- Infinera Corporation v. Alexander Soto And Walter SotoInstitution deniedPTAB · Dec 4, 2023 · IPR2023-00834 · APJ Thu A Dang · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood that claims 1–3, 5, 10–14, and 16–21 were obvious over the cited combinations.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“We accordingly determine that Petitioner does not sufficiently show that Vrazel meets the requirements of the recited step of “converting the first electrical binary data signal in the pluggable optical transceiver module to a first electrical m-ary modulation signal.” We therefore conclude that Petitioner does not demonstrate a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on its challenge of independent claim 1 as unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) over Pang and Vrazel. Each of claims 2, 3, 5, 10, 13, 14, and 16–21 depends directly or indirectly from independent claim 1, and Petitioner challenges these claims as unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) over Pang and Vrazel. Ex. 1001, 15:23–28, 32–35, 16:9–11, 16:18–25, 16:30–43; Pet. 46–56. The deficiency in Petitioner’s analysis of independent claim 1 also applies to each of these dependent claims. We accordingly conclude that Petitioner does not demonstrate a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on its challenge of dependent claims 2, 3, 5, 10, 13, 14, and 16–21. 3. Asserted Obviousness of Claims 11 and 12 over Pang, Vrazel and Yee (Ground 2). Claims 11 and 12 depend directly from claim 1. Petitioner does not rely on Yee to remedy the deficiencies discussed above concerning the “converting” to “m-ary modulation” signal step, but rather relies on its arguments associated with claim 1. See Pet. 59–60. We already addressed those arguments, and we find those arguments unavailing for the reasons stated above. We accordingly conclude that Petitioner does not demonstrate a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on its challenge of dependent claims 11 and 12.” slip op. at 21
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Not reached
“III CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, we deny institution of an inter partes review.2 IV, ORDER In consideration of the foregoing, it is hereby: ORDERED that the Petition is denied, and no trial is instituted. 2 Because we deny the Petition on the merits, we do not reach Patent Owner’s request that we exercise our discretion to deny the Petition under Apple Inc. v. Fintiv, Inc., IPR2020-00019, Paper 11 at 13–14 (PTAB Mar. 20, 2020) (precedential) or under 35 U.S.C. § 325(d). See Prelim. Resp. 33– 54.” slip op. at 23
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsNot reached
“III CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, we deny institution of an inter partes review.2 IV, ORDER In consideration of the foregoing, it is hereby: ORDERED that the Petition is denied, and no trial is instituted. 2 Because we deny the Petition on the merits, we do not reach Patent Owner’s request that we exercise our discretion to deny the Petition under Apple Inc. v. Fintiv, Inc., IPR2020-00019, Paper 11 at 13–14 (PTAB Mar. 20, 2020) (precedential) or under 35 U.S.C. § 325(d). See Prelim. Resp. 33– 54.” slip op. at 23
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“C. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner asserts that a POSITA would have “at least a Bachelor’s degree in Computer Science, Computer Engineering, Electrical Engineering, or a similar degree and at least two years of professional experience with optical communications, networking, and signal processing,” wherein “[m]ore experience can supplement less education and vice versa.” Pet. 6 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 38). Patent Owner does not contest Petitioner’s proposal or offer an alternative. On this record, we are persuaded that Petitioner’s proposal is consistent with the technology described in the Specification and the cited prior art. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposed level of skill.” slip op. at 9
§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,887,795 - Infinera Corporation v. Alexander Soto And Walter SotoInstitution deniedPTAB · Dec 4, 2023 · IPR2023-00838 · APJ Patrick M Boucher · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show that Vrazel’s encoder or encoder and pre-distorter provided the claimed m-ary modulator for claims 1–3, 5, 6, 8, 10–17, 22, and 23.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“We accordingly determine that Petitioner does not sufficiently show that Vrazel meets the requirements of the recited “m-ary modulator” in any of the challenged independent claims. We therefore conclude that Petitioner does not demonstrate a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on its challenge of independent claims 1, 22, or 23 as unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) over Pang and Vrazel.” slip op. at 20
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot reached
“Because it is dispositive, we focus our analysis on each independent claim’s recitation of “an m-ary modulator for increasing the number of bits per symbol in the first electrical data signal to produce a first m-ary modulation signal.” Ex. 1001, 15:6–8 (claim 1), 17:13–15 (claim 22), 18:9– 11 (claim 23). In addressing this limitation, Petitioner relies solely on Vrazel, which Petitioner contends “discloses this limitation in at least two ways.” Pet. 28 (addressing claim 1), 64 (addressing claim 22 by referring to analysis for claim 1), 66 (addressing claim 23 by referring to analysis for claim 1).” slip op. at 16
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“used to construe the claim in a civil action under 35 U.S.C. 282(b), including construing the claim in accordance with the ordinary and customary meaning of such claim as understood by one of ordinary skill in the art and the prosecution history pertaining to the patent.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b) (2019); see Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312–13 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). “Petitioner proposes that each claim term in the Challenged Claims be given its plain and ordinary meaning in this proceeding, and that no specific construction of any claim term is required.” Pet. 6. Patent Owner similarly does not propose any explicit construction of any claim term in its Preliminary Response. On the record before us, we do not find it necessary to construe any term for this Decision. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“[W]e need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 9
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,771,181 - Infinera Corporation v. Alexander Soto And Walter SotoInstitution deniedPTAB · Dec 4, 2023 · IPR2023-00835 · APJ Patrick M Boucher · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because the Petition did not show a reasonable likelihood that claims 1–3, 5–7, 9, and 11–20 were unpatentable over Pang and Vrazel.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“We accordingly determine that Petitioner does not sufficiently show that the Vrazel meets the requirements of the recited “m-ary modulator.” We therefore conclude that Petitioner does not demonstrate a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on its challenge of independent claim 1 as unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) over Pang and Vrazel. F. Dependent Claims Each of claims 2, 3, 5–7, 9, and 11–20 depends directly or indirectly from independent claim 1, and Petitioner challenges those claims as unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) over Pang and Vrazel. Ex. 1001, 15:29–16:33; Pet. 53–67. The deficiency in Petitioner’s analysis of independent claim 1 also applies to each of the dependent claims. We accordingly conclude that Petitioner does not demonstrate a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on its challenge of dependent claims 2, 3, 5–7, 9, and 11–20.” slip op. at 19
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedOther
“Petitioner proposes that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have had at least a Bachelor’s degree in Computer Science, Computer Engineering, Electrical Engineering or a similar degree and at least two years of professional experience with optical communications, networking, and signal processing.” Pet. 7. Petitioner adds that “[m]ore experience can supplement less education and vice versa,” and supports its proposal with testimony by Dr. Min. Id.; Ex. 1003 ¶ 41. Patent Owner does not specifically address the level of ordinary skill in its Preliminary Response. Because we find Petitioner’s proposal reasonable, consistent with the level of skill reflected by the prior art, and supported by Dr. Min’s testimony, we adopt it for purposes of this Decision. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the prior art may reflect an appropriate level of skill in the art).” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“used to construe the claim in a civil action under 35 U.S.C. 282(b), including construing the claim in accordance with the ordinary and customary meaning of such claim as understood by one of ordinary skill in the art and the prosecution history pertaining to the patent.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b) (2019); see Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312–13 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). “Petitioner proposes that each claim term in the Challenged Claims be given its plain and ordinary meaning in this proceeding, and that no specific construction of any claim term is required.” Pet. 6–7. Patent Owner similarly does not propose any explicit construction of any claim term in its Preliminary Response. On the record before us, we do not find it necessary to construe any term for this Decision. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“[W]e need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 9
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot reached
“We accordingly determine that Petitioner does not sufficiently show that the Vrazel meets the requirements of the recited “m-ary modulator.” We therefore conclude that Petitioner does not demonstrate a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on its challenge of independent claim 1 as unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) over Pang and Vrazel. F. Dependent Claims Each of claims 2, 3, 5–7, 9, and 11–20 depends directly or indirectly from independent claim 1, and Petitioner challenges those claims as unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) over Pang and Vrazel. Ex. 1001, 15:29–16:33; Pet. 53–67. The deficiency in Petitioner’s analysis of independent claim 1 also applies to each of the dependent claims. We accordingly conclude that Petitioner does not demonstrate a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on its challenge of dependent claims 2, 3, 5–7, 9, and 11–20.” slip op. at 19
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,263,723 - ROKU, Inc. v. Universal Electronics, Inc.Some claims unpatentablePTAB · Nov 28, 2023 · IPR2022-00943 · APJ Sharon Fenick · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–7, 9–13, 15, and 16 are unpatentable as obvious; claims 8 and 14 were not shown unpatentable.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner argues that: On or before 7/12/2017, [one of ordinary skill in the art] would have had a bachelor’s degree in computer science, in electrical engineering, or a related field, and approximately three years of experience or equivalent study in voice-controlled devices in smart home systems. Additional graduate education could 2 Neither party presents arguments or evidence relating to such objective evidence of nonobviousness. in the field could substitute for formal education. Pet. 18. We adopted this definition for the purposes of the Decision on Institution. Dec. on Inst. 8–9. Patent Owner adopts Petitioner’s definition. PO Resp. 4. We again adopt Petitioner’s definition, which is consistent with the level of skill as reflected in the prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner
“Absent a recitation of order, or an order mandated by grammar or logic, the steps of a method claim are not construed to require a particular order. See, e.g., Altiris, Inc. v. Symantec Corp., 318 F.3d 1363, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2003). Patent Owner argues that the steps of claim 1, a method claim, must be performed in sequential order. PO Resp. 13–16. Without commenting on or conceding Patent Owner’s proposal, Petitioner contends that “the trial grounds meet this proposed construction.” Pet. Reply 24–25; Tr. 8:25–11:16. Our record does not reflect any indication that Patent Owner’s proposed construction requiring the sequential ordering of the method steps is not at least encompassed by the correct construction of claim 1. Because of this, and because Petitioner agrees that the arguments in the Petition meet this construction, we accept Patent Owner’s construction as correct for the purposes of this Decision.” slip op. at 10
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableNot shown unpatentableMixed
“We do not agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner’s showing uses the same sound data to teach the “first sound data” of limitation 1.a and the “second sound data” of limitation 1.c. Patent Owner is correct that Rosenberg’s claim 5 describes the determination of a volume threshold based on the volume of the ambient audio signal in which characteristic form(s) (e.g., the name of the user of the media player) are present. Ex. 1006, 13:66–21, 14:28–30. However, the Petition describes using Fu’s “predetermined threshold” in combination with Hart-787’s device, which attenuates audio output of a device upon detecting a user’s utterance intended to gain the attention of the device, in order to “include adjusting the audio output volume of a wirelessly-linked audio-producing device when the voice-controlled device determines that the ambient noise level at the time a Ex. 1004, 2:22–37, 5:61–6:10, 9:18–25; Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 24, 32, 54; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 88–89). Petitioner further proposes including a threshold that is advantageously based on the environment in which the device is operating as described in Fu, for example to respond to differing levels of noise at different times of day. Id. at 26, 29–30, 40 (citing Ex. 1006, 10:42–67, 14:28–30; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 48–53, 55, 58, 87, 91, 107–109). We agree with Petitioner that Patent Owner’s arguments address the references individually instead of addressing the combination of the teachings proposed in the Petition. See Pet. Reply 8, 13–14; see also Dec. on Inst. 21–22, 23–24, 25–26. The Petition relies upon a combination of elements of Hart-787 with the predetermined threshold as taught in Fu and with establishing such a threshold based on the operating environment of a device as in Rosenberg. Pet. 26–31, 34–41. Patent Owner is correct that Rosenberg’s threshold is set at the time of the utterance in Rosenberg’s claim 5 and cites Petitioner’s declarant as “conceding” issues regarding how “Rosenberg’s volume threshold is determined.” PO Resp. 20–21. But this argument and the ostensible concession do not squarely address the proposed combination, which combines Fu’s teaching of an adjustment unit that “compares the volume of the ambient noise received . . . to a predetermined threshold” with Rosenberg’s teaching that such “a threshold may be ‘determined based on the volume of [an] ambient audio signal.’” Pet. 39, 40 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Ex. 1006, 14:28–30). While Patent Owner argues that “Petitioner has not proposed using a predetermined/pre-set threshold or a previously established threshold based on environmental noise in the combination of Hart-787 with F[u] and Rosenberg” (PO Resp. 46), we find, on the contrary, that the Petition describes a combination based predetermined threshold” and on a threshold “determined according to an environmental noise level.” Pet. 29–30. Thus, we find Petitioner’s unpatentability grounds do not suffer from the issues Patent Owner argues are a consequence of the purported use of the same sound data for the “first sound data” of claim limitation 1.a and for the “second sound data” of claim limitation 1.c. We do not agree with Patent Owner’s arguments regarding Fu’s teachings with respect to limitation 1.e’s “transition from a first state having a first volume level to a second state having a second volume level that is less than the first volume level” because these arguments similarly do not address the proposed combination. See PO Resp. 26–30. The Petition cites Hart-787 for attenuating the volume of an audio-producing device when a wake word is issued. Pet. 32–34, 43–44. The Petition cites Fu for adjusting volume of an audio-producing device if the level of ambient noise exceeds a predetermined threshold. Id. at 36–39, 44–45. Thus, even if Fu teaches only increasing the volume of an audio-producing device if the predetermined threshold is exceeded, the Petition relies on the combination of teachings of Hart-787 and Fu, and Patent Owner’s argument that neither reference teaches “decreasing a controllable appliance’s volume output when a previously established volume threshold is exceeded” (PO Resp. 30) does not address the combination proposed. Patent Owner’s argument that “Petitioner has not proposed modifying Fu to decrease a controllable appliance’s volume output when a volume threshold is exceeded” (PO Resp. 30) similarly does not address the combination proposed in the Petition. We also find that the preponderance of the evidence supports Petitioner’s showing regarding the motivation to combine the references.” slip op. at 23
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner
“We also find that the preponderance of the evidence supports Petitioner’s showing regarding the motivation to combine the references. transmitted volume down control signals as the means for attenuating audio output, Petitioner contends that Hart-787 “broadly teaches” that a device transmits control command signals to the audio-producing device, relying on the testimony of its declarant. See Pet. 23 (citing Ex. 1004, 5:47–51; Ex. 1003 ¶ 82), 43–44 (citing Ex. 1004, 1:67–2:7, 2:26–27, 5:47–51; Ex. 1003 ¶ 118). In addition, Petitioner shows that these control signals were well-known in the art and would have been known to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention, supporting its showing with additional testimony from its declarant. Id. at 44 (citing Ex. 10183, 2:39–47, 5:35–38; Ex. 10194 ¶¶ 3, 13; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 44–45, 118). We conclude Petitioner’s evidence regarding the showing in Hart-787 is sufficient with respect to this point. Hart-787 describes altering a signal sent to the speaker to attenuate the audio from that speaker. Ex. 1004, 1:67– 2:1. Petitioner’s declarant testifies that using transmitted control signals to do this would have been known to one of ordinary skill. Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 44–45, 82, 118. We consider Petitioner’s evidence regarding what one of ordinary skill in the art would have understood from Hart-787’s disclosure to be sufficient for the showing regarding the “causing one or more commands to be automatically issued to the controllable appliance to thereby cause” that appliance to transition to a lower volume level, as required in limitation 1.e. While Patent Owner argues that Petitioner’s declarant “concede[s] that Hart- 787 does not disclose or teach how its voice-controlled device decreases the audio output of the controllable appliance,” the cited portion of the” slip op. at 25
Patent outcomesUS 10,930,276 mixedClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,930,276 - PTAB · Nov 21, 2023 · IPR2023-01165 · APJ Bart A Gerstenblith · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR of claims 1–20 on all petition grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that Peloton would show at least one claim obvious over Morris and Ray.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“An inter partes review may be instituted only if “the information presented in the petition . . . and any [preliminary] response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2018). For the reasons given below, on this record, Petitioner has established a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in showing the unpatentability of at least one of the Challenged Claims. Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review of the Challenged Claims on all grounds raised in the Petition.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“G. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner, supported by Mr. Rawl’s testimony, proposes that a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention “is a person having: (i) a bachelor’s degree in an exercise related field or mechanical or electrical engineering and (ii) three to five years of industry experience in designing cardiovascular exercise equipment (such as treadmills, bicycles, steppers, ellipticals) or in a similar field.” Pet. 12 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 31–34).6 Petitioner also asserts that a person could qualify as an ordinarily skilled artisan with less education but more experience or less experience but more education. Id. (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 31–34). Patent Owner has not taken a position as to the level of ordinary skill in the art at this stage of the proceeding. At this stage of the proceeding and on the present record, we find that Petitioner’s uncontested level of ordinary skill in the art is consistent with the level of ordinary skill in the art reflected by the ’340 patent and the prior art of record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001); In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995); In re Oelrich, 579 F.2d 86, 91 (CCPA 1978). Therefore, we adopt Petitioner’s level of ordinary skill in the art, as articulated above, in our consideration of the issues presently before us.” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Additionally, only terms that are in controversy need to be construed, and these need be construed only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). Petitioner “does not believe construction of any term is necessary to resolve the invalidity challenges in this Petition.” Pet. 11 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 29–30). Petitioner explains that, as of the filing of the Petition, none of the claim terms recited in the ’340 patent have been construed in a prior proceeding. Id. Patent Owner has not taken a position as to claim construction at this stage of the proceeding. On the present record, we need not construe any claim terms expressly because none are in dispute. See Realtime Data, 912 F.3d at 1375.” slip op. at 9
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner
“3. Motivation to Combine and Reasonable Expectation of Success Petitioner contends Morris and Ray describe exercise equipment (e.g., treadmills) that detect a user’s presence while using the equipment and present the user’s exercise data on a display while a user is exercising to motivate the user to exercise and improve the user’s exercise experience. Pet. 12. Petitioner asserts one of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to combine the complementary teachings of Morris and Ray by incorporating Ray’s camera and software instructions for validating user exercise data in Morris’ treadmill apparatus with a reasonable expectation of success. Id. at 13. In particular, Petitioner contends Morris provides an express motivation to install and use Ray’s camera for user detection by teaching that “its exercise equipment could be fitted with optical sensor(s).” Id. (citing Ex. 1006 ¶ 33). Additionally, Petitioner asserts Morris’ treadmill includes an information processing system that processes sensor signals and includes virtual reality content on a screen displayed to the user. Id. (citing Ex. 1006 ¶¶ 32, 34–36, 50, 56–58, Figs. 6, 11–12C, claims 29–37). Thus, Petitioner contends “the signal processing and display system of Morris had the necessary capabilities to accommodate Ray’s user detection/validation software and implement, with a reasonable expectation of success, its functionalities that included producing and presenting the motivational image of the user exercising.” Id. at 13–14. Additionally, Petitioner contends one of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to combine the teachings of Morris and Ray because of “Ray’s express teachings that its user validation/motivation technology could be ‘easily and affordably merged’ into a treadmill.” Pet. 14 (quoting Ex. 1004, 9:55–57). Petitioner asserts incorporating these features into Morris’ treadmill “would have been obvious and produced predictable results with a reasonable expectation of success.” Id. (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 142–143).” slip op. at 16
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,227,340 - PTAB · Nov 21, 2023 · IPR2023-01164 · APJ James P Calve · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–20 because Peloton showed a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on claims 1, 2–7, and 10–20 over Morris and Ray.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“review. See 35 U.S.C. § 314 (2018); 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2022) (“The Board institutes the trial on behalf of the Director.”). An inter partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . the information presented in the petition . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Upon consideration of the evidence and arguments in the record, we determine that the information presented shows a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail with respect to at least one of the challenged claims. We therefore grant institution of an inter partes review.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“degree in an exercise related field or mechanical or electrical engineering and (ii) three to five years of industry experience in designing cardiovascular exercise equipment (such as treadmills, bicycles, steppers, ellipticals) or in a similar field” Pet. 16 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 31–34). Petitioner also asserts that a person could qualify as an ordinarily skilled artisan with less education but more experience or less experience but more education. Id. At this stage, Patent Owner does not address the level of ordinary skill in the art. On the present record, we find that Petitioner’s uncontested level of ordinary skill in the art is consistent with the ’375 patent and the prior art of record. Therefore, we adopt Petitioner’s level of ordinary skill in the art, as articulated above, in our consideration of the issues presently before us.” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Petitioner does not propose any claim constructions and asserts that” slip op. at 9
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundInstituted
“such as treadmills that detect a user’s presence on the treadmill and present the user’s exercise data on a display while the user is exercising to provide a number of similar benefits including motivating a user to exercise. Pet. 16– 17 (citing Ex. 1006 ¶¶ 5, 26, 35, Abstr.; Ex. 1004, 5:41–48, 8:22–26, 11:56– 61, 13:20–30, Abstr.). Petitioner contends that a skilled artisan would have been motivated to combine the complementary teachings of Morris and Ray that addressed these similar objectives to achieve predictable results. Id. at 16–17 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 137–140). Petitioner asserts that a skilled artisan would have incorporated Ray’s camera and software instructions to validate a user’s exercise data into Morris’ treadmill with a reasonable expectation of success because Morris expressly taught that “its exercise equipment could be fitted with optical sensor(s).” Id. at 17 (citing Ex. 1006 ¶ 33).” slip op. at 15
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,796,375 - PTAB · Nov 21, 2023 · IPR2023-01163 · APJ Juliet Mitchell Dirba · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted review of claims 1–20 on all asserted grounds after finding a reasonable likelihood that claims 1–9, 12, and 14–20 would have been obvious over Morris and Ray.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“record, Petitioner has shown sufficiently that Morris and Ray, in combination, teach or suggest each element of independent claim 1. Petitioner has also sufficiently shown that one of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to combine the teachings of Morris and Ray as proposed and would have had a reasonable expectation of success in doing so. Accordingly, we determine that Petitioner has shown a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in establishing that the subject matter of claim 1 would have been obvious over Morris and Ray.” slip op. at 21
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundInstituted
“have been motivated to combine Morris and Ray by adding several of Ray’s features to Morris’ treadmill, including Ray’s camera, its functionality of displaying a motivational image, and its ability to transmit exercise data to a remote location, and that the ordinarily skilled artisan would have had a reasonable expectation of success in achieving the combination proposed. Pet. 16–18. Petitioner asserts that an ordinarily skilled artisan would have been motivated to combine Morris and Ray because they provide complementary teachings and address similar objectives. Pet. 16 (citing Ex. 1004, Abstr., 5:41–48, 8:22–26, 11:56–61, 13:20–30; Ex. 1006 ¶¶ 6, 25, 33, 35, Abstr.; Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 135–138). Petitioner also asserts that Morris contemplates use of an optical sensor, provides exercise data and “a human analog display that mimic[s] the user’s bouncing motion,” and includes a signal processing and display system with the necessary capabilities to implement the combination. Id. at 16–17 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 139–143; Ex. 1006 ¶¶ 32–36, 50, 56–58, claims 29–37, Figs. 6, 11–12C). Petitioner further asserts that Ray expressly teaches that “its user validation and motivation technology could be ‘easily and affordably merged’ into a treadmill.” Id. at 18 (quoting Ex. 1004, 9:55–57) (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 143–144). Finally, Petitioner contends that an ordinarily skilled artisan would have been motivated to make the proposed combination because it would have improved Morris’ the user as the intensity and duration of exercise increased” and Ray’s ability to share exercise data with a remote location. Id. (citing Ex. 1004, 7:11–22, 11:55–59, 13:50–57; Ex. 1006 ¶ 50; Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 138, 145); see also id. at 16 (arguing user motivation would have motivated the combination) (citing Ex. 1004, 8:22–26, 11:56–61; Ex. 1006 ¶ 25). At this stage, we are persuaded that Petitioner has made a sufficient showing that one of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to combine Morris and Ray with a reasonable expectation of success.” slip op. at 15
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Petitioner does not propose any express claim constructions and states that the “claims . . . have not been construed by any courts as of the filing of th[e] Petition.” Pet. 15 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 29–30). At this stage, Patent Owner does not address the construction of any term or phrase. We determine that it is not necessary to expressly construe any claim terms or phrases for purposes of this Decision. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to necessary to resolve the controversy.”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 8
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“steppers, ellipticals) or in a similar field.” Pet. 15 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 31– 34). Petitioner also asserts that a person could qualify as an ordinarily skilled artisan with less education but more experience or less experience but more education. Id. At this stage, Patent Owner does not address the level of ordinary skill in the art. At this stage of the proceeding and on this record, we adopt Petitioner’s proposed level of skill, as articulated above. We are satisfied that it comports with the level of skill necessary to understand and implement the teachings of the ’227 patent.” slip op. at 8
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,032,227 - Trend Micro, Inc. v. Open Text Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Nov 6, 2023 · IPR2023-00677 · APJ Michelle N Wormmeester · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because Trend Micro did not show a reasonable likelihood that claims 1–19 were obvious over Rockwood and Xie.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“4. Summary In view of the foregoing, we determine that Petitioner has not demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of showing that independent claims 1, 8, and 16 would have been obvious over Rockwood and Xie. Claims 2–7, 9–15, and 17–19 depend from claims 1, 8, or 16. Accordingly, we also determine that Petitioner has not demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on its assertion as to these dependent claims. IV. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, Petitioner has not demonstrated on the record before us a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in showing the unpatentability of any of the challenged claims of the ’045 patent. Therefore, we do not institute trial.10 V. ORDER For the reasons given, it is ORDERED that the Petition is denied and no trial is instituted.” slip op. at 23
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Not reached
“10 Because we deny the Petition on the merits, we do not reach Patent Owner’s request that we exercise our discretion to deny the petition based on the state of the related litigation. See Prelim. Resp. 2–19.” slip op. at 23
- BurdenNot shown unpatentable
“For these reasons, we find Petitioner’s first mapping insufficient to establish a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner can prove the challenged claims unpatentable in view of Rockwood and Xie.” slip op. at 20
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable
“We additionally find it unclear which reference Petitioner relies on for the correlating. It appears that Petitioner finds the correlating in Rockwood (the reference with the attacker profile); but if Rockwood is intended to provide the correlating, it is unclear what role Xie has in Petitioner’s proposed combination. See Pet. 17–18. We further find that Petitioner does not adequately describe how these references might be combined. Rockwood describes a system that identifies attacks at a network edge as they occur,8 whereas Xie’s system looks for similar changes across different hosts within a network over multiple days. There is insufficient explanation of how Xie’s correlating technique would be beneficial in a system like that of Rockwood.” slip op. at 18
§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 9,578,045 - Google LLC v. Parus Holdings, Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Nov 6, 2023 · IPR2022-00805 · APJ Patrick M Boucher · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–26 are unpatentable: claims 1–26 as obvious over Wise and Woods, claims 1–25 over Wise and Dasan, and claim 26 over Wise, Dasan, and Uppaluru.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level board ownDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner proposes that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have had a Bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer science or a related field, and at least two years of experience with voice interfaces and information processing.” Pet. 6–7. Petitioner adds that “[m]ore education could substitute for less experience, and vice versa.” Id. Mr. Lipoff supports this articulation, and Patent Owner makes the same proposal. See Ex. 1002 ¶ 77; PO Resp. 1. Because we find the parties’ agreed proposal reasonable, consistent with the level of skill reflected by the prior art, and supported by Mr. Lipoff’s testimony, we adopt it for this Decision. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the prior art may reflect an appropriate level of skill in the art).” slip op. at 10
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for petitioner
“used to construe the claim in a civil action under 35 U.S.C. 282(b), including construing the claim in accordance with the ordinary and customary meaning of such claim as understood by one of ordinary skill in the art and the prosecution history pertaining to the patent.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b) (2019); see Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312–13 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). “Petitioner does not believe that any express constructions are necessary” to resolve the parties’ dispute, and Patent Owner agrees that “claim construction is unnecessary.” See Pet. 7; PO Resp. 1. On the record before us, we do not find it necessary to construe any term for this Decision. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“[W]e need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 10
- Expert testimonyPatent owner expert discountedDecided for petitioner
“Mr. Occhiogrosso made similarly inconsistent statements on this point on cross-examination. For example, when asked whether the claim requires that the “content-descriptor file be a different file,” Mr. Occhiogrosso responded that “[i]n my opinion, there’s nothing inherent that says it has to be stored in the same physical data file on the same storage medium.” Ex. 1057, 68:11–23. But when asked, “Could the content-descriptor file be one of the web pages that make up a website?” he responded, “In my opinion, no.” Id. at 70:9–13. Notwithstanding such inconsistent statements, we find that, taken as a whole, Mr. Occhiogrosso’s testimony reflects an opinion contrary to that of Mr. Lipoff, namely the recited “content-descriptor file” must be a file separate and distinct from an HTML web page. The Federal Circuit has “viewed extrinsic evidence in general as less reliable than the patent and its prosecution history in determining how to read claim terms,” e.g., because expert testimony “is generated at the time of and for the purpose of litigation and thus can suffer from bias that is not present in intrinsic evidence.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1318. In this instance, although we discern certain (but contrary) positions in the experts’ opinions on this point, the inconsistencies in their cross-examination testimony limit our confidence in those opinions. We accordingly give greater weight to the intrinsic evidence, which more strongly supports Petitioner’s position. We accordingly determine that Petitioner’s showing with respect to this limitation is sufficient.” slip op. at 39
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundUnpatentable
“Patent Owner disputes Petitioner’s reasoning because Petitioner’s “motivation to combine argument is centered on the periodic retrieval of information from an information source (webpage) and not on an information source that is periodically updated,” as the claim recites. PO Resp. 24. Nevertheless, Patent Owner concedes that Petitioner “establishes . . . that the Wise website information sources are periodically updated,” which Petitioner correctly observes “is all that the claim requires.” Id.; Reply 9. Patent Owner reasons that there is no motivation to combine teachings from the two references because “the Wise system alone already provides the most up-to-date and complete information to the user.” PO Resp. 27. But the Federal Circuit has criticized such an argument as “reasoning [that] belies its conclusion”: “[t]hat [two prior art references] address the same problem and that [one of the references] was a known way to address that problem is precisely the reason that there’s a motivation to combine under KSR and [Federal Circuit] precedent.” Intel Corp. v. PACT XPP Schweiz AG, 61 F.4th 1373, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2023) (quoted in Pet. 10– 11). This is the “known-technique” rationale, in which “[t]here is a motivation to combine when a known technique ‘has been used to improve one device, and a person of ordinary skill in the art would recognize that it would improve similar devices in the same way.” Id. at 1380–1381 (citing KSR, 550 U.S. at 417). Implementing periodic updating of information sources as taught by Dasan would be within the skill of an ordinary artisan to implement in Wise’s system. We accordingly determine that Petitioner articulates sufficient reasoning, supported by rational underpinning, to effect the combination it proposes and to meet the first aspect of the preamble.” slip op. at 19
Patent outcomesUS 9,769,314 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,769,314 - Nokia Of America Corporation v. Alexander Soto And Walter SotoInstitution deniedPTAB · Nov 3, 2023 · IPR2023-00680 · APJ Thu A Dang · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution for all challenged claims under § 325(d), finding substantially the same art and arguments had been presented to the Office and no material Office error was shown.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsInstitution denied 325dDenied
“5. 35 U.S.C. § 325(d) Conclusion We conclude that (1) substantially the same art was previously presented to the Office, and (2) Petitioner has not demonstrated that the Office erred. We therefore conclude that it is appropriate to exercise discretion under 35 U.S.C. § 325(d) to deny the Petition.” slip op. at 28
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied 325dInstitution denied
“III. CONCLUSION After considering the evidence and arguments presented in the Petition and Preliminary Response, we determine that, for each of Petitioner’s challenges, it is appropriate to exercise our discretion under 35 U.S.C. § 325(d) to deny the Petition with respect to those grounds. We accordingly exercise that discretion for the Petition as a whole and deny institution of an inter partes review.3 IV. ORDER In consideration of the foregoing, it is hereby: ORDERED that the Petition is denied, and no trial is instituted.” slip op. at 29
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 9,887,795
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.