- Arashi Vision (U.S.) LLC (D/B/A Insta360) v. Gopro, Inc.No claims unpatentablePTAB · Dec 10, 2025 · IPR2024-01186 · APJ Brian D Range · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–20 were not shown unpatentable because Kwatra does not teach or suggest minimizing rotational velocity and acceleration as required by the claims.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art (POSITA) would have the following characteristics: “a bachelor’s degree in engineering or computer science, or equivalent field, and two years of experience working on image or video processing or digital cameras.” Pet. 6 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 36–37). Petitioner states that, “[a]lternatively, a POSITA would have four years of experience working on image or video processing 6 Patent Owner asserts objective evidence of nonobviousness. Prelim. Resp. 19–27. or digital cameras.” Id. Petitioner further contends “[a]n advanced graduate degree in the disciplines cited above may make up for the work experience indicated above.” Id. Patent Owner does not dispute the level of ordinary skill in the art. Prelim Resp. 14–15. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposal as reasonable and consistent with the ’894 patent specification and the prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the prior art may reflect an appropriate level of skill in the art).” slip op. at 10
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for patent owner
“Petitioner “does not believe any terms require a formal construction.” Pet. 6. Patent Owner agrees “no claim terms presently require construction to resolve any current dispute between the parties.” PO Resp. 15. We do not discern a need to construe explicitly any claim language at this juncture because doing so would have no effect on our analyses below of Petitioner’s asserted grounds and will not assist in resolving the present controversy between the parties. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 11
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“Kwatra teaches, at Equation 7, minimizing velocity and acceleration of a function representing camera path (P). FF ¶¶ 6, 8–9. Kwatra does not state that this camera path function considers rotation. Rather, the words “camera path” suggest x, y, z movement of the camera rather than rotation of the camera. Dr. Foroosh’s testimony that Kwatra’s minimization of a smoothed camera path does not result in minimizing rotational velocity and acceleration is credible because this testimony is consistent with Kwatra as a whole and consistent with the other evidence of record. Id. ¶ 10. Kwatra recognizes that image rotation angle (“θ”) may not remain smooth. Id. ¶ 12. But rather than attempting to minimize velocity and acceleration of rotation of the camera housing, Kwatra states that applying a smoothness constraint on rotation angle “may be non-linear.” Id. ¶ 13. Consistent with Kwatra, Dr. Foroosh credibly explains the difficulty of applying linear techniques to rotation. Id. Thus, Kwatra proposes instead constraining the sine and cosine of theta. Id. ¶ 14. The Kwatra provisional application is part of the Kwatra reference (id. ¶ 15), and it similarly opts for simpler schemes rather than estimating all parameters for all frames jointly. Id. ¶ 16. The provisional explains that the rotational component is relatively small such that non-linear computations minimizing velocity and rotation can be avoided. Id. ¶¶ 17–18. The testimony of Patent Owner’s witness, Dr. Foroosh, explaining the provisional is credible (Ex. 2018 ¶ 72) because it is consistent with Kwatra’s complete disclosure. Dr. Foroosh’s testimony is more credible than the testimony of Petitioner’s witness, Dr. Katsaggelos, because Dr. Katsaggelos did not review the Kwatra provisional application and, thus, did not review the entire disclosure of Kwatra. Id. ¶ 19; see also In re Etter, 756 F.2d 852, 859 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (en banc) (obviousness analysis considers whether “the claimed inventions are rendered obvious by the teachings of the prior art as a whole” (emphasis added)).” slip op. at 28
- Expert testimonyPatent owner expert creditedPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner
“(id. ¶ 15), and it similarly opts for simpler schemes rather than estimating all parameters for all frames jointly. Id. ¶ 16. The provisional explains that the rotational component is relatively small such that non-linear computations minimizing velocity and rotation can be avoided. Id. ¶¶ 17–18. The testimony of Patent Owner’s witness, Dr. Foroosh, explaining the provisional is credible (Ex. 2018 ¶ 72) because it is consistent with Kwatra’s complete disclosure. Dr. Foroosh’s testimony is more credible than the testimony of Petitioner’s witness, Dr. Katsaggelos, because Dr. Katsaggelos did not review the Kwatra provisional application and, thus, did not review the entire disclosure of Kwatra. Id. ¶ 19; see also In re Etter, 756 F.2d 852, 859 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (en banc) (obviousness analysis considers whether “the claimed inventions are rendered obvious by the teachings of the prior art as a whole” (emphasis added)).” slip op. at 28
Patent outcomesUS 10,574,894 not shown unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,574,894 - Arashi Vision (U.S.) LLC (D/B/A Insta360) v. Gopro, IncNo claims unpatentablePTAB · Nov 25, 2025 · IPR2024-01165 · APJ William V Saindon · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–21 were not shown unpatentable because Zhou does not teach the claimed low-light high-pass or stickiness parameter limitations.
RulingsFinal written decision- BurdenFwd all claims patentableNot shown unpatentable
“4. Conclusion for the Prior Art Analysis In sum, we find that Zhou does not disclose the low-light high-pass parameter or the stickiness parameter. Petitioner’s grounds for both independent claims 1 and 16 rely on Zhou for teaching a low-light high-pass parameter or a stickiness parameter. Pet. 23–28, 64. Because we find Zhou does not teach these limitations, all of Petitioner’s grounds fall for this reason. III. CONCLUSION For the reasons given above, we determine that Petitioner has not established by a preponderance of the evidence that any claim of the ’840 patent would have been obvious in view of the prior art cited.” slip op. at 18
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedOther
“A person of ordinary skill in the art (POSITA) in the field of the ’840 patent would have a bachelor’s degree in engineering or computer science, or equivalent field, and two years of experience working on image or video processing, or digital cameras. Alternatively, a POSITA would have four years of experience working on image or video processing, or digital cameras. An advanced graduate degree in the disciplines cited above may make up for the work experience indicated above. Pet. 6 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 32). Patent Owner applies the same standard. PO Resp. 26–27. We use this agreed-upon standard for purposes of this Decision.” slip op. at 7
- Expert testimonyPatent owner expert creditedPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner
“We review this testimony based on the strength of the underlying factual basis. 37 C.F.R. § 42.65(a); Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Delta Resins & Refractories, Inc., 776 F.2d 281, 294 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (“Lack of factual support for expert opinion going to factual determinations, however, may render the testimony of little probative value . . ..”). Here, the underlying factual basis is not very strong for either witness. That said, we find that Dr. Foroosh’s testimony is more logically sound and consistent with the ’840 patent disclosure. Based on our reading of the specification, we find a clear indication that “stickiness” has to do with the past. In order to control “the extent by which preceding portion(s) . . . impacts determination of the smoothed trajectory” (emphasis added), one must control the degree by which the past frames impact determination. And to control the degree of the past’s influence, one must, as a consequence, favor the past over the future. That is, the frame of reference of the stickiness parameter is the past. The specification could have used a time-agnostic term, like a “nearness” or “adjacency” parameter, but it did not. Thus, the fact that “stickiness” is used in conjunction with “preceding” indicates that it deals with a preference for preceding frames. On this basis, we find Dr. Katsaggelos’s testimony less persuasive than Dr. Foroosh’s.” slip op. at 10
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for patent owner
“That said, we do not construe a stickiness parameter as prohibiting consideration of future frames. Instead, we determine that the stickiness parameter’s value determines the impact of the preceding portions, versus the following portions. The ’840 patent recognizes this, when it says that a stickiness parameter value of “1,” representing a “lazy” stabilizer that maximally favors the past, would not override a violation of the margin constraint based on the look-ahead (i.e., would not allow the viewing window to fall out of bounds in the event of large future motion). See Ex. 1001, 22:26–30; see also id. at 12:61–13:29 (acknowledging that favoring the past may lead to a conflict with the viewing window determination), 15:39–60 (adjusting the viewing window to ensure it does not violate a margin constraint). Thus, while a past-favoring parameter by necessity favors the past over the future, it does not prohibit consideration of the future. In view of the above, we construe the claimed “stickiness parameter” as a parameter that controls the extent by which preceding portions of the trajectory impacts determination of the smoothed trajectory, with an understanding that in order to favor preceding portions, to some extent, the parameter must relatively disfavor following portions.” slip op. at 10
Patent outcomesUS 10,958,840 not shown unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,958,840 - Arashi Vision (U.S.) LLC (D/B/A Insta360) v. Gopro, IncNo claims unpatentablePTAB · Nov 25, 2025 · IPR2024-01164 · APJ William V Saindon · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–21 were not shown unpatentable because Shi does not disclose the claimed low-light high-pass parameter required by the asserted obviousness grounds.
RulingsFinal written decision- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner
“Given the teachings of the specification, we agree with Patent Owner that a low-light high-pass parameter is a parameter of a smoothing function that favors high frequencies (high pass) when exposure times are long (low light). See Tr. 42:10–18 (Patent Owner’s counsel stating that “high-pass” means “there’s a bias or preference for high frequencies”); Ex. 2020, 93:23– 94:15 (Petitioner’s declarant, Dr. Katsaggelos, agreeing that a high-pass system attenuates the low frequency of a signal). Although we acknowledge Petitioner’s position that the specification provides other ways or considerations in implementing a smoothing function, based on our above analysis of the specification, we find that the specification describes the lowlight high-pass parameter as a specific component of a smoothing function. See, e.g., Ex. 1001, 21:17–25 (setting out several parameters besides the low-light high-pass parameter used in trajectory smoothing).” slip op. at 10
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“position and a real device position. Id. at 18:27–40. In other words, the blur is addressed by analyzing the image to identify motion and then shifting the image. Shi, however, does not disclose how its parameter is based on low light (or the long exposure times indicative of low light). In its Petition, Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art would understand that “blurs can be caused by low light conditions.” Pet. 28 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 111). Although this is true, that does not mean that Shi’s blurs are identified by a parameter that considers low light. As we just described, Shi identifies the blur by quantifying the amount of motion of the points in an image, not by identifying low light. This is simply a different way to determine the presence of motion blur. In Shi, blur is measured, whereas in the ’840 patent, it is inferred based on low-light conditions (e.g., by observing the exposure time). See, e.g., Ex. 1007, 18:7– 26; Ex. 1001, 19:12–26. In its Reply, Petitioner does not point to any further disclosures. Accordingly, we find that Shi does not disclose the “low-light” aspect of the claimed low-light high-pass parameter. This is sufficient to determine that Petitioner’s ground does not meet all claim limitations. Similarly, we find that Shi does not disclose the “high-pass” aspect of the parameter. Shi’s blur compensation uses a spherical interpolation to modify the image. Ex. 1007, 18:27–40. The low-light high-pass parameter, as we have construed the term, allows more high frequencies. To allow more high frequencies, this necessarily means either allowing fewer low frequencies, or allowing more high frequences as opposed to some counterfactual situation in which fewer high frequencies were going to be allowed. See Ex. 2020, 94:23–95:15; Ex. 2022. We are directed to no persuasive evidence from Petitioner that Shi’s spherical interpolation favors high frequencies over low frequencies. Accord Ex. 2018 ¶ 107 (Patent Owner’s expert stating that Shi’s spherical interpolation “reintroduce[es] both high- and low-frequency motion”). Even if Shi allows the viewing window to track the camera position “consistent with the natural blur in the image” (Ex. 1007, 17:63–67), we are not provided with sufficient evidence to conclude by a preponderance of the evidence that providing a similar visual goal as a high-pass parameter (Ex. 1001, 22:16–18, “the output motion may include high frequencies that mask motion blur”) is the same as having a high-pass parameter. Again, merely preserving high frequencies is not the same as having a “high-pass parameter” because, as construed, a “high-pass parameter” also involves some degree of attenuation of low frequencies or relative increase of high frequencies. Accordingly, we find that Shi does not disclose the “high-pass” aspect of the claimed low-light high-pass parameter.” slip op. at 18
Patent outcomesUS 10,958,840 not shown unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,958,840 - Microsoft Corporation / Affirmed Networks, Inc. v. Lemko CorporationNo claims unpatentablePTAB · Aug 30, 2024 · IPR2023-00529 · APJ Brian D Range · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–8, 11–16, and 21 were not proven unpatentable over Mauer and Waylett because the asserted combinations did not teach key claim limitations.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“II. ANALYSIS A. LEVEL OF ORDINARY SKILL Petitioner defines the person of ordinary skill in the art as follows: As of February 2006, a person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSITA”) would have been a person with a degree in 1 The Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) (“AIA”), amended 35 U.S.C. § 103. Because the challenged claims of the ’414 patent have an effective filing date before the effective date of the applicable AIA amendments, we refer to the pre-AIA version of 35 U.S.C. § 103 throughout this Decision. 2 Mauer et al., U.S. Patent No. 7,395,085 B1, issued July 1, 2008 (Ex. 1005, “Mauer”). 3 Waylett et al., U.S. Patent No. 8,184,603 B2, issued May 22, 2012 (Ex. 1006, “Waylett”). computer science, electrical or computer engineering, physics, or a similar discipline . . . [and] would also have at least two years of relevant experience including, for example, work related to telecommunications networks. Pet. 3 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 54). The institution decision adopted Petitioner’s definition of a person having ordinary skill in the art. Dec. on Inst. 11–12. Patent Owner applied this definition for its response. Resp. 19. Petitioner’s undisputed definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art is reasonable and consistent with the prior art and ’414 patent specification. Based on the record before us, we adopt Petitioner’s undisputed proposal. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the prior art may reflect an appropriate level of skill in the art).” slip op. at 12
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached
“Petitioner does not submit constructions for any claim terms. According to Petitioner, “[t]he Board construes claims under the same standard used in civil actions in federal district court. The district court for the related litigation has not yet construed the claim terms.” Pet. 7. The parties provided briefing regarding construction of “distributed mobile architecture (DMA).” Resp. 19–34; Pet. Reply 1–3; PO Sur-reply 11–14. But we do not need to construe “distributed mobile architecture (DMA)” to resolve this inter partes review. We thus do not construe this claim term. We also do not discern a need to construe explicitly any other claim language because doing so would have no effect on our analyses below of Petitioner’s asserted grounds and will not assist in resolving the present controversy between the parties. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). We discuss the meaning of ’414 patent claims to the extent necessary to resolve the issues we address below. Id.” slip op. at 14
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot reached
“a) Combination of Mauer and Waylett In support of both Ground 1 and Ground 2, Petitioner argues that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to combine Mauer’s and Waylett’s disclosures, “using Waylett’s Network-in-a-box 224 in each of Mauer’s WWAN 14 and WLAN 12, resulting in at least two DMA systems.” Pet. 11–13. Asserting that “Mauer teaches providing sufficient network coverage by use of different kinds of networks, network interfaces, and protocols,” Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have recognized that “Waylett discloses an inexpensive way to implement the same networks used in Mauer’s WWAN 14 and WLAN 12.” Id. Citing similarities in Mauer’s and Waylett’s systems, Petitioner argues that “a POSITA would have been able to modify Mauer’s WWAN 14 and WLAN 12 networks so that each network uses Waylett’s NIB 224.” Id. at 14. According to Petitioner, the combination would have included a number of beneficial features from Mauer. Id. at 14–15. Petitioner further advances three reasons that a person of ordinary skill would have had to combine the references’ teaching. Id. at 15–16. First, asserting that Waylett discloses cost benefits and Mauer discloses “an improved method and system for notifying mobile stations,” Petitioner contends the “references each provide reasoning” to combine their disclosures. Id. at 15. Second, Petitioner argues that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to “improve Mauer’s distributed wireless network system by consolidating it into a single box, making it compact in design allowing for faster deployment.” Id. at 16. “Third, Waylett’s NIB would help mitigate the shared concern of Mauer—that is, reaching a mobile station as it roams or moves outside of the service or coverage area.” Id.” slip op. at 24
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“Petitioner does not establish that Mauer sends calls to voicemail based on the two determinations claim 1 recites. Resp. 55–56. In particular, as we explain above, claim 1 requires making use of the DPR after first determining the second mobile subscriber is not located within a first wireless coverage area based on HLR and VLR information and also determining that the second mobile subscriber is not located within a second wireless coverage area based on certain CLR information. The Petition, at best, attempts to establish that Mauer directs to voicemail when a “communication session cannot be established over the first or second wireless network.” Pet. 37. But a general determination that a “communication session cannot be established” does not teach or suggest claim 1’s specific requirements that first, the DPR is utilized in the specific circumstance that the second mobile subscriber is not located within the first wireless coverage area (with this determination being made based on HLR and VLR information), and second, that the DPR is also not located within the second wireless coverage area (with this determination being made based on CLR information). See PO Sur-Reply 8–9; Ex. 2001 ¶¶ 111–113. For the reasons above, Petitioner does not establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the combined art teaches or suggests the final “when” recitation of claim 1.” slip op. at 29
Patent outcomesUS 7,653,414 not shown unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 7,653,414 - Apple Inc. v. Fintiv, Inc.No claims unpatentablePTAB · May 23, 2024 · IPR2023-00398 · APJ George R Hoskins · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–22 were not shown unpatentable as obvious over Dill, Vadhri, and Akashika because Dill was not shown to disclose the claimed Integration Tier Limitation.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“We adopt Petitioner’s undisputed formulation of ordinary skill in the art as set forth above, because we are satisfied this formulation generally comports with the level of skill necessary to understand and implement the teachings of the ’196 patent and the asserted prior art. We do not adopt Patent Owner’s annotation to Petitioner’s formulation as requiring knowledge of “mobile wallets” specifically, because we determine knowledge of “mobile payment systems and techniques” per Petitioner’s formulation is tied sufficiently to the claims of the ’196 patent to reflect the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art. At the same time, even if we were to include knowledge of “mobile wallets” in our formulation, it would not materially change our Decision as set forth below. That is, we would still determine Petitioner has not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that Dill discloses the Integration Tier Limitation.” slip op. at 10
- Expert testimonyNot reached
“We need not resolve the parties’ dispute as to whether Dr. Houh qualifies as an ordinarily skilled artisan. Even assuming that Dr. Houh possesses, at a minimum, ordinary skill in the art—as we have done in this Decision—we determine Petitioner still fails to show that any of the challenged claims are unpatentable.” slip op. at 12
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for patent owner
“The Integration Tier Limitation requires no further construction for purposes of this proceeding. See Pet. Reply 7 (“[N]o specific construction is required.”). The claim clearly specifies that the claimed “web services communication mechanisms” must serve as an interface between the integration tier and (1) the claimed mobile wallet application and, separately, (2) “a plurality of different device types over a plurality of different communication channels.” For purposes of this Decision, we assume that this interface may be direct or indirect. See id. at 6 (asserting that “communication channels that interface, even indirectly, with the ‘web services communication mechanisms’ still interface with the ‘web services communication mechanisms’”).” slip op. at 28
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“However, we find that of those four channels (1)–(4), only the first channel (1) is associated with web interface 137 such that it qualifies as a “communication channel,” as required by claim 1. There is no indication in the Dill disclosures cited by Petitioner that any of the other three channels (2)–(4) are associated with web interface 137. For example, Figure 9 of Dill includes a double-headed arrow to illustrate communication between web interface 137 and transfer options module 145, but Figure 9 does not include any arrows to illustrate communication between web interface 137 and any one or more of IVR interface 136, other interfaces 138, agent system 135, or mobile network 115. See Ex. 1005, Fig. 9. In other words, Petitioner fails to show Dill teaches web interface 137 interfaces with any devices over any of channels (2)–(4), as would be required by Petitioner’s mapping. In the Petition, Petitioner never clearly (or persuasively) addresses this requirement of the claim. Petitioner does contend that transfer options module 145 is coupled to various devices via interfaces 136–138 and exchanges transaction information (see Pet. 25–26; see also Pet. Reply 10– 11), but that contention misses the mark. The salient question is whether Dill’s web interface 137 (i.e., the claimed “web services communication mechanisms”) interfaces with the different device types over the channels, not whether transfer options module 145 (i.e., the claimed “integration tier”) does so.” slip op. at 30
Patent outcomesUS 10,438,196 not shown unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,438,196 - Apple Inc. v. Fintiv, Inc.No claims unpatentablePTAB · May 23, 2024 · IPR2023-00399 · APJ Juliet Mitchell Dirba · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–22 were not shown unpatentable under § 103 over Dill, Vadhri, and Akashika because Dill did not teach or render obvious the hardware SIM card and integration tier limitations.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“In the Institution Decision, we determined that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had “a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer science, or equivalent training, and approximately two years of work experience in software development with a basic knowledge of accounting” and “working knowledge of mobile payment systems and techniques,” as Petitioner proposes. Inst. Dec. 9 (quoting Pet. 3–4). We stated that “this definition generally comports with the level of skill necessary to understand and implement the teachings of the ’488 patent and the asserted prior art.” Id. (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 22; Ex. 2001 ¶ 35).” slip op. at 10
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedMixed
“In addition, Petitioner’s reliance on Dr. Houh’s testimony (see Pet. 23–24) is unavailing. Although Dr. Houh agrees with the arguments in the Petition and includes quotes from the cited portions of Dill and Bykov (see Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 95–97), he provides no additional analysis or explanation beyond what was provided in the Petition. As a result, his testimony suffers the same deficiencies as the Petition. Also, we do not credit his conclusion that Dill includes the requisite disclosure (see id. ¶ 97) because he fails to provide sufficient supporting explanation or evidence (see 37 C.F.R. § 42.65(a)). Finally, we note that Petitioner misrepresents Dr. Shamos’s testimony by stating that Dr. Shamos “agrees that if a mobile device executes a mobile wallet over a cellular network, the mobile device has a SIM card for the mobile wallet.” Pet. Reply 22 (emphasis added) (citing Ex. 1022, 29:4–7, 40:9–10). In the cited testimony, Dr. Shamos agrees that mobile devices have SIM cards, but he does not address where a mobile wallet application would be installed. Ex. 1022, 29:4–7, 40:9–10. Thus, contrary to Petitioner’s argument, we determine that Dr. Shamos’s testimony does not support Petitioner’s position.” slip op. at 27
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for petitioner
“for the term “hardware SIM card” because the important points are undisputed. In particular, the parties agree that a “hardware SIM card” is a SIM card implemented in hardware rather than software. See Pet. Reply 9 (citing Ex. 1021 ¶ 36); Tr. 40:25–41:2 (Patent Owner’s counsel explaining that the language in its proposed construction was “to differentiate it from a software SIM card”); see also PO Resp. 16, 19 (asserting that the term refers to a specific type of hardware, namely a “chip” or a “smart card”) (citing Ex. 2003 ¶¶ 32–33). The parties also agree that an ordinarily skilled artisan would have known that a “SIM card” is a component in a mobile device involved in identifying and authenticating a user to a mobile network. See Tr. 30:23–31:3 (Petitioner’s counsel stating “a SIM card, just as known in the art . . . would allow the user to be able to access the mobile network” 10 Each page in Exhibit 2021 includes at least two page numbers. For clarity, we refer to the page number of the exhibit (shown in the bottom right corner), and we have adjusted Patent Owner’s citation accordingly. given “the user’s identification information on it”), 39:24–40:2 (Patent Owner’s counsel stating that “I think everyone is in agreement that the critical aspect of what makes a SIM card a SIM card is that it can authenticate a mobile device to a wireless network”). The evidence supports the parties’ understanding. The word “SIM” is an acronym for “subscriber identity module” (see, e.g., Ex. 1001, 6:58–67; Ex. 2021, 5), and the record shows that a SIM is a specific component in a mobile device that is involved in identifying and authenticating a user to a mobile network (see Ex. 2003 ¶¶ 30–31; see also e.g., Ex. 2021, 7 (stating that a SIM’s “primary function” is “to authenticate the subscriber to the network”); Ex. 2025, 3 (describing the SIM)).11 Consequently, we determine that an ordinarily skilled artisan would have understood a “hardware SIM card” to be a hardware component in a mobile device that is involved in identifying and authenticating a user to a mobile network. We do not need to further construe the term, or determine whether the additional requirements proposed by Patent Owner are appropriate, because Petitioner fails to show that the prior art teaches or suggests the claimed “hardware SIM card,” as explained below. See infra § II.D.2.a (analyzing the parties’ substantive contentions).” slip op. at 13
- BurdenNot shown unpatentable
“Petitioner has not shown, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Dill discloses “a mobile wallet application installed on a hardware SIM card,” as required by element 1.3B. See Pet. 23–24. In particular, even assuming that Dill teaches installing a mobile wallet application somewhere on a mobile device (see Pet. 23),14 Dill does not teach installing it on a hardware SIM card,15 as specifically required by the claim. Petitioner relies upon paragraph 106 of Dill (see Pet. 23), but that paragraph does not disclose this claim limitation (see Ex. 1005 ¶ 106). In relevant part, that paragraph of Dill simply states: 14 Patent Owner disagrees with this premise, arguing that Dill does not disclose a mobile device that includes a mobile wallet application. See PO Resp. 52–56. We need not resolve that dispute because, even assuming Petitioner’s premise (as we have done in this Decision), Petitioner still fails to show that the claims are unpatentable. 15 As noted above, a “hardware SIM card” is a hardware component in a mobile device that is involved in identifying and authenticating a user to a mobile network. See supra § II.C.1 (addressing meaning of term). It should also be appreciated that the methods described above may be performed by hardware components or may be embodied in sequences of machine-executable instructions, which may be used to cause a machine such as a general-purpose or special-purpose processor or logic circuits programmed with the instructions to perform the methods. These machine-executable instructions may be stored on one or more machine readable mediums, such as CD-ROMs or other type of optical disks, floppy diskettes, ROMs, RAMs, EPROMs, EEPROMs, magnetic or optical cards, flash memory, or other types of machine-readable mediums suitable for storing electronic instructions. Alternatively, the methods may be performed by a combination of hardware and software. Ex. 1005 ¶ 106 (emphases added). This teaches storing instructions on “other types of machine-readable mediums,” but it fails to teach storing instructions on a hardware SIM card, much less storing Dill’s mobile wallet application there. In short, Dill is silent with respect to this issue, and silence is not disclosure. Notably, Petitioner does not contend (or show) that a mobile wallet application installed on a mobile device would necessarily be installed on a hardware SIM card. See Pet. 23–24; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 95–97. Indeed, the record indicates that a mobile wallet application installed on a mobile device could instead be installed on a different component. See, e.g., Ex. 1001, 7:1–3, 9:33–35 (identifying device memory as alternate component); Ex. 2021, 5 (describing SIM as the “smaller of two computer chips inside a GSM mobile handset”); cf. Pet. Reply 9 (distinguishing between hardware SIM cards and software ones). Thus, Petitioner fails to show that this claim limitation is inherent in Dill. See PAR Pharm., Inc. v. TWI Pharms., Inc., 773 F.3d 1186, 1196 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (explaining that inherency requires a showing that “the limitation at issue necessarily must be present”).” slip op. at 22
Patent outcomesUS 9,208,488 not shown unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,208,488 - Apple Inc. v. LBT IP I LLCNo claims unpatentablePTAB · Dec 15, 2023 · IPR2020-01189 · APJ John A Hudalla · IPR · Remand
Claims 8, 10, 13, and 15 were not shown unpatentable because Sakamoto discloses only two battery power thresholds, which do not meet the construed multitude limitation.
RulingsRemand decision- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningTerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner
“threshold values” includes GPS signal level thresholds, we start with the words of claim 8. Claim 8 recites a “battery power level monitor” that (1) “measures a power level of the charging unit” and (2) “adjusts a power level applied to location tracking circuitry responsive to one or more signal levels.” Claim 8 further recites that “the power level compris[es] a multitude of threshold values determined by a user or system administrator.” The remainder of claim 8 states the purpose of the “multitude of threshold values,” which is “to intermittently activate or deactivate the location tracking circuitry to conserve power of the charging unit in response to the estimated charge level of the charging unit.” The natural reading of these recitations is that the “power level” associated with the “multitude of threshold values” is the battery power level that is (1) measured by the battery power level monitor and (2) adjusted by the battery power level monitor and applied to location tracking circuitry. We also note that the claim language already incorporates a limitation directed to “signal levels” insofar as the battery power level monitor “adjusts a power level applied to location tracking circuitry responsive to one or more signal levels” (emphasis added). As such, the limitation “one or more signal levels” is recited separately from the limitation “the power level comprising a multitude of threshold values.” Given “[t]he general presumption that different terms have different meanings,” Chicago Bd. Options Exch., Inc. v. Int’l Sec. Exch., LLC, 677 F.3d 1361, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2012), we ascribe different meanings to the recited “signal levels” and “power level.”” slip op. at 15
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“the battery power thresholds between (1) high and normal sensitivity positioning modes and (2) normal sensitivity positioning mode and turning off power to the GPS receiver) and Sakamoto’s two GPS signal level thresholds (i.e., K1 and K2) for teaching “the power level comprising a multitude of threshold values.” Pet. 50–51; Pet. Reply 16–18. As discussed above, however, “the power level comprising a multitude of threshold values” refers to battery power level thresholds. See supra § II.C.2. We also determine above that signal level threshold values are not within the scope of “the power level comprising a multitude of threshold values.” See id. Accordingly, we are not persuaded that Sakamoto’s GPS signal level thresholds K1 and K2 teach the recited power level threshold values. Although Petitioner is correct that “Sakamoto uses the same modes with both sets of thresholds” and that both sets of thresholds might ultimately relate to conserving battery power (see Pet. Reply 17 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 58; Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 27–29)), we are not persuaded that these different types of thresholds are interchangeable within the scope of “the power level comprising a multitude of threshold values.” This is particularly true given that Petitioner already relies on Sakamoto’s GPS signal level thresholds K1 and K2 for teaching another aspect of claim 8, i.e., “responsive to one or more signal levels.” See Pet. 49–50. For these reasons, Petitioner has only established that Sakamoto teaches two battery power level thresholds within the scope of “the power level comprising a multitude of threshold values.” Because two threshold values are not a “multitude” (see supra § II.C.1), we find that Petitioner has not established that Sakamoto teaches “the power level comprising a multitude of threshold values,” as recited in claim 8. Thus, we determine Petitioner has not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the subject matter of claim 8 would have been obvious over Sakamoto. 3. Claims 10, 13, and 15 Claims 10, 13, and 15 each depend from claim 8. Ex. 1001, 17:4–10, 17:23–25, 17:29–33. Petitioner’s analysis for these claims does not cure the deficiencies discussed above with respect to claim 8. See Pet. 54–55. Thus, we determine Petitioner has not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the subject matter of claims 10, 13, and 15 would have been obvious over Sakamoto.” slip op. at 31
- BurdenNot shown unpatentable
“III. CONCLUSION Petitioner has not shown, by a preponderance of the evidence, that (1) the subject matter of claims 8, 10, 13, and 15 would have been obvious over Sakamoto; (2) the subject matter of claims 8, 10, 13, and 15 would have been obvious over the combination of Sakamoto and AAPA; or (3) the subject matter of claims 8, 10, 13, and 15 would have been obvious over the combination of Sakamoto and Hayasaka.” slip op. at 33
Patent outcomesUS 8,497,774 not shown unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,497,774 - Cerebras Systems Inc. v. Rex Computing, IncNo claims unpatentablePTAB · Oct 11, 2023 · IPR2022-00741 · APJ Michael T Cygan · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–19 were not shown unpatentable under § 103 because the cited combinations failed to teach required router retention, scratchpad memory, or optimal square-versus-linear tile assignment limitations.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“the time the ’975 patent was filed. Pet. 6. Relying upon the Conte Declaration, Petitioner asserts a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had “a Bachelor of Science degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, or a related subject matter, plus at least two years of professional experience in the field of microprocessor design or a similar field . . . and more experience would compensate for less formal education, and vice versa.” Id. (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 27–30). Patent Owner applies this 2 Patent Owner does not identify any secondary considerations to be considered. assessment in its Response. Resp. 8. Based on the fully developed record, we accept the assessment offered by Petitioner because it is supported by the Conte Declaration and is consistent with the ’975 patent and the asserted prior art.” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for patent owner
“[W]e need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). We determine that no constructions are required for the above-disputed terms. slip op. at 10
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Specification disavowal / 'present invention' languageTerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner
“above-described manner to store data. But Dr. Conte’s direct testimony does not address other statements in the ’975 patent specification that describe the scratchpad memory as an alternative to a cache. See Ex. 1001, 8:27–33 (“each of the cores includes a scratchpad memory . . . . As a result, conventional L-level caches may not be used in the architecture 299 because the scratchpad memories . . . provide data storage”); see also id. at 3:21–4:35 (describing drawbacks of prior art architectures that rely on caches), 5:14–20 (stating that each core may include a scratchpad memory instead of a cache). As Dr. Bagherzadeh stated, “Dr. Conte never reconciled [his] opinion with the ’975 Patent’s disclosure, which, as I described, connects the concept of using a scratchpad memory to a cache-less architecture.” Ex. 2001 ¶ 92 (citing Ex. 1001 Fig. 3). Dr. Conte’s deposition testimony did not clarify this issue, stating that the issue of cacheless architecture was “disconnected” from whether a microprocessor has a scratchpad. Ex. 2002, 40:10–15. The ’975 patent specification’s description of a scratchpad memory module as an alternative to cache memory is evidence that an ordinary artisan, upon reading the entirety of the ’975 patent, would not have considered the scope of the claimed scratchpad memory to include a cache memory. Dr. Conte has relied upon the ’975 patent specification for general properties seemingly common to both caches and scratchpad memory, but has not explained why the ’975 patent specification’s statements distinguishing a scratchpad memory from a cache should not limit the scope of the claimed “scratchpad memory.” As a result, Dr. Conte’s testimony does not significantly assist in construing “scratchpad memory” in any manner relevant to the pertinent issue; i.e., whether it may be taught by a prior art cache memory.” slip op. at 30
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“data “occurs in the router’s input buffer” (Pet. Reply 10 (emphasis added)), but Petitioner does not support this assertion with analysis or evidence. To the contrary, Petitioner has clarified that the “input” on which words wait is “the input of the processor,” not the router. Pet. Reply 12. Claim 1 requires that a router must be operable to retain such data (limitation [1g]), and that the processor cores are distinct from the routers (limitation [1a]). Thus, to the extent that MIT2002 teaches data waiting at the input of the processor, Petitioner has not pointed to evidence or reasoning persuasively showing that the claimed router is operable to retain a data packet, even if a buffer at the input of the processor is able to do so. Instead, Petitioner primarily relies on our preliminary determination, and on Patent Owner’s lack of argument to the contrary. Id. at 11–12. Neither of these act to satisfy Petitioner’s burden to show that MIT2002, in combination with the other applied references, teaches a router operable to retain data packets in the event of a traffic condition. Consequently, we are not persuaded that retention of data in the Raw system occurs at the router’s input buffer. For the above described reasons, we determine that Petitioner has not shown by a preponderance of evidence that the combined teachings of the applied references of this ground teach or suggest the “each router is operable to retain a data packet in the event of a traffic condition” limitation of [1g]. Accordingly, Petitioner has not demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that the subject matter of claim 1 would have been obvious.” slip op. at 24
Patent outcomesUS 10,355,975 not shown unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,355,975 - Linkedin Corporation v. Ebuddy Technologies B.V.No claims unpatentablePTAB · Jun 30, 2023 · IPR2022-00164 · APJ Jason M Repko · IPR · Final written decision
LinkedIn did not prove claims 1–3 and 6–10 unpatentable on any asserted Eaton- or Kim-based anticipation or obviousness ground.
RulingsFinal written decision- ExcludeOther
“In its Motion to Exclude, Patent Owner seeks to exclude Petitioner’s Exhibits 1017–1020, 1022–1026, 1030, 1032, 1033, 1034, and 1036. Mot. 1. Even without excluding any of these exhibits, Petitioner has not proven that any challenged claims are unpatentable. Thus, we dismiss Patent Owner’s Substitute Motion to Exclude as moot.” slip op. at 36
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner’s alternative definition that “a PHOSITA[3] would possess equivalent additional formal education such as graduate studies, or work experience to replace formal education” is unclear or, at best, does not meaningfully contribute to the first definition. See id. For example, Petitioner does not explain whether or how additional graduate studies would be both equivalent and additional to the education described in the first definition. See id. Patent Owner does not propose an alternative definition. See generally PO Resp.; Sur-reply. Thus, in this decision, we apply Petitioner’s proposed definition, without the alternative qualifier about “equivalent additional formal education . . . or work experience.” See Pet. 6. We determine that Petitioner’s definition is supported by the testimony of Dean Willis. Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 32–35.” slip op. at 6
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“B. Claim Construction We need only construe terms that are in controversy and only to the extent necessary to resolve the dispute. Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (citing Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). We need not construe any terms to resolve the issues in this case.” slip op. at 6
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedPatent owner expert creditedDecided for patent owner
“We credit Dr. Rajeev Surati’s testimony6 (Ex. 2020 ¶ 2053) on this issue over Dean Willis’s testimony (Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 211–13) because Dr. Rajeev Surati’s testimony is more consistent with Kim’s disclosure and Dean Willis’s Declaration lacks an adequate explanation. Thus, Petitioner has not shown that Kim discloses the associating step.” slip op. at 16
Patent outcomesUS 8,230,135 not shown unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 8,230,135 - Linkedin Corporation v. Ebuddy Technologies B.V.No claims unpatentablePTAB · Jun 30, 2023 · IPR2022-00165 · APJ Jameson Lee · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–3 and 6–10 were not shown unpatentable because Eaton and Kim each failed to disclose the claimed array and alternative-title limitations, and the obviousness grounds did not cure those deficiencies.
RulingsFinal written decision- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for patent owner
“alternative” or “alternative title.” Neither party contends that “alternative” or “alternative title” is a term of art with an art recognized meaning. In plain English, “alternative” as an adjective designates something that is another option, another choice. Dictionary.com (accessed June 23, 2022), https://www.dictionary.com/browse/alternative (Ex. 3002) (“affording a choice of two or more things, propositions, or courses of action,” “(of two things, propositions, or courses) mutually exclusive so that if one is chosen the other must be rejected: The alternative possibilities are neutrality and war.”). The specification of the ’179 patent also consistently uses the word “alternative” to mean something in lieu of or in place of another choice. For instance, the ’179 patent describes: Advantageously, data associated with the event can also (or in the alternative) be provided to the title provisioning engine 616. Ex. 1001, 8:15–17 (distinguishing “also” from “alternative”). A given event may cause the title provisioning engine 616 to rewrite the entire title array 618 with title strings associated with the most recent events. Alternatively, a given event may cause the title provisioning engine 616 to append title strings to the end of the title array 618. Id. at 8:24–28 (using “alternative” in mutually exclusive context). slip op. at 12
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for petitioner
“During oral hearing, counsel for Petitioner clarified that the index to an array may start from “0” rather than “1” and that the index also need not be a number. Tr. 18:13–19:19. With that clarification, counsel for Patent Owner indicated that there no longer is any dispute with regard to the meaning of “array.” Tr. 61:14–25. Accordingly, we have no need to construe the term “array.” 4. “event” The term “event” is recited in independent claim 1. The specification” slip op. at 14
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“reproduced above, are “event messages / strings 300 (shaded in green).” Pet. 30 (citing Ex. 1006 ¶ 31). But the cited evidence does not support that assertion. Paragraph 31 of Eaton describes the referenced column simply as “associated event 300.” Ex. 1006 ¶ 31. Further, even if the column stores associated event messages, Petitioner cites nothing to show that the associated messages in server memory column 300 are the event presence notification messages discussed above in the context of limitation 1[ii]. Alternatively, Petitioner relies on Eaton’s Figure 6 embodiment. Pet. 31. Petitioner asserts (id.) that in the Figure 6 embodiment server memory 160 stores an array of event notifications, referencing an annotated version of Eaton’s Figure 6, reproduced below: Figure 6 is a block diagram of an alternate embodiment of a server memory for use within a server of the instant message communication system, and Petitioner has shaded the EVENT AN–NN column green and the words “SERVER MEMORY” red. Ex. 1006 ¶ 19. Petitioner asserts that both the TOPIC N column 540 and the EVENT AN-NN column 670 as the stored event notifications. Pet. 31 (citing Ex. 1006 ¶¶ 56–58). But the assertion is not supported by the cited evidence. Paragraphs 56–58 of Eaton do not indicate that either topic entries 540 or event entries 670 are the event presence notification messages discussed above in the context of limitation 1[ii]. In its Reply, Petitioner asserts that event presence notification message EPNM “is associated with the character strings labelled Topics [1]- [N], and using ‘Topic N’ as the example, it is tied to ‘Event[s] AN-NN’ (representing the ‘events’ from the plurality of events 180 discussed in Claim 1[i]).” Reply 22. Even assuming that there is an association, Petitioner still has not shown that EPNM is any of Topics [1]-[N] in Figure 6. Similarly, Petitioner has not shown that EPNM is any of Event [1]-[N] in Figure 2.” slip op. at 26
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“’179 Patent as provided above in Ground 1. To the extent that there are arguably any meaningful differences between those claims and Eaton’s disclosures, those differences would have been trivial and obvious modifications to make for a PHOSITA.” Pet. 49. This conclusory assertion of obviousness does not specifically identify any difference between the claimed invention and Eaton, and does not provide any reasoning or rational underpinning to support the assertion. Conclusory assertions of obviousness are insufficient to satisfy Petitioner’s burden of proof. In re Magnum Oil Tools Int’l, Ltd., 829 F.3d 1364, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Petitioner asserts that to the extent that Eaton discloses various, “distinct” embodiments, it would have been obvious to one with ordinary skill in the art to combine Eaton’s teachings into a single system. Pet. 49. Petitioner also asserts that one with ordinary skill in the art “would understand that Eaton discloses possible configurations and/or operations of the same system, and to the extent that it is argued or found otherwise, the functions would have been entirely obvious to combine for [one of ordinary skill in the art] given Eaton’s express disclosures.” Id. It is uncertain what distinct embodiments are referred to by Petitioner. However, even assuming that the disclosures of Eaton’s embodiments, already discussed by Petitioner, are properly combinable, there still remains the deficiencies, discussed above in the alleged anticipation of claim 1 by Eaton, relating to the step of storing the event notification in an array, the step of providing the event notification from the array to a process executed by a processor, and the step of providing an alternative title from the array to the process. Accord Inst. Dec. 57.” slip op. at 33
Patent outcomesUS 8,402,179 not shown unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 8,402,179
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.