• Stingray Group Inc. / Stingray Music USA, Inc. v. Edwin A. Hernandez-MondragonSome claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jun 10, 2026 · IPR2025-00350 · APJ Jason M Repko · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 7–12 were held unpatentable over Wannamaker alone or with Avellan; claims 1–6 and 13 were not shown unpatentable because Avellan did not teach the claimed screen-capture sequence and assembly.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level board ownDecided for petitioner

    “Patent Owner submits a similar definition and does not take issue with the Petition’s characterization of the level of ordinary skill in the art. PO Resp. 17. We determine that no express finding is necessary and that the level of ordinary skill in the art is reflected by the prior art of record. Any perceived difference in how each party characterizes a POSITA’s education, knowledge, and work experience does not change our analysis or conclusions.” slip op. at 5

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “Neither party has offered any claim construction arguments, relying on ordinary and customary meaning. Pet. 19–20; PO Resp. 18. We determine that construction of claim terms is not necessary to resolve the disputes raised by the parties in this proceeding.” slip op. at 5

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner

    “Yet paragraph 122 of Mr. Lipoff’s declaration merely repeats the Petition’s argument almost verbatim. Compare Ex. 1007 ¶ 122, with Pet. 28. Mr. Lipoff does not add any citation to Avellan or any other source that supports his testimony. See Ex. 1007 ¶ 122. Nor does Mr. Lipoff offer any additional technical reasoning than what is stated in the Petition. Testimony may be entitled to little weight if it merely restates the petition’s unsupported, conclusory assertions without adding supporting evidence or technical reasoning. Xerox Corp. v. Bytemark, Inc., IPR2022-00624, Paper 9 at 15 (PTAB Aug. 24, 2022) (precedential). That is the case here.” slip op. at 8

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “We are persuaded by Patent Owner’s argument that claim 1 is not obvious over Avellan because it does not assemble a media stream of multimedia items using the recited screen captures. See PO Resp. 21–23. We agree with Patent Owner that the plain language of the claim requires more than transmitting individual media items. PO Sur-reply 20. To the extent that Avellan captures images, those images do not meet the claimed requirements for a “temporal sequence of screen captures” in the independent claims, which must (1) be of the web page rendered by a browser, (2) “define all the content of the web page at a given time,” (3) “illustrate a dynamic change of at least a portion of the content over time” when two of them are compared, and (4) used to assemble “the at least one media stream.” Rather, the record better supports Patent Owner’s argument that Avellan transmits the multimedia items separate from any media stream assembled from screen captures. PO Resp. 21–23; PO Sur-reply 20.” slip op. at 7

  Patent outcomesUS 10,524,002 mixed
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR
  Patents in suitUS 10,524,002
• Stingray Group Inc. / Stingray Music USA, Inc. v. Edwin A. Hernandez-MondragonSome claims unpatentable
  PTAB · May 28, 2026 · IPR2025-00351 · APJ Brian P Murphy · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–9 are unpatentable as obvious over the stated combinations; claims 10–26 were not shown unpatentable because Avellan does not teach limitations [10d]–[10f].

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelOther

    “would have a bachelor’s or equivalent degree in computer science or a related field and at least 2 years of experience in multimedia processing or delivery using internet protocols.” Pet. 10 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 67–68). The Petition further states that “a person with less formal education but more experience, or more formal education but less experience, could have also met the relevant standard for a POSITA.” Id. Patent Owner submits a similar definition and does not take issue with the Petition’s characterization of the level of ordinary skill in the art of delivering multimedia content. Resp. 18. We determine that no express finding is necessary and that the level of ordinary skill in the art is reflected by the prior art of record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001); In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995); In re Oelrich, 579 F.2d 86, 91 (CCPA 1978). Any perceived difference in how each party characterizes a POSITA’s education, knowledge, and work experience does not change our analysis or conclusions. slip op. at 7

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for patent owner

    “Neither party has offered any claim construction arguments, relying on ordinary and customary meaning. Pet. 11; Resp. 18–19; Reply 5. We determine that construction of claim terms is not necessary to resolve the disputes raised by the parties in this proceeding. See, e.g., Wellman, Inc. v. Eastman Chem. Co., 642 F.3d 1355, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“[C]laim terms need only be construed ‘to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 8

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner
  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element) › Inherent disclosureInherency not foundNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “To establish inherency, the extrinsic evidence “must make clear that the missing descriptive matter is necessarily present in the thing described in the reference, and that it would be so recognized by persons of ordinary skill.” Continental Can Co. v. Monsanto Co., 948 F.2d 1264, 1268 (Fed. Cir. 1991). “‘Inherency, however, may not be established by probabilities or possibilities. The mere fact that a certain thing may result from a given set of circumstances is not sufficient.’” Id. at 1269 (quoting In re Oelrich, 666 F.2d 578, 581 (C.C.P.A. 1981)). Reasonable inferences of a POSITA may suffice to establish inherent disclosure in a prior art reference such as Farber. See Eli Lilly v. Los Angeles Biomedical Research Institute, 849 F.3d 1073, 1074–1075 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“[T]he dispositive question regarding anticipation is whether one skilled in the art would reasonably understand or infer from a prior art reference that every claim element is disclosed in that reference.”). Here, however, we find the Petition’s argument and evidence insufficient to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that Farber inherently discloses limitation [1b].” slip op. at 16

  Patent outcomesUS 11,140,441 mixed
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness
  Patents in suitUS 11,140,441
• Samsung Display Co., Ltd. v. Pictiva Displays International Ltd.Some claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Feb 17, 2026 · IPR2024-01187 · APJ Garth D Baer · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1, 2, 8–11, and 16 are unpatentable as obvious over Ingle and Hasei; claims 3, 5, and 6 were not shown unpatentable because the Hanamura-based grounds lack the claimed trench.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner

    “isolation, rather than in the claims’ context, and in light of the ’492 patent’s specification. In the trench/layers context of the ’492 patent, the word in requires more than it does in the circle/square context.” slip op. at 6

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “a bachelor’s degree in Electrical Engineering, Physics, or a comparable field of study, and at least three years of research or industrial experience with semiconductor (organic or inorganic) optoelectronic devices and/or lighting or displays. An individual with additional education could have less research or industrial experience and vice-versa. Pet. 9. Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s proposed definition. We adopt Petitioner’s uncontested proposed definition because it is consistent with the disclosures of the asserted prior art.” slip op. at 9

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner
  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “rather than the combination of Ingle’s capacitor and Hasei’s droplet discharge application that Petitioner asserts. See In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 426 (CCPA 1981). Even if Ingle falls short of teaching structured application for its capacitor’s cathode, as Patent Owner argues, that does not undermine Petitioner’s challenge because Petitioner proposes using Hasei’s structured application (i.e., a droplet discharge device) to form the cathode of Ingle’s capacitor. See Pet. 24–25. Patent Owner’s additional argument that “Hasei contains no discussion of forming capacitors” (PO Resp. 36; see PO Sur-reply 17–18) is similarly flawed—it attacks Hasei individually, while ignoring Ingle’s capacitor teaching. We agree with Petitioner—the combination of Ingle and Hasei teaches structured application of the capacitor’s cathode. In addition, we disagree with Patent Owner that “Petitioner provides no reason why a POSITA would have extended Hasei’s method for producing its OLED to a capacitor.” PO Resp. 36; see PO Sur-reply 17 (asserting “pure conjecture”). To the contrary, as noted above, Petitioner explains, with relevant support from Hasei, that its structured application method reduced electrode-material waste and shortened manufacturing times as compared to photolithography. Pet. 25 (citing Ex. 1007 ¶¶ 5, 7). Given those benefits, Petitioner has articulated sufficient reasoning with rational underpinning to support that its proffered combination would have been obvious. See KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418 (2007).” slip op. at 13

  Patent outcomesUS 9,257,492 mixed
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR
  Patents in suitUS 9,257,492
• Samsung Display Co., Ltd. v. Pictiva Displays International Ltd.Some claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jan 22, 2026 · IPR2024-01094 · APJ Grace Karaffa Obermann · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1, 2, 6, and 8–14 are unpatentable as obvious over Ma; claims 3 and 4 were not shown unpatentable over Werner.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner contends: A person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSA”) at the time of the alleged invention of the ’223 patent would have had a university degree in chemistry and additional expertise or a second university degree in the field of electrical engineering, particularly optoelectronics, or alternatively a university degree in electrical engineering and additional expertise or a second university degree in the field of chemistry. The person of ordinary skill in the art has spent several years studying the structure and function of organic optoelectronic components, in particular OLEDs, and has detailed knowledge of the chemical structure of light-emitting organic layers and the transport of charge carriers to these layers. In this respect, the person of ordinary skill in the art works at the interface between electrical engineering/physics (charge carrier transport and light emission processes in optoelectronic components) and chemistry, in particular organic chemistry (materials and layer stack combinations suitable). Pet. 14 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 46–47). Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s contention. See generally Resp. Neither party indicates that the result would change depending on the definition selected. We adopt Petitioner’s uncontested proposed definition, because it is consistent with the disclosures of the asserted prior art references. See Ex. 1005, (code 57); Ex. 1007, 8107 (abstracts of the references asserted in the patentability challenges).” slip op. at 8

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “history pertaining to the patent.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b). Under that standard, claim terms generally are given their plain and ordinary meaning as would have been understood by the ordinarily skilled artisan at the time of the invention and within the context of the entire patent disclosure. See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). We construe claim terms only as relevant to the parties’ contentions and only to the extent necessary to resolve the issues in dispute. See Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999); Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017). Neither party indicates that an express construction for any claim term is necessary to resolve the disputes at hand. Pet. 15; see generally Resp. On this record, we determine that no claim term requires express construction for purposes of this Decision. In our analysis of the challenges, however, we discuss the meaning of the terms “metal complex” and “central metal atom,” which appear in claim 1 (Ex. 1001, 19:19–20) to the extent necessary to resolve Patent Owner’s contention that Petitioner fails to establish that Ma invalidates claim 1. See Resp. 53, 56–58.” slip op. at 9

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityPrinted publication establishedDecided for petitioner

    “Whether Ma qualifies as a “printed publication” involves an inquiry into the facts and circumstances surrounding the reference’s disclosure to members of the public. In re Klopfenstein, 380 F.3d 1345, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2004). A reference is considered “publicly accessible” upon a satisfactory showing that the document has been “disseminated or otherwise made available to the extent that persons interested and ordinarily skilled in the subject matter or art exercising reasonable diligence[] can locate it.” Kyocera Wireless Corp. v. ITC, 545 F.3d 1340, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2008); see Hulu, LLC v. Sound View Innovations, LLC, IPR2018-01039, Paper 29, 10– 11 (PTAB Dec. 20, 2019) (precedential).” slip op. at 10

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundUnpatentable

    “Based on the information presented, we find Petitioner has the better position. Patent Owner admits that joint vaporization means “two materials vaporize together.” Reply 21 (quoting Resp. 54). As Petitioner argues, “This is what Ma discloses.” Id. We agree with Petitioner that Ma describes a “two-component” electron transport layer having a “thickness with one value.” Id.; see Ex. 1007, 811 (reporting a “co-deposited” application of “BPhen:LiQ” that is “50 nm thick”). Ma’s disclosure, thereby, strongly “indicates that the two components were vaporized together––as opposed to creating a ‘macroscopically homogenous form’” prepared by sequentially vaporizing the individual components as Patent Owner “hypothesizes.” Reply 21 (citing Ex. 1020 ¶¶ 42–44; Ex. 2041 ¶¶ 155–157); see Resp. 54– 55; see also Ex. 1007, 811 (Ma’s description of its device fabrication, appearing in the third paragraph of the experiments section). Petitioner further advances evidence that “[p]reparing a layer that is ‘macroscopically homogeneous’ but potentially microscopically heterogeneous,” as Patent Owner postulates, “would introduce excessive variability and render the data noncomparable and unreliable, thus undermining the experiment’s purpose.” Reply 21 (citing Ex. 1020 ¶ 44); see Resp. 54–55. Patent Owner presents no counterargument or evidence that is persuasive to undercut Petitioner’s reasoning or evidence on that point. See Sur-reply 19–22. Petitioner also argues that an ordinarily skilled artisan would have recognized “that vaporizing materials together would best achieve Ma’s objective of assessing the current density using different Liq doping percentages.” Reply 22 (citing Ex. 1007, 811; Ex. 1020 ¶ 51). Here again, Petitioner’s evidence on point stands uncontested. See Sur-reply 19–22 (declining to contest that point). On this record, therefore, we agree with Petitioner that, as to the relevant disclosure in Ma, “the most natural interpretation of ‘co-deposition’ for forming a layer, particularly when there is nothing to indicate that the materials” are “vaporized sequentially,” is that the materials are co-deposited by joint vaporization. Reply 22 (citing Ex. 1020 ¶ 46–51). We further agree that, “[u]nder a preponderance standard, Ma’s disclosures are sufficient to render joint vaporization at least obvious.” Id. For the above reasons, we determine that Petitioner demonstrates by a preponderance of the evidence that Ma discloses joint vaporization as required by the challenged claims.” slip op. at 15

  Patent outcomesUS 8,558,223 mixed
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,558,223
• Toyota Motor Corp. v. Emerging Automotive LLCSome claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Oct 21, 2025 · IPR2024-00786 · APJ Frances L Ippolito · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 10, 11, 13–16 were held unpatentable: claims 10, 11, 13, 15, and 16 as anticipated by Xiao, and claim 14 as obvious over Xiao and Singh.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner

    “arguments, we agree with Patent Owner’s proposed construction that requires the server to conduct a compatibility check. We start with the express claim language. Claim 10 recites: determining, by the server, applicable settings for the selected vehicle, the applicable settings being settings that are preferred to be set as identified from the user profile and are compatible with settings that are settable in the selected vehicle. Ex. 1001, 33:10–14 (emphases added). The express claim language requires that the server determine applicable settings. Those applicable settings, determined by the server, must also be compatible with vehicle settings. As such, the plain and ordinary meaning of the claim language expressly requires that the server make a determination of applicable settings that are defined as being compatible with vehicle settings.” slip op. at 14

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSITA”) at the time of the invention of the ’268 patent “would have had at least a Bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer science, or closely related field, with at least two-to-four-years-experience in cloud services for settings customization, or a Master’s degree in electrical engineering, computer science, or equivalent.” Pet. 12 (citing Ex. 1009 ¶ 82). Patent Owner does not address the level of ordinary skill in the art. See, generally PO Resp. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposal because it is reasonable and consistent with the prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the prior art may reflect an appropriate level of skill in the art).” slip op. at 12

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “However, contrary to Dr. Almeroth’s testimony and Petitioner’s position, Xiao’s server already does not attempt to command vehicles to do things they cannot do. Xiao teaches that server 118 generates commands for command codes that exist and are settable in the vehicle. Ex. 1010 ¶¶ 102– 103. As such, if there is no corresponding automobile setting, then Xiao’s server would not list those command codes for retrieval and would not send a command based on that retrieved command code to control the automobile systems to achieve the operator’s desired settings because that command code is not in the database. Our understanding of Xiao is further supported by Dr. Almeroth’s testimony: By listing them in the table of automobile command code information 606, Xiao shows that there are particular settings compatible with particular automobiles and particular desired settings. Thus, Xiao demonstrates the necessarily present characteristic that certain settings (e.g., commands) are compatible with certain automobiles. Ex. 1009 ¶ 96 (emphases added). We note that Dr. Malek further explains “the nonsensical result achieved by the combination would be that Xiao’s server, at best, in response to the command request issued by the operator, could ‘look up’ a command code to apply a vehicle-specific setting to that automobile 112, only to find that there is ‘none.’” We agree with Dr. Malek that there is a “None” command code in Xiao’s database when Xiao’s database already stores settings that are known to be settable in a specific vehicle per the operator’s preferences. Ex. 2011 ¶ 135. Thus, based on the complete record, we determine that Petitioner has not demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that Xiao in combination with Hayashi render claim 10 obvious.” slip op. at 79

  • BurdenNot shown unpatentable

    “Anticipation is not an ipsissimis verbis test, but “[a] claim is anticipated only if each and every element as set forth in the claim is found, either expressly or inherently described, in a single prior art reference.” Verdegaal, 814 F.2d at 631. Petitioner and Dr. Almeroth both acknowledge that Xiao discloses operators on the same account. Pet. 40–41; Ex. 1009 ¶ 170. But Petitioner and Dr. Almeroth do not explain sufficiently how Xiao discloses these operators have sub-user accounts. Petitioner further contends Xiao discloses plurality of accounts. Pet. Reply 18–19 (citing Ex. 1024, 33:1–44:10, 45:22–46:2); Ex. 1010 ¶ 65. Again, Petitioner has not adequately explained how the plurality of accounts includes sub-user accounts because Xiao discloses generally that multiple operators of a vehicle are on the same, single account. Ex. 1010 ¶ 66.” slip op. at 65

  Patent outcomesUS 9,171,268 mixed
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 9,171,268
• Kohler Co. v. Delta Faucet Co.Some claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Oct 1, 2025 · IPR2024-00700 · APJ Jane E Inglese · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1, 2, and 9 are unpatentable as obvious; claims 3–8 and 10–24 were not shown unpatentable because the asserted references failed to establish limitations including the claimed light pipe features.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s definition of a POSITA. Petitioner’s witness (Mr. Cook) qualifies as a POSITA under this definition, and, therefore, is qualified to opine from the perspective of a POSITA on technical matters included within the areas of expertise prescribed by the definition. As indicated above, Petitioner’s definition of a POSITA does not require education in the field of optics and professional experience designing or analyzing optical apparatus, unlike Patent Owner’s definition. We are aware, however, that Patent Owner’s witness (Dr. Klopp) has more extensive experience with optical systems and methods than Petitioner’s witness (Mr. Cook). Compare Ex 1003 ¶¶ 8–14, Ex. 2005, 39:21–59:17, with Ex. 2003 ¶¶ 3–20, Ex. 2004, 1–2, Ex. 1015, 10:22–13:25. Although Mr. Cook possesses excellent credentials in the field of mechanical engineering, his experience in the design and analysis of optical systems and methods is sparse and insubstantial compared to that of Dr. Klopp. Id. Due to this difference in experience levels, in instances where the witnesses express differing views on factual issues related to optical systems and methods, we will accord more weight to Dr. Klopp’s testimony than to Mr. Cook’s.” slip op. at 8

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedPatent owner expert creditedMixed

    “through the light transmission portion and bottom output face 313 of light conductor 38, which teaches transmitting light in parallel with the longitudinal axis of the housing. Tseng does not disclose or teach that light is emitted through the side surface of annular protrusion 383 in a direction perpendicular to the longitudinal axis of the housing. Ex. 1004 ¶ 97. Petitioner’s assertions that this would be the case consist solely of conclusory statements, supported only by citations to Mr. Cook’s declaration. Mr. Cook, however, simply repeats Petitioner’s conclusory statements, without providing sound technical reasoning supported by objective evidence to explain and support his opinions. Ex. 2003 ¶¶ 101– 102, 105, 195–198, 202. We, therefore, accord little weight to Mr. Cook’s opinion on this particular matter because it “merely repeats, verbatim, the conclusory assertion for which it is offered to support,” and “does not cite to any additional supporting evidence or provide any technical reasoning [in] support.” Xerox Corp. v. Bytemark, Inc., IPR2022-00624, Paper 9 at 15 (PTAB Aug. 24, 2022) (precedential). Furthermore, Mr. Cook’s opinion conflicts with that of Patent Owner’s witness, Dr. Klopp, who opines that a “POSITA would understand from Tseng’s third embodiment that light from the LED would bypass the annular protrusion 383 of outer cliff 381, while transmitting downwardly toward the output face 313.” Compare Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 174–175, 190–194, with Ex. 2003 ¶¶ 101–102, 105. As discussed above, Mr. Cook is qualified to opine from the perspective of a POSITA on technical matters included within the expertise of a person meeting Petitioner’s definition of a POSITA, which do not include optics and optical apparatus. We, therefore, credit Dr. Klopp’s opinion over that of Mr. Cook on this particular factual issue of how it is directly related to optical systems and methods about which Mr. Cook possesses limited relevant experience. See Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 6–15 (experience in communication systems and electronics); Ex. 2005, 55:16–58:19 (design experience with electronics that use indicator lights or fiber-optic communications; no professional experience with light pipes, diffusers, or plumbing fixtures). Dr. Klopp possesses substantial research and professional experience with optical methods, fiber optic light pipes, light guides, diffusers, prisms, and analysis of faucets, spray heads, and plumbing fixtures. See Ex. 2003 ¶¶ 6–10 Supra 8 (discussing weight accorded to conflicting witness testimony); see also Resp. 2–3 (arguing that “Petitioner’s expert, Mr. Cook, is a mechanical engineer with substantial professional experience in electronics for high-voltage power systems and communications, but he has limited experience with the claimed subject matter.”).” slip op. at 34

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction needed

    “would be used to construe the claim[s] in a civil action [held] under 35 U.S.C. 282(b).” 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b). Under that standard, claim terms generally are given their plain and ordinary meaning as would have been understood by the ordinarily skilled artisan at the time of the invention when read in the context of the specification and prosecution history. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). We construe terms in controversy only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy. Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). Petitioner asserts that the claim terms do not require construction and should be afforded their plain and ordinary meaning. Pet. 13. Patent Owner contends that it applies the plain and ordinary meaning of the claim terms. Resp. 7. Taking into consideration the information presented, we determine that none of the claim terms requires express construction for purposes of resolving the dispute before us.” slip op. at 9

  • BurdenMixed

    “perpendicular to the longitudinal axis of Tseng’s housing (internal 33 and external 34 sleeves). “In an inter partes review, the burden of persuasion is on the petitioner to prove ‘unpatentability by a preponderance of the evidence,’ 35 U.S.C. § 316(e), and that burden never shifts to the patentee.” In re Magnum Oil Tools Int’l Ltd., 829 F.3d 1364, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (quoting Dynamic Drinkware, LLC v. Nat’l Graphics, Inc., 800 F.3d 1375, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2015)); see also Aqua Products, Inc. v. Matal, 872 F.3d 1290, 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2017 (en banc (quoting Magnum Oil)).” slip op. at 40

  Patent outcomesUS 10,393,363 mixed
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,393,363
• Inergy Technology, Inc. v. Force Mos Technology Co., Ltd.Some claims unpatentable
  PTAB · May 16, 2025 · IPR2024-00094 · APJ Mary C Hoffman · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1 and 3–5 are unpatentable over Kobayashi and Hshieh; claims 2 and 6 were not shown unpatentable over the asserted combinations.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSITA”), “at the filing date of the ’409 [p]atent[,] would have a master’s degree in electrical engineering, and at least two years of relevant work experience in the field of integrated circuit design and manufacturing.” Pet. 13 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 52). Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s proffered level of ordinary skill in the art. PO Resp. 9 (citing Ex. 2021 ¶ 55). We adopt Petitioner’s proffered level of ordinary skill in the art, which is supported by unopposed declaration testimony and consistent with the ’409 patent and prior art of record. See, e.g., Ex. 1001, 1:6–3:8 (describing the invention and related art in terms of integrated circuit design and fabrication). Neither party, moreover, indicates the overall result would change based on a different definition.” slip op. at 10

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for patent owner

    “Based on the arguments and evidence, we disagree with Petitioner’s proposed construction requiring the corners to be rounded via a particular process, because doing so would improperly import a process of manufacture from the Specification into apparatus claims. See Cont’l Circuits LLC v. Intel Corp., 915 F.3d 788, 799 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (explaining that, generally, a novel product that meets the criteria of patentability is not limited to the process by which it was made, however, process steps can be treated as part of a product claim if the patentee has made clear that the process steps are an essential part of the claimed invention). Here, the portions of the Specification relied on by Petitioner (Ex. 1001, 2:10–20, 4:53–64) disclose a process for manufacturing but do not make clear that the process is an essential part of the claimed invention. We also disagree with Petitioner’s assessment of the prosecution history, i.e., that the claims were amended to distinguish the claimed rounded corners from Pfirsch’s rounded corners, which, presumably, are formed as an incidental result of lithography. On the contrary, the Examiner found (and Patent Owner acknowledged) that Pfirsch has rounded corners. Ex. 1002, 276, 295, 302. As Patent Owner correctly points out, the claims were amended during prosecution to include a “circular” contact to distinguish over Pfirsch’s square contact. See id. Petitioner does not otherwise point to evidence that Patent Owner clearly and unmistakably limited the claim scope to rounded corners formed by a particular process.” slip op. at 12

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundUnpatentable

    “is ‘known’ is not sufficient for a motivation to combine.” PO Resp. 47. However, the motivation-to-combine analysis is a flexible one, and the “known-technique” rationale is adequate to show a motivation to combine. For example, “if a technique has been used to improve one device, and a person of ordinary skill in the art would recognize that it would improve similar devices in the same way, using the technique is obvious unless its actual application is beyond his or her skill.” KSR, 550 U.S. at 417; see also Intel Corp. v. PACT XPP Schweiz AG, 61 F.4th 1373, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2023) (quoting Intel Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 21 F.4th 784, 799–800 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (“If there’s a known technique to address a known problem using ‘prior art elements according to their established functions,’ then there is a motivation to combine.”). Here, as discussed above, the record shows that top view rounding was a known technique to eliminate corners, and that corners were a known problem (e.g., corners tend to reach undesirable higher peak electric field leading to premature breakdown voltage). See, e.g., Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 37, 39, 42– 44, 55–57, 122, 133, 135–141; Ex. 1005, 7:57–8:4; Ex. 1006, 1:18–21, 2:19–39, 5:3–17, Figs. 6A–8B; Ex. 1011, 1:29–41; Ex. 1012; PO Resp. 13, 46 (citing Ex. 1011, 1:34–40); Ex. 2021 ¶ 87. Furthermore, there is no dispute that modifying Kobayashi to eliminate corners via top view rounding was anything more than a “minor and commonplace modification” of cell shape within the skill of an ordinary artisan, or that top view rounding would change Kobayashi’s established function. Pet. 60; Ex. 2021 ¶ 86.” slip op. at 30

  • Obviousness (§103) › KSR rationalesMotivation foundUnpatentable

    “We agree that Kobayashi’ s Figure 5A solely cannot be relied upon as disclosing the claimed diameter. See Hockerson-Halbertstadt, Inc. v. Avia Group Int'l, 222 F.3d 951, 956 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (patent drawings not designated as being drawn to scale cannot be relied upon to define precise proportions of elements if the specification is completely silent on the issue). However, we do not agree that Petitioner failed to show Kobayashi suggests the recited diameter. We disagree with Patent Owner’s assertion that Dr. Liu’s “vague, purported ‘design considerations’” are “unsupported.” PO Resp. 43. Although Kobayashi is silent on the width/diameter of the trench contact in Figure 5A, Kobayashi discloses trenched gates having dimensions below 0.5 μm, which demonstrates that it was known in the art, and required no more than an exercise of ordinary skill in the art, to create trenched features of widths well below 1 μm. Kobayashi also discloses that the width of each trench, and the distance between the adjacent trenches (which includes the trench contact), must be selected to optimum sizes . . . [and] these sizes . . . have some degrees of freedom.” Ex. 1005, 7:42–48. This demonstrates a POSITA would seek to optimize trench contact width or diameter. Dr. Liu’s testimony regarding design considerations suggests the desirability of a reduced diameter trench contact, e.g., to minimize the width of the trench contact for purposes of easier filling, to minimize the total width of the unit cell, and to minimize manufacturing time by reducing etch back time. See Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 111–114. As Patent Owner acknowledges, “there is always a motivation to speed up the fabrication process or shrink feature sizes of semiconductors.” PO Resp. 43 (citing 2021 ¶ 131). However, contrary to Patent Owner’s arguments, these are not generic motivations “untethered” from Kobayashi. Id. Indeed, Kobayashi directly addresses the fabrication process (including new techniques to obtain trench widths under 0.5 μm) and the need to optimize the size of trench gates and the space in between (which includes the trench contact). Ex. 1005, 7:43–54, 7:19–9:53. Patent Owner also argues that Petitioner presents no evidence that modifying Kobayashi to have a diameter smaller than 1 μm is predictable. PO Resp. 44. We disagree. As discussed above, Petitioner points to Kobayashi’s teachings that the sizes are to be optimized and that the trench gate width is smaller than 0.5 μm, which suggests making other trench features of that width was within ordinary skill. Ex. 1003 ¶ 112. Furthermore, Kobayashi’s silence as to the dimensions of the trench contact suggests that the trench contact diameter dimension is likely in the ballpark of the other explicitly disclosed trenched feature dimensions and is a matter of routine optimization. In addition, Patent Owner advances no persuasive evidence that the claimed diameter produces unexpected results or is otherwise critical. Patent Owner also argues that reducing trench contact diameter has downsides (i.e., reduced ease of filling for metal plugs and reduced current carrying capacity) not addressed by Petitioner; however, Petitioner is not required to address those tradeoffs in its Petition, and we do not see how those tradeoffs would prevent the proposed combination. PO Resp. 44; see Medichem, S.A. v. Rolabo, S.L., 437 F.3d 1157, 1165 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“a given course of action often has simultaneous advantages and disadvantages, and this does not necessarily obviate motivation to combine.”); Winner Int'l Royalty Corp. v. Wang, 202 F.3d 1340, 1349 n.8 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (“The fact that the motivating benefit comes at the expense of another benefit, however, should not nullify its use as a basis to modify the disclosure of one reference with the teachings of another. Instead, the benefits, both lost and gained, should be weighed against one another.”). Here, Dr. Liu listed numerous benefits of having a reduced diameter, which weigh against the potential downsides raised by Patent Owner. Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 111–114. Moreover, we do not see how the downsides/tradeoffs prevent modifying Kobayashi in the manner suggested when the same tradeoffs appear to be applicable to the ’409 patent. Having considered Patent Owner’s arguments, and taking into” slip op. at 43

  Patent outcomesUS 7,812,409 mixed
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 7,812,409
• Unified Patents, LLC v. Dynapass IP Holdings LLCSome claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jul 12, 2024 · IPR2023-00425 · APJ Lynne H Browne · IPR · Final written decision

  Claim 5 is unpatentable as obvious over Veneklase and Jonsson; claims 1, 3, 4, and 6 were not shown unpatentable over Kew and Sormunen.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “In determining the level of skill in the art, we consider the type of problems encountered in the art, the prior art solutions to those problems, the rapidity with which innovations are made, the sophistication of the technology, and the educational level of active workers in the field. Custom Accessories, Inc. v. Jeffrey-Allan Indus. Inc., 807 F.2d 955, 962 (Fed. Cir. 1986); Orthopedic Equip. Co. v. U.S., 702 F.2d 1005, 1011 (Fed. Cir. 1983).” slip op. at 12

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached

    “v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc), and its progeny. Only terms that are in controversy need to be construed, and then only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy. Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co. Matal, 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (in the context of an inter partes review, applying Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). Petitioner states that “all terms should be given their plain meaning.” Pet. 6. Yet, Petitioner proposes claim construction for “cell phone network” and “[n]ot known to the user.” Pet. 9–13.7 As these terms are not in controversy, we do not construe them.” slip op. at 13

  • Strike new argumentNew argument disregardedDecided for patent owner

    “We agree with Patent Owner that it is too late for Petitioner to file a copy of the infringement contentions and argue that Patent Owner’s position in this Proceeding is inconsistent with its position in that proceeding. Petitioner had ample opportunity to raise its arguments about the infringement contentions well before the oral hearing. PO Resp. to Supp. 2. Patent Owner complied with our mandatory notice provision. Further, we agree with Patent Owner that its position in the infringement contentions is not inconsistent with its position in this proceeding. Paper 3, 1. For these reasons, we decline to exercise our authority under 37 C.F.R. § 42.5(b) to consider the infringement contentions and the new arguments during an oral hearing.” slip op. at 10

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner

    “Ex. 1005, 7:16–28. We do not agree with Patent Owner that these statements unequivocally support its position that Veneklase’s two-step authentication process is a principle of operation of its system. Rather, the quoted statements indicate that Veneklase’s use of two distinct communication channels and a random number generator are key features of Veneklase’s system that provide multiple levels of security and enhance security of that system. As modified Veneklase’s system still uses two distinct communication channels and a random number generator. Thus, to the extent that Veneklase’s enhanced security measures (i.e. two distinct communication channels and a random number generator) are a principle of operation of Veneklase’s system, the proposed modification does not destroy this principle of operation or render Veneklase’s system inoperable. Moreover, incorporating Jonsson’s teachings related to using an algorithm to create a new password would not destroy the principle of operation of Veneklase’s security system because it only changes how Veneklase accomplishes its goal of preventing unauthorized access to a computer system, rather than defeating its goal of preventing such access. See In re Mouttet, 686 F. 3d 1322, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2012). Further, we do not agree that Plas-Pak (a routine decision11) supports Patent Owner’s contention that the proposed combination impermissibly changes Veneklase’s principle of operation as Patent Owner has not identified differences between the two authentication processes that would be “unlikely to motivate a person of ordinary skill to pursue” the proposed combination. Plas-Plak, 600 F. App'x at 757-59.” slip op. at 25

  Patent outcomesUS 6,993,658 mixed
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 6,993,658
• Gce Gas Control Equipment Inc. v. Vbox, Inc.Some claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jun 18, 2024 · IPR2023-00326 · APJ Jane E Inglese · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 12–14 and 16 are unpatentable under § 103 over Deane alone and Deane, Dubois, and Berntson; claims 1–11 and 15 were not shown unpatentable.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for patent owner

    “III. ANALYSIS A. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art The level of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention is a factual determination that provides a primary guarantee of objectivity in an obviousness analysis. Al-Site Corp. v. VSI Int’l Inc., 174 F.3d 1308, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (citing Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1966); Ryko Mfg. Co. v. Nu-Star, Inc., 950 F.2d 714, 718 (Fed. Cir. 1991)). Based on Petitioner’s contention, which Patent Owner does not dispute, we find that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had a bachelor’s degree in mechanical engineering, chemical engineering, or a related field, and two years of experience in the research, design, or development of POCs and related hardware, software, and firmware. Compare Pet. 21, with Resp. 11. Our finding is supported by Dr. Knaebel’s testimony. Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 226–228. The level of ordinary skill in the art, as defined above, appears consistent with the disclosures of the asserted prior art and the written description of the invention provided in the ’614 patent.” slip op. at 8

  • Expert testimonyPatent owner expert creditedDecided for patent owner

    “Deane thus teaches that adsorbent housing 602 and adsorbent bed columns 508a, 508b—the asserted separation cartridge—are part of an apparatus that rests on a support surface such as a table or floor. Based on Deane’s disclosure, we find persuasive Patent Owner’s contention, and Patent Owner’s witness’s opinion, that Deane’s housing 602/adsorbent bed columns 508a, 508b (separation cartridge) cannot be removed from the receptacle by movement of the separation cartridge vertically downward. Resp. 37–38; Ex. 2001 ¶¶ 118–131. Neither Petitioner nor Petitioner’s witness, Dr. Knaebel, points to any evidence of record showing that one of ordinary skill in the art would have understood that Deane’s housing 602/adsorbent bed columns 508a, 508b (separation cartridge) could be removed from manifold 512 (receptacle) by moving housing 602/adsorbent bed columns 508a, 508b (separation cartridge) downward when the apparatus is resting on a table or floor, as taught by Deane. Pet. 42–43; Ex. 1078 ¶¶ 121–161. Petitioner fails to show that Deane’s housing 602/adsorbent bed columns 508a, 508b (separation cartridge) could be removed from the receptacle by movement of the separation cartridge in the downward (second) direction, as required by the removal direction limitation of claim 1. Petitioner, therefore, does not establish unpatentability under its axial movement theory.” slip op. at 26

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner

    “Giving effect to “by movement relative to the receptacle,” when interpreting this phrase in combination with “a separation cartridge selectively removable from a receptacle,” requires that the separation cartridge is removable from the receptacle by movement of the separation cartridge itself. Interpreting the removal direction limitation to encompass a stationary separation cartridge, as Petitioner proposes, would render “by movement relative to the receptacle” superfluous. Specifically, Petitioner’s interpretation of “relative movement” does not accord weight to the recitation “movement relative to the receptacle,” which requires something other than the receptacle—the separation cartridge—to move in order for movement to occur with reference to or in comparison with the receptacle. Petitioner’s interpretation of “relative movement” as permitting removal of the separation cartridge from the receptacle when the separation cartridge remains stationary, is inconsistent with the plain language of removal direction limitation as a whole. The plain language of the removal direction limitation indicates that the separation cartridge must be removable from the receptacle by movement of the separation cartridge in a specified (first) direction. Claim 1 defines the first direction as a direction opposite the (second) direction in which the inlet and outlet are oriented. The plain language of the removal direction limitation, therefore, requires that the separation cartridge is removable from a receptacle by movement of the separation cartridge in comparison to the receptacle in a direction opposite the direction in which the separation cartridge’s inlet and outlet are oriented.” slip op. at 15

  • Strike new argumentNew argument disregardedDecided for patent owner

    “(a) Untimely new theory of unpatentability We agree with Patent Owner (Sur-Reply 4) that Petitioner’s relative movement theory is an impermissible new theory of unpatentability improperly presented for the first time in the Reply. Corephotonics, Ltd. v. Apple Inc., 84 F.4th 990, 1008–09 (Fed. Cir. 2023) (A petitioner may not raise in a reply “‘an entirely new theory of prima facie obviousness absent from the petition,’ even if the new theory is responsive to the patent owner’s response or the Board’s institution decision.”) (quoting Wasica Finance GmbH v. Continental Automotive Systems, Inc., 853 F.3d 1272, 1286 (Fed. Cir. 2017); see also Henny Penny Corp. v. Frymaster LLC, 938 F. 3d 1324, 1330–31 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“We conclude that the Board did not abuse its discretion in . . . disregarding its [petitioner’s] new theory first raised in reply.”). Petitioner does not present the relative movement theory in the Petition, and instead presents it for the first time in the Reply. Pet. 42–43. Far from fairly meeting any argument introduced by Patent Owner in the Response, this new theory unfairly changes the thrust of the challenge.” slip op. at 27

  Patent outcomesUS 11,389,614 mixed
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,389,614
• Wolfspeed, Inc. / Ideal Industries Lighting, LLC D/B/A Cree Lighting v. Cao Lighting, Inc.Some claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Sep 28, 2023 · IPR2022-00848 · APJ Brian D Range · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 21, 22, 25, 26, 28–30, 32–36, 40, 42–44, 47–49, 52, 53, 56–59, 62, 63, 65–68, 71–73, 77, 78, 81, 82, 85, 86, and 88–91 are unpatentable under § 103; claim 41 is not shown …

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • ExcludeMotion to exclude, deniedDenied

    “declaration addresses the Patent Owner Response and is relevant to the issues at hand. We start with an important observation: claim 18 (the only independent claim at issue) is an apparatus claim; the claim is directed to a “semiconductor light source.” Ex. 1001, 9:52, EPRC 1:32. One requirement of this apparatus is that it comprise “a semiconductor chip” (id. at 9:66) where “said semiconductor chip is a light emitting diode (LED) chip EPRC, 1:34–36. As we explain when addressing claim construction, infra, we adopt Patent Owner’s proposed construction (Resp. 14) of “said semiconductor chip is a light emitting diode (LED) chip configured to output light at greater than about 40 milliwatts” as referring to “a semiconductor LED chip capable of emitting light greater than about 40 milliwatts.” See Section III.D, infra (emphasis added). Because of these recitations, Petitioner bears the burden of establishing that the prior art teaches or suggests a semiconductor LED chip “capable of emitting light greater than about 40 milliwatts.” As explained herein, we determine that in the Petition, Petitioner met this burden by establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that the Krames reference teaches an LED chip that has this capability. Pet. 53 (quoting Ex. 1008, 10). Notably, claim 18 does not require actual operation of anything at greater than 40 milliwatts because claim 21 is not a method claim. Petitioner never had a burden of establishing a method of running the Krames reference’s LED at this power output within a semiconductor light source.” slip op. at 9

  • Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner

    “We agree with Patent Owner that the challenged claims relate to light fixtures, LED packaging, and LED chip layer structure and that the ’770 patent claims reflect “a hybrid of the light bulb art and semiconductor art.” Resp. 16. The prior art of record, for example, Begemann, likewise reflects “a hybrid of the light bulb art and semiconductor art.” Id. (quoting Pet. 28). Petitioner’s expert, Dr. Lebby, agreed that a person having ordinary skill in 28:16. While Petitioner’s proposed description of a person having ordinary skill in the art could, in some instances, be sufficient to qualify a person as having ordinary skill, Patent Owner’s proposal is a more complete and accurate description of the level of skill commensurate with the scope of the challenged ’770 patent claims. Patent Owner’s description appears consistent with the prior art and patent specification before us and is supported by witness testimony. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (prior art itself may reflect an appropriate level of skill). For the purpose of this Decision, we adopt Patent Owner’s description. We further note that the outcome of our decision would be the same under either party’s asserted skill level.” slip op. at 15

  • Prior constructionPrior construction adoptedTerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner

    “Delaware held, with respect to related U.S. Patent 6,465,961, construed “a light emitting diode (LED) chip configured to output light at greater than about 40 milliwatts” as “at least one LED chip is capable of emitting light greater than about 40 milliwatts.” Resp. 14 (citing Ex. 1024, 15–18). Petitioner responds that the phrase “needs no construction” and that Petitioner’s grounds meet this construction. Reply 1. We note that the language of claim 18 does not precisely match the language the District Court considered, it is substantively the same. The record supports a construction very similar to the construction the District Court adopts, and we reference the District Court’s reasoning. Ex. 1024, 15– 18. We, thus, construe claim 18’s recitation that “said semiconductor chip is a light emitting diode (LED) chip configured to output light at greater than about 40 milliwatts” as referring to “a semiconductor LED chip that is capable of emitting light greater than about 40 milliwatts.” It is unnecessary to construe any other claim terms in this Decision because none of the parties’ disputes turn on the meaning of other terms. See, e.g., Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017).” slip op. at 17

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityPrinted publication establishedReference is prior artDecided for petitioner

    “The facts above are evidence of the Krames reference’s publication as of June 29, 2000, because the facts tend to make the Krames reference’s publication as of June 29, 2000, more probable than it would be without the evidence. See Fed. R. Evid. 401(a) (defining evidence as relevant “if it has any tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence”). The evidence is sufficient to support publication. Meanwhile, no evidence of record suggests that Krames was not a printed publication as of June 29, 2000. Thus, a preponderance of the evidence supports Krames’s prior art status. Patent Owner argues that Ms. Watters “never establishes a firm date when Krames was purportedly available to the relevant public.” Resp. 21. Patent Owner bases this argument by taking a tortured reading of Ms. Watters’s statement that “[m]embers of the interested public could locate a copy of [the Proceedings] on or after June 29, 2000, the date it was catalogued.” Id. (quoting Ex. 1020, 3); see also Sur-Reply 12–13. The best understanding of Ms. Watters’s statement, in view of the context of Ms. Watters explaining the library’s cataloguing process, is that a member of the interested public had two options: the person could choose to locate the Proceedings on June 29, 2000, or the person could choose to locate the Proceedings after June 29, 2000. Thus, the statement supports public availability as of June 29, 2000.” slip op. at 21

  Patent outcomesUS 6,634,770 mixed
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR
  Patents in suitUS 6,634,770

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.