- Google Inc. v. Alfonso Cioffi, Megan Elizabeth Rozman, Melanie Ann Rozman, And Morgan Lee RozmanInstitution deniedPTAB · May 2, 2017 · CBM2017-00010 · APJ Brian J Mcnamara · CBM · Institution
The Board denied institution because the ’528 Patent does not qualify for covered business method review; its claims are not directed to a financial activity.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“We perceive no “issue of material fact” that should be resolved in favor of the Petitioner at the institution stage. Pet. Supp. Brief 3. Although the Petition discusses the construction of several claim terms, none of the proposed interpretations includes any reference to features that are related to internet banking or any other feature that is financial in nature. See Pet. 29 (e.g., proposing that “web browser process” be construed as a “process that can access data on websites” in which “this ‘access’ to website data can be direct or indirect”). In short, none of the claims of the ’528 Patent is “directed to” a financial activity on its face, and we do not read any such financial activity into them based on the Specification’s assertion that malware protection could be useful in internet banking. Thus, we are not persuaded that the ’528 Patent qualifies for covered business method patent review.” slip op. at 12
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed patent owner constructionOther
“We agree that the parties’ proposed constructions are consistent with the Specification of the ’528 Patent and, in that context, are the broadest reasonable interpretations of the terms. Therefore, to the extent that claim constructions are relevant to this Decision, we adopt the proposed constructions. Citing the claim construction order entered by the district court in co- pending litigation, Petitioner proposes we construe the term “system file” in claims 21, 44, and 64 to be synonymous with a “critical file” or “critical system file,” which refers to files required for the proper operation of the computer’s systems. Pet. 27–28 (citing Ex. 1012). Patent Owner does not propose a specific construction. We agree that Petitioner’s proposed construction is broadest reasonable interpretation consistent with the specification of the ’528 Patent and we adopt it in this proceeding to the extent that claim constructions are relevant to this Decision.” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Preamble limiting or notPreamble limitingOther
“The parties also agree that the preamble of claim 64 is limiting. Pet. 29–30; Prelim. Resp. 15. The preamble of claim 64 recites specific features of the claimed computer program product, e.g., that the stored code is capable of executing instructions using a common operating system having at least one electronic data processor coupled to other elements in a specific way.” slip op. at 7
Claim constructionDiscretionary denial - Broadsign International, LLC v. T-Rex Property ABInstitution deniedPTAB · Apr 26, 2017 · CBM2017-00008 · APJ Barbara A Benoit · CBM · Institution
The Board denied institution because the challenged patent was not shown eligible for CBM review; claims 1, 11, 12, 49, 51-55, and 58-74 were disclaimed.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“We conclude that the information in the Petition does not demonstrate that the challenged patent is eligible for covered business method patent review. In addition, even after Patent Owner submitted, on February 7, 2017, its Preliminary Response and evidence of filing statutory disclaimer, Petitioner did not request an opportunity to present arguments that any other claims would meet the threshold financial requirement for a covered business method patent review. The remaining challenged claims 13, 42, 43, 48, 50, 56, and 57 on their face do not evince claiming a financial product or service, and the written description describes the invention as being broader than placement of commercial advertising. See, e.g., Ex. 1001, 2:50–53 (encompassing “direct placement of commercial advertisements, public service announcements and other content on electronic displays”). Accordingly, we determine that Petitioner has failed to meet its burden of showing that the challenged patent is eligible for covered business method patent review. Therefore, we do not institute a covered business method patent review for claims 13, 42, 43, 48, 50, 56, and 57 of the ’603 patent.” slip op. at 9
- Adverse judgmentAdverse judgmentOther
“that it filed with the Office a statutory disclaimer of claims 1–12, 17, 19, 20, 22, 28–33, 45–47, 49, 51–55, and 58–74 of the challenged patent pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 253(a) and 37 C.F.R. § 1.321(a). Ex. 2001, 4; see Prelim. Resp. 7. The disclaimer of a claim “shall . . . be considered as part of the original patent.” 35 U.S.C. § 253(a). The language “considered as part of the original patent” means that a patent subject to a disclaimer under § 253(a) “is treated as though the disclaimed claims never existed.” Vectra Fitness, Inc. v. TNWK Corp., 162 F.3d 1379, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (citing Altoona Publix Theatres v. Am. Tri-Ergon Corp., 294 U.S. 477, 492 (1935); Guinn v. Kopf, 96 F.3d 1419, 1422 (Fed. Cir. 1996)). Thus, even though claims of the challenged patent existed at the time the Petition here was filed, we must now treat the challenged patent as if it had never included those claims. 1. Disclaimed Claims Challenged in the Petition Of the challenged claims, Patent Owner disclaimed claims 1, 11, 12, 49, 51–55, and 58–74. Ex. 2001, 4. A covered business method patent review cannot be instituted based on disclaimed claims. 37 C.F.R. § 42.207(e) (“The patent owner may file a statutory disclaimer under 35 U.S.C. § 253(a) in compliance with 37 C.F.R. § 1.321(a), disclaiming one or more claims in the patent. No post-grant review will be instituted based on disclaimed claims.”). Accordingly, no covered business method patent review will be instituted for disclaimed claims 1, 11, 12, 49, 51–55, and 58–74. Nevertheless, our analysis continues because not all of the claims challenged in the Petition have been disclaimed by Patent Owner.” slip op. at 7
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for patent owner
“Petitioner proposes constructions for several terms that recite “means.” Pet. 33–35; see 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(3) (A petition must set forth “[h]ow the challenged claim is to be construed. Where the claim to be construed contains a means-plus-function or step-plus-function limitation as permitted under 35 U.S.C. 112(f), the construction of the claim must identify the specific portions of the specification that describe the structure, material, or acts corresponding to each claimed function.”). Patent Owner does not address directly Petitioner’s proposed constructions. See generally Prelim. Resp. 1–11. We conclude that no term needs to be construed expressly in order for us to determine whether a covered business method patent review should be instituted.” slip op. at 6
Claim constructionPatents in suitUS 6,430,603 - HP Inc. / SAP America, Inc. v. Big Baboon, Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Jun 28, 2016 · CBM2016-00020 · APJ Trenton A Ward · CBM · Institution
The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show that claims 15 and 20–34 were more likely than not unpatentable under § 101 or any of the three § 103 grounds.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“For the reasons that follow, Petitioner failed to establish that it is more likely than not that at least one of the challenged claims is unpatentable. Therefore, we deny the Petition.” slip op. at 2
- BurdenDenied
“We believe the same is true in this matter. Petitioner fails to identify specific documentary evidence indicating that the claim element “via Web administration, producing a software configuration in which selected ones of the modules are enabled or disabled” would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the ’275 patent. At best, Petitioner provides a string cite to nine different documents, without pointing to any particular page or disclosure in any of those documents, as allegedly illustrating an “industry-wide push to Web-enable,” and provides a string cite to eight different paragraphs of testimony from Dr. Greenspun, as allegedly indicating why a skilled artisan “would have seen a strong need to provide Web-enabled system administration capabilities for the R/3 system described in R/3 Online and R/3 Book.” See Pet. 63–64 (citing Exs. 1017– 1021, 1023, 1026, 1027, 1030; Ex. 1032 ¶¶ 58–60, 85–86, 110–112). Petitioner, however, fails to identify with specificity which documentary evidence indicates that it would have been common knowledge to provide a Web interface for system administration of the system described by R/3 Online and the R/3 Book and, thus, that claim 15 would have been obvious to an ordinarily skilled artisan based on combining this alleged common knowledge with the system described by R/3 Online and R/3 Book. The Board, and Patent Owner, are left to speculate as to which particular evidence Petitioner is relying on. See Pet. 12, 42; 37 C.F.R. §§ 42.304(b)(4)–(5) (a petition must “specify where each element of the claim is found in the prior art” and identify “specific portions of the evidence that support the challenge”), 42.22(a)(2) (a petition must include a “full statement of the reasons for the relief requested, including a detailed explanation of the significance of the evidence”). In view of this deficiency, we determine that Petitioner fails to articulate sufficient reasoning to support its assertion of obviousness. See KSR, 550 U.S. at 418 (citing In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006)). Accordingly, based on the record before us, we determine that Petitioner fails to demonstrate that it is more likely than not that independent claim 15, and claims 20–34 dependent therefrom, would have been obvious over R/3 Online and R/3 Book.” slip op. at 29
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached
“Petitioner urges the Board to construe two claim phrases. First, Petitioner urges us to construe the claimed “end-to-end, business-to-business, e-commerce business automation software for automation business functions across multiple business domains” to mean “[s]oftware that, using a computer network, at least partially automates business functions relating to two or more businesses and from two or more business domains (such as products, payments, and financial performance).” Pet. 19. Second, Petitioner urges us to construe the claimed “via Web administration, producing a software configuration in which selected ones of the modules are enabled or disabled” to mean “producing a software configuration in which modules can be enabled or disabled by (1) changing the configuration parameters of a web server program or (2) using a Web browser to change configuration parameters of software running on a server.” Pet. 21. Patent Owner does not offer any proposed constructions of claim terms in its Preliminary Response. For the reasons explained below, in this case determining the scope of the terms proffered by Petitioner is not necessary to determine whether Petitioner has met the standard for institution of a covered business method patent review, and we decline to adopt the constructions sought by Petitioner. See, e.g., Wellman, Inc. v. Eastman Chem. Co., 642 F.3d 1355, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“[C]laim terms need only be construed ‘to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 9
- Patent Eligibility (§101) › Alice/Mayo step one — 'directed to'Step1 not directed to exceptionNot shown unpatentable
“Claim 15 (the only claim substantively addressed by Petitioner), however, does not recite any “gathering” steps, and Petitioner does not explain sufficiently how the limitations of claim 15 are directed to the concept of “gathering” information. For example, claim 15 merely recites “providing . . . business automation software, “identifying multiple modules of the software,” and producing a “software configuration.” Additionally, claim 15 requires producing a “workscope/workflow structured display of complex database records,” which constitutes “an integrated decision-making environment for a particular business function.” Thus, the method of claim 15 does not expressly require that information be gathered across “multiple business domains.” Rather, claim 15 requires providing “business automation software” to produce a “structured display” of “records” pertaining to a “business transaction,” such that the display constitutes an “integrated decision-making environment for a particular business function.” Thus, even if Petitioner is correct that “gathering information from across a business and using the information to make decisions” by itself is an abstract idea, Petitioner’s analysis does not address sufficiently the specific language of claim 15 and explain why claim 15 is directed to that idea. See Pet. 27. Similarly, dependent claims 20–34 are not directed to “gathering information,” and Petitioner provides no analysis of the language of the dependent claims. In light of the above, we determine that Petitioner has failed to establish the first step of the Mayo framework; i.e., Petitioner fails to identify sufficiently an abstract idea to which claim 15 is directed.8 Petitioner combines its arguments under § 101 against dependent claims 20– 34 with its arguments against claim 15 and fails to provide any additional arguments for these dependent claims. See Pet. 25 (arguing that the “sixteen challenged claims of the ’275 patent are likewise unpatentable under §101”). Therefore, we similarly determine that Petitioner fails to establish the first step of the Mayo framework with respect to dependent claims 20–34. Based on the foregoing, we determine Petitioner has failed to establish, based on the record presented, that claims 15 and 20–34 are more likely than not directed to patent ineligible subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101. 8 We need not decide whether claim 15 is directed to a different abstract idea, and only determine that Petitioner has not shown sufficiently that claim 15 is directed to the alleged abstract idea that Petitioner proposes in the Petition.” slip op. at 19
Claim construction§ 101 eligibility§ 103 obviousnesscites Alice · MayoPatents in suitUS 6,343,275 - Great West Casualty Company / Bitco General Insurance Corporation et al. v. Intellectual Ventures II LLCInstitution deniedPTAB · Feb 9, 2016 · CBM2015-00171 · APJ Michael W Kim · CBM · Institution
The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show that any existing claim qualified as a covered business method patent under AIA § 18(d)(1).
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“that the patent for which review is sought is a covered business method patent.” The AIA defines “covered business method patent” as “a patent that claims a method or corresponding apparatus for performing data processing or other operations used in the practice, administration, or management of a financial product or service, except that the term does not include patents for technological inventions.” AIA § 18(d)(1); see 37 C.F.R. § 42.301(a).” slip op. at 6
- Adverse judgmentAdverse judgmentOther
“disclaimer under 37 C.F.R. § 1.321(a) of claims 1–10. Prelim. Resp. 13 (citing Ex. 2002). Thus, the question is whether we should consider now-statutorily disclaimed claims 1–10 in determining whether or not the ’177 patent is a covered business method patent for the purposes of instituting a covered business method patent review. We determine that we should not. 37 C.F.R. § 1.321(a) is the rule promulgated by the Office for creating a procedure for a patentee to avail itself of the provisions of 35 U.S.C. § 253. See Manual of Patent Examining Procedure § 1490. Our reviewing court has held that a patent with a statutory disclaimer is to be treated as though the disclaimed claims never existed. See Guinn v. Kopf, 96 F.3d 1419, 1422 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (“A statutory disclaimer under 35 U.S.C. § 253 has the effect of canceling the claims from the patent and the patent is viewed as though the disclaimed claims had never existed in the patent.”). Accordingly, for the purposes of whether or not to institute a covered business method patent review, we treat claims 1–10 as never having existed. See Google Inc. v. SimpleAir, Inc., CBM2015-00019 slip op. at 14– 15 (PTAB May 19, 2014) (Paper 11); but see J.P. Morgan Chase v. Intellectual Ventures, Case CBM2014-00157 slip op. at 12–15 (PTAB Jan. 12, 2016) (Paper 40) (although the panel states that “petitioner’s standing to file a petition for covered business method patent review is evaluated based on the time the petition was filed,” in this proceeding, Patent Owner” slip op. at 7
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“unexpired patent are interpreted according to their broadest reasonable construction in light of the specification of the patent in which they appear. 37 C.F.R. § 42.300(b); Versata Dev. Grp., Inc. v. SAP Am., Inc., 793 F.3d 1306, 1328 (2015) (affirming use of the broadest reasonable construction standard in a covered business method patent review). Under that standard, and absent any special definitions, we give claim terms their ordinary and customary meaning, as would be understood by one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention. In re Translogic Tech., Inc., 504 F.3d 1249, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2007).” slip op. at 5
Claim constructionPatents in suitUS 7,516,177 - PNC Bank, Na / Suntrust Bank v. Parus Holdings, Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Nov 9, 2015 · CBM2015-00150 · APJ Bart A Gerstenblith · CBM · Institution
The Board denied institution for claims 1–18 because Petitioner did not show that the patent was eligible for covered business method review.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“for the creation of a transitional program for reviewing covered business method patents. “The Director may institute a transitional proceeding only for a patent that is a covered business method patent.” Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 18(a)(1)(E), 125 Stat. 284, 330 (Sept. 16, 2011). A “covered business method patent” is a patent that “claims a method or corresponding apparatus for performing data processing or other operations used in the practice, administration, or management of a financial product or service, except that the term does not include patents for technological inventions.” Id. § 18(d)(1), 125 Stat. at 331; accord 37 C.F.R. § 42.301(a) (providing the same definition of “covered business method patent”). “The petitioner must demonstrate that the patent for which review is sought is a covered business method patent.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.304(a).” slip op. at 9
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Other PTAB motions (exclude, strike, seal, additional discovery, rehearing)Denied
“discussed above, a teleconference was held with the parties on November 5, 2015. Petitioner and Patent Owner jointly request authorization to file a motion for termination under 35 U.S.C. § 327, the statute governing termination of instituted post-grant reviews due to settlement, but confirmed during the call that no written settlement agreement currently exists. The parties request that the proceedings terminate without estoppel, such that Petitioner can re-file the petitions upon completion of Federal Circuit review of the District Court’s ineligibility determination, if necessary. Patent Owner limits its agreement to Petitioner re-filing the same petitions. Effectively, the parties request that we stay these proceedings pending Federal Circuit review of the District Court’s decision. We deny the parties’ request. As explained below, the ’120 patent is not eligible for covered business method patent review. Deferring entering such a decision is inconsistent with our policy objective of “secur[ing] the just, speedy, and inexpensive resolution of every proceeding.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.1. We do not reach, and, thus, express no opinion on, eligibility of the claims of the ’120 patent under 35 U.S.C. § 101.” slip op. at 3
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“II. CLAIM CONSTRUCTION Although Petitioner presents constructions for several claim terms, no terms require express construction for purposes of this Decision.” slip op. at 9
Claim constructionDiscretionary denialPatents in suitUS 8,843,120 - PTAB · Jun 15, 2015 · CBM2015-00047 · APJ James B Arpin · CBM · Institution
The Board denied institution on all challenged claims under § 325(d), finding the petition relied on the same references and substantially the same arguments presented in an earlier petition.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsInstitution denied 325dInstitution denied
“As noted above, according to 35 U.S.C. § 325(d), we may reject the present Petition because “the same or substantially the same prior art or arguments previously were presented to the Office” in the earlier Petition. (Emphasis added.) Here, Petitioner acknowledges that the same references are applied in the earlier and the present Petitions. Pet. 2 n.1; see Prelim. Resp. 3. On that basis alone, we may exercise our discretion and decline to institute covered business method patent review. Nevertheless, we also are persuaded that Petitioner asserts the same or substantially the same arguments in the present Petition that were asserted in the earlier Petition. First, although the Petitioner asserts that Peapod anticipates the challenged claims in the present Petition (Pet. 7), Petitioner asserted that each of Viescas, Filepp, and Peapod “individually may render the claims unpatentable” in the earlier Petition. CBM2014-00082, Paper 5, 18. Moreover, as we noted in the Decision on Institution in CBM2014- 00082, Petitioner argued in the earlier Petition that “each of the references— Viescas, Filepp, and Peapod—teaches or suggests all of the limitations of each of independent claims 1 ([CBM2014-00082, Paper 5,] 25–30) and 22 (id. at 42–51).” CBM2014-00082, Paper 10, 17–18. Second, with the exception of claims 16 and 42, Petitioner’s ground for challenging 1–3, 8– 12, 14, 15, 17, 18, 22, 24, 26–28, 30–32, 34, 41, and 44 in the present Petition is based on the same combination of references used to challenge those claims in the earlier Petition. Compare Pet. 42–78 with CBM2014- 00082, Paper 5, 20–75. In the present Petition, however, Petitioner allegedly “presents different legal arguments than those that were previously submitted and addresses the reasons relied on by the Board for not instituting CBM review [in CBM2014-00082].” Pet. 2 n.1. We are not persuaded by Petitioner’s unsupported contention, however, that the present Petition presents “different legal arguments.” Instead, for the reasons set forth above, in the present Petition, Petitioner simply recasts the facts in the context of the same legal arguments. See Prelim. Resp. 6–8.” slip op. at 10
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Not reached
“we interpret any claim terms of the challenged claims according to the Phillips standard. Nevertheless, only terms that are in controversy need to be construed, and then only to the extent necessary to resolve the 3 We also note that Patent Owner has charged Petitioner with infringing one or more claims of the ’110 patent. Pet. 79. Petitioner certifies that it is not barred or estopped from challenging the claims on the grounds identified in its Petition. Id. at 2 (citing 37 C.F.R. § 42.302(b)). Patent Owner does not contest Petitioner’s certification. controversy. Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999). Here, because we reject the Petition without reaching the merits of Petitioner’s grounds for unpatentability regarding the challenged claims, it is not necessary for us to construe any term of the challenged claims.4” slip op. at 5
Claim constructionDiscretionary denialcites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 5,664,110
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.