability. Furthermore, since nothing is known, at least at this point in time, about other properties associated with compound 25, you’d want to understand what those properties were and adjust them as need be. Generally speaking, those properties are things that we call, collectively, pharmaceutical properties. Ex. 2174, 115:11–116:13 (emphasis added). This testimony does not sufficiently support Petitioners’ contention that a skilled artisan would have reasonably expected cyclopropanating the pyrrolidine ring of compound 25 to increase its stability.” slip op. at 26

    Patent outcomesUS RE44,186 not shown unpatentable
    § 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  • PTAB · Jul 24, 2017 · IPR2016-00957 · APJ Stephen C Siu · IPR · Rehearing

    The Board denied VirnetX’s rehearing request, leaving claims 27 and 51 unpatentable as anticipated by Kiuchi.

    RulingsRehearing decision
    • RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied

      “path to address the claimed ‘first location’” and relies on In re Magnum Oil Tools Int’l., Ltd., 829 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2016) to support Patent Owner’s implied contention that the Final Decision may not address new arguments raised by Patent Owner in Patent Owner’s Preliminary Response and/or Patent Owner’s Response. Req. Reh’g. 6. We disagree. In the present matter and in accordance with Magnum Oil, the ultimate burden of proof remained with Petitioner and was never shifted to Patent Owner at any time during the proceedings and, as discussed above, at no time was an “entirely new path to address the claimed ‘first location’” introduced in the Decision.” slip op. at 3

    • BurdenDecided for petitioner

      “path to address the claimed ‘first location’” and relies on In re Magnum Oil Tools Int’l., Ltd., 829 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2016) to support Patent Owner’s implied contention that the Final Decision may not address new arguments raised by Patent Owner in Patent Owner’s Preliminary Response and/or Patent Owner’s Response. Req. Reh’g. 6. We disagree. In the present matter and in accordance with Magnum Oil, the ultimate burden of proof remained with Petitioner and was never shifted to Patent Owner at any time during the proceedings and, as discussed above, at no time was an “entirely new path to address the claimed ‘first location’” introduced in the Decision.” slip op. at 3

    None
    Patents in suitUS 7,921,211
  • PTAB · Jul 24, 2017 · IPR2016-00693 · APJ Stephen C Siu · IPR · Rehearing

    The Board denied VirnetX’s rehearing request, leaving intact its determination that claims 27 and 51 are anticipated by Kiuchi.

    RulingsRehearing decision
    • RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied

      “path to address the claimed ‘first location’” and relies on In re Magnum Oil Tools Int’l., Ltd., 829 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2016) to support Patent Owner’s implied contention that the Final Decision may not address new arguments raised by Patent Owner in Patent Owner’s Preliminary Response and/or Patent Owner’s Response. Req. Reh’g. 6. We disagree. In the present matter and in accordance with Magnum Oil, the ultimate burden of proof remained with Petitioner and was never shifted to Patent Owner at any time during the proceedings and, as discussed above, at no time was an “entirely new path to address the claimed ‘first location’” introduced in the Decision.” slip op. at 3

    • BurdenDecided for petitioner

      “path to address the claimed ‘first location’” and relies on In re Magnum Oil Tools Int’l., Ltd., 829 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2016) to support Patent Owner’s implied contention that the Final Decision may not address new arguments raised by Patent Owner in Patent Owner’s Preliminary Response and/or Patent Owner’s Response. Req. Reh’g. 6. We disagree. In the present matter and in accordance with Magnum Oil, the ultimate burden of proof remained with Petitioner and was never shifted to Patent Owner at any time during the proceedings and, as discussed above, at no time was an “entirely new path to address the claimed ‘first location’” introduced in the Decision.” slip op. at 3

    None
    Patents in suitUS 7,418,504
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