- Tanklogix, LLC v. SiteproInstitution deniedPTAB · Oct 10, 2025 · IPR2025-00650 · APJ Sheila F Mcshane · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood that claims 18–32 and 34 were unpatentable over Kahn or Kahn and Gutierrez.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“information presented in the petition . . . and any response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2024). Upon consideration of the Petition, the Preliminary Response, and the evidence of record, we determine that Petitioner has not established a reasonable likelihood of prevailing with respect to the unpatentability of at least one claim of the ’871 patent. Accordingly, for the reasons that follow, we decline to institute an inter partes review of claims 18–32 and 34 of the ’871 patent.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner
“The respective proposed levels of qualifications for a person of ordinary skill in the art are similar, with Patent Owner proposing two years of experience compared to Petitioner proposing significant experience with remotely controlling fluid-handling devices, like SCADA systems. Patent Owner also proposes more extensive experience in lieu of educational experience. While we find Petitioner’s proposed qualifications to be acceptable, we adopt Patent Owner’s proposed qualifications for the purposes of this Decision because they offer a wider range of qualifications that nonetheless comport with the level of skill necessary to understand and implement the teachings of the ’871 patent and the asserted prior art. Our analysis and findings herein, however, do not turn on any differences in the qualifications adopted.” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“We determine that we need not expressly construe any claim terms to resolve the parties’ disputes on the current record. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“[W]e need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 10
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“actuators and the remote control of fluid handling devices, including the receipt with the user-interface module of “a user command to actuate an actuator via a presented control interface” (limitation [18.7]) and “account authorized to send commands to remotely control fluid handling devices” (limitation [18.11]). We agree with Patent Owner that the Petition fails to demonstrate that Kahn discloses or teaches these limitations because the evidence does not provide support that there is remote control of fluid handling devices or the use of a user command on a control interface to send a command to a fluid handling device, for instance. Kahn is directed to providing access to fluid sensing data and analyzing and providing visual information on that data, but we do not discern that it teaches or discloses the capability to remotely control fluid handling devices. See, e.g., Ex. 1005, code (54), 1:27–36, 2:50–3:2. More specifically, the Kahn disclosures that Petitioner repeatedly relies upon for allegedly teaching this control are deficient. See Ex. 1005, 10:62–67, 14:35– 15:2, 15:62–16:32; see also Pet. 12–14, 16–18. Kahn discloses that “the communication unit 112B can include on-site alerts such as optical (indicator lights), audible alerts (e.g., alarm sounds), tactile (e.g., vibration of the unit) or can be interfaced to an appropriate control valve for simply shutting off the supply of fluid upon the detection of emergency events, for instance.” Ex. 1005, 10:62–67. Communication unit 112B is part of the local “sensor unit,” wherein the detection conditions determined by the sensor are communicated to remote devices by communication unit 112B. See id. at 3:31–33, 5:62–6:2, 6:27–35, 7:33–37, 13:7–12, Figs. 1A–1C. Kahn discloses that the sensor units, which include communication units 112B, can be located near shut-off valves and can communicate with distant locations. See id. at 11:1–13. There are no disclosures, however, in the above passages that there is remote control of fluid handling devices, that there is a user command on a control interface that actuates an actuator, or that there is a command sent to the facility actuators via a network connection, as required in limitations [18.5]–[18.7] and [18.9]–[18.12], respectively. Rather, the disclosure indicates that the communication unit 112B includes on-site alerts and that the local (non-remote) communication unit 112B can be interfaced with the control valve.” slip op. at 18
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,488,871 - Western Digital Technologies, Inc. v. Godo Kaisha IP Bridge 1Institution deniedPTAB · Oct 8, 2025 · IPR2025-00701 · APJ Sheila F Mcshane · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood that claims 1–14 were obvious over the asserted combinations.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsDenied
“Institution of an inter partes review is authorized by statute when “the information presented in the petition . . . and any response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2018). Upon consideration of the Petition, the Preliminary Response, and the evidence of record, we determine that Petitioner has not established a reasonable likelihood of prevailing with respect to the unpatentability of at least one claim of the ’138 patent. Accordingly, for the reasons that follow, we decline to institute an inter partes review of claims 1–14 of the ’138 patent.” slip op. at 2
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Petitioner states that “the claim terms should be given their plain and ordinary meaning and no claim construction is necessary to find the claims unpatentable.” Pet. 6. Patent Owner does not address claim construction. See generally Prelim. Resp. We determine that we need not expressly construe any claim terms to resolve the parties’ disputes on the current record. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“[W]e need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 8
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedOther
“a Ph.D. or master’s degree in electrical engineering, physics, materials science, or a related field, and at least one year or four years, respectively, of experience in the research, design, and/or development of magnetic/spintronic devices, or the equivalent. Pet. 8 (citing Ex. 1024 ¶¶ 25–29). Petitioner contends that less work experience can be compensated for by a higher level of experience and vice versa. Id. (citing Ex. 1024 ¶ 25). Petitioner also asserts that the proposed level of skill would be the same under any of the United States, Japanese, or PCT application dates. Id. at 8–9 (citing Ex. 1024 ¶¶ 24–25). Patent Owner does not challenge Petitioner’s proposed level of qualifications for one of ordinary skill in the art. Prelim. Resp. 20. At this stage of the proceeding, we adopt Petitioner’s assessment of the level of skill in the art, which is consistent with the ’138 patent and the asserted prior art of record.” slip op. at 7
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“As discussed above, Petitioner relies upon Parkin, and its layers 115 and 175, as the claimed first and second ferromagnetic material layers, respectively. See Pet. 10, 16. Petitioner admits that these layers are 8 In the Petition, Petitioner refers to the lower electrode “ferromagnetic layer 110’ as discussed in Claim 1[a]” in the discussion of limitation 1[d]. Pet. 18. Petitioner’s reference to “layer 110’” appears to be in error because the Petition’s discussion for limitation 1[a] refers to layer 115 of Parkin, as does Dr. Bokor’s testimony related to limitations 1[a] and 1[d]. Pet. 10; Ex. 1024 ¶¶ 109, 136. amorphous, but contends that, as Parkin discloses, these layers may be annealed. Id. at 17. Petitioner, however, refers to Parkin’s disclosure that only “a portion of the storage layer 175” is crystallized after annealing. Id. at 17–18 (citing Ex. 1062, 18:51–55) (emphasis added). Petitioner also relies upon Parkin’s “thin crystalline ferromagnetic layer” that is crystallized to teach limitation 1[d]. Id. at 18 (citing Ex. 1062, 18:55–59; Ex. 1024 ¶¶ 131–132) (emphasis added). Dr. Bokor additionally testifies that it is “Parkin’s ‘thin crystalline ferromagnetic layer’ of CoFeB” that meets the “entirely crystallized” requirement of limitation 1[d]. Ex. 1024 ¶ 132. Parkin, however, states that a thin crystalline ferromagnetic layer is formed, but “the bulk of storage layer 175 remains amorphous.” Ex. 1062, 18:55–60 (emphasis added). Petitioner fails to reconcile how its assertions that the first and second ferromagnetic layers, which are mapped to the totality of layers of 115 and 175, meet the limitation that the first and second ferromagnetic layers are each “entirely crystallized” when Petitioner relies only a thin layer, that is, a portion, of the 115 and 175 layers for the teaching that the respective layers are entirely crystallized. Put another way, Petitioner’s mapping is inconsistent: Petitioner relies upon the full depth of certain “layers” of Parkin for the teaching of the ferromagnetic layers, but then only relies upon thin portion of that depth for the assertion that the “layers” are entirely crystallized.” slip op. at 16
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,367,138 - Cradlepoint, Inc. / Honeywell International, Inc. et al. v. Sisvel S.P.A.No claims unpatentablePTAB · Sep 29, 2025 · IPR2021-00580 · APJ Monica S Ullagaddi · IPR · Remand
On remand, the Board held claims 1–10 not shown unpatentable under the Sachs anticipation and obviousness grounds because Sachs did not disclose the required timer stopping, and the new theories were not considered.
RulingsRemand decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Whether Mr. Bates is a Person of Ordinary Skill in the Art In the Final Written Decision, we adopted Petitioner’s definition because “there does not appear to be a dispute that needs to be resolved.” FWD 8. Here, where Mr. Bates’ qualifications are challenged, we have reviewed the complete record including the parties’ arguments on remand and we find that Mr. Bates does not meet the requirements for a person of ordinary skill in the art according to Petitioner’s definition for level of ordinary skill in the art, which we adopted (see FWD 8). Notably, the panel adopted Petitioner’s definition of the level of ordinary skill in the Institution Decision (Paper 16, 8), and neither party challenged that determination during the trial, although Patent Owner did offer its own definition (PO Resp. 9). Mr. Bates has one degree: “a bachelor’s degree in Business Management.” Ex. 2001 ¶ 7. A degree in Business Management is not “a degree in electrical engineering or a similar discipline.” Pet. 35 (emphasis added). Accordingly, we disregard the testimony of Mr. Bates in rendering our findings and conclusions in this Decision. We note that, even if we did consider Mr. Bates’s testimony, the findings and conclusions rendered in this Decision would not change.” slip op. at 12
- Expert testimonyPatent owner expert discountedDecided for petitioner
“cover for his lack of education.” Pet. Remand Br. 4. Patent Owner disagrees and argues, inter alia, that “Mr. Bates was a pioneer in the cellular telecommunications field with more than five decades of practical and teaching experience.” PO Remand Resp. 5 (citing Ex. 2001 ¶¶ 8–23) (emphasis omitted); see id. at 3–4, 6. Whether Mr. Bates is a Person of Ordinary Skill in the Art In the Final Written Decision, we adopted Petitioner’s definition because “there does not appear to be a dispute that needs to be resolved.” FWD 8. Here, where Mr. Bates’ qualifications are challenged, we have reviewed the complete record including the parties’ arguments on remand and we find that Mr. Bates does not meet the requirements for a person of ordinary skill in the art according to Petitioner’s definition for level of ordinary skill in the art, which we adopted (see FWD 8). Notably, the panel adopted Petitioner’s definition of the level of ordinary skill in the Institution Decision (Paper 16, 8), and neither party challenged that determination during the trial, although Patent Owner did offer its own definition (PO Resp. 9). Mr. Bates has one degree: “a bachelor’s degree in Business Management.” Ex. 2001 ¶ 7. A degree in Business Management is not “a degree in electrical engineering or a similar discipline.” Pet. 35 (emphasis added). Accordingly, we disregard the testimony of Mr. Bates in rendering our findings and conclusions in this Decision. We note that, even if we did consider Mr. Bates’s testimony, the findings and conclusions rendered in this Decision would not change.” slip op. at 12
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for patent owner
“C. Claim Construction The Federal Circuit determined that “the plain and unambiguous language of claim 1 requires that a method, to come within the claim, must perform both limitations 1[c] and 1[d] where their preconditions apply.” Sierra Wireless, 130 F.4th at 1022. We interpret the claims and analyze Petitioner’s unpatentability arguments under the Federal Circuit’s determination.” slip op. at 13
- Strike new argumentNew argument disregardedDecided for patent owner
“Petitioner was on notice, when Patent Owner’s Response was filed at the latest, that claim 1 could be construed as unconditionally requiring both limitations 1[c] and 1[d]. Indeed, Petitioner contended that it had shown both limitations “in single references.” Pet. Reply 5. Petitioner now seeks to shift its unpatentability contentions for limitation 1[c] from Figure 5 of Sachs to Figures 6 and 7. Petitioner’s new reliance on Figures 6 and 7 of Sachs is “a meaningfully distinct contention” from its position in both the Petition and the Reply. See Ariosa Diagnostics v. Verinata Health, Inc., 805 F.3d 1359, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2015). We therefore find that Petitioner impermissibly presents new theories of unpatentability on remand. 3. Independent Claim 1 We decline to address Petitioner’s new theories of unpatentability proposed on remand concerning Sachs’s Figure 7. See Pet. Remand Br. 15– 20. Although Petitioner cites pages 59–61 of the Petition as discussing Figure 7 of Sachs (see Pet. Remand Br. 15), the cited discussion concerns dependent claims 5 and 10, not independent claims 1 and 8.” slip op. at 17
Patent outcomesUS 7,869,396 not shown unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 7,869,396 - Skullcandy, Inc. v. Earin ABInstitution deniedPTAB · Sep 15, 2025 · IPR2025-00690 · APJ Monica S Ullagaddi · IPR · Director review
The Board denied institution because the petition did not show a reasonable likelihood that claims 20 and 21 were unpatentable on any asserted obviousness ground.
RulingsDirector review decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“review. See 35 U.S.C. § 314 (2018); 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2023). The standard for instituting an inter partes review is set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), which provides that an inter partes review may not be instituted “unless the Director determines . . . there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” Having considered the parties’ arguments and the evidence of record, we determine that, for the reasons discussed herein, Petitioner does not demonstrate a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail with respect to at least one of the challenged claims. We thus decline to institute an inter partes review on all challenged claims on all asserted grounds. See SAS Inst., Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1354, 1359–60 (2018).” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“may be considered, including the “type of problems encountered in the art; prior art solutions to those problems; rapidity with which innovations are made; sophistication of the technology; and educational level of active workers in the field.” In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (citing Custom Accessories, Inc. v. Jeffrey–Allan Indus., Inc., 807 F.2d 955, 962 (Fed.Cir.1986)).” slip op. at 7
- BurdenNot shown unpatentable
“Analysis of the Parties’ Contentions We agree with Patent Owner that the Petition is conclusory––the Cooperstock Declaration merely reiterates the position set forth in the Petition and does not provide sufficient detail or explanation of why Olodort’s “low power state” would have been understood by a POSITA to mean that “existing connections to a second wireless earbud and to a wireless audio streaming host device will be disconnected,” as recited in claim 20. 37 C.F.R. § 42.65(a) (“Expert testimony that does not disclose the underlying facts or data on which the opinion is based is entitled to little or no weight.”); see Pet. 23–24; Ex. 1007 ¶¶ 84–87. We further agree that claim 38 is not directed to entering “a standby mode” as it recites “the low power state is a standby mode from which the second earpiece is awakened in response to detecting that the second earpiece has been attached to an ear.” Ex. 1002, claim 38 (emphasis added). As such, we agree with Patent Owner that Olodort’s “claim 38 contains no disclosure concerning what happens to ‘existing connections’ when exiting, let alone entering, the ‘standby mode.’” See Prelim. Resp. 9 (citing Ex. 1002, claims 32, 34, 38). We further agree with Patent Owner that the Cooperstock Declaration in paragraphs 86 and 87 sets forth an alternative obviousness theory “based on a modification to Olodort to add ‘circuitry for disconnecting the earbuds from one another and from any wireless audio streaming host device when in the low power state’” that is improperly incorporated by reference into the Petition. Prelim. Resp. 10–11 (emphasis added) (citing 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3) (A petition for inter partes review “may be considered only if . . . the petition identifies, in writing and with particularity . . . the evidence that supports the grounds for challenged to each claim.”); 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(4) (“The petition must specify where each element of the claim is found in the prior art patents or printed publications relied upon.”); 37 C.F.R. § 42.6(a)(3) (“Arguments must not be incorporated by reference from one document into another.”)). As such, we need not and do not consider this alternative obviousness theory.” slip op. at 18
- Expert testimonyDecided for patent owner
“Analysis of the Parties’ Contentions We agree with Patent Owner that the Petition is conclusory––the Cooperstock Declaration merely reiterates the position set forth in the Petition and does not provide sufficient detail or explanation of why Olodort’s “low power state” would have been understood by a POSITA to mean that “existing connections to a second wireless earbud and to a wireless audio streaming host device will be disconnected,” as recited in claim 20. 37 C.F.R. § 42.65(a) (“Expert testimony that does not disclose the underlying facts or data on which the opinion is based is entitled to little or no weight.”); see Pet. 23–24; Ex. 1007 ¶¶ 84–87. We further agree that claim 38 is not directed to entering “a standby mode” as it recites “the low power state is a standby mode from which the second earpiece is awakened in response to detecting that the second earpiece has been attached to an ear.” Ex. 1002, claim 38 (emphasis added). As such, we agree with Patent Owner that Olodort’s “claim 38 contains no disclosure concerning what happens to ‘existing connections’ when exiting, let alone entering, the ‘standby mode.’” See Prelim. Resp. 9 (citing Ex. 1002, claims 32, 34, 38). We further agree with Patent Owner that the Cooperstock Declaration in paragraphs 86 and 87 sets forth an alternative obviousness theory “based on a modification to Olodort to add ‘circuitry for disconnecting the earbuds from one another and from any wireless audio streaming host device when in the low power state’” that is improperly incorporated by reference into the Petition. Prelim. Resp. 10–11 (emphasis added) (citing 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3) (A petition for inter partes review “may be considered only if . . . the petition identifies, in writing and with particularity . . . the evidence that supports the grounds for challenged to each claim.”); 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(4) (“The petition must specify where each element of the claim is found in the prior art patents or printed publications relied upon.”); 37 C.F.R. § 42.6(a)(3) (“Arguments must not be incorporated by reference from one document into another.”)). As such, we need not and do not consider this alternative obviousness theory.” slip op. at 18
§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,402,120 - PTAB · Aug 26, 2025 · IPR2025-00437 · APJ Mitchell G Weatherly · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR of claims 1–19 on all grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that Wang anticipates claim 1.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Owner”) did not file a Preliminary Response on the merits of patentability. Institution of an inter partes review is authorized by statute when “the information presented in the petition filed under section 311 and any response filed under section 313 shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Based on our review of the record,1 we conclude that Petitioner is reasonably likely to prevail with respect to at least one of the challenged claims.” slip op. at 2
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Instituted
“A claim is anticipated only if each and every element as set forth in the claim is found, either expressly or inherently described, in a single prior art reference.” Verdegaal Bros., Inc. v. Union Oil Co. of Cal., 814 F.2d 628, 631 (Fed. Cir. 1987). slip op. at 5
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“35 U.S.C. § 282(b), including construing the claim in accordance with the ordinary and customary meaning of such claim as understood by one of ordinary skill in the art and the prosecution history pertaining to the patent.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b). When applying that standard, we interpret the claim language as it would have been understood by one of ordinary skill in the art in light of the specification. Wasica Fin. GmbH v. Cont’l Auto. Sys., Inc., 853 F.3d 1272, 1279–80 (Fed. Cir. 2017). Thus, we give claim terms their ordinary and customary meaning as understood by an ordinarily skilled artisan. See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312–13 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). Only terms that are in controversy need to be construed, and then only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy. Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017). Petitioner contends that “no special constructions are required.” Pet. 10. We agree and do not expressly construe any claim term.” slip op. at 4
Claim construction§ 102 anticipationcites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 10,788,690 - Cambridge Industries USA, Inc. v. Applied Optoelectronics, Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Aug 26, 2025 · IPR2025-00436 · APJ Mitchell G Weatherly · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood that Mizobuchi or Akashi anticipates any of claims 1–17.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“Institution of an inter partes review is authorized by statute when “the information presented in the petition filed under section 311 and any response filed under section 313 shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Based on our review of the record, we conclude that Petitioner is reasonably likely to prevail with respect to at least one challenged claim.” slip op. at 2
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“All independent claims recite “a light engine driving circuit disposed on the substrate.” Ex. 1001, 9:59 (claim 1), 10:64 (claim 12), 12:7 (claim 15). Petitioner contends that “Mizobuchi discloses a light engine driving circuit disposed on the substrate that includes a clock data recovery (“CDR”) circuit and a power supply circuit.” See Pet. 19 (citing Ex. 1006, 3:57–4:18, 12:27–41, Figs. 2, 3A; Ex. 1003 ¶ 76 while addressing limitation 1d); see also id. at 26–28 (addressing claims 12 and 15 by cross-referencing showing for claim 1). Petitioner identifies the driving circuit on Mizobuchi’s “first circuit board” 2 in the annotated version of Mizobuchi’s Figure 2, reproduced below. See Pet. 19.” slip op. at 5
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Petitioner contends that the Board may find it necessary to interpret “feedthrough device,” “interconnect device,” and “opposing arrangement.” Pet. 8–11. Patent Owner responds to Petitioner’s proposed interpretations of these terms, but contends that the Board need not interpret them to determine whether to institute review. Prelim. Resp. 17–18. For reasons that become apparent below, we agree with Patent Owner and do not expressly construe these terms. B. Legal Standards” slip op. at 4
Claim construction§ 102 anticipationcites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 10,313,024 - Cambridge Industries USA, Inc. v. Applied Optoelectronics, Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Jul 29, 2025 · IPR2025-00434 · APJ Monica S Ullagaddi · IPR · Institution
Institution was denied for claims 1–7 because the Petition did not show a reasonable likelihood that either Shen or Soldano anticipates any challenged claim.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“The standard for institution is set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 314, which provides that an inter partes review may not be instituted unless the information presented in the Petition and the Preliminary Response shows that “there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314 (2019); see also 37 C.F.R § 42.4(a) (2019) (“The Board institutes the trial on behalf of the Director.”). Upon consideration of the parties’ contentions and the evidence of record, we conclude that Petitioner has not established a reasonable likelihood of prevailing in demonstrating the unpatentability of at least one challenged claim of the ’301 patent. Accordingly, we deny Petitioner’s request and do not institute an inter partes review.” slip op. at 2
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“C. Claim Construction We interpret a claim “using the same claim construction standard that would be used to construe the claim in a civil action under 35 U.S.C. 282(b).” 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b). Under this standard, we construe the claim “in accordance with the ordinary and customary meaning of such claim as understood by one of ordinary skill in the art and the prosecution history pertaining to the patent.” Id.” slip op. at 8
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“onset to show with particularity why the patent it challenges is unpatentable.” Harmonic Inc. v. Avid Tech., Inc., 815 F.3d 1356, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citing 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3)). “A claim is anticipated only if each and every element as set forth in the claim is found, either expressly or inherently described, in a single prior art reference.” Verdegaal Bros., Inc. v. Union Oil Co. of California, 814 F.2d 628, 631 (Fed. Cir. 1987). We analyze” slip op. at 7
Claim construction§ 102 anticipationPatents in suitUS 10,379,301 - Abbott Laboratories / Abbott Diabetes Care Inc. v. Altivera LLCAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Jul 15, 2025 · IPR2024-00425 · APJ Bach V Hoang · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–3, 5, 9, and 10 are unpatentable as obvious over Beck, Heller, and Lovejoy; the Board did not reach the alternative Bandy grounds.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Patent Owner does not dispute this assessment. See generally PO Resp. Having considered the record, we adopt Petitioner’s proposed level of skill, as articulated above. We are satisfied that Petitioner’s proposal comports with the level of skill necessary to understand and implement the teachings of the ’307 Patent. Accord Inst. Dec. 8–9.” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for petitioner
“both the unique sensor ID as well as the associated unique wireless device ID is contradicted, or at least unsupported, by the claim language and the Specification. We determine that this limitation does not require authentication of both the unique sensor ID and the unique wireless device ID, or otherwise require authentication using the unique wireless ID. Rather, the limitation only requires authentication of the unique sensor ID. The language and structure of the claim itself, “the remote server authenticates said unique sensor ID associated with said unique wireless device ID,” requires authentication of the unique sensor ID but not the unique wireless device ID. See Ex. 1001, 19:51–52 (emphasis added). The portion of the limitation reciting “associated with said unique wireless device ID” is linguistically an appositive modifying the “unique sensor ID.” Indeed, Patent Owner acknowledges the “plain meaning of the claim term is that the remote server authenticates the unique sensor ID and that such unique sensor ID is associated with a unique wireless device ID.” PO Resp. 18.” slip op. at 10
- Claim Construction › Functional claiming / §112(f) means-plus-function › Whether §112(f) applies (Williamson, nonce words)§112(f) appliesDecided for petitioner
“Patent Owner does not contest Petitioner’s proposed constructions of any of these other claim terms or phrases. PO Resp. 24. We agree with the parties that the identified limitations—which each recite a “means” or “means for” performing a particular function—are means-plus-function limitations that should be interpreted under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 6. See Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC, 792 F.3d 1339, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc) (holding that “use of the word ‘means’ creates a presumption that § 112, ¶ 6 applies”). And we agree with Petitioner’s uncontested identification of the recited functions and corresponding structure for these limitations for the reasons explained by Petitioner. See Pet. 11–15 (citing Ex. 1001, 2:20–21, 2:24–28, 3:33–36, 17:18–30); id. at 13–15 (citing Ex. 1009, 9:4–6, 9:19–20, 9:57–65, 10:10– 11) (explaining that Lovejoy is incorporated by reference into the ’307 Patent). We adopt the uncontested constructions identified by Petitioner, as” slip op. at 15
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner
“We agree with Petitioner that the improvements offered by the incorporation of Heller’s teachings would have motivated one of ordinary skill in the art to combine the teachings of Beck and Heller in the manner proposed by Petitioner. Confirming Petitioner’s assertion that the combination yields improvements, Heller states that it improves the type of glucose monitor used in one of Beck’s embodiments. Beck states that its “medical device 130 includes a glucose meter” which “measure[s] blood glucose levels of blood applied to test strips.” Ex. 1007 ¶ 34. Specifically addressing such “conventional” test strip glucose monitoring, Heller states that its in vivo glucose sensor system addresses a need for continuous or automatic monitoring in a small, comfortable device. Ex. 1016, 2:1–7, 2:15–58, 3:19–25. As such, we agree that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to combine the teachings of Beck and Heller to improve Beck’s medical device. See KSR, 550 U.S. at 401. We further agree with Petitioner that a POSITA would have been motivated to incorporate sensor implementation details described in Heller, e.g., an A/D converter and patient attachment systems, with Beck’s medical device. Pet. 44–45, 53, 55; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 228, 234, 236–238, 259, 267, 278, which do no more than yield predictable results, e.g., converting signals or attaching a sensor to a patient. See KSR, 550 U.S. at 401 (“[A] combination of familiar elements according to known methods is likely to be obvious when it does no more than yield predictable results.”).” slip op. at 20
Patent outcomesUS 7,969,307 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSRPatents in suitUS 7,969,307 - Interactive Communications International, Inc. v. Blackhawk Network Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Jul 14, 2025 · IPR2024-00465 · APJ Bart A Gerstenblith · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–24 are unpatentable: claims 1–10 and 12–24 as obvious over Szrek and Llach, and claim 11 as obvious over Szrek, Llach, and Gilmore.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level board ownDecided for petitioner
“B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner proposes that the level of ordinary skill in the art is an artisan with a working knowledge of POS activation systems and lottery systems that was gained through a mixture of training and work experience in the relevant field such as (i) having a Bachelor’s degree in computer science, computer communications, electrical engineering, or equivalent degree, coupled with at least three years of work experience; (ii) having a Master’s degree in computer science, computer communications, or electrical engineering, but having less work experience; or (iii) having no formal degree, but having experience in the relevant field of at least six years of work experience. Pet. 2–3 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 13–14).9 Patent Owner states that, “[f]or the purpose of this proceeding, Patent Owner adopts the Petition’s proposed definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art.” PO Resp. 19 (citing Pet. 2–3). We find that the parties’ agreed-upon level of ordinary skill in the art is consistent with the level of ordinary skill in the art reflected by the ’451 patent and the prior art of record. See Inst. Dec. 14; see Okajima v. 9 Petitioner proposes the same level of ordinary skill in the art that the Board adopted in PGR2020-00084 (Pet. 2–3 (citing Ex. 1008, 11)), and IPR2023- 01235 (see IPR2023-01235, Paper 34 at 12–13). Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001); In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995); In re Oelrich, 579 F.2d 86, 91 (CCPA 1978). Therefore, we adopt the parties’ agreed-upon level of ordinary skill in the art, as articulated above, in our consideration of the issues presently before us.” slip op. at 13
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached
“We need not construe “transaction processor” expressly because its meaning is not in dispute and its construction is not necessary to resolve the controversy before us.” slip op. at 16
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner
“On balance, we find that even with the alleged disadvantages identified by Patent Owner, one of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to modify Szrek with Llach’s third-party transaction processor because the advantage of having a “centralized intermediary” allows Szrek’s system to support different game providers, such as different lottery companies, which would reduce some implementation costs and allow the system to be more easily and cheaply extended. Pet. 47 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 181); see Medichem, S.A. v. Rolabo, S.L., 437 F.3d 1157, 1165 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“a given course of action often has simultaneous advantages and disadvantages, and this does not necessarily obviate motivation to combine”) (citing Winner Int’l Royalty Corp. v. Wang, 202 F.3d 1340, 1349 n.8 (Fed. Cir. 2000)); see also Intel Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 21 F.4th 784, 795 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (stating the same). We acknowledge that the combination comes with some disadvantages, including “add[ed] delay, reduce[d] efficiency, and . . . implementation complexities by converting a simple, direct communication exchange into an exchange that traverses multiple systems.” PO Resp. 52 (citing Ex. 2052 ¶ 163). But, “[t]he fact that the motivating benefit comes at the expense of another benefit, however, should not nullify its use as a basis to modify the disclosure of one reference with the teachings of another. Instead, the benefits, both lost and gained, should be weighed against one another.” Winner, 202 F.3d at 1349 n.8. Here, Szrek expressly teaches indirect communication as a possible implementation of its system and Petitioner’s combination—employing Llach’s third-party transaction processor as part of the indirect communication channel—offers the attractive benefit of allowing Szrek’s system to support different game providers, which would reduce some implementation costs even if it might increase other costs, e.g., by having to program certain components (e.g., the cash registers) differently. Specifically, we find that the ability to expand Szrek’s system to support different game providers provides advantages that outweigh the disadvantages discussed above in the circumstance where one desires a more robust and comprehensive system. See Pet. Reply 23 (noting three advantages of the combination— (1) “allow[ing] Szrek’s system to use ‘a centralized system for activating lottery tickets from different retailers and different locations,’” (2) “allow[ing] support for different game providers, such as different lottery companies,” “reduc[ing] implementation costs,” and (3) “allow[ing] Szrek’s system to ‘communicate with individual card” slip op. at 37
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of success › HindsightMotivation foundDecided for petitioner
“On balance, we find that even with the alleged disadvantages identified by Patent Owner, one of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to modify Szrek with Llach’s third-party transaction processor because the advantage of having a “centralized intermediary” allows Szrek’s system to support different game providers, such as different lottery companies, which would reduce some implementation costs and allow the system to be more easily and cheaply extended. Pet. 47 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 181); see Medichem, S.A. v. Rolabo, S.L., 437 F.3d 1157, 1165 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“a given course of action often has simultaneous advantages and disadvantages, and this does not necessarily obviate motivation to combine”) (citing Winner Int’l Royalty Corp. v. Wang, 202 F.3d 1340, 1349 n.8 (Fed. Cir. 2000)); see also Intel Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 21 F.4th 784, 795 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (stating the same). We acknowledge that the combination comes with some disadvantages, including “add[ed] delay, reduce[d] efficiency, and . . . implementation complexities by converting a simple, direct communication exchange into an exchange that traverses multiple systems.” PO Resp. 52 (citing Ex. 2052 ¶ 163). But, “[t]he fact that the motivating benefit comes at the expense of another benefit, however, should not nullify its use as a basis to modify the disclosure of one reference with the teachings of another. Instead, the benefits, both lost and gained, should be weighed against one another.” Winner, 202 F.3d at 1349 n.8. Here, Szrek expressly teaches indirect communication as a possible implementation of its system and Petitioner’s combination—employing Llach’s third-party transaction processor as part of the indirect communication channel—offers the attractive benefit of allowing Szrek’s system to support different game providers, which would reduce some implementation costs even if it might increase other costs, e.g., by having to program certain components (e.g., the cash registers) differently. Specifically, we find that the ability to expand Szrek’s system to support different game providers provides advantages that outweigh the disadvantages discussed above in the circumstance where one desires a more robust and comprehensive system. See Pet. Reply 23 (noting three advantages of the combination— (1) “allow[ing] Szrek’s system to use ‘a centralized system for activating lottery tickets from different retailers and different locations,’” (2) “allow[ing] support for different game providers, such as different lottery companies,” “reduc[ing] implementation costs,” and (3) “allow[ing] Szrek’s system to ‘communicate with individual card” slip op. at 37
Patent outcomesUS 11,488,451 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,488,451 - Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. v. Sionyx, LLCInstitution deniedPTAB · Jun 6, 2025 · IPR2025-00065 · APJ Brian D Range · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution of IPR challenging claims 1–44 under § 314(a), finding the Fintiv factors favoring denial outweighed the Petition’s strong merits.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Institution denied fintivInstitution denied
“stipulation would only eliminate the District Court’s consideration of Haddad204. Despite the stipulation, the District Court would still have to consider invalidity of every claim the Petition addresses and would still have to consider the Alie, Baggenstoss, and Park references. Cf. Stellar at 4 (“Petitioner’s invalidity arguments in the district court are more expansive and include combinations of the prior art asserted in these proceedings with unpublished system prior art, which Petitioner’s stipulation is not likely to moot.”). In other words, “Petitioner’s stipulation does not ensure that [this proceeding] would be a ‘true alternative’ to the district court proceeding.” Id. at 3–4. Because of the remaining overlap between the Petition and the District Court proceeding, Fintiv factor four weighs strongly in favor of discretionary denial.” slip op. at 15
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundOther
“for back side illumination (BSI), which appears to teach or suggest a textured region with surface features “located on the light incident side of the semiconductor layer and configured to interact with incident [EMR].” Pet. 22–27 (citing Ex. 1006, Fig. 5, ¶¶ 53, 68, 96; Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 39–40, 88–95, 101–107). As Petitioner and its expert explain, a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to modify Figure 5 of Alie into a BSI device because BSI devices allow more incident light to reach the semiconductor layer, resulting in more light being absorbed, an increase in the quantum efficiency, and an improvement in the signal to noise ratio. Pet. 25–26 (citing Ex. 1006 ¶¶ 68, 70; Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 39–40, 92, 95). Patent Owner argues that Alie does teach, suggest, or disclose “a textured region comprising a plurality of shallow trench isolation features.” Prelim. Resp. 9–11. But it appears Petitioner has at least shown Alie teaches or suggests this element. See discussion supra. Patent Owner further argues that Petitioner fails to present any proof that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to modify Figure 5 of Alie into a BSI device. Id. at 11–15. But, in our view, Petitioner has provided an adequate motivation to modify Alie—so that more light will be absorbed, yielding an increase in the quantum efficiency and an improvement in the signal to noise” slip op. at 18
- Parallel petitionsNot reached
“17 Petitioner filed petitions for IPR2025-00064 and IPR2025-00065 at the same time. Both petitions address the ’682 patent but apply different art. Patent Owner also argues the second petition (IPR2025-00065) should be denied because one petition is sufficient. Patent Owner’s Response to Petitioner’s Notice Ranking Parallel Petitions, Paper 11. Because we deny institution based on Fintiv discretion, it is not necessary to reach Patent Owner’s multiple petition argument.” slip op. at 20
§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites KSRPatents in suitUS 10,347,682
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.