- PTAB · Sep 12, 2017 · IPR2016-00502 · APJ James J Mayberry · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied Valeo’s rehearing request, leaving its final written decision that claims 1–13 were unpatentable on grounds other than the Nester obviousness grounds unchanged.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“II. STANDARD OF REVIEW “The burden of showing a decision should be modified lies with the party challenging the decision[,]” which party “must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed in a motion, an opposition, or a reply.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d).” slip op. at 3
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“such as the simple substitution of one known element for another or the mere application of a known technique to a piece of prior art ready for improvement, an express motivation to combine references may not be necessary under the Court’s flexible analysis. See KSR Int’l Co., 550 U.S. at 417. Valeo fails, however, to characterize its obviousness position as falling under these cases, nor do we read Valeo’s position as advocating a simple substitution or applying a known technique to a reference ready for improvement. See Pet. 41–42; Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 121–123. Instead, Valeo advocates substituting in Nester’s over-tuned pendulum absorber for Sudau’s even-tuned compensation flywheel, without explaining how such a substitution would be “simple.” See Ex. 1002 ¶ 120. Although Nester’s pendulum absorber may represent a “known technique,” Valeo fails to adequately explain why Sudau’s torque converter is so apparently “ready for improvement” that a person having ordinary skill in the art would need no further motivation to make the substitution.” slip op. at 13
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner
“unavailing. As an initial point, Valeo fails to identify where it relied on Dr. Shaw’s deposition testimony specifically quoted at page 6 of the Request in a motion, opposition, or reply, and we cannot discern independently where Valeo relied on this testimony. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). We cannot overlook facts that were not presented to us. Further, we find that Dr. Shaw’s testimony that Nester’s over-tuning addresses multiple effects is from the perspective of a co-author—Dr. Shaw is not testifying about what the actual reference discloses, but instead what the over-tuning may address based on his knowledge of the underlying testing. See Ex. 2013, 292:11– 297:24 (containing deposition testimony about the underlying testing and results, not specific disclosures in Nester). Our analysis in the Final Written Decision weighed already that evidence of record and found that Nestor’s over-tuning addressed non-linear effects only, and we are unpersuaded that the above-identified testimony affects dispositively the outcome of that weighing.” slip op. at 8
§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 8,161,740 - Neil Ziegmann / N.P.Z., Inc. v. Carlis G. StephensRehearing grantedPTAB · Sep 6, 2017 · IPR2015-01860 · APJ Michael W Kim · IPR · Rehearing
The Board granted rehearing in part, reaffirmed denial of IPR under § 325(d), and granted the request for an expanded panel.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, grantedGranted in part
“[dissatisfied] party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). Office Patent Trial Practice Guide, 77 Fed. Reg. 48,756, 48,768 (Aug. 14, 2012). Moreover, as the moving party, the burden of persuasion falls on Petitioner. 37 C.F.R. § 42.20(c). When rehearing a decision on institution, we review the decision for an abuse of discretion. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c). An abuse of discretion may arise if a decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of law, if a factual finding is not supported by substantial evidence, or if the decision represents an unreasonable judgment in weighing relevant factors. Star Fruits S.N.C. v. United States, 393 F.3d 1277, 1281 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Arnold P’ship v. Dudas, 362 F.3d 1338, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2004); In re Gartside, 203 F.3d 1305, 1315–16 (Fed. Cir. 2000).” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsInstitution denied 325dDenied
“arguments” is self-evident, so we focus on the next part, “substantially the same prior art or arguments.” 35 U.S.C. § 325(d) (emphasis added). We conclude that a set of prior art or arguments may be considered “substantially the same” if they are “cumulative to or substantially overlap with issues previously considered by the Office with respect to the patent.” 157 CONG. REC. S1375 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 2011) (statement of Sen. Kyl). In order for a party to bring this issue to the Office’s attention, the focus of the “substantially” analysis should be on the differences (or lack thereof) between the prior art and arguments presented in the petition, and those “previously . . . presented to the Office.” A party making assertions relevant to Section 325(d) should identify such differences (or lack thereof), whether substantive or procedural, and explain the relevance of those differences (or lack thereof).” slip op. at 8
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner
“Taker Magazine (Ex. 1027) and the Declaration of Neil Ziegmann (Ex. 1024) that purportedly show that the Examiner’s determination was erroneous. We note that Mr. Ziegmann’s testimony is discounted, in that he is an interested party in this proceeding. Cf. Finnigan Corp. v. ITC, 180 F.3d 1354, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“[T]he level of interest of the testifying witness is an important consideration when such testimony is offered to corroborate another witness’s testimony.”). Moreover, even when accorded some weight, we are unpersuaded that the Fur Taker advertisement and Mr. Ziegmann’s testimony come close to showing that the Examiner’s determination concerning nexus was erroneous. In particular, the vast majority of the evidence concerning secondary considerations in the prosecution history has not been challenged by Petitioner, and, thus, for the reasons set forth above, is treated as undisputed fact. To hold otherwise would allow Petitioner to make an end-run around Section 325(d) by merely submitting any piece of new evidence, no matter how minor or inconsequential.” slip op. at 27
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 8,881,447 - PTAB · Aug 24, 2017 · IPR2017-00936 · APJ Michael W Kim · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood that claims 1, 9, 10, and 13–16 were unpatentable over Ginter or Ginter and Stefik.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“inter partes review may not be instituted unless the information presented in the Petition shows “there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a); see also 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a). Upon consideration of the Petition, Preliminary Response, and the associated evidence, we determine that Petitioner has failed to demonstrate a reasonable likelihood it would prevail with respect to at least one of the challenged claims. Accordingly, and for the reasons that follow, we deny institution of an inter partes review.” slip op. at 2
- BurdenDecided for patent owner
“claim terms, “processing circuitry” and “microprocessor,” to the same CPU 654 of Ginter. Prelim. Resp. 17–20. We agree. See Unique Concepts, Inc. v. Brown, 939 F.2d 1558, 1563 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (two distinct claim elements should each be given full effect). Indeed, to determine otherwise would impermissibly read one of “processing circuitry” and “microprocessor” out of the claim. See Tex. Instruments Inc. v. U. S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 988 F.2d 1165, 1171 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (explaining claim language cannot be mere surplusage, an express limitation cannot be read out of the claim). Mapping both claim terms to CPU 654 of Ginter is especially problematic for the “microprocessor” limitation, which reads, in context, “a microprocessor having software programming to control the operation of the processing circuitry” (Claim 1 (emphasis added)). In making our determination, we acknowledge that Ginter discloses “one or more conventional general purpose central processing units (‘CPUs’) 654 . . . .” Ex. 1002, 185:21–22 (emphasis added). Accordingly, it is plausible that Petitioner intended for one of CPUs 654 to correspond to the recited “processing circuitry” and another of CPUs 654 to correspond to the recited “microprocessor.” We are unpersuaded, however, that Petitioner has articulated that intention with sufficient particularity in the aforementioned portions of the Petition. See 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3) (“A petition filed under section 311 may be considered only if . . . the petition identifies, in writing and with particularity, each claim challenged, the grounds on which the challenge to each claim is based, and the evidence that supports the grounds for the challenge to each claim . . . .”).” slip op. at 6
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“claim terms, “processing circuitry” and “microprocessor,” to the same CPU 654 of Ginter. Prelim. Resp. 17–20. We agree. See Unique Concepts, Inc. v. Brown, 939 F.2d 1558, 1563 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (two distinct claim elements should each be given full effect). Indeed, to determine otherwise would impermissibly read one of “processing circuitry” and “microprocessor” out of the claim. See Tex. Instruments Inc. v. U. S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 988 F.2d 1165, 1171 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (explaining claim language cannot be mere surplusage, an express limitation cannot be read out of the claim). Mapping both claim terms to CPU 654 of Ginter is especially problematic for the “microprocessor” limitation, which reads, in context, “a microprocessor having software programming to control the operation of the processing circuitry” (Claim 1 (emphasis added)). In making our determination, we acknowledge that Ginter discloses “one or more conventional general purpose central processing units (‘CPUs’) 654 . . . .” Ex. 1002, 185:21–22 (emphasis added). Accordingly, it is plausible that Petitioner intended for one of CPUs 654 to correspond to the recited “processing circuitry” and another of CPUs 654 to correspond to the recited “microprocessor.” We are unpersuaded, however, that Petitioner has articulated that intention with sufficient particularity in the aforementioned portions of the Petition. See 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3) (“A petition filed under section 311 may be considered only if . . . the petition identifies, in writing and with particularity, each claim challenged, the grounds on which the challenge to each claim is based, and the evidence that supports the grounds for the challenge to each claim . . . .”).” slip op. at 6
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“Patent Owner asserts that Petitioner impermissibly maps two distinct claim terms, “processing circuitry” and “microprocessor,” to the same processing means 1200 of Stefik. Prelim. Resp. 29–31. We agree. See Unique Concepts, 939 F.2d at 1563 (two distinct claim elements should each be given full effect). Indeed, to determine otherwise would impermissibly read one of “processing circuitry” and “microprocessor” out of the claim. See Texas Instr., 988 F.2d at 1171 (explaining that claim language cannot be mere surplusage, an express limitation cannot be read out of the claim). Mapping both claim terms to processing means 1200 of Stefik is especially problematic for the “microprocessor” limitation, which reads, in context, “a microprocessor having software programming to control the operation of the processing circuitry” (Claim 1 (emphasis added)). In making our determination, we acknowledge that it is plausible that Petitioner is mapping “processing circuitry” and “microprocessor” to processing means 1200 and processor element 1201, respectively, where processor element 1201 is a component of processing means 1200. We are unpersuaded, however, that Petitioner has articulated that mapping with sufficient particularity in the aforementioned portions of the Petition. See 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3) (“A petition filed under section 311 may be considered only if . . . the petition identifies, in writing and with particularity, each claim challenged, the grounds on which the challenge to each claim is based, and the evidence that supports the grounds for the challenge to each claim . . . .”). Moreover, as each of “processing circuitry” and “microprocessor” are recited as performing functions, if anything, it would appear that both “processing circuitry” and “microprocessor” should be mapped to processor element 1201, which would still be deficient for the reasons set forth above concerning processing means 1200. Patent Owner also asserts that Petitioner maps the ASIC chip of processing means 1200, which appears to be the same as processor element 1201, of Stefik to the recited “microprocessor,” but that an ASIC chip cannot correspond properly to a “microprocessor.” Prelim. Resp. 31. We agree. Patent Owner cites to a webpage that defines ASIC as follows: (Application Specific Integrated Circuit) Pronounced “a-sick.” A chip that is custom designed for a specific application rather than a general-purpose chip such as a microprocessor. The use of ASICs improve performance over general-purpose CPUs, because ASICs are “hardwired” to do a specific job and do not incur the overhead of fetching and interpreting stored instructions. Prelim. Resp. 31 (citing Ex. 2002); see also Dictionary.com Unabridged, Random House, Inc. http://www.dictionary.com/browse/microprocessor (accessed: June 12, 2017) (Ex. 3001) (microprocessor is “an integrated computer circuit that performs all the functions of a CPU”). Based on the above, we find that an ASIC is not a microprocessor. Against this objective evidence, Petitioner only states that “[a] person of ordinary skill in the art would know that an ASIC chip is a microprocessor” (Pet. 35), and provides a citation to paragraph 223 of Mr. Wechselberger’s Declaration, the relevant portion of which merely states, similarly, that “[a] person of ordinary skill in the art would appreciate that an ASIC chip functions would include those of a microprocessor,” without further relevant explanation or analysis. For the foregoing reasons, we determine that Petitioner failed to establish a reasonable likelihood it would prevail in showing that at least one of claims 1, 9, 10, and 13–16 is unpatentable as obvious over Ginter and Stefik.” slip op. at 10
§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 7,840,437 - Duncan Parking Technologies, Inc. v. Ips Group Inc.Rehearing grantedPTAB · Aug 18, 2017 · IPR2016-00067 · APJ Josiah C Cocks · IPR · Rehearing
The Board granted IPS’s rehearing request and held claims 1–5 and 7–10 not shown unpatentable as anticipated by King ’054 under § 102(e).
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, grantedGranted
“without prior authorization from the Board.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). The party requesting rehearing has the burden of showing that the decision from which rehearing is sought should be modified, and “[t]he request must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked.” Id.” slip op. at 3
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“communicated to the inventors of King ’054 by Mr. King. In that respect, we observe the following: (1) it is undisputed that Mr. King and the D+I inventors invented the substantive content that became claims 8 and 10 of the ’310 patent; (2) Mr. King is a common inventor as between each of the ’310 patent and King ’054; (3) the record reflects that there was frequent and numerous collaborative exchanges between Mr. King and the other inventors of King ’310 (i.e., the D+I inventors); and (4) those exchanges occurred prior to the filing of the application that became King ’054. See, e.g., Exs. 2018–31, 2034–42.” slip op. at 6
- Strike new argumentNew argument disregardedOther
“Response to IPS’s Request for Rehearing, provides little, if any, basis undermining the above-noted inference. DPT’s attempt, as a part of its Response, to belatedly seek rehearing of our Final Written Decision as to claims 1–5, 7, and 9 of the ’310 patent is both untimely and inadequately supported on the present record.4 Indeed, all the Response does is inappropriately seek rehearing of our Final Written Decision as to claims 1– 5, 7, and 9 of the ’310 patent, and does not follow our instruction of being responsive to the subject of the Request for Rehearing, i.e., the anticipation of dependent claims 8 and 10. See Paper 32, 2 (“The panel would like to hear from DPT as to the content of IPS’s Request for Rehearing. Accordingly, the panel authorizes . . . DPT to file a reply to IPS’s Request for Rehearing.”).” slip op. at 6
§ 102 anticipationPatents in suitUS 7,854,310 - Zepp Labs, Inc. v. Blast Motion, Inc.No claims unpatentablePTAB · Aug 14, 2017 · IPR2016-00675 · APJ Rama G Elluru · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1, 7, 13, 14, 19–22, and 32 were not shown unpatentable because the petition did not establish the claimed remote database.
RulingsFinal written decision- BurdenNot shown unpatentable
“We determine that Petitioner’s evidence and argument are insufficient to demonstrate that Mahajan teaches a “remote database.” As an initial matter, Petitioner does not explain sufficiently how Mahajan’s teaching of storing information informs a skilled artisan that that storage is a “database,” as required by claim 1. See Pet. 27; Pet. Reply 14–15. Petitioner also does not adequately explain why a storage medium, such as a hard drive or a server, sufficiently equates with a “database.” Id. Indeed, in response to the question—“[s]o Mahajan’s disclosure of a remote server is not the same thing as disclosing a remote database, correct?”—Dr. Nesbitt testified, “[n]ot exclusively.” Ex. 2011, 123:8–12; see id. at 120:19–21. Dr. Nesbitt further testified that, [a] server would be more of a hardware device, where a database would be more of a software. It would be a place where the data is actually stored within a remote computer or remote server. So it’s the hardware versus what’s in the hardware is the distinction” slip op. at 13
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable
“Although we acknowledge that Mahajan discloses that its system can be used in conjunction with database systems generally, Petitioner does not explain sufficiently why a skilled artisan would have modified Mahajan to include a “remote database.” See Pet. 27; Pet. Reply 14–15; Ex. 1003 ¶ 165 (emphasis added). Similarly, Petitioner also does not explain sufficiently why a skilled artisan would have modified the disclosed remote “server” of Mahajan to include a “database.” See id.” slip op. at 14
Patent outcomesUS 8,941,723 not shown unpatentable§ 103 obviousnesscites KSRPatents in suitUS 8,941,723 - Zepp Labs, Inc. v. Blast Motion, Inc.Some claims unpatentablePTAB · Aug 14, 2017 · IPR2016-00676 · APJ Rama G Elluru · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1, 7–9, and 12–15 were held unpatentable as obvious; claims 5 and 6 were not shown unpatentable because the evidence did not establish the claimed database limitation.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level board ownDecided for petitioner
“to the ’855 patent is “a person with a Bachelor’s degree in mechanical or electrical engineering or a related field with two to three years of experience working with data acquisition systems.” Pet. 9 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 19). According to Petitioner, “[w]ith more education, such as additional graduate degrees and/or study, less experience is needed to attain the ordinary level of skill.” Id.” slip op. at 7
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundUnpatentable
“The Supreme Court has made clear that “[t]hroughout this Court’s engagement with the question of obviousness, our cases have set forth an expansive and flexible approach inconsistent with the way the Court of Appeals applied its TSM test here.” KSR, 550 U.S. at 415. In direct contrast, Patent Owner’s assertions of law, by use of the terms “unnecessary” and “unneeded,” harkens back to the rigid TSM test, which the Supreme Court held explicitly as being incorrect. The Supreme Court further opined as follows: Neither the enactment of § 103 nor the analysis in [Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1 (1966)] disturbed this Court’s earlier instructions concerning the need for caution in granting a patent based on the combination of elements found in the prior art. For over a half century, the Court has held that a “patent for a combination which only unites old elements with no change in their respective functions . . . obviously withdraws what is already known into the field of its monopoly and diminishes the resources available to skillful men.” Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equipment Corp., 340 U.S. 147, 152, 71 S.Ct. 127, 95 L.Ed. 162 (1950). This is a principal reason for declining to allow patents for what is obvious. The combination of familiar elements according to known methods is likely to be obvious when it does no more than yield predictable results. Id. at 415–416. Contrary to Patent Owner’s assertions of law, there is no use of terms similar to “unnecessary,” “unneeded,” or even “goals” in the obviousness analysis. Instead, the Supreme Court’s inquiry is straightforward: (1) if the elements are found in the prior art, and (2) if the combination results in “no change in respective function” and “does no more than yield predictable results,” i.e., a predictable reason to combine for a predictable advantage, then the resulting combination is “likely to be obvious.” Id.” slip op. at 14
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of success › Teaching awayTeaching away not foundDecided for petitioner
“Patent Owner asserts further that “Mahajan teaches such a person of skill in the art not to include a memory, as its real-time data transmission system is described as preferable to a memory-based system such as Lee’s.” PO Resp. 28 (emphasis omitted). We disagree. While Mahajan does disclose such a general preference in one embodiment, we find that it, at the same time, expressly acknowledges the possibility of the alternative. Ex. 1005 ¶ 42 (“The hardware device need not have an on-board memory for storing the orientation and position information.”). See, e.g., Merck & Co. v. Biocraft Labs, 874 F.2d 804, 807 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (non-preferred embodiments can be the basis for an obviousness analysis). Specifically, we find that the words “need not” actually conveys the following meaning in the context of the Mahajan: “may, but need not.” This understanding is further underscored by the fact that Mahajan expressly incorporates-by-reference Lee, and, in describing Lee, asserts the following: “A distinctive feature of this instrumented golf club is the use of a data storage memory device located within the golf club that eliminates the need for radio transmission hardware.” Ex. 1005 ¶ 6. Indeed, not only does Mahajan acknowledge that an alternative of adding memory was known, it even identifies an advantage for that alternative. The argument that such an advantage may be allegedly contrary to the goals of Mahajan is unpersuasive, for the reasons set forth above. Finally, insofar as Patent Owner is asserting that Mahajan teaches away from the proffered modification, we disagree for the same reasons. See Galderma Labs., L.P. v. Tolmar, Inc., 737 F.3d 731, 738 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (a reference that “merely expresses a general preference for an alternative invention but does not criticize, discredit, or otherwise discourage investigation into” the claimed invention does not teach away).” slip op. at 22
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableNot shown unpatentableMixed
“We determine that Petitioner’s evidence and argument is insufficient to demonstrate that Mahajan teaches the limitation of claim 5. As an initial matter, Petitioner does not explain sufficiently how Mahajan’s teaching of storing information informs a skilled artisan that that storage is a “database,” as required by claim 5. See Pet. 32–33; Pet. Reply 14–15. Petitioner does not adequately explain why a storage medium, such a hard drive or a server, sufficiently equates with a “database.” Indeed, in response to the question— “[s]o Mahajan's disclosure of a remote server is not the same thing as disclosing a remote database, correct?”—Dr. Nesbitt testified, “[n]ot exclusively.” Ex. 2011, 123:8–12; see id. at 120:19–21. Dr. Nesbitt further testified that, [a] server would be more of a hardware device, where a database would be more of a software. It would be a place where the data is actually stored within a remote computer or remote server. So it’s the hardware versus what’s in the hardware is the distinction between the two. Id. at 122:17–23; see Ex. 2001 ¶ 63 (Patent Owner’s expert opining that “[d]isclosure of sending data to remote server for storage, without more, is insufficient to convey to a person of ordinary skill in the art that the server contains a database.”). The ’855 patent also distinguishes between a “remote database” and a “remote server.” See Ex. 1001, 8:33–34 57 (“[t]he data uploaded to the Internet, i.e., a remote database or remote server or memory remote to the system”); id. at 26:48–51. At oral argument,” slip op. at 30
Patent outcomesUS 8,905,855 mixed§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,905,855 - Zepp Labs, Inc. v. Blast Motion, Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Aug 14, 2017 · IPR2016-00677 · APJ Michael W Kim · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1, 2, 4, 7, and 8 are unpatentable: claims 1, 4, 7, and 8 as obvious over Mahajan, and claim 2 as obvious over Mahajan and Dugan.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level board ownDecided for petitioner
“Based on the above, we modify Petitioner’s proffered level of ordinary skill as follows: “a person with a Bachelor’s degree in mechanical or electrical engineering or a related field with two to three years of experience working with data acquisition systems, including motion data captured using markers and sensors.” We decline, however, to limit the level of ordinary skill to “designing wireless motion capture sensors,” as the ’928 Patent does not disclose being limited to “design” and “wireless” sensors. We note, however, that, in this case, the prior art itself reflects an appropriate skill level. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001). For example, the prior art of record, such as Mahajan, has been shown to relate to the field of data acquisition systems, and, in particular, motion capture sensors.” slip op. at 8
- Expert testimonyOther
“basis for the proposed modification, nor identifies any benefit. PO Resp. 17–23. We disagree. The relevant portion of the Petition cites expressly to paragraphs 42 and 127 of Mahajan, and in quoting paragraph 127, Petitioner bolds the following: “‘[t]he apparatus can be used alone or in conjunction with other hardware . . . or software . . . and may be adapted for wired transmission of data, wireless transmission of data, or for storage of data on the apparatus.’” Pet. 17. The next sentence of the Petition then reads “[t]hus, Mahajan teaches that the on-board memory component for storage of data on the apparatus is an obvious design choice.” Pet. 17. This statement is supported by Dr. Nesbitt’s testimony, with which we agree, explaining that Mahajan provides the option to include on-board memory and leaves it to the designer to include it, considering that it was common to include memory in data capture systems to store the captured data. Ex. 1003 ¶ 115. We are unclear as to how this portion of the Petition can be read as asserting anything other than coupling memory for the purpose of data storage would have been, as Petitioner phrases it, an “obvious design choice” to one of ordinary skill at the time of the invention.” slip op. at 17
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“its broadest reasonable construction in light of the specification of the patent in which it appears. 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b); see also Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S.Ct. 2131, 2142 (2016) (affirming that USPTO has statutory authority to construe claims according to 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b)). Under the broadest reasonable construction standard, claim terms are generally given their ordinary and customary meaning, as would have been understood by one of ordinary skill in the art in the context of the entire disclosure. In re Translogic Tech., Inc., 504 F.3d 1249, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2007). Any special definition for a claim term must be set forth in the specification with reasonable clarity, deliberateness, and precision. In re Paulsen, 30 F.3d 1475, 1480 (Fed. Cir. 1994). We must be careful not to read a particular embodiment appearing in the written description into the claim if the claim language is broader than the embodiment. In re Van Geuns, 988 F.2d 1181, 1184 (Fed. Cir. 1993). For the purposes of this Decision, we determine that no claim term needs express interpretation. See Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“[O]nly those terms need be construed that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.”).” slip op. at 6
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundUnpatentable
“Accordingly, given our above findings that (1) Mahajan discloses a microcontroller and (2) coupling memory for the purpose of data storage was known to one of ordinary skill at the time of the invention, we have little trouble in concluding that it would have been obvious to modify microcontroller 50 of Mahajan by coupling memory thereto for the purpose, i.e., the predictable reason to combine of, of data storage. With no persuasive evidence of unpredictability or change in function of the microcontroller with memory combination, nothing more is required under KSR, nor under other Federal Circuit precedent. See Broadcom Corp. v. Emulex Corp., 732 F.3d 1325, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (quoting Power-One, Inc. v. Artesyn Techs., Inc., 599 F.3d 1343, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2010)) (“a finding of obviousness at the time of invention requires a ‘plausible rational [sic] as to why the prior art references would have worked together’” (citation omitted)).” slip op. at 16
Patent outcomesUS 8,944,928 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,944,928 - Mastercard International Incorporated v. William GreciaRehearing deniedPTAB · Jul 27, 2017 · IPR2017-00791 · APJ Jameson Lee · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied Mastercard’s rehearing request to add Ameerally anticipation grounds for claims 1–4 and 11–21, finding the petition had not adequately asserted or explained those arguments and evidence.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“On request for rehearing, the burden of showing a decision on whether to institute trial should be modified lies with the party challenging the decision. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). “When rehearing a decision on petition, a panel will review the decision for an abuse of discretion.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c). “The request must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed in a motion, an opposition, or a reply.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). For reasons discussed below, Petitioner’s Request is denied.” slip op. at 2
- Strike new argumentNew argument disregardedDenied
“Req. Reh’g, 2–3. But the Board could not have overlooked or misapprehended arguments or evidence that were not specifically identified and explained in the Petition. It is too late for Petitioner to add further explanation in a Request for Rehearing. As noted above, Petitioner failed to identify the place in the Petition where the matter allegedly misapprehended or overlooked by the Board was addressed in the Petition, as is required by 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). In any event, the reproduced text of Paragraph 83 of Gautier modifies “account identifier” with the parenthetical “(such as an email address”).” Ex. 1011 ¶ 83. The parenthetical is exemplary in nature and indicates only that an email address can be an account identifier, and not that in iTunes the Account Name necessarily is a user’s email address.” slip op. at 5
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)
“we did not state or find that Petitioner’s assertion was not supported by the record evidence. Instead, we determined that why the last step of claim 1 is met by Ameerally was not adequately explained by Petitioner. For instance, with respect to Petitioner’s discussion of Frakes, we stated: The Figure illustrates detailed information kept by Frakes’s iTunes® system for a digital movie file. Id. at 4. Petitioner asserts: “Frakes illustrates ‘Purchased By’ and ‘Account Name’ in the metadata of the iTunes® media file (grayed out in image for privacy, but field illustrated), such that the claimed ‘electronic identification reference’ was necessarily written into the metadata as saved by iTunes®. (Cherukuri Decl. ¶ 139).” Pet. 46. However, neither Petitioner nor Mr. Cherukuri explains why the “Purchased By” or “Account Name” field is necessarily the login information, e.g., the user’s e-mail address, that the iTunes® system had requested and received, as had been explained by Petitioner and Mr. Cherukuri above when accounting for requesting an electronic identification reference and receiving the electronic identification reference. It is not explained why the fields cannot be another identification reference other than the user’s e-mail address. Paper 7, 32. With respect to Petitioner’s discussion of Zweig, we stated: The argument [about Zweig] establishes that, in the metadata for the digital content purchased or downloaded by a user there is an identifier, an electronic identification reference, that identifies that user. However, neither Petitioner nor Mr. Cherukuri explains why that identifier in the metadata is necessarily the login information, e.g., the user’s e-mail address, that the iTunes® system had requested and received, as had been explained by Petitioner and Mr. Cherukuri above when accounting for requesting an electronic identification reference and receiving the electronic identification reference. It is not explained why the fields cannot be another identification reference. Id. at 32–33. With respect to independent claims 11 and 21, we stated that for the same reasons discussed in the context of claim 1, the same operation as is required by claims 11 and 21 is not sufficiently accounted for by Petitioner. Id. at 33.” slip op. at 3
§ 102 anticipationPatents in suitUS 8,533,860 - Unified Patents Inc. v. Nonend Inventions N.V.Rehearing deniedPTAB · Jul 25, 2017 · IPR2016-00174 · APJ Daniel N Fishman · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied rehearing, leaving intact its findings that claims 1–6 and 8–18 were anticipated by Shastri and claims 1–20 were unpatentable over Goldszmidt-based grounds.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“a panel will review the decision for an abuse of discretion.” “An abuse of discretion occurs if a decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of law, if a factual finding is not supported by substantial evidence, or if the decision represents an unreasonable judgment in weighing relevant factors.” Arnold P’ship v. Dudas, 362 F.3d 1338, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (citing In re Gartside, 203 F.3d 1305, 1315–16 (Fed. Cir. 2000)). On rehearing, the burden of showing the Decision should be modified lies with the party challenging the Decision—here, Patent Owner. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). “The request must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed in a motion, an opposition, or a reply.” Id.” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Real party in interest / privityRpi dispute resolved for petitionerDecided for petitioner
“by our rules. Patent Owner’s argument that it received insufficient notice that its preliminary arguments regarding real party in interest (Paper 7, 4–13) would be waived fails to identify an argument we overlooked or misapprehended. Instead, Patent Owner’s argument challenges the propriety of our cautionary order that such arguments not raised in its Response will be waived. Arguments that are not raised in Patent Owner’s Response could not have been overlooked or misapprehended.” slip op. at 4
- BurdenDecided for petitioner
“to Patent Owner. As we observed in our Decision, Patent Owner complied with its burden to produce evidence supporting its position that the patent at issue antedates Shastri. Dec. 18–19 (“We find that Patent Owner has met that burden by producing the Declarations of the inventors of the ’862 patent (Exs. 2018, 2019) and corroborating evidence (Exs. 2020–2027, 2029) that allegedly show conception prior to Shastri, and reasonable diligence through filing of a patent application (constructive reduction to practice) to antedate the filing of Shastri. PO Resp. 11–13.”). As an initial matter, we disagree with Patent Owner’s argument that it provided the only evidence relating to antedating Shastri. Petitioner did provide cross-examination testimony of Patent Owner’s declarants—the inventors of the ’862 patent—concerning this issue, which is “evidence.” Even putting that aside, however, what Patent Owner is actually asserting is that the evidence Patent Owner provided supports only its position, and that, relatedly, Petitioner cannot use that same evidence to support Petitioner’s position. That assertion has no merit. While certainly a party would be expected to present evidence that, on balance, would favor their position, the evidence itself is merely objective information that can be used by any party, as appropriate. To that end, a party submitting evidence submits it at their own peril. In that vein, Petitioner had every right to, and indeed did, reply to Patent Owner’s proffered evidence (inventor Declarations and related documents) by arguing that Patent Owner’s evidence on this issue was not persuasive. Pet. Reply 6–8 (citing Exs. 1014 and 1015). As we discussed in our Decision, we weighed Petitioner’s proffered testimony against Patent Owner’s proffered evidence. Dec. 20–26. We determined that Patent Owner’s proffered evidence in support of its claim to antedate Shastri was not persuasive when viewed in the context of the entire record, including the cross-examination testimony of Patent Owner’s Declarants. Thus, our Decision did not overlook or misapprehend Patent Owner’s arguments to antedate Shastri, nor did we “discard” the “only” evidence on the issue.” slip op. at 5
- Expert testimonyDecided for petitioner
“to Patent Owner. As we observed in our Decision, Patent Owner complied with its burden to produce evidence supporting its position that the patent at issue antedates Shastri. Dec. 18–19 (“We find that Patent Owner has met that burden by producing the Declarations of the inventors of the ’862 patent (Exs. 2018, 2019) and corroborating evidence (Exs. 2020–2027, 2029) that allegedly show conception prior to Shastri, and reasonable diligence through filing of a patent application (constructive reduction to practice) to antedate the filing of Shastri. PO Resp. 11–13.”). As an initial matter, we disagree with Patent Owner’s argument that it provided the only evidence relating to antedating Shastri. Petitioner did provide cross-examination testimony of Patent Owner’s declarants—the inventors of the ’862 patent—concerning this issue, which is “evidence.” Even putting that aside, however, what Patent Owner is actually asserting is that the evidence Patent Owner provided supports only its position, and that, relatedly, Petitioner cannot use that same evidence to support Petitioner’s position. That assertion has no merit. While certainly a party would be expected to present evidence that, on balance, would favor their position, the evidence itself is merely objective information that can be used by any party, as appropriate. To that end, a party submitting evidence submits it at their own peril. In that vein, Petitioner had every right to, and indeed did, reply to Patent Owner’s proffered evidence (inventor Declarations and related documents) by arguing that Patent Owner’s evidence on this issue was not persuasive. Pet. Reply 6–8 (citing Exs. 1014 and 1015). As we discussed in our Decision, we weighed Petitioner’s proffered testimony against Patent Owner’s proffered evidence. Dec. 20–26. We determined that Patent Owner’s proffered evidence in support of its claim to antedate Shastri was not persuasive when viewed in the context of the entire record, including the cross-examination testimony of Patent Owner’s Declarants. Thus, our Decision did not overlook or misapprehend Patent Owner’s arguments to antedate Shastri, nor did we “discard” the “only” evidence on the issue.” slip op. at 5
NonePatents in suitUS 8,090,862 - Smart Microwave Sensors GmbH v. Wavetronix LLCAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Jul 17, 2017 · IPR2016-00488 · APJ Daniel N Fishman · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 9, 10, 12, 13, 22, 23, and 25 are unpatentable, including as anticipated by Boles or Farmer and obvious over combinations including Boles, Farmer, Herman, and others.
RulingsFinal written decision- ExcludeMotion to exclude, grantedGranted
“1. Exhibits 1002, 1008, 1009, and 1012 Patent Owner argues the date printed on each of Exhibits 1002, 1008, 1009, and 1012, is inadmissible hearsay under FRE 801 and 802 as out of court statement offered to prove that truth of the matter asserted—that each document was a printed publication as of the date printed on that document (i.e., that it was sufficiently publicly accessible). Paper 45, 2–3 (citing Standard Innovation Corp. v. Lelo, Inc., Case IPR2014-00148, Paper 41 (PTAB April 23, 2015)). As discussed supra, we agree with Patent Owner that the dates printed on these Exhibits are hearsay with no applicable exception. Thus, we grant Patent Owner’s motion requesting that we exclude the copyright notice date from each of Exhibits 1008, 1009, and 1012, and exclude the date of the EuMC conference on Exhibit 1002. However, we note that the documents per se are not excluded from the record as hearsay—only the date imprinted on each as proof of the printed publication status of each document. The underlying documents of these Exhibits are offered not to prove the publication dates thereof but, instead, are statements offered to demonstrate the knowledge of persons of ordinary skill in the art. Petitioner may rely on other evidence to establish the date of public accessibility of each of these documents, the analysis of which we have set forth supra. See Section II.B.1–4.” slip op. at 54
- Skill levelNot reached
- Expert testimonyPatent owner expert discountedDecided for patent owner
“data about multiple vehicles on a particular section of roadway (PO Resp. 7– 8), Petitioner counters by identifying references in the field of traffic engineering that use mobile sensors (i.e., not at a fixed location) for acquiring “traffic data.” Pet. Reply 2 (citing Ex. 1031 ¶¶ 6, 22, 181–183). Referring to pages 7–13 of Exhibit 1031 (Texas Highway Operations Manual discussing “Vehicle-based Equipment”), Patent Owner’s expert testified, on cross-examination, as follows: Q In view of the paragraph, would it be accurate to note that one of ordinary skill in the art would understand that the equipment located in a vehicle can be used to measure the speed of the traffic stream? A It says that a vehicle-mounted radar unit can be used to measure the timing speed of other vehicles in the traffic stream. It does not say it is used to measure the traffic stream. Q I said measure the speed of the traffic. A Yes. This says it is measuring the speed of vehicles in the traffic stream. Q So one of ordinary skill in the art would understand that the equipment located in a vehicle can be used to measure the speed of vehicles in a traffic stream? A That is how it’s worded, the speed of other vehicles in the traffic stream. Ex. 1036, 98:21–99:13. In light of that testimony, we determine that Patent Owner’s expert testimony in support of their assertion is not credible.” slip op. at 14
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner
“Id. at 49:19–50:10. Given, at best, significant ambiguity as to whether the Specification and other evidence requires that “traffic data” must refer to “all or substantially all vehicles,” we are persuaded that such a requirement would not be proper under a broadest reasonable construction. Regarding Patent Owner’s assertion that “traffic data” is limited to data about multiple vehicles on a particular section of roadway (PO Resp. 7– 8), Petitioner counters by identifying references in the field of traffic engineering that use mobile sensors (i.e., not at a fixed location) for acquiring “traffic data.” Pet. Reply 2 (citing Ex. 1031 ¶¶ 6, 22, 181–183). Referring to pages 7–13 of Exhibit 1031 (Texas Highway Operations Manual discussing “Vehicle-based Equipment”), Patent Owner’s expert testified, on cross-examination, as follows: Q In view of the paragraph, would it be accurate to note that one of ordinary skill in the art would understand that the equipment located in a vehicle can be used to measure the speed of the traffic stream? A It says that a vehicle-mounted radar unit can be used to measure the timing speed of other vehicles in the traffic stream. It does not say it is used to measure the traffic stream. Q I said measure the speed of the traffic. A Yes. This says it is measuring the speed of vehicles in the traffic stream. Q So one of ordinary skill in the art would understand that the equipment located in a vehicle can be used to measure the speed of vehicles in a traffic stream? A That is how it’s worded, the speed of other vehicles in the traffic stream.” slip op. at 14
Patent outcomesUS 6,693,557 unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 6,693,557
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.