• Shenzhen Tuozhu Technology Co., Ltd. v. Stratasys, Inc.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Oct 5, 2026 · IPR2025-00438 · APJ Lilan Ren · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–5, 7–13, and 16–20 are unpatentable; the Board found the challenged claims unpatentable on the grounds set out in its conclusions and summary table.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner’s definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art, and Petitioner’s definition appears consistent with the disclosures of the ’466 patent and the prior art of record. Accordingly, we adopt Petitioner’s definition. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001). C. Claim Construction” slip op. at 12

  • BurdenUnpatentable

    “Decision under 35 U.S.C. § 318(a) as to the patentability of the challenged claims of the ’466 patent. For the reasons discussed below, we determine Petitioner has established by a preponderance of the evidence that claims 1– 5, 7–13, and 16–20 of the ’466 patent are unpatentable.” slip op. at 2

  Patent outcomesUS 10,569,466 unpatentable
  Nonecites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,569,466
• Savant Technologies LLC D/B/A GE Lighting / Elong International USA Inc. et al. v. Feit Electric Company, Inc.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Sep 14, 2026 · IPR2025-00698 · APJ Kevin W Cherry · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–11, 18–20, 23–25, and 28 are unpatentable as obvious over the two combinations of prior art.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Thus, we adopt Petitioner’s articulation of the level of ordinary skill in the art, which is consistent with the ’539 patent and the asserted prior art, and we apply it in our obviousness analysis below.” slip op. at 9

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner

    “¶ 39). Petitioner further relies on Stokes to teach an average particle size that preferentially scatter blue . . . LED light as compared to yellow . . . light from the luminescent material.” Id. at 26–27 (citing Ex. 1108, 7:1–4). Petitioner argues that “a POSA would have been motivated to apply this principle to Krummacher, because it would increase the conversion of blue light to yellow light and improve the uniformity of the light source.” Id. at 27 (citing Ex. 1102 ¶ 237). Petitioner notes that “[c]onversion of blue light to yellow light is improved by maximizing the scattering of blue light.” Id. In addition, Petitioner asserts that “[u]niformity is improved by preferentially scattering the concentrated light from the blue-light LED chip instead of the disperse light emitted by the phosphor.” Id. at 28 (citing Ex. 1102 ¶ 237). Petitioner contends that “[a] POSA would have had a reasonable expectation of success applying this principle to Krummacher, because the relevant particle size range includes the range disclosed by Krummacher.” Id. Petitioner argues that “[a] POSA would have recognized selecting an average particle size as a design decision to be made based on a number of factors, including the light scattering properties of the particles, and well within the skill of the art.” Id. (citing Ex. 1102 ¶ 238). We find this explanation and the supporting testimony of Dr. Doolittle well-reasoned and supported and entitled to significant weight. Thus, we find that Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the combination of Krummacher and Stokes teaches limitation 1[c], and that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to combine the references in the manner proposed.” slip op. at 40

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundUnpatentable

    “¶ 39). Petitioner further relies on Stokes to teach an average particle size that preferentially scatter blue . . . LED light as compared to yellow . . . light from the luminescent material.” Id. at 26–27 (citing Ex. 1108, 7:1–4). Petitioner argues that “a POSA would have been motivated to apply this principle to Krummacher, because it would increase the conversion of blue light to yellow light and improve the uniformity of the light source.” Id. at 27 (citing Ex. 1102 ¶ 237). Petitioner notes that “[c]onversion of blue light to yellow light is improved by maximizing the scattering of blue light.” Id. In addition, Petitioner asserts that “[u]niformity is improved by preferentially scattering the concentrated light from the blue-light LED chip instead of the disperse light emitted by the phosphor.” Id. at 28 (citing Ex. 1102 ¶ 237). Petitioner contends that “[a] POSA would have had a reasonable expectation of success applying this principle to Krummacher, because the relevant particle size range includes the range disclosed by Krummacher.” Id. Petitioner argues that “[a] POSA would have recognized selecting an average particle size as a design decision to be made based on a number of factors, including the light scattering properties of the particles, and well within the skill of the art.” Id. (citing Ex. 1102 ¶ 238). We find this explanation and the supporting testimony of Dr. Doolittle well-reasoned and supported and entitled to significant weight. Thus, we find that Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the combination of Krummacher and Stokes teaches limitation 1[c], and that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to combine the references in the manner proposed.” slip op. at 40

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of success › HindsightMotivation foundDecided for petitioner

    “Finally, we do not agree with Patent Owner that “quantum efficiency” would have dissuaded a person of ordinary skill from making the combination. PO Resp. 36–38. To begin with, “[i]t’s not necessary to show that a combination is the best option, only that it be a suitable option.” Intel Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 21 F.4th 784, 800 (Fed. Cir. 2021). Here, as demonstrated by, at least, Shimizu and Stokes, blue LEDs in this wavelength range were known to work as light sources for white-light LEDs. See Pet. 30–31. Additionally, we find persuasive Petitioner’s evidence that a person of ordinary skill in the art would not have been concerned solely with quantum efficiency, but also with overall luminous efficacy of a complete white LED package. Reply 9. As Dr. Schubert’s textbook explains, A fundamental drawback of UV pumped white LEDs is the energy loss (Stoke’s shift). The potential luminous efficacy of UV pumped white LED lamps is, therefore, markedly lower than that of white sources based on a blue LED exciting a yellow phosphor. Ex. 2014, 358–59; see also Ex. 1148, 87:5–88:4 (acknowledging Stokes shift). Thus, the evidence shows that, whatever gain in quantum efficiency a lower wavelength might offer, there were other drawbacks that a person of ordinary skill would have to balance. But “a given course of action often has simultaneous advantages and disadvantages, and this does not necessarily obviate motivation to combine.” Medichem, 437 F.3d at 1165. Indeed, Petitioner has shown several references—including, Shimizu and Stokes—that made this tradeoff. Moreover, “[o]bviousness does not require absolute predictability of success. . . . [A]ll that is required is a reasonable expectation of success.” In re O’Farrell, 853 F.2d 894, 903–04 (Fed. Cir. 1988). We find that the prior art of record demonstrates that a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention would have such an expectation in making the combination of Krummacher, Stokes, and Shimizu. Accordingly, we find that Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that there would have been motivation to combine Krummacher, Stokes, and Shimizu with a reasonable expectation of success.” slip op. at 43

  Patent outcomesUS 8,614,539 unpatentable
  § 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,614,539
• Savant Technologies LLC D/B/A GE Lighting / Ledvance LLC et al. v. Feit Electric Company, Inc.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Aug 31, 2026 · IPR2025-00260 · APJ Kevin W Cherry · IPR · Final written decision

  The Board held all challenged original claims unpatentable as obvious and denied the contingent motion to amend substitute claims 30–49.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundUnpatentable

    “would have been motivated to combine the teachings of the prior art references to achieve the claimed invention, and that the skilled artisan would have had a reasonable expectation of success in doing so.’” Intelligent Bio-Sys., Inc. v. Illumina Cambridge Ltd., 821 F.3d 1359, 1367–68 (Fed. Cir. 2016); see KSR, 550 U.S. at 418. Further, an assertion of obviousness “cannot be sustained by mere conclusory statements; instead, there must be some articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of obviousness.” KSR, 550 U.S. at 418; In re NuVasive, Inc., 842 F.3d 1376, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (a finding of a motivation to combine “must be supported by a ‘reasoned explanation’”).” slip op. at 10

  • Obviousness (§103) › Objective indicia / secondary considerationsObjective indicia no nexusObjective indicia outweighedDecided for petitioner

    “7. Summary As discussed above, we find that Patent Owner has failed to show a” slip op. at 35

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Motions to amend / substitute claimsMotion to amend, deniedDenied

    “Motion to Amend meets the statutory and regulatory requirements set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 316(d) and 37 C.F.R. § 42.121 for claims 30 and 32–49. We further find that Patent Owner has not met the statutory and regulatory requirements for proposed claim 31. Accordingly, we address below whether any of the proposed substitute claims have been shown to be unpatentable.” slip op. at 86

  • Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Written description inadequateDenied

  Patent outcomesUS 8,604,678 unpatentable
  § 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,604,678
• Savant Technologies LLC D/B/A GE Lighting / Ledvance LLC et al. v. Feit Electric Company, Inc.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Aug 31, 2026 · IPR2024-01357 · APJ Kevin W Cherry · IPR · Final written decision

  The Board held challenged claims 1–3, 6, 7, 9–14, 16–21, 25, 26, and 29 unpatentable as obvious, and granted the motion to amend for substitute claims 30–49.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundUnpatentable

    “would have been motivated to combine the teachings of the prior art references to achieve the claimed invention, and that the skilled artisan would have had a reasonable expectation of success in doing so.’” Intelligent Bio-Sys., Inc. v. Illumina Cambridge Ltd., 821 F.3d 1359, 1367–68 (Fed. Cir. 2016); see KSR, 550 U.S. at 418. Further, an assertion of obviousness “cannot be sustained by mere conclusory statements; instead, there must be some articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of obviousness.” KSR, 550 U.S. at 418; In re NuVasive, Inc., 842 F.3d 1376, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (a finding of a motivation to combine “must be supported by a ‘reasoned explanation’”).” slip op. at 10

  • Obviousness (§103) › Objective indicia / secondary considerationsObjective indicia no nexusObjective indicia outweighedDecided for petitioner

    “7. Summary As discussed above, we find that Patent Owner has failed to show a” slip op. at 35

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner
  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Motions to amend / substitute claimsMotion to amend, grantedGranted in part

    “5. Conclusion For the reasons set forth above, we determine that Patent Owner’s Motion to Amend meets the statutory and regulatory requirements set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 316(d) and 37 C.F.R. § 42.121 for claims 30 and 32–49. We further find that Patent Owner has not met the statutory and regulatory requirements for proposed claim 31. Accordingly, we address below whether any of the proposed substitute claims have been shown to be unpatentable.” slip op. at 86

  Patent outcomesUS 8,604,678 unpatentable
  § 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,604,678
• Savant Technologies LLC D/B/A GE Lighting / Ledvance LLC et al. v. Feit Electric Company, Inc.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Aug 31, 2026 · IPR2025-00260 · APJ Kevin W Cherry · IPR · Final written decision

  The Board held all challenged claims 1–3, 6, 7, 9–14, 16–21, 25, 26, and 29 unpatentable as obvious and granted the motion to amend for substitute claims 30–49.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner

    “E. Credibility of Dr. Doolittle Patent Owner argues that we should give no weight to Dr. Doolittle’s testimony because, “[o]n cross examination, Prof. Doolittle repeatedly contradicted himself, dodged questions, and tried to shoehorn new and nonresponsive opinions into his answers to Patent Owner’s questions.” PO Resp. 25. Patent Owner raises two major complaints about Dr. Doolittle. First, Patent Owner argues that he took inconsistent positions by asserting in these IPR proceedings that the claims were entitled to their plain and ordinary meaning, while in the parallel district court proceeding, asserting that certain claim terms were indefinite. Id. at 26–28. Second, Patent Owner argues that Dr. Doolittle “repeatedly dodged questions and tried to shoehorn new and nonresponsive opinions into his answers to Patent Owner’s questions,” and that “[d]uring cross examination Patent Owner was forced to object to Prof. Doolittle’s nonresponsive answers no less than eighteen times.” Id. at 28. We strongly disagree with Patent Owner’s characterization of Dr. Doolittle’s testimony. We have reviewed the entirety of both of Dr. Doolittle’s depositions. We are impressed with his forthrightness, candor, and good humor in the face of Patent Owner’s counsel’s aggressive questioning. Contrary to Patent Owner’s assertions, we find that his testimony was well-reasoned, forthright, honest, and entitled to significant weight. Dr. Doolittle explained the different claim construction positions We also strongly disagree that Dr. Doolittle’s answers were nonresponsive or “evasive” as Patent Owner argues. Patent Owner’s numerous attempts to “strike” portions of his testimony belie Dr. Doolittle’s efforts to honestly and in good faith respond to Patent Owner’s counsel’s questions. Ex. 2025, 22:10–23:15, 25:9–26:14, 30:14–22, 40:3-9, 58:12–59:1, 60:18–61:13, 65:1–10, 83:15–84:16, 92:15–95:20, 96:18–99:9, 102:22–106:16, 135:3–136:22. An answer is not “non-responsive” simply because it does not conform to the conclusion you want or undermines the logic underlying your questioning. Dr. Doolittle explained his answers and addressed the issues Patent Owner asked about. Accordingly, we decline Patent Owner’s invitation to give Dr. Doolittle’s testimony no weight. Instead, we assess Dr. Doolittle’s testimony on a case-by-case basis as discussed below.” slip op. at 21

  • Skill levelOther

    “B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art We consider the asserted ground of unpatentability in view of the understanding of a person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSITA” or “POSA”). In assessing the level of ordinary skill in the art, various factors may be considered, including the “type of problems encountered in the art; prior art solutions to those problems; rapidity with which innovations are made; sophistication of the technology; and educational level of active workers in the field.” In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (quoting Custom Accessories, Inc. v. Jeffrey-Allan Indus., Inc., 807 F.2d Relying on the declaration testimony of its expert, Dr. Doolittle, Petitioner contends that an ordinarily skilled artisan for the ’678 patent “would have had an undergraduate degree (i.e., B.S., B.S.E. or the equivalent) in electrical engineering, materials science, physics, or a similar discipline” and “would also have one to two years of experience in the field of LED packaging design.” Pet. 5–6. Petitioner additionally contends that “[m]ore education could substitute for experience, and vice versa.” Id. Petitioner further contends that “[t]his person would have been capable of understanding and applying the teachings of the ’678 patent and the prior-art references discussed herein,” and “[m]oreover, the prior art reflects the level of skill at the time of the claimed invention.” Id. (citing Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Ex. 1102 ¶¶ 38–42). Patent Owner states that “solely for the purposes of this proceeding, Patent Owner and its technical expert employ the same level of skill in the art as Petitioners.” PO Resp. 24–25. Thus, we adopt Petitioner’s articulation of the level of ordinary skill in the art, which is consistent with the ’678 patent and the asserted prior art, and we apply it in our obviousness analysis below.” slip op. at 10

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundUnpatentable

    “lower wavelength might offer, there were other drawbacks that a person of ordinary skill would have to balance. But “a given course of action often has simultaneous advantages and disadvantages, and this does not necessarily obviate motivation to combine.” Medichem, S.A. v. Rolabo, S.L., 437 F.3d 1157, 1165 (Fed. Cir. 2006). Indeed, Petitioner has shown several references—including, Basin-2005, Shimizu, and Stokes—that made this tradeoff. Moreover, “[o]bviousness does not require absolute predictability of success. . . . [A]ll that is required is a reasonable expectation of success.” In re O’Farrell, 853 F.2d 894, 903–04 (Fed. Cir. 1988). We find that the prior art of record demonstrates that a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention would have such an expectation in making the combination of Basin-2007 and Basin-2005. Accordingly, we find that Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that there would have been motivation to combine Basin-2007 and Basin-2005 with a reasonable expectation of success. 4. Summary We have reviewed Petitioner’s contentions regarding claims 1–3, 6, 9, 10, 16–21, and 25 (Pet. 19–53), and find that Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that Basin-2007 and Basin-2005 teach the limitations of those claims, and that there would have been a motivation to combine the references in the manner suggested with a reasonable considerations does not outweigh the strong showing of obviousness. Accordingly, we find that Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that claims 1–3, 6, 9, 10, 16–21, and 25 would have been obvious over Basin-2007 and Basin-2005.” slip op. at 41

  • Obviousness (§103) › Objective indicia / secondary considerationsObjective indicia no nexusDecided for petitioner

    “1. Nexus In order for secondary considerations to be awarded “substantial” slip op. at 22

  Patent outcomesUS 8,604,678 unpatentable
  § 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,604,678
• Savant Technologies LLC D/B/A GE Lighting And Ledvance LLC / Savant Technologies LLC D/B/A GE Lighting, Elong International USA Inc., And Xiamen Longstar Lighting Co. Ltd v. Feit Electric Company, Inc.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Aug 31, 2026 · IPR2024-01357 · APJ Kevin W Cherry · IPR · Final written decision

  The Board held all challenged original claims unpatentable as obvious and granted the contingent motion to amend for substitute claims 30 and 32–49; substitute claim 31 was denied.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner

    “E. Credibility of Dr. Doolittle Patent Owner argues that we should give no weight to Dr. Doolittle’s testimony because, “[o]n cross examination, Prof. Doolittle repeatedly contradicted himself, dodged questions, and tried to shoehorn new and nonresponsive opinions into his answers to Patent Owner’s questions.” PO Resp. 25. Patent Owner raises two major complaints about Dr. Doolittle. First, Patent Owner argues that he took inconsistent positions by asserting in these IPR proceedings that the claims were entitled to their plain and ordinary meaning, while in the parallel district court proceeding, asserting that certain claim terms were indefinite. Id. at 26–28. Second, Patent Owner argues that Dr. Doolittle “repeatedly dodged questions and tried to shoehorn new and nonresponsive opinions into his answers to Patent Owner’s questions,” and that “[d]uring cross examination Patent Owner was forced to object to Prof. Doolittle’s nonresponsive answers no less than eighteen times.” Id. at 28. We strongly disagree with Patent Owner’s characterization of Dr. Doolittle’s testimony. We have reviewed the entirety of both of Dr. Doolittle’s depositions. We are impressed with his forthrightness, candor, and good humor in the face of Patent Owner’s counsel’s aggressive questioning. Contrary to Patent Owner’s assertions, we find that his testimony was well-reasoned, forthright, honest, and entitled to significant weight. Dr. Doolittle explained the different claim construction positions We also strongly disagree that Dr. Doolittle’s answers were nonresponsive or “evasive” as Patent Owner argues. Patent Owner’s numerous attempts to “strike” portions of his testimony belie Dr. Doolittle’s efforts to honestly and in good faith respond to Patent Owner’s counsel’s questions. Ex. 2025, 22:10–23:15, 25:9–26:14, 30:14–22, 40:3-9, 58:12–59:1, 60:18–61:13, 65:1–10, 83:15–84:16, 92:15–95:20, 96:18–99:9, 102:22–106:16, 135:3–136:22. An answer is not “non-responsive” simply because it does not conform to the conclusion you want or undermines the logic underlying your questioning. Dr. Doolittle explained his answers and addressed the issues Patent Owner asked about. Accordingly, we decline Patent Owner’s invitation to give Dr. Doolittle’s testimony no weight. Instead, we assess Dr. Doolittle’s testimony on a case-by-case basis as discussed below.” slip op. at 21

  • Skill levelOther

    “B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art We consider the asserted ground of unpatentability in view of the” slip op. at 10

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successUnpatentableMotivation foundUnpatentable

    “lower wavelength might offer, there were other drawbacks that a person of ordinary skill would have to balance. But “a given course of action often has simultaneous advantages and disadvantages, and this does not necessarily obviate motivation to combine.” Medichem, S.A. v. Rolabo, S.L., 437 F.3d 1157, 1165 (Fed. Cir. 2006). Indeed, Petitioner has shown several references—including, Basin-2005, Shimizu, and Stokes—that made this tradeoff. Moreover, “[o]bviousness does not require absolute predictability of success. . . . [A]ll that is required is a reasonable expectation of success.” In re O’Farrell, 853 F.2d 894, 903–04 (Fed. Cir. 1988). We find that the prior art of record demonstrates that a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention would have such an expectation in making the combination of Basin-2007 and Basin-2005. Accordingly, we find that Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that there would have been motivation to combine Basin-2007 and Basin-2005 with a reasonable expectation of success. 4. Summary We have reviewed Petitioner’s contentions regarding claims 1–3, 6, 9, 10, 16–21, and 25 (Pet. 19–53), and find that Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that Basin-2007 and Basin-2005 teach the limitations of those claims, and that there would have been a motivation to combine the references in the manner suggested with a reasonable considerations does not outweigh the strong showing of obviousness. Accordingly, we find that Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that claims 1–3, 6, 9, 10, 16–21, and 25 would have been obvious over Basin-2007 and Basin-2005.” slip op. at 41

  • Obviousness (§103) › Objective indicia / secondary considerations › NexusObjective indicia no nexusDecided for petitioner

    “1. Nexus In order for secondary considerations to be awarded “substantial” slip op. at 22

  Patent outcomesUS 8,604,678 unpatentable
  § 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,604,678
• Savant Technologies LLC D/B/A GE Lighting / Ledvance LLC et al. v. Feit Electric Company, Inc.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Aug 28, 2026 · IPR2024-01357 · APJ Kevin W Cherry · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–3, 6, 7, 9, 10, 16–21, 25, 26, and 29 are unpatentable; substitute claims 30–49 were not reached.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art We consider the asserted ground of unpatentability in view of the” slip op. at 10

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner

    “E. Credibility of Dr. Doolittle Patent Owner argues that we should give no weight to Dr. Doolittle’s testimony because, “[o]n cross examination, Prof. Doolittle repeatedly contradicted himself, dodged questions, and tried to shoehorn new and nonresponsive opinions into his answers to Patent Owner’s questions.” PO Resp. 25. Patent Owner raises two major complaints about Dr. Doolittle. First, Patent Owner argues that he took inconsistent positions by asserting in these IPR proceedings that the claims were entitled to their plain and ordinary meaning, while in the parallel district court proceeding, asserting that certain claim terms were indefinite. Id. at 26–28. Second, Patent Owner argues that Dr. Doolittle “repeatedly dodged questions and tried to shoehorn new and nonresponsive opinions into his answers to Patent Owner’s questions,” and that “[d]uring cross examination Patent Owner was forced to object to Prof. Doolittle’s nonresponsive answers no less than eighteen times.” Id. at 28. We strongly disagree with Patent Owner’s characterization of Dr. Doolittle’s testimony. We have reviewed the entirety of both of Dr. Doolittle’s depositions. We are impressed with his forthrightness, candor, and good humor in the face of Patent Owner’s counsel’s aggressive questioning. Contrary to Patent Owner’s assertions, we find that his testimony was well-reasoned, forthright, honest, and entitled to significant weight. Dr. Doolittle explained the different claim construction positions We also strongly disagree that Dr. Doolittle’s answers were nonresponsive or “evasive” as Patent Owner argues. Patent Owner’s numerous attempts to “strike” portions of his testimony belie Dr. Doolittle’s efforts to honestly and in good faith respond to Patent Owner’s counsel’s questions. Ex. 2025, 22:10–23:15, 25:9–26:14, 30:14–22, 40:3-9, 58:12–59:1, 60:18–61:13, 65:1–10, 83:15–84:16, 92:15–95:20, 96:18–99:9, 102:22–106:16, 135:3–136:22. An answer is not “non-responsive” simply because it does not conform to the conclusion you want or undermines the logic underlying your questioning. Dr. Doolittle explained his answers and addressed the issues Patent Owner asked about. Accordingly, we decline Patent Owner’s invitation to give Dr. Doolittle’s testimony no weight. Instead, we assess Dr. Doolittle’s testimony on a case-by-case basis as discussed below.” slip op. at 21

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundUnpatentable

    “lower wavelength might offer, there were other drawbacks that a person of ordinary skill would have to balance. But “a given course of action often has simultaneous advantages and disadvantages, and this does not necessarily obviate motivation to combine.” Medichem, S.A. v. Rolabo, S.L., 437 F.3d 1157, 1165 (Fed. Cir. 2006). Indeed, Petitioner has shown several references—including, Basin-2005, Shimizu, and Stokes—that made this tradeoff. Moreover, “[o]bviousness does not require absolute predictability of success. . . . [A]ll that is required is a reasonable expectation of success.” In re O’Farrell, 853 F.2d 894, 903–04 (Fed. Cir. 1988). We find that the prior art of record demonstrates that a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention would have such an expectation in making the combination of Basin-2007 and Basin-2005. Accordingly, we find that Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that there would have been motivation to combine Basin-2007 and Basin-2005 with a reasonable expectation of success.” slip op. at 41

  • Obviousness (§103) › Objective indicia / secondary considerationsDecided for petitioner

    “7. Summary As discussed above, we find that Patent Owner has failed to show a” slip op. at 35

  Patent outcomesUS 8,604,678 unpatentable
  § 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,604,678
• Valve Corporation v. Immersion CorporationAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Mar 23, 2026 · IPR2024-00582 · APJ Christopher L Ogden · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–6, 14–16, and 19 are unpatentable based on anticipation by or obviousness over Pratt, and obviousness over Pratt–Ku, Ku, or Ku–Jiang.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “The parties agree that formal education could substitute for practical experience, and vice versa. Pet. 6, PO Resp. 18. The parties’ proposed levels of ordinary skill appear to be substantially similar, supported by testimonial evidence, and consistent with the asserted prior art and the types of problems and solutions identified in the ’738 patent. See, e.g., Ex. 1001, 1:6–61. Although we discern no difference in the outcome of this decision from choosing one over the other, we adopt Petitioner’s proposed level of skill for this decision. The outcome of our decision would be the same under Patent Owner’s proposal.” slip op. at 7

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

    “We find insufficient support in the specification or prosecution history to narrow the term “haptic effect” to only one that has not been modified or combined with another haptic effect. The ’738 patent still refers to combined or modified haptic effects as a “haptic effect.” Ex. 1001, 11:35–38 (“a haptic effect may further be modified or combined with another haptic effect” and “the haptic effect can include one or more haptic effects”). We also find no support for importing into the construction of “haptic effect” the ’738 patent’s example in which a haptic effect can be “based on the proximity signal and the touch sensor signal.” That is already an explicit claim limitation. Id. at 14:19–20 (“generate a haptic output signal based at least in part on the first [proximity] and second [touch] sensor signals”). Including that limitation as part of the construction of “haptic effect” would render the limitation superfluous. See Apple, Inc. v. Ameranth, Inc., 842 F.3d 1229, 1237 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“The Board was correct to not include in its construction of ‘menu’ features of menus that are expressly recited in the claims . . . . Construing a claim term to include features of that term already recited in the claims would make those expressly recited features redundant.”). We also disagree with Patent Owner that the ’738 patent’s references to haptic effects modified or combined with other haptic effects are unclaimed embodiments. The ’738 patent discloses that a proximity-based haptic effect may be combined with a touch-based haptic effect, such as when “a particular haptic effect associated with a particular control on a user interface element [is] further . . . modified or combined with another haptic effect based on the proximity sensor signal,” or when “the haptic effect [to be output by the processor] . . . include[s] a haptic effect meant to confirm ‘pushing’ on a virtual button.” Ex. 1001, 11:32–40. These examples are consistent with the claim language and we find no credible evidence in the record that these embodiments are intended to be excluded from the claimed invention. Thus, we agree with Petitioner that it would be incorrect to construe the term “haptic effect” to include the extraneous limitations Patent Owner proposes. We also agree with Petitioner that a person of ordinary skill in the art reading the ’738 patent disclosure would have understood that a combined or modified haptic effect is still a haptic effect.” slip op. at 11

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “To show anticipation under § 102, a petitioner must locate every element in a claim, arranged as recited in the claim, in a single prior art reference. See Net MoneyIN, Inc. v. VeriSign, Inc., 545 F.3d 1359, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2008). The limitations may be present in the reference “either explicitly or inherently.” In re Schreiber, 128 F.3d 1473, 1477 (Fed. Cir. 1997). In making this determination, we consider the reference “together with the knowledge of one of ordinary skill in the pertinent art.” In re Paulsen, 30 F.3d 1475, 1480 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (citing In re Samour, 571 F.2d 559, 562 (CCPA 1978)).” slip op. at 13

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successUnpatentableMotivation foundUnpatentable

    “We find Petitioner’s arguments persuasive and disagree with Patent Owner’s arguments to the contrary. Ku discloses summing two overlapping vibration signals, one “based at least in part on” data from a proximity sensor and another “based at least in part on” data from a touch sensor. Ex. 1008, Fig. 12 (items 705, 710, and 715). The summed signal 715 is the basis for generating what the user would perceive as a single haptic effect. See Ex. 1004 ¶ 210–212. This meets limitation 1F. We agree with Petitioner’s argument as to why there would have been a motivation to modify Pratt to include Ku’s teachings. Petitioner’s argument is not merely that Pratt was ready for improvement; Petitioner persuasively argues that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had reason to add Ku’s method for confirming that the user has touched the intended icon to Pratt’s system. Both Pratt and Ku already disclose using both proximity and touch data in generating a haptic effect, and based on the evidence of record, we are of the view that combining the two teachings would not have been uniquely challenging or otherwise beyond the level of ordinary skill in the art. See Leapfrog Enters., Inc. v. Fisher-Price, Inc., 485 F.3d 1157, 1162 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (“Leapfrog presents no evidence that the inclusion of a reader in [electronic children's toys] was uniquely challenging or difficult to one of ordinary skill in the art.” (citing KSR, 550 U.S. at 419–420))” slip op. at 32

  Patent outcomesUS 11,175,738 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,175,738
• Aptiv Services US, LLC v. Microchip Technology, Inc.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Mar 20, 2026 · IPR2024-00646 · APJ Christopher L Ogden · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–18 are unpatentable under § 103 over Al-Shyoukh, Ivanov, and Stanescu; the Board did not reach the alternative ground.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Patent Owner’s proposal is most like Petitioner’s alternative proposal which would include a bachelor’s degree and two years of experience. However, Patent Owner does not provide a specific number of years of industry experience and Patent Owner would include mixed-signal IC design as an alternative to analog circuit design. We consider analog circuit design to be most pertinent to the problems and solution discussed in the ’074 patent. See Ex. 1001, 1:15–2:44. In addition, we find credible Petitioner’s argument that an ordinarily skilled artisan with a bachelor’s degree would have had two years of experience, whereas Patent Owner’s proposal does not provide a specific number of years. Thus, we determine that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had a bachelor’s degree and two years of experience in analog circuit design. Nevertheless, the outcome of our decision would be the same under either of the party’s proposals.” slip op. at 8

  • Prior constructionPrior construction adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Because neither party has argued that the district-court constructions should be modified or elaborated for this proceeding, and the constructions appear reasonable, we adopt these constructions for this decision. We also take judicial notice of the district court’s Memorandum supporting the claim construction order. Ex. 3001.9” slip op. at 10

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

    “We agree with Petitioner that “gm boosting” is the only gm enhancement referred to in the ’074 patent, that the ’074 patent uses the terms “gm enhanced” and “gm-boost” synonymously, and that Patent Owner has failed to point to any credible intrinsic evidence of this alleged distinction. Although, “[i]n the absence of any evidence to the contrary, we must presume that the use of . . . different terms in the claims connotes different meanings, CAE Screenplates Inc. v. Heinrich Fiedler GmbH, 224 F.3d 1308, 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2000), in this case there is evidence to the contrary. In particular, the ’074 patent never refers to “gm enhancement” as a function separate from “gm boosting.” Indeed, the transistors (368, 370, and 382) that Patent Owner identifies as performing the function of “gm enhancement” are disclosed as part of a “gm-boost stage.” Ex. 1001, 5:8–24. Patent Owner’s alleged separation of Figure 3B into distinct “gm boosting” and “gm enhancement” is not consistent with the intrinsic evidence and is based on the conclusory testimony of Dr. Taylor. Thus, based on the evidence of record, we disagree with Patent Owner’s proposed construction distinguishing the terms “gm enhanced” and “gm-boost” in claim 1. Rather, we find persuasive Petitioner’s argument that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have regarded these terms to be synonymous. We need not otherwise construe these two terms to resolve the contested issues in this proceeding. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 12

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner

    “We find Petitioner’s argument persuasive that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had reason to follow Ivanov’s teachings to include an enable/disable function in Al-Shyoukh’s biasing circuit to limit that circuit’s standby current for reasons of power-efficiency. Pet. 25–26; Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 67–68. The evidence of record also suggests that an enable/disable function was well known in the art and that it would have been within the level of ordinary skill in the art to add such a function to a biasing circuit, taking into consideration any known tradeoffs. Pet. Reply 17–18; Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 60, 67–68; PO Resp. 13–14 (acknowledging that “any [person of ordinary skill in the art” would attest[ that] engineering is full of tradeoffs” and listing some of the known tradeoffs that “a [person of ordinary skill in the art] would need to consider”). We also disagree with Patent Owner’s argument that Al-Shyoukh, Rincon-Mora, or other references teach away from adding an enable/disable function to Al-Shyoukh. Patent Owner has not pointed to anything in the prior art that criticizes, discredits, or otherwise discourages investigation into the claimed invention. Meiresonne v. Google, Inc., 849 F.3d at 1382.” slip op. at 34

  Patent outcomesUS 9,471,074 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 9,471,074
• PLR Worldwide Sales Ltd. v. Flip Phone Games Inc.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Nov 5, 2025 · IPR2024-00133 · APJ Scott B Howard · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–10 are unpatentable as obvious over Sturman and Ho; the Board found the Ho/Jiau/Choi grounds, with and without Ellis, insufficient.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner

    “We see very little difference between the parties’ respective proposals. We adopt Patent Owner’s marginally more specific proposal as it better reflects the ’089 patent. Additionally, because we would reach the same conclusions under Petitioner’s proposal, we agree with Patent Owner that this does not affect our analysis.” slip op. at 10

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed board ownDecided for patent owner

    “Consistent with Phillips, we begin with the “ordinary and customary meaning” of the words of the claims. Phillips, 415. F.3d at 1312–13 (quoting Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996)). The parties agree that the ordinary and customary meaning of the phrase “background object” is consistent with the dictionary definition and means an object that is “not in the foreground.” Tr. 8:10–16; PO Resp. 8–9; Ex. 2008 (AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 2006); see also Ex. 2009 (“the scenery or ground behind something,” “the part of a painting representing what lies behind objects in the foreground”) (MERRIAM- WEBSTER DICTIONARY 2007); Ex. 2010 (“the part of a picture or pattern that is behind the main people or things in it” (MACMILLIAN ENGLISH DICTIONARY 2007); Ex. 2011 (“the ground or parts, as of a scene, situated in the rear (opposed to foreground)”) (RANDOM HOUSE WEBSTER’S COLLEGE DICTIONARY 2005). Having determined the ordinary and customary meaning, we need only look to see if there is some reason—such as the applicant acting as a lexicographer or the ordinary and customary meaning being improperly subjective—why the ordinary and customary meaning is not controlling.” slip op. at 15

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for patent owner

    “We do not find that the prosecution history demonstrates that the applicant acted as a lexicographer by “clearly set forth a definition of the disputed claim term,” or “clearly express[ing] an intent to define the term” as required by Thorner, 669 F.3d at 1365. Instead, the language in the prosecution history is consistent with the ordinary and customary meaning. That is, the applicant focuses on the location of the object relative to the area of game play, i.e., the foreground. For example, the applicant distinguishes Chu’s object as not being “background objects” because they “are featured in the forefront of [the] game play as primary objects to be manipulated or used during game play (see Chu at ¶¶ [0063]–[0065]).” Ex. 1002, 85 (emphasis added).12 The applicant continued by arguing that Chu’s objects “exist in the background, outside of the primary focus of game play and as unexpectedly interactive components, and are not themselves needed or required in order to play the game.” Id. If anything, this demonstrates an intent of the applicant to use the customary and ordinary meaning—not in the foreground—and not act as a lexicographer.” slip op. at 17

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner

    “We do not agree with Patent Owner’s argument. Under our rules, “[e]xpert testimony that does not disclose the underlying facts or data on which the opinion is based is entitled to little or no weight.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.65(a). We have reviewed Dr. Zagal’s testimony on this subject (see Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 156–160, 163, 166, 172, 177–178) and find that it complies with our requirements. Specifically, Dr. Zagal provides his opinion and identifies specific evidence in the record that supports it. We do not find MarkForged, a nonprecedential decision, persuasive. Although MarkForged cites 37 C.F.R. § 42.65(a) as support for the proposition that expert testimony “is entitled to little to no weight [if] it merely parrots the Petition,” the rule is silent on that point. Patent Owner has not directed us to any rule or precedential decision that says that non- 17 The decision was affirmed by the Director. Xerox Corp. v. Bytemark, Inc., IPR2022-00624, Paper 12 (PTAB Aug. 24, 2022). conclusory testimony which cites underlying factual support, such as Dr. Zagal gives in this proceeding, is entitled to no weight.” slip op. at 49

  Patent outcomesUS 8,688,089 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,688,089

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.