- NVIDIA Corporation v. Invensas CorporationAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Sep 1, 2021 · IPR2020-01729 · APJ Bryan F Moore · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–8 are unpatentable under §103 over the listed combinations of Jaso, Stine1998, Pramanik1997, and Robinson.
RulingsFinal written decision- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached
“Petitioner responds that, because Jaso discloses a damascene process with trenches, Patent Owner’s proposed claim construction is “unnecessary.” Reply 32. We agree that the damascene process of Jaso is the same damascene process to which Patent Owner seeks to limit this claim term. Patent Owner does not argue otherwise in its Sur-reply. See Sur-reply. Thus, we decline to construe the term “etching . . . trenches into a dielectric layer.”” slip op. at 9
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner argues that one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention of the ’231 patent “would have had a Bachelor of Science degree in physics, chemistry, materials science, electrical engineering, mechanical engineering, or related discipline, in addition to 3–5 years of experience in the fabrication of integrated circuit devices. Additional years of experience could substitute for formal education, and vice versa.” Pet. 22 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 35). Patent Owner “does not dispute Petitioner’s description of the qualifications of a POSA for the purposes of this IPR.” PO Resp. 9. We regard Petitioner’s formulation of the level of skill as consistent with the prior art before us. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 Therefore, for purposes of this Final Written Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s assessment of the level of skill in the art because it is consistent with the ’231 patent and the asserted prior art, and we apply it in our analysis below.” slip op. at 14
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner
“Overall, we have considered all of Patent Owner’s arguments but do not find that they undermine the overall credibility of Dr. Boning. However, we will consider any question regarding his credibility on any specific issue raised by Patent Owner in the obviousness analysis below, where appropriate.” slip op. at 17
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“Petitioner argues it would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art to combine Jaso and Stine1998 “to etch a plurality of dummy trenches in a dielectric layer between a first (wider) trench and a series of second (narrower) trenches.” Id. at 66 (citation omitted). Petitioner argues that a person of ordinary still in the art “would be motivated to combine the teachings in Jaso and Stine1998, as both references are directed to the addition of dummy conductors to equalize pattern density to improve CMP planarity.” Id. at 38–39 (citing Ex. 1004, code (57), 3:29–64; Ex. 1005, 668). In particular, Petitioner states that “Stine1998 enhances and improves upon the disclosure in Jaso by providing general teachings and specific methods that are widely applicable to dummy metal-fill techniques for addressing added capacitance.” Id. at 39 (citing Ex. 1005, 670–672). Petitioner points out that “Stine1998 expressly motivates a [person of ordinary skill in the art] to apply its teachings to a damascene process requiring dummy-fill to enhance planarity” because Stine1998 states its methodology can be extended to “inlaid metal techniques such as copper (emphasis omitted). Analysis of Patent Owner’s Arguments 1) Prior Art Does not “Look for” a Specific Configuration Patent Owner argues “Stine1998 does not tell the POSA to look for a specific configuration of structures, and then insert dummy metal into a particular location within that configuration (as the Relevant Solution does.)” PO Resp. 36–37. Patent Owner also argues that Jaso and Stine1998 “together accordingly tell the POSA to focus on pattern density, and to take steps to ensure that variations in pattern density across the chip are minimized” as opposed to looking for the particular configuration called out by the claims. Id. at 58. There is no requirement in the claims for the prior art to “look for” specific structures, but rather it must disclose those structure required by the claims. For the reasons articulated in the Petition, we agree that the combined teachings of Jaso and Stine1998 teach the structure required by claim 1. Pet. 38–39 (citing Ex. 1004, code (57), 3:29–64; Ex. 1005, 668), 50–52 (citing Ex. 1005, 670). We also credit Dr. Boning’s testimony that these references’ teachings “to locate dummies in sparse regions proximate to wide and narrow lines...would obviously include placing dummies in regions between such lines.” Ex. 1002 ¶ 183 (emphasis added). The fact that Jaso and Stine1998 may not purposefully seek out the configuration relied on by Patent Owner does not undermine Petitioner’s showing that the proper configuration would result from an obvious combination of the references. Thus, we are not persuaded by these arguments.” slip op. at 28
Patent outcomesUS 6,232,231 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · GrahamPatents in suitUS 6,232,231 - NVIDIA Corporation v. Invensas CorporationAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Sep 1, 2021 · IPR2020-00603 · APJ Bryan F Moore · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–8 are unpatentable under §103: claims 1–4 and 8 over Jaso and Stine1998, with alternative grounds adding Pramanik1997; claims 5–7 over combinations adding Robinson.
RulingsFinal written decision- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Specification disavowal / 'present invention' languageDisclaimer not foundDecided for petitioner
“Patent Owner is correct that “[a] patent’s statement of the described invention’s purpose informs the proper construction of claim terms.” Kaken Pharm. Co. v. Iancu, 952 F.3d 1346, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2020). Nevertheless, a claim is not required to encompass all of the advantages or purposes of the invention. See Howmedica Osteonics Corp. v. Wright Med. Tech., Inc., 540 F.3d 1337, 1345 (Fed.Cir.2008) (“An invention may that every claim directed to that invention be limited to encompass all of them.”) (citations omitted). Additionally, notwithstanding the importance of a specification, limitations in the specification must not be read into the claims absent lexicography or disclaimer/disavowal. Hill-Rom Services, Inc. v. Stryker Corp., 755 F.3d 1367, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2014).” slip op. at 11
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner argues that one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention of the ’231 patent “would have had a Bachelor of Science degree in physics, chemistry, materials science, electrical engineering, mechanical engineering, or related discipline, in addition to 3–5 years of experience in the fabrication of integrated circuit devices. Additional years of experience could substitute for formal education, and vice versa.” Pet. 22 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 35). Patent Owner “does not dispute Petitioner’s description of the qualifications of a POSA for the purposes of this IPR.” PO Resp. 9. We regard Petitioner’s formulation of the level of skill as consistent with the prior art before us. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 Therefore, for purposes of this Final Written Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s assessment of the level of skill in the art because it is consistent with the ’231 patent and the asserted prior art, and we apply it in our analysis below.” slip op. at 14
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner
“look at Figure 8 and form any understanding of its structures at all” and thus, Dr. Boning’s opinions should be disregarded in their entirety. Id. at 44 (citing Ex. 2011 ¶¶ 191–199). We find that the explanations by Dr. Boning are a reasonable attempt to explain what one of ordinary skill in the art, with general background knowledge in the art, would glean from Figure 8 of Stine 1998 and are supported by additional cited references, such as Maly1991 and the StineThesis. See, e.g., Ex. 1052 ¶¶ 72 (citing Maly Fig. 4), 92 (citing Ex. 2016 (StineThesis), 92 (Ex. 2016, 165), 93. “[A] skilled artisan’s background knowledge is relevant to the reading of the prior art on which the obviousness challenge is based and . . . it is permissible, and sometimes even necessary, to establish such background knowledge by pointing to other prior art.” Rovalma, S.A. v. Bohler-Edelstahl GmbH & Co. KG, 856 F.3d 1019, 1027 (Fed. Cir. 2017). Despite Patent Owner’s criticism, Dr. Boning’s testimony cited by Patent Owner evidences Dr. Boning’s opinion that a person of ordinary skill in the art was aware of common artifacts and limitations in downscaled Boning also relies on secondary references to support his testimony about the general background knowledge of one of ordinary skill in the art. Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 65 (citing Ex. 1009 (Mead Textbook)), 74 (citing Ex. 1010 (Rabaey Textbook)), 75, 76, 152–157. Thus, we credit Dr. Boning’s testimony and do not disregard his testimony wholesale based on those alleged inconsistencies. Below, we focus on the testimony that is at issue in this IPR. There are three main reasons why Figure 8 of Stine1998 is at issue. First, Petitioner asserts that the white areas in Figure 8 are open areas between a wide trench and narrow trenches with no metal lines into which dummy conductors would be placed. See Pet. 37–38; Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 112, 152, 157. Patent Owner opposes that contention (PO Resp. 56) but, as explained in association with claim construction, we do not rely on a construction that requires no intervening trenches or other structures between the wide trench and narrow trenches. Additionally, Petitioner relies on the typical layout of chips and the figures of Jaso to support its interpretation of Figure 8. Pet. 45–46, 52–53. 13 Dr. Givens testifies that, because there is a discrepancy in Dr. Boning’s testimony regarding the inserts for various regions of Figure 8 of Stine1998 and the lack of any other inserts one of ordinary skill in the art would not assume the white areas contain no metal lines. Ex. 2011 ¶¶ 195–196. And, based on his magnification experiment, Dr. Givens testifies that Figure 4 of Maly1991 may contain metal lines. Id. We consider the fact that Dr. Givens’s testimony is largely based on what a person of ordinary skill in the art could discern from Figure 8 of Stine1998 and Figure 4 of Maly1991 alone rather than what one or ordinary skill in the art may glean based on their background knowledge in the art—for example whether Figure 8 of Stine1998 is consistent with conventional chip designs as Dr. Boning testified. Thus, we give slightly more weight to Dr. Boning’s testimony.” slip op. at 35
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“Analysis of Patent Owner’s Arguments 1) Prior Art Does not “Look for” a Specific Configuration Patent Owner argues “Stine1998 does not tell the POSA to look for a specific configuration of structures, and then insert dummy metal into a particular location within that configuration (as the Relevant Solution does.)” PO Resp. 36–37. Patent Owner also argues that Jaso and Stine1998 “together accordingly tell the POSA to focus on pattern density, and to take steps to ensure that variations in pattern density across the chip are minimized” as opposed to looking for the particular configuration called out by the claims. Id. at 58. There is no requirement in the claims for the prior art to “look for” specific structures, but rather it must disclose those structure required by the claims. For the reasons articulated in the Petition, we agree that the combined teachings of Jaso and Stine1998 teach the structure required by claim 1. Pet. 38–39 (citing Ex. 1004, code (57), 3:29–64; Ex. 1005, 668), 50–52 (citing Ex. 1005, 670). We also credit Dr. Boning’s testimony that these references’ teachings “to locate dummies in sparse regions proximate to wide and narrow lines...would obviously include placing dummies in regions between such lines.” Ex. 1002 ¶ 183 (emphasis added). The fact that Jaso and Stine1998 may not purposefully seek out the configuration relied on by Patent Owner does not undermine Petitioner’s showing that the proper configuration would result from an obvious combination of the references. Thus, we are not persuaded by these arguments. Dummy Trenches We also disagree with Patent Owner’s argument that “Stine1998 does not teach or suggest any ‘trenches in a dielectric layer.’” PO Resp. 47, 55– 56. Patent Owner argues that Stine1998’s “subtractive process used for the manufacture of the disclosed chip does not involve the formation of such trenches.” Id. at 47 (citing Ex. 2011 ¶ 171). That is, Patent Owner asserts Stine1998 deposits a dielectric layer around already-formed metal lines. This argument, however, is not commensurate with the scope of the claims as properly construed. As noted above, to the extent that a damascene process is required, Jaso teaches such a process. Pet. 44. Additionally, assuming arguendo Patent Owner’s argument is correct, it stands to reason that the spaces where dielectric is not deposited are free of dielectric (due to the presence of metal lines) and, therefore, the “trenches” are free of dielectric. Patent Owner also asserts Stine1998 does not disclose dummy trenches because it “states in passing that certain areas of its test chip would be ‘prime candidates’ for ‘metal-fill,’ but does not actually disclose the particular location of any alleged ‘dummy’ conductor.” PO Resp. 56 (citation omitted) (citing Ex. 2011 ¶ 205). Patent Owner’s argument improperly attacks Stine1998 alone when Petitioner argues that the combination of Jaso and Stine1998 teaches “trenches.” See In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 426 (CCPA 1981). Petitioner points out that Jaso describes “a damascene method wherein, in general, a via or trench pattern is etched into a planar dielectric layer.” Pet. 44 (emphasis omitted) (citing Ex. 1004, 1:28– 31; 8:5–8; Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 142–144). Petitioner states that Figure 11B of Jaso includes “trenches (15a-d) [which] correspond to trenches for interconnects 45. Patent Owner does not address the trenches taught by Jaso, much less teachings of Jaso in combination with the teachings of Stine1998. See PO Resp. 33–36, 55–61. Accordingly, we are not persuaded that the combination of Jaso and Stine1998 fails to teach “trenches.”” slip op. at 29
Patent outcomesUS 6,232,231 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · GrahamPatents in suitUS 6,232,231 - Juniper Networks, Inc. v. Correct Transmission, LLCInstitution deniedPTAB · Aug 30, 2021 · IPR2021-00571 · APJ Stephen E Belisle · IPR · Institution
Institution was denied for claims 1–6 and 10–15 because neither obviousness ground showed a reasonable likelihood of success on the required control traffic label limitation.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“Notably, although Petitioner understands that the Examiner allowed the Challenged Claims based on this “indicating” limitation (Pet. 33), Petitioner fails to direct us with particularity to any disclosure or teaching in Fine of a “control traffic label” itself “indicating” to LSRs that the STP is to be executed by the LSRs without transmission of the BPDU to the user equipment. See Pet. 33–35. As argued by Patent Owner (Prelim. Resp. 47– 48), Petitioner does not explain with particularity how or why Fine’s VLAN Tag field 304 or Destination Address field 306 (or both) indicates to LSRs that the STP is to be executed by the LSRs without transmission of the BPDU to user equipment (or teaches such “indicating”). Instead, Petitioner merely leaps from arguing that Fine teaches that tagged BPDUs do not reach user equipment (Pet. 34), to averring that this constitutes or teaches the claimed “indicating” limitation, without providing particular support and explanation for such a leap. See Pet. 33–35; 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3) (The petition must identify supporting evidence “with particularity.” (emphasis added)); 37 C.F.R § 42.104(b)(4) (“The petition must specify where each element of the claim is found in the prior art . . . .” (emphasis added)). For the foregoing reasons, and constrained by the Petition, we are not persuaded that the cited evidence adequately supports Petitioner’s contention that Fine discloses “the control traffic label indicating to the LSRs that the STP is to be executed by the LSRs without transmission of the BPDU to the user equipment,” as recited in independent claims 1 and 10.” slip op. at 14
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot reached
“Notably, although Petitioner understands that the Examiner allowed the Challenged Claims based on this “indicating” limitation (Pet. 33), Petitioner fails to direct us with particularity to any disclosure or teaching in Fine of a “control traffic label” itself “indicating” to LSRs that the STP is to be executed by the LSRs without transmission of the BPDU to the user equipment. See Pet. 33–35. As argued by Patent Owner (Prelim. Resp. 47– 48), Petitioner does not explain with particularity how or why Fine’s VLAN Tag field 304 or Destination Address field 306 (or both) indicates to LSRs that the STP is to be executed by the LSRs without transmission of the BPDU to user equipment (or teaches such “indicating”). Instead, Petitioner merely leaps from arguing that Fine teaches that tagged BPDUs do not reach user equipment (Pet. 34), to averring that this constitutes or teaches the claimed “indicating” limitation, without providing particular support and explanation for such a leap. See Pet. 33–35; 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3) (The petition must identify supporting evidence “with particularity.” (emphasis added)); 37 C.F.R § 42.104(b)(4) (“The petition must specify where each element of the claim is found in the prior art . . . .” (emphasis added)). For the foregoing reasons, and constrained by the Petition, we are not persuaded that the cited evidence adequately supports Petitioner’s contention that Fine discloses “the control traffic label indicating to the LSRs that the STP is to be executed by the LSRs without transmission of the BPDU to the user equipment,” as recited in independent claims 1 and 10.” slip op. at 14
§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 7,127,523 - Metall Zug AG / Haag-Streit AG et al. v. Carl Zeiss Meditec AGSome claims unpatentablePTAB · Jun 17, 2021 · IPR2020-00300 · APJ Amber L Hagy · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1 and 21–26 were held unpatentable as obvious over Huber, Everett, and Lexer; claims 2, 27, 40, and 42 were not shown unpatentable. Substitute claims 44 and 45 were entered.
RulingsFinal written decision- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableNot shown unpatentableMixed
“(7) Claim 1 Conclusion After having analyzed the entirety of the trial record and assigning” slip op. at 31
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Motions to amend / substitute claimsMotion to amend, grantedGranted
“For the above reasons, Petitioner has not met its burden to” slip op. at 72
Patent outcomesUS 8,690,330 mixed§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham · NautilusPatents in suitUS 8,690,330 - Google LLC v. Uniloc 2017 LLCRehearing deniedPTAB · May 25, 2021 · IPR2020-00170 · APJ Lynne E Pettigrew · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied Google’s rehearing request, leaving institution denied for claims 1–14 and 17–20 because the petition did not adequately explain combining Hull and Barber.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“disclosure or that the Decision’s analysis of Hull is unsupported by substantial evidence. Petitioner does not point to any disclosure in Hull of descriptors that are not invariant to distortions such as those caused by translation, rotation, and scaling. See Req. Reh’g 2–8. Although Petitioner cites references in Hull to “other” or “alternative” embodiments, Petitioner does not identify, nor do we see, any descriptors other than distortion- invariant descriptors in those embodiments. See id. at 3–8. Nor does Petitioner cite any disclosure in Hull explicitly stating that distortion-invariant descriptors are “optional” or “exemplary,” as Petitioner contends. See id. at 1, 6, 8.” slip op. at 4
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“adequate showing in its obviousness analysis that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have combined the teachings of Hull1 and Barber2 in the manner proposed to achieve the claimed invention, which relates to a system and method for matching a target image to images stored in a database.” slip op. at 2
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable
“adequate showing in its obviousness analysis that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have combined the teachings of Hull1 and Barber2 in the manner proposed to achieve the claimed invention, which relates to a system and method for matching a target image to images stored in a database.” slip op. at 2
§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 6,253,201 - Metall Zug AG / Haag-Streit AG et al. v. Carl Zeiss Meditec AGRehearing deniedPTAB · Mar 4, 2021 · IPR2020-01074 · APJ Grace Karaffa Obermann · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied rehearing and left in place its denial of institution, finding no abuse of discretion in denying the follow-on petition under General Plastic.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“When resolving a rehearing request, the Board reviews a decision on institution “for an abuse of discretion” (37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c) (2019)), which occurs when a “decision was based on an erroneous conclusion of law,” “clearly erroneous factual findings,” or “a clear error of judgment.” PPG Indus. Inc. v. Celanese Polymer Specialties Co., 840 F.2d 1565, 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (citations omitted). Applying that standard, we deny the Rehearing Request.” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › General Plastic (serial petitions)Decided for patent owner
“Accordingly, the Board found, “Standing alone, the sheer number of petitions (five), taken together with Petitioner’s unexplained and significant delay in filing the four follow-on petitions, supports an exercise of our discretionary denial powers.” Dec. 4. The Board supported that finding by an analysis of the factors that bear on the discretionary denial inquiry as set forth in General Plastic Industrial Co. v. Canon Kabushiki Kaisha, IPR2016-01357, Paper 19 (PTAB Sept. 6, 2017) (precedential) (“General Plastic”). Dec. 4–10 (applying the General Plastic factors).” slip op. at 3
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 8,690,330 - Polycom, Inc. v. Directpacket Research, Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Jan 11, 2021 · IPR2019-01235 · APJ Russell E Cass · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–23 are unpatentable as obvious under §103 over Krtolica and Rosenberg, with Eisenberg and DSDP added for certain dependent-claim grounds.
RulingsFinal written decision- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“with the claim language itself, we agree with Petitioner that the ordinary meaning of “multimedia communication data” is data related to multimedia communication, and that this may comprise signaling data required for communicating multimedia between two or more locations. We see nothing in the claim language that requires that data must include the underlying media content itself (such as video or voice signals) in order to qualify as “multimedia communication data.” We also are not persuaded by Patent Owner’s argument that Petitioner’s construction of “multimedia” “means no media” (PO Supp. 1 (emphasis omitted)), because Petitioner is not arguing that media content cannot be present, but instead is simply arguing that media content is one type of “multimedia communication data,” with” slip op. at 12
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successUnpatentableUnpatentable
“each of its elements was, independently, known in the prior art.” KSR, 550 U.S. at 418. An obviousness determination requires finding “both ‘that a skilled artisan would have been motivated to combine the teachings of the prior art references to achieve the claimed invention, and that the skilled artisan would have had a reasonable expectation of success in doing so.’” Intelligent Bio-Sys., Inc. v. Illumina Cambridge Ltd., 821 F.3d 1359, 1367–68 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citation omitted); see KSR, 550 U.S. at 418 (For an obviousness analysis, “it can be important to identify a reason that would have prompted a person of ordinary skill in the relevant field to combine the elements in the way the claimed new invention does.”). Further, an assertion of obviousness “cannot be sustained by mere conclusory statements; instead, there must be some articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of obviousness.” KSR, 550 U.S. at 418 (quoting In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006)); In re NuVasive, Inc., 842 F.3d 1376, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (A finding of a motivation to combine “must be supported by a ‘reasoned explanation.’” (citation omitted)). D. Ground 1: Obviousness over Krtolica and Rosenberg — Claims 1, 3–5, 9–11, 13, 14, 16, 17, 22, and 23 Petitioner contends that claims 1, 3–5, 9–11, 13, 14, 16, 17, 22, and 23 are unpatentable as obvious under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) over Krtolica and Rosenberg. Pet. 30–70. For the reasons that follow, Petitioner has demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that claims 1, 3–5, 9–11, 13, 14, 16, 17, 22, and 23 are unpatentable on this ground. 1. Overview of Krtolica Krtolica is directed to a system that sends information data packets” slip op. at 18
- Obviousness (§103) › Objective indicia / secondary considerations › NexusObjective indicia no nexusDecided for petitioner
“H. Objective Indicia of Nonobviousness Patent Owner also presents arguments and evidence of objective indicia or secondary considerations of nonobviousness. PO Resp. 51–57; PO Sur-Reply 19–22. Objective indicia of nonobviousness may include long-felt but unsolved need, failure of others, unexpected results, commercial success, copying, licensing, industry praise, and expert skepticism. Mintz v. Dietz & Watson, Inc., 679 F.3d 1372, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2012). “[O]bjective indicia ‘may often be the most probative and cogent evidence of nonobviousness in the record,’” and “help turn back the clock and place the claims in the context that led to their invention.” Id. at 1378 (quoting Ortho–McNeil Pharm. v. Mylan Labs., Inc., 520 F.3d 1358, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2008)). Evidence of objective indicia of nonobviousness “must always when present be considered en route to a determination of obviousness.” Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc. v. Maersk Drilling USA, Inc., 699 F.3d 1340, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2012); see also Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 839 F.3d 1034, 1048 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (en banc). Objective indicia of nonobviousness are “only relevant to the obviousness inquiry ‘if there is a nexus between the claimed invention and the [objective indicia of nonobviousness].’” In re Affinity Labs of Tex., LLC, 856 F.3d 883, 901 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (quoting Ormco Corp. v. Align Tech., Inc., 463 F.3d 1299, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2006)). For objective indicia of nonobviousness to be accorded substantial weight, their proponent must establish a nexus between the evidence and the merits of the claimed invention. ClassCo, Inc. v. Apple, Inc., 838 F.3d 1214, 1220 (Fed. Cir. 2016). As the Federal Circuit has explained, “a patentee is entitled to a rebuttable presumption of nexus between the asserted evidence of secondary considerations and a patent claim if the patentee shows that the asserted evidence is tied to a specific product and that the product ‘is the invention disclosed and claimed.’” Fox Factory, Inc. v. SRAM, LLC, 944 F.3d 1366, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (quoting Demaco Corp. v. F. Von Langsdorff Licensing Ltd., 851 F.2d 1387, 1392 (Fed. Cir. 1988)). That is, presuming nexus is appropriate “when the patentee shows that the asserted objective evidence is tied to a specific product and that product ‘embodies the claimed features, and is coextensive with them.’” Id. (quoting Polaris Indus., Inc. v. Arctic Cat, Inc., 882 F.3d 1056, 1072 (Fed. Cir. 2018)). On the other hand, the patentee is not entitled to a presumption of nexus if the patented invention is only a component of a commercially successful machine or process. Id. Once “the patentee has presented a prima facie case of nexus, the burden of coming forward with evidence in rebuttal shifts to the challenger . . . to adduce evidence to show that the commercial success was due to extraneous factors other than the patented invention.” Demaco, 851 F.2d at 1392–93. However, “[a] finding that a presumption of nexus is inappropriate” slip op. at 82
- ExcludeMotion to exclude, grantedGranted
“highly confidential source for the STNS system, and seeks to seal that identification. Paper 29, 1. The Motion is unopposed. We have reviewed the redacted portion of the document, as well as the explanations of the confidential nature of the materials for which sealing is sought, as discussed in the Motion. We grant the Motion and the associated request to enter the Protective Order.” slip op. at 92
Patent outcomesUS 8,560,828 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,560,828 - Polycom, Inc. v. Directpacket Research, Inc.Some claims unpatentablePTAB · Jan 11, 2021 · IPR2019-01234 · APJ Sheila F Mcshane · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 2–5, 15–17, 23–26, 29, and 30 are unpatentable over the stated obviousness grounds; claims 8, 9, 19, 20, 27, and 28 were not shown unpatentable.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“In the Decision on Institution, we adopted Petitioner’s proposed skill level, that is, that one of ordinary skill in the art would have a Bachelor’s degree or equivalent in electrical engineering, computer engineering, or similar field, and at least two years of experience in a relevant field such as telecommunications or multimedia communications. Inst. Dec. 20. We also agreed with Petitioner that one of ordinary skill would have some familiarity with the design and implementation of VoIP and multimedia networks. Id. We did not agree, however, that the level of qualifications included monitoring and maintaining VoIP and multimedia networks, as Petitioner asserted, and therefore declined to adopt those requirements. Id. ordinary skill in the art adopted in the Decision on Institution to include “familiarity with the design and implementation of VoIP and multimedia networks,” but further described this requirement to include other requirements: an understanding of the techniques employed by network firewalls and the issues they present with respect to establishing and conducting multimedia communication sessions; an understanding of the performance demands placed on the network by multimedia communications, and the constraints that such demands place on processing and security measures that could be adopted; and a recognition of the distinctions between prior art firewall traversal solutions and the inventions of the ’978 Patent. PO Resp. 21–22. Patent Owner refers to GPAC, which identifies the factor of the “type of problems encountered in the art” as a consideration in determining the level of ordinary skill in the art. Id. at 22 (citing In re GPAC, 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995)). We have reviewed the relevant technology and claims of the ’978 patent, as well as the technology of the asserted prior art, and we adopt the same qualifications as those adopted in the Decision on Institution because they are commensurate with the relevant technology. These qualifications are similar to presented by Petitioner, with the” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Petitioner relies on the ordinary and customary meaning of the claim terms as understood by one of ordinary skill in the art. Pet. 20. Patent Owner indicates that its arguments are also based upon the ordinary and customary meaning of the terms as they would be understood by one of ordinary skill in the art. PO Resp. 22. We determine that it is not necessary to provide an express interpretation of any of the terms of the claims. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017); Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“[O]nly those terms need be construed that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.”).” slip op. at 11
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundMotivation not foundMixed
“As discussed above, we agree with Petitioner that Kirchhoff discloses the use of SSL, a protocol that uses data encryption (Ex. 1005, 8:47–49). We also agree with Petitioner that Krtolica discloses the use of HTTP protocols on port 80 (Ex. 1004, 6:23–24), and does so with a goal of maintaining high network security (id. at 1:7–10, 2:33–36). As Kirchhoff discloses, and Dr. Lavian’s testimony supports, one of ordinary skill in the art would have been aware that port 443, rather than port 80, would be used for secure web connections using SSL, which includes the use of encryption, and this would have resulted in enhanced network security. See Ex. 1005, 3:38–41; Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 52, 69, 108. As Dr. Lavian testifies, SSL/TLS was the most widely deployed security protocol in the world and the well-known use of SSL in HTTPS protocol enables secure web-based e-commerce. Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 69, 108; Ex. 1035 ¶ 8; Ex. 1006, 5. And, Krtolica has a stated goal to maintain network security. Ex. 1004, 1:7–10, 2:33–37. We find this evidence provides a sufficient rational underpinning in support of obviousness for combining the teachings of Krtolica and Kirchhoff. See KSR, 550 U.S. at 418. Owner’s arguments that use of encryption in SSL was optional and adding encryption would allegedly undermine network security. Nor do we find persuasive the argument that the Petitioner’s motivation to combine based on efficiency is insufficient, because Petitioner relies on another rationale for the combination of Krtolica and Kirchhoff, that is, enhanced network security, also discussed above. We additionally do not find persuasive Patent Owner’s arguments that combining Krtolica and Kirchhoff would render the system of Krtolica unsatisfactory for its intended purpose because, as Petitioner argues, this assertion is contradicted by the state of the art at the time. See Pet. Reply 9. As discussed above, Dr. Lavian explains that there were known systems having firewalls with SSL traversal at the time of the invention. Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 53, 59–65; Ex. 1035 ¶ 20; Ex. 1014. Moreover, the ’978 patent uses encryption with firewalls using a single-port protocol, and Patent Owner does not direct us to any disclosure in that patent that indicates that the use of encryption with a single-port protocol was inventive in that the system, or that encryption had to be done in a special manner. See Pet. Reply 3 (citing Ex. 1001, Fig. 3 (at 311, 341), Fig. 5 (503, 508)); see also Ex. 1001, 6:4–8. In a similar vein, Patent Owner argues that due to incompatibilities the combination of SSL with Krtolica would be unsuccessful, and we address this issue below.” slip op. at 30
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of success › Teaching awayTeaching away not foundDecided for petitioner
“Where the prior art contains “apparently conflicting” teachings (i.e., where some references teach the combination and others teach away from it) each reference must be considered “for its power to suggest solutions to an artisan of ordinary skill . . . consider[ing] the degree to which one reference might accurately discredit another.” In re Young, 927 F.2d 588, 591 (Fed. Cir. 1991). In Hosner, AES encryption appears to have one of the higher processing speeds of the algorithms tested. See Ex. 1006, 23. Further, the ’978 patent itself supports the acceptable performance of AES encryption in single-port protocol, stating that “[a]ny method or algorithm of encryption may be used” with its invention “including, but not limited to 128-bit find Patent Owner’s argument on the use of AES to be persuasive. We have reviewed Petitioner’s explanations and supporting evidence as to how the combination of Kirchhoff and Krtolica teach the limitations of claims 4, 16, and 24, and we agree with and adopt Petitioner’s analysis. Pet. 75–76, 81.” slip op. at 65
Patent outcomesUS 7,710,978 mixedClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 7,710,978 - Amazon Web Services, Inc. v. Kove Io, Inc.Rehearing deniedPTAB · Nov 12, 2020 · IPR2020-00276 · APJ Kamran Jivani · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied rehearing, leaving institution denied because Petitioner did not show RFC1034 disclosed the claimed unique identifier-to-entity relationship for claims 1, 3, 6, 10, 14, 17, 23, 24, 30, and 31.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d) provides that: A party dissatisfied with a decision may file a request for rehearing. The burden of showing a decision should be modified lies with the party challenging the decision. The request must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and where each matter was previously addressed in a motion, opposition, or a reply. See Office Trial Practice Guide (84 Fed. Reg. 64,280 (Nov. 21, 2019)) (emphasis added). Under 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c), “[w]hen rehearing a decision on petition, a panel will review the decision for an abuse of discretion.” An abuse of discretion occurs when a “decision was based on an erroneous conclusion of law or clearly erroneous factual findings, or . . . a clear error of” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“institute a requested review, our inquiry seeks to ascertain whether Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of success on the challenges set forth in the Petition. 35 U.S.C. § 314(a); SAS Inst., Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1359–60 (2018). That inquiry is not limited to disputes presented in a Patent Owner Preliminary Response. Indeed, filing of a Patent Owner Preliminary Response is optional and does not impact our statutory obligation to review the Petition for a reasonable likelihood of success. 35 U.S.C. § 313; 37 C.F.R. § 42.107(a).” slip op. at 4
- BurdenDecided for patent owner
“upon does not remedy the deficiencies we identified in the Petition. As we stated, Dr. Weissman’s testimony “does not resolve the failure of Petitioner to account for the required relationship between a host computer (i.e., entity) and a domain name (i.e., identifier).” Dec. on Inst. 20–21 (citing Pet. 19–20, 22–23; Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 75, 88) (emphasis added). Thus, Petitioner fails to show that we misapprehended or overlooked arguments or evidence regarding the claimed “entity” because Petitioner did not clearly explain how a “host” as disclosed in RFC1034 meets the claimed entity and how a domain name (i.e., the “identifier”) identifies a single host. A rehearing request is not an opportunity to argue what should have been addressed in the Petition.” slip op. at 5
NonePatents in suitUS 7,233,978 - Apple Inc. v. Uniloc 2017 LLCAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Oct 15, 2020 · IPR2019-00918 · APJ Bryan F Moore · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1, 3–6, and 8–10 are unpatentable under § 103 over Charbonnier, RFC793, SMS Specification, and DECT Speakerphone; claims 4 and 9 also over Lee.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“person having such skill “would have had a Bachelor’s degree in computer science or a comparable field of study, plus approximately two to three years of professional experience with cellular phone and IP networks, or other relevant industry experience. Additional graduate education could substitute for professional experience and significant experience in the field could substitute for formal education.” Pet. 11 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 41). Patent Owner “does not offer a competing definition at this stage of the proceeding.” PO Resp. 4. We determine that Petitioner’s description of the 9 Patent Owner does not put forth evidence it alleges tends to show secondary considerations of non-obviousness in its Patent Owner Response. level of ordinary skill in the art is supported by the record. Therefore, we adopt Petitioner’s proposal.” slip op. at 10
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“We do not adopt Petitioner’s construction. First, for reasons discussed below, Petitioner’s construction does not find sufficient support. Second, Petitioner’s construction does not resolve the controversy between the parties. We also do not adopt Patent Owner’s construction, that the “terminal” must be capable of short-range wireless communications, such as Bluetooth communications, that may be employed by computers, for the reasons discussed below.” slip op. at 13
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner argues it would have been obvious to modify Charbonnier’s DECT base 7 to include a digital speakerphone as taught by DECT Speakerphone. Pet. 67. We find persuasive Petitioner’s rationale for the combination because both Charbonnier and DECT Speakerphone relate to DECT phones, and DECT Speakerphones provides several express motivations to combine by teaching digital speakerphones in DECT base stations. Id. at 66–67 (citing Ex. 1029, 1). Furthermore, DECT Speakerphone provides several reasons to include a digital speakerphone, including: (1) making and receiving calls from the base unit even when the handset is elsewhere, (2) hand free for more convenience, and (3) conference calling where more than one person can listen or speak. Id. (citing Ex. 1029, 1). We are persuaded by Petitioner’s argument that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had a reasonable expectation of success in adding a speakerphone to Charbonnier’s DECT base station 7 based on, for example, DECT Speakerphone and other documents showing Samsung and other phones with similar DECT speakerphones in the base station. Id. at 67 (citing Ex. 1046, Exhibit A). Furthermore, we find persuasive Petitioner’s argument that DECT” slip op. at 30
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“For the reasons above, we are persuaded that Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that Charbonnier, RFC793, SMS Specification, and DECT Speakerphone teach the limitations of claims 1 and 6.” slip op. at 44
Patent outcomesUS 8,369,298 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,369,298
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.