• Shenzhen Root Technology Co., Ltd. v. Willow Blossom Holdco LimitedAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jul 30, 2026 · IPR2025-00560 · APJ Barry L Grossman · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–29 are unpatentable under each asserted obviousness ground, including Chang and Fang, because Petitioner proved unpatentability by a preponderance of the evidence.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner

    “Additionally, we note that Patent Owner did not cross-examine Mr. Ryan Bauer, who provided a detailed, 169-page expert report providing, on behalf of Petitioner, his opinions about the issues in this proceeding. See Exhibit 1003. Mr. Bauer’s testimonial evidence in this proceeding remains unrebutted.” slip op. at 3

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had “bachelor’s degree in mechanical engineering or a similar field and at least two years of experience designing human breast pump equipment. More education could substitute for experience and vice versa.” Pet. 8 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 15–18). Mr. Bauer’s Declaration testimony states he considered some of the factors listed above. Ex. 1003 ¶ 17. Mr. Bauer testifies that based on his background and experience, in his opinion, the level of ordinary skill is as stated by Petitioner. Id. at 18. Based on the prior art, the sophistication of the disclosed technology in the ’381 patent, and Mr. Bauer’s undisputed testimony, we adopt Petitioner’s definition of the level of ordinary skill.” slip op. at 17

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “Petitioner asserts that the Examiner construed the term “self- contained, in-bra wearable device” to mean “complete, or having all that is needed, in itself’ and is capable of being worn in a bra.” Pet. 8 (citing Ex. 1005, 2290).14 According to Petitioner, “[Patent Owner] did not dispute this construction, and Petitioner applies it herein.” Id. Petitioner contends that all other terms “should receive their plain and ordinary meaning.” Id. We do not perceive the need to construe any claim limitation. Claims must be construed “only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.” AstraZeneca AB v. Mylan Pharms. Inc., 19 F.4th 1325, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. American Science & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999); see also Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“Because we need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy,’ we need not construe the claim preambles here where the construction is not ‘material to the [obviousness] dispute.’” (citations omitted)).” slip op. at 17

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundUnpatentable

    “(3) 1[a][1] a diaphragm configured to prevent milk from reaching an air pump by forming a seal around its outer edge; Petitioner relies on Fang for the disclosure of a diaphragm, as stated in this clause. Pet. 25–26. Petitioner asserts the proposed combination of elements suggest a breast pump device that would have used a diaphragm pump including first and second diaphragm housing components and an elastic diaphragm, “in accordance with Fang’s suggestions.” Id. at 25. As also asserted by Petitioner, Fang discloses that flexible diaphragm 7 (i.e., a membrane) is configured to prevent milk from reaching the pump. Id. at 26 (citing Ex. 1009 ¶ 19 (“The elastic diaphragm 7 is used to prevent milk from flowing into the air pump main unit 8.”). Mr. Bauer testifies: The flexible diaphragm [diaphragm 7 in Fang] forms a watertight and airtight seal around its outer edge. In doing so, the diaphragm prevents the passage of milk from reaching the air pump and facilitates generation of negative pressure during operation. Fang also explains that the elastic diaphragm 7 deforms away from the nipple tunnel when a vacuum is created on a pumping chamber, which then creates negative air pressure in the nipple tunnel when a vacuum is created on a pumping chamber.” slip op. at 28

  Patent outcomesUS 11,813,381 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,813,381
• Runergy Alabama Inc. / Runergy USA Inc. et al. v. Trina Solar Co., Ltd.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Apr 15, 2026 · IPR2025-00186 · APJ Avelyn M Ross · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–11 are unpatentable under § 103 over Chang and Jin; the Board found the combination disclosed the claimed isolation portion and supported the challenged claims.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been someone with an advanced degree involving the disciplines of electrical engineering, applied physics, chemistry, or materials science, and at least two years of experience designing, developing, or researching in the field. Alternatively, that person would have had a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, applied physics, or materials science, and at least three years of experience designing, developing, or researching in the field. Pet. 4 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 49). Patent Owner does not address the level of ordinary skill in the art. See generally PO Resp; Sur-reply. In light of the complete trial record before us, we adopt Petitioner’s proposal regarding the level of ordinary skill in the art. Based on our review of the ’104 patent and the prior art of record, we determine that the definition offered by Petitioner comports with the qualifications a person would have needed to understand the ’104 patent and the prior art.” slip op. at 9

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached

    “C. Claim Construction We construe claim terms according to the standard set forth in Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312–17 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc); 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b). Under Phillips, we give claim terms “their ordinary and customary meaning.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312. “[T]he ordinary and customary meaning of a claim term is the meaning that the term would have to a person of ordinary skill in the art in question at the time of the invention.” Id. at 1313. “Importantly, the person of ordinary skill in the art is deemed to read the claim term not only in the context of the particular claim in which the disputed term appears, but in the context of the entire patent, including the specification.” Id. Petitioner contends that “[n]o claim construction is believed to be necessary to resolve this Petition.” Pet. 23. And, Patent Owner does not address claim construction. See generally PO Resp. As neither party proposes an express construction for our consideration and because we determine that an express claim construction is not necessary for us to render a decision in this matter, we do not construe any claim terms. See Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (holding that “only those terms need be construed that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy”); see also Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (citing Vivid Techs. in the context of an inter partes review).” slip op. at 10

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedPatent owner expert creditedMixed

    “edge and offers little explanation of why the skilled artisan would apply Jin’s gap- T isolation region to both of Feldmann’s polysilicon and tunnel oxide layers. As noted above, Petitioner states that the skilled artisan would have included Jin’s gap-T isolation region in order to prevent shorting. Pet. 25. Petitioner’s reasoning is questionable—supported only by the conclusory testimony of Dr. Banerjee. Dr. Banerjee’s testimony offers no more evidentiary support than provided in the Petition. Compare Ex. 1003 ¶ 113, with Pet. 25. Petitioner cannot satisfy its burden of proving obviousness by employing “mere conclusory statements.” Magnum Oil, 829 F.3d at 1380. We acknowledge Dr. Banerjee’s testimony that the combination of Jin’s gap-T isolation region would prevent shorting and that extending the tunnel oxide layer the edge “could trap impurities and create negative fixed oxide charges, which could then create a p-type inversion in the n-type base substrate, leading to a leakage path to the p-type emitter on the front of the solar cell” (Ex. 1003 ¶ 113 (emphasis added)) but are not convinced by his equivocal testimony. Notably too, neither Jin nor Feldmann discuss issues relating to trapped impurities and Petitioner, as well as Dr. Banerjee, fail to direct our attention to any record evidence to support their contentions. Rather, we are persuaded by Dr. Peckerar’s testimony that as a general rule in semiconductor process technology, a bare silicon surface should not be left unpassivated after processing. Elemental silicon is highly chemically reactive. As such, the bare surface is a “magnet” for defects and contamination. Leaving the tunnel oxide in place across the entire substrate backside would reduce this problem. Ex. 2001 ¶ 142. Dr. Peckerar further explains that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have known how to avoid shorting and leakage. In particular, he testifies that the manner by which charge is transported through a tunnel oxide can be controlled by adjusting manufacturing parameters such as time, temperature, thickness, and ambient impurities. A POSITA would plainly have adjusted these parameters to ensure that the tunnel oxide operates as intended (i.e., minimizes recombinant losses while transporting charge carriers to the backside of the solar cell) while avoiding undesirable leakage current. Because unwanted leakage charge can be avoided via other means during manufacture, there would have been no reason to reduce the physical extent of the tunnel oxide. Ex. 2001 ¶ 152 (referring to Ex. 2001 ¶¶ 149–151). Moreover, Dr. Peckerar testifies that “Dr. Banerjee also appears to be arguing that incorporation of impurities into the oxide will produce a MOSFET-like structure, with the contaminated oxide acting as a MOS gate leading to enhanced leakage,” but, for that to occur, “the source and drain areas would need to be of the same type.” Ex. 2001 ¶ 159. Here however, “the tunnel oxide layer is located between an n-type polysilicon layer and p-type frontside emitter layer” so “[n]o MOSFET-like structure can form because the source and drain are of different types.” Ex. 2001” slip op. at 18

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of success › HindsightNot shown unpatentableMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable

    “base a conclusion of obviousness upon facts gleaned only through hindsight. “The invention must be viewed not after the blueprint has been drawn by the inventor, but as it would have been perceived in the state of the art that existed at the time the invention was made.” Sensonics, Inc. v. Aerosonic Corp., 81 F.3d 1566, 1570 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (citing Interconnect Planning Corp. v. Feil, 774 F.2d 1132, 1138 (Fed. Cir. 1985)). Therefore, “to establish a prima facie case of obviousness based on a combination of elements disclosed in the prior art, the [Petitioner] must articulate the basis on which it concludes that it would have been obvious to make the claimed invention.” Id. Impermissible hindsight is inferred when the specific understanding or principle within the knowledge of one of ordinary skill in the art that would motivate one (with no knowledge of the claimed invention) to make the proposed combination has not been explained. In re Rouffet, 149 F.3d 1350, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 1998).” slip op. at 16

  Patent outcomesUS 9,722,104 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 9,722,104
• Bio-Rad Laboratories, Inc. v. California Institute Of TechnologyNo claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Mar 23, 2026 · IPR2024-01451 · APJ Tawen Chang · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–19 were not shown unpatentable: Larson did not establish the claimed detection in a single sample volume, and the asserted obviousness combinations did not cure the deficiencies.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Patent Owner states that, “[f]or purposes of this IPR proceeding, PO does not contest Petitioner’s description of qualifications for a person of ordinary skill in the art (POSA) set forth [above].” PO Resp. 23. In view of the above, and because Petitioner’s uncontested description of one of ordinary skill in the art is reasonable and consistent with the ’921 patent and the cited art, we adopt Petitioner’s definition of a POSA for purposes of this Decision, except that we replace the phrase “at least a year of experience in quantitative and/or dPCR and fluorescence-based analyte detection” with “around a year of experience in quantitative and/or dPCR and fluorescence-based analyte detection.” Pet. 9 (emphasis added).13” slip op. at 14

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner

    “We begin with “the context in which a term is used in the asserted claim,” which can be “highly instructive.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1314. In this case, claim 1 recites that the claimed assay is “capable of unambiguously detecting the presence or absence of each of said at least M analytes, in any combination of presence or absence, in a single sample volume, . . . wherein the analytes are amplified in the single sample 15 In this regard, we note that Petitioner’s claim construction position is not predicated on the collection of droplets being reconstituted into its original, pre-partition form prior to amplification; rather, the droplets remain compartmentalized from each other in the PCR thermal cycling tube. Tr. 65:21–66:9 (Petitioner’s counsel explaining that the droplets do not combine in the PCR thermal cycling tube but, rather, are “suspended in an immiscible fluid and analyzed en masse”). indicates that the first instance of single sample volume, i.e., the single sample volume in which the presence or absence of each M analytes are to be detected, is the antecedent basis for the second instance of “single sample volume,” i.e., the single sample volume in which the analytes are amplified. Thus, as the parties appear to agree, the single sample volume in which amplification takes places must be the same single sample volume in which the presence or absence of analytes are to be detected. We are not persuaded that, when accorded its plain and ordinary meaning, a single sample volume divided into a collection of droplets would be considered the “same” single sample volume prior to its partition.” slip op. at 17

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “With respect to the limitation, “wherein the analytes are amplified in the single sample volume,” Petitioner asserts that “Larson discloses PCR assays that amplify target polynucleotide in a single sample volume, specifically a portion of the reaction mixture that is subsequently partitioned into droplets.” Pet. 31 (emphasis added). There is no dispute that the amplification of the analytes in Larson occurs in the droplets. Larson ¶¶ 6–7 (explaining that “[d]igital PCR (dPCR) is an alternative quantitation method in which dilute sample are divided into many separate reactions” and that “[t]he template is amplified in the droplet for detection”) (emphasis added). Because the claims require that amplification of the analytes be in the same sample volume in which the at least M analytes, in any combination of presence or absence, is unambiguously detected, and because the pre-partition single sample volume is not the same single sample volume as the collection of droplets after partition under our claim construction set forth above, we find Petitioner has not shown, by a preponderance of evidence, that claims 1–10 and 13–19 are anticipated by Larson.17 Tr. 68:12–69:14 (Petitioner’s counsel” slip op. at 27

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “Although we agree with Petitioner that Larson contemplates scenarios in which droplets may contain more than one target molecule and does not require the exclusion of such multiple occupancy droplets in all embodiments, we are nevertheless not persuaded Petitioner has shown, based on a preponderance of evidence, that Larson renders obvious an assay capable of unambiguously detecting, in such multiple occupancy droplets, the presence or absence of each of at least M analytes, in any combination of presence or absence, when M is greater than F and F is at least 2.” slip op. at 32

  Patent outcomesUS 11,827,921 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,827,921
• Shenzhen Root Technology Co., Ltd. v. Willow Blossom Holdco LimitedAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Feb 18, 2026 · IPR2024-01296 · APJ Barry L Grossman · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–46 are unpatentable as obvious under § 103 over the asserted combinations of Chang, Fang, Yuen, Khalil, Park, and Chen.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner asserts that before the effective filing date of the claimed invention a person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSITA”) “would have had at least a bachelor’s degree in mechanical engineering or a similar field and at least two years of experience designing human breast pump equipment” and that “[m]ore education could substitute for experience and vice versa.” Pet. 2 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 15–18). Mr. Bauer’s cited testimony supports Petitioner’s assertion.” slip op. at 16

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached

    “[parent application to the application that matured into the ’380 patent], the Examiner construed the term ‘self-contained, in-bra wearable device’ to mean ‘complete, or having all that is needed, in itself’ and is capable of being worn in a bra.” Pet. 3 (citing Ex. 1005, 2290) (emphasis omitted). According to Petitioner, “PO did not dispute this construction, and Petitioner applies it herein.” Id. Petitioner also states that “[o]ther terms of the Challenged Claims should receive their plain and ordinary meaning, and no formal claim constructions are necessary in this proceeding because ‘claim terms need only be construed to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” Id. (citing Wellman, Inc. v. Eastman Chem. Co., 642 F.3d 1355, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2011); Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 69–70). Again, because Patent Owner did not file a Response, we exercise our discretion and look to Patent Owner’s Preliminary Response. We note that in the Preliminary Response Patent Owner states that “[f]or purposes of this Preliminary Response, no claim terms require construction to resolve the prior art grounds raised in the Petition.” Prelim. Resp. 19. According to specific construction, any such terms should be accorded their plain and ordinary meaning in light of the specification.” Id. Construction is needed only for those terms “that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.” See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). There are no claim terms in controversy. Accordingly, we need not construe any terms for our analysis.” slip op. at 17

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundUnpatentable

    “Petitioner contends (Pet. 17) that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have been motivated to implement Chang’s breast pump device as suggested by Fang” to achieve four benefits: (1) “to facilitate convenient cleaning and maintenance” (Pet. 19 (citing Ex, 1003 ¶ 102)); (2) “to facilitate more rapid assembly and disassembly (e.g., during use)” (id. at 20–21 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 105)); (3) “as a particularly effective and suitable option to generate negative” slip op. at 34

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “a breast pump device having “a diaphragm pump that generates negative air pressure.” Pet. 33; see also id. at 38. Petitioner explains Chang’s pump “generates suction by cyclical compression and decompression of a conduit or flex-tube, and expressly notes that other configurations were known and suitable.” Id. at 17 (citing Ex. 1007 ¶¶ 22, 25, 28, 68, 79, 84–86). Chang, however, does not mention, specifically, that Chang’s pump is a “diaphragm” pump. We note, however, that this claim clause does not state or require any specific type of pump. It merely requires a “pump.” Clause 1[e]/29[e], discussed below, however, does require a “diaphragm” pump. Petitioner here merely lays the foundation for this later clause by asserting that “Fang provides a straightforward suggestion of a diaphragm pump including a diaphragm housing component formed in a wall of the pump housing.” Id. at 18 (citing Ex. 1009 ¶¶ 24–25, Fig. 7; Ex. 1003 ¶ 97). Thus, Petitioner asserts, Fang teaches “an ‘air pump’ in pneumatic connection with the diaphragm that serves to generate negative air pressure,” and Chang teaches “the location of pump components (e.g., ‘motor’ [46]).” Pet. 33 (citing Ex. 1007 ¶¶ 72, 80, Fig, 6A; Ex. 1009 ¶¶ 19, 24). Petitioner then asserts that “the ‘air pump’ components of the combined device are positioned within the pump housing,” and the air pump is powered by Chang’s rechargeable battery. Id. (citing Ex. 1007 ¶¶ 72, 80).” slip op. at 34

  Patent outcomesUS 11,413,380 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,413,380
• Advancell Pty Ltd. v. Sciencons As And Artbio, Inc.Instituted
  PTAB · Nov 6, 2025 · PGR2025-00040 · APJ Kimberly Mcgraw · PGR · Institution

  The Board instituted PGR on claims 1–9, 11–33, and 35–38 on all petition grounds, finding it more likely than not that Hassfjell-Hoff anticipates at least claim 1.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

    “Under 35 U.S.C. § 324(a), a post-grant review may be instituted only if “the information presented in the petition . . . demonstrate[s] that it is more likely than not that at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition is unpatentable.” Post-grant review is available for patents that issue from applications that at one point contained at least one claim with an effective filing date on or after March 16, 2013. See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) (“AIA”), §§ 3(n)(1), 6(f)(2)(A). After considering the briefing and the evidence of record, for the reasons set forth below, we determine that Petitioner has shown that the ’437 patent is eligible for post-grant review and that it is more likely than not that at least one challenged claim of the ’437 patent is unpatentable under § 324(a). Accordingly, we institute a post-grant review of all challenged claims of the ’437 patent.” slip op. at 2

  • Adverse judgmentAdverse judgmentOther

    “Here, Patentee Sciencons AS filed a statutory disclaimer of claims 10 and 34 of the ’437 patent. Ex. 2001; Prelim. Resp. 43. Based on our review of Exhibit 2001 and the Office’s public records, we find that the disclaimer of claims 10 and 34 complies with the above-listed requirements of 37 C.F.R. § 1.321(a). Accordingly, we treat claims 10 and 34 as having never been part of the ’437 patent. See Vectra Fitness, Inc. v. TNWK Corp., 162 F.3d 1379, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (“This court has interpreted the term ‘considered as part of the original patent’ in [35 U.S.C.] § 253 to mean that the patent is treated as though the disclaimed claims never existed.”). Because post-grant review cannot be instituted based on disclaimed claims, claims 10 and 34 are outside the scope of this proceeding. 37 C.F.R. § 42.207(e) (“No post-grant review will be instituted based on disclaimed claims.”); General Elec. Co. v. United Techs. Corp., IPR2017-00491, Paper 9 (PTAB July 6, 2017) (precedential) (denying institution in view of a statutory disclaimer of all the challenged claims). Thus, we confine our analysis in this Decision to claims 1–9, 11–33, and 35– 38, the remaining challenged claims that have not been disclaimed.” slip op. at 6

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Real party in interest / privityGranted

    “Sciencons AS also states that ARTBIO, Inc. is responsible for defending the ’437 patent in this proceeding and requests that ARTBIO, Inc. be included in the caption for this proceeding.2 Paper 4, 1. ARTBIO, Inc. has signed powers of attorney appointing the same practitioners that were appointed by Sciencons AS to transact all business associated with the instant post-grant review review of the ’437 patent. See Paper 3. To date, no objection has been raised to Patent Owner’s request. Given Sciencons AS’s representation that ARTBIO, Inc. is currently the exclusive licensee of the ’437 patent and is responsible for defending the ’437 patent, we grant Sciencons AS’s unopposed request that ARTBIO, Inc. be included in the caption. For convenience we refer to Sciencons AS and the purported exclusive licensee ARTBIO, Inc. collectively as “Patent Owner.” As stated supra, to the extent any party disputes ARTBIO, Inc.’s right to participate in this proceeding or to be included in the caption, the party shall request authorization to brief the issue within 10 business days of this Decision.” slip op. at 3

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “nuclear chemistry, radiochemistry, or materials science, or a comparable field of study, plus approximately two to three years of professional experience with radioisotope generators, radiopharmaceutical chemistry, nuclear medicine, or other relevant industry experience” and that “[a]dditional graduate education could substitute for professional experience, and significant experience in the field could substitute for formal education.” Pet. 2–3 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 33; Ex. 1019 ¶ 27). At this stage of the proceeding, Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s proposed definition nor provide a proposed definition of its own. See generally Prelim. Resp. For the purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s undisputed proposed definition of a POSITA.” slip op. at 10

  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips
  Patents in suitUS 12,249,437
• Canadian Solar (USA) Inc. v. Trina Solar Co., Ltd.Instituted
  PTAB · Oct 29, 2025 · IPR2025-00918 · APJ Avelyn M Ross · IPR · Institution

  The Board instituted inter partes review of claims 1–11 on all asserted grounds and granted Canadian Solar’s motion for joinder in IPR2025-00007.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

    “We instituted review of claims 1–11 of the ’104 patent in IPR2025-00007 after a review of all arguments and evidence presented by the parties, including Patent Owner’s arguments in its preliminary response. For the reasons discussed in the Institution Decision in IPR2025-00007, we determine that Petitioner demonstrates a reasonable likelihood of showing at least one claim of the ’104 patent is unpatentable. Thus, we find that the Petition warrants institution of inter partes review on all claims and grounds set forth in the Petition.” slip op. at 11

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingJoinder, grantedGranted

    “Patent Owner did not file an opposition to Petitioner’s Motion for Joinder. Upon consideration of Petitioner’s arguments, we are persuaded that it is appropriate under these circumstances to join Petitioner to the proceeding in IPR2025-00007. Petitioner’s agreement to accept an “understudy” role and to not actively participate in IPR2025-00007 unless the current petitioner ceases to participate will limit any potential impact on the trial schedule and will avoid increasing the costs or complexity of the proceeding. Therefore, joinder of 8 Available at https://www.uspto.gov/TrialPracticeGuideConsolidated. Petitioner to IPR2025-00007 will further the goals of a just, speedy, and inexpensive resolution of Petitioner’s challenge. 37 C.F.R. § 42.1(b).” slip op. at 12

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “In light of the record before us, and for purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposal regarding the level of ordinary skill in the art. Based on our review of the ’104 patent and the prior art of record, we determine that the definition offered by Petitioner comports with the qualifications a person would have needed to understand the ’104 patent and the prior art. We will make any final determination pertaining to the level of ordinary skill in the art, however, on the full trial record.” slip op. at 10

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “For purposes of this Decision, we need not expressly construe any claim terms. See Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (holding that “only those terms need be construed that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy”); see also Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (citing Vivid Techs. in the context of an inter partes review).” slip op. at 11

  Claim constructioncites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 9,722,104
• Canadian Solar (USA) Inc. v. Trina Solar Co., Ltd.Instituted
  PTAB · Oct 29, 2025 · IPR2025-00917 · APJ Debra L Dennett · IPR · Institution

  The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–17 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that at least one challenged claim is unpatentable, and granted Canadian Solar’s motion for joinder.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

    “We instituted review of claims 1–17 of the ’009 patent in IPR2025-00006 after a review of all arguments and evidence presented by the parties, including Patent Owner’s arguments in its preliminary response. For the reasons discussed in the Institution Decision in IPR2025-00006, we determine that Petitioner demonstrates a reasonable likelihood of showing at least one claim of the ’009 patent is unpatentable. Thus, we find that the Petition warrants institution of inter partes review on all claims and grounds set forth in the Petition.” slip op. at 11

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingJoinder, grantedGranted

    “Patent Owner did not file an opposition to Petitioner’s Motion for Joinder. Upon consideration of Petitioner’s arguments, we are persuaded that it is appropriate under these circumstances to join Petitioner to the proceeding in IPR2025-00006. Petitioner’s agreement to accept an “understudy” role and to not 8 Available at https://www.uspto.gov/TrialPracticeGuideConsolidated. actively participate in IPR2025-00006 unless the current petitioner ceases to participate will limit any potential impact on the trial schedule and will avoid increasing the costs or complexity of the proceeding. Therefore, joinder of Petitioner to IPR2025-00006 will further the goals of a just, speedy, and inexpensive resolution of Petitioner’s challenge. 37 C.F.R. § 42.1(b).” slip op. at 12

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedOther

    “Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been someone with an advanced degree involving the disciplines of electrical engineering, applied physics, chemistry, or materials science, and at least two years of experience designing, developing, or researching in the field. Alternatively, that person would have had a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, applied physics, or materials science, and at least three years of experience designing, developing, or researching in the field. Pet. 5 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 49). In light of the record before us, and for purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposal regarding the level of ordinary skill in the art. Based on our review of the ’009 patent and the prior art of record, we determine that the definition offered by Petitioner comports with the qualifications a person would have needed to understand the ’009 patent and the prior art. We will make any final determination pertaining to the level of ordinary skill in the art, however, on the full trial record.” slip op. at 10

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “Petitioner contends that “[n]o claim construction is necessary to resolve this Petition.” Pet. 25. For purposes of this Decision, we need not expressly construe any claim terms. See Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (holding that “only those terms need be construed that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy”); see also Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (citing Vivid Techs. in the context of an inter partes review).” slip op. at 11

  Claim constructioncites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,230,009
• Shenzhen Root Technology Co., Ltd. v. Willow Blossom Holdco Limited And Willow Innovations, Inc.Instituted
  PTAB · Oct 14, 2025 · IPR2025-00554 · APJ Barry L Grossman · IPR · Institution

  The Board instituted review of claims 17–19 and 21–33 on every asserted ground, finding a reasonable likelihood that claim 17 is unpatentable over Furrer alone and Furrer with Alvarez.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

    “After considering the Petition and the evidence of record, based on the analysis in this Decision, we determine that Petitioner has demonstrated that there is a reasonable likelihood that at least one of the challenged claims is unpatentable. Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review of all challenged claims and on all grounds asserted in the Petition. PGS Geophysical AS v. Iancu, 891 F.3d 1354, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (stating that a decision to institute is “a simple yes-or-no institution choice respecting a petition, embracing all challenges included in the petition”).” slip op. at 3

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had “bachelor’s degree in mechanical engineering or a similar field and at least two years of experience designing human breast pump equipment. More education could substitute for experience and vice versa.” Pet. 3–4 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 30–33). Mr. Bauer’s Declaration testimony states he considered some of the factors listed above. Ex. 1003 ¶ 32. Mr. Bauer testifies that based on his background and experience, in his opinion, the level of ordinary skill is as stated by Petitioner. Id. at 33. For purposes of this Decision, based on the prior art, the sophistication of the disclosed technology in the ’381 patent, and Mr. Bauer’s undisputed testimony, we adopt Petitioner’s definition of the level of ordinary skill.6” slip op. at 15

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “Petitioner asserts that “[a]ll claim terms should be construed according to the Phillips standard,” and that “no formal claim constructions are necessary for purposes of resolving controversies in this proceeding. Pet. 3. We agree. Given the lack of dispute on this record, we do not perceive the need to construe any claim limitation. Claims must be construed “only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.” AstraZeneca AB v. Mylan Pharms. Inc., 19 F.4th 1325, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. American Science & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999); see also Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“Because we need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy,’ we need not construe the claim preambles here where the construction is not ‘material to the [obviousness] dispute.’” (citations omitted)).” slip op. at 16

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundInstituted

    “Mr. Bauer further testifies: For electric-powered breast pumps, the only two options for providing electricity to the pump was either via a wire plugged into an outlet or via a battery, as would have been well-known to a POSITA. It would have been obvious for a POSITA to utilize a battery as the power source for Furrer’s pump as it was one of the two available options and would have provided known benefits. Ex. 1003 ¶ 93. As to why this a person of ordinary skill would have chosen the option of a battery powered breast pump, Mr. Bauer testifies that: Selection of battery power for Furrer’s pump would have beneficially provided a portable system that was usable during travel. Additionally, such a configuration would have allowed the user to move freely about a room, or be positioned in a location within a room without being tethered to a wall plug, allowing the user to, for example, sit or lay in the most convenient location while using the system without having to worry about being close to an outlet. Such mobility provided by selecting battery power for Furrer’s pump would have particularly aligned with Furrer’s suggestion for a ‘hands-free’ and discrete solution. Id. (internal citations omitted); see also Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 138, 143, 145 (further discussing the motivation to combine Furrer and Alvarez in the context of Ground 1B). Based on the record before us, without any evidence or argument to the contrary, we determine that Petitioner shows sufficiently for purposes of trial institution that Furrer, alone or in combination with Alvarez, discloses the claimed control unit comprising a battery, and a pump.” slip op. at 23

  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,806,454
• Padagis US LLC v. Neurelis, Inc.Instituted
  PTAB · Sep 16, 2025 · IPR2025-00465 · APJ Timothy G Majors · IPR · Institution

  The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–18 because Petitioner showed a reasonable likelihood of proving claim 1 obvious over Gwozdz and Meezan.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

    “A claim is unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103 if the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the relevant art. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 406 (2007). The question of obviousness is resolved on the basis of underlying factual determinations including: (1) the scope and content of the prior art; (2) any differences between the claimed subject matter and the prior art; (3) the level of ordinary skill in the art; and (4) secondary considerations (i.e., objective indicia) of nonobviousness when presented.6 Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1966). To show unpatentability based on a combination of teachings, “[a]n obviousness determination [also] requires finding both that a skilled artisan would have been motivated to combine the teachings of the prior art references to achieve the claimed invention, and that the skilled artisan would have had a reasonable expectation of success in doing so.” CRFD” slip op. at 7

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “[A POSA] would have been a pharmaceutical scientist, chemist, or biologist involved in the research and development of pharmaceutical formulations and/or delivery, and would have at least a Bachelor’s degree with at least 5 years of experience, or a Master’s, Ph.D. or Pharm.D. degree with several years of experience. In addition, a POSA would have had knowledge of benzodiazepine structure and function, and would further have knowledge and practical experience working with intranasal and transmembrane formulations, including knowledge of the physiology and anatomy of the nasal cavity, with relevant experience in developing intranasal formulations. Pet. 23–24; Ex. 1062 ¶ 20. Patent Owner “does not dispute” Petitioner’s POSA definition at this stage. Prelim. Resp. 18. We apply Petitioner’s proposed POSA definition for this Decision, which definition appears to be generally consistent with the cited prior art.” slip op. at 8

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached

    “standard used in a civil action before the courts under 35 U.S.C. § 282(b), including construing claim language in accordance with its ordinary and customary meaning as understood by the POSA, in view of the patent’s specification and considering the patent’s prosecution history. 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b). We need only expressly construe terms to the extent needed to resolve the controversy before us. Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019).” slip op. at 8

  • Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Written description inadequateNot entitled to earlier dateDecided for petitioner

    “applicant, as part of the bargain with the public, must describe his or her invention so that the public will know what it is and that he or she has truly made the claimed invention.” AbbVie Deutschland GmbH & Co., KG v. Janssen Biotech, Inc., 759 F.3d 1285, 1298 (Fed. Cir. 2014). “[T]he test for sufficiency [of the written description requirement] is whether the disclosure of the application relied upon reasonably conveys to those skilled in the art that the inventor had possession of the claimed subject matter as of the filing date sought.” Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly and Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc) (explaining that “the description must clearly allow persons of ordinary skill in the art to recognize that [the inventor] invented what is claimed”) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also id. at 1352 (“[A] description that merely renders the invention obvious does not satisfy the requirement.”).” slip op. at 25

  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,241,414
• Padagis US LLC v. Neurelis, Inc.Instituted
  PTAB · Sep 16, 2025 · IPR2025-00466 · APJ Timothy G Majors · IPR · Institution

  The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–27 because Petitioner showed a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on at least one claim, including claim 1 over Gwozdz and Meezan.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

    “Under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), an inter partes review may not be instituted unless it is determined that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner will prevail with respect to at least one of the claims challenged in the petition. For reasons explained below, we conclude that Petitioner shows a reasonable likelihood that it will prevail with respect to at least one of the ’786 patent’s challenged claims.1 We institute inter partes review on all challenged claims. SAS Inst. Inc. v. Iancu, 584 U.S. 357, 362–63 (2018); 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a) (“When instituting inter partes review, the Board will authorize the review to proceed on all of the challenged claims and on all grounds of unpatentability asserted for each claim.”).” slip op. at 2

  • Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Not entitled to earlier dateDecided for petitioner

    “We find that Petitioner has made a threshold showing that the ’558 Provisional does not provide written description support for claim 1’s pharmaceutical solution consisting of each of the recited elements, including n-dodecyl beta-D-maltoside. It is true that “n-Dodecyl β-D-maltoside” can be found listed in the SIGMA Catalog. Ex. 1026, 316. But Dr. Donovan’s testimony helps put that listing in context. It is merely one among well over 100 ionic and non-ionic detergents listed in the cited six pages of the SIGMA Catalog. See 1026, 316–321; Ex. 1062 ¶ 50. When further considered in the context of paragraphs 150–152 of the ’558 Provisional, which generically suggest that “enhancer” compounds can be used in “some embodiments”—then introducing at least 15 classes of potential enhancers16 including “preferred” lysophospholipids and acyl carnitines—the listing of n-dodecyl beta-D-maltoside among at least 150 biological detergents in the SIGMA Catalog is even more remote. Moreover, although satisfaction of the written description requirement is not limited to what is exemplified in a priority application, none of the ’558 Provisional’s examples use any “enhancer,” much less any detergent, any alkyl glycoside, or n-dodecyl beta-D maltoside in particular. The 16 The ’558 Provisional suggests that whether “a given compound” will function as an “enhancer” in a formulation requires testing. Ex. 1008 ¶ 150 (indicating “an in vivo or good model test” may “determin[e] whether the uptake of the drug is enhanced to a clinically significant degree”). ethanol. See Ex. 1008 ¶¶ 172–174 (Examples 1 and 2). In short, we find no sufficient disclosure of “blaze marks” in the ’558 Provisional that point to the inventors’ possession of a pharmaceutical solution that includes n-dodecyl beta-D-maltoside as claimed. Purdue Pharma L.P. v. Faulding Inc., 230 F.3d 1320, 1326–27 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (analogizing an application’s generic disclosures to a forest of unmarked trees and explaining that, “to satisfy the written description requirement,” there must be “blaze marks directing the skilled artisan to that tree [within the forest that represents the claimed invention]” in the application).” slip op. at 28

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › §315(e) estoppelEstoppel does not applyDecided for patent owner

    “and applying collateral estoppel to vacate a claim construction in an underlying IPR). In an IPR, “a party seeking to invoke collateral estoppel must show: ‘(1) the issue is identical to one decided in the first action; (2) the issue was actually litigated in the first action; (3) resolution of the issue was essential to a final judgment in the first action; and (4) [the party against whom collateral estoppel is being asserted] had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the first action.’” Google LLC v. Hammond Development Int’l, Inc., 54 F.4th 1377, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2022) (quoting In re Freeman, 30 F.3d 1459, 1465 (Fed. Cir. 1994)) (alteration in original).14 “It is [also] well established that patent claims need not be identical for collateral estoppel to apply.” Id. at 1381. Instead, “collateral estoppel requires the issues of patentability be identical.” Id. If “the differences between the unadjudicated patent claims and adjudicated patent claims do not materially alter the question of invalidity, collateral estoppel applies.” Ohio Willow Wood Co. v. Alps South, LLC, 735 F.3d 1333, 1342–43 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (affirming application of collateral estoppel where claims adjudicated as obvious required a “polymeric” gel whereas similar, unadjudicated claims required a “block copolymer” gel). “Collateral estoppel also applies to common issues in actions involving different but related patents.” Mycogen Plant Sci., Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 252 F.3d 1306, 1310 (Fed. Cir. 2001), vacated on other grounds, 353 U.S. 1109 (2002).” slip op. at 22

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Patents / published applications (effective date, provisional support)Reference is prior artReference not prior artMixed

    “We agree that at least one portion of Gwozdz is not prior art. To establish that the cited disclosures in Gwozdz are prior art, Petitioner must show support for those disclosures in the Gwozdz Provisional. In re Riggs, 131 F.4th 1377, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2025) (explaining that “the portion of the application relied on . . . as prior art must be supported by the provisional application”). Petitioner did not establish that Gwozdz’s disclosure of “penetration enhancers” finds support in the Gwozdz Provisional. Pet. 22. Conversely, Patent Owner shows that the phrase is absent in the Gwozdz Provisional. Prelim. Resp. 37.20 Based on this record, we determine that Gwozdz’s mention of “penetration enhancers” is not prior art to the 19 Patent Owner argues this “penetration enhancers” disclosure in Gwozdz is not prior art regardless which of the disputed priority dates (March 28, 2008, or March 27, 2009) one accords to the challenged claims. Prelim. Resp. 33. 20 We also agree that collateral estoppel does not bar Patent Owner from challenging Gwozdz’s prior-art status in this case. Patent Owner’s apparent concession that Gwozdz was prior art during the 451 IPR does not equate to the issue being actually litigated. Prelim. Resp. 34–35; Ex. 1040, 14 (“Patent Owner does not contest that Gwozdz is entitled to this filing date” of the Gwozdz Provisional). Purdue, 767 F. App’x at 922 (determining “[t]he priority date for the Joshi reference . . . cannot be determined based on collateral estoppel” where patentee could have argued, but did not in fact argue, Joshi’s prior-art status in an earlier matter).” slip op. at 35

  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,793,786

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.