• Trove Brands, LLC v. Camelbak Products, LLCInstitution denied
  PTAB · Jul 8, 2025 · IPR2025-00155 · APJ James A Worth · IPR · Institution

  The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood that claims 1, 3–9, 11–17, or 19 were unpatentable on the asserted obviousness grounds.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

    “Institution of an inter partes review is authorized by statute when “the information presented in the petition filed under [35 U.S.C. §] 311 and any response filed under [35 U.S.C. §] 313 shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2018).1 For the reasons set forth below, we determine that Petitioner has not demonstrated that there is a reasonable likelihood that at least one of claims 1, 3–9, 11–17, and 19 of the ’187 patent is unpatentable based on the grounds set forth in the Petition, and we do not institute an inter partes review.” slip op. at 2

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSITA”) would have had an undergraduate degree in mechanical engineering or equivalent coursework, and a year or more of experience in designing, prototyping, and/or manufacturing fluid containers or similar products. Pet. 19 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 29). Petitioner asserts that more work experience may substitute for a lower level of education, and vice versa. Id. Patent Owner admittedly sets forth “a similar, though slightly different, level of ordinary skill”: a bachelor’s degree in mechanical engineering or the equivalent coursework and approximately one year of experience with liquid-containing devices, with more work experience substituting for less education and vice versa. Prelim. Resp. 27 (citing Ex.2001 ¶¶ 60–64). Patent Owner discerns no material difference between the definitions provided by the parties for purposes of the Board’s decision on whether to institute this proceeding. Id. For purposes of this decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposed level of skill as being consistent with the prior art, although our conclusion on whether to institute would be unchanged under either definition.” slip op. at 10

  • Claim Construction › Functional claiming / §112(f) means-plus-function › Whether §112(f) applies (Williamson, nonce words)§112(f) appliesDecided for petitioner

    “The failure to use the word “means” in a claim element creates a rebuttable presumption that § 112 ¶ 6 does not apply. Williamson v. Citrix Online, 792 F.3d 1339, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc). The presumption can be overcome and § 112 ¶ 6 will apply if the challenger demonstrates that the claim term fails to “recite[ ] sufficiently definite structure” or else recites “function without reciting sufficient structure for performing that function. “Construing a means-plus-function claim term is a two-step process.” Id. at 1351. “The [tribunal] must first identify the claimed function.” Id. “Then, the [tribunal] must determine what structure, if any, disclosed in the specification corresponds to the claimed function.” Id. There may be multiple claimed functions, each with disclosed corresponding structure. See id. at 1351–52.” slip op. at 14

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner

    “We are persuaded by Patent Owner that the term “automatically” in “to automatically disengage the first and second catch structures” means that it is not just the force applied by the user that disengages the first and second catch structures, but also the bias of the mouthpiece that helps to disengage the first and second catch structures. In the first instance, we agree with Patent Owner that the claim itself recites that, upon actuation, the mouthpiece assembly is “release[d]” to “move via its bias from the stowed configuration to the dispensing configuration.” See Ex. 1001, 21:59–64. This meaning is supported by the Specification which states: “In some examples, the mouthpiece assembly is biased toward the dispensing configuration and thus moves automatically under its bias upon release by the user-release mechanism.” Ex. 1001, 1:64–67. We further agree with Patent Owner that the plain and ordinary meaning of “automatic” is that the user operation alone is not responsible for the action. For example, in one dictionary cited by Petitioner, “automatic” is defined as “2: having a self-acting or self-regulating mechanism.” See Ex. 2007, 1.11 The district court construction is consistent therewith. The district court identified two functions, the first of which is the same as that of the ’028 patent, i.e., “Automatically disengaging the first and second catch structures upon actuation of the user release mechanism and thereby releasing the mouthpiece assembly to move via its bias from the stowed configuration to the dispensing configuration.” See Section II.C.1, supra. In discussing that function, the district court states: “While a user may impart force upon user engagement portion 260 to release the mouthpiece, the bias of the mouthpiece towards the dispensing configuration causes the mouthpiece to move automatically, satisfying the requirements of Claim 1.” Ex. 2002, 16. We conclude that the term “automatically” in “adapted to” slip op. at 17

  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,684,187
• Trove Brands, LLC v. Camelbak Products, LLCInstituted
  PTAB · Jun 6, 2025 · IPR2025-00140 · APJ James A Worth · IPR · Institution

  The Board instituted IPR of claims 1–18 on all petitioned challenges, finding a reasonable likelihood that at least claim 1 is obvious over Nakajima and the knowledge of a person of ordinary skill.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

    “Institution of an inter partes review is authorized by statute when “the information presented in the petition filed under [35 U.S.C. §] 311 and any response filed under [35 U.S.C. §] 313 shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2018). For the reasons set forth below, we determine that Petitioner has demonstrated that there is a reasonable likelihood that at least one of claims 1–18 of the ’250 patent is unpatentable, and we institute an inter partes review of claims 1–18 based on the grounds set forth in the Petition.” slip op. at 2

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSITA”) would have had an undergraduate degree in mechanical engineering or equivalent coursework, and a year or more of experience in designing, prototyping, and/or manufacturing fluid containers or similar products. Pet. 15 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 25). Petitioner asserts that more work experience may substitute for a lower level of education, and vice versa. Id. Patent Owner admittedly sets forth “a similar, though slightly different, level of ordinary skill”: a bachelor’s degree in mechanical experience with liquid-containing devices, with more work experience substituting for less education and vice versa. Prelim. Resp. 28 (citing Ex. 2001 ¶ 50). Patent Owner discerns no material difference between the definitions provided by the parties for purposes of the Board’s decision on whether to institute this proceeding. Id. For purposes of this decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposed level of skill as being consistent with the prior art, although our conclusion on whether to institute would be unchanged under either definition.” slip op. at 9

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner

    “For purposes of this decision on institution, we adopt the proffered dictionary definition of “mouthpiece” as “a part (as of an instrument) that goes in the mouth or to which the mouth is applied” (see Ex. 2005), and we construe this as an intended use of this component of the apparatus, because this definition is consistent with the plain and ordinary meaning of the term which is a compound of “mouth” and “piece” and also because this definition is consistent with the Specification. For example, the Specification describes the use of the mouthpiece as follows: “In use, the mouthpiece is adapted to be configured to the dispensing configuration by a user placing the mouthpiece in the user’s mouth and biting upon or otherwise compressing the appropriate portions of sidewalls 92 of the mouthpiece.” Ex. 1001, 8:45–49. We note that, although the Specification refers to bite-actuation of the mouthpiece, for example in the field of the disclosure and certain embodiments (e.g., Ex. 1001, 1:25–27), the independent claims do not require bite-actuation. The Specification identifies the mouthpiece as item 72 (which is depicted, for example, in Figure 25, reproduced supra). Ex. 1001, 3:7‒8. 7 Exhibit 2005 appears to be from an online Merriam-Webster dictionary accessed March 13, 2025. Ex. 2005, 4. At this time, there is no argument in the preliminary record that this definition would have been different before the critical date of the patent.” slip op. at 12

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached

    “Although the construction of this limitation may be helpful in deciding the issues of unpatentability, we determine that the construction of this term would benefit from further briefing during the trial phase of this proceeding, and we invite the parties to continue to brief this issue. Therefore, we do not provide a preliminary construction of the term at this time.” slip op. at 14

  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,851,250
• Trove Brands, LLC v. Camelbak Products, LLCInstitution denied
  PTAB · May 7, 2025 · IPR2024-01501 · APJ Linda E Horner · IPR · Institution

  The Board denied institution because Trove did not show a reasonable likelihood of proving claims 1, 2, 5, 6, 8, 9, 15, 16, or 21 obvious over the asserted prior art.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

    “Under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), an inter partes review may not be instituted unless the information presented in the petition and the preliminary response shows “there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” Upon consideration of the Petition and the Preliminary Response, and for the reasons explained below, we determine that Petitioner has not shown a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail with respect to at least one of the challenged claims. Thus, we deny the Petition and do not institute an inter partes review of claims 1, 2, 5, 6, 8, 9, 15, 16, and 21 of the ’028 patent.” slip op. at 2

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Patent Owner argues that a POSITA would have “a bachelor’s degree in mechanical engineering or the equivalent coursework and approximately one year of experience with liquid-containing devices, with more work experience substituting for less education and vice versa.” Prelim. Resp. 23 (citing Ex. 2001 ¶¶ 56–65). Patent Owner also states that it “discerns no material difference between the definitions provided by the parties for purposes the Board’s decision on whether to institute this proceeding.” Id. We agree that there appears to be no material difference in the parties’ definitions of the level of ordinary skill in the art. For the purposes of this Decision, we apply Petitioner’s definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art. We determine that this definition is consistent with the prior art of record and the skill reflected in the Specification of the ’028 patent, based on our review of the limited record. Moreover, the prior art itself may be sufficient to demonstrate the level of skill in the art at the time of the invention. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (explaining that specific findings regarding ordinary skill level are not” slip op. at 11

  • Claim Construction › Functional claiming / §112(f) means-plus-function › Whether §112(f) applies (Williamson, nonce words)§112(f) appliesDecided for petitioner

    “as a means-plus-function limitation under 35 U.S.C. § 112, sixth paragraph, because “mechanism” is a nonce word for performing the claimed function without reciting structure for performing that function, and a POSITA would not have understood the term to have “a sufficiently definite meaning as the name for a structure that performs the claimed function.” Pet. 16–17 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 39). For claim 1, Petitioner identifies two distinct structures described in the ’028 patent that correspond to the claimed “user release mechanism” for performing the claimed functions. Id. at 34. Specifically, Petitioner asserts that the ’028 patent describes a first embodiment in which the corresponding structure includes sliding member 238, and its component parts. Id. at 34– 35 (citing Ex. 1001, 12:50–13:25, 13:29–33). In the second embodiment, the corresponding structure includes user engagement portion 260 on rigid collar 170. Id. at 35–36 (citing Ex. 1001, 13:40–54). Petitioner does not separately address the structure corresponding to the “user release mechanism” as recited in claim 21. Id. at 53‒54 (relying on the same arguments presented for unpatentability of claim 1). court issued a claim construction order in the parallel litigation construing the term “user release mechanism” as a means-plus-function limitation under § 112, sixth paragraph. Prelim. Resp. 23 (citing Ex. 2002, 12–15). The district court ruled that the corresponding structure for claim 1 includes “[s]liding member 238, including its component parts,” or “[u]ser engagement portion 260.” Ex. 2002, 15. For claim 21, the district court ruled that the corresponding structure includes “[s]liding member 238, including its component parts” or “[u]ser engagement pad 240, planar portion 242, tabs 244, collar engagement portion 254, depression 256.” Id. at 17. Patent Owner indicates that, “[f]or purposes of this proceeding only,” it does not dispute that the claimed user release mechanisms are means-plusfunction limitations, and it does not dispute the corresponding structure identified by Petitioner, even though the district court did not specifically identify engagement portion 260 as corresponding structure for claim 21. Prelim. Resp. 25 (citing Ex. 2002, 15–19). Although Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s proposed interpretation of the “user release mechanism,” because claim interpretation is a matter of law and the dispositive issue in this Decision turns on the interpretation of this claim limitation, we address it in this Decision. We agree with the parties that the “user release mechanism” elements recited in claims 1 and 21 are means-plus-function limitations governed by § 112, sixth paragraph. See 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 6 (“An element in a claim for a combination may be expressed as a means or step for performing a specified function without the recital of structure, material, or acts in support thereof, and such claim shall be construed to cover the corresponding structure, material, or acts described in the specification and equivalents thereof.”). “means,” it uses the nonce word “mechanism” without reciting structure for performing the functions recited in the claims. See Williamson v. CitrixOnline, LLC, 792 F.3d 1339, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“Generic terms such as ‘mechanism,’ ‘element,’ ‘device,’ and other nonce words that reflect nothing more than verbal constructs may be used in a claim in a manner that is tantamount to using the word “means” because they ‘typically do not connote sufficiently definite structure’ and therefore may invoke § 112, para. 6.”).” slip op. at 13

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot reached

    “[U]nder § 112, ¶ 6 equivalence, functional identity is required” and “[s]tructural equivalence under § 112, ¶ 6 is met only if the differences are insubstantial, that is, if the assertedly equivalent structure performs the claimed function in substantially the same way to achieve substantially the same result as the corresponding structure described in the specification.” (citing Chiuminatta Concrete Concepts, Inc. v. Cardinal Indus., Inc., 145 F.3d 1303, 1308 (Fed. Cir. 1998)). Here, Petitioner states that Kiyota’s lock release buttons 40 “perform the claimed function in the same way to achieve the same result” as the ’028 patent’s sliding member 238, and its component parts (Pet. 37) without providing sufficient supporting explanation or evidence. Petitioner explains only that the two structures operate in “substantially the same way” by a user pressing an element that that slides towards the mouthpiece assembly to disengage the catch structures. Id. at 37–38 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 89). The Petition does not discuss any of the differences between Kiyota’s structure and the ’028 patent’s structure or provide an explanation of why these differences are insubstantial. Indeed, as Patent Owner persuasively explains, there are notable differences in the “way” the two structures perform the claimed function and the “result” they achieve. See Prelim. Resp. 39–40 (discussing the ’028 patent’s one-finger operation and indirect catch disengagement, versus Kiyota’s two-finger operation and direct catch disengagement). Moreover, the analysis in Dr. Vallee’s declaration substantially parallels the discussion in the Petition and does not provide any additional explanation or evidence to show that the differences between the “way” the two structures operate or the “result” they achieve are insubstantial. Compare Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 85–91, with Pet. 34–38. For these reasons, Petitioner fails to show sufficiently that Kiyota discloses an equivalent structure to the structure described in the ’028 patent corresponding to the “user release mechanism” recited in claim 1. Accordingly, Petitioner has not met its burden to show a reasonable likelihood that claim 1 is unpatentable as obvious over Kiyota. slip op. at 23

  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 9,782,028
• Catalyst Orthoscience Inc. v. Shoulder Innovations, Inc.Institution denied
  PTAB · Apr 24, 2025 · PGR2025-00001 · APJ James A Tartal · PGR · Institution

  The Board denied institution of post-grant review of claims 1–22, exercising its discretion under § 324(a) based on the Fintiv factors.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Institution denied fintivInstitution denied

    “1. whether the court granted a stay or evidence exists that one may be granted if a proceeding is instituted; 2. proximity of the court’s trial date to the Board’s projected statutory deadline for a final written decision; 3. investment in the parallel proceeding by the court and the parties; 4. overlap between issues raised in the petition and in the parallel proceeding; 5. whether the petitioner and the defendant in the parallel proceeding are the same party; and 6. other circumstances that impact the Board’s exercise of discretion, including the merits. Fintiv 5−6. We consider these factors to assess “whether efficiency, fairness, and the merits support the exercise of authority to deny institution in view of an earlier trial date in the parallel proceeding.” Id. at 6. In” slip op. at 10

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot reached

    “parties, we do not find the merits to be particularly strong on the current record. For example, limitation [1-4] recites, in part, “a locking nut having . . . an external thread on an outside surface of the locking nut.” Ex. 1001, 9:46–47. In alleging obviousness based in part on Orphanos, Petitioner equates the claimed “locking nut” to Orphanos’s collet 230 in a first embodiment of Orphanos, or Orphanos’s collet portion 1052 in a second embodiment of Orphanos. Pet. 37–38. Petitioner acknowledges that the collet and collet portion do not have external threads, but rather are designed to have a snap-fit engagement with the inner sidewall of the baseplate’s central throughbore. Id. at 38. Petitioner argues that modifying the collet and collet portion to have external threads would have been obvious to the skilled artisan in view of Orphanos’s teachings and the knowledge of a person having ordinary skill in the art. Pet. 38–42 (arguing, inter alia, that it would have been “a substitution of a known part for a known problem” and “obvious as a matter of design choice”). Petitioner does not allege that replacing the snap-fit coupling with external threads would either: (1) result in any advantages; or (2) preserve any of Orphanos’s stated benefits of its snap-fit arrangement. See Pet. 34–37. That Petitioner describes no advantages to making its proposed modification potentially undermines Petitioner’s case that the skilled artisan would have done so. Cf. Winner Int’l Royalty Corp. v. Wang, 202 F.3d 1340, 1349 n.8 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (“The fact that the motivating benefit comes at the expense of another benefit . . . should not nullify its use as a basis to modify the disclosure of one reference with the teachings of another. Instead, the benefits, both lost and gained, should be weighed against one another.”).” slip op. at 16

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITANot reached

    “Petitioner’s arguments regarding the central post and locking nut include an implicit claim construction argument that these components need not be separate structures. Pet. 74, 76–81. Patent Owner, on the other hand, would have us interpret the claim to require that they be separate structures. Patent Owner raises credible evidence to support its theory. Specifically, Patent Owner directs us to the language of claim 1, which separately recites “a central screw” and “a locking nut.” Prelim. Resp. 51; see Ex. 1001, 9:44–53. Patent Owner further contends, in view of the claim language, that the claimed central post and locking nut are separate and distinct components. According to Patent Owner, however, Lefebvre’s main head and anchor rod portions are parts of a single monolithic anchoring screw. Prelim. Resp. 53–58. Where a claim lists elements separately, there is a rebuttable presumption that these elements have separate and distinct physical structures. See Google LLC v. EcoFactor, Inc., 92 F.4th 1049, 1058 (Fed. Cir. 2024) (citing Powell v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 663 F.3d 1221, 1231–1232 (Fed. Cir. 2011)). The presumption may be rebutted by the intrinsic record. Id. At this stage, however, Petitioner does not address that claim 1 appears to separately recite a central post and a locking nut, and does not direct us to any portion of the intrinsic record that might rebut the presumption that these elements are, therefore, separate and distinct structures. See Pet. 73–77. Petitioner also argues that the claim terms “baseplate central channel” and “central channel . . . configured to interface with the baseplate” are indefinite. Pet. 95–102. Patent Owner argues that the plain and ordinary meaning of the terms is clear and that Petitioner “had no problem” arguing how the asserted art purportedly rendered the claims obvious. Prelim. Resp. 69–77.” slip op. at 17

  • Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Definiteness (Nautilus)Not reached

    “Petitioner also argues that the claim terms “baseplate central channel” and “central channel . . . configured to interface with the baseplate” are indefinite. Pet. 95–102. Patent Owner argues that the plain and ordinary meaning of the terms is clear and that Petitioner “had no problem” arguing how the asserted art purportedly rendered the claims obvious. Prelim. Resp. 69–77. In sum, even if Petitioner’s contentions show it is more likely than not that at least one of the claims challenged in the Petition is unpatentable, we find Patent Owner’s arguments identify credible weaknesses in Petitioner’s contentions. Accordingly, we find that that the sixth Fintiv factor is neutral and does not weigh against discretionary denial.” slip op. at 18

  Claim construction§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosureDiscretionary denial
  Patents in suitUS 12,023,254
• Integrated Dna Technologies, Inc. v. Tecan Genomics, Inc.Instituted
  PTAB · Apr 21, 2025 · IPR2024-01504 · APJ James A Worth · IPR · Institution

  The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–4, 6, 7, 9, and 10 on all petitioned grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that claim 1 is obvious over Iafrate and Kivioja.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner

    “On this preliminary record, we agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner’s asserted level of ordinary skill in the art is higher than warranted when Petitioner argues that a person of ordinary skill “further would have had specific experience with implementing and designing library preparation methods.” Pet. 21–22. However, we disagree with Patent Owner that a POSA only need to “have had experience with DNA sequencing methods” (Prelim. Resp. 8) because an artisan with experience with only pre-NGS sequencing methods would not qualify as a person of ordinary skill. Instead, for purposes of this Decision, we find a person of ordinary skill would have had a Ph.D. in the field of chemistry, molecular biology, or biochemistry. Alternatively, a POSA would have had a B.S. or M.S. degree with three to five years of experience working in any of those fields. The person of ordinary skill would have had experience with NGS sequencing methods and a working knowledge of how those methods functioned. This definition of a person of ordinary skill is consistent with the skill level reflected in the disclosures of the ’357 patent and prior art. We further note that neither aspect of the dispute over the skill level affects our decision to institute review.” slip op. at 9

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Lexicography (patentee as own lexicographer)Term construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

    “1. “indexing site” Petitioner argues that the ’357 patent defines “indexing site” as a sample index, specifically, “a nucleic acid sequence that acts as an index for multiple polynucleotide samples, thus allowing for the samples to be pooled together into a single sequencing run, which is known as multiplexing.” Pet. 23 (citing Ex. 1004, 4:40–44). Patent Owner does not disagree other than to argue that no claim requires construction. The ’357 patent states: An indexing site is a nucleic acid sequence that acts as an index for multiple polynucleotide samples, thus allowing for the samples to be pooled together into a single sequencing run, which is known as multiplexing. provide a definition for “indexing site,” and we construe the term in accordance therewith.” slip op. at 10

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “3. “identifying sequence reads with identical identifier and target sequences as duplicates” Although the parties do not request construction of this limitation, we note that the parties may wish to address the construction of this limitation after institution. See Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (claims are construed only to the extent necessary the term “duplicates” means that the sequences are identical. We observe that the ’357 patent states: “A duplicate sequencing read can be a sequencing read with the same identifier site and target sequence as another sequencing read in the population of sequencing reads.” Ex. 1004, 4:12–15. The claim does not use the exact wording as the Specification.4” slip op. at 11

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner

    “4. “comprising” The parties may address the meaning of the transitional phrase “comprising” and whether the prior art meets the claim if the prior art discloses a method of identifying as duplicates those sequence reads with identical labels and target fragments and, in addition also identifies other sequence reads as duplicates, including sequence reads with some mutations resulting from PCR or SBS error. See Ex. 1079 ¶ 117. On this preliminary record, we construe “comprising” as an open-ended transition that is not limited to the listed steps. See Vivid Techs., Inc., 200 F.3d at 811.” slip op. at 13

  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,098,357
• Yita LLC / Jinrong (SH) Automotive Accessory Industrial Development Co. Ltd. v. Macneil IP LLCInstituted
  PTAB · Jun 13, 2023 · IPR2023-00173 · APJ Arthur M Peslak · IPR · Institution

  The Board instituted review of claims 1–6 on the asserted obviousness grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that at least one challenged claim is unpatentable.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

    “whether to institute an inter partes review under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). See also 37 C.F.R § 42.4(a) (2021) (“The Board institutes the trial on behalf of the Director.”). Under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), an inter partes review may not be instituted unless the information presented in the Petition shows “there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.”” slip op. at 2

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “We need not explicitly construe the term “vehicle floor tray” or any other claim term for the purposes of this decision. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). However, we offer the following reasons for not adopting Patent Owner’s proposed construction. Claim 1 recites the term “vehicle floor tray” but does not recite any specific structural details of the tray. Ex. 1001, 19:42–60. Thus, nothing in the claim language suggests the structural aspects of a vehicle floor tray included in Patent Owner’s proposed construction.” slip op. at 14

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have had a bachelor’s degree in mechanical engineering, industrial design, or a closely related field, or equivalent formal training, education, or practical experience in a field relating to product design, CAD, or manufacturing.” Pet. 13 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 27–28). Petitioner further contends that the person of ordinary skill in the art “would also have a minimum of three to five years of experience in plastics engineering, CAD, manufacturing, plastic product design, or a related industry,” but that “a higher level of training or practical experience might make up for less education, and vice-versa.” Id. Patent Owner does not, at this stage of the proceeding, dispute Petitioner’s definition of the person of ordinary skill in the art. Prelim. Resp. 12. For the purposes of this Decision, we apply Petitioner’s proposed level of skill in the art because it appears consistent with the problems addressed in the ’917 patent and the prior art.” slip op. at 12

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner

    “In his testimony concerning background prior art, Mr. Perreault relies on two prior art patents that disclose “floor mats” described similarly to Patent Owner’s description of a “vehicle floor tray.” See Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 29–30 (citing Ex. 1013 (“Bailey”); Ex. 1015 (“Tyler”)). Bailey describes a “floor mat” that is “molded or otherwise preformed into a tray-like shape which conforms to the contour of a portion of the carpeted automobile floor. The mat is dimensioned and configured to nest within and abut against the sides of a carpeted floor well of the vehicle.” Ex. 1013, 2:37–42, Fig. 6. Tyler describes “contoured vehicle floor mats” that “mate[] with the vehicle floorboard to hold the mat in place.” Ex. 1013, code (57), 1:52–54. Based on these exhibits, we find that Mr. Perreault’s testimony is not conclusory and not based on an improper definition of floor tray. Based on the present record and after considering Patent Owner’s contentions, Petitioner sufficiently establishes that Stanesic discloses the subject matter of the preamble. In particular, Stanesic discloses “a tray-like central area” and “the raised wall 22 has two walls that rise about one to about two inches from the base 15” (Ex. 1005, 2:61–62), which sufficiently supports Petitioner’s contention that Stanesic discloses, or at least suggests, a vehicle floor tray.” slip op. at 22

  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 9,138,917
• Yita LLC / Jinrong (SH) Automotive Accessory Industrial Development Co. Ltd. v. Macneil IP LLCInstituted
  PTAB · Jun 13, 2023 · IPR2023-00172 · APJ Arthur M Peslak · IPR · Institution

  The Board instituted inter partes review of claims 1–6 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that at least one challenged claim would be unpatentable.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

    “whether to institute an inter partes review under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). See also 37 C.F.R § 42.4(a) (2021) (“The Board institutes the trial on behalf of the Director.”). Under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), an inter partes review may not be instituted unless the information presented in the Petition shows “there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.”” slip op. at 2

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsDenied

    “and Cicotte, the dispute for the first prong of the Advanced Bionics framework revolves around whether Rothkop is cumulative of Exhibits 2001, 2002, 2003, and 2004 cited in an IDS considered by the Examiner. Petitioner does not dispute that Cicotte is cumulative of Exhibit 2005 or 2006. See Prel. Reply. For the purposes of the § 325(d) analysis, we will assume, without deciding, that Rothkop is cumulative of at least one of the references Patent Owner relies on, i.e., Exhibits 2001, 2002, 2003, and 2004. We, thus, assume, without deciding, that the first prong of the Advanced Bionics framework is satisfied and move to the second prong. 4. Advanced Bionics Framework, Prong Two: Has Petitioner Demonstrated that the Office Erred in a Manner Material to the Patentability of the Challenged Claims? The ’655 patent issued from an application filed on August 6, 2014.” slip op. at 45

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “For the following reasons, we do not adopt Patent Owner’s proposed construction. Claim 1 recites a “vehicle floor tray” but does not recite any specific structural details of the tray. Ex. 1001, 19:46–2:2. Thus, nothing in the claim language suggests the aspects of a vehicle floor tray included in Patent Owner’s proposed construction. Patent Owner does not direct us to an explicit lexicographic definition of the term “vehicle floor tray” in the Specification of the ’655 patent. Rather, Patent Owner relies on descriptions of aspects of the embodiment disclosed in Figure 1 of the ’655 patent. For example, the ’655 patent generally describes that “[f]loor trays have sidewalls.” Ex. 1001, 1:58. The ’655 patent states that in an “aspect” of the invention, “a vehicle floor tray has a central panel for the placement on the floor of a vehicle foot well, and at least first and second upstanding panels.” Id. at 5:28–30. In column 7, the ’655 patent describes that “[d]isposed around the central or floor panel 102 are a series of upstanding side panels, which will vary in number and configuration from one vehicle model to the next.” Id. at 7:47–49 (emphasis added). These portions of the Specification suggest that the term “vehicle floor tray” should not be limited to any particular number of side panels or any particular configuration such as the side panels are joined to the floor panel and each other. In the Summary of the Invention, the ’655 patent discloses “a vehicle” slip op. at 12

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundInstituted

    “For the following reasons, Patent Owner’s contentions are unavailing based on the present record. First, as discussed above, Patent Owner’s attempt to draw a distinction between floor trays and floor mats is unavailing based on the present record and undercut by its own exhibits describing Patent Owner’s vehicle floor trays as “mats.” See Ex. 2010; Ex. 2012; Ex. 2013; Ex. 2014. Second, as discussed above, the fact that Petitioner has not shown that someone previously scanned a vehicle footwell is unavailing because this challenge is based on obviousness, not anticipation. Third, the sentence in Rothkop that Patent Owner contends discloses a kind of scanner, not what is to be scanned, is “[t]he data input device may comprise a scanner 12 for scanning a physical part such as an existing seat, frame, or vehicle.” Ex. 1006, 4:61– 63. Based on the present record, we do not agree that this sentence discloses a type of scanner. Fourth, Patent Owner’s arguments concerning the claimed invention creating a new product versus reverse engineering an existing product in Rothkop raises potential fact questions that are best resolved at trial based on a fully developed record. Petitioner provides numerous reasons why a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to combine Stanesic, Rothkop, and Cicotte in such a manner that teaches or suggests all limitations of claim 1. Pet. 29–34. Petitioner sufficiently supports this reasoning with the testimony of Mr. Perreault that he supports with reference to Stanesic, Rothkop, Cicotte, and other references showing the background art. Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 147–157. Further, Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s conclusion that the combination of Stanesic, Rothkop, and Cicotte “would be nothing more than applying known techniques . . . to a known method of producing a custom-fit vehicle floor tray . . . that is ready for improvement, yielding the predictable result of generating a custom-fit floor tray.” Compare Pet. 33, with Prelim. Resp. Based on the present record and after considering all of Patent” slip op. at 32

  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,899,655
• Peaklogic, Inc. v. Wave Neuroscience, Inc.Institution denied
  PTAB · Mar 23, 2023 · IPR2022-01527 · APJ David Cotta · IPR · Institution

  Institution was denied for claims 1, 2, 4, 5, 7, 8, 10, and 11 because the petition did not show a reasonable likelihood of success on any asserted anticipation or obviousness ground.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

    “Under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), inter partes review may not be instituted unless the Petition “shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” For the reasons discussed below, Petitioner has not established a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on its assertion that the challenged claims are unpatentable based on the grounds advanced here. Accordingly, we deny institution of inter partes review of claims 1, 2, 4, 5, 7, 8, 10, and 11 of the ’554 patent.” slip op. at 2

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner

    “Importantly, however, Dr. Silvetz does not cite anything to support his opinion that stimulation at a frequency above the peak alpha frequency moves the peak frequency. Id. Nor does Dr. Silvetz explain why such stimulation moves the peak frequency. Id. Accordingly, Dr. Silvetz’s testimony is entitled to little weight. Xerox Corp. v. Bytemark, Inc., IPR2022-00624, Paper 9 at 15 (PTAB Aug. 24 ,2022) (Decision Denying Institution) (precedential) (finding that conclusory testimony that “does not cite to any additional supporting evidence or provide any technical reasoning to support [that testimony] . . . is entitled to little weight”); see also, 37 C.F.R. § 42.65(a) (“Expert testimony that does not disclose the underlying facts or data on which the opinion is based is entitled to little or no weight.”); Upjohn Co. v. Mova Pharm. Corp., 225 F.3d 1306, 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (“Lack of factual support for expert opinion going to factual determinations, however, may render the testimony of little probative value in a validity determination.”) (quoting Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Delta Resins & Refractories, Inc., 776 F.2d 281, 294 (Fed. Cir. 1985)); Carella v. Starlight Archery & Pro Line Co., 804 F.2d 135, 138 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (“Although in some circumstances unsupported oral testimony can be sufficient to provide” slip op. at 18

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentable

    “a) Alleged express disclosure The evidence of record does not support Petitioner’s contention that Klimesch expressly discloses the intrinsic frequency limitation. Although Klimsech discloses treating subjects with rTMS at a frequency one Hz above the intrinsic frequency (IAF + 1 HZ), it does not disclose what effect such treatment has on the intrinsic frequency. See generally, Ex. 1005. Petitioner asserts that “stimulation at IAF + 1 Hz triggered increased EEG output in the EEG band of that stimulation frequency (IAF to IAF + 2 Hz) directly corresponding to enhanced alpha power in that EEG band.” Pet. 24. EEG power is, however, distinct from frequency. See e.g., Ex. 2002, Fig. 1A (spectral analysis plotting frequency on the x-axis and power on the y-axis). Thus, even if we were to credit Petitioner’s assertion that stimulation at IAF + 1 Hz “increased EEG output” and “enhanced alpha power,” such assertion does not support that Klimesch expressly discloses changing the frequency at which peak alpha power is observed.” slip op. at 13

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot reached

    “1. Claim 1 Petitioner relies on the same evidence discussed in connection with Grounds 1 and 2 to establish disclosure of the intrinsic frequency limitation. Pet. 39 (“For the reasons provided above in Grounds 1 and 2, both Klimesch and Jin disclose this element [the intrinsic frequency limitation] of claim 1. In particular, the recited movement is the natural, inherent consequence of applying a magnetic field to the human brain at or near the subject’s peak frequency in the alpha band”). We have already determined that this evidence is insufficient to support that Klimesch or Jin discloses the intrinsic frequency limitation. Accordingly, we determine that Petitioner has not established a reasonable likelihood that it will prevail in showing that the combination of Klimesch and Jin renders claim 1 obvious.” slip op. at 25

  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,480,554
• Peaklogic, Inc. v. Wave Neuroscience, Inc.Institution denied
  PTAB · Mar 23, 2023 · IPR2022-01526 · APJ David Cotta · IPR · Institution

  The Board denied institution because the petition did not show a reasonable likelihood that claim 1 was anticipated by Klimesch or Jin, or obvious over their combination.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

    “Under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), inter partes review may not be instituted unless the Petition “shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” For the reasons discussed below, Petitioner has not established a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on its assertion that the challenged claims are unpatentable based on the grounds advanced here. Accordingly, we deny institution of inter partes review of claim 1 of the ’259 patent.” slip op. at 2

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “encountered in the art, the art’s solutions to those problems, the rapidity with which innovations are made, the sophistication of the technology, and the educational level of active workers in the field. Custom Accessories, Inc. v. Jeffrey-Allan Indus., Inc., 807 F.2d 955, 962 (Fed. Cir. 1986). Petitioner contends that the person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSA”) would have had “a medical degree plus at least two years of academic and/or industry experience in the field of TMS.” Pet. 10. According to Petitioner, “[a]dditional professional and/or technical experience could substitute for education, and vice versa.” Id. Patent Owner does not challenge Petitioner’s proposed definition of the POSA for purposes of its preliminary response. See generally, Prelim. Resp. Petitioner’s definition appears to be consistent with the level of skill in the art reflected in the prior art of record and the disclosure of the ’259 patent. Accordingly, for purposes of this Decision, we accept Petitioner’s proposed definition of the person of ordinary skill in the art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“the prior art itself [may] reflect[] an appropriate level” as evidence of the ordinary level of skill in the art) (quoting Litton Indus. Prods., Inc. v. Solid State Sys. Corp., 755 F.2d 158, 163 (Fed. Cir. 1985)).” slip op. at 7

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner

    “Importantly, however, Dr. Silvetz does not cite anything to support his opinion that stimulation at a frequency above the peak alpha frequency moves the peak frequency. Id. Nor does Dr. Silvetz explain why such stimulation moves the peak frequency. Id. Accordingly, Dr. Silvetz’s testimony is entitled to little weight. Xerox Corp. v. Bytemark, Inc., IPR2022-00624, Paper 9 at 15 (PTAB Aug. 24, 2022) (Decision Denying Institution) (precedential) (finding that conclusory testimony that “does not cite to any additional supporting evidence or provide any technical reasoning to support [that testimony] . . . is entitled to little weight”); see also, 37 C.F.R. § 42.65(a) (“Expert testimony that does not disclose the underlying facts or data on which the opinion is based is entitled to little or no weight.”); Upjohn Co. v. Mova Pharm. Corp., 225 F.3d 1306, 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (“Lack of factual support for expert opinion going to factual determinations, however, may render the testimony of little probative value in a validity determination.”) (quoting Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Delta Resins & Refractories, Inc., 776 F.2d 281, 294 (Fed. Cir. 1985)); Carella v. Starlight Archery & Pro Line Co., 804 F.2d 135, 138 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (“Although in some circumstances unsupported oral testimony can be sufficient to prove prior knowledge or use, it must be regarded with suspicion and subjected to close scrutiny.”). peak alpha frequency moves the peak frequency to a higher frequency is not specific to the conditions under which rTMS was administered in Klimesch. This is problematic because Dr. Silvetz also testifies that the brain’s response to rTMS varies depending on the conditions under which it was administered. Ex. 1003 ¶ 20 (“The brain’s natural response varies depending on factors such as: a) the location of the electromagnet; b) the frequency of stimulation; c) the duration of stimulation; d) the number of stimulation pulses administered; e) the amplitude of the pulses administered; and f) the patient’s physiology.”). In summary, given that it not accompanied by supporting evidence, does not provide any technical reasoning, and is not specific to Klimesch, we give little weight to Dr. Silvetz’s testimony in determining whether Petitioner has established a reasonable likelihood that Klimesch inherently discloses the intrinsic frequency limitation. We do not determine here that Dr. Silvetz’s testimony is incorrect, only that it is insufficiently supported by evidence and technical reasoning to be accorded substantial weight.” slip op. at 18

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached

    “Although the parties have briefed construction of the terms “preselected intrinsic frequency” and “preselected Q-factor” (Pet. 13–20; Prelim. Resp. 11–16), there does not appear to be any dispute regarding the “preselected” aspect of these claim terms. Pet. 18, 20 (proposing that “preselected intrinsic frequency” and “preselected Q-factor” be construed to require “a fixed target [intrinsic frequency/Q-factor] . . . chosen before treatment”); Prelim. Resp. 16 (proposing that the Board should adopt the district court’s claim construction: “a targeted [intrinsic frequency/Q-factor] chosen before treatment”); Reply 4 (“the parties to the IPRs have agreed that, for the purposes of these IPRs, the Board should accept the claim construction as adopted by the district court”). Accordingly, we do not find it necessary to construe any claim terms in order to resolve this proceeding. See Vivid Techs. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“[O]nly those terms need be construed that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.”).” slip op. at 8

  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 9,446,259
• Vudu, LLC v. Ideahub, Inc.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Apr 14, 2022 · IPR2020-01688 · APJ Monica S Ullagaddi · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1, 3, 4, 6, 8, 11, 13, 15, 18, 19, 21, and 23 are unpatentable over DIS 23009-1; the revised contingent motion to amend is denied.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “A person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSA”) in the relevant field as of the earliest priority date would have had at least the equivalent of a Bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or a related subject and two or more years of experience in the field of media streaming over the Internet. Pet. 18–19 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 82). Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s assertions regarding the level of ordinary skill in the art, nor 6 Patent Owner does not present objective evidence of nonobviousness. does it present its own definition. We adopt Petitioner’s definition as it is consistent with the specification of the ’830 patent and the cited references.” slip op. at 10

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached

    “Petitioner proposes that we construe “adaptation set,” “SegmentBase,” and “SegmentTemplate.” Pet. 19–21. Patent Owner does not address claim construction in its briefing. We need not construe any claim term to resolve any issues before us, and therefore, do not expressly define any claim term in our Decision. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (explaining that construction is needed only for terms that are in dispute, and only as necessary to resolve the controversy).” slip op. at 11

  • Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Written description inadequateDenied

    “not describe additional configuration information nor user characteristic information. Instead, it describes “an additional configuration to select a representation based on a user characteristics and terminal characteristics.” Ex. 2004 ¶ 232. It is unclear from Patent Owner’s argument whether Patent Owner intends for the claimed “user characteristic information” to include or refer to additional configuration information, accessibility features of a representation, or both. Reply Rev. Opp. 1 (citing Ex. 2004 ¶¶ 232, 234, 253). In any event, merely because paragraph 253 uses the term “[h]ereinafter” before it discloses “two simple attributes [] for the above-described purpose”––and not even in close proximity to the “user characteristics” and “additional configuration” in paragraph 232––is not sufficient to provide support for “the user characteristic information includ[ing] the usedWith attribute and the equivalentTo attribute,” as recited 8 Ex. 2005 is Application No. 16/168,933 (“the ’933 application”). in limitations [38.6], [40.6], and [46.6]. None of the cited portions (i.e., Ex. 2004 ¶¶ 232, 234, 253, 255–257, Table 13; Ex. 2005 ¶¶ 254–256, Table 13) indicates a sufficient connection or relationship, or the claimed inclusive relationship, between user characteristic information and the usedWith and equivalentTo attributes. Contra Reply Opp. Rev. MTA 1 (Patent Owner arguing that the cited disclosures “clearly show this relationship between the claimed attributes and user characteristic information”). For the foregoing reasons, we determine that claims 38, 40, and 46 do not find sufficient written description support in the ’644 application nor in the ’933 application, whether considered individually or collectively, and thus, these claims contain new matter.” slip op. at 35

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundUnpatentable

    “rationale for combining DIS 23009-1 with M20060, Petitioner persuasively contends that: A POSA would have been motivated to add the additional “metadata” described in M20060 to the MPDs described in the DIS 23001-6 or DIS 23009-1 references in order to enable the client to choose the most suitable version of media content among alternative versions of media content. For example, M20060 describes that the additional metadata (e.g., the extended accessibility element and the usedWith, equivalentTo, bitDepth, minBitDepth, and maxBitDepth attributes) helps “both users and clients to select appropriate representations” by, for example, “1) supporting accessibility, 2) describing relationships of representations, and 3) describing media’s bit depth.” Moreover, a POSA would have had an expectation of success in modifying the MPDs in DIS 23001-6 or DIS 23009-1 to include the additional metadata described below because it simply would have been a matter of adding additional metadata to the MPD XML schemas described in DIS 23001-6 or DIS 23009-1. Id. (citing Ex. 1094 ¶ 33; Ex. 1097 § 1, 1). Dr. Bestavros persuasively explains that “M20060 expressly references the DIS 23001-6 reference and proposes specific modifications to the MPEG DASH metadata included in the MPD XML schema.” Ex. 1094 ¶ 34 (citing Ex. 1097 § 1, 1 (introduction of M20060); Ex. 1097, 7 (references cited by M20060)).” slip op. at 41

  Patent outcomesUS 10,270,830 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,270,830

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.