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  • PTAB · Dec 19, 2025 · IPR2025-01110 · APJ Kristen L Droesch · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–16, finding a reasonable likelihood they are obvious over Kim and over Chu and Choi.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “An inter partes review may not be instituted unless it is determined that “the information presented in the petition filed under section 311 and any response filed under section 313 shows that there is a reasonable 1 Deputy Director Stewart was recused in this matter. claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). For the reasons provided below, we determine, based on the record before us, there is a reasonable likelihood Petitioner would prevail in showing at least one of the challenged claims is unpatentable.” slip op. at 2

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “had a Bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or a related field, and at least 3 years of experience in the research, design or development of wireless communication devices, systems, and/or networks, or the equivalent, as of the Critical Date,” and that “[i]ncreased educational experience can make up for less work experience, and vice versa.” Pet. 2 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 26–28). Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art, except as to the date that pertains to such skill level. Prelim. Resp. 4–5. Namely, Patent Owner asserts that “Petitioner is incorrect” that “the ’171 Patent is entitled to an effective date of no earlier than January 22, 2021.” Id. at 5. For the purpose of institution, we adopt Petitioner’s definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art because it is consistent with the level of skill reflected by the ’171 Patent Specification and the asserted prior art, except that we delete the qualifier “at least” to eliminate vagueness as to the amount of required experience.” slip op. at 10

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for patent owner

      “claim construction standard as that applied in federal courts in a civil action under 35 U.S.C. § 282(b), which is generally referred to as the Phillips standard. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b); Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). Under the Phillips standard, “words of a claim ‘are generally given their ordinary and customary meaning.’” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312. “Petitioner submits that no formal claim constructions are necessary.” Pet. 1–2. Similarly, “Patent Owner does not contend that any formal claim construction is necessary” at this stage of the proceeding. Prelim. Resp. 5. For the purpose of institution, we need not explicitly construe any claim terms. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 9

    • Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Not entitled to earlier dateDecided for petitioner

      “Corp. Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 627 F.3d 859, 870–71 (Fed. Cir. 2010). For a claim in a later-filed application to be entitled to the filing date of an earlier application, the earlier application must provide written description support for the claimed subject matter. Anascape, Ltd. v. Nintendo of Am. Inc., 601 F.3d 1333, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2010). To satisfy the written description requirement, “a prior application itself must describe an invention, and do so in sufficient detail that one skilled in the art can clearly conclude that the inventor invented the claimed invention as of the filing date sought.” Lockwood v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 107 F.3d 1565, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1997); see also VasCath v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1563–64 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (“[T]he applicant must [] convey with reasonable clarity to those skilled in the art that, as of the filing date sought, he or she was in possession of the invention . . . now claimed.”), Ariad Pharm. Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc) (“[I]t is the specification itself that must demonstrate possession.”). On the record before us, we do not agree that the ’171 Patent is entitled to a filing date earlier than Jan. 11, 2021. In particular, we do not agree that PCT ’199 describes the invention in enough detail such that a person of ordinary skill in the art could conclude that the inventor was in possession of the invention as of the March 4, 2016 filing date. The disclosures of PCT ’199 cited by Patent Owner to show written description support show: (1) transmission packets for multi-user uplink data, which includes padding such that multi-user upstream data transfers from each resource terminate at the same time (see Ex. 1012 ¶¶ 17–21); (2) performing padding on a trigger frame that triggers multi-user simultaneous transmission, where the trigger frame includes AID information of the performing preset padding before the FCS field of the trigger frame according to one embodiment (see Ex. 1012 ¶ 136, Fig. 20); and (4) inserting redundant AID information prior to the FCS field of the trigger frame, according to another embodiment (see Ex. 1012 ¶ 136, Fig. 20). PCT ’199 does not describe the invention in enough detail to enable a person of ordinary skill in the art to conclude that the inventor possessed a frame for allocating resource for uplink (UL) multi-user (MU) transmission to one or more terminals that includes the AID field set to a value related to a first padding field, when the padding field is included in the frame. In particular, we discern no disclosure that conveys that the inventor possessed the following: (1) an AID field for the MU UL resource allocation frame is set to a value, (2) that the AID field is set to a value related to the padding field, and (3) that the AID field is set to a value related to the padding field, and conditioned on the inclusion of the AID field in the frame. Moreover, to the extent that Patent Owner’s assertions are premised on the PCT ’199’s disclosure of a preset padding being performed before the FCS field of the trigger frame and the disclosure of inserting redundant AID information prior to the FCS field of the trigger frame, we note that these disclosures are directed to two embodiments. See Ex. 1012 ¶ 136, Fig. 20. PCT ’199 does not provide any suggestion that the two embodiments are used together, or that the redundant AID information of one embodiment can serve as a preset padding of the other embodiment.” slip op. at 16

    Claim construction§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 11,716,171
  • PTAB · Dec 10, 2025 · IPR2025-01069 · APJ Daniel J Galligan · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–14 and all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood of prevailing based on Bharadwaj alone and Bharadwaj with Yu.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “institute review. Paper 11. The standard for instituting an inter partes review is set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), which provides that an inter partes review may not be instituted unless the information presented in the Petition and the Preliminary Response shows “there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” For the reasons explained below, we institute an inter partes review of all challenged claims on all grounds raised in the Petition.” slip op. at 2

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “To the extent Patent Owner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art need not be defined as of the critical date, we disagree. Under Section 103, we must determine “if the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains” (emphasis added). “Obviousness is determined from the vantage point of a hypothetical person having ordinary skill in the art to which the patent pertains.” In re Rouffet, 149 F.3d 1350, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 1998). Thus, we define the hypothetical person of ordinary skill in the art as of a time before the effective filing date. To the extent Patent Owner’s argument is that, to testify from the perspective of a person of ordinary skill in the art, one need not have been a person of ordinary skill in the art as of the critical date, we agree. Although one must at least possess ordinary skill in the art to testify from the perspective of a person of ordinary skill, [a]n expert need not have acquired that skill level prior to the time of the invention to be able to testify from the vantage point of a person of ordinary skill in the art. Rather, an expert can acquire the necessary skill level later and develop an understanding of what a person of ordinary skill knew at the time of the invention. Osseo Imaging, LLC v. Planmeca USA Inc., 116 F.4th 1335, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2024). the uncontested assessment offered by Petitioner, which appears consistent with the ’077 patent and the asserted prior art, except that we delete the qualifier “at least” to eliminate vagueness as to the amount of experience.” slip op. at 6

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached

      “C. Claim Construction The parties agree that no claim terms require express construction. Pet. 10; Prelim. Resp. 2–4. Patent Owner, however, notes that, in related district court litigation, Petitioner has asserted that some claims terms are indefinite. Patent Owner argues that the Petition should be denied because Petitioner has taken inconsistent claim construction positions between the district court and the Board. Paper 14 at 1–3 (citing Tesla, Inc. v. Intellectual Ventures II LLC, IPR2025-00340, Paper 18 at 4 (PTAB Nov. 5, 2025) (informative); Revvo Techs., Inc. v. Cerebrum Sensor Techs., Inc., IPR2025-00632, Paper 20 at 4–5 (PTAB Nov. 3, 2025) (precedential)). Petitioner responds that, in the related district court litigation, the parties have narrowed the claim construction disputes and that Petitioner accords the plain and ordinary meaning to claim terms and no longer asserts that any claim term of the ’077 patent is indefinite. Paper 15 (citing, inter alia, Ex. 1126 (Defendants’ Responsive Claim Construction Brief)). The evidence supports Petitioner’s position because, in the related district court litigation, the defendants agree with the plaintiff (Patent Owner) that certain phrases in the ’077 patent claims should be given their “[p]lain and ordinary meaning” and are “not indefinite.” Ex. 1126, 6 (native page 1). Thus, the record does not show inconsistent claim construction positions that warrant denial under PTAB precedent. See Revvo, Paper 20 at 5 (addressing a situation in which a petitioner advances “different claim construction positions” in district court and at the PTAB). See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 7

    • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Patents / published applications (effective date, provisional support)Reference is prior artDecided for petitioner

      “We agree with Patent Owner that Bharadwaj includes subject matter that is not in Bharadwaj-Prov59, namely the change from adding the value Resp. 20; Ex. 1007 ¶ 51 (adding m); Ex. 1006 ¶ 50 (subtracting m); Prelim. Resp. 20. Petitioner, however, points out this change in the Petition and acknowledges that it is after the identified critical date of August 20, 2015. See Pet. 28. Thus, we do not understand Petitioner to be relying on Bharadwaj’s disclosure of subtracting m to determine length, as disclosed in the publication of the non-provisional application, as a prior art disclosure. We understand Petitioner to be relying on disclosures in Bharadwaj-Prov059 for prior art teachings for its obviousness contentions. Patent Owner does not appear to dispute that Bharadwaj-Prov59’s disclosures are prior art, arguing instead that it is improper to rely “on matters in Bharadwaj beyond ‘incorporation by reference’ of the Bharadwaj-Prov59.” See Prelim. Resp. 20–21. On this record, we determine that Bharadwaj-Prov59’s disclosures are prior art as of its June 2, 2015, filing date by virtue of its incorporation by reference into Bharadwaj, a published US patent application. Ex. 1006 ¶ 1; see Pet. 12–13.” slip op. at 8

    Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 10,313,077
  • PTAB · Dec 9, 2025 · IPR2025-00756 · APJ Thu A Dang · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted IPR on claims 1, 2, 5–8, 11, and 12 on three §103 grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood of unpatentability over the asserted combinations.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “III. CONCLUSION Because we determine that Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in showing at least one of the challenged claims is unpatentable, we institute inter partes review as to all challenged claims and grounds presented in the Petition. At this stage of the proceeding, we have not made a final determination as to the patentability of any of these challenged claims. ORDER For the reasons given, it is ORDERED that pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 314, an inter partes review is instituted as to claims 1, 2, 5–8, 11, and 12 of the ’803 patent to determine whether: 1) claims 1, 5–7, 11, and 12 are unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as obvious over TS 36.300, TS 36.321, and TS 36.331; 2) claims 1, 2, 5–8, 11, and 12 are unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as obvious over Ericsson and TS 25.331; and 3) claims 5, 6, 11, and 12 are unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as obvious over Ericsson, TS 25.331, and Sebire; and” slip op. at 27

    • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner

      “ordinary meaning, “primary” and “non-primary” cells are all cells that the WTRU is connected to (PO Resp. 16), the plain language in claim 1, and similarly in claim 7, does not require a “primary” node or “non-primary” cell to have a connection to the WTRU. See Ex. 1001, 10:38−56; 11:11–26. We find unavailing Patent Owner’s contention that the claims require that the WTRU “be connected to more than one cell,” wherein cells that are “associated with a wireless network node,” but are not connected to the WTRU “at the same time” cannot be “primary” or “non-primary” cells. PO Resp. 16. In the ’803 patent, nothing in the Specification clearly limits “primary” and “non-primary” cells as Patent Owner proposes. Prelim. Resp. 16. Patent Owner points to the Specification of the ’803 patent to show that, for softer handover, the WTRU is connected “with more than one cell [] which are controlled by the same Node-B,” and “[o]ne of the[se] cells 808 may be designated as a primary cell 808a, while other cells are designated as a non-primary cells 808b.” Id. (alterations in original) (citing Ex. 1001, 8:44–46, 9:4–6, Figs. 8A–B). However, this portion of the Specification (describing a softer handover embodiment in which a cell “may be designated” as a primary while other as non-primary) does not provide a clear definition to warrant interpreting the “primary” and “non-primary” cells as requiring “connection” to the WTRU “at the same time.” Id. That is, nothing in the Specification clearly precludes “primary” and “non-primary” cells from being “source” and “target” cell, as Patent Owner contends. PO Resp. 16. and the Specification, we determine that the terms “primary” and “non-primary” recited in claims 1 and 7 are not limited to cells connected to a WRTU at the same time. We determine no further explicit construction of this term is necessary to resolve the controversy. See Vivid Techs., 200 F.3d at 803.” slip op. at 8

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundInstituted

      “f) Motivation to combine Ericsson and TS 25.331 Petitioner contends that a “POSITA would have been motivated to combine Ericsson and TS 25.331 because they are directed to similar technologies and a skilled artisan would have understood the benefits of combining these two references,” and “would have understood that there was a high likelihood of success in making the combination.” Pet. 34 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 156–157). In particular, the references “are both reasonably pertinent to the problem faced by the inventor, namely protocols for handover in a telecommunications system.” Id. (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 158). According to Petitioner, the combination “involves the predictable use of interchangeable prior art elements according to their established functions” more than routine engineering.” Id. at 37 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 174). At this stage of the proceeding, Patent Owner does not present arguments in the Preliminary Response addressing the specific merits of Petitioner’s contentions with respect to the motivation to combine Ericsson and TS 25.331. See generally Prelim. Resp. 15–18. We find availing Petitioner’s contention that Ericsson and TS25.331 are “directed to similar technologies,” and that a “skilled artisan would have understood the benefits of combining these two references.” Pet. 34. On this preliminary record, we are persuaded that Petitioner has made a sufficient showing that a POSITA would have had a reason to combine the teachings of Ericsson and TS 25.331.” slip op. at 20

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “Petitioner, relying on the testimony of Dr. Kakaes, contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art (POSITA) “would have had a B.S. in Electrical Engineering or a related field with at least three years of experience designing, developing, and/or testing telecommunication systems,” and “would also have familiarity with the wireless standards and well-known protocols for accessing wireless networks existing at the relevant time,” wherein “[m]ore education may supplement practical experience or vice versa.” Pet. 12–13. At this stage in the proceeding, Patent Owner does not contest Petitioner’s proposal or offer an alternative. On this record, we are persuaded that Petitioner’s proposal is consistent with the technology described in the Specification and the cited prior art. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposed level of skill.” slip op. at 10

    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 10,764,803
  • PTAB · Nov 7, 2025 · IPR2025-01044 · APJ Daniel J Galligan · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted IPR of claims 1–10 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that Samsung would prevail on at least claim 1 under §103.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “institute review. Paper 11. The standard for instituting an inter partes review is set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), which provides that an inter partes review may not be instituted unless the information presented in the Petition and the Preliminary Response shows “there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” For the reasons explained below, we institute an inter partes review of all challenged claims on all grounds raised in the Petition.” slip op. at 2

    • Skill levelSkill level board ownDecided for petitioner

      “had a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or a related field, and at least 3 years of experience in the research, design or development of wireless communication devices, systems, and/or networks, or the equivalent, as of the Critical Date,” which we understand Petitioner identifies as September 7, 2016. Pet. 2, 4 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 26–28). Petitioner also contends that “[i]ncreased educational experience can make up for less work experience, and vice versa.” Pet. 4. Patent Owner does not object to Petitioner’s definition at this stage. Prelim. Resp. 11. To the extent necessary, and for purposes of this Decision, we accept the uncontested assessment offered by Petitioner, which appears consistent with the ’879 patent and the asserted prior art, except that we delete the qualifier “at least” to eliminate vagueness as to the amount of experience.” slip op. at 5

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

      “C. Claim Construction The parties agree that no claim terms require express construction. Pet. 4; Prelim. Resp. 11. On this record, we determine that no terms need express construction. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve” slip op. at 5

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundOther
    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 11,516,879
  • PTAB · Nov 7, 2025 · IPR2025-01043 · APJ Daniel J Galligan · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted IPR of claims 1–10 on all petition grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that Samsung would prevail on at least claim 1 as obvious over Zhou, Cherian, and Kim.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “institute review. Paper 11. The standard for instituting an inter partes review is set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), which provides that an inter partes review may not be instituted unless the information presented in the Petition and the Preliminary Response shows “there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” For the reasons explained below, we institute an inter partes review of all challenged claims on all grounds raised in the Petition.” slip op. at 2

    • Skill levelSkill level board ownOther

      “had a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or a related field, and at least 3 years of experience in the research, design or development of wireless communication devices, systems, and/or networks, or the equivalent, as of the Critical Date,” which we understand Petitioner identifies as September 7, 2016. Pet. 2, 4 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 26–28). Petitioner also contends that “[i]ncreased educational experience can make up for less work experience, and vice versa.” Pet. 4. Patent Owner does not object to Petitioner’s definition at this stage. Prelim. Resp. 11. To the extent necessary, and for purposes of this Decision, we accept the uncontested assessment offered by Petitioner, which appears consistent with the ’035 patent and the asserted prior art, except that we delete the qualifier “at least” to eliminate vagueness as to the amount of experience.” slip op. at 5

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

      “C. Claim Construction The parties agree that no claim terms require express construction. Pet. 4; Prelim. Resp. 11. On this record, we determine that no terms need express construction. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve” slip op. at 5

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundOther

      “expressly discloses multiple options for resetting the timer, including “after the STA 106 transmits a scheduled UL transmission, or transmits a scheduled UL transmission and gets an ACK message.” Ex. 1005 ¶ 81. We find sufficiently persuasive Petitioner’s explanation that “after” in Zhou means after the transmission ends if an ACK is not requested; in the case of an ACK, Zhou expressly discloses starting the timer after receiving the ACK. See Pet. 46–49. Petitioner’s declarant, Dr. Valenti, testifies that “[a] STA measures the ‘completion’ of the transmission by receiving an ACK— if an ACK is requested—or upon completion of the physical transmission.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 152 (citing Ex. 1018 ¶ 9). On this record, we find this testimony to be sufficiently credible based on the evidence cited. See Ex. 1018 ¶ 9 (“A successful transmission occurs when the node either receives an expected acknowledgment correctly, or transmits a frame that does not require an acknowledgement.”).” slip op. at 13

    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 11,116,035
  • PTAB · Nov 6, 2025 · IPR2025-00820 · APJ Neil T Powell · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–11 on all petition grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that claim 1 would have been obvious over Tadros, Porter, Kalili, and Texin 990R.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “review. See 35 U.S.C. § 314; 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a). To institute an inter partes review, we must determine that the information presented in the Petition and the Preliminary Response shows “a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). For the reasons set forth below, we determine that there is a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner will prevail with respect to at least one challenged claim. We institute an inter partes review of claims 1–11 based on the grounds set forth in the Petition.” slip op. at 2

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “Pet. 17–18 (citing Ex. 1007 ¶¶ 13–15). Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s explanation of the level of skill in the art. See generally Prelim. Resp. At this stage of the proceeding and on the present record, we adopt Petitioner’s uncontested proposed level of ordinary skill in the art, which we find consistent with the level of ordinary skill in the art reflected by the ’090 patent and the prior art of record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001); In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995); In re Oelrich, 579 F.2d 86, 91 (CCPA 1978).” slip op. at 8

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

      “Additionally, only terms that are in controversy need to be construed, and these need be construed only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). Both parties indicate that no claim terms need to be expressly construed. Pet. 29–30; Prelim. Resp. 5. Consistent with that, we determine that we need not construe any claim terms expressly in order to resolve the parties’ dispute regarding whether Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of prevailing.” slip op. at 8

    • Obviousness (§103) › Analogous artAnalogous artDecided for petitioner

      “Weighing the parties’ arguments and evidence, we find Petitioner’s arguments and evidence sufficient at this stage to demonstrate a reasonable likelihood of prevailing. Pet. 8–17, 30–49. For example, regarding whether of Porter’s disclosure to the problem faced by inventor of the ’090 patent. Pet. 8; Ex. 1007 ¶¶ 98–108, 125–127, 144–164. The ’090 patent illustrates that its inventor faced the problem of selecting desirable materials for an aligner, including selecting a desirable material for an aligner’s hard layer. Ex. 1001, 5:44–59. Petitioner and Dr. Osswald provide significant evidence and reasoning tending to show that Porter’s discussion of Tritan logically would have commended itself to the attention of an inventor facing the problem of selecting an aligner hard layer. Pet. 8 (citing Ex. 1007 ¶¶ 98–108, 125–127, 144–164). For example, Dr. Osswald explains that “because Tritan copolyesters are BPA-free, Rafih specifically discloses Tritan EX401 as an exemplary material” for its oral appliance. Id. ¶ 99 (citing Ex. 1104, 5:4–64, claims 2, 9, 10). In view of this, Dr. Osswald testifies that “Rafih would inform a [person of ordinary skill in the art] that Porter’s guidance regarding replacing polycarbonate with Tritan applies to dental appliances.” Ex. 1007 ¶ 146. At this stage, weighing Petitioner’s evidence against Patent Owner’s contrary attorney argument that Porter focuses on dishware, we determine Petitioner has shown sufficiently that Porter is analogous art. Pet. 8; Ex. 1007 ¶¶ 98–108, 125–127, 144–164; Prelim. Resp. 1, 9–10, 18–21.” slip op. at 11

    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips
    Patents in suitUS 11,648,090
  • PTAB · Nov 6, 2025 · IPR2025-00821 · APJ Neil T Powell · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted review of claims 1–23, 25, and 26 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that claim 1 would have been obvious over Tadros, Porter, Kalili, and Texin 990R.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “We have authority to determine whether to institute an inter partes review. See 35 U.S.C. § 314; 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a). To institute an inter partes review, we must determine that the information presented in the Petition and the Preliminary Response shows “a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). For the reasons set forth below, we determine that there is a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner will prevail with respect to at least one challenged claim. We institute an inter partes review of claims 1–23, 25, and 26 based on the grounds set forth in the Petition.” slip op. at 2

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “Pet. 17 (citing Ex. 1007 ¶¶ 13–15). Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s explanation of the level of skill in the art. See generally Prelim. Resp. At this stage of the proceeding and on the present record, we adopt Petitioner’s uncontested proposed level of ordinary skill in the art, which we find consistent with the level of ordinary skill in the art reflected by the ’090 patent and the prior art of record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001); In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995); In re Oelrich, 579 F.2d 86, 91 (CCPA 1978).” slip op. at 8

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

      “Additionally, only terms that are in controversy need to be construed, and these need be construed only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). Neither party indicates that we need to construe expressly any claim terms. Pet. 27–28; Prelim. Resp. 5. Consistent with that, we determine that we need not construe any claim terms expressly in order to resolve the parties’ dispute regarding whether Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of prevailing.” slip op. at 8

    • Obviousness (§103) › Analogous artAnalogous artDecided for petitioner

      “arguments and evidence sufficient at this stage to demonstrate a reasonable likelihood of prevailing. Pet. 8–17, 53–71. For example, regarding whether Porter is analogous art, Petitioner sufficiently shows reasonable pertinence of Porter’s disclosure to the problem faced by inventor of the ’091 patent. Pet. 8; Ex. 1007 ¶¶ 98–108, 125–127, 146–165. The ’091 patent illustrates that its inventor faced the problem of selecting desirable materials for an aligner, including selecting a desirable material for an aligner’s hard layer. Ex. 1001, 5:44–59. Petitioner and Dr. Osswald provide significant evidence and reasoning tending to show that Porter’s discussion of Tritan logically would have commended itself to the attention of an inventor facing the problem of selecting an aligner hard layer. Pet. 8 (citing Ex. 1007 “because Tritan copolyesters are BPA-free, Rafih specifically discloses Tritan EX401 as an exemplary material” for its oral appliance. Id. ¶ 99 (citing Ex. 1104, 5:4–64, claims 2, 9, 10). In view of this, Dr. Osswald testifies that “Rafih would inform a [person of ordinary skill in the art] that Porter’s guidance regarding replacing polycarbonate with Tritan applies to dental appliances.” Ex. 1007 ¶ 147. At this stage, weighing Petitioner’s evidence against Patent Owner’s countervailing attorney argument that Porter focuses on dishware, we determine Petitioner has shown sufficiently that Porter is analogous art. Pet. 8; Ex. 1007 ¶¶ 98–108, 125–127, 146–165; Prelim. Resp. 1–2, 9–10, 34–36.” slip op. at 13

    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips
    Patents in suitUS 11,648,091
  • PTAB · Nov 6, 2025 · IPR2025-00936 · APJ Daniel J Galligan · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–16 over all petitioned grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on at least claim 1 over Lee.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “On this record, we find Petitioner’s contentions persuasive. As noted above, Lee states the following: “[I]f the coloring disable bit indicates that the frame corresponds to a trigger frame related to multiuser transmission, the STA may not perform the change of the CCA level irrespective of information indicated by the coloring bit.” Ex. 1005 ¶ 68. Even though the coloring disable bit indicates that the frame corresponds to a trigger frame for multiuser transmission, Lee states that “the coloring disable bit can also be comprehended as a bit indicating that CCA level change is not performed.” Ex. 1005 ¶ 68. This supports Petitioner’s contention that the coloring disable bit is signaling information that indicates that a CCA level change is not allowed, even if it indicates other things as well. See Pet. 12.” slip op. at 10

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “To the extent Patent Owner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art need not be defined as of the critical date, we disagree. Under Section 103, we must determine “if the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains” (emphasis added). “Obviousness is determined from the vantage point of a hypothetical person having ordinary skill in the art to which the patent pertains.” In re Rouffet, 149 F.3d 1350, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 1998). Thus, we define the hypothetical person of ordinary skill in the art as of a time before the effective filing date. To the extent Patent Owner’s argument is that, to testify from the perspective of a person of ordinary skill in the art, one need not have been a person of ordinary skill in the art as of the critical date, we agree. Although one must at least possess ordinary skill in the art to testify from the perspective of a person of ordinary skill, time of the invention to be able to testify from the vantage point of a person of ordinary skill in the art. Rather, an expert can acquire the necessary skill level later and develop an understanding of what a person of ordinary skill knew at the time of the invention. Osseo Imaging, LLC v. Planmeca USA Inc., 116 F.4th 1335, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2024). To the extent necessary, and for purposes of this Decision, we accept the uncontested assessment offered by Petitioner, which appears consistent with the ’597 patent and the asserted prior art, except that we delete the qualifier “at least” to eliminate vagueness as to the amount of experience.” slip op. at 5

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

      “C. Claim Construction The parties agree that no claim terms require express construction. Pet. 3; Prelim. Resp. 8. On this record, we determine that no terms need express construction. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 6

    • BurdenInstituted

      “On this record, we find Petitioner’s contentions persuasive. As noted above, Lee states the following: “[I]f the coloring disable bit indicates that the frame corresponds to a trigger frame related to multiuser transmission, the STA may not perform the change of the CCA level irrespective of information indicated by the coloring bit.” Ex. 1005 ¶ 68. Even though the coloring disable bit indicates that the frame corresponds to a trigger frame for multiuser transmission, Lee states that “the coloring disable bit can also be comprehended as a bit indicating that CCA level change is not performed.” Ex. 1005 ¶ 68. This supports Petitioner’s contention that the coloring disable bit is signaling information that indicates that a CCA level change is not allowed, even if it indicates other things as well. See Pet. 12.” slip op. at 10

    Claim constructioncites KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 11,700,597
  • PTAB · Nov 6, 2025 · IPR2025-00935 · APJ Daniel J Galligan · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted IPR of claims 1–16 on all petitioned grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that Samsung would prevail on at least one challenged claim.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “On this record, we find Petitioner’s contentions persuasive. As noted above, Lee states the following: “[I]f the coloring disable bit indicates that the frame corresponds to a trigger frame related to multiuser transmission, the STA may not perform the change of the CCA level irrespective of information indicated by the coloring bit.” Ex. 1005 ¶ 68. Even though the coloring disable bit indicates that the frame corresponds to a trigger frame for multiuser transmission, Lee states that “the coloring disable bit can also be comprehended as a bit indicating that CCA level change is not performed.” Ex. 1005 ¶ 68. This supports Petitioner’s contention that the coloring disable bit is signaling information that indicates that a CCA level change is not allowed, even if it indicates other things as well. See Pet. 13.” slip op. at 10

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedOther

      “To the extent Patent Owner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art need not be defined as of the critical date, we disagree. Under Section 103, we must determine “if the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains” (emphasis added). “Obviousness is determined from the vantage point of a hypothetical person having ordinary skill in the art to which the patent pertains.” In re Rouffet, 149 F.3d 1350, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 1998). Thus, we define the hypothetical person of ordinary skill in the art as of a time before the effective filing date. To the extent Patent Owner’s argument is that, to testify from the perspective of a person of ordinary skill in the art, one need not have been a person of ordinary skill in the art as of the critical date, we agree. Although one must at least possess ordinary skill in the art to testify from the perspective of a person of ordinary skill, time of the invention to be able to testify from the vantage point of a person of ordinary skill in the art. Rather, an expert can acquire the necessary skill level later and develop an understanding of what a person of ordinary skill knew at the time of the invention.” slip op. at 5

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

      “C. Claim Construction The parties agree that no claim terms require express construction. Pet. 3; Prelim. Resp. 8. On this record, we determine that no terms need express construction. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 6

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successOther

      “On this record, it is not entirely clear that comparing a BSS color value to determine if a receiving station is in that BSS is prohibited by the claim’s recitation “not to use” a BSS color, as Patent Owner’s argument implies. Rather, claim 1’s recitation “not to use a Basic Service Set (BSS) color when signaling information indicates that an operation based on the BSS color is not allowed” appears directed to prohibiting a particular operation based on the BSS color, not necessarily disregarding the BSS color entirely. Further, comparing BSS values to determine BSS identity appears consistent with claim 1’s recitation that “the BSS color is an communication terminal recognizes that a BSS color collision has occurred.” On this record, it appears that BSS color would need to be identified to determine if a color collision occurs. See Prelim. Resp. 4 (“BSS color collisions occur when two or more BSSs operating on the same frequency channel (and overlapping in coverage area) use the same BSS color. See ’163 Patent at 2:46-59, 10:41-62. In other words, a wireless communication terminal receives a signal with the same BSS color that device understands applies to it, even though the signal is intended for another device in a different BSS (albeit using the same BSS color). When a color collision is detected, the wireless communication terminal reports to the base wireless communication terminal, which will indicate that a color collision has occurred. ’163 Patent at 3:16-20.”). In that light, we see some merit in Petitioner’s position that an “operation based on BSS COLOR (e.g., allowing access and re-using the channel) is not allowed” based on the Low Power/High Interference Indicator, even if some reference is made to the BSS color to resolve a condition precedent to that determination, namely whether the data are from a different BSS. See Pet. 53–54 (citing Ex. 1009 ¶ 26; Ex. 1003 ¶ 170). Petitioner’s second theory is based on setting the color field to a reserved value of “0000,” which Petitioner argues “indicates that operations based on BSS COLOR are not allowed and the receiving STA does not use BSS COLOR.” Pet. 54–55 (citing Ex. 1009 ¶¶ 25, 29; Ex. 1003 ¶ 172). On this record, we question how setting a color value to 0000 can teach the subject matter of claim 1, which also requires that “the BSS color is an identifier of a BSS.” Petitioner acknowledges that a reserved value of 0000 in the color field does not identify a BSS. See Pet. 54–55 (asserting that a that a COLOR field value of ‘0000’ does not represent a valid BSS identifier”). We also recognize, however, that claim 7, depending from claim 1, recites “the BSS color indicated by the signaling field of the PPDU is a predetermined value” and that claim 8, depending from claim 7, recites that the predetermined value is 0. Thus, Choudhury’s reserved value disclosures appear to teach this subject matter of claims 7 and 8, even if claims 7 and 8 are inconsistent with claim 1’s requirement that “the BSS color is an identifier of a BSS.” See Ex. 1001, 21:23–30 (disclosing that the BSS color value may be set to a predetermined value such as zero).” slip op. at 12

    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 11,129,163
  • PTAB · Nov 6, 2025 · IPR2025-00819 · APJ Kristina M Kalan · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted IPR on all challenged claims based on both obviousness grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood of success on at least one claim.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “that Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of showing that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to combine the teachings of Tadros, Kalili, and Texin 990R to meet the limitations of the claims challenged under this ground.” slip op. at 14

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “would have had at least a four-year undergraduate degree in materials science, mechanical engineering, chemical engineering, or a related field and at least two years of experience in the field of polymer science, combined with at least two years of experience in the field of design, manufacture, and processing of thermoformable polymer sheets for use in various applications, such as in orthodontic and dental appliances. Additional education could substitute for professional experience and vice versa. Pet. 18–19 (citing Ex. 1007 ¶¶ 13–15). At this stage, Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s proposal or offer an alternative proposal. See generally Prelim. Resp. Because Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art appears to be consistent with the cited prior art and is undisputed on this record, we adopt it for purposes of this Decision. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (indicating that the prior art itself may reflect an appropriate skill level).” slip op. at 8

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

      “Only claim terms in controversy need be construed. Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“[O]nly those terms need be construed that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.”). For purposes of this Decision, we determine that no claim term requires express construction.” slip op. at 9

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundInstituted

      “that Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of showing that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to combine the teachings of Tadros, Kalili, and Texin 990R to meet the limitations of the claims challenged under this ground. We disagree that Petitioner fails to meet its burden as to the motivation to combine arguments. Petitioner persuasively maps the limitations of the challenged claims to portions of the references relied upon. Pet. 28–38 (claim 1), 38–51. Petitioner also, on this record, provides adequate statements of motivation to combine with a reasonable expectation of success. See, e.g., id. at 34–36 (citing Ex. 1007 ¶¶ 31, 39–42, 147–151, 174–176). The Petition’s reliance on supporting testimony and related corroborating evidence to support the combination does not amount to impermissible hindsight, as that testimony takes into account “knowledge which was within the level of ordinary skill in the art at the time the claimed invention was made and does not include knowledge gleaned only from applicant’s disclosure.” In re McLaughlin, 443 F.2d 1392, 1395 (CCPA 1971). Without further clarification or support from Patent Owner, and in the absence of testimony to support the assertion that a POSITA would not have combined the cited references in the manner proposed with a reasonable expectation of success, we are unpersuaded by Patent Owner’s arguments in this regard.” slip op. at 14

    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR
    Patents in suitUS 11,154,384
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