• Tesla, Inc. v. Charge Fusion Technologies, LLCAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jul 13, 2026 · IPR2025-00153 · APJ Carl M Defranco · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–30 are unpatentable as obvious under § 103 over the asserted combinations of prior art.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “understanding of one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention. Tesla submits that one of ordinary skill in the art would have had at least a bachelor’s degree in electrical or mechanical engineering (or an equivalent field) and at least two years of work experience involving automotive systems, including electric vehicle power management. . . . Additional industry 1 US 2009/0313034 A1, pub. Dec. 17, 2009 (Ex. 1004, “Ferro”). 2 EP 1,920,968 A1, pub. May 14, 2008 (Ex. 1005, “Oyobe”). 3 US 7,124,691 B2, iss. Oct. 24, 2006 (Ex. 1006, “Donnelly”). 4 Steven E. Letendre, The V2G Concept: A New Model for Power? PUBLIC UTILITIES FORTNIGHTLY, Feb. 15, 2002, at 16 (Ex. 1007, “Letendre”). 5 US 5,654,621, iss. Aug. 5, 1997 (Ex. 1078, “Seelig”). 6 US 6,662,083 B1, iss. Sep. 16, 2003 (Ex. 1010, “Knockeart”). experience or technical training may offset less formal education, while advanced degrees or additional formal education may offset lesser levels of industry experience. Pet. 2 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 14–15). Charge Fusion “takes no position with respect to Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill.” PO Resp. 17. For purposes of our analysis, we apply Tesla’s proposed level of ordinary skill, which we find to be consistent with the problems addressed in the ’987 patent and the prior art. B. Claim Interpretation” slip op. at 6

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “1. “dynamic attribute of an electric charge provider” In the Petition, Tesla proposes that we construe “dynamic attribute of an electric charge provider,” as recited in every independent claim, to mean “a changing or otherwise fluctuating cost (or price) of electricity for purchase from an electric charge provider.” Pet. 4–5. Charge Fusion responds that Tesla improperly narrows the meaning of this claim limitation. PO Resp. 15 (arguing this claim term “is not just limited to ‘changing or otherwise fluctuating cost (or price)’ as alleged by the Petition” (emphasis added)). Although we consider Tesla’s proposed construction to identify an exemplary “dynamic attribute of an electric charge provider,” we see no need to limit the meaning of this limitation as proposed by Tesla. Indeed, Tesla agrees. See Pet. Reply. 7 (arguing only that this claim limitation “at least includes” such an example). And Charge Fusion does not contend otherwise. See PO Resp 15 (arguing only that this limitation “is not just limited to” cost fluctuations). As such, we see no need to further construe this claim limitation. 2. “determine . . . a charging schedule for the vehicle” Limitation 1[g] recites “determine, based at least on the one or more charging preferences and at least one current value of a dynamic attribute of an electric charge provider, a charging schedule for the vehicle.” Independent claim 8, 15, and 22 recite a materially identical limitation. Tesla submits that this limitation should not be construed as a means-plus- function limitation under 35 U.S.C. § 112(6). See Pet. 5. Charge Fusion agrees that “nothing in the claim invokes [§] 112(6).” PO Resp. 16. As such, we discern no dispute regarding the meaning of this claim limitation.” slip op. at 8

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner

    “Initially, we note that, as claimed, there is no express restriction on the manner in which the “amount” or “charge” is specified or otherwise expressed. Indeed, the Specification uses both “desired charge percent level” and “desired charge range level” as alternative ways for a user to specify an “amount of charge.” Ex. 1001, 14:53–15:8 (emphases added). The Specification defines “desired charge range level” as meaning “a desired distance to travel.” Id. at 15:3–8. Elsewhere, the Specification describes that a user may specify the amount of charge as follows: “the user may indicate a desired charging level (and/or a desired charging level may be automatically calculated) based on a desired distance of travel.” Id. at 19:49–57 (emphasis added). More specifically, annotated Figure 7 of the ’987 patent, reproduced below, demonstrates how a user may select “amount of charge” in terms of a desired mileage range 720 or a percentage level 718. See Pet. Reply 2. As shown in red, annotated Figure 7 illustrates that a user selects “desired charge level 720” on “vehicle charge indicator 714” by moving a slider to a value specified in “miles” (e.g., 110 miles). The Specification, after discussing selecting a desired charge percent level 718, explains: The user may also or alternatively view and/or change the desired charge range level 720. An estimate of how far the vehicle can travel on a given charge amount (which may be a general average and/or may be computed based on a specific itinerary and/or past driving habits) can be determined, for example, and utilized to express the desired charge level in terms of distance capable of being traveled. In such a manner, for example, a user may determine a desired distance to travel (e.g., how far it is from home to work or vice versa) and may set the desired charge range level 720 to match the desired distance. Ex. 1001, 14:65–15:8. Thus, the Specification confirms that “amount of charge” may be expressed in terms of a desired mileage as well as a desired percentage level.” slip op. at 11

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of success › HindsightMotivation foundDecided for petitioner

    “We disagree. Charge Fusion’s reliance on Wonderland is misplaced and does not support the proposition for which it is cited. In Wonderland, the district court denied the accused infringer’s motion for summary judgment of invalidity, in part, because genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether there was sufficient motivation to combine the prior art. Wonderland, 988 F. Supp. 2d at 511. As such, the district court’s Wonderland decision does not constitute a final ruling on the motivation to combine issue, and the Federal Circuit’s summary affirmance of the district court’s ruling neither addresses the issue nor reflects how the issue was resolved at trial. See Wonderland NurseryGoods Co. v. Thorley Indus., LLC, 644 F. App’x 1011 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Moreover, contrary to Charge Fusion’s assertion, Tesla correctly notes that although Ferro refers to wireless charging, it provides no implementation details. Ex. 1004 ¶ 36; Ex. 2006, 54:8–55:9. Nonetheless, Ferro does describe manual options for initiating charging, and Tesla’s expert credibly testifies that one of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to apply Oyobe’s vehicle sensor to allow a user to initiate Ferro’s charging methods more easily without having to leave the vehicle. See Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 146, 151, 152 (citing Ex. 1004 ¶ 109). Accordingly, we find that Tesla establishes that one of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to incorporate Oyobe’s use of a sensor to establish presence of a vehicle near a charging station into Ferro’s system.” slip op. at 17

  Patent outcomesUS 11,631,987 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips
  Patents in suitUS 11,631,987
• Tesla, Inc. v. Charge Fusion Technologies, LLCAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jul 13, 2026 · IPR2025-00152 · APJ Carl M Defranco · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–17 are unpatentable as obvious: claims 1–4, 6–9, and 11–14 over Sutardja, Donnelly, and Letendre; claims 5, 10, and 15 with Seelig; claims 16 and 17 with Knockeart.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “understanding of one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention. Tesla submits that one of ordinary skill in the art would have had at least a bachelor’s degree in electrical or mechanical engineering (or an equivalent field) and at least two years of work experience involving automotive systems, including electric vehicle power management. . . . Additional industry experience or technical training may offset less formal education, 1 US 2008/0136371 A1, pub. Jun. 12, 2008 (Ex. 1011, “Sutardja”). 2 US 7,124,691 B2, iss. Oct. 24, 2006 (Ex. 1006, “Donnelly”). 3 Steven E. Letendre, The V2G Concept: A New Model for Power? PUBLIC UTILITIES FORTNIGHTLY, Feb. 15, 2002, at 16 (Ex. 1007, “Letendre”). 4 US 5,654,621, iss. Aug. 5, 1997 (Ex. 1078, “Seelig”). 5 US 6,622,083 B1, iss. Sep. 16, 2003 (Ex. 1010, “Knockeart”). while advanced degrees or additional formal education may offset lesser levels of industry experience. Pet. 2–3 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 29). Charge Fusion “takes no position with respect to Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art.” PO Resp. 9. For purposes of our analysis, we apply Tesla’s proposed level of ordinary skill, which we find to be consistent with the problems addressed in the ’788 patent and the prior art. B. Claim Interpretation” slip op. at 6

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for patent owner

    “shown in Figure 7 of the ’788 patent. Pet. 4–5. Charge Fusion responds that Tesla’s proposed construction should be rejected because it “wrongly import[s] embodiments from the specification.” PO Resp. 14–16. We discern no dispute over the meaning of “unitary vehicle charge indicator” because, contrary to what Charge Fusion argues, Tesla does not contend that this limitation is “required to be limited to” the bar graph embodiment of Figure 7, only that it “at least includes” that embodiment. Compare Pet. 5, with PO Resp. 14–16. Tesla also argues that the “first” and “second” portions of the unitary vehicle charge indicator—which indicate the charged and uncharged capacities of the battery—recite merely “communicative content,” and thus, are “not entitled to any patentable weight” because they are directed to nonfunctional printed matter. Pet. 5–7 (citing various case law). At the same time, however, Tesla maintains that “[r]egardless, Donnelly teaches a bar graph indicating the amount of charge and uncharged capacity.” Pet. Reply 11–12 (citing Pet. 33–34); see also Hrg. Tr. 74:22–25, 75:9–11. For reasons expressed below, we agree that Tesla persuasively demonstrates that the asserted combination teaches the “unitary vehicle charge indicator element” as claimed and construed by Charge Fusion. Accordingly, we need not decide the printed matter issue.” slip op. at 8

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

    “Initially, we note that, as claimed, there is no express restriction on the manner in which the “amount” or “charge” is specified or otherwise expressed. Indeed, the Specification uses both “desired charge percent level” and “desired charge range level” as alternative ways for a user to specify an “amount of charge.” Ex. 1001, 14:63–15:18 (emphases added). In particular, the Specification defines “desired charge range level” as meaning “a desired distance to travel.” Id. at 15:8–18. Elsewhere, the Specification describes that a user may specify the amount of charge as follows: “the user may indicate a desired charging level (and/or a desired charging level may be automatically calculated) based on a desired distance of travel.” Id. at 19:59–67 (emphasis added).” slip op. at 9

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “full charge” for the battery, and thus, Tesla fails to explain how the combination of Sutardja with Donnelly’s battery bar graph image “would allow a user to select a specific amount of charge or how this would result in a unitary vehicle charge indicator,” as claimed. PO Resp. 30. According to Charge Fusion, “[l]imiting the single option of ‘full charge’ as described in Sutardja would defeat the purpose of implementing a slider” as taught by Donnelly. Id. (citing Ex. 2008 ¶ 72). We disagree. Charge Fusion’s argument rests on the mistaken premise that Sutardja only contemplates selecting a full amount of charge for the battery and not an amount below a full charge, i.e., a partial charge. But that is not what Sutardja says. More accurately, Sutardja teaches that the user specifies the amount of charge—"The user interface module 108 may comprise a key pad, a display, a microphone, and/or a speaker (all not shown). A user of the vehicle 102-1 may use the user interface module 108 to set charging parameters for charging the battery 14.” Ex. 1011 ¶ 243. Elsewhere, Sutardja teaches that the user may set a “predetermined level” of charge— The charge monitoring module 150 may inform the control module 112 when the battery 14 is charged to a predetermined level (e.g., full charge) that may be indicated in the charging parameters. Subsequently, the charge monitoring module 150 may stop charging the battery 14 by deactivating the converter 156 and the charging module 152. The power meter 24 may measure the amount of power received from the utility company 23 during the charging operation. Id. ¶ 270 (emphases added). Although that passage indicates that a “full charge” is an example of a “predetermined level” of charge, nowhere does it exclude the selection of a lesser amount. Indeed, the passage contemplates the ability to “stop charging the battery,” which indicates that selection of the predetermined level may be less than a full charge. Id. Thus, we are not persuaded by Charge Fusion’s argument to the contrary. Rather, in our view, Tesla demonstrates by a preponderance of the evidence that the Sutardja-Donnelly combination teaches a “unitary vehicle charge indicator” that includes at least “first” and “second” portions and that one of ordinary skill in the art would have had reason to successfully combine their respective teachings in a manner that allows a user to predetermine, i.e., specify, an amount of charge. slip op. at 17

  Patent outcomesUS 11,990,788 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips
  Patents in suitUS 11,990,788
• Klipsta Pty Ltd v. Lindsay AlbaneseSome claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jul 10, 2026 · IPR2025-00346 · APJ Annette R Reimers · IPR · Final written decision

  Claim 16 is unpatentable as obvious over the asserted grounds; claims 1–15, 17, and 18 were not shown unpatentable.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “may be considered, including the “type of problems encountered in the art; prior art solutions to those problems; rapidity with which innovations are made; sophistication of the technology; and educational level of active workers in the field.” In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995). Petitioner contends that a person having ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention (“POSITA”) “would be a regular consumer/shopper with a rudimentary knowledge of the use of magnetic clips and a basic understanding of clip construction.” Pet. 13. We find that the ’047 patent and the cited prior art references reflect the appropriate level of skill at the time of the claimed invention and that the level of skill reflected in these references and in the ’047 patent is consistent with the definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art proposed by Petitioner. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 10

  • BurdenMixed

    “Petitioner’s mapping of the components of KR ’458’s fastening device is insufficient. Although Petitioner maps the center line of fastening member 115 to the recited second end, Petitioner fails to adequately map the recited first end of the second strap or explain why one of skill in the art would consider the second ferromagnetic member (convex member 117) to be disposed at the first end of the second strap as required by claim 1. that the first end is “upward to connector 117.” Pet. 24. This is not the end of the second strap. As discussed above, the end of the second strap wraps around rectangular ring 210 and is then secured to itself.7 Connector 117 is positioned below the true end of the strap, more in the middle of this segment of the strap. In other words, Petitioner arbitrarily defines the strap as only the portion of hat holder 110 between the center line and connector 117, in contradiction to what KR ’458 actually discloses. Nowhere does Petitioner explain why connector 117 is disposed at the first end of the second strap. Neither does Petitioner explain why we should disregard the true end of the strap, nor why one of skill in the art would consider only a middle portion of the strap to be the second strap. Thus, Petitioner has not satisfied its burden in this regard. Therefore, Petitioner has not shown that KR ’458 discloses “a second strap having a first end and a second end, the second strap joined to the first strap,” with “a second ferromagnetic member disposed at the first end of the second strap.” For the foregoing reasons, we determine that a preponderance of the evidence does not support that claim 1 is anticipated by KR ’458.” slip op. at 23

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

    “The ’047 patent discloses that in addition to being separate straps, the rear strap and the front strap “can be formed from a single piece of material.” Ex. 1001, 3:40–44, 5:24–32, 10:18–25. In particular, Figures 5A–5B of the ’047 patent illustrate rear strap 510 and front strap 520 as being “formed from a single piece of material that is folded approximately in half where a first half can be the rear strap 510 and a second half can be the front strap 520.” Id. at 10:18–21, Figs. 5A–5B. Indeed, Patent Owner acknowledges “[i]t should be noted that forming the first and second straps from a single piece of material is well within the scope of the claimed invention.” Ex. 1007, 5 (citing the ’047 patent at 3:37–44). Moreover, we note the positions taken by the parties are consistent with the fact that claim second strap are formed from a single folded strap.” Ex. 1001, 14:47–48. We, therefore, adopt Petitioner’s construction of “the second strap joined to the first strap” to include “a single piece of material.”” slip op. at 11

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITADecided for patent owner

    “Petitioner’s construction of a “hook” to include a “structure that serves to attach the hat holder to another object” is based on function, rather embodiments in the Specification of the ’047 patent. Although strap-style hook 340 of Figures 3A–3C is a flexible component rather than a more rigid component like hook 140 shown in Figures 1A–1C , both can be considered types of hooks. All of the embodiments, whether rigid or flexible, can be considered to have a hook-like structure when serving the function of attaching the hat holder to another object. Petitioner’s proposed construction would render the term “hook” meaningless, as various types of structures could be used to attach the hat holder to another object, that would not reasonably be considered to be a “hook.” For example, a snap, safety pin, ring, or button could be used to attach a hat holder to another object. Petitioner’s identification of different embodiments in the ’047 patent of hook-like structures does not show why one of skill in the art would consider almost any structure to be considered a “hook.” We, therefore, reject Petitioner’s construction of a “hook” as a “structure that serves to attach the hat holder to another object.” “wherein the first strap and the second strap are configured to retain a” slip op. at 12

  Patent outcomesUS 10,413,047 mixed
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,413,047
• GD Energy Products, LLC v. Kerr Machine CompanyAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jun 29, 2026 · PGR2025-00031 · APJ Ryan H Flax · PGR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–14 are unpatentable as obvious under each of four asserted grounds: Kerr; Aplex and Stanton; Blume, Stanton, and Wilkinson; and the sale of the Kerr Pump.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “The person of ordinary skill in the art would have a minimum of a bachelor’s degree in mechanical or petrochemical engineering, or a comparable engineering discipline, and a minimum of 3-5 years of work experience in the design and/or manufacturing of reciprocating pumps and valves, including fluid ends and/or comparable high pressure fluid components, for industrial applications, including for use in the oil and gas industry. See, e.g., EX1003, ¶32.” slip op. at 12

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “[W]e need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). We decline to expressly construe any claim language. slip op. at 12

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner

    “Regarding the combining of Aplex and Stanton, Petitioner asserts that the ordinarily skilled artisan would have understood that providing a packing/stuffing arrangement, as taught by Stanton, within a fluid end housing, as taught by Aplex, would improve pressure and fluid isolation compared with an arrangement where the packing was bolted to the outside of the fluid end as in Aplex unmodified. Pet. 66 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 189, 236). Patent Owner does not dispute this rationale. We find this to be a reason, with rationale underpinning, why the person of ordinary skill in the art would have combined these references with a reasonable expectation of success.” slip op. at 29

  • Adverse judgmentOther

    “The record indicates that Patent Owner has statutorily disclaimed claim 15 as of April 28, 2025. Ex. 2206.” slip op. at 8

  Patent outcomesUS 12,152,582 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 12,152,582
• Tesla, Inc. v. Charge Fusion Technologies, LLCAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · May 13, 2026 · IPR2025-00032 · APJ Mitchell G Weatherly · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–29 are unpatentable as obvious under §103 based on the asserted combinations of prior art.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “understanding of a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention. Graham, 383 U.S. at 17. Petitioner submits that the ordinarily skilled artisan would have at least a bachelor’s degree in electrical or mechanical engineering (or an equivalent field) and at least two years of work experience involving automotive systems, including electric vehicle power management. . . . Additional industry experience or technical training may offset less formal education, while advanced degrees or additional formal education may offset lesser levels of industry experience. Pet. 2 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 30–32). Patent Owner “takes no position with respect to Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill.” PO Resp. 17. For the purposes of our analysis below, we apply Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill, which we find to be consistent with the problems addressed in the ’338 patent and the prior art.” slip op. at 10

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

    “Initially, we note that “amount of charge” reflects no express limitation on the manner of expressing the “amount” or the “charge.” And the Specification uses both “desired charge percent level” and “desired charge range level” as alternative ways for a user may specify an “amount of 3 As recited in independent claims 10, 19, and 28 charge.” For example, the Specification describes that a user may specify an amount of charge by specifying a desired travel distance as follows: “the user may indicate a desired charging level (and/or a desired charging level may be automatically calculated) based on a desired distance of travel.” Ex. 1001, 19:49–57 (emphasis added). Therefore, “amount of charge” may also refer to a desired mileage or range. Figure 7 further demonstrates that a user may select “amount of charge” in terms of a “percent” or a “range” as shown in Petitioner’s annotated version of the pertinent portion of that figure as shown below.” slip op. at 11

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of success › HindsightMotivation foundDecided for petitioner

    “We disagree with Patent Owner. First, Patent Owner’s reliance on Wonderland as announcing a rule having broad effect is misplaced. Patent Owner contends that the “Federal Circuit has confirmed that where the primary reference already includes the function of the secondary reference, an allegation to incorporate that function into the primary reference is improper hindsight and no motivation to combine exists.” Id. at 29 (citing Wonderland NurseryGoods Co. v. Thorley Indus., LLC, 988 F.Supp. 2d 479, 498–99 (W.D. Pa. 2013), aff'd, 644 F. App'x 1011 (Fed. Cir. 2016); citing Kinetic Concepts, Inc. v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., 688 F.3d 1342, 1368 (Fed.Cir.2012))). Patent Owner’s citation to Wonderland does not support the proposition for which it is cited, namely that the Federal Circuit has “confirmed” that incorporating a function from a secondary reference into a primary reference is “improper hindsight” that precludes a motivation to combine teachings from the primary and secondary references. In Wonderland, the district court denied an accused infringer’s motion for summary judgment of invalidity, in part, due to its finding that genuine issues of material fact existed for the issue of whether sufficient motivation to combine prior art existed. Wonderland, 988 F. Supp. 2d at 511. The Wonderland decision does not constitute a final ruling on that issue, and the Federal Circuit’s summary affirmance of the final ruling by the district court does not address the issue or reflect how the issue was resolved at trial. Wonderland NurseryGoods Co. v. Thorley Indus., LLC, 644 F. App’x 1011 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Second, Petitioner also correctly points out that although Ferro refers to wireless charging, it provides no implementation details. Ex. 1004 ¶ 36; Ex. 2003, 54:8–55:9. Ferro also describes manual options for initiating charging, Ex. 1003¶ 146 (citing Ex. 1004 ¶ 109), and that an ordinarily skilled artisan would have been motivated to apply Oyobe’s vehicle sensor to allow a user to initiate Ferro’s charging methods more easily without the user having to leave the vehicle, Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 151, 152. Accordingly, we find that Petitioner has established that an ordinarily skilled artisan would have been motivated to incorporate Oyobe’s use of a sensor to establish presence of a vehicle near a charging station into Ferro’s system.” slip op. at 20

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner

    “The test for obviousness is not whether the features of a secondary reference may be bodily incorporated into the structure of the primary reference. . . . Rather, the test is what the combined teachings of the references would have suggested to those of ordinary skill in the art.” MCM Portfolio LLC v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 812 F.3d 1284, 1294 (Fed. Cir. 2015). Patent Owner’s argument fails to account for the level of skill and creativity of an ordinarily skilled artisan, who would have possessed a bachelor’s degree in engineering and could have easily accounted for the differences in scale depicted by Letendre’s and Donnelly’s controls. Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 247–249. Accordingly, we find that Petitioner’s showing on the motivation to combine teachings of Ferro, Donnelly, and Letendre to arrive at limitation 1h is persuasive. slip op. at 30

  Patent outcomesUS 11,563,338 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,563,338
• Shenzhen Ronglida Technology Co. Ltd. v. Pathway IP LLCInstituted
  PTAB · Jan 15, 2026 · IPR2025-01231 · APJ Mary C Hoffman · IPR · Institution

  The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–13 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that at least one challenged claim is unpatentable.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Real party in interest / privityRpi dispute resolved for petitionerDecided for petitioner

    “petition identifies all real parties in interest. 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(2). Whether an unnamed party is a real party in interest “is a highly fact-dependent question.” See Applications in Internet Time, LLC v. RPX Corp., 897 F.3d 1336, 1351, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“AIT”); Ventex Co., Ltd. v. Columbia Sportswear N. Am., Inc., IPR2017-00651, Paper 152 at 4–5 (PTAB Jan. 24, 2019) (precedential) (citing Worlds Inc. v. Bungie, Inc., 903 F.3d 1237, 1242 (Fed. Cir. 2018)); Consolidated Trial Practice Guide, 13 (2019), https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/tpgnov.pdf (CTPG). “A common consideration is whether the non-party exercised or could have exercised control over a party’s participation in a proceeding.” CTPG at 16. Other considerations include whether the non-party is funding or directing the proceeding; the non-party’s relationship with the petitioner; the non-party’s relationship to the petition itself, including the nature and/or degree of involvement in the filing; and the nature of the entity filing the petition. Id. at 17–18.” slip op. at 8

  • Skill levelSkill level board ownOther

    “person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSITA”) “would have at least a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering or a related field and at least two years of experience with lighting technology.” Pet. 2 (citing Ex. 1017 ¶ 35). Petitioner makes additional contentions about what a POSITA would have understood. Id. (“A POSITA would understand that all types of cameras (e.g., analog and digital, photo and video) generally involve the same lighting considerations . . . . [and] that it is important to provide light that evenly illuminates the target subject or object to minimize reflected glare and shadows.”). Patent Owner contends that a POSITA would have at least: (a) a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, optical engineering, or a related field; (b) two years of practical experience in designing and developing lighting systems, particularly those integrated with electronic devices such as webcams or computer monitors; and (c) knowledge of user-interface considerations for consumer electronics . . . . Additional experience can substitute for education and vice versa. Prelim. Resp. 12 (citing Ex. 2036 ¶ 48). Patent Owner disputes Petitioner’s contentions regarding what a POSITA would have understood. Prelim. Resp. 12–13 (“[O]ne of ordinary skill in the art would have understood that analog and digital cameras have different operating principles and lighting requirements [and] Petitioner’s lack of appreciation for the suitability and unsuitability of different lights for different applications infects and dooms its invalidity analysis.” (citing Ex. 2036 ¶¶ 36–47)). and years of experience required for a POSITA. Pet. 2; Prelim. Resp. 12. For purposes of this Decision, we consider a person of ordinary skill in the art to have a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering or related field and two years of practical experience in lighting technology, and that additional experience may substitute for education and vice versa, which is consistent with the level of skill reflected in the ’729 patent and prior art of record. See Exs. 1001, 1005–1010, 1012–1015; see also Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (explaining that specific findings regarding ordinary skill level are not required “where the prior art itself reflects an appropriate level and need for testimony is not shown” (quoting Litton Indus. Prods., Inc. v. Solid State Sys. Corp., 755 F.2d 158, 163 (Fed. Cir. 1985))).” slip op. at 12

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “Patent Owner agrees that the Board need not formally construe any claim terms in order to adjudicate the merits of the Petition and argues Petitioner fails to show unpatentability of any claim under any reasonable construction of the claims. Prelim. Resp. 13 (citing Ex. 2036 ¶ 51). We determine that no express claim construction is necessary to determine whether institution is warranted in this proceeding. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (holding that only terms in controversy must be construed “and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy”) (citing Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 14

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

    “claimed subject matter and the prior art are “such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains.” KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 406 (2007). When a ground in a petition is based on a combination of references, we consider “whether there was an apparent reason to combine the known elements in the fashion claimed by the patent at issue.” Id. at 418 (citing In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006)). We base our obviousness inquiry on factual considerations including (1) the scope and content of the prior art, (2) any differences between the claimed subject matter and the prior art, (3) the level of skill in the art, and (4) any objective indicia of obviousness or non-obviousness that may be in evidence.14 See Graham, 383 U.S. at 17–18.” slip op. at 24

  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 7,841,729
• Weatherford U.S., L.P v. Halliburton Energy Services, Inc.Some claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Dec 9, 2025 · IPR2024-00990 · APJ Brent M Dougal · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 11–12 and 14–20 are unpatentable; claims 1–10 and 21–23 are not shown unpatentable. Substitute claims 29–37 are unpatentable, and the motion to amend is denied as to them.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “The level of skill is uncontested. Patent Owner adopts the level of skill identified by Petitioner as: [at] the time of the alleged invention in 2018, a POSITA[2] would have had a B.S. degree in mechanical or petroleum engineering or a similar technical discipline, with at least five years of experience in oil or gas well drilling, completion, and/or subsurface production operations or in technical support of such operations including at least some experience in unconsolidated formations utilizing sand control methods and means. Also,” slip op. at 8

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableNot shown unpatentableMixed

    “on embodiments of Yeh with concentric sand screens having nine shunt tubes (six transport tubes and three packing tubes) (Yeh Figures 4A–B) and eccentric sand screens with four shunt tubes (two transport tubes and two packing tubes) (Yeh Figures 8A, 8C). See Pet. 32–37, 39, 41–43. Yet, Petitioner’s reasoning as to why “a higher-pressure shunt tube assembly necessitated greater wall thickness” rests on an unspoken one to one comparison between the shunt tubes of the different systems. See id.; see also Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 291–297 (Petitioner’s declarant comparing possible transport tubes of different pressure regions without considering or addressing any difference in the number of transport tubes). However, the embodiments relied on by Petitioner have different numbers of shunt tubes, and thus the greater wall thickness does not appear to be “necessitated” in the way inferred by Petitioner. Further, Petitioner’s analysis would seem to be most appropriate when comparing two concentric sand screens for different pressure regions, or two eccentric sand screens for different pressure regions. relies on Yeh’s teachings related to a horizontal well bore of 5000 feet for the “concentric screen → crossover tool → eccentric screen” arrangement, as well as, for why the concentric screen needs to be rated for a high pressure. Pet. 32–37, 39, 41–43. Petitioner also refers to these features for why one of skill in the art would combine the teachings of Yeh and Yeh2. Id. at 32. However, on cross-examination, Petitioner’s declarant agreed that it is concentric sand screens having a 6x3 shunt tube design that would provide the noted benefits of being rated for a higher pressure and being more robust (as relied on in the Petition), as compared to eccentric sand screens. Ex. 2013, 42:20–43:8; Sur-reply 4–5. This also exposes another issue with Petitioner’s arguments. Though Petitioner identifies that one of skill in the art would be aware that material choice, wall thickness, and pipe diameter all impact burst pressure of a pipe (Pet. 42 (citing Ex. 1017, 24 (Equation (14))), the Petition essentially ignores the fact that the claims do not require a single pipe in isolation. The claims require two shunt tube assemblies, each surrounding a base pipe within a wellbore. It is uncontested that a wellbore provides a confined space for such a system and thus any change in wall thickness of one pipe can result in a significant impact in the function of the other pipes. We find the testimony of Petitioner’s declarant (see, e.g., Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 290–297) unpersuasive when discussing wall thickness because it focusses on basic considerations of a standalone pipe, without sufficient consideration of the claimed completion assembly with its required pipe and tube structure. PO Resp. 20–26.” slip op. at 17

  • Strike new argumentNew argument disregardedDecided for patent owner

    “In response to Patent Owner’s argument concerning Yeh’s embodiments relied on in the Petition, Petitioner argues for the first time that Patent Owner’s declarant “conceded, Yeh discloses that both concentric and 47:19–48:21). Petitioner does not provide a citation to Yeh or a citation to where the Petition relies on the same number of shunt tubes between concentric and eccentric screens. The deposition cited by Petitioner discusses Yeh at column 16, lines 26 through 35. However, the Petition does not cite or rely on these teachings of Yeh. Thus, we decline to consider this late argument.4 See 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3) (requiring the petition to identify “with particularity . . . the grounds on which the challenge to each claim is based, and the evidence that supports the grounds”); 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(5).” slip op. at 18

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundUnpatentable

    “Thus, we agree with Petitioner that the combination of Yeh and Yeh2 teaches determining the shunt tube system operating pressures associated with the distal end of the production zone, but also more generally, determining the operating pressures along the entire production zone. With this knowledge of the system operating pressures, Petitioner argues that one of skill in the art would have selected eccentric screens for the distal end of the production zone “at any point at which the slurry pressure dropped below the pressure capacity of the eccentric screen shunt tubes.” Pet. 66 (citing Ex. 1005, 30:16–20; Ex. 1003 ¶ 388). In other words, knowing that the pressure decreases as you approach the toe, Yeh’s low-pressure rated eccentric screens could be used from some point prior to and covering the toe. determined pressure.” PO Resp. 37–38. We disagree. As discussed above, the record supports Petitioner’s position that one of skill in the art would have “understood the need to determine the shunt tube system operating pressure throughout the horizontal wellbore.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 383; see also Pet. 64–65. We find convincing Petitioner’s argument that one of skill with this understanding of the system pressures would select a shunt tube system rated to not only address the distal end, but also to address the needs of the adjacent region, so long as the pressure rating supported such a selection. See Pet. 65–67; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 385–388.” slip op. at 22

  Patent outcomesUS 11,333,007 mixed
  Claim construction§ 101 eligibility§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,333,007
• Kia Corp. / Toyota Motor Corp. v. Emerging Automotive LLCAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Dec 9, 2025 · IPR2024-00981 · APJ Georgianna W Braden · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–20 are unpatentable over the Kleve-based grounds; the Board found the Zaid-based grounds did not render their challenged claims unpatentable.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

    “Pet. 2. Patent Owner filed a Preliminary Response (Paper 7, “Prelim. Resp.”). Petitioner filed an authorized Reply to Patent Owner’s Preliminary Response (Paper 8, “Prelim. Reply”), and Patent Owner filed an authorized Sur-reply to Petitioner’s Reply (Paper 9, “Prelim. Sur-reply”). Trial was instituted on the asserted grounds of unpatentability. Paper 10 (“Inst. Dec.”), 56.” slip op. at 3

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “Petitioner contends express claim construction is unnecessary and states that all terms should be given their plain and ordinary meaning. Pet. 8. Patent Owner does not address claim construction in its Response. Construction is needed only for those terms “that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.” See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). There are no claim terms in controversy that need be construed for our analysis.” slip op. at 10

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Here, Petitioner asserts a person of ordinary skill in the art would have “had at least a four-year undergraduate degree in electrical engineering, automotive engineering, or [a] closely related field and [at] least two years of experience in the field of access control systems, vehicle electronics, and/or cryptography.” Pet. 2 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 79–82). Dr. Almeroth supports Petitioner’s position and further testifies that “[a]dditional education could substitute for professional experience and vice versa.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 79. Patent Owner does not assert a different level of skill in the art at the time of the alleged invention and appears to apply Petitioner’s proposed level of skill. See PO Resp. Patent Owner’s declarant, Dr. Malek, explicitly adopts Petitioner’s level of skill in the art but states that his opinions would be applicable under any reasonable definition for an ordinarily skilled artisan at the critical time. See Ex. 2001 ¶ 37. For the purposes of this Decision, we too adopt Petitioner’s level of ordinary skill in the art because it appears consistent with the problems addressed in the ’188 patent and the prior art of record.” slip op. at 11

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedPatent owner expert discountedDecided for petitioner

    “Additionally, we credit the testimony of Dr. Almeroth, who opines that Kleve discloses that certain restrictions are sent with the request to generate a virtual key. Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 118–123. Specifically, Dr. Almeroth testifies that Kleve discloses that the virtual key “enable[s] the keyless drive system for the appropriate Temporary User during a given rental period.” Id. According to Dr. Almeroth, this “indicates that rental agreement restrictions were sent with the request so that the virtual key could be associated with said restrictions.” Id. (citing Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 39, 68 (“Once the rental period has expired the virtual key may be reset and cleared from the VCS.”)). Dr. Almeroth further testifies that the virtual key in Kleve is always generated after the rental agreement. Id. (citing Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 39 (“[O]nce the Temporary User selects the vehicle, pays the appropriate amount and signs a consent agreement, th[e]n the system may generate a virtual key to distribute to the Temporary User and VCS.”), 68). We do not agree with Patent Owner’s argument that Dr. Almeroth’s declaration testimony contradicts Kleve. See PO Resp. 27–29. Rather, as discussed previously, we find that Kleve’s vehicle owner can set a restriction, such as the rental start period, prior to step 214 in Kleve’s Figure 2 and that such restrictions can be associated with the e-key. We also do not agree with Patent Owner’s argument that (1) Dr. Almeroth’s declaration testimony contradicts his deposition testimony or that (2) Dr. Almeroth “admitted his testimony was wrong.” See PO Sur-Reply 7 (citing Ex. 2030, 27:5–10, 27:21–28:1). In a particular embodiment to which Dr. Almeroth was citing, he noted that the e-key is always generated after the rental agreement. See Ex. 2030, 26:14–20. Then the following exchange occurs: Q. So you use typically and always. So always does not refer to all of the embodiments of Kleve, is that fair? A. I think a person of skill in the art could read Kleve and understand that there are probably multiple ways in which the flow of actions among the parties could occur. And I think thinking about a real world scenario, in most cases you have an agreement before you would generate an eKey, but maybe, maybe not. I don’t -- I don't know that the real world is necessarily cut and dry. So reading -- a person reading Kleve would understand it’s describing embodiments where it’s always the case. That might be a pretty common scenario, but I don't know that it would necessarily be a hard and fast rule in every embodiment or in the understanding a person of skill in the art would have. Id. at 28:3–20. There is nothing in the deposition testimony by Dr. Almeroth that appears inconsistent with his declaration testimony nor does there appear to be the kind of admission touted by Patent Owner. Instead, it is Dr. Malek who takes an overly narrow view of Kleve that appears inconsistent with Kleve’s disclosure when read as a whole. See, e.g., Ex. 2001 ¶¶ 56–57. Therefore, we do not credit or agree with Dr. Malek’s testimony that Kleve teaches away from the concept of a virtual key created with the agreed-upon rental period as a restriction. See id. ¶ 57.” slip op. at 31

  Patent outcomesUS 9,365,188 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 9,365,188
• Toyota Motor Corp. v. Emerging Automotive LLCAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Nov 19, 2025 · IPR2024-00814 · APJ Frances L Ippolito · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1, 2, and 4–20 are unpatentable as obvious over the stated combinations of Rector, Kleve, and, for certain claims, additional references.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSITA” or “POSA”) at the time of the invention of the ’244 patent “would have had at least a Bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer science, or closely related field, with at least two-to-four years’ experience in cloud services for settings customization” and that computer science, or equivalent) could substitute for professional experience and vice-versa.” Pet. 12 (citing Ex. 1005 ¶ 89). Patent Owner does not address the level of ordinary skill in the art. See, generally PO Resp. Patent Owner’s Declarant, Dr. Malek, adopts the definition proffered by Petitioner and its Declarant, Dr. Almeroth. Ex. 2001 ¶ 37. We adopt Petitioner’s proposal as it is reasonable and consistent with the prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the prior art may reflect an appropriate level of skill in the art).” slip op. at 8

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for patent owner

    “Patent Owner asserts that the term “transferring is configured to instruct” should be construed according to its plain and ordinary meaning – the limitation.” PO Resp. 11. Patent Owner contends that the challenged claims require more than that the server is capable of the recited transferring (e.g., claims 1 and 17), and must be configured to accomplish the specific purpose of the claims. Id. at 12–17. Our analysis and the outcome of this dispute, however, would not change even if we were to adopt Patent Owner’s construction. Therefore, upon review of the entire record, including arguments by the parties and the relied upon evidence, we determine no terms require express construction to reach our decision. See Realtime Data LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 9

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedPatent owner expert discountedDecided for petitioner

    “With regard to this testimony, we note that Dr. Malek does not provide an underlying basis for these statements to support his conclusion that it is “common knowledge” that distributed software systems are less secure than local software systems. Id. In fact, when viewed with Kleve, Dr. Malek’s testimony appears to contradict Kleve’s express teaching that the “system may be further extended to facilitate the virtual key with additional security by requiring remote credential verification at the vehicle . . . by the VCS, using a server, or allowing the Owner to verify the Temporary User’s request.” Ex. 1007 ¶ 49 (emphases added). With regard to Kleve’s disclosure, Dr. Malek further testifies that [a] POSITA would understand that in Kleve credential authorization can be performed by: (1) VCS, (2) server, or (3) owner . . . . While Kleve discloses the verification can be performed by any of these entities, it states the client-side verification at the vehicle using VCS provides additional security. A POSITA would not have been motivated to modify side verification. Rector already uses the more secure client-side verification. Ex. 2003 ¶ 79 (emphases added). Dr. Malek, however, does not explain how Kleve’s express teachings limit “additional security” to client-side verification with VCS. Id. In fact, Kleve expressly discloses the opposite. Kleve teaches that the additional security may be provided by a remote credential certification that “may be done by the VCS, using a server, or allowing the Owner to verify the Temporary User’s request.” Ex. 1007 ¶ 49 (emphasis added). Kleve further teaches that the Temporary User may enter “a credential verification password at the vehicles touchscreen visual display while having the VCS, server, or owner compare and verify authorization.” Id. (emphasis added). Even Dr. Malek acknowledges that the verification can be performed by “any of these entities,” including the server. Id. We further note Dr. Almeroth testifies that “[t]he server-side verification may be done above and beyond any verification that takes place locally. The server-side verification could also be done as a check on local verification.” Ex. 1005 ¶ 122. This testimony is consistent with and supported by Kleve’s disclosure, which expressly states that “additional security” includes remote credential verification at the vehicle using a server. Ex. 1007 ¶ 49. As such, we credit Dr. Almeroth’s testimony as his testimony better supported by prior art disclosure.” slip op. at 28

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner

    “With regard to this testimony, we note that Dr. Malek does not provide an underlying basis for these statements to support his conclusion that it is “common knowledge” that distributed software systems are less secure than local software systems. Id. In fact, when viewed with Kleve, Dr. Malek’s testimony appears to contradict Kleve’s express teaching that the “system may be further extended to facilitate the virtual key with additional security by requiring remote credential verification at the vehicle . . . by the VCS, using a server, or allowing the Owner to verify the Temporary User’s request.” Ex. 1007 ¶ 49 (emphases added). With regard to Kleve’s disclosure, Dr. Malek further testifies that [a] POSITA would understand that in Kleve credential authorization can be performed by: (1) VCS, (2) server, or (3) owner . . . . While Kleve discloses the verification can be performed by any of these entities, it states the client-side verification at the vehicle using VCS provides additional security. A POSITA would not have been motivated to modify side verification. Rector already uses the more secure client-side verification. Ex. 2003 ¶ 79 (emphases added). Dr. Malek, however, does not explain how Kleve’s express teachings limit “additional security” to client-side verification with VCS. Id. In fact, Kleve expressly discloses the opposite. Kleve teaches that the additional security may be provided by a remote credential certification that “may be done by the VCS, using a server, or allowing the Owner to verify the Temporary User’s request.” Ex. 1007 ¶ 49 (emphasis added). Kleve further teaches that the Temporary User may enter “a credential verification password at the vehicles touchscreen visual display while having the VCS, server, or owner compare and verify authorization.” Id. (emphasis added). Even Dr. Malek acknowledges that the verification can be performed by “any of these entities,” including the server. Id. We further note Dr. Almeroth testifies that “[t]he server-side verification may be done above and beyond any verification that takes place locally. The server-side verification could also be done as a check on local verification.” Ex. 1005 ¶ 122. This testimony is consistent with and supported by Kleve’s disclosure, which expressly states that “additional security” includes remote credential verification at the vehicle using a server. Ex. 1007 ¶ 49. As such, we credit Dr. Almeroth’s testimony as his testimony better supported by prior art disclosure.” slip op. at 28

  Patent outcomesUS 11,396,244 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,396,244
• Tesla, Inc. v. Iqar Inc.Rehearing denied
  PTAB · Nov 6, 2025 · IPR2024-00543 · APJ Sean P O’Hanlon · IPR · Rehearing

  The Board denied Tesla’s rehearing request and left claims 8 and 18 not shown unpatentable under §103 over Hongo, Obradovich, Niki, and Newstrom.

  RulingsRehearing decision

  • RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied

    “II. STANDARD OF REVIEW A party requesting rehearing bears the burden of showing that the decision should be modified. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). The party must identify specifically all matters we misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed in a motion, an opposition, or a reply. Id.” slip op. at 2

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “Petitioner’s counsel during the hearing or any of Petitioner’s arguments and evidence. As confirmed by Petitioner’s counsel, Petitioner relies solely on Newstrom’s disclosure of loading its spatial database 20 into solid state memory via a “wireless connection to [a] server” in asserting that the database “may be hosted on a server that is remote from a vehicle.” Pet. 83 (citing Ex. 1012, 8:26–38; Ex. 1003 ¶ 197). Column 8, lines 27–29 is the only disclosure in Newstrom of a “wireless connection.” Although Petitioner argues that Newstrom’s system communicates wirelessly with the geospatial database while the vehicle is being driven (see Dec. 38 (citing Pet. 83); Tr. 19:20–22), Petitioner relies solely on the single instance of “wireless” in Newstrom’s disclosure to satisfy the recitation that the database (which Petitioner maps to Newstrom’s geospatial database 20) is “remote.” In the Decision, we explained that Petitioner’s reliance on Newstrom’s “wireless connection” and its assertion that the geospatial database may be hosted on a remote server were not persuasive to satisfy Petitioner’s burden to prove the unpatentability of claims 8 and 18 by a preponderance of the evidence, especially given Newstrom’s express disclosure that the geospatial database is located on the vehicle. Dec. 40–42. For example, we stated: Petitioner does not explain adequately why Newstrom’s disclosure that, when first initializing the database manager, the geospatial database is loaded into solid state memory by, for example, wirelessly transferring data from a server means that the geospatial database is remote from the vehicle. Similarly, Petitioner does not explain adequately why Newstrom’s disclosure that the database manager can load new portions of the data into solid state memory as the vehicle location changes means that the geospatial database is remote from the vehicle. Nor does Petitioner’s conclusory contention that “the geospatial database 20 may be hosted on a server that is remote from a vehicle” (Pet. 83 (emphasis added)) apprise us of disclosure that Newstrom’s geospatial database is remote from the vehicle. Dr. Morellas’ testimony is substantially identical to the Petition (see Ex. 1003 ¶197) and, thus, also fails to provide adequate support for Petitioner’s assertions. During the hearing, counsel for Petitioner confirmed that it relied solely on Newstrom’s disclose of the database using a “wireless connection” by which the database manager communicates with the database in arguing that Newstrom’s geospatial database 20 is remote from vehicle 12. Tr. 19:14–24; see also Ex. 1012, 8:27–29. Petitioner, however, fails to explain adequately how such wireless communication indicates that the database is not located on vehicle, especially given Newstrom’s express disclosure (discussed above) that the database is onboard the vehicle.” slip op. at 5

  • Strike new argumentNew argument disregardedDecided for patent owner

    “Initially, Petitioner’s reliance on assertions made in its Reply, relying on Dr. Morellas’ second declaration, fail to persuade us that we overlooked or misapprehended any arguments made in the Petition. Such post-institution arguments attempting to bolster the Petition are untimely and, thus, improper. See Patent Trial and Appeal Board Consolidated Trial Practice Guide 73 (Nov. 2019).6 Even considering Petitioner’s Reply arguments, however, we are not” slip op. at 7

  § 103 obviousness
  Patents in suitUS 10,882,399

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.