- PTAB · May 5, 2022 · IPR2022-00063 · APJ Bryan F Moore · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–34 and all asserted grounds after finding a reasonable likelihood that Samsung would prevail on obviousness over Ellsberry and Jeddeloh.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Decided for petitioner
“another patent asserted in the Related Case was filed within a week of the Preliminary Response. Id. We decline to attempt to predict how the District Court would proceed should a stay be requested by either of the parties. Accordingly, we find that this factor neither favors nor weighs against discretionary denial of inter partes review. C. Factor 2 — Proximity of Court’s Trial Date Patent Owner admits that “[t]he district of Delaware has not yet set a trial date.” Id. Accordingly, this factor weighs against exercising our discretion to deny inter partes review.” slip op. at 8
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsDecided for petitioner
“Given the facts above, because Averbuj was not presented in combination with the other references asserted here and is only used in two of the four grounds, the combination of references asserted in the Petition do not qualify as art that was “previously presented” to the Office. Thus, we find that the combination of references asserted in the Petition, were not previously presented to the Office. Additionally, Patent Owner does not assert or explain sufficiently that Ellsberry, Jeddeloh, and/or Lee are cumulative of any reference cited during prosecution of the ’523 patent. Prelim. Resp. 41–43. On this record, we are not persuaded that Ellsberry, Jeddeloh, and Lee are cumulative of any reference cited during prosecution of the ’523 patent. Accordingly, the first condition of the first part of the Advanced Bionics framework is not satisfied, and we need not consider whether Petitioner has demonstrated that the Office erred in a manner material to the patentability of challenged claims. Conclusion After evaluating the Becton, Dickinson factors within the Advanced” slip op. at 13
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, or in a related field and at least one year of work experience relating to memory systems, and would be familiar with the design of memory devices, memory modules, and BIST.” Pet. 6. Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s characterization or offer its own. Accordingly, for purposes of this decision, we adopt Petitioner’s characterization of the level of ordinary skill, which we determine is consistent with the ’523 patent written description and the asserted prior art. slip op. at 14
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Petitioner offers constructions of several terms which are not disputed by Patent Owner. Pet. 13–15. Nevertheless, we determine that it is not necessary to provide an express interpretation of any of the terms of the claims at this juncture. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017); Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“[O]nly those terms need be construed that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.”).” slip op. at 15
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,217,523 - PTAB · Mar 15, 2022 · IPR2021-01158 · APJ Lynne E Pettigrew · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR of claims 1–20 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that Palo Alto Networks would prevail in showing at least one challenged claim unpatentable.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Denied
“1. whether the court granted a stay or evidence exists that one may be granted if a proceeding is instituted; 2. proximity of the court’s trial date to the Board’s projected statutory deadline for a final written decision; 3. investment in the parallel proceeding by the court and the parties; 4. overlap between issues raised in the petition and in the parallel proceeding; 5. whether the petitioner and the defendant in the parallel proceeding are the same party; and 6. other circumstances that impact the Board’s exercise of discretion, including the merits. Apple Inc. v. Fintiv, Inc., IPR2020-00019, Paper 11 at 5–6 (PTAB Mar. 20, 2020) (precedential) (“Fintiv”). In evaluating these factors, we “take[] a holistic view of whether efficiency and integrity of the system are best served by denying or instituting review.” Id. at 6. We consider each of these factors below.” slip op. at 8
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsDenied
“35 U.S.C. § 325(d) because every ground asserted in the Petition is based on the same or substantially similar art and arguments already considered during prosecution of the ’899 patent. Prelim. Resp. 13–26. Section 325(d) states, in relevant part, “[in] determining whether to institute or order a proceeding under this chapter, chapter 30, or chapter 31, the Director may take into account whether, and reject the petition or request because, the same or substantially the same prior art or arguments previously were presented to the Office.” The Board uses the following two-part framework in determining whether to exercise discretion under § 325(d) to deny institution: (1) whether the same or substantially the same art previously was presented to the Office or whether the same or substantially and (2) if either condition of the first part of the framework is satisfied, whether the petitioner has demonstrated that the Office erred in a manner material to the patentability of challenged claims. Advanced Bionics, LLC v. MED-EL Elektromedizinische Geräte GmbH, IPR2019-01469, Paper 6 at 8 (PTAB Feb. 13, 2020) (precedential). In applying the two-part framework, we consider the following non-exclusive factors: (a) the similarities and material differences between the asserted art and the prior art involved during examination; (b) the cumulative nature of the asserted art and the prior art evaluated during examination; (c) the extent to which the asserted art was evaluated during examination, including whether the prior art was the basis for rejection; (d) the extent of the overlap between the arguments made during examination and the manner in which Petitioner relies on the prior art or Patent Owner distinguishes the prior art; (e) whether Petitioner has pointed out sufficiently how the Examiner erred in its evaluation of the asserted prior art; and (f) the extent to which additional evidence and facts presented in the Petition warrant reconsideration of the prior art or arguments. Becton, Dickinson & Co. v. B. Braun Melsungen AG, IPR2017-01586, Paper 8 at 17–18 (PTAB Dec. 15, 2017) (precedential as to § III.C.5, first paragraph). Factors (a), (b), and (d) relate to whether the art or arguments presented in the Petition are the same or substantially the same as those previously presented to the Office. Advanced Bionics, Paper 6 at 10. Factors (c), (e), and (f) relate to whether the petitioner has demonstrated a material error by the Office. Id.” slip op. at 12
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“institute an inter partes review if “the information presented in the petition . . . and any response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2018). After considering the parties’ arguments and the evidence of record, we determine the information presented shows a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail in establishing the unpatentability of at least one of the challenged claims of the ’899 patent. Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review of claims 1–20 of the ’899 patent on the grounds asserted in the Petition.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“had “a bachelor’s degree in computer science, electrical engineering, or a related field, and approximately two years of professional experience or equivalent study in network security and the use of machine-learning algorithms.” Pet. 13 (citing Ex. 1004 ¶ 30). Petitioner further asserts that “[a]dditional graduate education could substitute for professional experience, or significant experience in the field could substitute for formal education.” Id. (citing Ex. 1004 ¶ 30). At this stage of the proceeding, Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s assessment of the level of ordinary skill in the art. See generally Prelim. Resp. Based on the information presented in the Petition and Dr. Lee’s testimony, we adopt Petitioner’s assessment for purposes of this Decision.” slip op. at 16
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,503,899 - PTAB · Mar 15, 2022 · IPR2021-01157 · APJ Brian J Mcnamara · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–17, finding a reasonable likelihood that the challenged claims are obvious over four combinations of Jungck, Shah, Ke, and Sarathy.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“inter partes review may not be instituted unless the information presented in the Petition “shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.”” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Denied
“1. whether the court granted a stay or evidence exists that one may be granted if a proceeding is instituted; 2. proximity of the court’s trial date to the Board’s projected statutory deadline for a final written decision; 3. investment in the parallel proceeding by the court and the parties; 4. overlap between issues raised in the petition and in the parallel proceeding; 5. whether the petitioner and the defendant in the parallel proceeding are the same party; and 6. other circumstances that impact the Board’s exercise of discretion, including the merits. Apple Inc. v. Fintiv, Inc., IPR2020-00019, Paper 11 at 5–6 (PTAB Mar. 20, 2020) (precedential) (“Fintiv”). In evaluating these factors, we “take[] a holistic view of whether efficiency and integrity of the system are best served by denying or instituting review.” Id. at 6. We consider each of these factors below.” slip op. at 11
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsDenied
“35 U.S.C. § 325(d). See Prelim. Resp. 19–35. Pursuant to § 325(d), the Director may elect not to institute a proceeding if the challenge to the patent is based on matters previously presented to the Office. Section 325(d) states, in relevant part, “[in] determining whether to institute or order a proceeding under this chapter, chapter 30, or chapter 31, the Director may take into account whether, and reject the petition or request because, the same or substantially the same prior art or arguments previously were presented to the Office.” The Board uses the following two-part framework in determining whether to exercise discretion under § 325(d) to deny institution: (1) whether the same or substantially the same art previously was presented to the Office or whether the same or substantially the same arguments previously were presented to the Office; and (2) if either condition of the first part of the framework is satisfied, whether the petitioner has demonstrated that the Office erred in a manner material to the patentability of challenged claims. Advanced Bionics, LLC v. MED-EL Elektromedizinische Geräte GmbH, IPR2019-01469, Paper 6 at 8 (PTAB Feb. 13, 2020) (precedential) (footnote omitted).” slip op. at 16
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“VII. LEVEL OF ORDINARY SKILL IN THE ART Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had “a bachelor’s degree in computer science, computer engineering, or an equivalent, and four years of professional experience” and that “[l]ack of work experience can be remedied by additional education, and vice versa.” Pet. 16 (citing Ex. 1004, Decl. of Dr. Vijay Madisetti (“Madisetti Decl.”) ¶¶ 34–36). Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s description of a person of ordinary skill. The level of ordinary skill in the art usually is evidenced by the references themselves. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001); In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995); In re Oelrich, 579 F.2d 86, 91 (CCPA 1978). Petitioner’s description of a person of ordinary skill is commensurate with the subject matter of the ’906 patent and we apply it for purposes of this Decision.” slip op. at 10
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,749,906 - PTAB · Feb 16, 2022 · IPR2021-01150 · APJ Bryan F Moore · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–18 under § 103 over Paxton, Sutton, and Ivershen, finding a reasonable likelihood of success on at least claim 1.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Decided for petitioner
“We concur with Petitioner’s assertions regarding the status of the underlying, related litigation. With respect to Fintiv factor (1), we determine this factor to be neutral. Although the parties stipulated to a trial date, the district court has yet to enter that schedule or hold a scheduling conference. The district court has continued the scheduling conference until after it decides the pending motion to stay. See Ex. 1031, Ex. 1032, 4:11–22. On this record, we are not persuaded that the district court will adhere to the previously agreed upon August 2022 trial date. Even with the arguments and evidence presented, we determine it to be speculative as to whether a stay may be granted if a proceeding is instituted. We reach the same conclusion with respect to Fintiv factor (2), given the speculative nature of the “trial date.” With respect to Fintiv factor (3), we determine that this weighs against discretionary denial; although some discovery has occurred, the parties have not invested significant resources in the district court proceeding.” slip op. at 12
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsDecided for petitioner
“Given the facts above, because Ivershen was submitted and discussed during the prosecution of the ’903 patent and in IPR2018-01654 and IPR2018-01655, Ivershen qualifies as art that was “previously presented” to the Office. Thus, we find that Ivershen, the same prior art asserted in the Petition, previously was presented to the Office. Nevertheless, Petitioner asserts that the other prior art references in” slip op. at 19
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedOther
“Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Noting that relevant experience and education can substitute for each other, Petitioner states that a person of ordinary skill in the relevant art, at the time the ’903 patent was filed, had a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or a related field, and approximately 2–3 years of experience in the design or development of telecommunication systems, or the equivalent. Additional graduate education could substitute for professional experience, or significant experience in the field could substitute for formal education. Pet. 13 (citing Ex. 1003 [Declaration of Dr. Robert Akl] ¶¶ 18–20). Petitioner’s definition of a person of ordinary skill, which Patent Owner does not dispute at this stage, appears appropriate for the technology addressed by this proceeding.” slip op. at 21
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Petitioner asserts “no terms require construction.” Pet. 13. Patent Owner asserts “no express construction of any term is required to resolve any controversy in this proceeding.” Prelim. Resp. 12. After review of the current record, we conclude that no express claim construction is necessary to determine whether to institute review of the challenged claims. See, e.g., Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng'g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)) (“[W]e need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”).” slip op. at 22
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,530,903 - PTAB · Jan 26, 2022 · IPR2021-01152 · APJ Kevin F Turner · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–20 based on three § 103 grounds: Jungck and Bhatia; Jungck, Bhatia, and RFC2003; and Jungck, Bhatia, and Turner.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Denied
“has yet to enter a case schedule. Even with the arguments and evidence presented, we determine it to be speculative as to whether a stay may be granted if a proceeding is instituted. We reach the same conclusion with respect to Fintiv factor (2), given the speculative nature of the “trial date.” With respect to Fintiv factor (3), we determine that this weighs against discretionary denial; although some discovery has occurred, the parties have not invested significant resources in the district court proceeding. With respect to Fintiv factor (4), the existence of Petitioner’s stipulation regarding the full scope of estoppel is sufficient to suggest that overlap between the proceedings will be minimized. See Sotera Wireless, Inc. v. Masimo Corp., IPR2020-01019, paper 12 (PTAB Dec. 1, 2020) 18 (precedential) (“Petitioner’s stipulation here mitigates any concerns of duplicative efforts between the district court and the Board, as well as concerns of potentially conflicting decisions. See Sand Revolution 12. Importantly, Petitioner broadly stipulates to not pursue ‘any ground raised or that could have been reasonably raised.’ Reply 6. As noted in Sand Revolution, such a broad stipulation better addresses concerns of duplicative efforts and potentially conflicting decisions in a much more substantial way. Sand Revolution 12 n.5. Accordingly, Petitioner’s broad stipulation ensures that an inter partes review is a ‘true alternative’ to the district court proceeding. Thus, we find that this factor weighs strongly in favor of not exercising discretion to deny institution under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a).”) (underlining added). Although Patent Owner asserts that there are deficiencies in Petitioner’s stipulation, those can be addressed through additional stipulations. We determine that Fintiv factor (4) weighs against discretionary denial.” slip op. at 10
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsDenied
“2. Discretion Under § 325(d) With respect to 35 U.S.C. § 325(d), Petitioner asserts that “[n]one of the art relied upon herein was cited, discussed, or applied in the ’246’s prosecution,” and that the art cited therein is not “the same or substantially the same.” Pet. 7. Patent Owner does not argue that we should deny the Petition under this statutory basis. See Prelim. Resp. As such, we decline to exercise our discretion to deny institution of review under 35 U.S.C. § 325(d).” slip op. at 11
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“III. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in showing that at least one claim of the ’246 Patent is unpatentable. IV. ORDER Accordingly, it is: ORDERED that, pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), an inter partes review is hereby instituted as to claims 1–20 of the ’246 Patent on the following asserted grounds:” slip op. at 34
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“At this stage of the proceeding, we find Petitioner’s proposal consistent with the level of ordinary skill in the art reflected by the prior art of record, see Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001); In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995); In re Oelrich, 579 F.2d 86, 91 (CCPA 1978), and, therefore, we adopt Petitioner’s unopposed position as to the level of ordinary skill in the art for purposes of this decision.” slip op. at 12
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,091,246 - Google LLC v. Ikorongo Technology LLC And Ikorongo Texas LLCRehearing grantedPTAB · Jan 25, 2022 · IPR2021-00205 · APJ Bryan F Moore · IPR · Rehearing
The Board granted Google's rehearing request and instituted IPR on claims 5–7, 9–12, 21–23, 25–28, 37, and 39–42 on all petitioned grounds.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, grantedGranted
“Circuit directed the WDTX to transfer the district court cases to the NDCA [Northern District of California] (Ex-1023 at 16) . . . the cases against LGE and Samsung will be given a new case schedule in the NDCA, delaying not only the trial date but the overall investment in the case by both the parties and the court.” Request 5. We agree. In fact, the cases in NDCA are currently stayed pending an appeal of the Federal Circuit’s Decision. Ex. 3003. In weighing the Fintiv factors, we relied on the involvement of the ’554 patent in the WDTX cases as the basis for our weighing four of six factors and for our holistic assessment of the factors in favor of our exercising our discretion to deny institution. DDI 7–13. However, the WDTX cases no longer provide any basis for exercising our discretion to deny institution.” slip op. at 8
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Decided for petitioner
“3 In assessing whether to exercise such discretion, the Board weighs the following factors: 1. whether the court granted a stay or evidence exists that one may be granted if a proceeding is instituted; 2. proximity of the court’s trial date to the Board’s projected statutory deadline for a final written decision; 3. investment in the parallel proceeding by the court and the parties; 4. overlap between issues raised in the petition and in the parallel proceeding; 5. whether the petitioner and the defendant in the parallel proceeding are the same party; and 6. other circumstances that impact the Board’s exercise of discretion, including the merits. Fintiv, Paper 11 at 6–7. Circuit directed the WDTX to transfer the district court cases to the NDCA [Northern District of California] (Ex-1023 at 16) . . . the cases against LGE and Samsung will be given a new case schedule in the NDCA, delaying not only the trial date but the overall investment in the case by both the parties and the court.” Request 5. We agree. In fact, the cases in NDCA are currently stayed pending an appeal of the Federal Circuit’s Decision. Ex. 3003. In weighing the Fintiv factors, we relied on the involvement of the ’554 patent in the WDTX cases as the basis for our weighing four of six factors and for our holistic assessment of the factors in favor of our exercising our discretion to deny institution. DDI 7–13. However, the WDTX cases no longer provide any basis for exercising our discretion to deny institution.” slip op. at 7
- Parallel petitionsDecided for petitioner
“should exercise its discretion under § 314(a) to deny at least one of Petitioner’s two overlapping petitions. Petitioner concurrently filed two petitions against the ’554 patent: IPR2021-00204 (Petition 1) and IPR2021- 00205 (Petition 2).” Prelim. Resp. 18. Petitioner contends “Petition 2 challenges only claims with an admitted later priority date . . . [and n]one of the claims challenged in Petition 2 are addressed in Petition 1. The two” slip op. at 9
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“E. Obviousness Analysis We determine that Petitioner has shown a reasonable likelihood of establishing the obviousness of the limitations of claim 1 and of claim 5 (which includes the limitations of claim 1) and, on that basis, institute inter partes review of all the Challenged Claims. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a) (“When instituting inter partes review, the Board will authorize the review to proceed on all of the challenged claims.”). Although dependent claim 5 is the first Challenged Claim in the Petition, we begin our analysis thereof by analyzing its underlying base claim, namely, independent claim 1.” slip op. at 17
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,874,554 - Google LLC v. Ikorongo Technology LLC And Ikorongo Texas LLCRehearing grantedPTAB · Jan 25, 2022 · IPR2021-00204 · APJ Bryan F Moore · IPR · Rehearing
The Board granted rehearing and instituted IPR on claims 1–4, 8, 17–20, 24, 33–36, and 38 on all petition grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood of obviousness.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, grantedGranted
“as our basis for exercising our discretion to deny institution are no longer in the Western District of Texas. Ex. 1023, 16; Ex. 3003. In the Request for Rehearing, Petitioner argues that (at that time), “[b]ecause the Federal Circuit directed the WDTX to transfer the district court cases to the NDCA [Northern District of California] (Ex-1023 at 16) . . . the cases against LGE and Samsung will be given a new case schedule in the NDCA, delaying not 3 In assessing whether to exercise such discretion, the Board weighs the following factors: 1. whether the court granted a stay or evidence exists that one may be granted if a proceeding is instituted; 2. proximity of the court’s trial date to the Board’s projected statutory deadline for a final written decision; 3. investment in the parallel proceeding by the court and the parties; 4. overlap between issues raised in the petition and in the parallel proceeding; 5. whether the petitioner and the defendant in the parallel proceeding are the same party; and 6. other circumstances that impact the Board’s exercise of discretion, including the merits. Fintiv, Paper 11 at 6. only the trial date but the overall investment in the case by both the parties and the court.” Request 5. We agree. In fact, the cases in NDCA are currently stayed pending an appeal of the Federal Circuit’s Decision. Ex. 3003. In weighing the Fintiv factors, we relied on the involvement of the ’554 patent in the WDTX cases as the basis for our weighing four of six factors and for our holistic assessment of the factors in favor of our exercising our discretion to deny institution. DDI 7–13. However, the WDTX cases no longer provide any basis for exercising our discretion to deny institution.” slip op. at 7
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Decided for petitioner
“3 In assessing whether to exercise such discretion, the Board weighs the following factors: 1. whether the court granted a stay or evidence exists that one may be granted if a proceeding is instituted; 2. proximity of the court’s trial date to the Board’s projected statutory deadline for a final written decision; 3. investment in the parallel proceeding by the court and the parties; 4. overlap between issues raised in the petition and in the parallel proceeding; 5. whether the petitioner and the defendant in the parallel proceeding are the same party; and 6. other circumstances that impact the Board’s exercise of discretion, including the merits. Fintiv, Paper 11 at 6. only the trial date but the overall investment in the case by both the parties and the court.” Request 5. We agree. In fact, the cases in NDCA are currently stayed pending an appeal of the Federal Circuit’s Decision. Ex. 3003. In weighing the Fintiv factors, we relied on the involvement of the ’554 patent in the WDTX cases as the basis for our weighing four of six factors and for our holistic assessment of the factors in favor of our exercising our discretion to deny institution. DDI 7–13. However, the WDTX cases no longer provide any basis for exercising our discretion to deny institution.” slip op. at 7
- Parallel petitionsDecided for petitioner
“B. Multiple Petitions In its Preliminary Response, Patent Owner also argues “[t]he Board should exercise its discretion under § 314(a) to deny at least one of Petitioner’s two overlapping petitions. Petitioner concurrently filed two petitions against the ’554 patent: IPR2021-00204 (Petition 1) and IPR2021- 00205 (Petition 2).” Prelim. Resp. 17. Petitioner contends “Petition 2 challenges only claims with an admitted later priority date . . . [and n]one of the claims challenged in Petition 2 are addressed in Petition 1. The two petitions therefore differ materially both in substance and in the defenses Patent Owner may potentially raise, and were needed to comply with the word limits.” Paper 3, 3. Patent Owner argues this reason is moot because Patent Owner “has opted to not raise a priority dispute at the pre-institution stage.” Prelim Resp. 18–20. We determine that Patent Owner may raise a priority challenge post-institution so Petitioner’s reason for two petitions is still valid. Thus, we determine that denial of one of the two petitions is not appropriate in this case.” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“We are also guided by the principle that we need only construe claim terms if, and to the extent that, it is necessary for the purpose of the proceeding. See, e.g., Wellman, Inc. v. Eastman Chem. Co., 642 F.3d 1355, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“[C]laim terms need only be construed ‘to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). The Petition states, “[n]o claim terms need to be construed by the Board at this time.” Pet. 6. Patent Owner “does not propose any claim constructions.” Prelim. Resp. 21. Petitioner does present an implied construction of “location information” which we discuss below, in Section III.E.1.d., in association with Petitioner’s contentions regarding that claim term. Nevertheless, in this Decision, we give the claim terms their ordinary and customary meanings.” slip op. at 12
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,874,554 - Apple Inc. v. Corephotonics, Ltd.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Dec 7, 2021 · IPR2020-00862 · APJ Bryan F Moore · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1, 2, 5, 9–14, 17, 21, and 22 are unpatentable under §103 over the Golan-based combinations; the Board found the combinations taught the limitations and secondary considerations lacked nexus.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedOther
“Here, as explained below in Section III.E.2., under either articulation of the level of skill in the art Petitioner has shown the claims would have been obvious. Therefore, we do not need to determine whether knowledge of photography is required for the level of skill in this case. Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (Where a determination of level of skill would not change the result “we find no harm under the circumstances of this case in the Board’s failure to set forth express findings as to the level of skill.”). For the reasons above, we determine, on the full record before us, that the level of ordinary skill in the art proposed by Petitioner is consistent with the ’332 patent and the asserted prior art. We adopt that level for the purpose of this Decision.” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction needed
“Petitioner asserts “for the purposes of this proceeding and the analysis presented herein, no claim term requires express construction [and that it] analyzes the claims consistent with ordinary and customary meaning as would be understood by a POSITA in light of the specification.” Pet. 8. Patent Owner does not request construction of any claim term. See generally PO Resp. 12 12 Patent Owner proposed a construction for the limitation “no-switching criterion,” as recited in each of the challenged claims in its Preliminary Response. Prelim. Resp. 7–8. Patent Owner asserted “no-switching criterion” should be construed as “one more criteria determined based on inputs obtained from the two camera images.” Id. at 7. In the Institution Decision, we did not limit “no-switching criterion” to “one more criteria determined based on inputs obtained from the two camera images.” Patent Owner did not address claim construction in its Patent Owner Response. See generally PO Resp. Our Scheduling Order states that “Patent Owner is cautioned that any arguments not raised in the response may be deemed waived.” Paper 8, 8. Thus, Patent Owner’s proposed construction for the limitation “no-switching criterion” is waived and we do not explicitly We do not discern a dispute between the parties regarding any limitation and we need not expressly construe any limitation to resolve the controversy before us. See, e.g., Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“[W]e need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 10
- BurdenUnpatentable
“We have reviewed Petitioner’s arguments, the supporting testimony provided by Dr. Durand, the cited portions of Golan, Martin, and Togo and the other cited evidence and we are persuaded that the proposed combination teaches the limitations recited in independent claim 1 as set forth above. Petitioner’s rationales for combining Golan and Martin and Golan, Martin, and Togo are set forth earlier in this Section, and is determined to be supported by sufficient rational underpinning for at least the reasons set forth above. Patent Owner’s contentions regarding secondary considerations of non-obviousness are set forth above and, as discussed, do not weigh in favor of non-obviousness because Patent Owner has not established a nexus between the claimed invention and the cited evidence. For the foregoing reasons, we conclude Petitioner establishes unpatentability of independent claim 1 over Golan and Martin by a preponderance of the evidence. Accordingly, we are persuaded that Petitioner demonstrates the unpatentability of claim 1 over the combination of Golan, Martin, and Togo by a preponderance of the evidence.” slip op. at 55
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner
“We do not agree with Patent Owner’s arguments, which are premised on a “physical” or “bodily” incorporation of limitations of one reference into the other. This is not the standard. See In re Sneed, 710 F.2d 1544, 1550 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (“[I]t is not necessary that the inventions of the references be physically combinable to render obvious the invention under review.”). The relevant inquiry is whether the claimed subject matter would have been obvious to those of ordinary skill in the art in light of the combined teachings of those references. See In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 425 (CCPA 1981). “Combining the teachings of references does not involve an ability to combine their specific structures.” In re Nievelt, 482 F.2d 965, 968 (CCPA 1973). Rather than express obviousness as the physical incorporation of a structure from one reference into the structure of another reference, the prior art should be viewed as a combination of teachings from different sources, and the use of those teachings by one of ordinary skill in the art. See KSR Int’l Co., 550 U.S. at 418(the conclusion of obviousness can be based on the interrelated teachings of multiple patents, the effects of demands known to the design community or present in the marketplace, and the background knowledge possessed by a person having ordinary skill in the art). Petitioner contends “Togo’s image-quality-based no-switching criterion teachings apply to the combination regardless of whether a distance between cameras is close or whether optical axes are parallel.” Pet. Reply 10 (citing Ex. 1040 ¶ 52). Petitioner seeks only “to incorporate Togo’s teachings of a no-switching criterion based on a specific ‘setting magnification X’ and ‘photography distance Y’ of an object to be imaged.” Pet. 32 (citing Ex. 1005 ¶ 15; Ex. 1010 ¶¶ 2, 37, 49; Ex. 1003 ¶ 68). Thus, Patent Owner’s argument does not undermine Petitioners showing For the foregoing reasons, we are persuaded that Petitioner’s rationale for combining Golan, Martin, and Togo is supported by sufficient rational underpinning. See KSR, 550 U.S. at 418. We are further persuaded that the cited evidence sufficiently supports Dr. Durand’s testimony.” slip op. at 43
Patent outcomesUS 10,356,332 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,356,332 - Apple Inc. v. Corephotonics, Ltd.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Dec 7, 2021 · IPR2020-00861 · APJ Bryan F Moore · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1, 4, 8–12, 15, 19, and 20 are unpatentable as obvious over the Golan, Martin, and Togo combinations, with Levey, Border, or Parulski added for certain dependent claims.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelOther
“Here, as explained below in Section III.E.2., under either articulation of the level of skill in the art Petitioner has shown the claims would have been obvious. Therefore, we do not need to determine whether knowledge of photography is required for the level of skill in this case. Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (Where a determination of level of skill would not change the result, “we find no harm under the circumstances of this case in the Board’s failure to set forth express findings as to the level of skill.”). For the reasons above, we determine, on the full record before us, that the level of ordinary skill in the art proposed by Petitioner is consistent with the ’898 patent and the asserted prior art. We adopt that level for the purpose of this Decision.” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner asserts “for the purposes of this proceeding and the analysis presented herein, no claim term requires express construction [and that it] analyzes the claims consistent with ordinary and customary meaning as would be understood by a POSITA in light of the specification.” Pet. 8. Patent Owner does not request construction of any claim term. See generally PO Resp.12 12 Patent Owner proposed a construction for the limitation “no-switching criterion,” as recited in each of the challenged claims, in its Preliminary Response. Prelim. Resp. 7–9. Patent Owner asserted “no-switching criterion” should be construed as “one more criteria determined based on inputs obtained from the two camera images.” Id. at 7. In the Institution Decision, we did not limit “no-switching criterion” to “one more criteria determined based on inputs obtained from the two camera images.” Patent Owner did not address claim construction in its Patent Owner Response. See generally PO Resp. Our Scheduling Order states that “Patent Owner is cautioned that any arguments not raised in the response may be deemed waived.” Paper 8, 8. Thus, Patent Owner’s proposed construction for the limitation “no-switching criterion” is waived, and we do not We do not discern a dispute between the parties regarding any limitation and we need not expressly construe any limitation to resolve the controversy before us. See, e.g., Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“[W]e need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 9
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner
“from parallax, which Martin depends on. Id. at 40 (citing Ex. 2001 ¶ 84; Ex. 1001, 7:50–53). “A reference may be said to teach away when a person of ordinary skill, upon reading the reference, would be discouraged from following the path set out in the reference, or would be led in a direction divergent from the path that was taken by the applicant.” Ricoh Co., Ltd. v. Quanta Computer Inc., 550 F.3d 1325, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (quoting In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 990 (Fed. Cir. 2006)). We are not persuaded that the invention claimed in the ’898 patent or Golan teaches away from Martin because they do not discourage or lead one in a direction divergent from Martin’s teachings relevant to “evaluat[ing] if a no-switching criterion is fulfilled or not fulfilled . . .” as recited in claim 1. In addition to providing an autostereoscopic display of 3D images using parallax images, Martin also discloses aligning these same parallax images using transformation parameters. See Ex. 1006, 5:38–42. Thus, Martin’s teaching of critical alignment does not appear to be divergent from or incompatible with the scope of independent claim 1 or the objectives of the ’898 patent. Nor is Martin incompatible with Golan for having a different objective. Petitioner need not show that Martin shares a common objective with Golan or the patent at issue. Intelligent Bio-Systems, 821 F.3d at 1367. Thus, Patent Owner’s teaching away argument does not undermine Petitioner’s contentions.” slip op. at 34
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of success › Teaching awayTeaching away not foundDecided for petitioner
“from parallax, which Martin depends on. Id. at 40 (citing Ex. 2001 ¶ 84; Ex. 1001, 7:50–53). “A reference may be said to teach away when a person of ordinary skill, upon reading the reference, would be discouraged from following the path set out in the reference, or would be led in a direction divergent from the path that was taken by the applicant.” Ricoh Co., Ltd. v. Quanta Computer Inc., 550 F.3d 1325, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (quoting In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 990 (Fed. Cir. 2006)). We are not persuaded that the invention claimed in the ’898 patent or Golan teaches away from Martin because they do not discourage or lead one in a direction divergent from Martin’s teachings relevant to “evaluat[ing] if a no-switching criterion is fulfilled or not fulfilled . . .” as recited in claim 1. In addition to providing an autostereoscopic display of 3D images using parallax images, Martin also discloses aligning these same parallax images using transformation parameters. See Ex. 1006, 5:38–42. Thus, Martin’s teaching of critical alignment does not appear to be divergent from or incompatible with the scope of independent claim 1 or the objectives of the ’898 patent. Nor is Martin incompatible with Golan for having a different objective. Petitioner need not show that Martin shares a common objective with Golan or the patent at issue. Intelligent Bio-Systems, 821 F.3d at 1367. Thus, Patent Owner’s teaching away argument does not undermine Petitioner’s contentions.” slip op. at 34
Patent outcomesUS 10,230,898 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,230,898 - Bright Data Ltd. v. Metacluster LT, UabInstitution deniedPTAB · Dec 1, 2021 · IPR2021-00983 · APJ Debra K Stephens · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because the petition did not show a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on any challenged claim under the asserted anticipation or obviousness grounds.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“(a) THRESHOLD.—The Director may not authorize an inter partes review to be instituted unless the Director determines that the information presented in the petition filed under section 311 and any response filed under section 313 shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level board ownOther
“Patent Owner does not contest Petitioner’s assertion (see generally Prelim. Resp.). The prior art itself demonstrates the level of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention (see Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (explaining that specific findings regarding ordinary skill level are not required “where the prior art itself reflects an appropriate level and a need for testimony is not shown”) (quoting Litton Indus. Prods., Inc. v. Solid State Sys. Corp., 755 F.2d 158, 163 (Fed. Cir. 1985))). in light of Petitioner’s definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art, we determine an ordinarily skilled artisan is: an individual who had (1) a bachelor’s degree or equivalent in the field of Electrical Engineering, Computer Engineering, or Computer Science, or in an equivalent field that includes network engineering as a topic of study (hereinafter, “technical study”), plus at least one year of industry technical experience in the computer network field, such as serving as an engineer for an Internet service provider performing network design, development, or configuration tasks, or as a software developer for network communications software or related utility software, or (2) three years of full-time technical experience in the field of electrical engineering, computer engineering, or computer science or in an equivalent field that includes network engineering or network communications software (hereinafter, “technical fields”), or (3) an equivalent combination of academic study in technical study and work experience in the technical fields.” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Lexicography (patentee as own lexicographer)Term construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner
“Proxy Rotator’ as ‘a system coupled of separate components implementing a specific method and responsible for collecting statistical data, proxy control, rotation, maintenance, and reporting’” (Prelim. Resp. 15 (citing Ex. 1001, 5:4–7)). of separate components implementing a specific method and responsible for collecting statistical data, proxy control, rotation, maintenance, and reporting” (id. at 5:4–7). In accordance with the Specification’s “general terminology description,” we construe the term “Smart Proxy Rotator” as a system coupled of separate components implementing a specific method and responsible for collecting statistical data, proxy control, rotation, maintenance, and reporting.” slip op. at 11
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for patent owner
“construed as “‘the portion of all proxy requests received by the SPR during a time period that the SPR will refer to a particular proxy provider,’ which may be equal to the weight assigned to that particular proxy provider divided by the sum of weights assigned to all proxy providers during the same time period” (Prelim. Resp. 20 (citing Ex. 2003 ¶ 56)). Patent Owner’s definition requiring a “utilization threshold” to be a “portion of all proxy requests received by the SPR during a time period that the SPR will refer to a particular proxy provider” is too narrow. The ’948 Patent does not expressly define the term “utilization threshold,” and, instead, describes utilization thresholds using an example (id. at 8:1–8). The ’948 Patent states [o]ne of the usage examples can be the following: if one provider has a weight equal to 10, and the other provider has a weight equal to 20, the proxy rotator should use the second provider 66.6% of the time and the first provider 33.3% of the time, when no changes to the default providers’ weights have been introduced. These percentages are the utilization thresholds of each provider. threshold is a goal amount of use, not an actual amount of use. A utilization threshold may represent a desired maximum percentage (i.e., proportion), of proxy requests to be referred to a particular proxy provider. Based on the Specification’s use of a “utilization threshold,” we construe the term to mean “a maximum percentage of use assigned to a particular proxy provider that is equal to a weight for the particular proxy provider divided by the sum of respective weights assigned to all proxy providers during the same time period.”” slip op. at 14
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,601,948
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.