• Netflix, Inc. v. Divx, LLCAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Sep 21, 2026 · IPR2020-00558 · APJ Kevin F Turner · IPR · Remand

  Claims 1–24 are unpatentable as obvious over Chen, Lindahl, and Hurst because the combination teaches the claim limitations and has motivation to combine and a reasonable expectation of success.

  RulingsRemand decision

  • RemandOther

    “On February 13, 2026, the Federal Circuit issued a decision in the appeal vacating the Second Final Decision as to all challenged claims and remanding for further proceedings. Netflix II, 7. The Federal Circuit reversed the Board’s claim construction, vacated the Board’s decision, and remanded for further proceedings consistent with the claim construction the 6 The First Final Decision also addressed Petitioner’s Motion to Exclude (Paper 42), where we granted-in-part, denied-in-part, and dismissed-in-part that Motion. See 1st Final Dec. 28–37. Our determinations on that Motion were a part of Petitioner’s appeal to the Federal Circuit. See Paper 52. As the Federal Circuit did not address this aspect of the First Final Written Decision, we determine our conclusions with respect to that Motion remain undisturbed. Federal Circuit adopted. Id. The Federal Circuit issued its mandate on March 23, 2026.” slip op. at 4

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention (“POSITA”) would have had “a bachelor’s degree in mechanical engineering, electrical engineering, computer science, or a similar field with at least two years of experience in video streaming and media security or . . . a master’s degree in mechanical engineering, electrical engineering, computer science, or a similar field with a specialization in video streaming and media security.” Pet. 14–15 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 65–67). Patent Owner does not refute Petitioner’s assessment and appears to apply such a level of skill in its arguments against combining Chen, Lindahl, and Hurst to teach or suggest the elements of the challenged claims. See generally PO Resp. As such, we continue to adopt and apply Petitioner’s unopposed position as to the level of ordinary skill in the art for purposes of this decision. See Inst. Dec. 6; 1st Final Dec. 6; 2nd Final Dec. 10.” slip op. at 7

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

    “In response, we conclude that the most natural reading of limitation [l] results from examination of the entire limitation: “locating encryption information that identifies encrypted portions of frames of video within the requested portions of the selected stream of protected video.” Ex. 1001, 27:54–57. The “within” most naturally connotes where the encrypted portions of frames of video occur, as opposed to determining where the encryption information may be located. Patent Owner’s interpretation is not wrong, i.e., the limitation could be read as Patent Owner suggests, leading to a narrower construction, but we are not persuaded that the construction of limitation [l] must be so limited, on the basis of the words themselves. We continue to reject Patent Owner’s interpretation that limitation [l] requires locating encryption information within the requested portions of the selected stream of protected video. See Inst. Dec. 27–30; 1st Final Dec. 8. Although it is apparent that encryption information can be found within the requested portions, we are not persuaded that the claim language or ’588 Patent implicitly or explicitly requires such a relationship. Likewise, although embodiments disclosed in the Specification of the ’588 Patent are consistent with Patent Owner’s more restrictive construction, the Specification also is consistent with the more grammatically correct construction as well. Thus, we construe limitation [l] as requiring that the encrypted portions of frames of video be within the requested portions of the selected stream of protected video, but we do not construe limitation [l] as requiring that the encryption information be within the requested portions of the selected stream of protected video.” slip op. at 15

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner

    “We are persuaded that the Petition demonstrates that one of ordinary skill in the art would have had a motivation to combine Chen, Lindahl, and Hurst, as asserted by Petitioner. As the Federal Circuit found, the Petition pointed to and relied upon the portions in Chen describing pre-Chen art, without scalability or FEC features that were part of what Chen describes as aspects of its own inventive system. Netflix I, slip op. at 9–10 (citing Pet. 17–19, 69–70). We agree with Petitioner that “Chen-924 teaches several embodiments that adaptively stream alternative representations of a video using partially encrypted container files.” Pet. 20 (citing Ex. 1010, 14:41–15:60). We determine that Chen-924 provides support for the rationale provided in the Petition, and that one of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to combine Chen and Lindahl in view of the disclosure of Chen-924. As discussed above, the Petition does not rely solely on privacy concerns and improvements to efficiency as its motivation to combine the references. See Pet. 18–19 (specifying piracy concerns, improvements to the efficiency of adaptive streaming, optimization of the balance between bitrate and bandwidth, and improvements to the end-user experience with fast startup and seek). With respect to whether one of ordinary skill in the art would have” slip op. at 30

  Patent outcomesUS 10,225,588 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,225,588
• Apple Inc. v. Proxense, LLCAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Sep 17, 2026 · IPR2025-00562 · APJ Thu A Dang · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–20 are unpatentable as obvious over Giobbi ’157, Giobbi ’139, and Dua; the Board also finds the claims unpatentable under the Broadcom grounds.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Claim Construction › Functional claiming / §112(f) means-plus-function › Whether §112(f) applies (Williamson, nonce words)§112(f) does not applyDecided for petitioner

    “IPR2024-00783, Ex. 1001, 22:36–49. As the Federal Circuit stated, when a disputed claim limitation does not employ “means for” language, the presumption is that each of the terms conveys sufficiently definite structure or act and, thus, is not subject to § 112 ¶ 6. See Dyfan, 28 F.4th at 1367. Based on the record before us, this presumption that each of the terms is not subject to § 112 ¶ 6 is not overcome.” slip op. at 17

  • Skill levelOther

    “differences between the claimed subject matter and the prior art are such that the subject matter, as a whole, “would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains.” KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 406 (2007). The question of obviousness is resolved on the basis of underlying factual determinations including: (1) the scope and content of the prior art; (2) any differences between the claimed subject matter and the prior art; (3) the level of ordinary skill in the art; and (4) objective evidence of non-obviousness. See Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1966).” slip op. at 25

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner

    “We find persuasive Dr. Wolfe’s supporting testimony that a POSITA would have understood the terms “PDK” and “RDC” to have “definite structure.” Ex. 1013 ¶¶ 35–56. In particular, we find persuasive Dr. Wolfe’s testimony that the term “PDK,” for example, “encompasses at least ‘a collection of circuit components that includes an antenna, a transceiver, and a controller and memory for storing information particular to a user.’” Id. ¶ 35. Dr. Wolfe’s testimony is consistent with the Specification of the ’188 patent. See Ex. 1001, 5:42–6:7, 3:48–62. In particular, the Specification of the ’188 patent describes a microchip that stores information in memory and responds through an antenna when probed, which is consistent with Dr. Wolfe’s testimony. Id.; Ex. 1001, 1:30–62.” slip op. at 19

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “differences between the claimed subject matter and the prior art are such that the subject matter, as a whole, “would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains.” KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 406 (2007). The question of obviousness is resolved on the basis of underlying factual determinations including: (1) the scope and content of the prior art; (2) any differences between the claimed subject matter and the prior art; (3) the level of ordinary skill in the art; and (4) objective evidence of non-obviousness. See Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1966).” slip op. at 25

  Patent outcomesUS 9,049,188 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 9,049,188
• Twitch Interactive, Inc. v. Razdog Holdings LLCAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jul 27, 2026 · IPR2025-00308 · APJ Aaron W Moore · IPR · Final written decision

  The Board held claim 1 unpatentable as obvious over Darnell and Kim, and over Dasgupta and Darnell; Judge Moore dissented as to the Dasgupta and Kim ground.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Decided for patent owner

    “2. “Real Time” – The Parties’ Positions In the preliminary phase of this proceeding, the principal claim term” slip op. at 9

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundUnpatentable

    “1. Rationale to Combine Darnell and Kim Petitioner contends that “Darnell and Kim address similar problems of” slip op. at 35

  • Expert testimonyOther

    “form of storage or minimal time delay, and Patent Owner concedes as much in this proceeding. See, e.g., Ex. 1082, 125:19–22, 126:3–10; Tr. 41:26– 42:14, 53:20–25. Accordingly, the mere fact that Darnell’s system may aggregate content feeds or content items on a server, merge content, store content, and then deliver content to a user interface, does not preclude it from being done in “real time” as that term would be understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art reading the ’654 patent in its entirety.” slip op. at 48

  Patent outcomesUS 10,334,068 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,334,068
• Twitch Interactive, Inc. v. Razdog Holdings LLCAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jul 27, 2026 · IPR2025-00307 · APJ Kevin C Trock · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–18 are unpatentable: the majority finds them obvious over the asserted prior-art combinations, including Darnell and Kim and Dasgupta-based combinations.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • BurdenFwd all claims unpatentableUnpatentable

    “§ 6. This Final Written Decision issues pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 318(a) (2018) and 37 C.F.R. § 42.73 (2019). For the reasons discussed herein, we determine that Petitioner, Twitch Interactive, Inc., has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that claims 1–18 (the “challenged claims”) of U.S. Patent No. 9,729,658 B2 (Ex. 1001, “the ’658 patent”) are unpatentable. See 35 U.S.C. § 316(e) (2018); 37 C.F.R. § 42.1(d) (2019).” slip op. at 2

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Plain and ordinary meaningDecided for petitioner

    “2. “Real Time” – The Parties’ Positions In the preliminary phase of this proceeding, the principal claim term” slip op. at 10

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundUnpatentable

    “1. Rationale to Combine Darnell and Kim Petitioner contends that “Darnell and Kim address similar problems of” slip op. at 37

  Patent outcomesUS 9,729,658 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 9,729,658
• Tesla, Inc. v. Intellectual Ventures II LLCAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jun 26, 2026 · IPR2025-00220 · APJ Kristen L Droesch · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–18 are unpatentable under § 103 over Wallen and Berggren because the combined teachings render the claimed subject matter obvious.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for petitioner

    “We agree that Patent Owner’s proposed claim construction is wholly unsupported by, and inconsistent with, the language of independent claims 1, 7, and 13, and the aims of the ’670 Patent Specification. See Ex. 1001, 2:3– 25, 9:32–10:5, 12:51–67, 18:54–19:6, 19:26–42, 20:12–26. Moreover, the cited extrinsic evidence––testimony by Patent Owner’s expert Dr. Lomp–– does not support Patent Owner’s proposed construction because it is internally inconsistent and also undermined by Dr. Lomp’s inconsistent deposition testimony. See Ex. 1036, 11:6–17, 12:9–12; Ex. 2010 ¶¶ 40, 48. Similarly, the extrinsic evidence cited by Petitioner (e.g., Exs. 1037, 1038, 2009) undermines Patent Owner’s position emphasizing the intended recipient devices of SIB1. In summary, we decline to adopt Patent Owner’s proposed claim construction because it is unsupported by the claim language, the ’670 Patent Specification, and the cited extrinsic evidence. with the ordinary and customary meaning which does not include limiting SIB1 to an ordinary legacy SIB and excluding MTC specific SIBs or SIBs intended for MTC devices. In addition, we need not construe explicitly any other claim term or phrase. See, e.g., Nidec Motor Corp. 868 F.3d at 1017 (“[W]e need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 13

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “would have had a bachelor’s degree from an accredited program in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or equivalent training, and at least two years of professional experience relating to wireless communication technology” and “[l]ack of professional experience can be remedied by additional education, and vice versa.” Pet. 15–16 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 19–21). Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s definition. See generally PO Resp. We find that “at least” in Petitioner’s formulation of the level of skill in the art is vague and open-ended. Otherwise, we adopt Petitioner’s definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art because it is consistent with the level of skill reflected by the ’670 Patent Specification and the prior art of record. slip op. at 14

  • Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Not entitled to earlier dateDecided for petitioner

    “filing date. As explained above, the burden of production shifted to Patent Owner to show that Wallen is not prior art because the ’670 Patent is entitled to the earlier January 20, 2012, filing date of foreign priority application GB1201000. See Dynamic Drinkware, 800 F.3d at 1379–1380. For a claim in a later-filed application to be entitled to the filing date of an earlier application, the earlier application must provide written description support for the claimed subject matter. Anascape, Ltd. v. Nintendo of Am. Inc., 601 F.3d 1333, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2010). To satisfy the written description requirement, “a prior application itself must describe an invention, and do so in sufficient detail that one skilled in the art can clearly conclude that the inventor invented the claimed invention as of the filing date sought.” Lockwood v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 107 F.3d 1565, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1997); see also VasCath v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1563–64 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (“[T]he applicant must . . . convey with reasonable clarity to those skilled in the art that, as of the filing date sought, he or she was in possession of the invention . . . now claimed.” (emphasis omitted)), Ariad Pharm. Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc) (“[I]t is the specification itself that must demonstrate possession.”). Patent Owner’s arguments fail to meet this burden of production because, aside from addressing a system information block 1, Patent Owner’s arguments do not substantively address how GB1201000 provides written description support for any other limitations of the claimed invention. See PO Resp. 43, 57. Accordingly, Patent Owner has not met its burden of production in coming forward with evidence or argument to show possession of the claimed invention in foreign priority application GB1201000, the burden of production did not shift back to Petitioner, and,” slip op. at 18

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner

    “primary synchronization signal (PSS), a secondary synchronization signal (SSS), and a physical broadcast channel (PBCH) including a master information block (MIB).” See Pet. 41–42 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 70–75; Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 76, 77, 83–84). Petitioner implicitly acknowledges that Wallen does not expressly disclose a physical broadcast channel (PBCH), but relies on Berggren for confirming that the LTE standard specifies that a PBCH carries the MIB. See Pet. 42–43 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 74; Ex. 1007 ¶¶ 73–75). According to Petitioner, “a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to transmit Wallen’s MIB using a PBCH as taught by Berggren.” Pet. 43 (citing Pet. 33–38). In particular, Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have been motivated for Wallen’s LTE system to utilize the LTE standard implementation details taught by Berggren,” and “it would have been predictable and beneficial for Wallen’s user equipment to receive the MIB in the [PBCH], as was standard in LTE.” Pet. 34 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 58), 37 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 63). According to Petitioner, “the combination is nothing more than ‘the predictable use of prior art elements according to their established functions.’” Pet. 38 (citing KSR, 550 U.S. at 417). Based on the entire record developed during trial, we are persuaded by a preponderance of the evidence that Petitioner provides sufficient articulated reasoning with rational underpinning to support the conclusion that it would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art to modify Wallen’s broadcast MIB with Berggren’s teachings of using a PBCH for transmitting broadcast MIBs. See Pet. 33–38; KSR, 550 U.S. at 418.” slip op. at 24

  Patent outcomesUS 11,206,670 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,206,670
• Tesla, Inc. v. Intellectual Ventures II LLCNo claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jun 23, 2026 · IPR2025-00219 · APJ Frederick C Laney · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 11–22 were not shown unpatentable under any § 103 ground because the prior art did not teach or suggest receiving the claimed resource allocation and multi-level TPC command on one physical channel.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • BurdenNot shown unpatentable

    “onset to show with particularity why the patent it challenges is unpatentable.” Harmonic Inc. v. Avid Tech., Inc., 815 F.3d 1356, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citing 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3) (requiring inter partes review petitions to identify “with particularity . . . the evidence that supports the grounds for the challenge to each claim”)). This burden of persuasion never shifts to the patent owner. See Dynamic Drinkware, LLC v. Nat’l Graphics, Inc., 800 F.3d 1375, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2015). Moreover, a petitioner should 1 The Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (“AIA”), Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011), amended 35 U.S.C. § 103, effective March 16, 2013. Because the application from which the ’153 patent issued claims priority to an application filed before this date, the pre-AIA version of § 103 applies. not “place the burden on [the Board] to sift through information presented by the Petitioners, determine where each element [of the challenged claims] is found in [the cited references], and identify any differences between the claimed subject matter and the teachings of [the cited references.]” Google Inc. v. EveryMD.com LLC, IPR2014-00347, Paper 9 at 25 (PTAB May 22, 2014).” slip op. at 5

  • Expert testimonyPatent owner expert creditedPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner

    “The second and third asserted benefits—reduced complexity and reduced latency—rest on the declaration of Dr. Kotzin (Ex. 1003 ¶ 64) rather than on any disclosure of Andersson or Khan. We accord that testimony little weight on this point because it asserts the benefits in conclusory terms without explaining why they would result from inserting a scheduling grant into Andersson’s undefined “other bits,” as distinct from Khan’s separate-slot design.” slip op. at 20

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “A. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner asserts that ordinarily skilled artisans “would have a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or equivalent training, and approximately two years of experience working in the field of wireless communication systems or design of similar communication systems.” Pet. 14. Petitioner’s proposed definition, which Patent Owner does not dispute, appears reasonable and consistent with the asserted prior art and the ’500 Patent. Therefore, we adopt it as the ordinary level of skill of an artisan in the field of the patented technology for our analysis below.” slip op. at 7

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “Patent Owner offers a proposed construction for the recited “single physical channel” found in limitation 11.2 and “an accumulation of TPC commands” found in independent claims 12 and 18. PO Resp. 9–17. Petitioner likewise addresses the scope of an accumulation of TPC commands, but Petitioner does not contest directly Patent Owner’s proposed construction for “single physical channel.” Pet. Reply 2–7. We determine, however, that no express construction of any claim term is necessary to resolve the dispute between the parties. Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“[W]e need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 8

  Patent outcomesUS 9,706,500 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 9,706,500
• Tesla, Inc. v. Intellectual Ventures II LLCNo claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jun 22, 2026 · IPR2025-00217 · APJ Frederick C Laney · IPR · Final written decision

  The Board held claims 1–5, 10–15, and 20 not unpatentable under four §103 grounds because the petitioner did not establish the claimed enabled-accumulation indication or single-channel combination.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • BurdenNot shown unpatentable

    “onset to show with particularity why the patent it challenges is 1 The Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (“AIA”), Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011), amended 35 U.S.C. § 103, effective March 16, 2013. Because the application from which the ’153 patent issued claims priority to an application filed before this date, the pre-AIA version of § 103 applies. 2 US 6,334,047 B1, iss. Dec. 25, 2001 (Ex. 1009). 3 US 2001/0036238 A1, pub. Nov. 1, 2001 (Ex. 1010) 4 US 2004/0190485 A1, pub. Sept. 30, 2004 (Ex. 1005). 5 US 2004/0077370 A1, pub. Apr. 22, 2004 (Ex. 1008). 6 US 6,600,772 B1, iss. July 29, 2003 (Ex. 1004). 7 US 6,529,741 B1, iss. Mar. 4, 2003 (Ex. 1007). unpatentable.” Harmonic Inc. v. Avid Tech., Inc., 815 F.3d 1356, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citing 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3) (requiring inter partes review petitions to identify “with particularity . . . the evidence that supports the grounds for the challenge to each claim”)). This burden of persuasion never shifts to the patent owner. See Dynamic Drinkware, LLC v. Nat’l Graphics, Inc., 800 F.3d 1375, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2015). Moreover, a petitioner should not “place the burden on [the Board] to sift through information presented by the Petitioners, determine where each element [of the challenged claims] is found in [the cited references], and identify any differences between the claimed subject matter and the teachings of [the cited references].” Google Inc. v. EveryMD.com LLC, IPR2014-00347, Paper 9 at 25 (PTAB May 22, 2014).” slip op. at 5

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “A. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner asserts that ordinarily skilled artisans “would have a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or equivalent training, and approximately two years of experience working in the field of wireless communication systems or design of similar communication systems.” Pet. 15. Petitioner’s proposed definition, which Patent Owner does not dispute, appears reasonable and consistent with the asserted prior art and the ’153 patent. Therefore, we adopt it as the ordinary level of skill of an artisan in the field of the patented technology for our analysis below.” slip op. at 7

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed board ownDecided for patent owner

    “apparent agreement between the parties: “TPC command accumulation” refers to a process that collects and uses TPC commands from a network device to cumulatively affect transmission power. And having studied the intrinsic record of the ’153 patent, we are in accord. But, we decline to further limit the construction of “TPC command accumulation” in the manner proposed by either party––i.e., (1) each TPC command adjustment must be summed to cumulatively affect transmission power (as proposed by Petitioner) or (2) a TPC command value must be added to an integrator. Although both parties are able to point to disclosures in the ’153 Patent where the TPC command accumulation of an exemplary embodiment is described as using an integrator and/or summing each TPC command adjustment to cumulatively affect a UE’s transmission power (PO Resp. 16 (citing Ex. 1001, 3:39–43, 7:15–29, 9:27–42; Ex. 2016 ¶¶ 35–42); Pet. Reply 4–5 (citing Ex. 1001, 3:39–43, 7:2–6, 7:8–22, 9:28–40)), neither party has demonstrated persuasively that the intrinsic record of the ’153 Patent demonstrates a clear intent to limit “TPC command accumulation” to those particular embodiments.” slip op. at 11

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundReasonable expectation not foundNot shown unpatentable

    “A rationale supports obviousness only where the proffered benefit would flow from the specific modification proposed; a benefit that the prior art realizes in a different structural context does not, without more, establish that the same benefit would result from inserting one reference’s element into the other. On this record, the nexus between Khan’s benefits and Petitioner’s “other bits” modification is missing.” slip op. at 40

  Patent outcomesUS 10,952,153 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,952,153
• Apple Inc. / Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. et al. v. Smart Mobile Technologies LLCAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Apr 22, 2026 · IPR2022-01002 · APJ Jameson Lee · IPR · Remand

  On remand, claims 1–9 and 12–20 are unpatentable as obvious over Paulraj and Heath under § 103.

  RulingsRemand decision

  • RemandOther

    “determining no challenged claim had been proved unpatentable by Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd., Samsung Electronics America, Inc., and Apple Inc. (collectively, “Petitioner”). Paper 41. Petitioner appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. Papers 43, 44. On January 13, 2026, the Federal Circuit vacated and remanded, on the basis that the Board erred by not considering certain alternative arguments presented in the Petitioner’s Reply (Paper 29), which were properly responsive to claim construction proposed in the Patent Owner Response and adopted by the Board.1 Paper 45. In its Reply, Petitioner alternatively argued that even under the Patent Owner’s claim construction relating to “the plurality of antennas,” the same prior art references nonetheless still rendered obvious the challenged claims. In this remand proceeding, neither party requested the filing of additional briefing, despite having been given an opportunity to make and explain such a request. Paper 51. We have authority to conduct this inter partes review under 35 U.S.C. § 6. This Final Written Decision on Remand is issued pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 318(a) and 37 C.F.R. § 42.73. Having considered all of the arguments presented in Petitioner’s Reply, we determine that Petitioner has proved by a preponderance of the evidence that claims 1–9 and 12–20 of U.S. Patent No. 9,191,083 B1 (Ex. 1001, “the ’083 patent”) are unpatentable. A.” slip op. at 2

  • Skill levelSkill level board ownDecided for petitioner

    “Bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or a related field, and at least two years of experience related to the design or development of wireless communication systems, or the equivalent.” Pet. 2–3 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 27–28). Petitioner additionally states that “[a]dditional graduate education could substitute for professional experience, or significant experience in the field could substitute for formal education.” Pet. 3. Patent Owner does not in its Response address the level of ordinary skill. Patent Owner’s expert witness, Dr. Cooklev, testifies that he “will apply the same definition of the level of skill of a POSITA [as Petitioner].” Ex. 2004 ¶ 19. Based on the evidence of record, we determine a person of ordinary skill would have had a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or a related field, and two years of experience related to the design or development of wireless communication systems. This is consistent with Petitioner’s articulation of the level of ordinary skill, with the exception of Petitioner’s open-ended reference to “at least” two years of experience, because that would improperly encompass a level of experience only possessed by an expert. This articulation of the level of ordinary skill is also the same as what we determined in the Final Written decision issued on November 30, 2023. Paper 41, 6. C. slip op. at 6

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner

    “Patent Owner contends: “The plain meaning of the claims requires that the same ‘plurality of antennas’ be used for transmitting and receiving the plurality of signal streams.” PO Resp. 5, 9–12. Citing Dr. Cooklev’s testimony, Patent Owner contends that the ’083 patent’s Specification describes embodiments that use the same antennas for both transmitting and receiving data streams. PO Resp. 7–9 (citing Ex. 2004 ¶¶ 34–35). In the Final Written Decision, we determined: Although we do not understand the claims to require both transmission and reception “via all antennas” all of the time, we determine the claims require a set of antennas in which at least some of the antennas are for both transmitting and receiving. We disagree with Petitioner that two separate sets of antennas— one set of transmitting antennas and a separate, nonoverlapping set of receiving antennas—fall within the scope of the challenged claims. Paper 41, 13 (emphasis added). The Federal Circuit agreed with our claim construction. Apple Inc. v. Smart Mobile Technologies LLC, U.S. Ct. App. Fed. Cir., slip op. 24-1419 (January 13, 2026) (2026 WL 91021) (Paper 45, 2–4). We continue to apply the same construction here that we adopted in the Final Written Decision.” slip op. at 9

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “legally sufficient motivation for modifying Paulraj, but only attempted to show that the modification “could” have been made by one of ordinary skill in the art which is not enough for a showing of obviousness. Sur-reply 8–9. We disagree with Patent Owner. Establishing that certain technique was well-known to one of ordinary skill in the art at the effective filing date of the challenged patent constitutes sufficient motivation to make a modification in accordance with what was well-known in the art to one of ordinary skill, absent factors not present here. Indeed, “if a technique has been used to improve one device, and a person of ordinary skill in the art would recognize that it would improve similar devices in the same way, using the technique is obvious unless its actual application is beyond his or her skill.” KSR, 550 U.S. at 417. That would be the situation where a technique was well-known to one of ordinary skill in the art, unless there is actual difficulty in making the application. The “improvement” here, although not articulated by Petitioner, is inherent with the technique, not requiring use of separate antennas for transmitting and receiving, i.e., eliminating the need for additional parts. Further, it is not necessary to show that a modification is the “best option,” because any “suitable option” would suffice. See Intel Corporation v. Qualcomm Incorporated, 21 F.4th 784, 800 (Fed. Cir. 2021). Here, Patent Owner does not assert that one of ordinary skill in the art would have had difficulty modifying Paulraj to use some of the same antennas both for transmitting and for receiving. Nor does Patent Owner dispute that it was well known to one of ordinary skill in the art to use the same antenna(s) for both transmitting and for receiving. We further note the following description in the Specification of the ’083 patent: “The typical CT/MD [cellular telephone/mobile device] has one transmitter and one receiver (T/R), with one antenna.” Ex. 1001, 1:47–48. That statement is fully consistent with Petitioner’s assertion that it was well-known to use the same antenna for transmitting and for receiving. For the foregoing reasons, notwithstanding Patent Owner’s arguments to the contrary, we determine that Petitioner sufficiently has shown that it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art to modify Paulraj such that some of the same antennas would be used both for transmitting and for receiving, according to limitations 1[b], 1[d], and 1[e].” slip op. at 36

  Patent outcomesUS 9,191,083 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 9,191,083
• Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. / Samsung Electronics America, Inc. v. Power2b, Inc.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Mar 13, 2026 · IPR2021-01266 · APJ John D Hamann · IPR · Remand

  On remand, the Board held claims 29, 36–38, 44–46, 48, 49, and 56–58 unpatentable as obvious over Reime, with additional grounds also supporting the challenged claims.

  RulingsRemand decision

  • ExcludeMotion to exclude, deniedDenied

    “In addition, Patent Owner filed a Motion to Exclude certain of Petitioner’s evidence (Paper 32) and Petitioner filed an Opposition (Paper 33). We denied this motion. See Final Dec. 58–61.” slip op. at 3

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for petitioner

    “transmission paths. See Pet. Reply 14–15; PO Sur-reply 15. And we agree with both parties that the light that is transmitted directly through the plate to the sensor element does not have intervening reflections—such is consistent with the plain and ordinary meaning of “directly to.” See PO Resp. 31–32; Pet. Reply 14–15; PO Sur-reply 15. Nothing in claim 48’s language, however, requires that all of the reflected light be transmitted directly to the sensor element, which Patent Owner argues. Ex. 1001, 70:32–35; PO Resp. 31–32; PO Sur-reply 14–16. Rather, we agree with Petitioner that the claim language “merely requires that some light reflected by the object goes ‘directly to’ at least one sensor element once it is transmitted through the viewing plane defining plate.” Pet. Reply 14. We also agree that “none of these dependent claims purport to be exclusive of one another.” Id. at 15. Rather, claims 46–48 simply require some light be transmitted (or propagated) for their particular transmission path, without reciting all light. See Ex. 1001, 70:24–35.” slip op. at 13

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableNot shown unpatentableMixed

    “We find Petitioner’s arguments based on Reime alone insufficient. Thus, we find that Petitioner does not show by a preponderance of the evidence that claim 49 is rendered obvious by Reime alone.” slip op. at 52

  • Obviousness (§103) › KSR rationalesUnpatentableUnpatentable

    “And in view of the above, we find persuasive Dr. Bederson’s testimony that “[c]hoosing a multi-element detector or a single-element detector would have been a simple design choice using commercially available detectors.” Ex. 1002 ¶ 117. Accordingly, we find that one of ordinary skill in the art would have found it obvious for Reime’s receivers to be implemented using discrete single-element detectors. See KSR, 550 U.S. at 417 (“When there is a design need or market pressure to solve a problem and there are a finite number of identified, predictable solutions, a person of ordinary skill has good reason to pursue the known options within his or her technical grasp. If this leads to the anticipated success, it is likely the product not of innovation but of ordinary skill and common sense.”). We find unavailing Patent Owner’s argument that “Petitioner relies on expert testimony to gap-fill missing elements regarding Reime’s failure to disclose or suggest the different claim arrangements of detector elements in a ‘detector assembly.’” PO Resp. 78 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 111–119; Ex. 2056 ¶ 171). Rather, in light of Reime’s teachings, coupled with the general knowledge of one of ordinary skill in the art, it would have been obvious to employ discrete single-element detectors for Reime’s receivers. See Koninklijke Philips N.V. v. Google LLC, 948 F.3d 1330, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (finding obviousness can rely on supported expert testimony to supply an element of a claim). We appropriately consider such evidence of the knowledge that one of ordinary skill in the art would have had as part of our obviousness analysis. See Randall Mfg. v. Rea, 733 F.3d 1355, 1362–63 (Fed. Cir. 2013). Moreover, “AAPA can be important evidence of general background knowledge, and general knowledge can be used to supply a missing claim 1371, 1378–79 (Fed. Cir. 2025). Here, Petitioner relies on the cited AAPA as evidence of one of ordinary skill in the art’s general knowledge at the time of the ’093 patent, and the AAPA is not the basis for this ground. See Pet. 4, 42–43; Pet. Remand 4–5. As Shockwave Med. explains, Federal Circuit “case law has long recognized numerous permissible uses for general background knowledge in an IPR such as, ‘for example, furnishing a motivation to combine, or supplying a missing claim limitation.” 142 F.4th at 1378–79 (quoting Qualcomm Inc. v. Apple Inc., 24 F.4th 1367, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2022) (citing Randall Mfg., 733 F.3d at 1362; Koninklijke, 948 F.3d at 1337–38)).” slip op. at 31

  Patent outcomesUS 9,569,093 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 9,569,093
• Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. / Samsung Electronics America, Inc. v. Power2b, Inc.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Mar 13, 2026 · IPR2021-01239 · APJ John D Hamann · IPR · Remand

  On remand, the Board held claims 17, 18, 21, 22, 26, and 30 unpatentable as obvious over Reime, with claims 17, 18, 21, 22, and 30 also obvious over Reime and Hinckley.

  RulingsRemand decision

  • ExcludeMotion to exclude, deniedDenied

    “In addition, Patent Owner filed a Motion to Exclude certain of Petitioner’s evidence (Paper 28) and Petitioner filed an Opposition (Paper 34). We denied this motion. See Paper 41, 47–50.” slip op. at 3

  • Skill levelSkill level board ownOther

    “one having ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention of the ’850 patent: one who “would have had a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or a related field, and . . . years of experience in the research, design, development, and/or testing of touch and/or proximity sensors, human-machine interaction and 3 The Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (“AIA”) included revisions to 35 U.S.C. § 103 that became effective on March 16, 2013. Because the ’850 patent issued from an application filed before March 16, 2013, we apply the pre-AIA version of the statutory basis for unpatentability. 4 US 2003/0034439 A1, published Feb. 20, 2003 (Ex. 1010, “Reime”). 5 US 2002/0021278 A1, published Feb. 21, 2002 (Ex. 1011, “Hinckley”). Petitioner lists the combination of Reime and Hinckley as a separate asserted ground for claim 26. We combine these two asserted grounds into one as they rely on the same combination. additional education substituting for experience and vice versa.” Final Dec. 8–9. This definition for one having ordinary skill was not the subject of appeal, and we maintain it for purposes of this Final Written Decision on Remand. Moreover, it is consistent with the ’850 patent and the asserted prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 8

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner

    “PO Resp. 17–29; Pet. Reply 8–15; PO Sur-reply 6–11. We construed this term in the Final Written Decision. Final Dec. 10–24. In particular, we concluded that (i) “detector assembly” means “two or more detector elements that detect electromagnetic radiation,” and (ii) a detector assembly is not required to be physically separate from (i.e., not interspersed with) a pixel array. Id. at 20, 22. The Federal Circuit found the first part of our construction erroneous. Appeal Dec. 7–10. In particular, the Federal Circuit concluded that “[t]he element.” Id. at 8. In addition, to guide the Board’s analysis on remand, the Federal Circuit construed “the terms ‘at an edge’ and ‘at least one edge’ [to] require a detector assembly to be arranged along one or more edges of a viewing plane defining plate.” Id. at 10–11. In other words, the Federal Circuit “clarif[ied] that arranging a detector assembly ‘at,’ ‘along,’ or ‘about’ ‘at least one edge’ or ‘an edge’ does not limit the detector assembly to being arranged entirely on ‘one edge.’” Id. at 12.” slip op. at 9

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “the Federal Circuit already has concluded that claim 15 is obvious in view of Reime. Appeal Dec. 9–10. Claim 17 further recites “wherein the detector assembly comprises: a support substrate, and an arrangement of detector elements.” Ex. 1001, 67:15–18. We agree with Petitioner and find that Reime teaches these further limitations. Pet. 34–35; Pet. Remand 2–4; Pet. Resp. Remand 1–3. First, as we found in the Final Written Decision, Reime’s receivers 30 and 32 are two detector elements that detect electromagnetic radiation (i.e., light), and Reime’s receivers 30 and 32, collectively, comprise a detector assembly. Final Dec. 27–28 (citations omitted). Moreover, Reime’s two receivers 30 and 32 comprise a detector assembly having multiple detector elements (e.g., two receivers) to teach “an arrangement of detector elements.” Ex. 1010 ¶¶ 73, 86, Figs. 9A–9C; Ex. 2060,7 127:17–18; Pet. 32–33; Pet. Reply 20; Pet. Remand 3. In addition, as we found in the Final Written Decision, Reime teaches that each of receivers 30 and 32 are centered on opposite edges of the plate. 7 Deposition Transcript of Dr. Benjamin Bederson (Apr. 7, 2022). Ex. 1010, Fig. 6A, ¶ 82) (affirming that Reime teaches having one light receiver (e.g., 30 or 32) on each side of a four-sided touch pad). In further support, we agree with Petitioner and find that Reime teaches that receivers 30 and 32 “are mounted in the peripheral area surrounding the LCD 92.” Pet. 32–33; Ex. 1010 ¶ 86; see also id. at Figs. 9A–9C (showing that the receivers are positioned at the edge of the LCD screen); infra annotated Fig. 9E (showing receivers 30 and 32 along edges of the LCD). Accordingly, we find Reime’s detector assembly that comprises receivers 30 and 32 is arranged along two edges (one edge for each receiver) of the LCD, which meets the Federal Circuit’s construction for being arranged at at least one edge. See supra Section III (concluding “at least one edge” means “arranged along one or more edges”) (emphasis added).” slip op. at 12

  Patent outcomesUS 8,624,850 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,624,850

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.