- Tesla, Inc. v. Autonomous Devices, LLCSome claims unpatentablePTAB · Jan 3, 2025 · IPR2023-01172 · APJ Robert J Weinschenk · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–9, 11–14, 16–24, 26, 28, 29, and 31–34 are unpatentable as anticipated by Grotmol; claim 15 was not shown unpatentable because Grotmol does not disclose its required sequence.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner argues that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had “(1) a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, systems engineering, or equivalent course work with two to three years of work experience in computer vision, image/video processing, and/or machine learning; or (2) a master’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, systems engineering, or equivalent course work with a focus in computer vision, image/video processing, and/or machine learning.” Pet. 3–4 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 41). Petitioner’s description of the level of ordinary skill in the art is supported by the testimony of Petitioner’s declarant, Dr. Jason Janet. Ex. 1003 ¶ 41. Patent Owner “adopts” Petitioner’s description of the level of ordinary skill in the art. PO Resp. 4–5. We also adopt Petitioner’s description for the purposes of this Decision.” slip op. at 5
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached
“The parties appear to agree that the term “connection” refers to a relationship, but dispute whether it includes a link. PO Resp. 7; Pet. Reply 23. We need not resolve this claim construction issue in order to resolve the parties’ disputes about the asserted ground of unpatentability. Specifically, as discussed below, even if we assume for the purposes of this Decision that the term “connection” means a “relationship that includes a link,” the asserted prior art still discloses the disputed claim limitation. See Section II.D.23.” slip op. at 6
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner
“We agree with Patent Owner that claim 15 requires modifying the first instruction set before determining the modified first instruction set based on an at least partial match between the new digital picture and the first digital picture. Claim 15 recites “modifying: the first one or more instruction sets” and “determining the modified the first one or more instruction sets . . . based on the at least partial match between the new one or more digital pictures and the first one or more digital pictures.” Ex. 1001, 162:65–163:15 (emphasis added). The phrase “the modified . . . instruction sets” in the determining limitation indicates an order because it refers back to the instruction sets modified in the modifying limitation. Id. Further, the phrase “based on the at least partial match” indicates that a partial match between the new picture and the first picture returns the modified first instruction set. Id. In order for a partial match to return the modified first instruction set, it is logical that the first instruction set previously was modified and correlated to the first picture. Id. Thus, claim 15 indicates that the modifying limitation is performed before the determining limitation. See Altiris, Inc. v. Symantec Corp., 318 F.3d 1363, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“First, we look to the claim language to determine if, as a matter of logic or grammar, [the recited steps] must be performed in the order written.”).” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Functional claiming / §112(f) means-plus-function › Whether §112(f) applies (Williamson, nonce words)§112(f) appliesDecided for petitioner
“3. Means-plus-function limitations Petitioner contends that the corresponding structure for the “means for receiving or generating a first one or more digital pictures,” the “means for receiving or generating a first one or more instruction sets for operating the first device,” and the “means for learning the first one or more digital pictures correlated with the first one or more instruction sets for operating the first device” in claim 34 is “one or more processor circuits.” Pet. 4 (citing Ex. 1001, 16:8–60). Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s proposed construction. PO Resp. 11. We adopt Petitioner’s proposed construction for purposes of this Decision. D. Anticipation of Claims 1–9, 11–24, 26, 28, 29, and 31–34 by Grotmol Petitioner argues that claims 1–9, 11–24, 26, 28, 29, and 31–34 are” slip op. at 10
Patent outcomesUS 11,055,583 mixedClaim construction§ 102 anticipationPatents in suitUS 11,055,583 - Tesla, Inc. v. Autonomous Devices, LLCSome claims unpatentablePTAB · Dec 12, 2024 · IPR2023-01054 · APJ Russell E Cass · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 4 and 11 are unpatentable over Grotmol and Hickman; claims 5 and 7 are not shown unpatentable. Substitute claims 21 and 24–26 are unpatentable; claims 22 and 23 are not reached.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art, 3 Patent Owner does not present objective evidence of nonobviousness in this proceeding. would have [had] at least: (1) a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, systems engineering, or equivalent course work with two to three years of work experience in computer vision, image/video processing, and/or machine learning; or (2) a master’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, systems engineering, or equivalent course work with a focus in computer vision, image/video processing, and/or machine learning. Pet. 4 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 40–42). Patent Owner adopts Petitioner’s definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art. PO Resp. 6. Considering the subject matter of the ’974 patent, the background technical field, and the asserted prior art, we agree with Petitioner’s proposed qualifications for the person of ordinary skill in the art, except we decline to adopt “at least,” as that language is vague and open-ended. Otherwise, Petitioner’s proposed definition is consistent with the level of skill reflected in the specification of the ’974 patent and the asserted prior art references. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001). Accordingly, except as noted above, we adopt Petitioner’s assessment” slip op. at 11
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“1. “connection” Claim 7 recites, in pertinent part, that “a first connection is generated” slip op. at 14
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMixed
“c) Conclusion—Claim 7 After consideration of the contentions and the evidence of record, we” slip op. at 52
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Motions to amend / substitute claimsMotion to amend granted in partGranted in part
“7 We recognize that our conclusion here differs from the preliminary determination made in our Preliminary Guidance. After considering the full trial record, including Patent Owner’s MTA Reply, Petitioner’s MTA Sur-reply, Patent Owner’s Sur-sur-reply, and the arguments made at the oral hearing, we find that Petitioner has satisfied its burden of showing that this claim limitation would have been obvious over the Grotmol-Hickman combination. When issuing our Preliminary Guidance, we emphasized that the views expressed therein were “preliminary,” “subject to change upon consideration of the complete record,” and “not binding on the Board when reaching a final written decision.” See Prelim. Guid. 3.” slip op. at 99
Patent outcomesUS 10,452,974 mixedClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,452,974 - Qualcomm Incorporated v. Fedex Corporate Services, Inc.Some claims unpatentablePTAB · Oct 6, 2023 · IPR2022-00586 · APJ Christopher L Ogden · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–15 and 26–30 are unpatentable as obvious over Lau and Benson; claim 28 also relies on Harring. Qualcomm did not show claims 16–25 unpatentable.
RulingsFinal written decision- Exclude
“We do not rely on Exhibits 1010, 1014, 1026, or 1027 for any determinations or findings in this decision. See infra note 10 (noting the context in which Ex. 1014 has been cited). When we use the phrase “evidence of record” or other similar terms or phrases, we are referring to the evidence of record except that evidence that is the subject of FedEx’s Motion to Exclude, that is, Exhibits 1010, 1014, 1026, 1027, and 2049. Accordingly, Patent Owner’s Motion to Exclude as to Exhibits 1010, 1014, 1026, and 1027 is dismissed as moot.” slip op. at 7
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Dr. Almeroth essentially agrees with Qualcomm’s articulation of the level of ordinary skill as expressed above. See Ex. 2200 ¶¶ 45–46. Because Qualcomm’s uncontroverted articulation of the level of ordinary skill in the art is supported by testimonial evidence by both parties and appears consistent with the types of problems and solutions in the ’231 patent, we adopt it for this decision. See, e.g., Ex. 1001, 1:16–2:37 (“Field of the Disclosure” and “Background” sections of the ’231 patent, describing background knowledge about methods for tracking packages using wireless sensor devices). Qualcomm also contends that an ordinarily skilled artisan “would have been familiar with the field of technology described [on pages 7–13 of 6 Qualcomm argues that this is “at least” the level of ordinary skill in the art. Pet. 7. As we did in our instituting decision, we disregard this qualification to avoid vagueness. Dec. 19 n.6; Dr. Almeroth agrees. Ex. 2200 ¶ 46. the Petition].” Id. (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 41). The “Field of Technology” section of the Petition refers to background knowledge of RFID technology and hierarchical sensor networks. See Pet. 7–13. Because whether this subject matter is part of the background knowledge in the art is not determinative of our decision, we need not adopt this part of Qualcomm’s articulation of the level of ordinary skill.” slip op. at 8
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedPatent owner expert discountedMixed
“Although the ’231 patent does appear to describe these as two separate embodiments, the embodiments both include smartphone 200. See Ex. 1001, 110:13–14, 19–20, 23–26. We find persuasive Qualcomm’s argument that the only apparent difference between the two embodiments is that in the second one, smartphone 200 has an app that allows it to use hardware capable of directly communicating with the server. In other words, the distinction is a matter of programming: the smartphone 200 is both “unable” and “not operable to” communicate with a server when it is not presently configured that way through software. This is inconsistent with Dr. Almeroth’s opinion that a device would not be “unable to directly communicate with the server” if it “ha[s] the circuitry components necessary to communicate with a server but simply lack the programming to do so presently.” Ex. 2200 ¶ 54. Thus, we do not find his testimony credible on this point.” slip op. at 12
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITANo construction needed
“Although the ’231 patent does appear to describe these as two separate embodiments, the embodiments both include smartphone 200. See Ex. 1001, 110:13–14, 19–20, 23–26. We find persuasive Qualcomm’s argument that the only apparent difference between the two embodiments is that in the second one, smartphone 200 has an app that allows it to use hardware capable of directly communicating with the server. In other words, the distinction is a matter of programming: the smartphone 200 is both “unable” and “not operable to” communicate with a server when it is not presently configured that way through software. This is inconsistent with Dr. Almeroth’s opinion that a device would not be “unable to directly communicate with the server” if it “ha[s] the circuitry components necessary to communicate with a server but simply lack the programming to do so presently.” Ex. 2200 ¶ 54. Thus, we do not find his testimony credible on this point. Regarding FedEx’s term-differentiation argument, we agree with Qualcomm that, based on the above evidence in the ’231 patent disclosure, there does not appear to be any meaningful difference between “unable to” and “not operative to” as those terms appear in the claims. Thus, we disagree with FedEx’s proposed construction of “unable to directly communicate with the server.” Our prior-art analysis below will be informed by the discussion above, but we need not explicitly construe this term to resolve the issues raised in the Petition. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“[W]e need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy’ . . . .” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 12
Patent outcomesUS 9,182,231 mixedClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,182,231 - Apple Inc. v. Mullen Industries LLCInstitutedPTAB · May 9, 2023 · IPR2023-00091 · APJ James J Mayberry · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR of claims 1–20 on all grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood of success on the §103 challenge based on Sheha, Smith, and Carey.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“35 U.S.C. § 314 and 37 C.F.R. § 42.4. To institute an inter partes review, we must determine that the information presented in the Petition shows “a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least [one] of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2018). For the reasons set forth below, upon considering the Petition, Preliminary Response, and evidence of record, we institute an inter partes review.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“On the current record, we find Petitioner’s proposal is consistent with the level of skill reflected in the ’283 patent Specification and the prior art of record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001). We adopt Petitioner’s proposal for the purposes of this Decision.” slip op. at 13
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Petitioner asserts that “[n]one of the claim terms of the ’283 Patent need be construed by the Board.” Pet. 11. Patent Owner does not address claim construction at this stage of the proceeding. Based on the record before us, we do not need to construe explicitly any claim term to resolve the parties’ disputes at this stage of the proceeding. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms that . . . are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). To the extent that the scope of any particular claim term requires discussion, however, we provide the discussion in our assessment of the challenges.” slip op. at 14
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner
“have had reason to combine the teachings of Sheha with Smith and Carey to arrive at the subject matter of claim 1. As for Smith, Petitioner contends that a person having ordinary skill in the art “would have understood that the mobile devices in Sheha include wireless telephones that would have included conventional functionality such as contact lists and manual input devices such as buttons to interact with a contact list, such as those discussed in Smith.” Pet. 17 (referencing Ex. 1021 ¶ 202); see also id. at 26 (“It would have been obvious to include the standard feature of a contact list [from Smith] into the Sheha wireless devices to enable a user to easily retrieve and select a contact of interest from among multiple saved contacts.”). Petitioner adds that because these functions “were routine and conventional,” an artisan of ordinary skill would have had a reasonable expectation of success in incorporating the functionality into Sheha’s wireless device. Id. (referencing Ex. 1021 ¶ 202). With respect to Carey, Petitioner contends that a person having ordinary skill in the art “would have understood that the mobile devices in Sheha include wireless telephones that could provide users with added functionality, such as location services, that might require a user to enter authorization information to use such added functionality, as described in Sheha.” Pet. 18 (referencing Ex. 1021 ¶¶ 165–166); see also id. at 28 (“A [person having ordinary skill in the art] would have included [Carey’s] functionality to enable a user of Sheha’s system to input their username and password.”). Petitioner contends that a person having ordinary skill would have had a reasonable expectation of success incorporating Carey’s functionality, as Sheha describes an authentication process similar to Carey’s process. Id. Upon review of the information in the Petition and corresponding evidence with respect to motivation to combine, we determine Petitioner has made a sufficient showing, at this stage of the proceeding, that a person having ordinary skill in the art would have had reason to combine Smith’s and Carey’s teachings with Sheha as proposed by Petitioner. On the current record, we determine that Petitioner provides rational factual underpinnings to support its reasoning. Cf. KSR Int’l Co., 550 U.S. at 418 (stating that, to facilitate the analysis of an obviousness position, the proponent should” slip op. at 25
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,204,283 - Qualcomm Incorporated / Zyxel Communications Corporation v. Unm Rainforest InnovationsAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Jul 15, 2022 · IPR2021-00377 · APJ Kristen L Droesch · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1, 2, and 11–13 are unpatentable over Hui; the contingent motion to amend is denied because substitute claims 29, 30, and 39–41 are unpatentable over Hui.
RulingsFinal written decision- ExcludeMotion to exclude, deniedMotion to exclude, grantedMixed
“A motion to exclude evidence must be filed to preserve a prior objection to evidence and must identify the objections in the record. 37 C.F.R. § 42.64(c). An objection to evidence submitted prior to the institution of the trial, including evidence submitted with a petition to institute inter partes review, must be filed within ten business days of the institution of the trial. 37 C.F.R. § 42.64(b)(1). Once a trial is instituted, any objection must be filed within five business days of the service of evidence to which the objection is directed. Id. The objection must identify 9 Patent Owner quotes Paper 26 which was expunged and replaced with Paper 36. See Ex. 3001. 10 Paper 30 was expunged and replaced with Paper 37. the grounds for the objection with sufficient particularity to allow for correction in the form of supplemental evidence. Id. An objection to deposition evidence “must be made during the deposition.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.64(a).” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for petitioner
“We agree with Petitioner’s arguments. Petitioner is correct that the ’204 Patent does not redefine compression to exclude quantization, or otherwise disavow the scope of “compression.” We also agree that compression is a broad and basic term that encompasses any form of compression. We agree, however, with Patent Owner that compression and quantization should not be interpreted as having the exact same meaning. Patent Owner’s arguments, however, focusing on the purposes of quantization and compression are misplaced. In cases where quantization results in a reduced data size, quantization can be encompassed by the term compression. We find that, consistent with the ’204 Patent Specification, the scope of the term “compress[ing]” may include quantization, so long as the quantization results in using fewer bits than the original digital representation, i.e., a reduction in data size. For the foregoing reasons, we decline to adopt Patent Owner’s proposal that “‘compress[ing] the estimated CSI,’ should be construed as plain and ordinary meaning, which excludes ‘quantizing the estimated CSI’ without further separately applied compression.” See PO Resp. 20; PO Sur-reply 9. As demonstrated in the analysis below, we need not provide an explicit claim construction for “compress[ing] the estimated CSI.” The ordinary and customary meaning applies to “compress[ing] the estimated CSI.”” slip op. at 30
- Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner
“B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner asserts: As of 2008, a person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSA”) in the field of the ’204 patent would have had a Bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, or a related field, and around two years of experience in the design or development of wireless communication systems, or the equivalent plus knowledge of [multiple-input, multiple-output (“MIMO”)] and [orthogonal frequency-division multiplexing (“OFDM”)]. Pet. 19 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 19). Patent Owner offers a slightly different description as follows: At the relevant time, a person of ordinary skill in the art in the technical field of the ’204 patent would have had at least a Bachelor’s Degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, or a related field, and approximately one year of experience in the design or development of wireless communications systems or the equivalent, including knowledge of MIMO and OFDM. Id. (citing Ex. 2001 ¶ 31). We adopt Patent Owner’s definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art because it is consistent with the level of skill reflected by the ’204 Patent Specification and the asserted prior art, but our conclusions would be the same under Petitioner’s definition.” slip op. at 32
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedOther
“excluded under Federal Rules of Evidence 702 and 703. Rule “702 imposes a special obligation upon a trial judge to ‘ensure that any and all scientific testimony . . . is not only relevant, but reliable,’” which is a “basic gatekeeping obligation.” Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 147 (1999) (quoting Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993)). The policy considerations for excluding expert testimony, such as those implemented by Daubert’s gatekeeping framework, are less compelling in bench proceedings such as inter partes reviews than in jury trials because, unlike a lay jury, the Board has significant experience in evaluating expert testimony. Accordingly, the danger of prejudice in this proceeding would be considerably lower than in a lay jury trial and the wholesale exclusion of a witness’s declaration is rarely called for in a proceeding before the Board. Furthermore, Patent Owner’s arguments challenging the credibility of Dr. Roy go to the weight that should be given to Dr. Roy’s Declaration testimony, not the admissibility of the Declaration. In our patentability analysis that follows, we account for the evidence that Dr. Roy’s Declaration is substantially the same as Dr. Akl’s Declaration, the supporting evidence cited therein, as well as Dr. Roy’s deposition testimony in determining the appropriate weight to give Dr. Roy’s testimony when weighing the record evidence.” slip op. at 14
Patent outcomesUS 8,249,204 unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,249,204 - Apple Inc. v. Corephotonics, Ltd.Some claims unpatentablePTAB · Nov 2, 2021 · IPR2020-00878 · APJ Bryan F Moore · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1, 2, 4–6, 9–15, 17, 18, 20–23, and 25–29 are unpatentable; claims 3, 8, 16, 19, 24, and 30 were not shown unpatentable.
RulingsFinal written decision- BurdenMixed
“35 U.S.C. § 6. This Final Written Decision is issued pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 318(a) and 37 C.F.R. § 42.73. For the reasons discussed herein, we determine that Petitioner has shown, by a preponderance of the evidence, that claims 1, 2, 4–6, 9–15, 17, 18, 20–23, and 25–29 of the ’897 patent are unpatentable and that Petitioner has not shown, by a preponderance of the evidence, that claims 3, 8, 16, 19, 24, and 30 of the ’897 patent are unpatentable.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“would include someone who had, at the priority date of the ’897 Patent, (i) a Bachelor’s degree in Physics, Optical Sciences, or equivalent training, as well as (ii) approximately three years of experience in designing multi-lens optical systems. Such a person would have had experience in analyzing, tolerancing, adjusting, and optimizing multi-lens systems for manufacturing, and would have been familiar with the specifications of lens systems and their fabrication. In addition, a POSITA [person of ordinary skill in the art] would have known how to use lens design software such as Code V, Oslo, or Zemax, and would have taken a lens design course. Pet. 6–7 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 19–20). Patent Owner applied the same level of skill for the purposes of this IPR. PO Resp. 14–15 (citing Ex. 2001 ¶ 19). We regard Petitioner’s formulation of the level of skill as consistent with the prior art before us. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (prior art itself may reflect an appropriate level of skill). Therefore, for purposes of this Final Written Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s assessment of the level of skill in the art because it is consistent with the ’897 patent and the asserted prior art, and we apply it in our analysis below.” slip op. at 11
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for patent owner
“Patent Owner argues that no “dispute between the parties in this IPR depends on the construction of EFL, TTL, or of any other claim term [and] submits that the Board should refrain from construing any terms in the patent for the purposes of this proceeding.” PO Resp. 17. Petitioner does not respond to this argument. See generally Pet. Reply. We agree with Patent Owner. If we were to adopt either construction, it would not change the determination made in this Decision. Thus, we decline to construe any claim terms for purposes of this Final Written Decision. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)) (“[W]e need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”).” slip op. at 10
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 102 as anticipated by Ogino. Pet. 10–40. Patent Owner does not present arguments related to this ground. See generally PO Resp. For the reasons that follow, we are persuaded that the evidence supports Petitioner’s arguments and thus, Petitioner establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that claims 1, 4, 9–15, 17, 20, and 25–29 are unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 102 as anticipated by Ogino.” slip op. at 17
Patent outcomesUS 10,330,897 mixedClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,330,897 - Apple Inc. v. Corephotonics, Ltd.Some claims unpatentablePTAB · Nov 2, 2021 · IPR2020-00877 · APJ Monica S Ullagaddi · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1, 2, 5–7, 11–13, 15, 16, 18, 20, and 21 are unpatentable as obvious; claims 3 and 4 were not shown unpatentable because the May combination was insufficiently supported.
RulingsFinal written decision- BurdenMixed
“In an [inter partes review], the petitioner has the burden from the onset to show with particularity why the patent it challenges is unpatentable.” Harmonic Inc. v. Avid Tech., Inc., 815 F.3d 1356, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citing 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3) (requiring inter partes review petitions to identify “with particularity . . . the evidence that supports the grounds for the challenge to each claim”)). The burden of persuasion never shifts to Patent Owner. See Dynamic Drinkware, 800 F.3d at 1378 (citing Tech. Licensing Corp. Videotek, Inc., 545 F.3d 1316, 1326–27 (Fed. Cir. 2008)) (discussing the burden of proof in an inter partes review). Furthermore, Petitioner cannot satisfy its burden of proving obviousness by employing “mere conclusory statements.” Magnum, 829 F.3d at 1380. Thus, to prevail in an inter partes review, Petitioner must explain how the proposed combinations of prior art render the challenged claims unpatentable. slip op. at 8
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner contends [A] person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSITA”) would include someone who had, as of the priority date of the ’840 Patent (i) a Bachelor’s degree in Physics, Optical Sciences, or equivalent training, as well as (ii) approximately three years of experience in designing miniature lens systems for mobile device applications. . . . Such a person would have had experience in analyzing, tolerancing, adjusting, and optimizing multi-lens systems, and would have been familiar with the specifications of lens systems, especially lenses configured for use in mobile devices, such as cell phones. . . . In addition, a POSITA would have known how to use lens design software such as Code V, Oslo, or Zemax, and would have taken a lens design course. . . . Such a POSITA would have been familiar with photographic lenses and with mechanical and electronic devices. Lack of work experience can be remedied by additional education, and vice versa. Pet. 6–7 (citing Ex. 1003, 10). Patent Owner “applies the level of ordinary skill in the art set forth in the petition and used by the Board in its Institution Decision.” PO Resp. 3 (Inst. Dec. 8). We determine that the level of ordinary skill in the art proposed by Petitioner is consistent with the ’840 patent and the asserted prior art. We apply Petitioner’s definition in making the findings and conclusions rendered in this Decision.” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Independent claim 1 recites “the Telephoto lens unit and the Wide lens unit having, respectively, total track length (TTL)/effective focal length (EFL) ratios smaller and larger than 1 and defining separate Telephoto and Wide optical paths.” Ex. 1001, 19:48–52. Petitioner asserts that “a POSITA would find, in light of the specification, the term ‘total track length (TTL)’ to include ‘the length of the optical axis spacing between the object-side surface of the first lens element and the image plane.’” Pet. 8 (citing Ex. 1003, 20) (emphasis omitted). Petitioner further asserts that, although the Specification of the ’840 patent does not expressly define EFL, “its meaning is well known in the art, as exemplified in Li ([Ex.] 1007), which states that ‘[t]he focal length of a lens assembly [is] also referred to as the effective focal length[.]’” Pet. 8–9 (quoting Ex. 1007, 2:59–61) (alterations in the original). Patent Owner “does not believe that any terms require construction to resolve the disputes addressed in this response.” PO Resp. 3. We do not discern a dispute as to the claim terms TTL and EFL in this proceeding and as such, we need not expressly construe these terms. Nidec Motor Corp., 868 F.3d at 1017. .” slip op. at 10
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner
“(2) Discussion of Rationale for Combining We have reviewed the record developed at trial including the cited portions of Parulski, Huang, and Tang. We determine that Petitioner has supported its seven reasons for combining Parulski, Huang, and Tang with sufficient rational underpinning evidenced by the exhibits cited above. Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s rationale for combining. See generally PO Resp. We determine that Petitioner has shown that an ordinarily skilled artisan would have been motivated to combine Parulski, Huang, and Tang, and that such motivation is supported by sufficient rational underpinning. Based on the complete record developed at trial, we determine that cited portions of Parulski, Huang, and Tang sufficiently support Petitioner’s contentions with respect to the telephoto lens unit and the wide lens unit as claimed.” slip op. at 22
Patent outcomesUS 10,288,840 mixedClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,288,840 - Polycom, Inc. v. Directpacket Research, Inc.Some claims unpatentablePTAB · Jan 11, 2021 · IPR2019-01234 · APJ Sheila F Mcshane · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 2–5, 15–17, 23–26, 29, and 30 are unpatentable over the stated obviousness grounds; claims 8, 9, 19, 20, 27, and 28 were not shown unpatentable.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“In the Decision on Institution, we adopted Petitioner’s proposed skill level, that is, that one of ordinary skill in the art would have a Bachelor’s degree or equivalent in electrical engineering, computer engineering, or similar field, and at least two years of experience in a relevant field such as telecommunications or multimedia communications. Inst. Dec. 20. We also agreed with Petitioner that one of ordinary skill would have some familiarity with the design and implementation of VoIP and multimedia networks. Id. We did not agree, however, that the level of qualifications included monitoring and maintaining VoIP and multimedia networks, as Petitioner asserted, and therefore declined to adopt those requirements. Id. ordinary skill in the art adopted in the Decision on Institution to include “familiarity with the design and implementation of VoIP and multimedia networks,” but further described this requirement to include other requirements: an understanding of the techniques employed by network firewalls and the issues they present with respect to establishing and conducting multimedia communication sessions; an understanding of the performance demands placed on the network by multimedia communications, and the constraints that such demands place on processing and security measures that could be adopted; and a recognition of the distinctions between prior art firewall traversal solutions and the inventions of the ’978 Patent. PO Resp. 21–22. Patent Owner refers to GPAC, which identifies the factor of the “type of problems encountered in the art” as a consideration in determining the level of ordinary skill in the art. Id. at 22 (citing In re GPAC, 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995)). We have reviewed the relevant technology and claims of the ’978 patent, as well as the technology of the asserted prior art, and we adopt the same qualifications as those adopted in the Decision on Institution because they are commensurate with the relevant technology. These qualifications are similar to presented by Petitioner, with the” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Petitioner relies on the ordinary and customary meaning of the claim terms as understood by one of ordinary skill in the art. Pet. 20. Patent Owner indicates that its arguments are also based upon the ordinary and customary meaning of the terms as they would be understood by one of ordinary skill in the art. PO Resp. 22. We determine that it is not necessary to provide an express interpretation of any of the terms of the claims. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017); Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“[O]nly those terms need be construed that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.”).” slip op. at 11
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundMotivation not foundMixed
“As discussed above, we agree with Petitioner that Kirchhoff discloses the use of SSL, a protocol that uses data encryption (Ex. 1005, 8:47–49). We also agree with Petitioner that Krtolica discloses the use of HTTP protocols on port 80 (Ex. 1004, 6:23–24), and does so with a goal of maintaining high network security (id. at 1:7–10, 2:33–36). As Kirchhoff discloses, and Dr. Lavian’s testimony supports, one of ordinary skill in the art would have been aware that port 443, rather than port 80, would be used for secure web connections using SSL, which includes the use of encryption, and this would have resulted in enhanced network security. See Ex. 1005, 3:38–41; Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 52, 69, 108. As Dr. Lavian testifies, SSL/TLS was the most widely deployed security protocol in the world and the well-known use of SSL in HTTPS protocol enables secure web-based e-commerce. Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 69, 108; Ex. 1035 ¶ 8; Ex. 1006, 5. And, Krtolica has a stated goal to maintain network security. Ex. 1004, 1:7–10, 2:33–37. We find this evidence provides a sufficient rational underpinning in support of obviousness for combining the teachings of Krtolica and Kirchhoff. See KSR, 550 U.S. at 418. Owner’s arguments that use of encryption in SSL was optional and adding encryption would allegedly undermine network security. Nor do we find persuasive the argument that the Petitioner’s motivation to combine based on efficiency is insufficient, because Petitioner relies on another rationale for the combination of Krtolica and Kirchhoff, that is, enhanced network security, also discussed above. We additionally do not find persuasive Patent Owner’s arguments that combining Krtolica and Kirchhoff would render the system of Krtolica unsatisfactory for its intended purpose because, as Petitioner argues, this assertion is contradicted by the state of the art at the time. See Pet. Reply 9. As discussed above, Dr. Lavian explains that there were known systems having firewalls with SSL traversal at the time of the invention. Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 53, 59–65; Ex. 1035 ¶ 20; Ex. 1014. Moreover, the ’978 patent uses encryption with firewalls using a single-port protocol, and Patent Owner does not direct us to any disclosure in that patent that indicates that the use of encryption with a single-port protocol was inventive in that the system, or that encryption had to be done in a special manner. See Pet. Reply 3 (citing Ex. 1001, Fig. 3 (at 311, 341), Fig. 5 (503, 508)); see also Ex. 1001, 6:4–8. In a similar vein, Patent Owner argues that due to incompatibilities the combination of SSL with Krtolica would be unsuccessful, and we address this issue below.” slip op. at 30
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of success › Teaching awayTeaching away not foundDecided for petitioner
“Where the prior art contains “apparently conflicting” teachings (i.e., where some references teach the combination and others teach away from it) each reference must be considered “for its power to suggest solutions to an artisan of ordinary skill . . . consider[ing] the degree to which one reference might accurately discredit another.” In re Young, 927 F.2d 588, 591 (Fed. Cir. 1991). In Hosner, AES encryption appears to have one of the higher processing speeds of the algorithms tested. See Ex. 1006, 23. Further, the ’978 patent itself supports the acceptable performance of AES encryption in single-port protocol, stating that “[a]ny method or algorithm of encryption may be used” with its invention “including, but not limited to 128-bit find Patent Owner’s argument on the use of AES to be persuasive. We have reviewed Petitioner’s explanations and supporting evidence as to how the combination of Kirchhoff and Krtolica teach the limitations of claims 4, 16, and 24, and we agree with and adopt Petitioner’s analysis. Pet. 75–76, 81.” slip op. at 65
Patent outcomesUS 7,710,978 mixedClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 7,710,978 - Apple Inc. v. Corephotonics Ltd.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Apr 6, 2020 · IPR2019-00030 · APJ Monica S Ullagaddi · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–5 are unpatentable as obvious over Ogino and Beich; claims 1–4 are also unpatentable over Ogino alone, but claim 5 is not shown unpatentable on that ground.
RulingsFinal written decision- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“We construe claim terms to the extent necessary. See, e.g., Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“[W]e need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 7
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed board ownDecided for patent owner
“supported by the cited evidence. We are persuaded, instead, that “the image plane and the sensor are taught by the ’568 patent to be coincident,” and “[t]hus, there is no ambiguity in the ’568 patent about where the image plane is located or that TTL is measured to the image plane,” as Petitioner argues in its Reply. Reply 13 (Ex. 1026 ¶ 5; Ex. 1003, 33–35). Patent Owner acknowledges as much, noting that “as these terms[, i.e., the image plane and the sensor,] are used in the specification of the ’568 patent, the image plane is the surface of the sensor.” Sur-reply 2. We find that the ’568 patent discloses that the electronic sensor corresponds to or is coincident with the image plane and thus, the TTL could be measured with respect to either the sensor (electronic or film) or the image plane and reach the same result. Based upon the complete trial record, we maintain our construction of TTL from the ’1140IPR and the ’1146IPR3, which encompasses “the length of the optical axis spacing between the object-side surface of the first lens element and one of: an electronic sensor, film, and an image plane corresponding to either the 3 The panel authorized, and the parties filed, supplemental briefing to address this construction before it was adopted in both the related ’1140IPR and ’1146IPR, and that the parties responded to this construction in the hearing in this proceeding (with citations to the transcript). See, e.g., Paper 28 (PO’s demonstratives), 5; ’1140IPR, Paper 31; ’1146IPR, Paper 30; see also Trial Practice Guide Update 13–14 (July 2019), https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/trial-practice-guide-update3.pdf; Hamilton Beach Brands, Inc. v. f’real Foods, LLC, 908 F.3d 1328, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (finding that the Board did not violate the Administrative Procedure Act when it adopted its own claim construction in the final decision because the parties had notice and an opportunity to be heard). electronic sensor or a film sensor.” See ’1140IPR, Paper 37, 18; ’1146IPR, Paper 37, 14.” slip op. at 14
- Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner
“Even assuming, arguendo, we were to credit Patent Owner’s expert testimony as to the disjointed nature of optical lens assembly design experience and manufacturing experience, we are not persuaded that a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention having only design experience would be so completely unaware of manufacturing considerations so as to preclude taking into account the very general guidance of Beich. See Reply 24–25. Beich teaches that a lens designer should have a basic understanding of the manufacturing process, which would include the limits for fabricating lens elements in an optical lens assembly. Ex. 1020, 7. We are persuaded that the information conveyed in Beich would have been understood, known, and applied by the ordinarily skilled lens designer (see Reply 4–6 (citing Ex. 2014, 4, 9, 11, Fig. 9.2)), irrespective of whether such person had manufacturing experience. Stated differently, although an ordinarily skilled designer of an optical lens assembly may not have had any real-world manufacturing experience, we are persuaded that such person would still have taken into account manufacturing concerns. Although there are differences between the definitions proposed, our conclusions rendered in this decision do not turn on selecting a particular definition for the level of ordinary skill in the art, for the reasons discussed above. We determine, on this record, that the level of ordinary skill proposed by Patent Owner is consistent with the ’568 patent and the asserted prior art. We agree with Patent Owner’s proposal regarding the level of ordinary skill except for Patent Owner’s arguments about manufacturing discussed above. As such, we adopt Patent Owner’s proposal.” slip op. at 18
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundUnpatentable
“As noted by Petitioner, The Handbook of Optics discloses that “[i]n the case of both negative and positive lens elements, it is good policy to avoid element forms wherein the center-to-edge thickness ratio exceeds three for positive elements.” Ex. 1019 § 34.15. Thus, we are persuaded by Petitioner’s fourth reason that the cited disclosure provides evidence that the ordinarily skilled artisan would have selected a particular diameter for the first lens element disclosed in Ogino in conformance with manufacturing considerations known to the ordinarily skilled artisan. We are further persuaded that, from the selection of that particular diameter, a Z1 value for the object-side surface and a Z2 value for image-side surface at the minimum usable edge of the first lens element can be obtained and, in turn, circumferential edge thickness L1e can be obtained. Pet. 35–36 (citing Ex. 1003, 42; Ex. 1005, 15:1–3). We are further persuaded by Petitioner’s supporting reasoning that “a POSITA would understand the manufacturing benefits of maintaining the lowest possible center-to-edge thickness ratio since ‘the preferred shape of a molded element is one that has fairly uniform thickness.’” Id. at 42 (quoting Ex. 1018, 92) (citing Ex. 1003, 48). Based on our review of the complete record, we find that the record supports Petitioner’s contentions concerning claim 1. Petitioner demonstrates by a preponderance of the evidence that claim 1 is unpatentable as obvious over Ogino.” slip op. at 37
Patent outcomesUS 9,857,568 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,857,568 - Emerson Electric Co. v. Sipco, LLCSome claims unpatentablePTAB · Nov 28, 2018 · IPR2017-00359 · APJ Bryan F Moore · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 32, 34, 37–38, 55–57, and 59 are unpatentable over Cunningham; claims 1, 3–8, 11–14, 24–31, 36, 42, 43, 46–49, 51–54, and 60–64 were not shown unpatentable.
RulingsFinal written decision- BurdenNot shown unpatentable
“This argument is conclusory and not supported by sufficient evidence. Moreover, the stated conclusion is vague with respect to the limitation at issue. Petitioner argues that “the node 18 must translate messages” (id. (emphasis added)), but does not explicitly argue that all three recited pieces of information—“the select information, the transmitter identification information, and transceiver identification information”—must be translated. Even assuming Mason’s node must translate all three recited pieces of information, Petitioner does not show that all such translated pieces of information must be further transmitted to the AMR server over the WAN. In particular, Petitioner does not show that transceiver identification information would have to be further transmitted.” slip op. at 21
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“Moreover, we agree with Petitioner that such a construction is “non- specific, vague and unhelpful” in the context of the ’692 patent. Reply. 16. Patent Owner’s construction limits “low power” to signals having a “limited transmission range,” but provides no guidance of what “limited” means, or what its boundaries might be. Petitioner argues correctly that Patent Owner’s construction fails to address questions its proposed construction raises, such as, what a ‘limited’ transmission range means and how ‘limited’ the range must be (i.e., what the range’s distance should be), whether the transmission range depends on the particular system or application, and whether other factors should be considered in determining whether the transmission range is limited.” slip op. at 14
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“Notably, Petitioner says these contentions are “further evidence” but does not explain how this evidence is to be used to buttress Cunningham’s disclosure or how it is to be combined with Cunningham’s disclosure. Specifically, given the limited contentions in the Petition detailed above, Petitioner does not explain how Energy Management Services or the “routines” described in the Provisional send control signals from the computer to the actuator as required by the claims. For example, even if we to accept that the “Williams Network Control Center” creates control signals as required by the claim Petitioner has not explained how those signals are translated from network transfer protocol to RF signals and then translated to an analog signal that can be used at an actuator. Even though the ’978 Provisional is allegedly incorporated by reference, an obviousness determination still requires--“[w]hether a [obviousness challenge] is based on combining disclosures from multiple references, combining multiple embodiments from a single reference, or selecting from large lists of elements in a single reference[--] a motivation to make the combination and a reasonable expectation that such a combination would be successful, otherwise a skilled artisan would not arrive at the claimed combination.” In re Stepan Co., 868 F.3d 1342, 1346 n. 1 (Fed. Cir. 2017); c.f. Boston Sci. Scimed, Inc. v. Cordis Corp., 554 F.3d 982, 991 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (finding obviousness shown despite fact that “all of the limitations are found in two separate embodiments pictured side by side in the patent, not in one embodiment” because the party showed motivation to combine and reasonable likelihood of success). Additionally, “there must be evidence presented on the obviousness of the claim as a whole.” Circuit Check Inc. v. QXQ Inc., 795 F.3d 1331, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (citing KSR, 550 U.S. at 420, 127 S.Ct. 1727); see also Acorda Therapeutics, Inc. v. Roxane Labs., Inc., 903 F.3d 1310, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“The determination of obviousness is made with respect to the subject matter as a whole, not separate pieces of the claim”). Here, the “routines” described in the ’978 Provisional work differently than the “utility prices” embodiment of Cunningham. Petitioner has not explained how those would work together to meet the claim limitations.” slip op. at 30
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableNot shown unpatentableMixed
“Patent Owner’s argument is inapposite, as it is premised on reading a limitation into the claims, namely that the information encoded in the RF signal must be translated in real time. Further, we agree with Petitioner, that even under such an erroneously narrow construction, Cunningham would meet the limitation. In that regard, Petitioner argues that, “although Cunningham discloses sending cumulative data readings, individual signals from the sensor are identified by the gateway and this information is then transmitted (with transmitter identification information) to a computer on the WAN.” Reply 6 (citing Ex. 1046 ¶¶31–32; Ex. 1004, 31:6–28). Petitioner argues, and we are persuaded, that “Cunningham explains that the ‘most current cumulative reading’ is the current absolute ‘reading’ (i.e., information signal) from the sensor (Ex. 1004, 13:44–46) and that two cumulative readings can be used to ‘interpolate’ and ‘recover’ a missed reading (i.e., a signal from the sensor).” Reply 7 (citing Ex. 1004, 13:44–56; 31:6–27; Pet. 75; Ex. 1002 ¶¶115, 152; Ex. 1046 ¶32). We are persuaded that Cunningham discloses this limitation. Lastly, claim 32 also recites “a computer configured to execute at least one computer program that formats and stores select information responsive to the electrical signal for retrieval upon demand from a remotely located device.” To meet this limitation, Petitioner accurately points out that “Cunningham discloses that[,] in response to receiving information from the sensor interface module through the data collection modules, the host module compiles the information into a user specified readable format and stores it for later retrieval upon demand from a customer computer or workstation.” Pet. 83 (citing Ex. 1004, 7:19–27, 44:12–41, 44:53–64, 46:44–61, 47:44–54, Ex. 1002 ¶¶138–140). Patent Owner does not contest that Cunningham discloses “a computer configured to execute at least one computer program that formats and stores select information responsive to the electrical signal for retrieval upon demand from a remotely located device.” See PO Resp. 22–29, 41–46. We are persuaded that Cunningham discloses this limitation. For the forgoing reasons, Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of” slip op. at 37
Patent outcomesUS 6,437,692 mixedClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 6,437,692
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.