- Trove Brands, LLC v. Camelbak Products, LLCSome claims unpatentablePTAB · Jun 2, 2026 · IPR2025-00140 · APJ Carl M Defranco · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–6 are unpatentable as obvious; claims 7–18 were not shown unpatentable because Ribarits does not disclose a mouthpiece disposed on the pivotal mount.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Trove contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have had an undergraduate degree in mechanical engineering or equivalent coursework, and a year or more of experience in designing, prototyping, and/or manufacturing fluid containers or similar products” and that “[m]ore work experience may substitute for a lower level of education, and vice versa.” Pet. 15 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 25). While CamelBak offers “a similar, though slightly different level,” it nonetheless “discerns no material difference between the definitions provided by the parties for purposes of the Board’s decision in this proceeding.” PO Resp. 27. That being the case, we adopt Trove’s proposed definition of the level of skill in the art, as it is 2 JP 2002-211613A, published July 31, 2002 (Ex. 1004, “Nakajima”). 3 WO 2004/063042 A2, published July 29, 2004 (Ex. 1006, “Ribarits”). 4 US 4,485,963, issued Dec. 4, 1984 (Ex. 1007, “Panicci”). 5 US 6,523,711 B1, issued Feb. 25, 2003 (Ex. 1008, “Hughes”). reasonable and consistent with what is reflected in the asserted prior art and the specification of the ’250 patent. B. Claim Construction” slip op. at 7
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner
“We will not bite. CamelBak’s original assertion—that the plain and ordinary meaning of the constituent parts of “mouth” and “piece” is “a piece (or part) that goes in the mouth”—underscores the fallacy of CamelBak’s additional physical contact requirement. PO Resp. 28 (emphasis added). Indeed, in support of that earlier assertion, CamelBak pointed to the very dictionary definition that we relied on at institution in construing “mouthpiece” as a part that either “goes in the mouth or to which the mouth is applied.” See id. at 31 (citing Ex. 2005 (emphasis added)). Even the original testimony of CamelBak’s own expert confirms that one skilled in the art “would understand that the term ‘mouthpiece’ is commonly known in the art as a part designed for a user’s mouth,” without any requirement for physical contact with the mouth. Ex. 2016 ¶ 58 (citing Ex. 2005) (emphasis added)). And nothing in the Specification limits that common understanding. Although, indisputably, the Specification contemplates an embodiment where the user physically contacts the mouthpiece with their teeth (i.e., a bite-actuated mouthpiece), it also contemplates an embodiment where the user simply inserts the bottle in their mouth and commences fluid flow by squeezing it. See Ex. 1001, 10:9–13. That disclosure supports a meaning of “mouthpiece” that simply requires placement in the opening of the user’s mouth without necessarily incurring physical contact with some portion of the mouth, such as the teeth, tongue, or lips. Indeed, had CamelBak wished to premise the meaning of “mouthpiece” on some sort of physical contact with the mouth, it knew how to do so. For instance, the independent claims of CamelBak’s earlier ’255 patent, which is the subject of the related 1137 IPR, are limited in just such a manner, as they recite “wherein the resilient mouthpiece is adapted to resiliently compress responsive to compressive forces applied to the resilient mouthpiece by a user’s teeth.” Ex. 2023, at 20–25 (emphasis added). Thus, we reject CamelBak’s attempt to narrow our construction of “mouthpiece” to something other than “a part (as of an instrument) that goes in the mouth or to which the mouth is applied.” Neither the intrinsic nor extrinsic evidence supports the narrower construction proposed by CamelBak.” slip op. at 11
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner
“In reply, Trove argues that CamelBak’s “novel” construction that the mouthpiece moves with rotational motion about that same axis of rotation defined by the two joint as the pivotal mount and in the same direction as the pivotal mount “are inconsistent with the claim language’s plain and ordinary meaning and find no support in the intrinsic and extrinsic record.” See Pet. Reply 16. But, because we find that, when properly construed, the claimed “pivotal movement with the pivotal mount” about “two joints that define a pivotal axis” requires that the mouthpiece rotate about the same axis and in the same direction as the pivotal mount, we reject Trove’s argument as unavailing. And, although we agree with Trove that Nakajima’s mouthpiece engages in counter-clockwise rotation about a “Second Pivot Axis” when Nakajima’s lid 4 is opened (id. at 20–22), that rotation is about a different axis—one defined by Nakajima’s protrusions 24 rather than the claimed “pivotal axis” defined by Nakajima’s hinge shafts 19—and in a different manner—an upward and counterclockwise path rather than the claimed “pivotal movement with the pivotal mount” defined by Nakajima’s lid 4. Finally, in an alternative theory, Trove and its expert use “image- manipulation tools” in an attempt to show that Nakajima’s mouthpiece engages in some initial “clockwise-rotation” with Nakajima’s lid as it is opened. See Pet. Reply 18–24. We reject that theory as entirely conjectural and unsupported by the evidence.” slip op. at 39
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“We disagree. As discussed above, the proper construction of “for pivotal movement with the pivotal mount” requires that the mouthpiece mirror the rotational movement of the pivotal mount, i.e., rotate about the same axis as the pivotal mount and in the same direction as the pivotal mount. See supra § II.B.3. But Nakajima’s mouthpiece does neither, and, thus, does not exhibit the claimed “pivotal movement with the pivotal mount” about “two joints that define a pivotal axis for . . . the pivotal mount axis,” as properly construed.” slip op. at 36
Patent outcomesUS 11,851,250 mixedClaim construction§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 11,851,250 - Tesla, Inc. v. Charge Fusion Technologies, LLCAll claims unpatentablePTAB · May 13, 2026 · IPR2025-00032 · APJ Mitchell G Weatherly · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–29 are unpatentable as obvious under §103 based on the asserted combinations of prior art.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“understanding of a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention. Graham, 383 U.S. at 17. Petitioner submits that the ordinarily skilled artisan would have at least a bachelor’s degree in electrical or mechanical engineering (or an equivalent field) and at least two years of work experience involving automotive systems, including electric vehicle power management. . . . Additional industry experience or technical training may offset less formal education, while advanced degrees or additional formal education may offset lesser levels of industry experience. Pet. 2 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 30–32). Patent Owner “takes no position with respect to Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill.” PO Resp. 17. For the purposes of our analysis below, we apply Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill, which we find to be consistent with the problems addressed in the ’338 patent and the prior art.” slip op. at 10
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“Initially, we note that “amount of charge” reflects no express limitation on the manner of expressing the “amount” or the “charge.” And the Specification uses both “desired charge percent level” and “desired charge range level” as alternative ways for a user may specify an “amount of 3 As recited in independent claims 10, 19, and 28 charge.” For example, the Specification describes that a user may specify an amount of charge by specifying a desired travel distance as follows: “the user may indicate a desired charging level (and/or a desired charging level may be automatically calculated) based on a desired distance of travel.” Ex. 1001, 19:49–57 (emphasis added). Therefore, “amount of charge” may also refer to a desired mileage or range. Figure 7 further demonstrates that a user may select “amount of charge” in terms of a “percent” or a “range” as shown in Petitioner’s annotated version of the pertinent portion of that figure as shown below.” slip op. at 11
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of success › HindsightMotivation foundDecided for petitioner
“We disagree with Patent Owner. First, Patent Owner’s reliance on Wonderland as announcing a rule having broad effect is misplaced. Patent Owner contends that the “Federal Circuit has confirmed that where the primary reference already includes the function of the secondary reference, an allegation to incorporate that function into the primary reference is improper hindsight and no motivation to combine exists.” Id. at 29 (citing Wonderland NurseryGoods Co. v. Thorley Indus., LLC, 988 F.Supp. 2d 479, 498–99 (W.D. Pa. 2013), aff'd, 644 F. App'x 1011 (Fed. Cir. 2016); citing Kinetic Concepts, Inc. v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., 688 F.3d 1342, 1368 (Fed.Cir.2012))). Patent Owner’s citation to Wonderland does not support the proposition for which it is cited, namely that the Federal Circuit has “confirmed” that incorporating a function from a secondary reference into a primary reference is “improper hindsight” that precludes a motivation to combine teachings from the primary and secondary references. In Wonderland, the district court denied an accused infringer’s motion for summary judgment of invalidity, in part, due to its finding that genuine issues of material fact existed for the issue of whether sufficient motivation to combine prior art existed. Wonderland, 988 F. Supp. 2d at 511. The Wonderland decision does not constitute a final ruling on that issue, and the Federal Circuit’s summary affirmance of the final ruling by the district court does not address the issue or reflect how the issue was resolved at trial. Wonderland NurseryGoods Co. v. Thorley Indus., LLC, 644 F. App’x 1011 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Second, Petitioner also correctly points out that although Ferro refers to wireless charging, it provides no implementation details. Ex. 1004 ¶ 36; Ex. 2003, 54:8–55:9. Ferro also describes manual options for initiating charging, Ex. 1003¶ 146 (citing Ex. 1004 ¶ 109), and that an ordinarily skilled artisan would have been motivated to apply Oyobe’s vehicle sensor to allow a user to initiate Ferro’s charging methods more easily without the user having to leave the vehicle, Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 151, 152. Accordingly, we find that Petitioner has established that an ordinarily skilled artisan would have been motivated to incorporate Oyobe’s use of a sensor to establish presence of a vehicle near a charging station into Ferro’s system.” slip op. at 20
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner
“The test for obviousness is not whether the features of a secondary reference may be bodily incorporated into the structure of the primary reference. . . . Rather, the test is what the combined teachings of the references would have suggested to those of ordinary skill in the art.” MCM Portfolio LLC v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 812 F.3d 1284, 1294 (Fed. Cir. 2015). Patent Owner’s argument fails to account for the level of skill and creativity of an ordinarily skilled artisan, who would have possessed a bachelor’s degree in engineering and could have easily accounted for the differences in scale depicted by Letendre’s and Donnelly’s controls. Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 247–249. Accordingly, we find that Petitioner’s showing on the motivation to combine teachings of Ferro, Donnelly, and Letendre to arrive at limitation 1h is persuasive. slip op. at 30
Patent outcomesUS 11,563,338 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,563,338 - Penumbra, Inc. v. Rapidpulse, Inc.No claims unpatentablePTAB · Feb 17, 2026 · IPR2024-01261 · APJ Jamie T Wisz · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–20 were not shown unpatentable because the asserted combinations did not teach the claimed predetermined cycle for controlling distal fluid flow.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“(1) a person with a B.S. in engineering or an equivalent field, with two-four years of academic or industry experience in aspiration embolectomy and thrombectomy or comparable industry experience who would, where appropriate, work or consult with others, including a physician, to develop embolectomy or thrombectomy devices; or (2) an interventional neurosurgeon with at least three years of experience developing and/or using medical devices in embolectomy or thrombectomy procedures, and who would, where appropriate, work or consult with others, including an engineer, to develop such a medical device. Pet. 11 (citing Ex. 1005 ¶ 48). Petitioner also contends that, “[a] person with less education but more relevant practical experience, or more relevant education but less practical experience, may also meet this standard.” Id. Patent Owner states that for purposes of its PO Response, it “accepts ¶ 44). We adopt Petitioner’s characterization because it is consistent with the level of skill in the art at the time of the invention as reflected by the ’402 patent and the cited prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (explaining that specific findings regarding ordinary skill level are not required “where the prior art itself reflects an appropriate level and a need for testimony is not shown” (quoting Litton Indus. Prods., Inc. v. Solid State Sys. Corp., 755 F.2d 158, 163 (Fed. Cir. 1985))).” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner
“specification explicitly includes sensors similar to those in the prior art in support of their argument that the claimed “predetermined cycle” must not exclude the use of such sensors. Pet. Reply 15 (citing Ex. 1001, 32:55–33:7, 40:66–41:5, 44:9–29). We reviewed the portions of the specification cited by Petitioner. We agree with Patent Owner that one excerpt discussing sensor use appears to be directed to triggering the predetermined cycle rather than causing timing changes during the cycle itself (Ex. 1001, 32:55–66) (describing use of a pressure sensor to “determine when the vacuum channel 3 is clogged by a thrombus and automatically perform the unclogging procedures described herein”), while another excerpt discusses a sensor that Petitioner that the ’402 patent discusses the use of sensors to “tune” the system and that such “tuning” can be done statically (setting the cycle timing in advance) or dynamically (adjusting the timing during the cycle itself). See Ex. 1001, 48:19–49:50. Overall, we find that these disclosures involving sensors demonstrate that sensors may be used in various ways in different embodiments. However, none of these disclosures explicitly discuss the use of sensors in conjunction with a “pre-determined cycle.” Therefore, we find that the ’402 patent specification’s discussion of “sensors” are not particularly informative as to the appropriate construction of a “predetermined cycle” and do not outweigh the other explicit disclosures of “predetermined cycle” in the patent. We next turn to the other intrinsic evidence discussed by the parties — the prosecution history. As discussed by Patent Owner, in the Notice of Allowance, the Examiner found that Garrison did not teach or suggest a “predetermined cycle” because Garrison’s controller “changed the cycle of opening and closing the valves based on feedback from sensors.” Ex. 1004, 86. We acknowledge that the patent applicant filed subsequent comments during prosecution in which they stated that they “do[] not concede that the Examiner’s characterizations of the terms of the claims and the prior art are correct.” Id. at 29. However, we agree with Patent Owner that the importance of the Examiner’s statement in the Notice of Allowance does not rely on it being an express disclaimer (a standard which it does not meet). PO Sur-reply 8. We also considered Petitioner’s contention that the Examiner’s interpretation of Garrison may have been in error (PO Resp. 16); however, even if this were true, the Examiner’s statement still provides helpful insight into how the Examiner was interpreting the term sensors to change the opening and closing of valves during a cycle was not a “predetermined cycle.” Id. at 86. In sum, we find that Patent Owner’s proposed construction is consistent with the usage of the term “predetermined cycle” in the ’402 patent specification and prosecution history. Thus, after considering all of the cited evidence, we construe “predetermined cycle” to mean that “the timing of the sequence of valve operations in the cycle is determined beforehand, i.e., fixed, rather than varying based on feedback after operation begins.”” slip op. at 14
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached
“2. Other Terms The parties also provided proposed constructions for the limitations of “[limited/limiting] to a positive amount of exit flow” and “control[ling] fluid flow in and out from the distal end of the catheter.” See Pet. 15–16; Pet. Reply 1–8; PO Resp. 22–24; PO Sur-Reply 2–6. However, having evaluated the arguments and evidence before us, we determine that construction of these terms is not necessary for purposes of this Decision. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (citing Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“[O]nly those terms need be construed that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.”)).” slip op. at 16
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“We agree with Patent Owner that neither Petitioner nor Mr. Brown propose any combination of Yang and Mullins that does not include Mullins’s pressure sensor in order “to control fluid flow in and out from the distal end of the catheter.” Indeed, in addressing the “predetermined cycle” limitation, Mr. Brown contends that Mullins discloses a “cycling controller that ‘varies aspiration pressure according to sensed pressure within the catheter lumen.’” Ex.1005 ¶¶ 131–32 (citing, e.g., Ex.1008, 27:40–28:20 (“[a] novel aspect of this pump system is the incorporation of feedback into the pump algorithm in order to produce more effective pressure cycling”)). This use of a sensor to change pressure during a cycle, is not a “predetermined cycle” under our construction. combinations is its discussion of distal end flow control, not for its sensors.” Pet. Reply 17 (citing Ex. 1035 ¶ 83). However, Petitioner’s obviousness grounds rely on the combination of Yang and Mullins, especially with regard to Mullins’s disclosure of “a controller” in order “to control fluid flow in and out.” As discussed above, Mullins relies on the sensor-feedback approach in order to control flow and we find that Petitioner has not presented persuasive evidence of how the combined disclosures of Yang and Mullins would control flow without using Mullins’s sensor feedback approach. See W.L. Gore & Assocs., Inc. v. Garlock, Inc., 721 F.2d 1540, 1550 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (error to “consider[] … references in less than their entireties, i.e., in disregarding disclosures in [them] … that diverge from and teach away from the invention”). Therefore, we determine that Petitioner has not sufficiently shown that the combination of Yang and Mullins discloses or renders obvious “a controller configured to open and close the vacuum valve and the vent valve in a predetermined cycle to change a level of vacuum at the distal end of the catheter and to control fluid flow in and out from the distal end of the catheter.” Accordingly, having considered the parties’ respective evidence and arguments, we find that Petitioner has not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that claim 1 of the ’402 patent would have been unpatentable as obvious over the combination of Yang and Mullins.” slip op. at 27
Patent outcomesUS 11,406,402 not shown unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,406,402 - Alpinestars S.P.A. / Alipinestars USA Inc. v. Dainese S.P.A.Rehearing deniedPTAB · Feb 9, 2026 · IPR2025-00750 · APJ Benjamin D M Wood · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied rehearing, leaving institution denied because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on claims 1–22 under the challenged obviousness grounds.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“Petitioner misstates the Decision’s reasoning. As is clear from the previous discussion, we determined that Petitioner’s articulated reasons for combining EP’536 with CN’180 lacked a rational underpinning, not because “EP’536 does not relate to ‘air bags,’” but because the means by which EP’536’s device inflates differs fundamentally from that of CN’180’s device. Dec. 17–18. Petitioner did not acknowledge this critical difference in the Petition, and continues not to do so in its Rehearing Request.” slip op. at 5
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable
“EP’536 with CN’180 lacked a rational underpinning because EP’536’s inflation mechanism differs fundamentally from CN’180’s inflation mechanism. Dec. 17–18. As we stated, whereas CN’180’s fall-protection belt uses an airbag that requires an external source of pressurized air to inflate, EP’536’s garment does not need an external inflation device because “the gas generating agent 18 in each envelope automatically generates gas and inflates the envelopes in response to rising temperatures.” Id. at 18 (citing Ex. 1004 ¶ 15; Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 5, 19). This difference reflects the fundamentally different purposes of the two devices: CN’180’s device is designed to provide “fall protection” to, e.g., “elderly people,” (Ex. 1005 ¶ 1, 3), whereas EP’536’s device provides “adaptive thermal insulation” for, e.g., garments worn by fire fighters. Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 1–3, 250. Because of the different means by which EP’536’s and CN’180’s devices inflate and the different purposes for doing so, we were not persuaded that one of ordinary skill in the art would have combined the references as Petitioner proposed. Dec. 18. We further noted that the modification would not have improved the reusability of EP’536’s device “by having only one mechanism to recharge,” because EP’536’s “gas generating agent does not need any ‘mechanism to recharge.’” Dec. 18. Instead, we noted EP’536’s teaching that its gas generating agent “automatically recombines or condenses in response to a temperature decrease to return the envelopes, and therefore the garment, to its original thickness, at which point the gas generating agent is ready for subsequent reactivation.” Id. (citing Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 139–141). Finally, we determined that replacing EP’536’s envelopes with CN’180’s airbag “would have made EP’536’s invention unsuitable for its intended purpose: providing a protective garment with ‘adaptive thermal insulation.’” Dec. 19. We stated that “Petitioner does not suggest, and we have found nothing in the record to establish, that CN’180’s airbag would provide this feature.” Id. at 20.” slip op. at 3
- Obviousness (§103) › KSR rationalesMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable
“rationales for combining EP’536 and CN’180. Reh’g Req. 6–7. First, Petitioner asserts that we “improperly rejected Petitioner’s ‘simple substitution’ evidence in view of [the Board’s] incorrect conclusion that EP’536 does not disclose an ‘external source of inflation [EP’536’s dosing aids].’” Id. at 6 (citing Dec. 18–19). This argument is unpersuasive at least because, as we discussed above, EP’536’s dosing aids do not constitute an external source of inflation. Petitioner further argues that we incorrectly evaluated its “obvious to try” rationale because, contrary to our analysis, Petitioner did in fact identify a problem to be solved by its “finite number of solutions”: “simplify[ing] the design and reduc[ing] the number of required inflation mechanisms.” Id. at 6–7. The Petition’s entire “obvious to try” discussion is as follows: [A] POSITA would have found it obvious to try a one-piece airbag 10 with strip-shaped inflation units 12 in the EP’536- CN’180 airbag system because it would have been a selection from a finite number of identified predictable solutions (i.e., using one chamber with connected individual inflation units 12 versus multiple individual envelopes 20). 5 Petitioner also argues that dosing aids are “needed in order to make the disclosed device reusable.” Reh’g Req. 5–6. This is incorrect, as EP’536 conveys that the reusability of the device is a result of the gas generating agent condensing or recombining when temperatures fall. Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 139– 141. Even if it were true, however, it is unclear how it would support Petitioner’s argument. Pet. 16. As is evident, Petitioner did not identify a design need, market pressure, or other problem that would have been addressed by its identified “solutions,” and therefore we were not persuaded by this rationale. Dec. 19. Petitioner’s attempt to cure this deficiency in its Rehearing Request is tardy. We cannot misapprehend or overlook an assertion that Petitioner fails to make in the Petition. It is also insufficient. Petitioner does not provide any evidence of a known design need or market pressure to “simplify [EP’536’s] design” or reduce the number of “required inflation mechanism” it uses.” slip op. at 7
§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 12,012,065 - Solaris Oilfield Site Services Operating, LLC / Solaris Oilfield Site Services Personnel, LLC v. Masaba, Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Jan 26, 2026 · IPR2024-01179 · APJ Carl M Defranco · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–25 are unpatentable under § 103 over the asserted combinations of Waldner, Dynatek, and additional references; the Board cancelled all challenged claims.
RulingsFinal written decision- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedPatent owner expert discountedDecided for petitioner
“Also, to the extent Masaba relies on extrinsic expert testimony, we note that Masaba’s expert cites absolutely no support for his understanding of the claims, much less explains why we should adopt his understanding over the plain and ordinary meaning of “conveying aggregate” and “moving aggregate.” See Ex. 2004 ¶ 34. Absent supporting citations, such extrinsic testimony is entitled to little, if any, weight. As such, we reject the notion that Waldner’s discharge chute member 242 is not a conveyor “for conveying aggregate” or “for moving aggregate,” as required by claim elements 1[h] and 1[i].” slip op. at 21
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“We disagree that Dr. Durham does not possess the necessary level of skill in the art to qualify as an expert in this case. Looking at the specification of the ’689 patent and the prior art of record, we think Masaba sets the bar too high. We acknowledge that one of ordinary skill in the art should have some education and/or experience in the mechanical art of conveying aggregate materials, but we do not think opining on the ’689 patent and asserted prior art necessarily requires that person to have the amount of education and experience that Masaba advocates. The ’689 patent relates generally to an “aggregate transferring system for receiving aggregate from a vehicle and elevating the aggregate to a higher vertical level for deposit into, for example, a silo.” Ex. 1001, 1:15– 18. And, as described in the ’689 patent and discussed later, the transferring system is an assembly of known types of conveyors, such as a belly-dump truck conveyor, a bucket elevator, and an articulated belt conveyor, for transferring the aggregate horizontally and vertically from a belly-dump truck to the discharge point, such as a silo. Without doubt, Dr. Durham has enough education and experience to reliably opine on the combination of known parts.” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Plain and ordinary meaningNo construction needed
“We reject this argument for several reasons. First, nowhere does the plain language of the claims specify how the aggregate is conveyed or moved from the conveyor extension assembly’s inlet to its outlet, be it passively by means of gravity or actively by means of a conveyor belt. Instead, the claims simply use those verbs according to their plain and ordinary meaning, which is “to transfer or deliver” or “to cause to go or pass” from one place to another. See Ex. 3001, 253 (defining “convey”), 760 (defining “move”).10 Second, the specification of the ’689 patent similarly uses these terms in a plain and ordinary sense, without ever attributing to them some sort of special meaning. See, e.g., Ex. 1001, 4:9–12 (“The apparatus 10 is suitable for performing the transfer of aggregate from 10 We reference the original pagination of the dictionary in which these definitions appear. one location to another, such as, for example, from a vehicle carrying the aggregate to a silo 1 for storing the aggregate.”). The ’689 patent specification also makes clear that active conveyance of the aggregate is an option and not a requirement of the claimed invention, stating that the conveyor extension assembly “may further include a conveyor belt 150.” Ex. 1001, 10:60–66 (emphasis added). Limiting claim elements 1[h] and 1[i] to a device “for actively conveying” or “for actively moving aggregate” would improperly import limitations from the specification into the claims. Thus, based on the intrinsic evidence, we determine that claim elements 1h and 1k are properly construed to encompass passive and/or active movement of the aggregate via the conveyor extension assembly.” slip op. at 20
- Claim Construction › Functional claiming / §112(f) means-plus-function › Whether §112(f) applies (Williamson, nonce words)Not reached
“Owner asserts” that two claim terms—“unloader structure” and “trailer structure”—should be construed as means-plus-function limitations under 35 U.S.C. § 112(f), Solaris submits an express construction detailing the corresponding structure in the specification for performing the recited function of the claimed unloader and trailer structures. See id. at 24–25. Only in disputing Solaris’s Ground 3 does Masaba advocate that the claim term “trailer structure” should be construed under § 112(f), and then only in conjunction with dependent claims 3 and 21. See PO Resp. 58. As such, we address Masaba’s proposed construction in our analysis of Ground 3. We now turn to Solaris’s grounds of unpatentability.” slip op. at 12
Patent outcomesUS 11,780,689 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSRPatents in suitUS 11,780,689 - Trove Brands, LLC v. Camelbak Products, LLCNo claims unpatentablePTAB · Jan 15, 2026 · IPR2024-01137 · APJ Carl M Defranco · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–7 and 9–23 were not shown unpatentable under § 103 because the asserted combinations failed to teach the claimed mouthpiece movement or bite-actuated compression.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Trove contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have had an undergraduate degree in mechanical engineering or equivalent coursework, and a year or more of experience in designing, prototyping, and/or manufacturing fluid containers or similar products” and that “[m]ore work experience may substitute for a lower level of education, and vice versa.” Pet. 18 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 26). While CamelBak offers a “slightly different” level of skill in the art, it nonetheless “discerns no material difference between the definitions provided by the parties for purposes of the 2 JP 2002-211613, published July 31, 2002 (Ex. 1004, “Nakajima”). 3 US 6,070,767, issued June 6, 2000 (Ex. 1005, “Gardner”). 4 WO 2004/063042, published July 29, 2004 (Ex. 1006, “Ribarits”). 5 US 4,485,963, issued Dec. 4, 1984 (Ex. 1007, “Panicci”). 6 US 6,523,711 B1, issued Feb. 25, 2003 (Ex. 1010, “Hughes”). Board’s decision on the patentability of the ’255 patent.” PO Resp. 14–15. That being the case, we adopt Trove’s proposed definition of the level of skill in the art, as it is reasonable and consistent with what is reflected in the asserted prior art and the specification of the ’255 patent. B. Claim Construction” slip op. at 7
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Prosecution history disclaimer / disavowalTerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner
“not move in a circular path that maintains a constant radius about the axis of rotation defined by McDonough’s axle 30, but instead engages in up-and-down translational motion (red arrows) relative to axle 30. Thus, we understand CamelBak’s arguments during reexamination to have distinguished the purely rotational (i.e., circular) motion of the claimed mouthpiece from a mouthpiece that moves with a translational component relative to the pivotal axis. In sum, this reexamination history shows that, by distinguishing over the translational motion of McDonough’s mouthpiece, CamelBak limited the claimed mouthpiece to one that (1) maintains a circular path of constant radius about the pivotal mount’s axis of rotation, and (2) does not include a path that has a translational component relative to the pivotal axis. See Fenner Investments, Ltd. v. Cellco Partnership, 778 F.3d 1320, 1323 & 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“Any explanation, elaboration, or qualification presented by the inventor during patent examination is relevant, for the role of claim construction is to capture the scope of the actual invention that is disclosed, described, and patented.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); CVI/Beta Ventures, Inc. v. Tura LP, 112 F.3d 1146, 1158 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (“[T]hrough statements made during prosecution or reexamination an applicant for a patent or a patent owner, as the case may be, may commit to a particular meaning for a patent term, which meaning is then binding in litigation.”) (emphasis added); see also Univ. of Massachusetts v. L’Oreal S.A., 36 F.4th 1374, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2022) (“The prosecution history, in particular, may be critical in interpreting disputed claim terms, and even where prosecution history statements do not rise to the level of unmistakable disavowal, they do inform the claim construction.”) (internal quotations omitted).” slip op. at 17
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner
“Those detailed descriptions demonstrate that “adapted to,” as recited in claims 1 and 20, means that the resilient mouthpiece is specifically designed and configured to dispense fluid as a result of a user biting the mouthpiece, rather than merely being “capable of” being compressed. See Giannelli, 739 F.3d at 1379–80. Indeed, as disclosed, a distinct benefit of the resilient mouthpiece being bite-actuated “is that a user may position the drink bottle (and mouthpiece) to a desired drinking orientation, and even a partially or completely inverted orientation, without drink fluid being dispensed from the mouthpiece” until the user bites upon the mouthpiece to commence fluid flow through self-sealing valve to the user. Id. at 10:9–19. Thus, the intrinsic evidence, i.e., the specification and figures of the ’255 patent, confirm that the phrase “adapted to” means “designed or configured to” and is not satisfied by mere hypothetical capability. That is, as claimed, the resilient mouthpiece is designed or configured to compress based on actual forces applied by a user’s teeth, as opposed to merely being capable of compression based on the inherent nature of the mouthpiece’s material. C. Obviousness” slip op. at 24
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“Although we agree with Trove that Nakajima’s mouthpiece engages in up-and-down movement relative to the pivot axis identified in Trove’s annotated figures, we disagree that Nakajima’s mouthpiece is “pivotal about an axis defined by the pair of lateral projections as [they] rotate within the pair of sockets,” as required by claim 1. As discussed above, the proper construction of this claim limitation requires that the mouthpiece moves with rotational motion in a circular path of constant radius about the pivotal axis defined by the pair of lateral projections. See supra § II.B.1. Nakajima, on the other hand, discloses that its mouthpiece moves with translational motion, i.e., up-and-down movement, relative to the pivotal axis defined by lateral projections 19 of Nakajima’s lid 4—“[T]he mouthpiece moves up and down in conjunction with the opening and closing of the lid.” Ex. 1004 ¶ 3 (emphasis added); see also id., Abstract (“[T]he mouthpiece 2 moves up and down in conjunction with the opening and closing of the lid 4.”). Indeed, although Trove relies exclusively on Nakajima’s disclosure of up-and-down movement for the mouthpiece, Trove never explains how such up-and-down movement equates to rotational motion required by the disputed limitation of claim 1. Nor can it.” slip op. at 28
Patent outcomesUS 10,676,255 not shown unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 10,676,255 - PTAB · Dec 19, 2025 · IPR2025-01078 · APJ Robert L Kinder · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1, 2, 4–12, 14–22, and 24–30, finding a reasonable likelihood that Kido anticipates at least one challenged claim.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“review. 35 U.S.C. § 314(b); 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2024). An inter partes review may not be instituted “unless. . . the information presented in the petition . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Moreover, a decision to institute under 35 U.S.C. § 314 may not institute on fewer than all claims challenged in the petition. SAS Inst., Inc. v. Iancu, 584 U.S. 357, 371 (2018).” slip op. at 2
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for petitioner
“At this juncture in the proceeding, and based on the current record, we do not agree with Patent Owner that “payout,” as claimed, should be limited to “the amount a player will win in relation to the amount wagered.” We recognize, as Patent Owner points out, that the examples provided in the Specification are listed in odds format. See id. at 2. The Specification, however, also states that “[a]ny suitable payouts can be used in some embodiments.” Ex. 1011, 5:18–21. This language suggests a broader interpretation of “payout” beyond just payout odds and we therefore decline to import the wager limitation into the claim term. Although the ’371 patent generally describes payouts in terms of odds, like 49:1, the intrinsic record lacks clear evidence necessary to limit the claims as Patent Owner proposes.” slip op. at 8
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner proposes “a person having at least a Bachelor’s Degree in electrical engineering, computer science, or computer engineering, or undergraduate training in an equivalent field and at least two years of relevant experience in electronic gaming technology.” Pet. 10 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 22–26). Petitioner further notes that “[a]dditional graduate education could substitute for professional experience, and significant work experience could substitute for formal education.” Id. Patent Owner does not dispute this level of skill. See Prelim. Resp. 13–14 (“Evolution does not set forth an alternative level of skill for a person of ordinary skill in the art”). For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposal, which comports with the teachings of the ’371 patent and the asserted prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (holding that the prior art itself can reflect the appropriate level of ordinary skill in the art).” slip op. at 11
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Instituted
“Based on the evidence before us, we find persuasive Petitioner’s contention that Kido’s accumulated jackpot paid when landing on a star mark reads on the claimed “a first selected position . . . to have an increased payout . . . greater than a first non-selected payout.” See Pet. 25–27, 30, 35, 36. As explained above, the current record does not support limiting the term “payout” to just the amount a player will win in relation to the amount wagered. As Petitioner notes, a payout that receives Kido’s accumulated Prog bonus payout is necessarily higher than a payout that does not receive the Prog bonus. Pet. 35–36 (“had the first selected position not been randomly selected, the player would only be eligible for the basic payout”). Further, Kido even describes its bonus routines and jackpots as payouts. Kido describes, for example, that “[w]hen the privilege unit 113 obtains the win information from the special game value award mark win determining unit 112, it awards, as a payout, the game value stored in the accumulated game value memory 117” and it describes the “jackpot (JP) amount” as “a special payout.” Ex. 1007 ¶¶ 119, 129.” slip op. at 14
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 11,756,371 - PTAB · Dec 17, 2025 · IPR2025-01072 · APJ Frederick C Laney · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted review of claims 1–3, 5–11, 13–19, and 21–24 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that Kido anticipates claims 1, 9, and 17.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“review. 35 U.S.C. § 314(b); 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2024). An inter partes review may not be instituted “unless. . . the information presented in the petition . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Moreover, a decision to institute under 35 U.S.C. § 314 may not institute on fewer than all claims challenged in the petition. SAS Inst., Inc. v. Iancu, 584 U.S. 357, 371 (2018).” slip op. at 2
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for petitioner
“At this juncture in the proceeding, and based on the current record, we do not agree with Patent Owner that “payout,” as claimed, should be limited to “the amount a player will win in relation to the amount wagered.” Sur-reply 2. We recognize, as Patent Owner points out, that the examples provided in the Specification are listed in odds format. See id. The Specification, however, also states that “[a]ny suitable payouts can be used in some embodiments.” Ex. 1001, 5:16–17. This language suggests a broader interpretation of “payout” beyond just payout odds and we therefore decline to import the wager limitation into the claim term. Although the ’014 patent generally describes payouts in terms of odds, like 49:1, the intrinsic record lacks clear evidence necessary to limit the claims as Patent Owner proposes.” slip op. at 8
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Reference is prior artInstituted
“Based on the evidence before us, we find persuasive Petitioner’s contention that Kido’s accumulated jackpot paid when landing on a star mark reads on the claimed “first payout . . . wherein the first payout is higher.” See Pet. 32–36. As explained above, the current record does not support limiting the term “payout” to just the amount a player will win in relation to the amount wagered. As Petitioner notes, a first payout that receives Kido’s accumulated Prog bonus payout is necessarily higher than a second payout that does not receive the Prog bonus. Id. at 35. Further, Kido even describes its bonus routines and jackpots as payouts. Kido describes, for example, that “[w]hen the privilege unit 113 obtains the win information from the special game value award mark win determining unit 112, it awards, as a payout, the game value stored in the accumulated game value memory 117” and it describes the “jackpot (JP) amount” as “a special payout.” Ex. 1007 ¶¶ 119, 129.” slip op. at 14
Claim construction§ 102 anticipationcites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 11,011,014 - PTAB · Dec 16, 2025 · IPR2025-01073 · APJ Robert L Kinder · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR of claims 1–5, 7–12, 14–18, and 20 on all petitioned grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that Kido anticipates at least one challenged claim.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“review. 35 U.S.C. § 314(b); 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2024). An inter partes review may not be instituted “unless. . . the information presented in the petition . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Moreover, a decision to institute under 35 U.S.C. § 314 may not institute on fewer than all claims challenged in the petition. SAS Inst., Inc. v. Iancu, 584 U.S. 357, 371 (2018).” slip op. at 2
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“At this juncture in the proceeding, and based on the current record, we do not agree with Patent Owner that “payout,” as claimed, should be limited to “the amount a player will win in relation to the amount wagered.” We recognize, as Patent Owner points out, that the examples provided in the Specification are listed in odds format. See id. at 2. The Specification, however, also states that “[a]ny suitable payouts can be used in some embodiments.” Ex. 1005, 5:13–17. This language suggests a broader interpretation of “payout” beyond just payout odds and we therefore decline to import the wager limitation into the claim term. Although the ’024 patent generally describes payouts in terms of odds, like 49:1, the intrinsic record lacks clear evidence necessary to limit the claims as Patent Owner proposes.” slip op. at 8
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Instituted
“Based on the evidence before us, we find persuasive Petitioner’s contention that Kido’s accumulated jackpot paid when landing on a star mark reads on the claimed “first payout . . . wherein the first payout is higher.” See Pet. 33–35. As explained above, the current record does not support limiting the term “payout” to just the amount a player will win in relation to the amount wagered. As Petitioner notes, a first payout that receives Kido’s accumulated Prog bonus payout is necessarily higher than a second payout that does not receive the Prog bonus. Pet. 35. Further, Kido even describes its bonus routines and jackpots as payouts. Kido describes, for example, that “[w]hen the privilege unit 113 obtains the win information from the special game value award mark win determining unit 112, it awards, as a payout, the game value stored in the accumulated game value memory 117” and it describes the “jackpot (JP) amount” as “a special payout.” Ex. 1007 ¶¶ 119, 129. Patent Owner next contends that Kido does not disclose a first payout that is “for the spin of the roulette wheel.” Prelim. Resp. 29. Patent Owner’s argument is premised on the cumulative nature of Kido’s Prog bonus – it builds with every spin of the roulette wheel until won. Id. (“Each time the wheel is spun, 0.5% of the amount wagered is added to the progressive jackpot, and thus, the jackpot’s value reflects multiple spins of the roulette wheel.”). Thus, according to Patent Owner, the value of the jackpot is determined using multiple spins of the roulette wheel and is not “for a spin of the roulette wheel” as claimed.” Id. at 30. The claims, however, only require a first payout that is higher than a second payout. Nothing prohibits the higher payout from accumulating from prior spins of the roulette wheel because, when it is actually won, it will be for that last spin of the roulette wheel. Ex. 1005, 8:35–36 (“indicating that the first player is to be paid at the first payout for the spin of the roulette wheel”). Regardless of how Kido’s Prog bonus accumulated, it is paid for a spin of the roulette wheel – at that juncture Kido discloses each claim element. Anticipation occurs when a prior art reference discloses every element of a patent claim at a point in time, as Kido does with a single spin of the roulette wheel that pays the Prog bonus. As persuasively explained by Petitioner, “the steps of Figure 12 (including A13) occur within a single round of roulette, for a single spin of the roulette wheel, until the routine ‘returns to the step of A1 and is transited to a next game.’” Pet. 39 (quoting Ex. 1007 ¶ 233).” slip op. at 13
Claim construction§ 102 anticipationcites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 10,629,024 - Weatherford U.S., L.P v. Halliburton Energy Services, Inc.Some claims unpatentablePTAB · Dec 9, 2025 · IPR2024-00990 · APJ Brent M Dougal · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 11–12 and 14–20 are unpatentable; claims 1–10 and 21–23 are not shown unpatentable. Substitute claims 29–37 are unpatentable, and the motion to amend is denied as to them.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“The level of skill is uncontested. Patent Owner adopts the level of skill identified by Petitioner as: [at] the time of the alleged invention in 2018, a POSITA[2] would have had a B.S. degree in mechanical or petroleum engineering or a similar technical discipline, with at least five years of experience in oil or gas well drilling, completion, and/or subsurface production operations or in technical support of such operations including at least some experience in unconsolidated formations utilizing sand control methods and means. Also,” slip op. at 8
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableNot shown unpatentableMixed
“on embodiments of Yeh with concentric sand screens having nine shunt tubes (six transport tubes and three packing tubes) (Yeh Figures 4A–B) and eccentric sand screens with four shunt tubes (two transport tubes and two packing tubes) (Yeh Figures 8A, 8C). See Pet. 32–37, 39, 41–43. Yet, Petitioner’s reasoning as to why “a higher-pressure shunt tube assembly necessitated greater wall thickness” rests on an unspoken one to one comparison between the shunt tubes of the different systems. See id.; see also Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 291–297 (Petitioner’s declarant comparing possible transport tubes of different pressure regions without considering or addressing any difference in the number of transport tubes). However, the embodiments relied on by Petitioner have different numbers of shunt tubes, and thus the greater wall thickness does not appear to be “necessitated” in the way inferred by Petitioner. Further, Petitioner’s analysis would seem to be most appropriate when comparing two concentric sand screens for different pressure regions, or two eccentric sand screens for different pressure regions. relies on Yeh’s teachings related to a horizontal well bore of 5000 feet for the “concentric screen → crossover tool → eccentric screen” arrangement, as well as, for why the concentric screen needs to be rated for a high pressure. Pet. 32–37, 39, 41–43. Petitioner also refers to these features for why one of skill in the art would combine the teachings of Yeh and Yeh2. Id. at 32. However, on cross-examination, Petitioner’s declarant agreed that it is concentric sand screens having a 6x3 shunt tube design that would provide the noted benefits of being rated for a higher pressure and being more robust (as relied on in the Petition), as compared to eccentric sand screens. Ex. 2013, 42:20–43:8; Sur-reply 4–5. This also exposes another issue with Petitioner’s arguments. Though Petitioner identifies that one of skill in the art would be aware that material choice, wall thickness, and pipe diameter all impact burst pressure of a pipe (Pet. 42 (citing Ex. 1017, 24 (Equation (14))), the Petition essentially ignores the fact that the claims do not require a single pipe in isolation. The claims require two shunt tube assemblies, each surrounding a base pipe within a wellbore. It is uncontested that a wellbore provides a confined space for such a system and thus any change in wall thickness of one pipe can result in a significant impact in the function of the other pipes. We find the testimony of Petitioner’s declarant (see, e.g., Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 290–297) unpersuasive when discussing wall thickness because it focusses on basic considerations of a standalone pipe, without sufficient consideration of the claimed completion assembly with its required pipe and tube structure. PO Resp. 20–26.” slip op. at 17
- Strike new argumentNew argument disregardedDecided for patent owner
“In response to Patent Owner’s argument concerning Yeh’s embodiments relied on in the Petition, Petitioner argues for the first time that Patent Owner’s declarant “conceded, Yeh discloses that both concentric and 47:19–48:21). Petitioner does not provide a citation to Yeh or a citation to where the Petition relies on the same number of shunt tubes between concentric and eccentric screens. The deposition cited by Petitioner discusses Yeh at column 16, lines 26 through 35. However, the Petition does not cite or rely on these teachings of Yeh. Thus, we decline to consider this late argument.4 See 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3) (requiring the petition to identify “with particularity . . . the grounds on which the challenge to each claim is based, and the evidence that supports the grounds”); 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(5).” slip op. at 18
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundUnpatentable
“Thus, we agree with Petitioner that the combination of Yeh and Yeh2 teaches determining the shunt tube system operating pressures associated with the distal end of the production zone, but also more generally, determining the operating pressures along the entire production zone. With this knowledge of the system operating pressures, Petitioner argues that one of skill in the art would have selected eccentric screens for the distal end of the production zone “at any point at which the slurry pressure dropped below the pressure capacity of the eccentric screen shunt tubes.” Pet. 66 (citing Ex. 1005, 30:16–20; Ex. 1003 ¶ 388). In other words, knowing that the pressure decreases as you approach the toe, Yeh’s low-pressure rated eccentric screens could be used from some point prior to and covering the toe. determined pressure.” PO Resp. 37–38. We disagree. As discussed above, the record supports Petitioner’s position that one of skill in the art would have “understood the need to determine the shunt tube system operating pressure throughout the horizontal wellbore.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 383; see also Pet. 64–65. We find convincing Petitioner’s argument that one of skill with this understanding of the system pressures would select a shunt tube system rated to not only address the distal end, but also to address the needs of the adjacent region, so long as the pressure rating supported such a selection. See Pet. 65–67; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 385–388.” slip op. at 22
Patent outcomesUS 11,333,007 mixedClaim construction§ 101 eligibility§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,333,007
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.