- Fusion Orthopedics, LLC v. Extremity Medical, LLCSome claims unpatentablePTAB · Nov 4, 2024 · IPR2023-00894 · APJ Robert A Pollock · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–10 and 12–15 are unpatentable; claim 11 was not shown unpatentable. Substitute claims 16–25 and 27–30 are unpatentable over Mazur; claim 26 was not reached.
RulingsFinal written decision- BurdenMixed
“It is of the utmost importance that petitioners in the IPR proceedings adhere to the requirement that the initial petition identify ‘with particularity’ the ‘evidence that supports the grounds for the challenge to each claim.’” Intelligent Bio-Sys., Inc. v. Illumina Cambridge Ltd., 821 F.3d 1359, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3)). Here, however, not until its Reply does Petitioner belatedly suggest that Ferrante’s disclosure of bone screws with self-tapping ends equally meets the limitation of claim 10 (with respect to the first member) as with claim 11 (with respect to the second member), and that both claims are obvious in light of “evidence” from Ferrante “that it was well known to equip bone screws with self-tapping ends.” Reply 26–27. We do not discern these arguments in the Petition, and consider them waived. See Netflix, Inc. v. DivX, LLC, 84 F.4th 1371,1377 (Fed. Cir. 2023) (“While the Board should not take an overly mechanistic view of a petition and decline to address an argument because the petitioner did not present it with ideal vigor and clarity, the Board should also not have to decode a petition to locate additional arguments beyond the ones clearly made.”). In sum, Petitioner’s error in failing to first address limitations of claim 10 in the Petition specific to the Cognet/Ferrante combination indicates a failure to meet the particularity requirements for what must be in the petition and cannot be left to be filled in on reply. See 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3); 37 C.F.R. §§ 42.22(a)(2) (requiring, among other things, “a detailed explanation of the significance of the evidence”), 42.104(b)(4)–(5) (requiring that petition “specify where each element of the claim is found in the prior art patents or printed publication relied upon” and, regarding submitted evidence, state “the relevance of the evidence to the challenge raised, including identifying specific portions of the evidence that support the challenge”). Microsoft, 2022 WL 989403, at *6. Accordingly, Petitioner has not shown persuasively that claim 11 would have been obvious in light of Cognet and Ferrante for the reasons set forth in the Petition. slip op. at 41
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner
“We also find persuasive Mr. Dominguez’s explanation that one of ordinary skill in the art would have understood “bore” as including stepped diameter holes, sometimes described as a bore having a counterbore. See generally Ex. 1018 ¶¶ 4–29; Reply 3–10. Three of Mr. Dominguez’s illustrative examples are reproduced in the annotated figures below. The above figures show Mr. Dominguez’s annotated illustrations from the Jackson (Ex. 1019, Fig. 3), Brånemark (Ex. 1021, Fig. 4), and Ray (Ex. 1025, Fig. 1) references as discussed at paragraphs 10, 12, and 13, respectively, of Mr. Dominguez’s Second Declaration. With reference to the above figures, Mr. Dominguez testifies that “Jackson describes a bone repair set screw in which ‘[t]he bore 27 comprises a first bore section 31, a second bore section 32,’ etc. delineated by shoulders 41, 42, etc. (Ex. 1019, 5:24– 43)” (Ex. 1018 ¶ 10); “Brånemark describes an osseous implantation device having body 1ʺ with first and second holding portions 21ʺ, 31ʺ and ‘an inner through bore with a first portion 4ʺ in the first holding portion and a second portion 5ʺ in the second holding portion.’” Ex. 1021, 4:44–46” (id. ¶ 12); and Ray discloses surgical calipers including “handle 12 having ‘stepped cylindrical bore 14,’” wherein “[c]ollar 20 of a shaft inserted in the bore ‘rests against a step of the bore 14’ (2:14–15)” (id. ¶ 13). Patent Owner responds that Mr. Dominguez’s examples “that allegedly show a single bore encompassing two or more stepped-diameter holes or a counterbore . . . . are specific to these references and divorced from the disclosures of the ’166 patent.” Sur-Reply 7. Insofar as the ’166 patent makes no mention of the term “bore” outside the claims, and Mr. Dominguez’s examples are all taken from the field of orthopedic surgery, we do not find this argument persuasive. Patent Owner further appears to contend that exemplary references to a “cylindrical stepped down bore” or a “stepped cylindrical bore” are too specific to be within the scope of the term “bore.” Sur-Reply 7–8. As these terms merely describe species within a larger genus, and Patent Owner presents no cogent reason to exclude them, we do not find this argument availing. Relatedly, we are also not persuaded by Patent Owner’s argument that “the prior art treats a ‘bore’ as an element that is distinct from a ‘counterbore.’” Id. at 8. Rather, we credit Mr. Dominguez’s testimony that “[a] counterbore is not a structure unto itself, a counterbore is part of a larger structure” as exemplified by numerous examples including Laps (Ex. 1028 ¶ 33 (sensor assembly wherein “bore 16 includes a counterbore 18”)); Martinez (Ex. 1029, 3:61 (surgical cutting instrument wherein “bore 56 has a counterbore 64”)); Zang (Ex. 1030, 2:49 (bone anchor having a “bore [that] includes a counterbore”)); Ledet (Ex. 1022, 29:3–5 (vertebral fixation plate having “through holes . . . . countersunk, or counterbored to accommodate the head of a bone screw”)); Seo (Ex. 1031, 3:45 (chair leg employing “counterbored bore 23”)); and Exner (Ex. 1032, 2:16 (extrusion press including “counterbored axial bore 6”)). Ex. 1018 ¶¶ 17–23. That a reference may refer to a figure as showing “bore 103” with “counterbore 105 . . . formed on one end” does not indicate that they are distinct structures as Patent Owner contends, but merely that the focus of each term is directed to the entire bore or to a particular aspect of the bore, i.e., its counterbore. See” slip op. at 22
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Patent Owner subsequently proposed an alternative definition, as a person having “[a] Bachelor’s Degree in biomedical and/or mechanical engineering or similar training and . . . at least three years of experience with implant devices used for internal fixation of bones.” POR 5 (citing Ex. 2012 ¶¶ 32–33). According to Patent Owner, “[t]his hypothetical person would be capable of performing various design tasks and would understand the basic mechanical features and operation of orthopaedic implant devices [and] have an appreciation for orthopaedic fusion techniques and the medical issues and concerns faced by a doctor/surgeon charged when performing operations to implant orthopaedic devices.” Id. Despite some differences in wording, Patent Owner asserts (and Petitioner does not contest) that any “distinction between the parties’ proposed definitions of a POSITA does not affect the arguments set forth herein.” Id. (citing Ex. 2012 ¶ 34). Consistent with this view, we find the parties’ constructions equally applicable in light of the prior art of record and the disclosure of the ’166 patent. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“the prior art itself [may] reflect[] an appropriate level” as evidence of the ordinary level of skill in the art) (quoting Litton Indus. Prods., Inc. v. Solid State Sys. Corp., 755 F.2d 158, 163 (Fed. Cir. 1985)). We adopt, for convenience, Petitioner’s definition, but our analysis does not change depending on which of the two articulations are applied here. H.” slip op. at 12
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner
“one of ordinary skill in the art would understand that “bore,” as used in the context of claims 1 and 12, encompasses a multi-diameter passage, and in particular, one having stepped longitudinal cross sections such as that shown in Cognet’s Figure 1. See generally DI 11–13. For the reasons that follow, we conclude that one of ordinary skill in the art would have understood “bore” as such. Relying on the testimony of Mr. Dominguez, Petitioner initially proposed a construction of “bore” as “a usually cylindrical hole made by or as if by the turning or twisting movement of a tool.” Pet. 16 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 58). Petitioner’s proposal relied on Mr. Dominguez’s testimony that “[a] bore is a cylindrical hole made by the spinning rotation of a twist drill cutting tool. It is typically made by removing material from a solid or hollow object, similar to a tunnel or orifice.” Ex. 1002 ¶ 58. Pointing to its annotation of Cognet’s Figure 1, above, Patent Owner argued that that the term “bore” excludes a tunnel made by “two adjacent bores.” See Prelim. Resp. 21–25. In view of the then-available evidence, we provisionally construed “bore” as a hole or passage made by or as if by the turning or twisting movement of a tool such that its interior walls have cylindrical lateral cross-sections, and which do not exclude holes or passages having tapered or stepped longitudinal cross-sections. DI 13.” slip op. at 19
Patent outcomesUS 11,298,166 mixedClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,298,166 - PTAB · Sep 6, 2024 · IPR2024-00430 · APJ Jon M Jurgovan · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–24 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on at least one claim.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), an inter partes review may not be instituted unless the information presented in a petition and the preliminary response “shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” Upon consideration of the Petition and Preliminary Response, and accompanying exhibits and evidence, we determine Petitioner has established a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail with respect to at least one challenged claim in the inter partes review. Therefore, we grant institution of an inter partes review as to all of the challenged claims of the ’690 patent on all challenges in the Petition.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“A POSITA6 would have had a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, or a similar discipline, and three to four years of experience working in signal processing and/or communication systems/networks. Additional education may substitute for experience, and significant work experience may substitute for formal education. Pet. 6 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 115–120). Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s proposed level of skill in the art, which is consistent with the prior art references asserted by Petitioner. Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1354–55 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (stating that the applied prior art may reflect an appropriate level of skill). For this stage of the proceeding, we agree with and will use Petitioner’s proposed level for this Decision.” slip op. at 12
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Since the parties apply what they contend is the plain and ordinary meaning of the claim terms in their briefs, and have stipulated in the Cox case that the plain and ordinary meaning applies, and Patent Owner argues that the district court’s construction in the Charter case is the plain and ordinary meaning, there is no controversy concerning claim terms that we need to resolve in this Decision. Pet. 6; Prelim. Resp. 10; Ex. 1005, 104–105; Ex. 2001, 2. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). At this stage of the proceeding, therefore, we apply the plain and ordinary meaning to the claim terms consistent with their ordinary and customary meaning under 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b). We note, however, that Patent Owner seems to consider the court’s construction in the Charter case to require that the claimed “probe” must be of a type that can be compared with a reference signal. Prelim. Resp. 10. We question whether all of the different types of probes mentioned and claimed in the ’690 patent would require comparison with a reference signal. See, e.g., Ex. 1001, 2:7–19. However, this is a matter best resolved, if necessary, on a full record at trial.” slip op. at 14
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableUnpatentableMixed
“Prelim. Resp. 23 (citing Ex. 1013, 37) (annotated in red by Patent Owner). IEEE-802.16’s Table 5 shows that the CID is a field of a generic MAC header. Petitioner does not show sufficiently that the CID, located in the header, specifies content payload of a MAC message, as required by limitation 1A. Petitioner alternatively relies on IEEE-802.16’s ranging code index that it contends is another example of data that is in a ranging request parameter and is used for the ranging response payload. Pet. 15 (citing Ex. 1013, 49–51, 204–213, 576–579, 665–66; Ex. 1002 ¶ 149). Patent Owner asserts that the portions of IEEE-802.16 that Petitioner cites do not disclose that the ranging code index is sent as part of a ranging request message. Prelim. Resp. 25. Although the parts of IEEE-802.16 that Petitioner cites disclose that the ranging code index is sent from the SS to the BS and is included in a ranging response (Ex. 1013, 49–51, 204–213, 576–579, 665–66), the cited parts do not disclose that the SS sends the ranging code index to the BS in a ranging request. Consequently, Petitioner has not established that IEEE- 802.16 anticipates a ranging code index that is a parameter of a ranging request specifying the content payload of the ranging response corresponding to limitation 1A. For the foregoing reasons, on this record, we determine that Petitioner has not shown a reasonable likelihood to prevail in showing that claim 1 is anticipated by IEEE 802.16.” slip op. at 18
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSRPatents in suitUS 8,284,690 - Hunter’S Manufacturing Company, Inc. D/B/A Tenpoint Crossbow Technologies v. Ravin Crossbows, LLCAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Jul 9, 2024 · IPR2023-00407 · APJ Robert J Silverman · IPR · Final written decision
Claim 1 is unpatentable as anticipated by Stanziale ’771; the Board did not reach the alternative grounds.
RulingsFinal written decision- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“As an initial matter, the recited expression “mounted to” is broad. The Federal Circuit has explained that words in a claim “will ordinarily be given their full meaning,” without imposing narrowing modifications on the claim language. Johnson Worldwide, 175 F.3d at 989, see also Virginia Panel, 133 F.3d at 865–66. As to whether the “mounted to” connection may be an indirect connection, the parties agree that an indirect connection is permitted — a view that is amply supported by the intrinsic record, as discussed above. With regard to the types of movement that may occur between a “string guide” and a corresponding “limb,” the intrinsic record shows that that various types of movements (including no movement at all) are characterized as “mounted to.” Slight variations of “mounted to,” occurring in the intrinsic record, are helpful in understanding the claim language — particularly because the ’015 patent itself uses such a variant (“mounted . . . on”) to describe the very connection (between a “string guide” and a “limb”) that is elsewhere, and in claim 1, is described as “mounted to.” See Ex. 1001, 5:23–26.” slip op. at 22
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“Patent Owner’ sole argument — i.e., that Stanziale ’771 fails to teach the “mounted to” limitation — is based upon its construction of the “mounted to” limitation, which permits the “string guide” to be rotatable relative the corresponding “limb,” but permits no other type of relative motion. See PO Resp. 4, 13–14. As discussed above, we do not accept Patent Owner’s construction of the “mounted to” limitation. In Stanziale ’771, first and second pulleys 145, 146, and interconnecting pivot 147 (all three of which Petitioner maps to claim 1’s “string guide[s]”) are pivotally connected to a number of intermediate members (e.g., lever arms or pushing arms 32, connecting elements 27, and constraining member 29) which are, in turn, pivotally connected to elastic members 10 (which Petitioner maps to claim 1’s “limb[s]”). See Pet. 41–42 (citing Ex. 1012 7:9–17, 8:26–8:13, 11:8–9, 14:18–15:22, 16:24–25, 16:29, 17:2, 17:15–17, 17:24–27, 19:12–30, 20:32–21:16, Figs. 1–7; Ex. 1016 ¶¶ 177–179); see also Ex. 1012 11:3–7, 11:34–12:4, 12:10–17, 16:29–18:3, 18:22–19:30, Figs. 8, 9, 10a, 10b. Therefore, Stanziale ’771, in Petitioner’s mapping, teaches the “string guide[s]” connected indirectly to the “limb[s].” Per the construction of the “mounted to” limitation employed herein (“connected to, either directly or indirectly”), Petitioner establishes, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Stanziale ’771 teaches the “string guide[s]” “mounted to” the “limb[s],” as recited in claim 1 of the ’015 patent. Contrary to Patent Owner’s concerns (see Paper 47, 1), the indirect connection between Stanziale ’771’s “string guide[s]” and “limb[s]” is not “unbounded.” Rather, the connection disclosed by Stanziale ’771 is the type of indirect connection supported by the intrinsic record. See supra § II.B. Patent Owner’s contention that “a POSA would be disinclined to rely on [Stanziale ’771] as a reference for the improved crossbow design disclosed in Claim 1” is not persuasive. See PO Resp. 38 (citing Ex. 2029 ¶ 46). The test for anticipation is whether a prior art reference discloses each and every element recited in the claim, not whether one of ordinary skill in the art would have been inclined to rely on the reference. See Net MoneyIN, Inc., 545 F.3d at 1369.” slip op. at 32
- ExcludeMotion to exclude, deniedMixed
“Motions to exclude evidence are authorized under 35 C.F.R. § 42.64. Rule 42.64(b)(1) states: “Once a trial has been instituted, any objection [to evidence] must be filed within five business days of service of evidence to which the objection is directed.” Further, “[t]he objection must identify the grounds for the objection with sufficient particularity to allow correction in the form of supplemental evidence.” 35 C.F.R. § 42.64(b)(1). “A motion to exclude evidence must be filed to preserve any objection.” 35 C.F.R. § 42.64(c).” slip op. at 40
- Expert testimonyPatent owner expert creditedDecided for patent owner
“In the present proceeding, Petitioner proposed — and Patent Owner does not dispute (see PO Resp. 3) — the following definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art: A hypothetical POSA to which the ’015 Patent pertains would be a technical person who has at least some experience working in the field of archery, reviewing crossbows or engineering related to bows and/or crossbows, and is generally familiar with prior art crossbows. (Ex. 1016 ¶17.) Such a person would likely have at least a bachelor’s degree in mechanical engineering or, alternatively, would have several years of experience in the field of archery or engineering related to bows and/or crossbows. (Id.) Pet. 28. As discussed above, we adopt Petitioner’s description of a person of ordinary skill for the purposes of this Decision. See supra § II.A. Petitioner alleges various deficiencies in Mr. Teater’s background, education, and knowledge. Paper 39, 4–8. Nevertheless, Mr. Teater satisfies the definition, of a person of ordinary skill in the art, that Petitioner advanced. Specifically, Mr. Teater has reviewed crossbows for 14 years, encompassing the relevant priority date for the ’015 patent, during which time he wrote evaluations of various bows and crossbows, developed and published testing standards for crossbows, and served on the Archery Trade Association’s technical committee for standards and guidelines. Paper 41, 4 (citing Ex. 2029 ¶¶ 3, 4, 7). Accordingly, Mr. Teater satisfies Petitioner’s definition of “a technical person who has at least some experience working in the field of archery, reviewing crossbows or engineering related to bows and/or crossbows, and is generally familiar with prior art crossbows.” Pet. 28. Petitioner emphasizes that Mr. Teater “does not have a degree in mechanical engineering.” Paper 39, 4 (citing Ex. 2034, 1; Ex. 1034, 43:20–44:5). However, no degree of any kind is mandatory for satisfying Petitioner’s definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art. Indeed, Petitioner’s definition states that “[s]uch a person would likely have at least a bachelor’s degree in mechanical engineering or, alternatively, would have several years of experience in the field of archery or engineering related to bows and/or crossbows.” Pet. 28 (emphasis added). There is no dispute that Mr. Teater meets this standard. Petitioner raises various other issues that form no part of the definition that Petitioner advanced — for example, whether Mr. Teater has taught courses related to crossbows, whether he is named as an inventor on a” slip op. at 36
Patent outcomesUS 9,354,015 unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipationcites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 9,354,015 - Samsung Bioepis Co. Ltd. v. Regeneron Pharmaceuticals, Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Jun 14, 2024 · IPR2023-00442 · APJ John G New · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1, 3–11, 13, 14, 16–24, and 26 are unpatentable as obvious over Dixon because Dixon anticipates them.
RulingsFinal written decision- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Preamble limiting or notPreamble limitingDecided for petitioner
“We adopt the same reasoning here, and conclude that the evidence of record and the Specification of the ’681 patent support construing the preamble’s recitation of a “method for treating a patient with an angiogenic eye disorder” as meaning administering a compound, i.e., the recited VEGF antagonist, to a patient for the purpose of improving or providing a beneficial effect in their angiogenic eye disorder. We find that, as in Eli Lilly & Co. v. Teva Pharms. Int’l GmbH, although the claims “encompass a clinical result, they do not require such a result.” (emphasis added). 8 F.4th 1331, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2021). We consequently reject Patent Owner’s proposed construction that the language of the preamble reciting a “method for treating an angiogenic eye disorder” requires not only an intent to treat, but, additionally, a high degree of efficacy on par with monthly Lucentis. See PO Resp. 9–10.” slip op. at 17
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“We adopt Petitioner’s proposed construction of the claim terms “initial dose,” “secondary dose,” and “tertiary dose.” Petitioner proposes adoption of the definitions expressly set forth in the Specification of the ’681 patent, viz., that the initial dose is the dose “administered at the beginning of the treatment regimen,” and is followed by the secondary doses that are “administered after the initial dose,” and the tertiary doses are “administered after the secondary doses” and may be distinguished from the secondary doses “in terms of frequency of administration.” Ex. 1001, col. 3, ll. 36–44. Patent Owner does not expressly dispute Petitioner’s construction, other than to argue that, by 2011, a person of ordinary skill in the art would have understood “initial” and “secondary” doses to correspond to loading doses and “tertiary” doses to correspond to maintenance doses. PO Resp. 13 (citing Ex. 2056 ¶ 66; Ex. 2349, 6–11. Patent Owner contends that the purpose (and expected effect) of loading doses was to achieve visual acuity gains and retina drying, and the goal of less frequent maintenance doses was to maintain the efficacy achieved with loading doses. Id. at 14 (citing Ex. 2056 ¶ 66). As we have explained above, we do not find persuasive Patent Owner’s argument that the definition of these terms requires a high, or otherwise defined, degree of efficacy. As we stated in the -00881 and -01225 Decisions: Based on those express definitions in the Specification, we do not find cause to construe the terms differently. In particular, we do not find that the Specification requires the “tertiary doses” to maintain any efficacy gain achieved after the initial and secondary doses, or that the term suggests any specific level of efficacy. The Specification unequivocally states that “[t]he terms ‘initial dose,’ ‘secondary doses,’ and ‘tertiary doses,’ refer to the temporal sequence of administration of the VEGF antagonist.”” slip op. at 18
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed board ownDecided for patent owner
“If a claim limitation is directed to printed matter, the second step of the Praxair analysis is to determine whether the printed matter is functionally related to its “substrate.” Praxair, 890 F.3d at 1032. Printed matter that is functionally related to its substrate is given patentable weight. Id. (citing DiStefano, 808 F.3d at 850). However, “[w]here the printed matter is not functionally related to the substrate, the printed matter will not distinguish the invention from the prior art in terms of patentability.” Id. (quoting In re Ngai, 367 F.3d 1336, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2004)). More specifically, printed matter is functionally related to its substrate when the language changes not mere thoughts or outcomes, but provides action steps that the method requires. See C R Bard Inc. v. AngioDynamics, Inc., 979 F.3d 1372, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (holding that the test for printed matter is whether it “merely informs people of the claimed information, or whether it instead interacts with the other elements of the claim to … cause a specific action in a claimed process.”); see also Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Ben Venue Laboratories, Inc., 246 F.3d 1368, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (stating that language “is only a statement of purpose and intended result” where its “expression does not result in a manipulative difference in the steps of the claim”) (emphasis added).” slip op. at 21
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“A Person of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner notes that the Petitioner in the ’00881 IPR proposed that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have: (1) knowledge regarding the diagnosis and treatment of angiogenic eye disorders, including the administration of therapies to treat said disorders; and (2) the ability to understand results and findings presented or published by others in the field. Pet. 17–18 (quoting -00881 IPR, Paper 94 at 9–10). Furthermore, it was asserted that such a person would typically have an advanced degree, such as an M.D. or Ph.D. (or equivalent, or less education but considerable professional experience in the medical, biotechnological, or pharmaceutical field), with practical academic or medical experience in (i) developing treatments for angiogenic eye disorders, including through the use of VEGF antagonists, or (ii) treating of same, including through the use of VEGF antagonists. Id. at 18 (citing -00881 IPR Paper 94 at 10). Patent Owner does not expressly contest this definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art in its Response. In the -01225 IPR, we adopted the same definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art for the challenged claims of the ’681 patent, concluding that that definition was consistent with the level of skill in the art. See -01225 IPR, Paper 96 at 52–53. Having previously adopted this definition of the level of skill in the art for the claims of the ’681 patent, we do so again in the present proceeding.” slip op. at 25
Patent outcomesUS 10,130,681 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,130,681 - Mylan Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. Regeneron Pharmaceuticals, Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Jan 9, 2024 · IPR2023-00566 · APJ John G New · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–9, 34–39, 41–43, and 45 are unpatentable as anticipated by Dixon; the Board did not reach the other grounds.
RulingsFinal written decision- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“inter partes review are anticipated by Dixon and therefore unpatentable (Ground 1). Because we reach this conclusion, we do not reach Petitioner’s contentions that the claims are obvious on the basis of Ground 5. Nor does our analysis rely upon, or cite to, Exhibit 1058. We consequently dismiss as moot Patent Owner’s motion to exclude Exhibit 1058.” slip op. at 24
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for patent owner
“Owner and its experts proposed claim construction of “effectively treating” as meaning “noninferior,” “statistically noninferior,” or “comparable.” Pet. Reply 4. Petitioner asserts that Patent Owner, and its expert, Dr. Do, advance the proposed construction of “effectively treating, ” with no explanation for what that means, or how it comports with the challenged dependent claims that recite visual acuity limitations ranging from losing less than 15 letters to gaining more than 15 letters. Id. at 4–5.” slip op. at 32
- ExcludeMotion to exclude, grantedMotion to exclude, deniedMixed
“inter partes review are anticipated by Dixon and therefore unpatentable (Ground 1). Because we reach this conclusion, we do not reach Petitioner’s contentions that the claims are obvious on the basis of Ground 5. Nor does our analysis rely upon, or cite to, Exhibit 1058. We consequently dismiss as moot Patent Owner’s motion to exclude Exhibit 1058.” slip op. at 24
Patent outcomesUS 10,888,601 unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipationcites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 10,888,601 - Mylan Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. Regeneron Pharmaceuticals, Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Jan 9, 2024 · IPR2023-00533 · APJ John G New · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–9, 34–39, 41–43, and 45 are unpatentable as anticipated by Dixon; the Board did not reach the other grounds.
RulingsFinal written decision- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“inter partes review are anticipated by Dixon and therefore unpatentable (Ground 1). Because we reach this conclusion, we do not reach Petitioner’s contentions that the claims are obvious on the basis of Ground 5. Nor does our analysis rely upon, or cite to, Exhibit 1058. We consequently dismiss as moot Patent Owner’s motion to exclude Exhibit 1058.” slip op. at 24
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Preamble limiting or notPreamble limitingDecided for patent owner
“Id. at 18. The similar language of the challenged claims of the ’601 patent, and our reasoning in the related -00881 Decision, compel the same conclusion here, i.e., that the preamble is limiting upon the claims.” slip op. at 43
- ExcludeMotion to exclude, grantedMotion to exclude, deniedMixed
“inter partes review are anticipated by Dixon and therefore unpatentable (Ground 1). Because we reach this conclusion, we do not reach Petitioner’s contentions that the claims are obvious on the basis of Ground 5. Nor does our analysis rely upon, or cite to, Exhibit 1058. We consequently dismiss as moot Patent Owner’s motion to exclude Exhibit 1058.” slip op. at 24
Patent outcomesUS 10,888,601 unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipationcites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 10,888,601 - Mylan Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. Regeneron Pharmaceuticals, Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Jan 9, 2024 · IPR2022-01225 · APJ John G New · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1, 3–11, 13, 14, 16–24, and 26 are unpatentable as anticipated by Dixon; the Board did not reach the remaining grounds.
RulingsFinal written decision- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Preamble limiting or notPreamble limitingDecided for patent owner
“Here, the claims are directed to methods of administering, i.e., using, a VEGF antagonist for an intended purpose of “treating an angiogenic eye disorder in a patient.” The Specification repeatedly characterizes the method as one for treating angiogenic eye disorders in patients. Apart from the preamble, the independent claims do not elsewhere recite or indicate any other use for the method steps comprising the administration of a VEGF antagonist. Thus, we determine that the preamble sets forth the essence of the invention—treating an angiogenic eye disorder in a patient. Additionally, we find that the preamble provides antecedent basis for claim terms “the patient” recited in the body of each independent claim, and “angiogenic eye disorders” recited in dependent claims 6, 7, 18, and 20. Indeed, without the preamble, it would be unclear to whom the doses of VEGF are administered. Thus, …in view of the evidence of record, namely, the claim language and the written description of the ’338 patent, we find that the preambles of method claims 1 and 14 are limiting insofar as they require “treating an angiogenic eye disorder in a patient.” Id. at 17–18 (citations omitted). We adopt this same reasoning here and find that the preamble of claim 1 reciting “[a] method for treating an angiogenic eye disorder in a patient” is limiting.” slip op. at 34
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“We adopt Petitioner’s proposed construction of the claim terms “initial dose,” “secondary dose,” and “tertiary dose.” Petitioner proposes adoption of the definitions expressly set forth in the Specification of the ’681 patent, viz., that the initial dose is the dose “administered at the beginning of the treatment regimen,” and is followed by the secondary doses that are “administered after the initial dose,” and the tertiary doses are “administered after the secondary doses” and may be distinguished from the secondary doses “in terms of frequency of administration.” Ex. 1001, col. 3, ll. 36–44.” slip op. at 37
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for petitioner
“If a claim limitation is directed to printed matter, the next step in the Praxair analysis is to determine whether the printed matter is functionally related to its “substrate.” Praxair, 890 F.3d at 1032. Printed matter that is functionally related to its substrate is given patentable weight. Id. (citing DiStefano, 808 F.3d at 850). However, “[w]here the printed matter is not functionally related to the substrate, the printed matter will not distinguish the invention from the prior art in terms of patentability.” Id. (quoting In re Ngai, 367 F.3d 1336, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2004)). More specifically, printed matter is functionally related to its substrate when the language changes not mere thoughts or outcomes, but provides action steps that the method requires. See C R Bard Inc. v. AngioDynamics, Inc., 979 F.3d 1372, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (holding that the test for printed matter is whether it “merely informs people of the claimed information, or whether it instead interacts with the other elements of the claim to … cause a specific action in a claimed process.”); see also Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Ben Venue Laboratories, Inc., 246 F.3d 1368, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (stating that language “is only a statement of purpose and intended result” where its “expression does not result in a manipulative difference in the steps of the claim”) (emphasis added).” slip op. at 46
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“A Person of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have: (1) knowledge regarding the diagnosis and treatment of angiogenic eye disorders, including the administration of therapies to treat said disorders; and (2) the ability to understand results and findings presented or published by others in the field. Pet. 28. Petitioner asserts that such a person would typically have an advanced degree, such as an M.D. or Ph.D. (or equivalent, or less education but considerable professional experience in the medical, biotechnological, or pharmaceutical field), with practical academic or medical experience in (i) developing treatments for angiogenic eye disorders, including through the use of VEGF antagonists, or (ii) treating of same, including through the use of VEGF antagonists. Id. at 28–29 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 27–29; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 21–25). Patent Owner does not expressly contest this definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art in its Response. Because we find Petitioner’s definition to be consistent with the level of skill in the art (see, e.g., Exs. 1006, 1020), we adopt Petitioner’s definition.” slip op. at 52
Patent outcomesUS 10,130,681 unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 10,130,681 - Apple Inc. v. Logantree, LPAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Aug 30, 2023 · IPR2022-00040 · APJ Patrick R Scanlon · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–5, 8–11, 20, 25, 30–32, 36, 39–42, 45–51, 61–65, 144, and 147 are unpatentable, principally as obvious over the grounds decided.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“In the Decision on Institution, we adopted Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art, stating it was “consistent with the evidence of record, including the asserted prior art.” Dec. Inst. 8. In proposing a different level of ordinary skill in the art, Patent Owner does not explain why its proposed skill level is more appropriate.13 PO Resp. 18. In addition, the parties’ proposed definitions are substantially similar. Accordingly, for the purposes of this Decision, we apply Petitioner’s definition, although our conclusions with respect to obviousness would be the same if we were to apply Patent Owner’s definition.” slip op. at 10
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for patent owner
“We determine that we need not expressly construe “movement sensor” to resolve the parties’ disputes because doing so would have no effect on the analysis below. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms that . . . are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs, 200 F.3d at 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). To the extent the parties raise claim construction issues in addressing the asserted grounds, we address such issues below.” slip op. at 11
- Expert testimonyPatent owner expert creditedDecided for patent owner
“any weight. Reply 29–30. First, Petitioner contends that the Patent Owner Response does not provide a single citation to Dr. Madisetti’s declaration, Exhibit 2005. Id. at 29. However, Patent Owner explains that the Patent Owner Response mistakenly cites to Exhibit 2001 instead of Exhibit 2005 due to a filing error and confirms that Dr. Madisetti’s declaration is persuasive. Petitioner also argues that Dr. Madisetti’s testimony in Exhibit 2005 is not based on underlying facts because, in the 60-paragraph declaration, only paragraphs 32–35 and 59 have any citations. Reply 29. Petitioner also asserts that Dr. Madisetti refused to answer questions and provide clarification during his deposition. Id. at 30 (citing Ex. 1040, 30:3–20, 52:2–14, 78:16–84:4). Patent Owner states that it served a supplemental declaration in response to Petitioner’s Objection to Evidence months before the deposition of Dr. Madisetti.14 Sur-reply 20. On this record, we decline to discount Dr. Madisetti’s testimony in its entirety as suggested by Petitioner. Instead, we consider Dr. Madisetti’s testimony, as we do all expert testimony, in accordance with governing law and Board rules. E. Ground 1: Asserted Obviousness Based on Allum, Raymond, and Conlan” slip op. at 11
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner
“We agree with Petitioner. Allum’s and Conlan’s design schemes, although different, are not mutually exclusive. Indeed, in addition to the pushbuttons, Conlan’s monitor includes a movement senor for detecting a full range of a subject’s movement and a memory in which data obtained by the monitor can be stored and later retrieved for evaluation. Ex. 1010, 2:60–63, 3:56–58, 4:47–49. As such, Conlan combines the pushbuttons for a user to tell the device about the user’s condition with a movement senor and a memory that enables the device to tell the user (or another person) about the user’s conditions (i.e., the user’s movements). Furthermore, even if Conlan did not disclose using two design schemes together, the differences in the design schemes identified by Patent Owner would not prevent one of ordinary skill in the art from considering combining the references. Rather, as Petitioner asserts, adding Conlan’s pushbuttons would allow the resulting device to gather additional data relating to a particular event, such as a feeling of dizziness, that pertains to the subject’s balance or movement. See Pet. 21–22 (citing Ex. 1010, 6:38–46; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 78–79); see also id. at 34 (arguing that “switches 22, ‘dizziness,’ and, when depressed, the switches 22, 23 ‘cause that occurrence to be recorded in the internal memory of the monitor’”). We are persuaded that one of ordinary skill in the art would recognize such additional data to be beneficial to Allum’s diagnostic and rehabilitative tool for people prone to abnormal falling and wishing to improve movement control.” slip op. at 18
Patent outcomesUS 6,059,576 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 6,059,576 - Dr. Reddy’S Laboratories, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., Hoffman-La Roche AG, And Abbvie Inc.Some claims unpatentablePTAB · Jul 5, 2023 · PGR2022-00023 · APJ Robert A Pollock · PGR · Final written decision
The Board held claims 2, 3, 5, 14, 26, 27, and 30 unpatentable for lack of written description, but did not find claims 1, 6, and 25 unpatentable.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level board ownDecided for patent owner
“We do not discern a substantive difference between the parties’ respective definitions for the level of ordinary skill in the art. Although Petitioner did not expressly recite hematological malignancies, Petitioner did refer to expertise in clinical oncology and cancer biology, which would encompass the blood cancers recited by Patent Owner. Accordingly, we find the parties’ respective definitions to be equivalent and consistent with the level of ordinary skill in the art as reflected by the prior art in this proceeding. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (explaining that specific findings regarding ordinary skill level are not required “where the prior art itself reflects an appropriate level and a need for testimony is not shown” (quoting Litton Indus. Prods., Inc. v. Solid State Sys. Corp., 755 F.2d 158, 163 (Fed. Cir. 1985))). We find that Dr. Gordon and Dr. Sharman are both qualified to opine from the perspective of a skilled artisan as both are persons of at least ordinary skill in the art, based on either party’s definition. Ex. 1020, ¶¶ 8– 19; Ex. 2008, ¶¶ 11–24.” slip op. at 7
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedPatent owner expert creditedDecided for patent owner
“We find Dr. Sharman’s statements and deposition testimony have substantially greater credibility than Dr. Gordon’s statements and deposition testimony based on Dr. Sharman’s significantly greater relevant experience in treatment and study of hematological cancers using chemotherapeutic agents and based on Dr. Sharman’s superior recollection and more complete analysis of the record found in the ’942 patent. In particular, we found Dr. Gordon’s statement that no example “includes” every element of claim 1 factually incorrect as contradicted by at least Figure 2 of the ’942 patent where the ordinary understanding of includes to mean encompasses is used. See Ex. 1020 ¶ 131. Ebit Sys. Am., LLC v. Thales Visonix, Inc., 881 F.3d 1354, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“The PTAB [i]s entitled to weigh the credibility of the witnesses ....”).” slip op. at 16
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for patent owner
“The parties do not identify any issue relating to the preamble that needs to be addressed to resolve the sole written description challenge and the parties do not dispute that the transitional term “comprising” is “inclusive or open-ended and does not exclude additional, unrecited elements or method steps.” Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. US. Gypsum Co., 195 F.3d 1322, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 1999). We therefore find that there are no terms that need claim construction. See, e.g., Wellman, Inc. v. Eastman Chem. Co., 642 F.3d 1355, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“[C]laim terms need only be construed ‘to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 8
- Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Written description adequateWritten description inadequateMixed
“We find that Figure 2 of the ’942 patent and the associated example provide literal and express descriptive support for claim 1 of the ’942 patent. As descriptive support for claim 1, the ’942 patent teaches treatment of leukemia or lymphoma, including chronic lymphocytic leukemia and small lymphocytic lymphoma (Ex. 1001, 16:21–22), by orally administering the Bcl-2 inhibitor GDC-0199 (Ex. 1001, 17:16) in escalating doses of 50 mg per day during a first week and 100 mg per day during a second week (Ex. 1001, Figure 2). Claim 1 of the ’942 patent, as written, does not exclude performance of the complete combination therapy shown in Figure 2. Rather, the reasonable understanding of the term “comprising” in claim 1 encompasses monotherapy with GDC-0199 alone and combination therapy with obinutuzumab. Both embodiments are described in the Specification. As Patent Owner points out, the ’942 Specification is replete with disclosures to administer GDC-0199 by itself to a patient, stating” slip op. at 16
Patent outcomesUS 10,993,942 mixedClaim construction§ 112 disclosurePatents in suitUS 10,993,942 - Bausch & Lomb Incorporated v. Zeavision, LLCAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Apr 10, 2023 · IPR2022-00089 · APJ Tina E Hulse · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 12–14, 16–21, 23, and 24 are unpatentable: Lang anticipates some claims, and the asserted Lang-based combinations render all challenged claims obvious.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“In our Institution Decision, we adopted Petitioner’s definition (Dec. Inst. 6–7), which Patent Owner states that it “does not contest.” PO Resp. 17. Because the parties do not dispute the level of ordinary skill in the art, we adopt Petitioner’s definition as consistent with the prior art’s demonstration of the level of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (explaining that specific findings regarding ordinary skill level are not required “where the prior art itself reflects an appropriate level and a need for testimony is not shown” (quoting Litton Indus. Prods., Inc. v. Solid State Sys. Corp., 755 F.2d 158, 163 (Fed. Cir. 1985))). Moreover, we find that Dr. Johnson and Dr. Dorey are both qualified to opine from the perspective of a skilled artisan as both are persons of at least ordinary skill in the art. See Ex. 1024 ¶¶ 2–11, App’x A; Ex. 2001 ¶¶ 4–14, App’x A; see also Kyocera Senco Indus. Tools Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 22 F. 4th 1369, 1376–77 (Fed. Cir. 2022) (“To offer expert testimony from the perspective of a skilled artisan in a patent case—like for claim construction, validity, or infringement—a witness must at least have ordinary skill in the art.”).” slip op. at 7
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Preamble limiting or notPreamble limitingDecided for petitioner
“Similarly, here, the Specification consistently states that the invention relates to oral formulations for protecting eye health and that the benefits of carotenoids, such as zeaxanthin and lutein, include the ability to absorb UV and blue light. See, e.g., Ex. 1001, Abstract (“Oral formulations for promoting eye health”), 4:25–31 (stating carotenoids such as zeaxanthin are “very good at absorbing ultraviolet (UV) and blue light”), 15:45–47 (“one object of this invention is to disclose multi-component orally-ingestible formulations for protecting eye health in mammals”). Like the preamble in Proveris, the preamble in claim 12 is the only reference in any of the independent claims to the allegedly inventive concept of protecting eye health from the harmful effects of blue light. Proveris, 739 F.3d at 1373. Moreover, the preamble of claim 12 recites: “A nutrient formulation for oral ingestion for protecting a user’s eyes from the harmful effect of blue light, the formulation comprising:.” Ex. 1001, 37:13–15. The body of claim from the group consisting of capsules, tablets, liquids, and powders for oral ingestion.” Ex. 1001, 37:22–24 (emphasis added). Similarly, claim 22, which depends from claim 12, relies on the preamble of claim 12 for antecedent basis for the limitation “wherein the user has macular degeneration and a lens-related disorder.” Id. at 38:21 (emphasis added). Thus, “the nutrient formulation” and “the user” in the claim body derives antecedent basis from the “nutrient formulation” and “user” that is “defined in greater detail in the preamble.” See Proveris, 739 F.3d at 1373. Accordingly, reading the patent as a whole, because the inventor clearly relied on both the preamble and the body of claim 12 to define the claimed invention, the preamble of claim 12 should be construed as limiting. See id.” slip op. at 10
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“stereoisomers” should have its plain and ordinary meaning, and a person of ordinary skill in the art would understand this term to mean that the zeaxanthin that is present in the 3R-3R' stereoisomer form is “largely but not wholly free of meso-zeaxanthin stereoisomers.” Pet. 19 (citing Ex. 1024 ¶ 57, Ex. 1031, 3). Petitioner also contends the term “mixed tocopherols” should be construed to mean “a mixture of tocopherols such as alpha-, beta-, gamma-, and delta-tocopherols.” Pet. 22–24 (citing Ex. 1024 ¶¶ 65–66). Patent Owner does not address either of these claim terms in its Response. See generally PO Resp. Because there does not appear to be any dispute over the construction of these terms, we adopt Petitioner’s proposed constructions as they are consistent with the plain and ordinary meaning of the terms. See Wellman, terms need only be construed ‘to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 11
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableNot shown unpatentableMixed
“2. Analysis Anticipation requires that “each and every element as set forth in the claim is found, either expressly or inherently described, in a single prior art omitted). “To establish inherency, the extrinsic evidence ‘must make clear that the missing descriptive matter is necessarily present in the thing described in the reference, and that it would be so recognized by persons of ordinary skill.’” Id. (citation omitted). Moreover, to anticipate, a prior art reference must “disclose[] within the four corners of the document not only all of the limitations claimed but also all of the limitations arranged or combined in the same way as recited in the claim.” Net MoneyIN, Inc. v. Verisign, Inc., 545 F.3d 1359, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2008).” slip op. at 13
Patent outcomesUS 10,307,384 unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,307,384
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.