• Permobil, Inc. v. Pride Mobility Products CorporationAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Dec 31, 2014 · IPR2013-00411 · APJ Matthew R Clements · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–10 are unpatentable as obvious over Goertzen and Hosino; claims 1 and 4–10 are also unpatentable as obvious over Goertzen and Mulhern ’420.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “plate”(claim 1) In the Decision to Institute, we concluded that no express construction of “a forward-extending front arm rigidly extending from the mounting plate” was necessary. Dec. to Inst. 7–8. Neither party contests that conclusion, and nothing since our Decision to Institute indicates it should be changed. We maintain our conclusion that no express construction of “a forward-extending front arm rigidly extending from the mounting plate” is necessary.” slip op. at 6

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner

    “Figures 3B depicts mounting plate 56 relative to drive wheel axis A-DW. However, the ’343 patent also discloses that: for conventional configurations having a motor that is perpendicular to the drive wheel axis (and requiring a right angle gearbox, which is not shown in the figures), the motor swings about the gearbox output shaft to impart motion to the front caster arm, as for example shown in U.S. Pat. No. 6,129,165. Ex. 1001, col. 9, ll. 20–25 (emphasis added). Figure 9 of the ’165 patent is reproduced below: Figure 9 depicts a side view of a power wheelchair according to the ’165 patent. The ’343 Patent describes motor 80 of Figure 9 as “perpendicular to the drive wheel axis” 24. As can be seen by a comparison of the figures, motor 80 of Figure 9 of the ’165 patent is oriented differently from mounting plate 56 of Figure 3B of the ’343 patent. Thus, the ’343 patent uses “perpendicular to the drive wheel axis” to refer to orientations other than the orientation of mounting plate 56 in Figure 3B.” slip op. at 7

  • Skill levelSkill level board ownDecided for patent owner

    “We are not persuaded that the level of ordinary skill in the art required at least three years of experience specific to obstacle-traversing and curb-climbing systems and suspensions, as Patent Owner contends. The problems identified by Patent Owner and the skills required—e.g., “analysis of the various forces and moments,” “understanding of moment arms,” “understand[ing] the effects on moments and forces,” (PO Resp. 28–29)— are within the ordinary skill of a person with an undergraduate degree in mechanical engineering. Moreover, we note that the named inventor of the ’343 patent—James Mulhern—testified, in a related reexamination, that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had only “a B.S. in mechanical engineering or equivalent, or at least 3 years of experience in the field of designing powered wheelchairs for personal mobility.” Ex. 1026 ¶ 10 (emphasis added). Based on our review of the technology claimed in the ’343 patent and the description of the powered wheelchair set forth in the specification, we determine that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had either (1) an undergraduate degree in mechanical engineering or an equivalent degree; or (2) at least three years of experience designing powered wheelchairs for personal mobility.” slip op. at 10

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner

    “deceleration, or doing any of the engineering that, according to him, would be necessary to compensate for the reduced stability caused by a lower pivot. PO Resp. 19–23. The question before us, however, is not whether Dr. Richter did the engineering necessary to combine the prior art into a functional prototype, but whether doing so would have been within the ability of a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the claimed invention. In that regard, we credit Dr. Richter’s testimony that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have known how to change various other parameters in order to achieve a stable version of the claimed invention. Ex. 2004, 185:23–186:14. Patent Owner asserts that the proposed modification is anything but routine (PO Resp. 23–25), but does not explain why such calculations would not have been within the ability of a person of ordinary skill in the art. For the foregoing reasons, we find that Petitioner has articulated sufficiently a reason with rational underpinnings for for combining the teachings of Goertzen and Hosino to achieve the wheelchair recited in the challenged claims.” slip op. at 19

  Patent outcomesUS 8,408,343 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR
  Patents in suitUS 8,408,343
• Permobil, Inc. v. Pride Mobility Products CorporationAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Dec 31, 2014 · IPR2013-00407 · APJ Matthew R Clements · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–13 are unpatentable under § 103: claims 1, 4–8, and 11–13 over Goertzen and Hosino; claims 2, 3, 9, and 10 over those references and Schaffner.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “mounted to the frame such that the arm is capable of rotating about a pivot axis.” Pet. 6–7 (citing Ex. 1001, col. 7, ll. 47–48 (“A suspension arm 224 is pivotally mounted to the frame 3 at pivot 224A.”)). Patent Owner contends that Petitioner’s proposed construction “is vague because, when read in context of the rest of the claim language, it is unclear whether ‘a pivot axis’ in the construction is the recited ‘arm pivot axis’ or some different axis.” Prelim. Resp. 18. We are not persuaded by Patent Owner’s argument because each of claims 1 and 7 specifies that the arm is pivotably mounted to the frame “at an arm pivot axis.” However, we also are not persuaded by Petitioner’s argument that the patentee intended to give “pivotably mounted to the frame” a meaning other than its plain and ordinary meaning. Apart from the claims, the ’598 patent does not use the term “pivotably mounted,” and the portion of the ’598 patent cited by Petitioner describes a suspension arm as “pivotally mounted,” not “pivotably mounted.” Ex. 1001, col. 7, ll. 47–48. Thus, we conclude that “pivotably mounted to the frame” does not require express construction. slip op. at 7

  • Skill levelSkill level board ownDecided for petitioner

    “We are not persuaded that the level of ordinary skill in the art required at least three years of experience specific to curb-climbing systems, as Patent Owner contends. The problems identified by Patent Owner and the skills required—e.g., “analysis of the various forces and moments,” “understanding of moment arms,” “understand[ing] the effects on moments and forces,” (PO Resp. 29–30)—are within the ordinary skill of a person with an undergraduate degree in mechanical engineering. Moreover, we note that the named inventor of the ’598 patent—James Mulhern—testified, in a related reexamination, that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had only “a B.S. in mechanical engineering or equivalent, or at least 3 years of experience in the field of designing powered wheelchairs for personal mobility.” Ex. 1028 ¶ 10 (emphasis added). Based on our review of the technology claimed in the ’598 patent and the description of the anti-tip systems for powered vehicles set forth in the specification, we determine that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had either (1) an undergraduate degree in mechanical engineering or an equivalent degree; or (2) at least three years of experience designing powered wheelchairs for personal mobility.” slip op. at 9

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner
  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner

    “Patent Owner also faults Dr. Richter for not analyzing declines or deceleration, or doing any of the engineering that, according to Dr. Richter, would be necessary to compensate for the reduced stability caused by a lower pivot. PO Resp. 19–24. The question before us, however, is not whether Dr. Richter did the engineering necessary to combine the prior art into a functional prototype, but whether doing so would have been within the ability of a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the claimed invention. In that regard, we credit Dr. Richter’s testimony that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have known how to change various other parameters in order to achieve a stable version of the claimed invention. Ex. 2004, 185:23–186:14. Patent Owner asserts that the proposed modification is anything but routine (PO Resp. 24–26), but does not explain why such calculations would not have been within the ability of a person of ordinary skill in the art. For the foregoing reasons, we are persuaded Petitioner has articulated sufficiently a reason with rational underpinnings for combining the teachings of Goertzen and Hosino to achieve the wheelchair recited in the challenged claims.” slip op. at 18

  Patent outcomesUS 8,408,598 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR
  Patents in suitUS 8,408,598
• Riverbed Technology, Inc. v. Silver Peak Systems, Inc.Other
  PTAB · Dec 30, 2014 · IPR2013-00403 · APJ Justin T Arbes · IPR · Final written decision

  The Board canceled claims 1–27 and granted substitute claims 28 and 30, but denied substitute claims 29 and 31–33 for failure to meet amendment requirements or show patentability.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • ScopeMotion to amend, grantedGranted

    “1. No Broadening of Scope Proposed substitute claims in an inter partes review “may not enlarge the scope of the claims of the patent.” 35 U.S.C. § 316(d)(3); see 37 C.F.R. § 42.121(a)(2)(ii). In its Motion to Amend, Patent Owner proposes claim 28 as a substitute for claim 2, claim 29 as a substitute for claim 11, claim 30 as a substitute for claim 13, claim 31 as a substitute for claim 22, claim 32 as a substitute for claim 24, and claim 33 as a substitute for claim 27. Mot. 1–6. Each claim includes all of the limitations of the corresponding claim for which it is a substitute, and adds additional limitations. No limitations are removed. Petitioner in its Opposition does not dispute Patent Owner’s assertion that the proposed substitute claims do not enlarge the scope of the claims of the ’583 patent. See Mot. 8. We are persuaded that the proposed substitute claims do not enlarge the scope of the original patent claims.” slip op. at 12

  • Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Written description adequateDecided for patent owner

    “2. Written Description Support Pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 42.121(b), a motion to amend in an inter partes review must set forth “[t]he support in the original disclosure of the patent for each claim that is added or amended,” and “[t]he support in an earlier-filed disclosure for each claim for which benefit of the filing date of the earlier filed disclosure is sought.”” slip op. at 12

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner

    “Term Proposed Interpretation “sync point” “a location in a data flow having data meeting a specified criteri[on]” “fine sync point” “a location in a data flow having data meeting a specified fine criteri[on] that is less restrictive than a coarse criteri[on]” “coarse sync point” “a location in a data flow having data meeting a specified coarse criteri[on] more restrictive than a fine criteri[on]” Mot. 6–7 (citing Ex. 1001, col. 9, ll. 20–57). Petitioner in its Opposition does not argue that Patent Owner’s proposed interpretations are incorrect. We agree that Patent Owner’s proposed interpretations represent the broadest reasonable interpretation of the claims in light of the Specification of the ’583 patent. The Specification discloses fine filter 560 and coarse filter 565, where “[t]he appliance designates the locations in the data flow which meet the fine and coarse filter criteria as fine and coarse sync-points, respectively,” and the filter criteria for coarse filter 565 are “more restrictive” than the filter criteria for fine filter 560. Ex. 1001, col. 9, ll. 20–38. The Specification also describes an example where “the filter criteri[on] declares a fine sync-point when the top five bits of the hashes are all zeros and a coarse filter criteri[on] which stores or compares hashes when the top ten bits of the hashes are all zeros” (i.e., the filter criterion for the coarse filter is more restrictive). Id. at col. 9, ll. 30–34. Accordingly, we interpret “sync point,” “fine sync point,” and “coarse sync point” as set forth above.” slip op. at 14

  • Prior constructionPrior construction adoptedDecided for patent owner

    “Also, in the Decision on Institution, we interpreted various claim terms of the independent claims of the ’583 patent as follows: Term Interpretation “network memory” (claims 1, 12, device(s) in a network for and 23) storing information “appliance” (claims 1, 12, and 23) hardware and/or software elements applied to a particular use “instruction” (claims 1, 12, and a message or signal that 23) indicates, explicitly or implicitly, an action to perform See Dec. on Inst. 6–10. Patent Owner’s proposed substitute claims depend from the original independent claims of the ’583 patent, and the parties do not dispute these interpretations in their papers. We do not perceive any reason or evidence that now compels any deviation from these interpretations. Accordingly, for purposes of assessing the proposed substitute claims, we incorporate our previous analysis of the three terms above. See id.” slip op. at 15

  Claim construction§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosure
  Patents in suitUS 8,370,583
• CB Distributors, Inc. / Dr Distributors, LLC v. Fontem Holdings 1 B.V.Some claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Dec 24, 2014 · IPR2013-00387 · APJ Jacqueline Wright Bonilla · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–10, 12, 15–26, and 33–38 are unpatentable: claims 1, 2, 5–8, 10, 33, 35, 37, and 38 as anticipated by Liu; the specified remaining claims as obvious over Hon ’494 and Liu.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

    “filed a Petition (Paper 1, “Pet.”) to institute an inter partes review of claims 1–12, 15–26, and 33–41 of U.S. Patent No. 8,156,944 B2 (Ex. 1001) (“the ’944 patent”). The previous Patent Owner, Ruyan Investment (Holdings) Limited,1 did not file a preliminary response. We determined that the information presented in the Petition demonstrated that there was a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail in challenging claims 1–12, 15–26, and 33–38, but not claims 39–41, of the ’944 patent, as unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 102 or § 103, or both. Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 314, we instituted this proceeding on December 30, 2013, to review whether claims 1–12, 15–26, and 33–38 are unpatentable on the following grounds. Reference(s) Basis Claims Challenged Liu (Ex. 1019)2 § 102 1, 2, 5–8, 10, 33, 35, 37, and 38 Hon ’494 (Exs. 1008/1009)3 § 103 1–4, 8–12, 15–26, 33, 34, 36, and 38” slip op. at 2

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

    “We decline, however, to read limitations that are not recited into the claims. While we read claims in view of the Specification, we do not read limitations from embodiments in the Specification into the claims. Hill-Rom Servs., Inc. v. Stryker Corp., 755 F.3d 1367, 1371 (Fed. Cir 2014) (citing Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad, Inc., 358 F.3d 898, 904 (Fed. Cir. 2004)). Our reviewing court “has expressly rejected the contention that if a patent describes only a single embodiment, the claims of the patent must be construed as being limited to that embodiment.” Hill-Rom Servs., 755 F.3d at 1371–72 (quoting Liebel-Flarsheim, 358 F.3d at 906).” slip op. at 10

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

    “At least one dictionary definition provided by Patent Owner mirrors the dictionary definition cited in our Decision to Institute. Dec. to Inst. 11 (citing Random House Webster’s College Dictionary 1051 (1995) (defining “porous” as “permeable by water, air, etc.” or “full of pores”)). Exhibit B attached to Mr. Sheehan’s Declaration provides several definitions for “porous” as presented in the Free Online Dictionary (http://www.thefreedictionary.com/porous). That dictionary defines “porous” to mean, among other definitions, “having pores,” “[a]dmitting the passage of gas or liquid through pores or interstices,” or “permeable to water, air, or other fluids.” Ex. 2001, Ex. B. The other dictionary cited by Mr. Sheehan provides definitions for “porous” that include “containing minute interstices through which water, air, etc., may pass.” Id. at Ex. C (providing an on-line Oxford English Dictionary). While both dictionaries define “porous” to include the definition of “full of pores,” both dictionaries also include less limiting definitions. Id. at Exs. B, C. We do not agree with Patent Owner or Mr. Sheehan that the broadest reasonable construction of “porous” is limited to “full of pores or interstices into which liquid or gas is absorbed or defused.” PO Resp. 26; Ex. 2001 ¶ 29. Rather, as discussed in our Decision to Institute, we interpret “porous,” consistent with its ordinary meaning and how it is used the Specification, to refer to a component that includes pores and is permeable to liquid, i.e., admits passage of air or liquid through pores or interstices. Dec. to Inst. 11. A component that includes such pores has the ability to “absorb” liquid in the pores, consistent with disclosures in the Specification, regardless of whether the porous component has a few pores or is full of pores, such as in the case of a foam. Ex. 1001, 6:30–34; 7:3–7.” slip op. at 12

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “narrowly as Patent Owner suggests. Rather, we consider whether Liu describes (i) an atomizing chamber that runs through, i.e., inside and along the length of, the atomizer and its electric heating rod, such that (ii) atomization occurs along (i.e., runs through), the length of the chamber. Petitioner has established by a preponderance of the evidence that Figure 2 of Liu depicts (i) an atomizing chamber inside heater housing 24 that runs through, i.e., inside and along the length of, heater housing 24 and its electric heating rod (i.e., rod and heater wire 26). Pet. 18–20, 24, 28 (citing Ex. 1019, Figs. 2, 5, 6:18–22, 7:16–19, 9:19–20). Petitioner also establishes that Liu describes (ii) atomization occurring along the length of the chamber inside heater housing 24. Contrary to Patent Owner’s assertion, it does not matter to our analysis that the upstream end of heater housing 24 in Liu is not “unblocked,” and it does not matter whether apertures 28 are “small.” Rather, we consider whether apertures in heater housing 24 in Liu allow liquid to come into the chamber such that atomization occurs along the length of the chamber, as required by claims 1 and 10.” slip op. at 19

  Patent outcomesUS 8,156,944 mixed
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness
  Patents in suitUS 8,156,944
• Fidelity National Information Services, Inc. v. Checkfree CorporationAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Dec 22, 2014 · CBM2013-00030 · APJ Brian J Mcnamara · CBM · Final written decision

  Claims 1–21 are unpatentable under § 101 because they claim an abstract payment-intermediation concept implemented with generic computer functions.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

    “BACKGROUND On December 23, 2013, we entered a Decision to Institute a covered business method patent review, Paper 16 (“Dec. to Inst.”), of U.S. Patent No. 7,853,524 B2 (“the ’524 Patent”) on the grounds that claims 1–21 do not recite patent-eligible subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.” slip op. at 2

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “terms “electronic bill” and “EBP” do not even appear in the specification, Petitioner argues that Patent Owner is attempting to recast abstract ideas recited in the ’524 Patent claims in a manner that requires machines or transformations. Pet. Reply 2, 6. We agree with Petitioner that Patent Owner’s construction arguments attempt to read into the claims features that are not recited in them. For example, although there is no EBP system mentioned in the claims, citing the testimony of its expert, Dr. John Kelly, Patent Owner argues that a payment request is captured through an automated interaction with a user over a telephone or is conveyed by transferring data to the EBP system over a data network from a computer. PO Resp. 21–22. As discussed below, we decline to alter any of the constructions we applied in our Decision to Institute.” slip op. at 4

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner

    “Merchant credit limit associated with a payee Patent Owner contends that our construction of the “merchant credit limit associated with a payee” as the maximum amount of credit a merchant extends to a payer is contrary to the plain language of the claims because the limit is associated with the payee. PO Resp. 51. Our construction is consistent with the limit being associated with the payee, i.e., the party to whom the payment is made. Patent Owner’s proposed construction, “a value reflecting the credit limit used by the EBP system which is associated with a particular payee,” PO Resp. 52, reads into the claim an extrinsic EBP system not discussed in the specification. In addition, the value reflecting the credit limit is the amount of credit a payee, i.e., a merchant, extends to a payer. Claims 1, 11, and 21 each recite comparing a payment amount associated with the received request, i.e., the request received on behalf of the payer, to a merchant credit limit associated with the payee. The only credit limits described in the specification are limits on the amount of credit extended to a payer. Although the specification describes a merchant credit limit, it does not describe specifically such a limit associated with the payee. The specification describes comparing the payment amount to a merchant credit limit, and making the payment as an electronic payment or a service provider check, if the payment amount is under a specified amount. Ex. 1001, col. 5, l. 65–col. 6, l. 5. Any amount within the merchant’s (i.e., the payee’s) credit limit is added to the consumer’s (i.e., payer’s) monthly ACH balance, and any transaction can be compared to the consumer’s credit limit parameters stored in a database. Id. at col. 6, ll. 5–10. The specification also describes releasing the payment as a draft written on the consumer’s account, rather than the service provider’s account, if the payment amount exceeds the consumer’s, i.e., the payer’s, credit limit. Id. at col. 6, ll. 10– 16. Because the consumer’s credit limit described in the specification protects the service provider, id. at col. 5, ll. 35–37, 65–66, it is a limit associated with the service provider rather than the payee. Claims 1, 11, and 21, however, recite the merchant credit limit associated with the payee. Because each merchant may extend a different amount of credit to each customer, the merchant credit limit associated with the payee limitation appears to require the service provider computer to select a payment means based on comparing the requested payment amount to the amount of credit the merchant, i.e., the payee, extends to the payer. That is, the amount of the payment is compared to the payer’s credit limit with the payee. In any case, as discussed below, this limitation is not material to our determination of the issues under 35 U.S.C. § 101.” slip op. at 8

  • Patent Eligibility (§101) › Alice/Mayo step one — 'directed to'Step1 directed to exceptionUnpatentable

    “and 21 of the ’524 Patent recites a method or apparatus in which a service provider receives a request to pay a payee, selects a form of crediting the payee based on comparing the payer’s account number to the payee’s merchant account scheme and the payment amount to a merchant credit limit associated with the payee, and directs the payment to the payee in the selected form. Thus, each of the independent claims is drawn to a computer-implemented process or apparatus in which a third party intermediary, i.e., the payment service provider, receives a request to make payment, applies certain criteria to determine what form of payment to use, and then directs the payment to the payee in that form. In Alice, the Supreme Court considered claims that, on their face, were drawn to the fundamental economic concept of exchanging financial obligations between two parties using a third-party intermediary to mitigate settlement risk. The Court, concluded that, like the hedging in Bilski, the claims were drawn to an “abstract idea” beyond the scope of § 101. Alice Corp., 134 S. Ct. at 2355–57.1 In the ’524 Patent, the service provider intermediates payment between the payer and the payee, acting much like the third party intermediary in Alice. The payment service provider mitigates settlement risk by crediting the payee or issuing a check to the payee drawn on the service provider’s funds, or in other circumstances, issuing a draft drawn on the payer’s funds, i.e., determining the form of payments based on the comparisons recited in the claims. Ex. 1001, col. 5, l. 25–col. 6, l. 15. The computer implementation associated with comparing the account number and 1 In Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 (2010) the Court found upatentable, as abstract ideas, claims drawn to hedging against the financial risk of commodity price fluctuations where the claims recited the steps of initiating a series of financial transactions between commodity providers and consumers, identifying market participants with a counterrisk for the same commodity and initiating a series of risk balancing transactions between those market participants and the commodity provider. the credit limit are incidental to the fundamental economic concept of having a third party intermediate a settlement either by crediting the payee from the third party’s funds (as in a credit transaction) or from the payer’s funds (as when the amounts exceed the payer’s credit limit with the service provider). Thus, we conclude that each of independent claims 1, 11, and 21 is directed to an abstract concept.” slip op. at 12

  Patent outcomesUS 7,853,524 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 101 eligibilitycites Alice · Mayo · Bilski
  Patents in suitUS 7,853,524
• Metavante Corporation / Fidelity National Information Services, Inc. v. Checkfree CorporationAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Dec 22, 2014 · CBM2013-00032 · APJ Brian J Mcnamara · CBM · Final written decision

  Claims 1–60 are unpatentable under § 101 because they claim an abstract intermediary function implemented with routine computer activity.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • ExcludeMotion to exclude, deniedDenied

    “Petitioner’s expert Michael Shamos. Paper 41 (“Mot. to Exclude”). Petitioner opposes Patent Owner's Motion to Exclude on the basis that these statements Patent Owner moves to exclude are proper rebuttal to Patent Owner's experts. Paper 42 (“Opp. to Mot. to Exclude”). Our Final Written Decision does not cite or rely on any of the subject matter Patent Owner seeks to exclude. Therefore, we dismiss Patent Owner’s Motion to Exclude.” slip op. at 23

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed board ownDecided for petitioner

    “We agree with Petitioner. Claim 1 recites the single step of executing computer implemented instructions with one or more processors. Claim 1 recites that those instructions include ones in which the clearinghouse receives a payment request (or a request to add a payee to a payer’s pick list), accesses billing information stored in a database, identifies payee bill presentment information from the accessed information, and generates and transmits to the payer a notification of the bill presentment information.1 Although the one or more processors may also execute instructions to perform routine ancillary functions for the central clearinghouse to receive the request, access the database and transmit the information, there are no such instructions or structures recited in claim 1. Claim 1 of the ’749 Patent does not recite any structure for the bill presentment and payment central clearinghouse—nor does claim 1 recite any particular software instructions, any particular processors, any particular configuration or interconnection of the recited “one or more processors,” or any other structure to execute the claimed functions called for in the instructions. Thus, the bill presentment and payment central clearinghouse in claim 1 must be construed without structural limitations, other than being programmed to carry out the recited functions.” slip op. at 5

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner

    “The ’749 Patent describes the payee-pick-list as a list of payees the user may plan to pay electronically and states that each user’s individual list is stored in the form of a database in a memory associated with the central clearinghouse station. Ex. 1001, col. 16, ll. 49–54. We disagree with Patent Owner’s characterization of the payee-pick-list as a data structure merely because it is used directly by the programmed central clearinghouse computer system. PO Resp. 40. Claim 1 recites receiving a request to add a payee to a pick-list associated with the payer, but does not recite any limitations concerning the pick-list. The specification refers to a database known as a payee-pick-list that includes certain information such as payee identifiers, street addresses, cities, states, zip codes, phone numbers and consumer account numbers. Ex. 1001, col. 16, 61–65. Nothing in this list of common information associated with the payee requires any particular data structure. Thus, we do not import a data structure limitation into the construction of "payee-pick-list” or "pick-list."” slip op. at 7

  • Patent Eligibility (§101) › Alice/Mayo step one — 'directed to'Step1 directed to exceptionUnpatentable

    “patentable subject matter. First, we determine whether the claims at issue are directed to one or more patent-ineligible concepts, i.e., laws of nature, natural phenomenon and abstract ideas. Id. at 2355 (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1296–96 (2012)). If so, we then consider whether the elements of each claim, both individually and as an ordered combination, transform the nature of the claim into a patent-eligible application to ensure that the patent in practice amounts to significantly more than a patent upon the ineligible concept itself. Id. Thus, the first step in our analysis is to consider whether the claims of the ’749 Patent recite a patent-ineligible concept. Patent Owner describes the central clearinghouse as a necessary intermediary between payers and payees interacting with each user station and handling EBPP interactions between thousands, if not millions, of such stations, which themselves are computers. Id. at 22. In Alice, the Supreme Court considered claims drawn to a method of exchanging financial obligations between two parties using a third-party intermediary to mitigate settlement risk and concluded that on their face, claims drawn to the concept of an intermediated settlement, like the hedging in Bilski, is an “abstract idea” beyond the scope of § 101. Id. at 2355–57.2 We conclude that the claims of the ’749 Patent, which are directed to a clearinghouse that acts as an intermediary between a payer and the payee by notifying the payer about payee bill presentment information, are not directed to patent-eligible subject matter. The steps recited in claim 1, and in each 2 In Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 (2010), the Supreme Court found unpatentable, as abstract ideas, claims drawn to hedging against the financial risk of commodity price fluctuations where the claims recited the steps of initiating a series of financial transactions between commodity providers and consumers, identifying market participants with a counter-risk for the same commodity and initiating a series of risk balancing transactions between those market participants and the commodity provider. of independent claims 20, 40, 59, and 60, are carried out by a clearinghouse that receives a request from a payer to provide payee information or add a payee to the payer’s pick-list. The claims recite receiving a request and are not limited to any particular number of such requests. The clearinghouse retrieves the payee information from a database and generates and transmits a responsive notification message to the payer. Thus, independent claims 1, 20, 40, 59, and 60 are drawn to the patent-ineligible concept of executing instructions in which an intermediary receives a request, retrieves information from a database, and transmits the information to the requester.” slip op. at 9

  Patent outcomesUS 7,792,749 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 101 eligibilitycites Alice · Mayo · Bilski
  Patents in suitUS 7,792,749
• Nuvasive, Inc. v. Warsaw Orthopedic, Inc.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Dec 17, 2014 · IPR2013-00395 · APJ Lora M Green · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–6 are unpatentable under § 103(a) over both Senter and Brantigan ’035, and Michelson ’037, Wagner, and Brantigan ’035.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelOther

    “A claim is unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) if the differences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 406 (2007). The question of obviousness is resolved on the basis of underlying factual determinations including: (1) the scope and content of the prior art; (2) any differences between the claimed subject matter and the prior art; (3) the level of ordinary skill in the art; and (4) objective evidence of nonobviousness. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1966). The level of ordinary skill in the art usually is evidenced by the references themselves. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001); In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995); In re Oelrich, 579 F.2d 86, 91 (CCPA 1978).” slip op. at 11

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner

    “As demonstrated by the embodiment shown in Figure 14, reproduced above, however, there may be more than a single bearing surface. The claim language only requires that those bearing surfaces be convex. We agree, therefore, with Petitioner that the claim language does not require that the convexity be along the entire length of the implant. Moreover, independent claims 1 and 4 only require that the “upper and lower bearing surfaces . . . being convex along the entire length of said upper and lower bearing surfaces.” There is nothing in the claim language that requires that the convexity conform to the anatomic endplates of the adjacent vertebrae. The Specification does not provide a definition of convexity as conforming to the anatomic endplates of the adjacent vertebrae with reasonable clarity, deliberateness, and precision. We decline, therefore, to construe the convexity of the bearing surfaces as requiring that the convexity conform to the anatomic endplates of the adjacent vertebrae. Thus, we construe “upper and lower bearing surfaces” as requiring that the bearing surface itself must be convex along the entire length of the bearing surface, but as the implant may have more than one upper bearing surface, as well as more than one lower bearing surface, the convexity need not be along the entire length of the implant. Moreover, the convexity need not conform to the anatomic endplates of the adjacent vertebrae.” slip op. at 10

  • Obviousness (§103) › Objective indicia / secondary considerations › NexusObjective indicia no nexusDecided for petitioner

    “Evidence of commercial success, or other secondary considerations, is only significant if there is a nexus between the claimed invention and the commercial success.” Ormco Corp. v. Align Tech. Inc., 463 F.3d 1299, 1311-12 (Fed. Cir. 2006). “For objective evidence to be accorded substantial weight, its proponent must establish a nexus between the evidence and the merits of the claimed invention.” In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1995). In order to establish a proper nexus, the patent owner must offer proof that the sales were a direct result of the unique characteristics of the claimed invention—as opposed to other economic and commercial factors unrelated to the quality of the patented subject matter. See Microsoft v. Proxyconn, Inc., IPR2012-00026, slip op. at 4 (PTAB Mar. 8, 2013) (Paper 32). Patent Owner, however, has not attempted to establish a nexus between the claims of the ’696 and the CLYDESDALE® Spinal System. Thus, Patent Owner’s arguments and evidence as to commercial success are entitled to little or no weight. slip op. at 13

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of success › Teaching awayTeaching away not foundMotivation foundDecided for petitioner

    “Moreover, as taught by Brantigan ’035, the sharp apexes of the nubs bite into the vertebrae bone, and, thus, once the implant is in the proper position, it will not shift from that position. Ex. 1005, 21:1–5. We, thus, credit Dr. Brantigan’s testimony that the ratchetings would not propel an implant forward, but would resist forward movement of the implant, as well as back-out of the implant, after implantation. Ex. 1017 ¶ 18. Thus, we agree with Petitioner that Senter does not teach away from the combination with Brantigan ’035.” slip op. at 19

  Patent outcomesUS 8,444,696 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,444,696
• Nuvasive, Inc. v. Warsaw Orthopedic, Inc.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Dec 17, 2014 · IPR2013-00396 · APJ Lora M Green · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 7–12 are unpatentable under § 103(a) as obvious over the combination of Steffee, Michelson ’037, and Kim.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner

    “Patent Owner argues that ratchetings should be construed as “facets that are angled to afford forward movement of the spinal fusion implant in one direction and facets that are angled to prevent the spinal fusion implant from backing out in the opposite direction.” PO Resp. 17 (citing Ex. 2005 ¶ 38). Petitioner does not present an alternate construction. We determine that Patent Owner’s construction is consistent with the Specification and the language of the claim itself, and, thus, we adopt that construction.” slip op. at 10

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner

    “a hole that extends from the upper bearing surface to the lower bearing surface that is of sufficient size to permit growth of bone therethrough. Stated differently, “opening,” as required by challenged independent claims 7 and 10, requires that the hole be vertical in the implant as placed. While Steffee does not teach a vertical opening, it does teach that the implant has a plurality of horizontal openings that extend between the side surfaces to allow for blood flow, as well as bone growth from one side of the implant to the other. Ex. 1108, 2:64–67. Michelson ’037 also teaches an implant that may contain a plurality of cells or openings of 1–3 mm, into which fusion-promoting materials may be placed, allowing a bony bond between the adjacent vertebrae to each other, as well as to the implant. Ex. 1109, 8:10–21. Thus, the openings of Steffee and the opening of Michelson ’037 serve the same purpose—that is, to allow the growth of bone to aid in bonding the implants to the adjacent vertebrae. The addition of vertical openings as taught by Michelson ’037 to the implant of Steffee would have been a predictable use of an element taught by the prior art according to its established function. KSR, 550 U.S. at 417.” slip op. at 21

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of success › Teaching awayTeaching away not foundDecided for petitioner

    “The obviousness inquiry, however, does not require an advantage or an improvement in properties. See In re Fulton, 391 F.3d 1195, 1200 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“[A] finding that the prior art as a whole suggests the desirability of a particular combination need not be supported by a finding that the prior art suggests that the combination claimed by the patent applicant is the preferred, or most desirable, combination.”); see also In re Gurley, 27 F.3d 551, 553 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (“[a] known or obvious composition does not become patentable simply because it has been described as somewhat inferior to some other product for the same use.”). Moreover, the fact that Brantigan ’757, referenced by Steffee, discloses horizontal slots, but Steffee did not adopt them, does not amount to a teaching away from the use of horizontal slots. See Fulton, 391 F.3d at 1201 (“The prior art’s mere disclosure of more than one alternative does not constitute a teaching away from any . . . alternatives because such disclosure does not criticize, discredit, or otherwise discourage the solution claimed.”).” slip op. at 22

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of success › HindsightDecided for petitioner

    “Michelson ’037 and Kim as compared to Steffee, Petitioner engaged in improper hindsight in combining Steffee with Michelson ’037 and Kim to arrive at the implant of challenged independent claims 7 and 10. PO Resp. 46. We disagree. Although the Supreme Court has cautioned that it may be valuable to identify a particular reason to combine two references, the obviousness analysis is not limited to this inquiry. See KSR, 550 U.S. at 418–19. “If a person of ordinary skill can implement a predictable variation, § 103 likely bars its patentability.” Id. at 417. Similarly, “if a technique has been used to improve one device, and a person of ordinary skill in the art would recognize that it would improve similar devices in the same way, using the technique is obvious unless its actual application is beyond his or her skill.” Id. The combination of Steffee, Michelson ’037, and Kim is no more “than the predictable use of prior art elements according to their established functions.” Id.” slip op. at 24

  Patent outcomesUS 8,444,696 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,444,696
• Groupon, Inc. v. Blue Calypso, LLCAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Dec 17, 2014 · CBM2013-00034 · APJ Barbara A Benoit · CBM · Final written decision

  Claims 1–5 are unpatentable as anticipated by Paul; the Board rejected the Ratsimor anticipation and obviousness grounds because Ratsimor was not proven publicly accessible.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for patent owner

    “1. “subsidy” Independent claim 1 recites “recognizing a subsidy, according to the subsidy program, for the subscriber.” The ’670 patent does not set forth a special definition for “subsidy.” Accordingly, we look to the ordinary meaning of the term “subsidy”—financial assistance given by one to another.5 The ’670 patent’s use of “subsidy” is consistent with its ordinary meaning. Specifically, the ’670 patent describes an advertiser setting up a subsidy program to subsidize communication fees, offer product discounts, generate and accumulate “reward points” for subscribers, or mitigate or defer other expenses of the subscriber. Ex. 1001, col. 3, ll. 39-45 (referring to Fig. 2). These examples are financial in nature. Product discounts reduce the monetary cost of a financial transaction, reward points are a form of currency, and mitigating or deferring expenses reduces the monetary cost of a financial transaction or postpones the monetary cost of a financial transaction, respectively. Also, the ’670 describes, as part of a subscriber setup process, an intermediary presenting, to a subscriber for selection, “subsidy programs available, including the criteria for continued subsidy and levels of subsidy.” Ex. 1001, col. 4, ll. 59-65 (referring to Fig. 3); see id. at col. 4, ll. 16-17. In an example of a bi-directional endorsement process, the ’670 patent further describes an advertiser calculating the amount to” slip op. at 7

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Preamble limiting or notPreamble limitingDecided for patent owner

    “We agree the preamble is limiting. In general, a preamble is construed as a limitation “if it recites essential structure or steps, or if it is ‘necessary to give life, meaning, and vitality’ to the claim.” Catalina Mktg. Int’l, Inc. v. Coolsavings.com, Inc., 289 F.3d 801, 808 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (quoting Pitney Bowes, Inc. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 182 F.3d 1298, 1305 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). When the limitations in the body of the claim “rely upon and derive antecedent basis from the preamble, then the preamble may act as a necessary component of the claimed invention.” Eaton Corp. v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 323 F.3d 1332, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2003). Notably, the preamble of independent claim 1 requires “a source communication device possessed by a subscriber,” “a destination communication device possessed by a recipient,” and “an advertisement.” The body of claim 1 recites “the source communication device,” “the subscriber,” “the destination communication device,” and “the 17 advertisement,” all of which rely on and derive antecedent basis from the preamble of claim 1. Accordingly, we conclude that the preamble of independent claim 1 is entitled to patentable weight.” slip op. at 17

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityPrinted publication not establishedReference not prior artNot shown unpatentable

    “Having reviewed the parties’ arguments and supporting evidence, we do not find sufficient evidence that the Ratsimor paper was accessible publicly and, therefore, we conclude the Ratsimor paper is not a printed publication under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b). Section 102 states: “A person shall be entitled to a patent unless . . . (b) the invention was . . . described in a printed publication . . . more than one year prior to the date of the application for patent . . . .” 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2011). “The statutory phrase ‘printed publication’ has been interpreted to give effect to ongoing advances in the technologies of data storage, retrieval, and dissemination.” In re Hall, 781 F.2d 897, 898 (Fed. Cir. 1986). As such, a printed publication under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) may be an electronic publication, such as the Ratsimor paper is purported to be. See In re Wyer, 655 F.2d 221, 226 (CCPA 1981) (holding that an electronic publication is considered to be a “printed publication” “upon a satisfactory showing that such document has been disseminated or otherwise made available to the extent that persons interested and ordinarily skilled in the subject matter or art, exercising reasonable diligence, can locate it and recognize and comprehend therefrom the essentials of the claimed invention without need of further research or experimentation”).” slip op. at 22

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “as recited in the claim, must be found in a single prior art reference. Net MoneyIN, Inc. v. VeriSign, Inc., 545 F.3d 1359, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2008); Karsten Mfg. Corp. v. Cleveland Golf Co., 242 F.3d 1376, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2001). To anticipate, a prior art reference must disclose more than “multiple, distinct teachings that the artisan might somehow combine to achieve the claimed invention.” Net MoneyIN, 545 F.3d at 1371; see also In re Arkley, 455 F.2d 586, 587 (CCPA 1972) (“The [prior art] reference must clearly and unequivocally disclose the claimed [invention] or direct those skilled in the art to the [invention] without any need for picking, choosing, and combining various disclosures not directly related to each other by the teachings of the cited reference.”). Although the elements must be arranged 30 or combined in the same way as in the claim, “the reference need not satisfy an ipsissimis verbis test,” i.e., identity of terminology is not required. In re Gleave, 560 F.3d 1331, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2009); In re Bond, 910 F.2d 831, 832 (Fed. Cir. 1990). Moreover, the prior art reference is read from the perspective of one with ordinary skill in the art. In re Graves, 69 F.3d 1147, 1152 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (“A reference anticipates a claim if it discloses the claimed invention such that a skilled artisan could take its teachings in combination with his own knowledge of the particular art and be in possession of the invention.”); In re Preda, 401 F.2d 825, 826 (CCPA 1968) (“[I]t is proper to take into account not only specific teachings of the reference but also the inferences which one skilled in the art would reasonably be expected to draw therefrom.”).” slip op. at 30

  Patent outcomesUS 8,457,670 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipationcites Phillips
  Patents in suitUS 8,457,670
• Groupon, Inc. v. Blue Calypso, LLCSome claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Dec 17, 2014 · CBM2013-00046 · APJ Michael W Kim · CBM · Final written decision

  Claims 1, 4–6, 10, and 14 are unpatentable as anticipated by Paul; claims 7–9 and 11 were not shown unpatentable.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Lexicography (patentee as own lexicographer)Term construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

    “we determine the meaning of the claims for purposes of this decision. In a covered business method patent review, a claim in an unexpired patent shall be given its broadest reasonable construction in light of the specification of the patent in which it appears. 37 C.F.R. § 42.300(b). Under the broadest reasonable construction standard, claim terms are given their ordinary and customary meaning, as would be understood by one of ordinary skill in the art in the context of the entire disclosure. In re Translogic Tech., Inc., 504 F.3d 1249, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2007). Any special definition for a claim term must be set forth in the specification with reasonable clarity, deliberateness, and precision. In re Paulsen, 30 F.3d 1475, 1480 (Fed. Cir. 1994). We must be careful not to read a particular embodiment appearing in the written description into the claim if the claim language is broader than the embodiment. In re Van Geuns, 988 F.2d 1181, 1184 (Fed. Cir. 1993). We construe the terms below in accordance with these principles.” slip op. at 7

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

    “subscriber according to the incentive program.” Petitioner contends that the express definitions of terms set forth in the “Definitions” section of the ’055 patent are the proper constructions of those terms. Pet. 10. We agree. Accordingly, we accept those definitions as proper constructions of “incentive” and “incentive program.” Furthermore, through their assertions concerning standing, Petitioner asserts that “incentive” and “incentive program” are financial in nature. We agree. Pet. 6–7. The ’055 patent repeatedly, and almost exclusively, discloses “incentive” and “incentive program” in a financial context. For example, the ’055 patent discloses that cash incentives are provided on debit cards or as cash distributions. Ex. 1001, 2:28–29. In another example, incentives are disclosed as “payments,” “payouts,” and “distributions.” Ex. 1001, 2:51, 6:34–45, 7:31–34, 8:3–6. In a further example, incentive programs are disclosed as having financial budgets and accounts that are debited until depletion. Ex. 1001, 6:41–45, 7:18–20, 8:50–56. Accordingly, we construe “incentive” and “incentive program” as being financial in nature.” slip op. at 8

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityPrinted publication not establishedReference not prior artNot shown unpatentable

    “do not find sufficient evidence that the Ratsimor paper was accessible publicly and, therefore, we conclude that Petitioner has failed to show that the Ratsimor paper is a printed publication under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b). Section 102 states: “A person shall be entitled to a patent unless . . . (b) the invention was . . . described in a printed publication . . . more than one year prior to the date of the application for patent . . . .” 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2011). “The statutory phrase ‘printed publication’ has been interpreted to give effect to ongoing advances in the technologies of data storage, retrieval, and dissemination.” In re Hall, 781 F.2d 897, 898 (Fed. Cir. 1986). As such, a printed publication under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) may be an electronic publication, such as the Ratsimor paper is purported to be. See In re Wyer, 655 F.2d 221, 226 (CCPA 1981) (holding that an electronic publication is considered to be a “printed publication” “upon a satisfactory showing that such document has been disseminated or otherwise made available to the extent that persons interested and ordinarily skilled in the subject matter or art, exercising reasonable diligence, can locate it and recognize and comprehend therefrom the essentials of the claimed invention without need of further research or experimentation”). The determination of whether a particular reference qualifies as a prior art printed publication “involves a case-by-case inquiry into the facts and circumstances surrounding the reference’s disclosure to members of the public.” In re Klopfenstein, 380 F.3d 1345, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2004). The key inquiry is whether the reference was made “sufficiently accessible to the public interested in the art” before the critical date. In re Cronyn, 890 F.2d 1158, 1160 (Fed. Cir. 1989). “A given reference is ‘publicly accessible’ upon a satisfactory showing that such document has been disseminated or otherwise made available to the extent that persons interested and ordinarily skilled in the subject matter or art exercising reasonable diligence, can locate it . . . .” Bruckelmyer v. Ground Heaters, Inc., 445 F.3d 1374, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2006). Indexing is not “a necessary condition for a reference to be publicly accessible,” but is among many factors that may bear on public accessibility. In re Lister, 583 F.3d 1307, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2009).” slip op. at 12

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “1. Principles of Law To establish anticipation, each and every element in a claim, arranged as recited in the claim, must be found in a single prior art reference. Net MoneyIN, Inc. v. VeriSign, Inc., 545 F.3d 1359, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2008); Karsten Mfg. Corp. v. Cleveland Golf Co., 242 F.3d 1376, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2001). To anticipate, a prior art reference must disclose more than “multiple, distinct teachings that the artisan might somehow combine to achieve the claimed invention.” Net MoneyIN, 545 F.3d at 1371. Although the elements must be arranged or combined in the same way as in the claim, “the reference need not satisfy an ipsissimis verbis test,” i.e., identity of terminology is not required. In re Gleave, 560 F.3d 1331, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2009); In re Bond, 910 F.2d 831, 832 (Fed. Cir. 1990). Moreover, the prior art reference is read from the perspective of one with ordinary skill in the art. In re Graves, 69 F.3d 1147, 1152 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (“A reference anticipates a claim if it discloses the claimed invention such that a skilled artisan could take its teachings in combination with his own knowledge of the particular art and be in possession of the invention.”); In re Preda, 401 F.2d 825, 826 (CCPA 1968) (“[I]t is proper to take into account not only specific teachings of the reference but also the inferences which one skilled in the art would reasonably be expected to draw therefrom.”).” slip op. at 19

  Patent outcomesUS 8,438,055 mixed
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation
  Patents in suitUS 8,438,055

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.