• Yantai Jereh Petroleum Equipment & Technologies Co., Ltd v. BJ Energy Solutions, LLCSome claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Feb 6, 2023 · PGR2021-00102 · APJ Patrick R Scanlon · PGR · Final written decision

  Claims 5 and 9 are unpatentable as indefinite under §112(b); the Board did not find claims 1–4, 6–8, and 10–28 unpatentable.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Based on our review of the record before us, particularly the ’459 patent’s description and Dr. Adnan’s testimony, we agree with Petitioner that the ordinary level of skill in the art does not require the high level of specialized knowledge of control systems suggested by Patent Owner. Moreover, we find that Petitioner’s stated level of ordinary skill in the art is reasonable because it is consistent with the evidence of record, including the asserted prior art. Accordingly, for the purposes of this Decision, we apply Petitioner’s definition, although our conclusions with respect to obviousness would be the same if we were to apply Patent Owner’s definition.” slip op. at 9

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner

    “Based on the full record, we are not persuaded that Mr. Marscher is unqualified to serve as an expert in this proceeding. As noted above, a person of ordinary skill in the art is not required to have been a fracturing operator. Patent Owner’s proposed definition does not even require experience as a fracturing operator. See PO Resp. 22. Furthermore, Mr. Marscher testifies that he has extensive experience developing pumps for fracturing applications. Ex. 2027, 6:24–8:7. Mr. Marscher also testifies that he has experience with control systems relating to pumps and pumps units. Id. at 212:19–23. This testimony, as well as his declaration and curriculum vitae, show that Mr. Marscher has extensive education and experience in relevant fields. Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 8–17; Ex. 1004. Accordingly, we are not persuaded that Mr. Marscher’s qualifications or experience provide reason to discount the weight associated with Mr. Marscher’s testimony.” slip op. at 10

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for patent owner

    “is the pump unit’s highest HHP output and one of ordinary skill in the art would have understood this value is the pump unit’s output power in intermittent duty. Pet. Reply 2 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 71–72, 123–124; Pet. 9– 10; Ex. 1036, 64:17–67:13, 119:17–120:11, 124:7–24, 198:9–200:9, 221:8– 222:15). However, even if Petitioner is correct that the “maximum power output value” is near or equivalent to a pump unit’s output power in intermittent duty, we are still not persuaded that the term “maximum intermittent power” should be tied to the “maximum power output value,” in conflict with the definition provided in the Specification. Petitioner also argues that Patent Owner’s proposed construction is indefinite. Pet. Reply 3. For the reasons discussed below (see supra § II.I.1), we determine that Petitioner has not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the term “maximum intermittent power,” as defined in the Specification, is indefinite. Thus, based on the complete record before us, we maintain our prior construction of “maximum intermittent power” for this Final Written Decision.” slip op. at 13

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “5. Additional Terms We determine that we need not expressly construe any other claim terms to resolve the parties’ disputes because doing so would have no effect on the analysis below. See Nidec, 868 F.3d at 1017; see also Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms that . . . are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 15

  Patent outcomesUS 10,907,459 mixed
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips · KSR · Graham · Nautilus
  Patents in suitUS 10,907,459
• Apple Inc. / LG Electronics, Inc. et al. v. Gesture Technology Partners, LLCSome claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Dec 5, 2022 · IPR2022-00362 · APJ Patrick R Scanlon · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–3, 5–10, and 12–17 are unpatentable over Numazaki and Nonaka; claims 4, 11, and 18 were not shown unpatentable because the evidence did not establish the sensors were fixed relative to each other.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingJoinder, grantedGranted

    “After institution, LG Electronics, Inc. and LG Electronics U.S.A., Inc. filed a petition and a motion for joinder to this proceeding. IPR2022-00092, Papers 1, 3. We granted the motion for joinder, and IPR2022-00092 was joined with this proceeding and dismissed. Paper 12, 11–12. In addition, Google LLC filed a petition and a motion for joinder to this proceeding. IPR2022-00362, Papers 2, 3. We granted the additional motion for joinder, and IPR2022-00362 was joined with this proceeding and dismissed. Paper 16, 5–6. Consequently, Apple Inc., LG Electronics, Inc., LG Electronics U.S.A., Inc., and Google LLC are joined in this proceeding.” slip op. at 2

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner contends that a person having ordinary skill in the art “would have had at least a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering or equivalent with at least one year of experience in the field of human computer interaction,” and “[a]dditional education or experience might substitute for the above requirements.” Pet. 5–6 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 29–31). Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s definition for the purposes of its Response. PO Resp. 5. Based on our review of the record before us, we determine that Petitioner’s stated level of ordinary skill in the art is reasonable because it is consistent with the evidence of record, including the asserted prior art. Accordingly, for the purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s definition.” slip op. at 8

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

    “C. Claim Construction In inter partes reviews, the Board interprets claim language using the district-court-type standard, as described in Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). See 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b). Under that standard, we generally give claim terms their ordinary and customary meaning, as would be understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention, in light of the language of the claims, the specification, and the prosecution history. See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1313–14. Although extrinsic evidence, when available, may also be useful when construing claim terms under this standard, extrinsic evidence should be considered in the context of the intrinsic evidence. See id. at 1317–19. capture command causes the digital camera to store an image to memory” in claim 1, “capturing an image to the digital camera in response to . . . the image capture command” in claim 8, and “correlate the gesture detected . . . with an image capture function and subsequently capture an image using the digital camera” in claim 13. Pet. 8. Specifically, Petitioner asserts that these phrases “should be construed broadly enough to encompass capturing/storing video or still images,” and provides reasons supporting its assertion. Id. at 8–10. Patent Owner does not contest Petitioner’s proposed claim constructions. PO Resp. 5. We agree with Petitioner’s supporting reasoning and accordingly adopt Petitioner’s proposed claim constructions.” slip op. at 8

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner

    “We find that Petitioner’s Reply argument is not beyond the proper scope of a reply because it directly responds to Patent Owner’s argument that Petitioner does not explain how elements from both the third and fifth embodiments would accessed by the reflected light extraction unit and whether these elements would operate simultaneously or at different times. Moreover, Petitioner’s Reply argument elaborates on the contentions in the Petition that the gesture recognition would be implemented as a means of allowing the user to initiate the fifth videoconferencing functionality. Pet. 31; see Chamberlain Grp., Inc. v. One World Techs., Inc., 944 F. 3d, 919, 925 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“Parties are not barred from elaborating on their arguments on issues previously raised.”). Accordingly, we find that the Petition adequately explains how the reflected light extraction unit would be accessed by both the third embodiment’s shape interpretation unit 333 and the fifth embodiment’s extraction unit 353. We particularly credit Dr. Bederson’s uncontroverted testimony that “it would be well within the capabilities of a [person having ordinary skill in the art] to utilize the same output by two separate processing blocks to implement the proposed combination,” and one of ordinary skill in the art “would understand there are no technical barriers to arranging multiple distinct processing units that separately process the same output of a single unit.” See Ex. 1018 ¶ 9.” slip op. at 24

  Patent outcomesUS 8,878,949 mixed
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,878,949
• Apple Inc. / LG Electronics, Inc. et al. v. Gesture Technology Partners, LLCSome claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Dec 5, 2022 · IPR2022-00092 · APJ Patrick R Scanlon · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–3, 5–10, and 12–17 are unpatentable as obvious over Numazaki and Nonaka; claims 4, 11, and 18 were not shown unpatentable.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “would have had at least a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering or equivalent with at least one year of experience in the field of human computer interaction,” and “[a]dditional education or experience might substitute for the above requirements.” Pet. 5–6 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 29–31). Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s definition for the purposes of its Response. PO Resp. 5. Based on our review of the record before us, we determine that Petitioner’s stated level of ordinary skill in the art is reasonable because it is consistent with the evidence of record, including the asserted prior art. Accordingly, for the purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s definition. slip op. at 8

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

    “district-court-type standard, as described in Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). See 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b). Under that standard, we generally give claim terms their ordinary and customary meaning, as would be understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention, in light of the language of the claims, the specification, and the prosecution history. See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1313–14. Although extrinsic evidence, when available, may also be useful when construing claim terms under this standard, extrinsic evidence should be considered in the context of the intrinsic evidence. See id. at 1317–19. capture command causes the digital camera to store an image to memory” in claim 1, “capturing an image to the digital camera in response to . . . the image capture command” in claim 8, and “correlate the gesture detected . . . with an image capture function and subsequently capture an image using the digital camera” in claim 13. Pet. 8. Specifically, Petitioner asserts that these phrases “should be construed broadly enough to encompass capturing/storing video or still images,” and provides reasons supporting its assertion. Id. at 8–10. Patent Owner does not contest Petitioner’s proposed claim constructions. PO Resp. 5. We agree with Petitioner’s supporting reasoning and accordingly adopt Petitioner’s proposed claim constructions.” slip op. at 8

  • BurdenMixed

    “We agree with Patent Owner that the Petition does not establish sufficiently that Numazaki’s unit 102 and camera 351 are fixed relative to one another. Without more, the mere fact that unit 102 and camera 351 are arranged in parallel and have overlapping fields of view does not establish that the structures are fixed. At the oral hearing, counsel for Petitioner indicated that Petitioner’s position was not an inherency argument but relied on Dr. Bederson’s analysis and interpretation of Numazaki’s fifth embodiment. Tr. 17:7–15. The Petition, however, does not reference any such analysis in connection with the subject matter of claims 4, 11, and 18. 27–28 of the Petition, which pertain to limitation 1[(a)]) discuss the overlapping fields of view but not assert that overlapping fields of view require the structures to be fixed with respect to one another. For the foregoing reasons, we determine that Petitioner has not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the combination of Numazaki and Nonaka renders obvious claims 4, 11, or 18.” slip op. at 34

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner

    “We find that Petitioner’s Reply argument is not beyond the proper scope of a reply because it directly responds to Patent Owner’s argument that Petitioner does not explain how elements from both the third and fifth embodiments would accessed by the reflected light extraction unit and whether these elements would operate simultaneously or at different times. Moreover, Petitioner’s Reply argument elaborates on the contentions in the Petition that the gesture recognition would be implemented as a means of allowing the user to initiate the fifth videoconferencing functionality. Pet. 31; see Chamberlain Grp., Inc. v. One World Techs., Inc., 944 F. 3d, 919, 925 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“Parties are not barred from elaborating on their arguments on issues previously raised.”). Accordingly, we find that the Petition adequately explains how the reflected light extraction unit would be accessed by both the third embodiment’s shape interpretation unit 333 and the fifth embodiment’s extraction unit 353. We particularly credit Dr. Bederson’s uncontroverted testimony that “it would be well within the capabilities of a [person having ordinary skill in the art] to utilize the same output by two separate processing blocks to implement the proposed combination,” and one of ordinary skill in the art “would understand there are no technical barriers to arranging multiple distinct processing units that separately process the same output of a single unit.” See Ex. 1018 ¶ 9.” slip op. at 24

  Patent outcomesUS 8,878,949 mixed
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,878,949
• Apple Inc. / LG Electronics, Inc. et al. v. Gesture Technology Partners, LLCSome claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Dec 5, 2022 · IPR2021-00921 · APJ Patrick R Scanlon · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–3, 5–10, and 12–17 are unpatentable as obvious over Numazaki and Nonaka; claims 4, 11, and 18 were not shown unpatentable.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner

    “We find that Petitioner’s Reply argument is not beyond the proper scope of a reply because it directly responds to Patent Owner’s argument that Petitioner does not explain how elements from both the third and fifth embodiments would accessed by the reflected light extraction unit and whether these elements would operate simultaneously or at different times. Moreover, Petitioner’s Reply argument elaborates on the contentions in the Petition that the gesture recognition would be implemented as a means of allowing the user to initiate the fifth videoconferencing functionality. Pet. 31; see Chamberlain Grp., Inc. v. One World Techs., Inc., 944 F. 3d, 919, 925 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“Parties are not barred from elaborating on their arguments on issues previously raised.”). Accordingly, we find that the Petition adequately explains how the reflected light extraction unit would be accessed by both the third embodiment’s shape interpretation unit 333 and the fifth embodiment’s extraction unit 353. We particularly credit Dr. Bederson’s uncontroverted testimony that “it would be well within the capabilities of a [person having ordinary skill in the art] to utilize the same output by two separate processing blocks to implement the proposed combination,” and one of ordinary skill in the art “would understand there are no technical barriers to arranging multiple distinct processing units that separately process the same output of a single unit.” See Ex. 1018 ¶ 9.” slip op. at 24

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableNot shown unpatentableMixed

    “We agree with Patent Owner that the Petition does not establish sufficiently that Numazaki’s unit 102 and camera 351 are fixed relative to one another. Without more, the mere fact that unit 102 and camera 351 are arranged in parallel and have overlapping fields of view does not establish that the structures are fixed. At the oral hearing, counsel for Petitioner indicated that Petitioner’s position was not an inherency argument but relied on Dr. Bederson’s analysis and interpretation of Numazaki’s fifth embodiment. Tr. 17:7–15. The Petition, however, does not reference any such analysis in connection with the subject matter of claims 4, 11, and 18. 27–28 of the Petition, which pertain to limitation 1[(a)]) discuss the overlapping fields of view but not assert that overlapping fields of view require the structures to be fixed with respect to one another. For the foregoing reasons, we determine that Petitioner has not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the combination of Numazaki and Nonaka renders obvious claims 4, 11, or 18. 6. Dependent Claims 2, 3, 5–7, 9, 10, 12, and 14–17 Petitioner provides reasonable and detailed explanations, supported by the testimony of Dr. Bederson, indicating where in the references the limitations of claims 2, 3, 5–7, 9, 10, 12, and 14–17 are disclosed. Pet. 33– 43, 44, 47, 49. Further, Patent Owner offers no arguments particularly directed to these dependent claims. PO Resp. 22, 25, 28. We have considered the evidence and arguments of record and determine that Petitioner has demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that the combination of Numazaki and Nonaka renders obvious claims 2, 3, 5–7, 9, 10, 12, and 14–17 for the reasons discussed in the Petition and as supported by the testimony of Dr. Bederson.” slip op. at 34

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingJoinder, grantedGranted

    “After institution, LG Electronics, Inc. and LG Electronics U.S.A., Inc. filed a petition and a motion for joinder to this proceeding. IPR2022-00092, Papers 1, 3. We granted the motion for joinder, and IPR2022-00092 was joined with this proceeding and dismissed. Paper 12, 11–12. In addition, Google LLC filed a petition and a motion for joinder to this proceeding. IPR2022-00362, Papers 2, 3. We granted the additional motion for joinder, and IPR2022-00362 was joined with this proceeding and dismissed. Paper 16, 5–6. Consequently, Apple Inc., LG Electronics, Inc., LG Electronics U.S.A., Inc., and Google LLC are joined in this proceeding.” slip op. at 2

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “would have had at least a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering or equivalent with at least one year of experience in the field of human computer interaction,” and “[a]dditional education or experience might substitute for the above requirements.” Pet. 5–6 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 29–31). Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s definition for the purposes of its Response. PO Resp. 5. Based on our review of the record before us, we determine that Petitioner’s stated level of ordinary skill in the art is reasonable because it is consistent with the evidence of record, including the asserted prior art. Accordingly, for the purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s definition. slip op. at 8

  Patent outcomesUS 8,878,949 mixed
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,878,949
• Bose Corporation v. Koss CorporationSome claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Sep 13, 2022 · IPR2021-00612 · APJ Patrick R Scanlon · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–3, 6, 8, 10–13, 16, 18, 20–22, 25, 27, 29–31, 34, 36, 38–43, 46, 48, and 51–56 are unpatentable; the remaining challenged claims were not shown unpatentable.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art In determining whether an invention would have been obvious at the” slip op. at 11

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner

    “C. Dr. Williams’ Credibility Patent Owner argues that the testimony of Dr. Williams, Petitioner’s” slip op. at 13

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed board ownOther

    “Accordingly, we disagree with Patent Owner’s assertion that body 12” slip op. at 20

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of success › Teaching awayTeaching away not foundDecided for petitioner

    “wireless interfaces, such that it could be used in Rezvani-446’s system.” PO Sur-reply 5. As such, Rezvani-875 would not have suggested to one of ordinary skill in the art that providing a headset with multiple wireless connections would produce undesirable battery drain. Accordingly, we are not persuaded that one of ordinary skill in the art would have been dissuaded from using two wireless connections because of increased battery usage.” slip op. at 28

  Patent outcomesUS 10,206,025 mixed
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,206,025
• Medtronic Corevalve LLC / Medtronic, Inc. v. Speyside Medical, LLCSome claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Aug 12, 2022 · IPR2021-00243 · APJ Patrick R Scanlon · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–4, 6–10, 16, and 17 are unpatentable as obvious over Lane; claims 18–22 and 24 were not shown unpatentable over the Lane and Thomas combinations.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner

    “In the Decision on Institution, we adopted Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art, stating it was “consistent with the evidence of record, including the asserted prior art.” Dec. Inst. 7. Petitioner does not challenge Patent Owner’s modification to its proposed definition, and Petitioner’s expert, Dr. Drasler, agrees that experience in the field of prosthetic cardiovascular implants would have included experience with transcatheter prosthetic cardiovascular implants as well as delivery systems and methods used to implant such prostheses. See generally Pet. Reply; Ex. 2048, 11:6–12:1. Thus, based on our review of the complete record, we adopt Petitioner’s definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art, modified as proposed by Patent Owner. We note, however, that our analysis in this proceeding would not differ if we did not adopt the modification proposed by Patent Owner.” slip op. at 8

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for petitioner

    “We agree with Petitioner. Patent Owner’s proposal that the distal end of the delivery catheter “houses the prosthetic” is in tension with the express language of the claim because the proposed construction suggests that “houses” necessarily means more than “at least” part of the prosthesis is disposed in the distal end. Indeed, if “houses” was not more limiting than “at least partially disposed” there would be no need to further define the spatial relationship between the distal end of the catheter and the prosthetic valve. Petitioner further argues that the Patent Owner’s construction is improper because it “wrongly limits the term to require that ‘the proximal end includes a handle that controls the deployment of the implant.’” Pet. Reply at 3 (citing PO Resp. 37–38). Petitioner asserts that the claims do not recite a handle and the ’897 patent’s “specification makes clear that a handle is a separate, optional component that is not integral to a delivery catheter: inner tubular member ‘can’ be connected to handle 907 and outer tubular member ‘can be connected’/‘attach[ed]’ to outer sheath handle 908.” Id. (citing Ex. 1001, 20:19–29, 26:30–33, claim 10). We again agree with Petitioner. Although the specification describes an embodiment in which proximal end 905 of inner tubular member 904 can be connected to handle 907 and proximal end 902 of outer tubular member 901 can be connected to handle 908 (Ex. 1001, 20:19–26), it is generally improper to read limitations from specific embodiments into the claims. See Cadence Pharms. Inc. v. Exela PharmSci Inc., 780 F.3d 1364, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“[E]ven if all of the embodiments discussed in the patent included a specific limitation, it would not be proper to import from the patent’s written description limitations that are not found in the claims themselves.” (internal quotations omitted)); SuperGuide Corp. v. DirecTV Enters., Inc., 358 F.3d 870, 875 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“Though understanding the claim language may be aided by the explanations contained in the written description, it is important not to import into a claim limitations that are not a part of the claim.”). Furthermore, at the oral hearing, Patent Owner indicated that “the proximal end includes a handle that controls the deployment of the implant” part of its proposed construction is not necessary. Tr. 61:8–14. In view of the above, we decline to adopt Patent Owner’s proposed” slip op. at 10

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Lexicography (patentee as own lexicographer)Term construed board ownDecided for petitioner

    “Furthermore, inventors can act as their own lexicographers if they clearly set forth a definition of a claim term other than its ordinary and customary meaning. Vasudevan Software, Inc. v. MicroStrategy, Inc., 782 F.3d 671, 677 (Fed. Cir. 2015). But any such definition must appear in the specification “with reasonable clarity, deliberateness, and precision.” Renishaw PLC v. Marposs Societa’ per Azioni, 158 F.3d 1243, 1249 (Fed. Cir. 1998); In re Paulsen, 30 F.3d 1475, 1480 (Fed. Cir. 1994). Absent any such definition, “limitations are not to be read into the claims from the specification.” In re Van Geuns, 988 F.2d 1181, 1184 (Fed. Cir. 1993). Here, a definition of “introducer catheter” does not appear in the specification “with reasonable clarity, deliberateness, and precision.” See generally Ex. 1001.” slip op. at 17

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for petitioner

    “We determine that we need not expressly construe this claim term to resolve the parties’ disputes because doing so would have no effect on the analysis below. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017); see also Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms that . . . are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 22

  Patent outcomesUS 9,445,897 mixed
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 9,445,897
• Med-El Elektromedizinische Geräte Ges.M.B.H. v. Advanced Bionics AGSome claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jun 2, 2021 · IPR2020-00190 · APJ Patrick R Scanlon · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1, 2, and 4–7 are unpatentable as obvious over Dooley and von Ilberg 1999; claims 3 and 8 were not shown unpatentable.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “In the Decision on Institution, we adopted Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art, stating it was “consistent with the evidence at this stage of the proceeding, including the asserted prior art.” Dec. Inst. 21. In its Response, Patent Owner notes that “Dr. Zeng explains that he would particularly emphasize experience relating to designing or developing cochlear implants and hearing aids, or systems for fitting such prostheses to patients,” but indicates that it does not dispute Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art for the purposes of this proceeding. PO Resp. 13 (citing Ex. 2014 ¶ 66). Based on our review of the complete record, we continue to apply the level of ordinary skill in the art adopted in the Decision on Institution. We” slip op. at 9

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for patent owner

    “Petitioner asserts that the Specification of the ’747 patent defines the term “electric-acoustic processor.” Pet. 20 (citing Ex. 1001, 10:65–67, 11:1–7). In the Decision on Institution, we determined that it was not necessary to construe “electric-acoustic processor” at that stage of the proceeding. Dec. Inst. 22 (citing Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017)). Patent Owner agrees the term “electric-acoustic processor” does not require construction for purposes of this proceeding. PO Resp. 14. Accordingly, we do not expressly construe “electric-acoustic processor” for this Decision.” slip op. at 10

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner

    “that “configured to generate or apply . . . acoustic stimulation signals to the acoustic sensing organs of the ear” means more than simply being capable of applying acoustic stimulation signals. Dec. Inst. 28. In its Response, Patent Owner argues that the term should be given its plain meaning and does not require explicit construction. PO Resp. 15–16. Patent Owner adds that: To the extent there is a dispute, Patent Owner agrees with the Board’s reasoning that the “configured to” language does not merely reflect an intended use and requires more than a device that is simply “capable of” generating or applying the recited acoustic or electric stimulation in different or separate configurations. Id. at 16 (citing Dec. Inst. 28). Petitioner does not respond to Patent Owner’s assertion that “configured to generate or apply” should be given its plain meaning but does indicate that it disagrees with our “construction” of the term “configured to.” Pet. Reply 14–15 (citing Dec. Inst. 27–28). Petitioner, however, does not present any reasoning supporting its assertion the Board was wrong or offer any argument regarding how “configured to” should be construed. See generally Pet. Reply. We did not expressly construe “configured to” or “configured to generate or apply” in the Decision on Institution, but, as noted above, we did determine that that “configured to generate or apply . . . acoustic stimulation signals to the acoustic sensing organs of the ear” means more than simply being capable of applying acoustic stimulation signals. Dec. Inst. 28. Based on the complete record, we still are not persuaded by Petitioner’s argument that “configured to” should be construed as merely “capable of,” and for the reasons in the Decision on Institution, which we adopt here, we determine acoustic sensing organs of the ear” means more than simply being capable of applying acoustic stimulation signals.” slip op. at 11

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “Anderson discloses an embodiment (“the acoustic embodiment”) in which earpiece 10 includes speaker 15 that generates acoustic waves (i.e., acoustic signals) to stimulate the user’s ear. Ex. 1003, 3:58–60, 4:33–35, 5:18–21, 6:63–67, Figs. 1, 2. Anderson also discloses in Figure 10 a different embodiment (“the cochlear implant embodiment”) that combines earpieces 10’ and 10” with a cochlear implant system. Id. at 27:25–45, Fig. 10. In this embodiment, “[s]peakers 15 in the left and right earpieces serve no purpose in the cochlear implant application, as the user is profoundly deaf, and may be disconnected to conserve power.” Id. at 27:52– 55. Because Anderson discloses that the speakers serve no purpose in the cochlear implant embodiment and could be disconnected from power, we determine that the speakers are not used in this embodiment. In addition, Petitioner does not direct us to—nor are we aware of—any disclosure in Anderson indicating that speaker 15 of the cochlear implant embodiment receives a signal that causes the speaker to generate acoustic output. In contrast, Anderson discloses that earpiece headset 21 of Figure 2, which is functionally equivalent to speaker 15 of the acoustic embodiment, receives a modified speech signal and converts this signal to acoustic waves. Ex. 1003, 4:33–35, 5:18–21; see also id. at 6:63–67 (disclosing that speaker 15 produces a processed acoustic signal that corresponds to the ambient acoustic signal detected by microphone 12). embodiment cannot generate or apply acoustic stimulation signals. For these reasons, we determine that speakers 15 in the cochlear implant embodiment are not configured to generate or apply acoustic stimulation signals.” slip op. at 16

  Patent outcomesUS 8,155,747 mixed
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,155,747
• Fanduel, Inc. / Draftkings, Inc. v. Interactive Games LLCSome claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Nov 8, 2018 · IPR2017-01333 · APJ George R Hoskins · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–3 are unpatentable as obvious over Carter and Barton; claim 6 is unpatentable as obvious over Carter, Barton, and Walker. Claims 1–3 and 6 were not shown unpatentable over Carter and Martin.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Prior constructionPrior construction adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “It “remains true in construing patent claims before the PTO” that “the prosecution history . . . serves as intrinsic evidence for purposes of claim construction.” Tempo Lighting, Inc. v. Tivoli, LLC, 742 F.3d 973, 977 (Fed. Cir. 2014). “The PTO should also consult the patent’s prosecution history in proceedings in which the patent has been brought back to the agency for a second review,” such as the present inter partes review. Microsoft Corp. v. Proxyconn, Inc., 789 F.3d 1292, 1298 (Fed. Cir. 2015), overruled on other grounds by Aqua Prods., Inc. v. Matal, 872 F.3d 1290 (Fed. Cir. 2017). Upon our review of the entire record, we agree with the construction of “selectable betting parameter” previously provided by the Board, during ex parte prosecution of the ’952 patent, as set forth above. Therefore, for the reasons provided in that previous Board decision, none of which are disputed here, we apply that construction here. 2.” slip op. at 9

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Specification disavowal / 'present invention' languageDisclaimer not foundDecided for patent owner

    “However, the Federal Circuit has “cautioned against reading limitations into a claim from the preferred embodiment described in the specification, even if it is the only embodiment described, absent clear disclaimer in the specification.” In re Am. Acad. of Sci. Tech Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Teleflex, Inc. v. Ficosa North America Corp., 299 F.3d 1313, 1327–28 (Fed. Cir. 2002); In re Paulsen, 30 F.3d 1475, 1480 (Fed. Cir. 1994). We find no such clear disclaimer in the ’952 patent specification that would require Patent Owner’s narrow interpretation of the “corresponding” claim term. In particular, while any given location in the cited example from the ’952 patent corresponds to one value of the parameter so the location “determines the bet input” (Ex. 1001, 2:20–22), there is no clear disclosure that other locations may not correspond to that same parameter. It is only in one “example” that each different location “corresponds to a different roulette number.” Id. at 2:22–24 (emphasis added). Thus, the ’952 patent disclosure does not clearly disclaim multiple different locations each corresponding to the same bet input (number or color). See id. at 2:12–31.” slip op. at 12

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached

    “After full consideration of the foregoing arguments, we conclude Patent Owner’s analysis of the scope of the claim limitation at issue is vague and confusing. That claim limitation is: the first and second selectable betting parameters are different such that selecting one would cause a different result for the bet than selecting the other. Ex. 1001, 35:23–28. Such language, on its own, presents a straight-forward claim requirement. Patent Owner’s overlying varnish suggesting that the claim requires a relationship between the first and second parameters, making them “comparable variables,” is not supported by the claim language at issue, and confuses Patent Owner’s analysis of the prior art at issue. We reject Patent Owner’s implicit claim construction of this claim limitation and determine no explicit claim construction of this limitation is needed to resolve the issues presented by the arguments and evidence of record. 4. Remaining Claim Terms The parties do not offer any further explicit claim constructions. We determine no further explicit claim constructions are needed to resolve the issues presented by the arguments and evidence of record. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co. Ltd., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (per curiam) (claim terms need to be construed “only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 16

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “We agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner’s reference to video game experience, as opposed to some other computer gaming experience, is not required to achieve ordinary skill in the art pertinent to the ’952 patent. The ’952 patent is concerned principally with implementing different gaming rules via computer hardware and software as a mobile gaming device moves between jurisdictions; the specific technical implementation of presenting the game on a computer screen is only a secondary consideration. See, e.g., Ex. 1001, Abstract. However, even if we were to accept Petitioner’s position on this point, it would not affect the bases for our decision set forth below. We agree with Petitioner that ordinary skill here requires gaming experience, and does not encompass telecommunications experience without gaming experience. While wireless communication and location tracking are components of the ’952 patent’s claimed invention, the specifics of how such communication and tracking occur is only a secondary consideration. See, e.g., Ex. 1001, Abstract, 1:51–2:11, 7:48–8:12. However, even if we were to accept Patent Owner’s position on this point, it would not affect the bases for our decision set forth below. We determine a person of ordinary skill in the art pertaining to the ’952 patent would have a Bachelor of Science Degree in Electrical Engineering, Computer Engineering, or a similar field. Such a person, further, would have at least about two years of experience designing and developing computer hardware and software to be used for playing games.” slip op. at 18

  Patent outcomesUS 9,306,952 mixed
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 9,306,952
• Apple Inc. v. Andrea Electronics Corp.Some claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jul 12, 2018 · IPR2017-00627 · APJ Jeremy M Plenzler · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–5, 10–16, 21–23, 25, and 38–46 are unpatentable; claims 6–9, 17–20, 24, and 47 were not shown unpatentable.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner

    “Although the dictionary defines “periodically” as “from time to time” or “at regular intervals of time,” based on the record before us, we agree with Patent Owner that its proposed construction is how one skilled in the art would have understood that term in the context of the ’345 patent Specification. Turning first to the intrinsic evidence, the Specification explains that “[t]he future and current minimum values are calculated continuously and initiated periodically, for example, every 5 seconds.” Ex. 1001, 8:37–39. Although the Specification later notes that “[i]t will be appreciated that, while specific values are used as in the several equations and calculations employed in the present invention, these values may be different than those shown” (id. at 8:64–67), this passage does not mean that the Specification contemplates arrangements where “periodically” is simply “from time to time.” Rather, we determine that statement from the Specification indicates that the specific amount of time (i.e., every 5 seconds) may vary. Turning now to the extrinsic evidence, the testimony of Dr. Douglas supports our conclusion, explaining that “at regular intervals of time” is the “only . . . definition . . . consistent with the understanding of a person skilled in the art in light of the specification of the ’345 Patent and its use in the particular field of audio signal processing” because [l]ike the “period” of an audio signal itself, which is the amount of time it takes for a signal to repeat itself, “periodically” as recited in claims 6 and 9 and throughout the remainder of the specification of the ’345 Patent refers to actions that occur at regular intervals (e.g., every 5 seconds rather than merely “from time to time”). Ex. 2002 ¶ 48. Moreover, Petitioner’s declarant, Dr. Hochwald testifies that outside of the context of the ’345 patent Specification, “periodically” means “at regular time intervals” (Ex. 2005, 99:13–15), and when asked about that term’s meaning in the context of the ’345 patent Specification, Dr. Hochwald simply noted that “all I can do is read what it says,” which is that “[i]t’s doing something periodically, for example, every five seconds” (id. at 100:4–6). Accordingly, the testimony from Dr. Douglas, as well as that from Dr. Hochwald, supports Patent Owner’s construction. In summary, we adopt Patent Owner’s construction of “periodically,” requiring “at regular intervals of time,” because (1) this is consistent with how this term is used in the context of the ’345 Patent Specification; and (2) this is supported by the testimony of both experts.” slip op. at 7

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableNot shown unpatentableMixed

    “Patent Owner responds that, because Helf uses average values (i.e., the average of eight consecutive values), it does not disclose using a minimum value. PO Resp. 17–23. Patent Owner acknowledges that the ’345 patent, itself, uses a “smoothing process [that] produces frequency bins with multiple smoothed magnitude values, ultimately finding the minimum of all of the values,” but contends that “Helf’s averaging process produces a single output representing one average of the original samples.” Id. at 20–21 (underlining omitted) (citing Ex. 1001, 8:14–28; Ex. 2002 ¶¶ 52, 63–72). We disagree with Patent Owner’s characterization of the differences between Helf and the ’345 patent. While Helf may ultimately produce a single minimum value, as discussed above, that value is based on a minimum value of the averages calculated over the given time period. At oral hearing, Patent Owner acknowledged that Helf determines many averages values (i.e., the averages of the eight consecutive frames) and determines a minimum of those values. See, e.g., Tr. 22:2–6. The claim simply requires a “future minimum value,” and does not preclude that value from being a minimum value taken from a set of average values. Indeed, such an interpretation of the claim would be inconsistent with the ’345 patent’s use of smoothed values noted by Patent Owner. Ex. 1001, 8:14–28. The testimony of Dr. Douglas cited by Patent Owner does not convince us otherwise. See Ex. 2002 ¶¶ 52, 63–72 (effectively repeating Patent Owner’s contentions, which are unpersuasive for the reasons set forth above). Accordingly, we are persuaded that Helf’s minimum value (Mk) corresponds to the “future minimum value” recited in claims 4 and 39.” slip op. at 13

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundMotivation foundMixed

    “With respect to its “running minimum estimator,” Helf explains that the “running minimum estimator” is used “when either the speech signal is never absent for more than a second or the background noise itself is never constant in spectral shape.” Ex. 1010, 8:11–15. Helf acknowledges that its “running minimum estimator” is “much less accura[te]” than its “stationary estimator,” which is typically used for background noise estimates. Id. at 8:15–17. As a result, Helf only uses its “running minimum estimator” if “[i]t has been more than 10 seconds since the last update of the background noise spectral estimate due to the Stationary Estimator,” and “[t]he difference, D, between the past background noise estimate, which may have resulted from the Stationary Estimator or the Running Minimum Estimator, and the current Running Minimum Estimator is great.” Id. at 8:32–42. We see no persuasive reason to set Helf’s current background noise estimate (Nk and Ck, considered the “current minimum” by Petitioner) to the minimum estimate (Mk) from the “running minimum estimator” (considered the “future minimum” by Petitioner). The testimony of Dr. Douglas supports this conclusion. See, e.g., Ex. 2002 ¶¶ 119, 120. Addressing the portions of Helf noted above, Dr. Douglas testifies that “Helf only relies on Mk in a ‘worst case’ scenario” and “disfavors the use of Mk, even where Bk is unavailable,” and concludes that “one of ordinary skill would not be motivated to force the use of the disfavored Mk every ten seconds even where the much more accurate Bk estimate is available.” Id. ¶ 119. Dr. Douglas further testifies that “one of ordinary skill would not have been motivated to abandon[] the comparison of D to a threshold” because “one of ordinary skill in the art would recognize that Helf is a signal-dependent system, and it would not abandon its ability to adapt to varying signal conditions in favor of a blind periodic update using a disfavored estimate.” Id. ¶ 120. We credit the testimony of Dr. Douglas over that of Dr. Hochwald in this regard. See Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 157–159; Ex. 2002 ¶¶ 115–120. The testimony from Dr. Douglas is consistent with the disclosure of Helf, while that of Dr. Hochwald is based on conclusory statements. For example, the only portions of Dr. Hochwald’s testimony cited in the Petition in connection with the rationale provided in this challenge are conclusory statements that “[a] person of ordinary skill would have found it obvious to modify Helf to update the background noise estimate after every 10 second period based on the teachings of Martin,” and “[t]he skilled person would have recognized it was beneficial to periodically update the minimum noise value to ensure it accurately reflected the current noise level,” which are contrary to the disclosure of Helf noted above. Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 158, 159.” slip op. at 21

  • Expert testimonyPatent owner expert creditedPetitioner expert discountedOther

    “We see no persuasive reason to set Helf’s current background noise estimate (Nk and Ck, considered the “current minimum” by Petitioner) to the minimum estimate (Mk) from the “running minimum estimator” (considered the “future minimum” by Petitioner). The testimony of Dr. Douglas supports this conclusion. See, e.g., Ex. 2002 ¶¶ 119, 120. Addressing the portions of Helf noted above, Dr. Douglas testifies that “Helf only relies on Mk in a ‘worst case’ scenario” and “disfavors the use of Mk, even where Bk is unavailable,” and concludes that “one of ordinary skill would not be motivated to force the use of the disfavored Mk every ten seconds even where the much more accurate Bk estimate is available.” Id. ¶ 119. Dr. Douglas further testifies that “one of ordinary skill would not have been motivated to abandon[] the comparison of D to a threshold” because “one of ordinary skill in the art would recognize that Helf is a signal-dependent system, and it would not abandon its ability to adapt to varying signal conditions in favor of a blind periodic update using a disfavored estimate.” Id. ¶ 120. We credit the testimony of Dr. Douglas over that of Dr. Hochwald in this regard. See Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 157–159; Ex. 2002 ¶¶ 115–120. The testimony from Dr. Douglas is consistent with the disclosure of Helf, while that of Dr. Hochwald is based on conclusory statements. For example, the only portions of Dr. Hochwald’s testimony cited in the Petition in connection with the rationale provided in this challenge are conclusory statements that “[a] person of ordinary skill would have found it obvious to modify Helf to update the background noise estimate after every 10 second period based on the teachings of Martin,” and “[t]he skilled person would have recognized it was beneficial to periodically update the minimum noise value to ensure it accurately reflected the current noise level,” which are contrary to the disclosure of Helf noted above. Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 158, 159.” slip op. at 21

  Patent outcomesUS 6,363,345 mixed
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness
  Patents in suitUS 6,363,345
• Apple Inc. v. Andrea Electronics Corp.Some claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jul 12, 2018 · IPR2017-00626 · APJ Jeremy M Plenzler · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–3, 12–25, 38, and 47 are unpatentable; claims 4–11 and 39–46 are not shown unpatentable, chiefly because the proposed Hirsch–Martin combination was not supported.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Expert testimonyPatent owner expert creditedPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner

    “In its Reply, Petitioner contends that, “[i]n this configuration [where W = 1], any purported distinction between windows and sub-windows in Martin vanishes and [Patent Owner]’s argument is irrelevant,” acknowledging that the proposed modification eliminates Martin’s sub-windows. Pet. Reply 5. Petitioner further contends that Patent Owner “incorrectly argues that the use of sub-windows is central to Martin’s algorithm” and “[n]othing in Martin suggests that the use of sub-windows is required.” Id. at 7 (citing Ex. 1023 ¶¶ 6–8). We disagree with Petitioner, and credit the testimony of Dr. Douglas over that of Dr. Hochwald with respect to Martin’s use of sub-windows because, as discussed below, Dr. Hochwald’s testimony is not consistent with the disclosure of Martin, while the testimony of Dr. Douglas is consistent with that disclosure. See, e.g., Ex. 1023 ¶¶ 6–9 (asserting that Martin does not expressly require sub-windows); Ex. 2002 ¶¶ 94–96 (discussing Martin’s use of at least two sub-windows for monotonic determination). As noted above, Martin’s algorithm requires a determination of whether or not “the minimum power of the last W windows with M samples each is monotonically increasing.” Ex. 1006, 1094. We are not persuaded by Petitioner’s argument that one skilled in the art would have found it obvious to modify Hirsch’s system based on a scenario from Martin where W = 1 because such a scenario is counter to the entire purpose of Martin. Even Petitioner’s Declarant, Dr. Hochwald, acknowledges that a single data point (i.e., W = 1) cannot be used to determine whether something is monotonically increasing. See Ex. 2005 69:10–17 (explaining that you need at least two data points to make such a determination, meaning W ≥ 2). Petitioner fails to provide persuasive reasoning as to why one skilled in the art would have modified Hirsch’s teachings in a manner that is contrary to the express disclosure of Martin.” slip op. at 14

  • Strike new argumentNew argument disregardedDecided for patent owner

    “Petitioner attempts to cure these deficiencies in its Reply, contending that, “[e]ven where Martin’s algorithm is configured to use multiple sub-windows, it still teaches the claimed ‘future minimum.’” Pet. Reply 8. We do not consider this new argument, as it is a new theory of unpatentability presented for the first time in the Petitioner’s Reply. See Dell Inc. v. Acceleron, LLC, 818 F.3d 1293, 1301 (Fed Cir. 2016) (“A patent owner . . . is undoubtedly entitled to notice of and a fair opportunity to meet the grounds of [unpatentability].”) (quoting Belden Inc. v. Berk-Tek LLC, 805 F.3d 1064, 1080 (Fed. Cir. 2015)). For at least these reasons, Petitioner has failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that claims 4–11, 39–42, and 46 are unpatentable over the combined teachings of Hirsch and Martin.” slip op. at 15

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “Hirsch is directed to “techniques . . . to estimate the noise spectra or the noise characteristics for noisy speech signals” that “can be combined with a nonlinear spectral subtraction scheme.” Ex. 1005, 153. Hirsch discusses use of “FFT based spectral analysis” (id. at 154), for example, which Petitioner cites as corresponding to the “generating the frequency spectrum of said audio signal thereby generating frequency bins of said audio signal” recited in claim 1 (Pet. 27). Hirsch discusses use of an “adaptive threshold” for each frequency bin to distinguish between speech and noise (Ex. 1005, 153), which Petitioner cites as corresponding to the “setting a threshold for each frequency bin using a noise estimation process” recited in claim 1 (Pet. 27). Hirsch describes comparing spectral components to their corresponding thresholds to determine if speech is present (Ex. 1005, 153), which Petitioner cites as corresponding to the “detecting for each frequency bin whether the magnitude of the frequency bin is less than the corresponding threshold, thereby detecting the position of noise elements for each frequency bin” recited in claim 1 (Pet. 27–28). Based on the record before us, we are persuaded that Hirsch discloses each and every element of claim 1. We also are persuaded that Hirsch discloses each and every element of claim 38 for the reasons discussed above in connection with claim 1, as well as the “subtracting said noise elements . . . from said audio signal” additionally recited in claim 38. With respect to the recited “subtracting,” Petitioner cites Hirsch’s discussion of spectral subtraction. Pet. 25–26 (citing Ex. 1005, 153–155). As Petitioner notes, “[t]he spectral subtraction technique shown in Hirsch subtracts the noise estimate from each sub-band or ‘bin’ and sets any negative values to zero” (id. (citing Ex. 1005, 153)), which “is the same technique used in the ’345 patent” (id. (citing Ex. 1001, 6:58–61, 7:16–27)). Claims 2, 3, 12, 13, 21, and 23 depend from claim 1, and Petitioner cites to relevant portions of Hirsch as disclosing the additional limitations of those claims. See Pet. 28–31. We are persuaded by Petitioner’s unrebutted arguments and evidence related to how Hirsch properly accounts for each and every element of these dependent claims, which we adopt for purposes of this decision. Specifically, we find that Hirsch discloses the additional limitations recited in those claims based on the citations to Hirsch therein and the supporting expert testimony. See id. Based on our review of the record before us, the preponderance of the evidence supports Petitioner’s contentions that claims 1–3, 12, 13, 21, 23, and 38 are anticipated by Hirsch.” slip op. at 7

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundMotivation foundMixed

    “Initially, we agree with Petitioner that one skilled in the art would have considered Martin’s teachings, generally, when reviewing the teachings of Hirsch, as Martin is specifically referenced in Hirsch itself. Nevertheless, we are not persuaded that one skilled in the art would have modified Hisch’s system based on the teachings of Martin in the particular manner proposed by Petitioner. Consistent with Patent Owner’s contentions noted above, Martin describes determining “[t]he noise power estimate is based on the minimum of signal power within a window of L samples” and “[f]or reasons of computational complexity and delay the data window of length L is decomposed into W windows of length M such that M * W = L,” and provides an example where W=4. Ex. 1006, 1094. Martin distinguishes between “slowly varying noise power” and “rapidly varying noise power” to determine its noise power estimate, with a determination of whether the minimum power in successive sub-windows is monotonically increasing central to its estimation. Id. “If the minimum power of the last W windows with M samples each is monotonically increasing we decide on rapid noise power variation” and “the noise power estimate equals the power minimum of the last M samples Pn(i) = PMmin(i = r * M).” Id. “In case of non monotonic power the noise power estimate is set to the minimum of the length L window.” Id. Regardless of whether the noise power calculation is that for “slowly varying noise power” or “rapidly varying noise power,” Martin requires that first a determination is made as to whether or not “the minimum power of the last W windows with M samples each is monotonically increasing.” Id. (emphasis added). To the extent there can be any dispute on this issue, the testimony from Dr. Douglas supports the understanding that at least two subwindows are required to determine which noise power calculation to use. See Ex. 2002 ¶¶ 95, 96. In its Reply, Petitioner contends that, “[i]n this configuration [where” slip op. at 13

  Patent outcomesUS 6,363,345 mixed
  § 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness
  Patents in suitUS 6,363,345

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.