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  • PTAB · Jul 18, 2024 · IPR2024-00095 · APJ Hyun J Jung · IPR · Rehearing

    The Board denied AliveCor’s rehearing request, finding no abuse of discretion in denying institution because the Petterson–Nakada combinations did not teach or suggest the claimed replacement of one user interface with another.

    RulingsRehearing decision
    • RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied

      “When rehearing a decision on institution, the Board reviews the decision for an abuse of discretion. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c). An abuse of discretion may arise if the decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of law, if substantial evidence does not support a factual finding, or if an unreasonable judgment is made in weighing relevant factors. Star Fruits S.N.C. v. U.S., 393 F.3d 1277, 1281 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Arnold P’ship v. Dudas, 362 F.3d 1338, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2004); In re Gartside, 203 F.3d 1305, 1315–16 (Fed. Cir. 2000); see also Reh’g Req. 8 (citing 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c)). Also, 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d) sets forth, in relevant part that: rehearing without prior authorization from the Board. The burden of showing a decision should be modified lies with the party challenging the decision. The request must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed in a motion, an opposition, or a reply.” slip op. at 2

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable

      “Our determinations regarding Nakada did not support Petitioner’s argument that Nakada’s “system is returned to the beginning state of the routine, which in the case of Petterson would be FIG. 2B.” Pet. 71; Dec. 39–40. We also stated that “the proposed combination does not address adequately Nakada’s description of powering down its display.” Id. at 40 (citing Pet. 48–50; Prelim. Resp. 25–26; Ex. 1011, Fig. 4). We, thus, determined Petitioner failed to show sufficiently that either Petterson or Nakada teaches or suggests “replacing display of the second user interface with the first user interface.” Dec. 38–41 (citing Pet. 48–50, 68–69, 70–71; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 379, 382; Ex. 1011, Fig. 4). The “totality of the combination” lacked replacing a user interface with any other user interface. Dec. 40–41 (determining “the asserted references neither individually nor combined as proposed would have, ‘in response to detecting that the first criteria are no longer met for a second period of time that is longer than the first period of time, replac[ed] display of the second user interface with the first user interface’”); Reh’g Req. 8 (arguing “the Board overlooked the totality of the combination and Petitioner’s arguments and supporting evidence regarding the modification of Petterson that would have been obvious . . . in view of Nakada”).” slip op. at 7

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

      “After considering the arguments and cited evidence of the Petition, we determined that Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood of prevailing with respect to at least one of the challenged claims of the ’533 patent. Paper 7 (“Decision” or “Dec.”). Petitioner subsequently filed a Request for Rehearing. Paper 8 (“Reh’g Req.”). For the reasons stated below, Petitioner has not shown that we abused our discretion in denying the Petition, and thus, Petitioner’s Request for Rehearing is denied.” slip op. at 2

    § 103 obviousness
    Patents in suitUS 10,568,533
  • PTAB · May 2, 2022 · DER2018-00004 · APJ James T Moore · DER · Rehearing

    The Board denied Arconic’s rehearing request, leaving in place denial of institution because it had not shown sufficiently corroborated prior conception for derivation.

    RulingsRehearing decision
    • RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied

      “decision for an abuse of discretion. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c). “An abuse of discretion occurs if a decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of law, if a factual finding is not supported by substantial evidence, or if the decision represents an unreasonable judgment in weighing relevant factors.” Arnold P’ship v. Dudas, 362 F.3d 1338, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2004). The party requesting rehearing bears the burden of showing an abuse of discretion, and “[t]he request must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d).” slip op. at 2

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

      “documents cited by Petitioner for each of the six steps of claim 22 and explained why they were insufficient to corroborate Mr. Marinelli’s testimony. Id. at 16–22. We concluded that “[s]ubstantial evidence does not support Petitioner’s assertion that its inventors conceived of the inventions allegedly communicated to Respondent’s inventors (i.e., the six-step processes of each of Respondent’s claims)” and denied institution of a derivation proceeding. Id. at 23.” slip op. at 4

    • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner

      “[w]e are not informed as to which of Mr. Marinelli, Mr. Dennis, and Mr. Shoemaker conceived what portions of the invention of claim 22 or how the three individuals jointly conceived of the recited process. Petitioner provides no explanation as to what the contributions of each individual were (other than that they were all “involved” in the development of the A951 process), the circumstances surrounding those contributions, or even when conception occurred. Indeed, Mr. Marinelli testifies that Petitioner began development of chromium-free aluminum pretreatments that provided the same performance characteristics of a chromate conversion coating in 1992 and that the development work spanned “the next two decades,” but does not explain when during that time he conceived of the process of claim 22 with Mr. Dennis and Mr. Shoemaker. Again, there is no meaningful information provided about what work was done by whom or the circumstances under which the claimed invention was conceived, other than a general assertion that it was Petitioner undertaking the work.” slip op. at 3

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Other PTAB motions (exclude, strike, seal, additional discovery, rehearing)Granted in part

      “a trial, a party may file a motion to expunge confidential information from the record.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.56. The Patent Trial and Appeal Board Consolidated Trial Practice Guide (Nov. 2019), 21–22, available at https://www.uspto.gov/TrialPracticeGuideConsolidated (“Trial Practice Guide”), provides: Confidential information that is subject to a protective order ordinarily would become public 45 days after denial of a petition to institute a trial or 45 days after final judgment in a trial. There is an expectation that information will be made public where the existence of the information is referred to in a decision to grant or deny a request to institute a review or is identified in a final written decision following a trial. A party seeking to maintain the confidentiality of information, however, may file a motion to” slip op. at 13

    None
    Patents in suitUS 11,807,942
  • PTAB · Feb 10, 2022 · IPR2020-00699 · APJ Matthew S Meyers · IPR · Rehearing

    The Board denied rehearing, leaving claim 12 not shown unpatentable under Grounds 8 and 9 because the petition lacked evidence tying the claimed shear strength to the required loop basis weight.

    RulingsRehearing decision
    • RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied

      “II. LEGAL STANDARDS A party requesting rehearing bears the burden of showing that a decision should be modified. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). The party must specifically identify all matters it believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was addressed previously in a motion, an opposition, or a reply. Id. A request for rehearing, therefore, is not an opportunity merely to disagree with the Board’s assessment of the arguments or weighing of the evidence, or to present new arguments or evidence. See, e.g., Presidio Components, Inc.v. AVX Corporation, IPR2015-01332, Paper 21, 4 (PTAB Feb. 21, 2016) (“Patent Owner’s arguments in this regard amount to a mere disagreement with our analysis or conclusion. But mere disagreement with our analysis or conclusion is not a sufficient basis for rehearing. It is not an abuse of discretion to provide analysis or conclusion with which Patent Owner disagrees.”)” slip op. at 3

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot shown unpatentableMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable

      “Id. at 9. As to Petitioner’s first and second arguments, we specifically addressed Petitioner’s argument that the proposed combination of Petersen-1 and Busam would meet the shear strength limitation of claim 12. Dec. 69– 73. After reviewing the evidence and arguments presented by both parties, we agreed with Patent Owner’s position. As to Petitioner’s third argument, that we overlooked Busam’s disclosure of an overlapping loop basis weight range, that disclosure was never in dispute. Petitioner argues that “Patent Owner attempted to shift the focus of the Board to the unrelated issue of whether Busam explicitly discloses an anticipating example.” Req. Reh. 11. Petitioner seems to be implying that we applied an anticipation standard to its obviousness arguments, but we did not. Instead, our decision was based 6 on a lack of record evidence of obviousness. See, e.g., Dec. 72–73 (“Petitioner does not point us to any evidence that Busam’s female loop material is capable of engaging with a male fastening portion with a shear strength that was ‘reported to be greater than 500 grammes’ and has ‘a fiber basis weight in a range from 20 grams per square meter to 30 grams per square meter,’ as claim 12 requires.”). We also agreed with Patent Owner that the Petitioner had impermissibly relied on new obviousness theories in its Reply that were not presented in the Petitioner. Dec. 73 (“Petitioner does not explain why the arguments made in its Reply relating to claim 12 could not have been presented in the first instance in the Petition or how the arguments in the Reply are responsive to Patent Owner’s arguments in the Patent Owner Response”).” slip op. at 6

    • Strike new argumentNew argument disregardedDecided for patent owner

      “Id. at 9. As to Petitioner’s first and second arguments, we specifically addressed Petitioner’s argument that the proposed combination of Petersen-1 and Busam would meet the shear strength limitation of claim 12. Dec. 69– 73. After reviewing the evidence and arguments presented by both parties, we agreed with Patent Owner’s position. As to Petitioner’s third argument, that we overlooked Busam’s disclosure of an overlapping loop basis weight range, that disclosure was never in dispute. Petitioner argues that “Patent Owner attempted to shift the focus of the Board to the unrelated issue of whether Busam explicitly discloses an anticipating example.” Req. Reh. 11. Petitioner seems to be implying that we applied an anticipation standard to its obviousness arguments, but we did not. Instead, our decision was based 6 on a lack of record evidence of obviousness. See, e.g., Dec. 72–73 (“Petitioner does not point us to any evidence that Busam’s female loop material is capable of engaging with a male fastening portion with a shear strength that was ‘reported to be greater than 500 grammes’ and has ‘a fiber basis weight in a range from 20 grams per square meter to 30 grams per square meter,’ as claim 12 requires.”). We also agreed with Patent Owner that the Petitioner had impermissibly relied on new obviousness theories in its Reply that were not presented in the Petitioner. Dec. 73 (“Petitioner does not explain why the arguments made in its Reply relating to claim 12 could not have been presented in the first instance in the Petition or how the arguments in the Reply are responsive to Patent Owner’s arguments in the Patent Owner Response”).” slip op. at 6

    § 103 obviousness
    Patents in suitUS 10,165,833
  • PTAB · Oct 20, 2021 · IPR2020-00301 · APJ Meredith C Petravick · IPR · Rehearing

    The Board denied Foster-Miller’s rehearing requests in both proceedings, leaving institution denied because the petition did not adequately show the challenged claim’s limitations in SuperDroid or Wang.

    RulingsRehearing decision
    • RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied

      “II. STANDARD A party requesting rehearing bears the burden of showing that a decision should be modified. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). The party must identify all matters it believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was addressed previously in a motion, an opposition, or a reply. Id. When rehearing a decision, we review the decision for an abuse of discretion. See generally 37 C.F.R. § 42.71 (b)–(d). An abuse of discretion occurs when a “decision was based on an erroneous conclusion of law or clearly erroneous factual findings, or ... a clear error of judgment.” PPG Indus. Inc. v. Celanese Polymer Specialties Co., 840 F.2d 1565, 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (citations omitted). A request for rehearing is not an opportunity merely to disagree with the panel’s assessment of the arguments or weighing of the evidence. “It is not an abuse of discretion to have made an analysis or conclusion with which a party disagrees,” and “mere disagreement with the Board’s analysis or conclusion is not a proper basis for rehearing.” EMC Corp. v. PersonalWeb Techs., LLC, IPR2013-00085, Paper 29 at 4 (PTAB June 5, 2013).” slip op. at 3

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot reached

      “Petitioner does not persuade us that we overlooked Superdroid’s disclosures. After careful consideration of the evidence presented in the Petition and the Requests for Rehearing, as stated in our Institution Decision, “it is not clear from SuperDroid’s figures h and i or the brief explanation of Steps 2 and 3 that the front end of the robot contacts and ascends the front face of the obstacle, with the support surface generating sufficient traction to climb the riser.” Inst. Dec. 14 (citing Ex. 2001 ¶¶ 26–27 (testimony of testimony of Dr. Robert H. Sturges, declarant for Patent Owner)). Petitioner provides additional argument and analysis of SuperDroid’s figures in support of its Request for Rehearing, but arguments that go beyond the analysis presented as to this limitation in the Petition could not have been misapprehended. See, e.g., Req. Reh’g 3 (providing annotated version of SuperDroid’s figure g), 6 (providing enlarged and annotated version of SuperDroid’s figure h). Petitioner’s argument is mere disagreement with our findings in the Institution Decisions regarding the disclosure of Superdroid.” slip op. at 4

    • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITADecided for patent owner

      “plain meaning of Element [1d] for the first time in its Request for Rehearing. Petitioner did not provide any explicit construction of Element [1d] in the Petition. See Pet. 10 (“no claim terms require[] construction, and all claims should be given their plain and ordinary meaning”). We could not have misapprehended an argument that was not adequately made in the Petition. In any event, Petitioner does not persuade us that the plain language of Element [1d] does not require pivoting the trailing arm while the vehicle ascends the stair. Petitioner’s argument relies upon Figs. 5G–5I of the ’752 patent to argue that Element [1d] does not require pivoting the trailing arm while the vehicle ascends the stair. Req. Reh’g 13. Petitioner’s argument, however, does not account for Figs. 5J–5O of the ’752 patent, which depict pivoting the trailing arm to push the robot vehicle upward while driving the vehicle tracks to surmount the stair nose. See Ex. 1001, 10:61–11:4, claims 2–4. Accordingly, the ’752 patent figures are consistent with reading Element [1d] to require pivoting the trailing arm while the vehicle ascends the stair. At a minimum, Petitioner’s reading of the claim required further explanation if not an explicit construction in the Petition, given that the limitation could be read consistent with the specification in a manner different that Petitioner presumed.” slip op. at 6

    • BurdenDecided for patent owner

      “And, as explicitly pointed out in the Institution Decision, the Petition’s explanation of how Wang meets Element [1d] is insufficient to establish that Wang’s arm pivots while ascending a stair. See Inst. Dec. 20– 21. “In an [inter partes review], the petitioner has the burden from the onset to show with particularity why the patent it challenges is unpatentable.” Harmonic Inc. v. Avid Tech., Inc., 815 F.3d 1356, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citing 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3) (requiring inter partes review petitions to identify “with particularity . . . the evidence that supports the grounds for the challenge to each claim”)).” slip op. at 6

    Claim construction§ 103 obviousness
    Patents in suitUS 8,074,752
  • PTAB · Oct 20, 2021 · IPR2019-01548 · APJ Meredith C Petravick · IPR · Rehearing

    The Board denied rehearing in both proceedings, finding no overlooked or misapprehended matter and no abuse of discretion in denying institution on the SuperDroid and Wang/Liu grounds.

    RulingsRehearing decision
    • RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied

      “II. STANDARD A party requesting rehearing bears the burden of showing that a decision should be modified. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). The party must identify all matters it believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was addressed previously in a motion, an opposition, or a reply. Id. When rehearing a decision, we review the decision for an abuse of discretion. See generally 37 C.F.R. § 42.71 (b)–(d). An abuse of discretion occurs when a “decision was based on an erroneous conclusion of law or clearly erroneous factual findings, or ... a clear error of judgment.” PPG Indus. Inc. v. Celanese Polymer Specialties Co., 840 F.2d 1565, 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (citations omitted). A request for rehearing is not an opportunity merely to disagree with the panel’s assessment of the arguments or weighing of the evidence. “It is not an abuse of discretion to have made an analysis or conclusion with which a party disagrees,” and “mere disagreement with the Board’s analysis or conclusion is not a proper basis for rehearing.” EMC Corp. v. PersonalWeb Techs., LLC, IPR2013-00085, Paper 29 at 4 (PTAB June 5, 2013).” slip op. at 3

    • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

      “forward end of the vehicle to ascend a riser of the stair, the support surface generating sufficient traction against the riser to climb the riser as the support surface is driven.” Ex. 1001, 16:56–59. As it did in the Petition (Pet. 18–19), Petitioner argues that steps 2 and 3 and corresponding figures h and i of Superdroid show the forward end of the vehicle ascending a riser of a stair and that “‘[o]ne of ordinary skill would have understood that in order for the vehicle to climb as shown in Superdroid, the treads must generate sufficient traction against the front of the obstacle (riser)’” (Id. at19). Req. Reh’g 2–11.” slip op. at 4

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

      “plain meaning of Element [1d] for the first time in its Request for Rehearing. Petitioner did not provide any explicit construction of Element [1d] in the Petition. See Pet. 10 (“no claim terms require[] construction, and all claims should be given their plain and ordinary meaning”). We could not have misapprehended an argument that was not adequately made in the Petition.” slip op. at 6

    • BurdenNot shown unpatentable

      “And, as explicitly pointed out in the Institution Decision, the Petition’s explanation of how Wang meets Element [1d] is insufficient to establish that Wang’s arm pivots while ascending a stair. See Inst. Dec. 20– 21. “In an [inter partes review], the petitioner has the burden from the onset to show with particularity why the patent it challenges is unpatentable.” Harmonic Inc. v. Avid Tech., Inc., 815 F.3d 1356, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citing 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3) (requiring inter partes review petitions to identify “with particularity . . . the evidence that supports the grounds for the challenge to each claim”)).” slip op. at 6

    § 103 obviousness
    Patents in suitUS 8,074,752
  • PTAB · Mar 4, 2021 · IPR2020-00344 · APJ Barry L Grossman · IPR · Rehearing

    The Board denied rehearing and upheld denial of institution because Grounds 7, 8, 11, and 12 lacked particularity, justifying denial of the entire petition.

    RulingsRehearing decision
    • RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied

      “II. REQUEST FOR REHEARING When rehearing a decision on institution, the Board reviews the decision for an abuse of discretion. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c). An abuse of 1 The PTAB E2E docket system correctly identifies the denial of POP review as Paper “11,” dated “October 26, 2020.” This document itself, however, incorrectly states that it is “Paper 10.” In fact, “Paper 10” in the PTAB E2E docket system for this IPR proceeding is Patent Owner’s “RESPONSE TO PETITIONER’S REQUEST FOR REHEARING,” filed on August 21, 2020 See Paper 10. We note that Patent Owner was not authorized to file this response. See Consolidated Office Patent Trial Practice Guide (“Consolidated Practice Guide”), November 2019, 90 (“The opposing party should not file a response to a request for rehearing absent a request from the Board.”). No such request was made by the Board. Accordingly, Paper 10 will be expunged from this record and will not be considered in deciding Petitioner’s Request for Rehearing. discretion may arise if the decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of law, if a factual finding is not supported by substantial evidence, or if an unreasonable judgment is made in weighing relevant factors. Star Fruits S.N.C. v. U.S., 393 F.3d 1277, 1281 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Arnold P’ship v. Dudas, 362 F.3d 1338, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2004); In re Gartside, 203 F.3d 1305, 1315–16 (Fed. Cir. 2000). The burdens and requirements of a request for rehearing are stated in 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d): (d) Rehearing. . . . The burden of showing a decision should be modified lies with the party challenging the decision. The request must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed in a motion, an opposition, or a reply. Under 35 U.S.C. § 314, an inter partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). If an inter partes review is instituted, a final written decision under 35 U.S.C. § 318(a) must decide the patentability of all claims, and all grounds, asserted in the petition. SAS Institute, Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348 (2018).” slip op. at 3

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

      “The Petition fails to identify with particularity what disclosure is relied on from each of the references in Grounds 7, 8, 11, and 12, how it would be combined with the other disclosures, and why the proposed combination would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the relevant technology. Without any explanation as to what, how, and why the references would have been combined in Grounds 7, 8, 11, and 12, we, and the Patent Owner, are left to speculate as to the specific details of asserted unpatentability based on combining the references to arrive at the claimed invention. See Paper 7 (“Decision” or “Dec.”), 14 (citation omitted). We determined that “[t]he lack of particularity [in Grounds 7, 8, 11, and 12] infects the proceeding sufficiently that we do not institute an inter partes review.” Id. at 16–17.” slip op. at 2

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot reached

      “asserted unpatentability of the claims challenged in Grounds 7 and 8, and why it would have been obvious to combine selected disclosures from each of the three references. We have not been directed to any persuasive evidence that the Petition met this burden.” slip op. at 10

    • Other 314aInstitution denied discretionary otherDenied

      “Petition, “the Board takes a holistic view of whether efficiency and integrity of the system are best served by denying or instituting review.” See, e.g., Apple Inc. v. Fintiv, Inc., IPR2020-00019, Paper 11, 6 (PTAB Mar. 20, 2020) (Precedential). Apple v. Fintiv was decided in the context of evaluating the factors related to a co-pending parallel district court proceeding. The same holistic view applies equally to situations where some claims meet the requirements for instituting a trial and some do not. While we consider the number of claims that fail to meet the statutory and other requirements to institute an inter partes review, as well as the number of claims that meet these requirements, there is no fixed threshold or ratio of claims that meet the requirements compared to those that do not meet the requirements that controls our determination, as suggested by Petitioner (see Req. Reh’g 2. The Patent and Trademark Office addressed this issue in its “SAS Q&As”, which stated: D3. Q: Will the Board institute a petition based on the percentage of claims and grounds that meet the reasonable likelihood standard, e.g., 50%? A: No. The Board does not contemplate a fixed threshold for a sufficient number of challenges for which it will institute. Instead, the panel will evaluate the challenges and determine whether, in the interests of efficient administration of the Office and integrity of the patent system (see 35 USC § 316(b)), the entire petition should be denied under 35 USC § 314(a). Ex. 3003, 8. As explained in our TPG, If a panel determines that a petition meets the standards for institution in relation to fewer than all the challenges presented, or where deficiencies in the petition (such as a failure to provide a construction under 35 U.S.C. § 112(f)) affect only a portion of the challenges presented, the panel will evaluate all the challenges and determine whether, in the interests of efficient administration of the Office and integrity of the patent system, the entire petition should be denied. TPG, 64. Where no trial is instituted, a decision to that effect will be provided, as was done in this proceeding. “The Board expects that the decision will contain a short statement as to why the standards were not met, although this may not be necessary in all cases.” Id. at 64–65.” slip op. at 20

    § 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denial
    Patents in suitUS 6,918,801
  • PTAB · Jan 7, 2021 · IPR2020-00439 · APJ Meredith C Petravick · IPR · Rehearing

    The Board denied Petitioner’s rehearing request, leaving in place its discretionary denial of institution under § 325(d) because the same or substantially the same art or arguments were previously presented.

    RulingsRehearing decision
    • RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied

      “STANDARD A party requesting rehearing bears the burden of showing that a decision should be modified. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). The party must identify all matters it believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was addressed previously in a motion, an opposition, or a reply. Id. When rehearing a decision, we review the decision for an abuse of discretion. See generally 37 C.F.R. § 42.71 (b)–(d). An abuse of discretion occurs when a “decision was based on an erroneous conclusion of law or clearly erroneous factual findings, or . . . a clear error of” slip op. at 2

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsInstitution denied 325dInstitution denied

      “applied the two-part framework set forth in Advanced Bionics. Inst. Dec. 8–20. The two-part framework is: (1) determining whether the same or substantially the same art previously was presented to the Office or whether the same or substantially the same arguments previously were presented to the Office; and (2) if either condition of the first part of the framework is satisfied, determining whether the petitioner has demonstrated that the Office erred in a manner material to the patentability of challenged claims. Advanced Bionics, Paper 6 at 8. In applying the two-part framework, we considered several nonexclusive factors, including:” slip op. at 3

    Discretionary denial
    Patents in suitUS 10,457,437
  • PTAB · Jan 7, 2021 · IPR2020-00438 · APJ Meredith C Petravick · IPR · Rehearing

    The Board denied Husky’s rehearing request, leaving institution denied under § 325(d) because the petition relied on art or arguments previously presented to the Office.

    RulingsRehearing decision
    • RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied

      “decision should be modified. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). The party must identify all matters it believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was addressed previously in a motion, an opposition, or a reply. Id. When rehearing a decision, we review the decision for an abuse of discretion. See generally 37 C.F.R. § 42.71 (b)–(d). An abuse of discretion occurs when a “decision was based on an erroneous conclusion of law or clearly erroneous factual findings, or . . . a clear error of” slip op. at 2

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsInstitution denied 325dInstitution denied

      “the same prior art or arguments previously were presented to the Office.” 35 U.S.C. § 325(d). In that respect, section 325(d) provides that the Director may elect not to institute a proceeding if the challenge to the patent is based on matters previously presented to the Office. Advanced Bionics, LLC v. Med-El Elektromedizinische Geräte GmbH, IPR2019-01469, Paper 6 at 7 (PTAB Feb. 13, 2020) (precedential) (“Advanced Bionics”).” slip op. at 3

    Discretionary denial
    Patents in suitUS 10,214,312
  • PTAB · Jan 7, 2021 · IPR2020-00437 · APJ Meredith C Petravick · IPR · Rehearing

    The Board denied Husky’s rehearing request, leaving in place the discretionary denial of institution under § 325(d) across the related proceedings.

    RulingsRehearing decision
    • RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied

      “STANDARD A party requesting rehearing bears the burden of showing that a decision should be modified. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). The party must identify all matters it believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was addressed previously in a motion, an opposition, or a reply. Id. When rehearing a decision, we review the decision for an abuse of discretion. See generally 37 C.F.R. § 42.71 (b)–(d). An abuse of discretion occurs when a “decision was based on an erroneous conclusion of law or clearly erroneous factual findings, or . . . a clear error of” slip op. at 2

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsInstitution denied 325dDecided for patent owner

      “In evaluating the parties’ contentions concerning section 325(d), we applied the two-part framework set forth in Advanced Bionics. Inst. Dec. 8–20. The two-part framework is: (1) determining whether the same or substantially the same art previously was presented to the Office or whether the same or substantially the same arguments previously were presented to the Office; and (2) if either condition of the first part of the framework is satisfied, determining whether the petitioner has demonstrated that the Office erred in a manner material to the patentability of challenged claims. Advanced Bionics, Paper 6 at 8. In applying the two-part framework, we considered several nonexclusive factors, including: (a) the similarities and material differences between the asserted art and the prior art involved during examination; (b) the cumulative nature of the asserted art and the prior art evaluated during examination; (c) the extent to which the asserted art was evaluated during examination, including whether the prior art was the basis for rejection; (d) the extent of the overlap between the arguments made during examination and the manner in which Petitioner relies on the prior art or Patent Owner distinguishes the prior art; (e) whether Petitioner has pointed out sufficiently how the Examiner erred in its evaluation of the asserted prior art; and (f) the extent to which additional evidence and facts presented in the Petition warrant reconsideration of the prior art or arguments. Becton, Dickinson & Co. v. B. Braun Melsungen AG, IPR2017-01586, Paper 8 at 17–18 (PTAB Dec. 15, 2017) (precedential as to Section III.C.5, first paragraph) (“Becton, Dickinson”). After review of factors (a), (b), and (d), we determined that the same or substantially the same art or arguments previously were presented to the Office, and addressed factors (c), (e), and (f) as to whether Petitioner demonstrated that the Office erred in a manner material to the patentability of the challenged claims. See Advanced Bionics, Paper 6 at 10.” slip op. at 3

    • Strike new argumentNew argument disregardedDecided for patent owner

      “Further, we note that Petitioner argued that discretionary denial was unwarranted under § 325(d) in its Reply to Patent Owner’s Preliminary Response. See e.g., Paper 17, 1–6. These arguments focused on Colloud and did not mention The US Standard. See id. We could not have abused our discretion by overlooking an argument that discretionary denial was unwarranted based on the inclusion of The US Standard, when Petitioner did not make such an argument in its Reply.” slip op. at 6

    Discretionary denial
    Patents in suitUS 10,214,311
  • PTAB · Jan 7, 2021 · IPR2020-00436 · APJ Meredith C Petravick · IPR · Rehearing

    The Board denied Husky’s rehearing request, leaving institution denied under § 325(d) because the same or substantially the same art or arguments had previously been presented.

    RulingsRehearing decision
    • RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied

      “STANDARD A party requesting rehearing bears the burden of showing that a decision should be modified. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). The party must identify all matters it believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was addressed previously in a motion, an opposition, or a reply. Id. When rehearing a decision, we review the decision for an abuse of discretion. See generally 37 C.F.R. § 42.71 (b)–(d). An abuse of discretion occurs when a “decision was based on an erroneous conclusion of law or clearly erroneous factual findings, or . . . a clear error of” slip op. at 2

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsInstitution denied 325dInstitution denied

      “applied the two-part framework set forth in Advanced Bionics. Inst. Dec. 8–20. The two-part framework is: (1) determining whether the same or substantially the same art previously was presented to the Office or whether the same or substantially the same arguments previously were presented to the Office; and (2) if either condition of the first part of the framework is satisfied, determining whether the petitioner has demonstrated that the Office erred in a manner material to the patentability of challenged claims. Advanced Bionics, Paper 6 at 8. In applying the two-part framework, we considered several nonexclusive factors, including:” slip op. at 3

    Discretionary denial
    Patents in suitUS 10,266,299
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