• Unified Patents, LLC v. Intellectual Ventures II, LLCAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Aug 9, 2023 · IPR2022-00429 · APJ Matthew S Meyers · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–20 are unpatentable: claims 1–5, 7–12, and 14–20 over Chowdhary under §§ 102 and 103, and claims 1–20 over Chowdhary and Tobey under § 103.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Real party in interest / privityDecided for petitioner

    “On this record, we determine that we need not address whether Toyota was improperly excluded as an RPI because, “even if it were, it would not create a time bar or estoppel under 35 U.S.C. § 315.” See SharkNinja, Paper 11 at 18. Other than asserting that “estoppel provisions are implicated by this case” (PO Sur-reply 2311), there is no allegation or evidence that Toyota or any other RPI is barred or estopped from this proceeding, or that 11 Patent Owner asserts without explaining that the ’475 patent “is currently being asserted by Patent Owner against Toyota, as well as GM (another paying Member of Unified similarly situated to Toyota.). PO Sur-reply 23. However, the record indicates that the Toyota case has been dismissed and the GM case stayed. See Paper 32, 1 (Intellectual Ventures I LLC et al. v. Toyota Motor Corp. et al., 2:21-cv00389 (E.D. Tex. October 19, 2021) stipulated dismissal without prejudice on March 20, 2023); see also id. at 2 (Intellectual Ventures I LLC et al. v. General Motors Company, 6:21- cv01088 (W.D. Tex. October 19, 2021) (stayed pending settlement on April 6, 2023)). And, upon further inquiry, PACER Case Locator indicates that the GM case was dismissed in an order granting joint motion to dismiss entered on June 20, 2023. See GM case, Document 116. Petitioner purposefully omitted any other RPI to gain some advantage in our forum. See Unified Patent, LLC v. MemoryWeb, LLC, IPR2021-01413, Paper 76 at 5 (PTAB May 22, 2023) (Director Review Decision) (“The Board can and should make a determination of the real parties in interest or privity in any proceeding in which that determination may impact the underlying proceeding, for example, but not limited to, a time bar under 35 U.S.C. § 315(b) or an estoppel under 35 U.S.C. § 315(e) that might apply. That is not the situation here.”). Because we determine that neither the time bar nor estoppel provisions of 35 U.S.C. § 315 are implicated in this case, “we need not address whether [Toyota] is an unnamed RPI.” See Unified Patent, Paper 76 at 5 (“The Board should not have determined whether [there were additional] RPIs in this proceeding given that determination was not necessary to resolve the proceeding.”).” slip op. at 8

  • Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner

    “Petitioner asserts that at the time of the invention, one of ordinary skill in the art “would have had a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer science, computer engineering, physics, or a related subject, and two to three years of work experience in vehicle telematics.” Pet. 6–7 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 37–40). Petitioner asserts that “[a] lack of experience can be remedied with additional education (e.g., a Master’s degree), and likewise, a lack of education can be remedied with additional work experience (e.g., 5–6 years).” Id. Patent Owner essentially agrees with Petitioner’s assertion, but contends that the work experience should more broadly be in “mobile communications.” PO Resp. 16 (citing Ex. 2017 ¶ 27). In our Institution Decision, we determined that there was “not much difference between Petitioner’s and Patent Owner’s assertions, but noted that “we find that Patent Owner’s broader definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art is more consistent with the scope and content of the ’475 [p]atent.” Inst. Dec. 16–17 (citing Ex. 1001, 8:53–54; Ex. 1003, 3:15–18, Fig. 1). In its Reply, “Petitioner accepts the level of skill definition adopted in the Institution Decision,” and notes that “[n]either party contends that the differences in the proposed definitions affect the patentability of the challenged claims.” Pet. Reply 7. Based on this record, we apply Patent Owner’s definition of the level of skill, which also was applied in our Institution Decision, because it is consistent with the level of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention as reflected in the prior art of record. See Okajima, 261 F.3d at 1355.” slip op. at 12

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed board ownOther

    “We begin our analysis by considering the language of the claims. At the outset, we note that none of independent claims 1, 8, and 15 require “actively notify[ing] the recipient soon after the violation,” as Patent Owner proposes. Independent claim 1 requires that if the computing device located within the vehicle determines that the vehicle committed a violation, the computing device located in the vehicle sends an indication of the violation to a remote computing system. Ex. 1001, 10:55–55. Independent claim 1 further recites “wherein the remote computing device is configured to notify a recipient about the violation committed by the vehicle.” Id. at 10:56–58. Independent claims 8 and 15 includes substantially similar limitations. Id. at 11:14–28, 12:11–25. Thus, the independent claims broadly recite “notify[ing] a recipient about the violation” without reference to any type, i.e., “active” or “passive,” or timing of the notification. Turning to dependent claims 4 and 5, claims 4 and 5 both begin by reciting “[t]he method of claim 1, wherein the remote computing device is configured to notify the recipient about the violation committed by the vehicle by.” Ex. 1001, 10:66–67:1, 11:3–5. Claim 4 further limits independent claim 1 “by permitting the recipient to view the indication of the violation via a browser” (id. at 10:67–11:2) and claim 5 further limits claim 1 “by sending a communication to the recipient in response to receiving the indication of the violation from the computing device” (id. at 11:4–6). Thus, we understand the recitation of “configured to notify a recipient” in claim 1 as being broad enough to cover both the notification recited in claim 4 that “permit[s] the recipient to view . . . via a browser” and the notification recited in claim 5 that “send[s] a communication to the recipient in response to receiving the indication of the violation from the computing device.” Id. at 10:66–11:7.” slip op. at 18

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “At the outset, we agree with Petitioner that Patent Owner’s arguments are all premised upon its proposed construction of the phrase “configured to notify a recipient,” which, we do not adopt. See § III.C.1. As discussed above, we are not persuaded that the phrase “configured to notify a recipient,” as it appears in the context of claim 1, requires any type of active notification, as Patent Owner proposes. Consequently, Patent Owner’s argument that Chowdhary fails to teach the limitation at issue because Chowdhary “is wholly silent with regard to anything that is configured to actively notify someone about a violation” is unavailing. PO Resp. 24 (citing Ex. 2017 ¶ 57); see also id. at 27 (“[N]either the shortcuts to the reports shown in Figure 10 . . . or any other disclosure in Chowd[h]ary, actively notifies the fleet manager that a violation has been committed by the driver of the vehicle.”). Notwithstanding, to address this limitation, Petitioner directs us to Chowdhary’s disclosure that its “VSM application server automatically generates reports when new event data is received based on previously set criteria.” Id. (citing Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 7, 47–51, 96–97, 102–103, 114, Figs. 10–30; Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 84–87). Petitioner provides the following copy of Figure 10 of Chowdhary, annotated to identify, among several items, icon 1102 and icon 1104. Figure 10 illustrates “an example screen display for one embodiment of the VSM user interface” that includes “an ‘Alert/Notifications’ and ‘Messages’ screen.” Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 19, 97. Petitioner explains that Chowdhary discloses VSM application server receives speeding event data and prepares speeding reports based on the received event data. [Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 7, 47–51, 96–97, 114, Figs. 10–30]. An administrator sets alerts and/or notifications for reports that are of particular interest to the administrator so that an Alert/Notification is posted providing the title of the report (orange), the date/time the report was created (green), a link (via icon 1102, blue) to access the report each time a new speed limit violation report is created, and an icon 1104 (red) to remove reports so only new Alerts/Notifications are shown. [Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 97–98, 120, Fig. 10]. Pet. Reply 12–13. Relying on the deposition testimony of Mr. Wilson, Petitioner asserts that “Mr. Wilson testified that a clear notification would occur when a user logs in to a website, and there is an indication that a new message is available for the user to view.” Pet. Reply 13 (citing Ex. 2015,” slip op. at 32

  Patent outcomesUS 9,291,475 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 9,291,475
• Vudu, LLC v. Ideahub, Inc.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Apr 14, 2022 · IPR2020-01688 · APJ Monica S Ullagaddi · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1, 3, 4, 6, 8, 11, 13, 15, 18, 19, 21, and 23 are unpatentable over DIS 23009-1; the revised contingent motion to amend is denied.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “A person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSA”) in the relevant field as of the earliest priority date would have had at least the equivalent of a Bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or a related subject and two or more years of experience in the field of media streaming over the Internet. Pet. 18–19 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 82). Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s assertions regarding the level of ordinary skill in the art, nor 6 Patent Owner does not present objective evidence of nonobviousness. does it present its own definition. We adopt Petitioner’s definition as it is consistent with the specification of the ’830 patent and the cited references.” slip op. at 10

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached

    “Petitioner proposes that we construe “adaptation set,” “SegmentBase,” and “SegmentTemplate.” Pet. 19–21. Patent Owner does not address claim construction in its briefing. We need not construe any claim term to resolve any issues before us, and therefore, do not expressly define any claim term in our Decision. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (explaining that construction is needed only for terms that are in dispute, and only as necessary to resolve the controversy).” slip op. at 11

  • Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Written description inadequateDenied

    “not describe additional configuration information nor user characteristic information. Instead, it describes “an additional configuration to select a representation based on a user characteristics and terminal characteristics.” Ex. 2004 ¶ 232. It is unclear from Patent Owner’s argument whether Patent Owner intends for the claimed “user characteristic information” to include or refer to additional configuration information, accessibility features of a representation, or both. Reply Rev. Opp. 1 (citing Ex. 2004 ¶¶ 232, 234, 253). In any event, merely because paragraph 253 uses the term “[h]ereinafter” before it discloses “two simple attributes [] for the above-described purpose”––and not even in close proximity to the “user characteristics” and “additional configuration” in paragraph 232––is not sufficient to provide support for “the user characteristic information includ[ing] the usedWith attribute and the equivalentTo attribute,” as recited 8 Ex. 2005 is Application No. 16/168,933 (“the ’933 application”). in limitations [38.6], [40.6], and [46.6]. None of the cited portions (i.e., Ex. 2004 ¶¶ 232, 234, 253, 255–257, Table 13; Ex. 2005 ¶¶ 254–256, Table 13) indicates a sufficient connection or relationship, or the claimed inclusive relationship, between user characteristic information and the usedWith and equivalentTo attributes. Contra Reply Opp. Rev. MTA 1 (Patent Owner arguing that the cited disclosures “clearly show this relationship between the claimed attributes and user characteristic information”). For the foregoing reasons, we determine that claims 38, 40, and 46 do not find sufficient written description support in the ’644 application nor in the ’933 application, whether considered individually or collectively, and thus, these claims contain new matter.” slip op. at 35

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundUnpatentable

    “rationale for combining DIS 23009-1 with M20060, Petitioner persuasively contends that: A POSA would have been motivated to add the additional “metadata” described in M20060 to the MPDs described in the DIS 23001-6 or DIS 23009-1 references in order to enable the client to choose the most suitable version of media content among alternative versions of media content. For example, M20060 describes that the additional metadata (e.g., the extended accessibility element and the usedWith, equivalentTo, bitDepth, minBitDepth, and maxBitDepth attributes) helps “both users and clients to select appropriate representations” by, for example, “1) supporting accessibility, 2) describing relationships of representations, and 3) describing media’s bit depth.” Moreover, a POSA would have had an expectation of success in modifying the MPDs in DIS 23001-6 or DIS 23009-1 to include the additional metadata described below because it simply would have been a matter of adding additional metadata to the MPD XML schemas described in DIS 23001-6 or DIS 23009-1. Id. (citing Ex. 1094 ¶ 33; Ex. 1097 § 1, 1). Dr. Bestavros persuasively explains that “M20060 expressly references the DIS 23001-6 reference and proposes specific modifications to the MPEG DASH metadata included in the MPD XML schema.” Ex. 1094 ¶ 34 (citing Ex. 1097 § 1, 1 (introduction of M20060); Ex. 1097, 7 (references cited by M20060)).” slip op. at 41

  Patent outcomesUS 10,270,830 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,270,830
• Vudu, Inc. v. Ideahub, Inc.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Apr 14, 2022 · IPR2020-01689 · APJ Monica S Ullagaddi · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1, 11, 25, 27, and 29 are unpatentable as anticipated by and obvious over DIS 23009-1; the revised contingent motion to amend proposing claims 31–35 is denied.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “B. Level Of Ordinary Skill In The Art Petitioner contends that: A person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSA”) in the relevant field as of the earliest priority date would have had at least the equivalent of a Bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or a related subject and two or more years of experience in the field of media streaming over the Internet. Pet. 19 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 82). Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s assertions regarding the level of ordinary skill in the art, nor does it present its own definition in any of its briefing. We adopt Petitioner’s definition as it is consistent with the Specification of the ’414 patent and the cited references.” slip op. at 10

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for patent owner

    “Petitioner proposes that we construe “adaptation set,” and “SegmentTemplate.” Pet. 19–21. Patent Owner does not address claim construction in any of its briefing. 6 Patent Owner does not present objective evidence of nonobviousness. and therefore, do not expressly define any claim term in our Decision. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (explaining that construction is needed only for terms that are in dispute, and only as necessary to resolve the controversy).” slip op. at 10

  • Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Written description inadequateNot shown unpatentable

    “The newly-cited portion in paragraph 232 does not describe additional configuration information nor user characteristic information. Instead, it describes “an additional configuration to select a representation based on a user characteristics and terminal characteristics.” Ex. 2004 ¶ 232. It is unclear from Patent Owner’s argument whether Patent Owner intends for the claimed “user characteristic information” to include or refer to additional configuration information, accessibility features of a representation, or both. Reply Rev. Opp. 1 (citing Ex. 2004 ¶¶ 232, 234, 253). In any event, merely simple attributes [] for the above-described purpose”––and not even in close proximity to the “user characteristics” and “additional configuration” in paragraph 232––is not sufficient to provide support for “the user characteristic information includ[ing] the usedWith attribute and the equivalentTo attribute,” as recited in limitations [31.11], [32.12], and [35.7]. None of the cited portions (i.e., Ex. 2004 ¶¶ 232, 234, 253, 255–257, Table 13; Ex. 2005 ¶¶ 254–256, Table 13) indicate a sufficient connection or relationship, or the claimed inclusive relationship, between user characteristic information and the usedWith and equivalentTo attributes. Contra Reply Opp. Rev. 1 (Patent Owner arguing that the cited disclosures “clearly show this relationship between the claimed attributes and user characteristic information”). For the foregoing reasons, we determine that claims 31, 32, and 35 do not have sufficient written description support in the ’644 application and the ’092 application, either individually or collectively, and as such, contain new matter.” slip op. at 29

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Priority / effective filing date / continuation supportDecided for petitioner

    “are not entitled to a priority date earlier than March 16, 2012 (the filing date of PCT ’922), because the disclosure of KR10-2011-0023271 does not support at least the limitations of: “the adaptation set includes one or more attributes or elements that are common to each of the representations for that adaptation set,” as recited in independent claims 1 and 11, and the “SegmentTemplate” recited in independent claims 25. Patent Owner has not asserted, after institution, that the challenged claims are entitled to an earlier date. See Tech. Licensing Corp. v. Videotek, Inc., 545 F.3d 1316, 1327–28 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (indicating that patent owner bears a burden of production in arguing that the asserted references are not prior art based on entitlement to an earlier priority date). As such and for the reasons discussed below, Petitioner has persuasively demonstrated that DIS 23001-6, DIS 23009-1, and 3GPP TS 26.247 qualify as prior art to the challenged claims, because Petitioner has sufficiently demonstrated that the references were publicly accessible prior to the applicable priority date of March 16, 2012.” slip op. at 12

  Patent outcomesUS 10,313,414 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,313,414
• Google LLC v. Ikorongo Technology LLC And Ikorongo Texas LLCRehearing granted
  PTAB · Jan 25, 2022 · IPR2021-00205 · APJ Bryan F Moore · IPR · Rehearing

  The Board granted Google's rehearing request and instituted IPR on claims 5–7, 9–12, 21–23, 25–28, 37, and 39–42 on all petitioned grounds.

  RulingsRehearing decision

  • RehearingRehearing, grantedGranted

    “Circuit directed the WDTX to transfer the district court cases to the NDCA [Northern District of California] (Ex-1023 at 16) . . . the cases against LGE and Samsung will be given a new case schedule in the NDCA, delaying not only the trial date but the overall investment in the case by both the parties and the court.” Request 5. We agree. In fact, the cases in NDCA are currently stayed pending an appeal of the Federal Circuit’s Decision. Ex. 3003. In weighing the Fintiv factors, we relied on the involvement of the ’554 patent in the WDTX cases as the basis for our weighing four of six factors and for our holistic assessment of the factors in favor of our exercising our discretion to deny institution. DDI 7–13. However, the WDTX cases no longer provide any basis for exercising our discretion to deny institution.” slip op. at 8

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Decided for petitioner

    “3 In assessing whether to exercise such discretion, the Board weighs the following factors: 1. whether the court granted a stay or evidence exists that one may be granted if a proceeding is instituted; 2. proximity of the court’s trial date to the Board’s projected statutory deadline for a final written decision; 3. investment in the parallel proceeding by the court and the parties; 4. overlap between issues raised in the petition and in the parallel proceeding; 5. whether the petitioner and the defendant in the parallel proceeding are the same party; and 6. other circumstances that impact the Board’s exercise of discretion, including the merits. Fintiv, Paper 11 at 6–7. Circuit directed the WDTX to transfer the district court cases to the NDCA [Northern District of California] (Ex-1023 at 16) . . . the cases against LGE and Samsung will be given a new case schedule in the NDCA, delaying not only the trial date but the overall investment in the case by both the parties and the court.” Request 5. We agree. In fact, the cases in NDCA are currently stayed pending an appeal of the Federal Circuit’s Decision. Ex. 3003. In weighing the Fintiv factors, we relied on the involvement of the ’554 patent in the WDTX cases as the basis for our weighing four of six factors and for our holistic assessment of the factors in favor of our exercising our discretion to deny institution. DDI 7–13. However, the WDTX cases no longer provide any basis for exercising our discretion to deny institution.” slip op. at 7

  • Parallel petitionsDecided for petitioner

    “should exercise its discretion under § 314(a) to deny at least one of Petitioner’s two overlapping petitions. Petitioner concurrently filed two petitions against the ’554 patent: IPR2021-00204 (Petition 1) and IPR2021- 00205 (Petition 2).” Prelim. Resp. 18. Petitioner contends “Petition 2 challenges only claims with an admitted later priority date . . . [and n]one of the claims challenged in Petition 2 are addressed in Petition 1. The two” slip op. at 9

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

    “E. Obviousness Analysis We determine that Petitioner has shown a reasonable likelihood of establishing the obviousness of the limitations of claim 1 and of claim 5 (which includes the limitations of claim 1) and, on that basis, institute inter partes review of all the Challenged Claims. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a) (“When instituting inter partes review, the Board will authorize the review to proceed on all of the challenged claims.”). Although dependent claim 5 is the first Challenged Claim in the Petition, we begin our analysis thereof by analyzing its underlying base claim, namely, independent claim 1.” slip op. at 17

  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,874,554
• Google LLC v. Ikorongo Technology LLC And Ikorongo Texas LLCRehearing granted
  PTAB · Jan 25, 2022 · IPR2021-00204 · APJ Bryan F Moore · IPR · Rehearing

  The Board granted rehearing and instituted IPR on claims 1–4, 8, 17–20, 24, 33–36, and 38 on all petition grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood of obviousness.

  RulingsRehearing decision

  • RehearingRehearing, grantedGranted

    “as our basis for exercising our discretion to deny institution are no longer in the Western District of Texas. Ex. 1023, 16; Ex. 3003. In the Request for Rehearing, Petitioner argues that (at that time), “[b]ecause the Federal Circuit directed the WDTX to transfer the district court cases to the NDCA [Northern District of California] (Ex-1023 at 16) . . . the cases against LGE and Samsung will be given a new case schedule in the NDCA, delaying not 3 In assessing whether to exercise such discretion, the Board weighs the following factors: 1. whether the court granted a stay or evidence exists that one may be granted if a proceeding is instituted; 2. proximity of the court’s trial date to the Board’s projected statutory deadline for a final written decision; 3. investment in the parallel proceeding by the court and the parties; 4. overlap between issues raised in the petition and in the parallel proceeding; 5. whether the petitioner and the defendant in the parallel proceeding are the same party; and 6. other circumstances that impact the Board’s exercise of discretion, including the merits. Fintiv, Paper 11 at 6. only the trial date but the overall investment in the case by both the parties and the court.” Request 5. We agree. In fact, the cases in NDCA are currently stayed pending an appeal of the Federal Circuit’s Decision. Ex. 3003. In weighing the Fintiv factors, we relied on the involvement of the ’554 patent in the WDTX cases as the basis for our weighing four of six factors and for our holistic assessment of the factors in favor of our exercising our discretion to deny institution. DDI 7–13. However, the WDTX cases no longer provide any basis for exercising our discretion to deny institution.” slip op. at 7

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Decided for petitioner

    “3 In assessing whether to exercise such discretion, the Board weighs the following factors: 1. whether the court granted a stay or evidence exists that one may be granted if a proceeding is instituted; 2. proximity of the court’s trial date to the Board’s projected statutory deadline for a final written decision; 3. investment in the parallel proceeding by the court and the parties; 4. overlap between issues raised in the petition and in the parallel proceeding; 5. whether the petitioner and the defendant in the parallel proceeding are the same party; and 6. other circumstances that impact the Board’s exercise of discretion, including the merits. Fintiv, Paper 11 at 6. only the trial date but the overall investment in the case by both the parties and the court.” Request 5. We agree. In fact, the cases in NDCA are currently stayed pending an appeal of the Federal Circuit’s Decision. Ex. 3003. In weighing the Fintiv factors, we relied on the involvement of the ’554 patent in the WDTX cases as the basis for our weighing four of six factors and for our holistic assessment of the factors in favor of our exercising our discretion to deny institution. DDI 7–13. However, the WDTX cases no longer provide any basis for exercising our discretion to deny institution.” slip op. at 7

  • Parallel petitionsDecided for petitioner

    “B. Multiple Petitions In its Preliminary Response, Patent Owner also argues “[t]he Board should exercise its discretion under § 314(a) to deny at least one of Petitioner’s two overlapping petitions. Petitioner concurrently filed two petitions against the ’554 patent: IPR2021-00204 (Petition 1) and IPR2021- 00205 (Petition 2).” Prelim. Resp. 17. Petitioner contends “Petition 2 challenges only claims with an admitted later priority date . . . [and n]one of the claims challenged in Petition 2 are addressed in Petition 1. The two petitions therefore differ materially both in substance and in the defenses Patent Owner may potentially raise, and were needed to comply with the word limits.” Paper 3, 3. Patent Owner argues this reason is moot because Patent Owner “has opted to not raise a priority dispute at the pre-institution stage.” Prelim Resp. 18–20. We determine that Patent Owner may raise a priority challenge post-institution so Petitioner’s reason for two petitions is still valid. Thus, we determine that denial of one of the two petitions is not appropriate in this case.” slip op. at 9

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “We are also guided by the principle that we need only construe claim terms if, and to the extent that, it is necessary for the purpose of the proceeding. See, e.g., Wellman, Inc. v. Eastman Chem. Co., 642 F.3d 1355, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“[C]laim terms need only be construed ‘to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). The Petition states, “[n]o claim terms need to be construed by the Board at this time.” Pet. 6. Patent Owner “does not propose any claim constructions.” Prelim. Resp. 21. Petitioner does present an implied construction of “location information” which we discuss below, in Section III.E.1.d., in association with Petitioner’s contentions regarding that claim term. Nevertheless, in this Decision, we give the claim terms their ordinary and customary meanings.” slip op. at 12

  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,874,554
• Apple Inc. v. Corephotonics, Ltd.Rehearing granted
  PTAB · Nov 4, 2021 · IPR2020-00487 · APJ Monica S Ullagaddi · IPR · Rehearing

  Claims 1–18 are unpatentable under §103: claims 1–4, 7, 10–13, and 16 over Golan and Martin; the remaining claims over combinations adding Ahiska, Levey, or Parulski.

  RulingsRehearing decision

  • RehearingRehearing, grantedGranted

    “We initially concluded that Petitioner failed to establish a reasonable likelihood of prevailing in demonstrating that the challenged claims are unpatentable. Paper 9 (“Decision Denying Institution” or “DDI”). Specifically, we concluded that Petitioner’s rationale for combining Golan and Martin was not sufficiently supported by a rational underpinning. Dec. 26 (citing KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418 (2007)). Accordingly, we declined to institute trial on the challenged claims of the ’233 patent. Id. Petitioner filed a request for rehearing (Paper 10, “Rehearing Request” or “Reh’g Req.”) of our Decision Denying Institution. We granted that request and instituted trial (Paper 13, “Institution Decision” or “Inst. Dec.”) on all challenged claims on all grounds set forth in the Petition. Patent Owner filed a Response (Paper 16, “Patent Owner Response” or “PO. Resp.”).1 Petitioner filed a Reply (Paper 25, “Petitioner’s Reply” or “Pet.” slip op. at 2

  • Expert testimonyOther

    “Dr. Durand testifies that “a POSITA would have understood that Martin’s teachings of critical alignment for stable transition between images of different points of view apply to electronic camera systems providing continuous zoom video output [i]mages as taught in Golan, regardless of whether a three dimensional illusion is provided.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 59. Citing Ahiska (Ex. 1007), Border (Ex. 1009), Orimoto (Ex. 1014), and Hansen (Ex. 1019) to support his testimony, Durand further testifies that It was well known in the art that for seamless transition between two images of different points of views in continuous zoom video applications, when calibration between two cameras (e.g., the electronic calibration of Golan) is not sufficient alone (e.g., because of shocking, vibration, thermal variation, etc.), image registration of two images from two imaging sections for position matching (e.g., critical alignment of Martin) may be used. Id. ¶ 57 (citing Ex. 1007, 4:58–62, 10:2–5; Ex. 1014, 1:63–2:1; Ex. 1019, 1059; Ex. 1009 ¶¶ 41, 42). The portion of Hansen (Ex. 1019) cited by Dr. Durand addresses how extrinsic calibration errors occur and “a method to recalibrate extrinsic parameters online to correct drift or bias.” Ex. 1019, 1059 (emphasis omitted). Orimoto discloses how misalignment occurs, irrespective of “how exactly the dual lens camera has been conditioned and adjusted by the manufacturer.” Ex. 1014, 1:63–2:1. Border addresses image registration as an alternative to correspondence (i.e., calibration). Ex. 1009 ¶¶ 41, 42. And Ahiska disclose image registration or matching, when calibration is insufficient, to provide a seamless transition between master and slave cameras and “create the quality of a continuous zoom function.” Ex. 1007, 4:58–62, 10:2–5 (“[i]f calibration between the [wide-angle] master and slave cameras is insufficient alone, image registration or matching can be carried out,” “transition[ing] between the master view and the slave view as seamlessly as possible to create the quality of a continuous zoom function”). Petitioner’s third and fourth reasons for combining Golan and Martin are supported by Dr. Durand’s testimony quoted above, which is in turn supported by Ahiska and Border. The portions of Border cited by Dr. Durand address image registration as an alternative to correspondence (i.e., calibration). Ex. 1009 ¶¶ 41, 42. The portions of Ahiska cited by Dr. Durand address the additional step of image registration or matching, when calibration is insufficient, to provide a seamless transition between master and slave cameras and “create the quality of a continuous zoom function.” Ex. 1007, 4:58–62, 10:2–5. Thus, each of Border and Ahiska show a relation between electronic calibration and registration. As such, and for the foregoing reasons, we are persuaded that Petitioner’s rationale for combining Golan and Martin is supported by sufficient rational underpinning, based on the entirety of the record developed at trial. See KSR, 550 at 418.” slip op. at 21

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner contends [A] Person of Ordinary Skill in the Art (“POSITA”) at the time of the claimed invention would have a bachelor’s or the equivalent degree in electrical and/or computer engineering or a related field and 2–3 years of experience in imaging systems including optics and image processing. Pet. 5. Petitioner supports its contention with the testimony of Dr. Durand. Ex. 1003 ¶ 17. Patent Owner “adopts Petitioner’s definition of the level of ordinary skill. . . .” PO Resp. 7 (citing Pet. 3; Ex. 2015 ¶¶ 31–33). The level of ordinary skill in the art proposed by Petitioner is consistent with the ’233 patent and the asserted prior art. Where pertinent, we apply Petitioner’s definition in making the findings and conclusions rendered in this Decision.” slip op. at 9

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “understood ‘reduce an image jump effect seen in video output images’ to mean “reduce a discontinuous image change in video output images.’” Pet. 6 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 41–43). Petitioner asserts the Specification supports this proposed construction. Id. (citing Ex. 1001, 10:30–40). Patent Owner “adopts, for this IPR proceeding only, Petitioner’s proposed construction for the phrase ‘reduce an image jump effect seen in video output images’ and appl[ies] it in [its] analysis herein.” PO Resp. 8 (citing Ex. 2015 ¶¶ 34–36). We do not discern a dispute between the parties regarding this limitation and we need not expressly construe this limitation to resolve the controversy before us. See, e.g., Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“[W]e need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 10

  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 9,661,233
• Polycom, Inc. v. Directpacket Research, Inc.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jan 11, 2021 · IPR2019-01235 · APJ Russell E Cass · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–23 are unpatentable as obvious under §103 over Krtolica and Rosenberg, with Eisenberg and DSDP added for certain dependent-claim grounds.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

    “with the claim language itself, we agree with Petitioner that the ordinary meaning of “multimedia communication data” is data related to multimedia communication, and that this may comprise signaling data required for communicating multimedia between two or more locations. We see nothing in the claim language that requires that data must include the underlying media content itself (such as video or voice signals) in order to qualify as “multimedia communication data.” We also are not persuaded by Patent Owner’s argument that Petitioner’s construction of “multimedia” “means no media” (PO Supp. 1 (emphasis omitted)), because Petitioner is not arguing that media content cannot be present, but instead is simply arguing that media content is one type of “multimedia communication data,” with” slip op. at 12

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successUnpatentableUnpatentable

    “each of its elements was, independently, known in the prior art.” KSR, 550 U.S. at 418. An obviousness determination requires finding “both ‘that a skilled artisan would have been motivated to combine the teachings of the prior art references to achieve the claimed invention, and that the skilled artisan would have had a reasonable expectation of success in doing so.’” Intelligent Bio-Sys., Inc. v. Illumina Cambridge Ltd., 821 F.3d 1359, 1367–68 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citation omitted); see KSR, 550 U.S. at 418 (For an obviousness analysis, “it can be important to identify a reason that would have prompted a person of ordinary skill in the relevant field to combine the elements in the way the claimed new invention does.”). Further, an assertion of obviousness “cannot be sustained by mere conclusory statements; instead, there must be some articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of obviousness.” KSR, 550 U.S. at 418 (quoting In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006)); In re NuVasive, Inc., 842 F.3d 1376, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (A finding of a motivation to combine “must be supported by a ‘reasoned explanation.’” (citation omitted)). D. Ground 1: Obviousness over Krtolica and Rosenberg — Claims 1, 3–5, 9–11, 13, 14, 16, 17, 22, and 23 Petitioner contends that claims 1, 3–5, 9–11, 13, 14, 16, 17, 22, and 23 are unpatentable as obvious under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) over Krtolica and Rosenberg. Pet. 30–70. For the reasons that follow, Petitioner has demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that claims 1, 3–5, 9–11, 13, 14, 16, 17, 22, and 23 are unpatentable on this ground. 1. Overview of Krtolica Krtolica is directed to a system that sends information data packets” slip op. at 18

  • Obviousness (§103) › Objective indicia / secondary considerations › NexusObjective indicia no nexusDecided for petitioner

    “H. Objective Indicia of Nonobviousness Patent Owner also presents arguments and evidence of objective indicia or secondary considerations of nonobviousness. PO Resp. 51–57; PO Sur-Reply 19–22. Objective indicia of nonobviousness may include long-felt but unsolved need, failure of others, unexpected results, commercial success, copying, licensing, industry praise, and expert skepticism. Mintz v. Dietz & Watson, Inc., 679 F.3d 1372, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2012). “[O]bjective indicia ‘may often be the most probative and cogent evidence of nonobviousness in the record,’” and “help turn back the clock and place the claims in the context that led to their invention.” Id. at 1378 (quoting Ortho–McNeil Pharm. v. Mylan Labs., Inc., 520 F.3d 1358, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2008)). Evidence of objective indicia of nonobviousness “must always when present be considered en route to a determination of obviousness.” Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc. v. Maersk Drilling USA, Inc., 699 F.3d 1340, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2012); see also Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 839 F.3d 1034, 1048 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (en banc). Objective indicia of nonobviousness are “only relevant to the obviousness inquiry ‘if there is a nexus between the claimed invention and the [objective indicia of nonobviousness].’” In re Affinity Labs of Tex., LLC, 856 F.3d 883, 901 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (quoting Ormco Corp. v. Align Tech., Inc., 463 F.3d 1299, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2006)). For objective indicia of nonobviousness to be accorded substantial weight, their proponent must establish a nexus between the evidence and the merits of the claimed invention. ClassCo, Inc. v. Apple, Inc., 838 F.3d 1214, 1220 (Fed. Cir. 2016). As the Federal Circuit has explained, “a patentee is entitled to a rebuttable presumption of nexus between the asserted evidence of secondary considerations and a patent claim if the patentee shows that the asserted evidence is tied to a specific product and that the product ‘is the invention disclosed and claimed.’” Fox Factory, Inc. v. SRAM, LLC, 944 F.3d 1366, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (quoting Demaco Corp. v. F. Von Langsdorff Licensing Ltd., 851 F.2d 1387, 1392 (Fed. Cir. 1988)). That is, presuming nexus is appropriate “when the patentee shows that the asserted objective evidence is tied to a specific product and that product ‘embodies the claimed features, and is coextensive with them.’” Id. (quoting Polaris Indus., Inc. v. Arctic Cat, Inc., 882 F.3d 1056, 1072 (Fed. Cir. 2018)). On the other hand, the patentee is not entitled to a presumption of nexus if the patented invention is only a component of a commercially successful machine or process. Id. Once “the patentee has presented a prima facie case of nexus, the burden of coming forward with evidence in rebuttal shifts to the challenger . . . to adduce evidence to show that the commercial success was due to extraneous factors other than the patented invention.” Demaco, 851 F.2d at 1392–93. However, “[a] finding that a presumption of nexus is inappropriate” slip op. at 82

  • ExcludeMotion to exclude, grantedGranted

    “highly confidential source for the STNS system, and seeks to seal that identification. Paper 29, 1. The Motion is unopposed. We have reviewed the redacted portion of the document, as well as the explanations of the confidential nature of the materials for which sealing is sought, as discussed in the Motion. We grant the Motion and the associated request to enter the Protective Order.” slip op. at 92

  Patent outcomesUS 8,560,828 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,560,828
• Polycom, Inc. v. Directpacket Research, Inc.Some claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jan 11, 2021 · IPR2019-01234 · APJ Sheila F Mcshane · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 2–5, 15–17, 23–26, 29, and 30 are unpatentable over the stated obviousness grounds; claims 8, 9, 19, 20, 27, and 28 were not shown unpatentable.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “In the Decision on Institution, we adopted Petitioner’s proposed skill level, that is, that one of ordinary skill in the art would have a Bachelor’s degree or equivalent in electrical engineering, computer engineering, or similar field, and at least two years of experience in a relevant field such as telecommunications or multimedia communications. Inst. Dec. 20. We also agreed with Petitioner that one of ordinary skill would have some familiarity with the design and implementation of VoIP and multimedia networks. Id. We did not agree, however, that the level of qualifications included monitoring and maintaining VoIP and multimedia networks, as Petitioner asserted, and therefore declined to adopt those requirements. Id. ordinary skill in the art adopted in the Decision on Institution to include “familiarity with the design and implementation of VoIP and multimedia networks,” but further described this requirement to include other requirements: an understanding of the techniques employed by network firewalls and the issues they present with respect to establishing and conducting multimedia communication sessions; an understanding of the performance demands placed on the network by multimedia communications, and the constraints that such demands place on processing and security measures that could be adopted; and a recognition of the distinctions between prior art firewall traversal solutions and the inventions of the ’978 Patent. PO Resp. 21–22. Patent Owner refers to GPAC, which identifies the factor of the “type of problems encountered in the art” as a consideration in determining the level of ordinary skill in the art. Id. at 22 (citing In re GPAC, 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995)). We have reviewed the relevant technology and claims of the ’978 patent, as well as the technology of the asserted prior art, and we adopt the same qualifications as those adopted in the Decision on Institution because they are commensurate with the relevant technology. These qualifications are similar to presented by Petitioner, with the” slip op. at 8

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “Petitioner relies on the ordinary and customary meaning of the claim terms as understood by one of ordinary skill in the art. Pet. 20. Patent Owner indicates that its arguments are also based upon the ordinary and customary meaning of the terms as they would be understood by one of ordinary skill in the art. PO Resp. 22. We determine that it is not necessary to provide an express interpretation of any of the terms of the claims. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017); Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“[O]nly those terms need be construed that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.”).” slip op. at 11

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundMotivation not foundMixed

    “As discussed above, we agree with Petitioner that Kirchhoff discloses the use of SSL, a protocol that uses data encryption (Ex. 1005, 8:47–49). We also agree with Petitioner that Krtolica discloses the use of HTTP protocols on port 80 (Ex. 1004, 6:23–24), and does so with a goal of maintaining high network security (id. at 1:7–10, 2:33–36). As Kirchhoff discloses, and Dr. Lavian’s testimony supports, one of ordinary skill in the art would have been aware that port 443, rather than port 80, would be used for secure web connections using SSL, which includes the use of encryption, and this would have resulted in enhanced network security. See Ex. 1005, 3:38–41; Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 52, 69, 108. As Dr. Lavian testifies, SSL/TLS was the most widely deployed security protocol in the world and the well-known use of SSL in HTTPS protocol enables secure web-based e-commerce. Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 69, 108; Ex. 1035 ¶ 8; Ex. 1006, 5. And, Krtolica has a stated goal to maintain network security. Ex. 1004, 1:7–10, 2:33–37. We find this evidence provides a sufficient rational underpinning in support of obviousness for combining the teachings of Krtolica and Kirchhoff. See KSR, 550 U.S. at 418. Owner’s arguments that use of encryption in SSL was optional and adding encryption would allegedly undermine network security. Nor do we find persuasive the argument that the Petitioner’s motivation to combine based on efficiency is insufficient, because Petitioner relies on another rationale for the combination of Krtolica and Kirchhoff, that is, enhanced network security, also discussed above. We additionally do not find persuasive Patent Owner’s arguments that combining Krtolica and Kirchhoff would render the system of Krtolica unsatisfactory for its intended purpose because, as Petitioner argues, this assertion is contradicted by the state of the art at the time. See Pet. Reply 9. As discussed above, Dr. Lavian explains that there were known systems having firewalls with SSL traversal at the time of the invention. Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 53, 59–65; Ex. 1035 ¶ 20; Ex. 1014. Moreover, the ’978 patent uses encryption with firewalls using a single-port protocol, and Patent Owner does not direct us to any disclosure in that patent that indicates that the use of encryption with a single-port protocol was inventive in that the system, or that encryption had to be done in a special manner. See Pet. Reply 3 (citing Ex. 1001, Fig. 3 (at 311, 341), Fig. 5 (503, 508)); see also Ex. 1001, 6:4–8. In a similar vein, Patent Owner argues that due to incompatibilities the combination of SSL with Krtolica would be unsuccessful, and we address this issue below.” slip op. at 30

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of success › Teaching awayTeaching away not foundDecided for petitioner

    “Where the prior art contains “apparently conflicting” teachings (i.e., where some references teach the combination and others teach away from it) each reference must be considered “for its power to suggest solutions to an artisan of ordinary skill . . . consider[ing] the degree to which one reference might accurately discredit another.” In re Young, 927 F.2d 588, 591 (Fed. Cir. 1991). In Hosner, AES encryption appears to have one of the higher processing speeds of the algorithms tested. See Ex. 1006, 23. Further, the ’978 patent itself supports the acceptable performance of AES encryption in single-port protocol, stating that “[a]ny method or algorithm of encryption may be used” with its invention “including, but not limited to 128-bit find Patent Owner’s argument on the use of AES to be persuasive. We have reviewed Petitioner’s explanations and supporting evidence as to how the combination of Kirchhoff and Krtolica teach the limitations of claims 4, 16, and 24, and we agree with and adopt Petitioner’s analysis. Pet. 75–76, 81.” slip op. at 65

  Patent outcomesUS 7,710,978 mixed
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 7,710,978
• Power Integrations, Inc. v. Semiconductor Components Industries, LLCSome claims unpatentable
  PTAB · May 23, 2019 · IPR2018-00180 · APJ Kamran Jivani · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 4–7, 9–16, and 18 are unpatentable over Hwang or Hwang and Balakrishnan; claim 17 was not shown unpatentable over Hwang.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner

    “Although the parties formulate slightly differently their respective assessments of the skill level, neither party disputes directly the other’s assessment nor makes any arguments related to the assessments. See generally Pet.; PO Resp. The ’221 patent states its disclosure “relates, in general, to integrated circuits and, more particularly, to power converter integrated circuits.” Ex. 1001, 1:9–11. In view of the foregoing, we adopt Patent Owner’s formulation of the level of ordinary skill in the art. Further, this level of ordinary skill is reflected by the prior art of record. Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the prior art itself can reflect the appropriate level of ordinary skill in the art).” slip op. at 8

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for petitioner

    “construction must begin with the words of the claims themselves.”); In re NTP, Inc., 654 F.3d 1279, 1288 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (citing Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc)) (“As with any claim construction analysis, we begin with the claim language.”). None of the challenged claims (nor even unchallenged claim 8) recites the claimed disabling or terminating occurs in response to the detect signal independent of other circuit conditions or in response only to the detect signal. See Ex. 1001, 12:5–14:36. For instance, independent claim 4 merely recites, “wherein the control circuit disables the switched drive control signal in response to the detect signal.” Id. at 12:49–51. Independent claim 7 similarly recites, “wherein the gating circuit disables the drive control signal in response to the detect signal.” Id. at 13:11–13. Independent claim 9 discloses only, “a first comparator . . . having an output for disabling the pulse generator.” Id. at 13:27–30. Finally, independent claim 15 requires, “comparing the error signal to a reference signal . . . to terminate the step of generating in response to the error signal.” Id. at 14:21–23. Therefore, the plain language of the challenged claims does not, standing alone, support adoption of Patent Owner’s proposed construction.” slip op. at 13

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner

    “testimony from their respective declarants on whether one of ordinary skill in the art would understand “in response to” as requiring “independent of other circuit conditions.” Compare Reply 2–3 (citing Ex. 1016 ¶¶ 18–21, 26–30; Ex. 2003, 43:16–45:1) with PO Resp. 14–15, 17 (citing Ex. 2001 ¶¶ 42, 44–45.) and Sur-Reply 11–12 (citing Ex. 2001 ¶ 45). Patent Owner further directs our attention to a single sentence of deposition testimony in which Petitioner’s declarant Dr. Szepesi appears to agree with Patent Owner’s construction by stating, in the context of claim 9, that “the output signal of this first comparator disables the output pulses driving the gate of that independent of anything else.” PO Resp. 8 (citing Ex. 2003, 44:16– 45:1). Petitioner rebuts Patent Owner’s arguments by identifying additional deposition testimony and statements made in a second declaration offered by Dr. Szepesi opposing Patent Owner’s construction. Reply 2–3 (citing Ex. 1016 ¶¶ 18–21, 26–30; Ex. 2003, 43:16–45:1). For instance, immediately before the statement Patent Owner cites, Dr. Szepesi testified: Q: “So is it your opinion that an output for disabling the pulse generator must disable the pulse generator regardless of the other conditions in the circuit?” . . . A: “I don't understand your question. I said disabling the pulse generator means that the output of the pulse generator which is providing the pulses to the gate of the main switch, those pulses are disabled. That’s what it means in my opinion in this context.” Ex. 2003, 43:24–44:9. And, in his supplemental declaration, Dr. Szepesi states: As a first matter, I opined during my deposition that “an output disabling a pulse generator” means that “the output signal of this first comparator disables the output pulses driving the gate of that independent of anything else.” But, at the time of my deposition I had not done a focused claim construction analysis of the limitation “a first comparator […] having an output for disabling the pulse generator.” This is because I hadn’t anticipated there being a dispute relevant to the validity analysis in view of what I understood as the plain meaning of the language. Despite the quote that Patent Owner relied upon, I believe now that a POSITA would not understand the claim language to require the first comparator to disable the output pulses independent of anything else. This belief is consistent with my responses to the first two of three successive questions in which I was asked about “disabling the pulse generator.” It is my opinion that the operation of the disclosed embodiment requires the presence of other conditions precedent before the first comparator can disable the drive pulses and this requirement is not excluded by the claim language. Ex. 1016 ¶ 18 (emphasis added). Our reviewing court has made clear that extrinsic evidence “is generally of less significance than the intrinsic record” in matters of claim construction. Wi-LAN, Inc. v. Apple Inc., 811 F.3d 455, 462 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citation omitted). Here, beyond competing declarant testimony, neither party has entered into the record extrinsic evidence, such as dictionary definitions or contemporaneous usage in the art, addressing the scope of “in response to.” Having considered the testimony upon which Patent Owner relies and weighing it against the claim language itself, the Specification’s disclosures set forth above, and the contrary testimony of Petitioner’s declarant, we find on balance that it does not warrant departing from the plain and ordinary meaning of “in response to” as Patent Owner urges. See In re Paulsen, 30 F.3d 1475, 1480 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (holding that an inventor may define specific terms used to describe invention, but must do so “with reasonable clarity, deliberateness, and precision”) (quoting Intellicall, Inc. v. Phonometrics, Inc., 952 F.2d 1384, 1387-88 (Fed. Cir. 1992)).” slip op. at 17

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “Claim 4 further recites, “a control circuit having an input coupled for receiving the detect signal, wherein the control circuit disables the switched drive control signal in response to the detect signal.” Patent Owner’s sole contention with respect to claim 4 is that “[t]he alleged detect signal in Hwang does not satisfy this limitation” because “unlike the ’221 patent, the alleged ‘control circuit’ does not disable the switched drive control signal ‘in response to the detect signal’ independent of other circuit conditions.” PO Resp. 15–16. As discussed above, we decline to import into claim 4 a requirement that the claimed disabling must occur independent of other circuit conditions. See supra Section III.C.1. Because Patent Owner’s argument relies on a claim construction that we rejected above, we are not persuaded that Hwang fails to meet the limitations of claim 4. Rather, having reviewed the evidence cited by Petitioner, we agree with Petitioner that Hwang discloses the limitations of independent claim 4, arranged as recited in the claim. Petitioner’s analysis, as supported by the Szepesi Declaration, further demonstrates where Petitioner contends each element of dependent claims 5 and 6 is disclosed in Hwang. Pet. 21–24. Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s analysis beyond the argument raised with respect to claim 4. See PO Resp. 17. Having reviewed the evidence cited by Petitioner, we agree with Petitioner that Hwang discloses the limitations of dependent claims 5 and 6, arranged as recited in these claims, and we adopt that analysis as our own. Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, we find Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that Hwang anticipates claims 4–6.” slip op. at 25

  Patent outcomesUS 6,597,221 mixed
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 6,597,221
• C&D Zodiac, Inc. v. B/E Aerospace, Inc.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Oct 23, 2018 · IPR2017-01275 · APJ Jennifer S Bisk · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1, 3–10, and 12–17 are unpatentable as obvious over the Admitted Prior Art and Betts; Petitioner obtained partial adverse judgment on Ground 2.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Adverse judgmentAdverse judgmentGranted

    “Ground 2 based on the Supreme Court’s decision in SAS Institute Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348 (2018), Petitioner filed a Request for Partial Adverse Judgment against itself with respect to Ground 2, pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 42.73(b). See Paper 30 (modifying institution decision to institute on all challenged grounds presented in Petition); Paper 33 (Petitioner’s Request for 1 Patent Owner filed two versions of the Preliminary Response: Paper 6, to which access is restricted to the parties and the Board; and Paper 7, a publicly available, redacted version of Paper 6. 2 Patent Owner filed two versions of the Patent Owner Response: Paper 20, to which access is restricted to the parties and the Board; and Paper 21, a publicly available, redacted version of Paper 20. Partial Adverse Judgment as to Ground 2). We granted Petitioner’s Request for Partial Adverse Judgment on July 5, 2018. Paper 36 (granting adverse judgment as to Ground 2).” slip op. at 2

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “B. Level of Ordinary Skill In determining the level of ordinary skill in the art, various factors may be considered, including the “type of problems encountered in the art; 4 Petitioner defines “Admitted Prior Art” as certain portions of the ’641 patent, including Figure 1. Pet. 11–12 (citing Ex. 1001, 1:21–22, Fig. 1; Ex. 1004 ¶ 86). 5 U.S. Patent No. 3,738,497, issued June 12, 1973 (Ex. 1005) (“Betts”). 6 The Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (“AIA”), Pub. L. No. 112-29, took effect on March 18, 2013. Because the application from which the ’641 patent issued was filed before that date, any citations to 35 U.S.C. §§ 102 and 103 are to their pre-AIA version. prior art solutions to those problems; rapidity with which innovations are made; sophistication of the technology; and educational level of active workers in the field.” In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (citation omitted). Petitioner relies on the testimony of Alan Anderson, who testifies that a person with ordinary skill in the art “would have had a bachelor’s degree in mechanical engineering, industrial design, or a similar discipline, or the equivalent experience, with at least two years of experience in the field of aircraft interior design.” Pet. 29 (citing Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 27–29). Patent Owner does not address Petitioner’s proposal, or offer a competing proposal for a person of ordinary skill in the art. Based on our review of the record, we adopt Petitioner’s definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 8

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached

    “patent according to their broadest reasonable construction in light of the specification of the patent in which they appear.7 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b). Consistent with the broadest reasonable construction, claim terms are presumed to have their ordinary and customary meaning as understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art in the context of the entire patent disclosure. In re Translogic Tech., Inc., 504 F.3d 1249, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2007). Only terms that are in controversy need to be construed, and then only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy. Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999).” slip op. at 9

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner

    “Based on our review of the evidence and arguments, we find that one of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to modify the Admitted Prior Art lavatory by replacing the flat forward wall with the contoured forward wall of Betts. Petitioner submits convincing argument based on the testimony of Mr. Anderson, that designers of airplane interiors were concerned about adding space to the cabin and that the Betts contoured wall increased interior space. Pet. 22–25 (citing Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 57–59). Betts itself backs up this testimony by stating that one of the goals of its design is “to provide more passenger room.” Ex. 1005, Abstract. We also agree with Petitioner’s assertion that Figure 1 of Betts depicts a passenger seat further aft in the cabin than it could have been if the wall were flat with no recess, and merely extended up from the bottom portion of the wall. See Betts Fig. 1; Pet. 23–24. Betts therefore depicts how the contoured wall and recess provide more passenger space when compared to a flat, vertical wall, and Betts discusses the ability of its design to save space. As such, Betts adequately supports the proposed modification of the prior art flat forward wall as shown in the Admitted Prior Art. Patent Owner’s argument that flat forward lavatory walls co-existed with the Betts design for years without modification, even if accurate, does not outweigh the more convincing evidence and argument supporting Petitioner’s position based on Betts and the Anderson Declaration. In addition, Patent Owner’s argument that one would need to “totally deconstruct” Betts in order to add a lavatory to Betts misapprehends Petitioner’s proposed modification. Petitioner proposes to replace a lavatory flat forward wall as shown in the Admitted Prior Art with the Betts contoured wall, not add a lavatory behind the Betts contoured wall. See Pet. 22, 24; Reply 4–5. Although we do not apply collateral estoppel for the reasons provided above, we note that our findings regarding the proposed combination and modification are consistent with the Federal Circuit’s decision in the related case. See B/E Aerospace, 709 F. App’x at 694 (rejecting Patent Owner’s argument that Petitioner’s combination required adding lavatory to Betts). Based on the foregoing, we find that one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention would have been motivated to modify the lavatory flat forward wall in the Admitted Prior Art by replacing it with the contoured forward wall of Betts.” slip op. at 14

  Patent outcomesUS 9,073,641 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 9,073,641

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