• Salvacion USA, Inc. v. Trutek CorpAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Dec 2, 2025 · IPR2024-00711 · APJ Sheridan K Snedden · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–3 and 8 are unpatentable as anticipated by Chen, Baker, Wahi ’005, and, for claims 1, 2, and 8, Rolf; the Board also finds them obvious over the asserted grounds.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “In our Institution Decision, we adopted Petitioner’s definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSITA”) as it was undisputed at the time and consistent with the evidence of record. Inst. Dec. 7–8. Based on our consideration of the full record, we maintain our determination that a POSITA at the time the application for the ’802 patent was filed “would have had at least an undergraduate degree in pharmacy, chemistry, biochemistry, biomedical engineering or a closely related field, such that the POSITA generally understand[s] pharmaceutical formulation.” Pet. 12. Additionally, we agree with Petitioner that “[a] POSITA would be familiar with the chemical ingredients in the [’802] Patent, biocidic agents, and cationic agents, have knowledge of airborne particles including viruses and bacteria, and understand electrostatic fields, electrostatic attraction and repulsion, adhesion and cohesion.” Id. (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 38–39).” slip op. at 11

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Preamble limiting or notPreamble limitingDecided for petitioner

    “of independent claims 1, 2, and 8 as limiting. Inst. Dec. 7–8. The parties do not dispute our construction of the preambles of claims 1, 2, and 8 as limiting. See generally PO Resp.; Pet. Reply 2–4. After consideration of the full trial record, we maintain our construction of the preamble of claims 1, 2, and 8 as limiting for the reasons set forth in our Institution Decision. Id. Briefly, the preamble of independent claims 1, 2, and 8 limits the challenged claims as both the preamble and the body are used to define the subject matter claimed. See Allen Engineering Corp., v. Bartell Industries, Inc., 299 F.3d 1336, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2002). In particular, the preamble is “necessary to give life, meaning and vitality” to the claim, see id., because it provides the only description in the claim for the application site of the formulation, i.e., “to skin or tissue of nasal passages,” and how the formulation is applied, i.e., “in a thin film.”” slip op. at 8

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed board ownDecided for petitioner

    “After consideration of the full trial record, we maintain our construction. From our perspective, the claims themselves support this construction as the claims expand upon the term “electrostatically inhibiting” with specific means for achieving such inhibition. Specifically, claims 1 and 2 recite electrostatically attracting the particulate matter, holding the matter in place, and inactivating the matter. Additionally, the Specification supports our construction as it describes the use of “an electrostatic field such that oppositely charged airborne particulates (including microorganisms) in the vicinity of the surface are electrostatically trapped, held thereto and one or more of the microorganisms so captured is neutralized, killed, inactivated, and rendered harmless.” Ex. 1001, 3:36–40; PO Resp. 10 n.6.” slip op. at 9

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for petitioner

    “We adopt the parties’ construction of “adequate impermeability” that has been accepted in the related district court litigation: “Adequate impermeability” refers to the “thin film holding harmful particles in place and inhibiting them from penetrating the thin film and contacting the skin or tissue of an individual’s nasal passages. This is done by varying the concentration of ingredients . . .[,] thereby adjusting the adhesion and cohesion of the thin film.” Pet. Reply 3 (quoting Ex. 1010, 17). Furthermore, as stated in our Institution Decision, along with that term, the claim language explains that the thin film is meant to stick to the skin or tissue and to hold the particulate matter in place. Inst. Dec. 9–10. The claim language also explains that the cohesion of the formulation is adjusted to provide adequate impermeability to the thin film. Thus, it is reasonable to consider the recited impermeability is a function of the cohesive properties of the thin film, and that such impermeability refers to a property of the thin film, i.e., inhibiting the penetration or passage of matter through it onto the skin or tissue at the application site.” slip op. at 10

  Patent outcomesUS 8,163,802 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,163,802
• Snap Inc. v. You Map Inc.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Aug 31, 2023 · IPR2022-00568 · APJ Jason M Repko · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–20 are unpatentable as obvious over Feldman and Jackson, or Feldman, Jackson, and Rush; the contingent motion to amend is granted.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “had a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer science, or a related field, plus two years’ work or research experience with location-based content delivery and/or visualization.” Pet. 5 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 19– experience and vice versa.” Id. Patent Owner does not contest Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art. See PO Resp.; Sur-reply. Patent Owner’s expert, Dr. Shamos, testifies that he “generally agree[s]” with Petitioner’s proposed articulation, and provides substantially the same expression of the level of ordinary skill in the art. Shamos Decl. ¶¶ 30–31. In this Decision, we apply Petitioner’s proposed definition.” slip op. at 6

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

    “Although Patent Owner appears to argue that applying the preference factors to a general score does not encompass weighting the general score’s components (see, e.g., id. at 10–12; Sur-reply 13–16), this is not reflected in Patent Owner’s proposed construction (PO Resp. 12). Patent Owner’s construction provides no limitation on how the preference factors are applied to a general score. See id. To the extent Patent Owner argues that the phrase “applied to,” as recited in the claim, excludes such component-based weighting, we disagree. Rather, the record better aligns with Petitioner’s argument that “applied to” involves a linear combination of values, which could be the values of the general score’s components. See Pet. 30–31. Petitioner’s position is supported by the plain language of the claim, the ’727 patent’s discussion of weighted aggregation, and Mr. William’s testimony—all of which indicate that weighting the component scores is encompassed by claim 1. As for the plain language, the claim does not define how the factors are “applied to” the general score. Rather, the claim only recites that they are. In the context of the claim, the preference factors are applied to the general score. Patent Owner does not dispute this. PO Resp. 12. Claim 1 further recites that the customized score is based on the application of the preference factors to the general score. Ex. 1001, 23:14–27. We note that the generate the combined ranking, which is then used for the recited selection. Beyond that, the claim does not specify how the two rankings are used or how the combined ranking must be generated. Thus, under the claim’s plain language, the customized score can be used to rank the posts and is based on the general score. Id.” slip op. at 11

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedPatent owner expert discountedDecided for petitioner

    “adequately supported. We find that Mr. William’s declaration is adequately supported. This is not case where an expert “does not disclose the underlying facts or data on which the opinion is based.” See 37 C.F.R. § 42.65(a). Rather, Mr. Williams adequately supports his testimony about the second preference factor with reasoning based on Jackson’s teachings about how the social-network distance is used to weight the global score. See, e.g., Williams Decl. ¶ 133 (citing Ex. 1006, Fig. 4A, 16:23–25, 58–60). weighting criteria can be used together. Id. ¶¶ 147–149 (citing Ex. 1006, 3:57–44:22, 5:53–58, 9:54–67, 13:17–22, 17:47–67). Mr. Williams’s analysis relies on Jackson’s discussion of using multiple factors to score a post. Ex. 1006, 17:47–55, cited in Williams Decl. ¶ 147; see also Pet. 42–43; Reply 9. Mr. Williams also cites Jackson’s discussion of how social-network distance and geographic distance can be used together. Williams Decl. ¶ 147 (citing Ex. 1006, 3:57–4:22). We agree with Petitioner that Jackson adequately supports this part of Mr. Williams’s analysis. Reply 7–9. Specifically, Jackson discloses that a determination may use social-network distance to “modify the criteria” that it uses to provide posts to users. Ex. 1006, 3:66–4:1, cited in Williams Decl. ¶ 147. Jackson further explains how geographic distance can be used in addition to other criteria: “Transmitting the post to the second computing device may be dependent upon determining that the criteria is met and determining that the posting location is within the threshold distance.” Id. at 4:19–22 (emphasis added), cited in Williams Decl. ¶ 147. This is consistent with Jackson’s teaching that a post may be recommended based on several factors and for several reasons. Id. at 17:47–67, cited in Williams Decl. ¶ 147. Also, Jackson explains how the global score, which Petitioner mapped to the recited “general score,” is used to generate a post’s score: “[A] particular post’s global score . . . is multiplied by, divided by, or summed with a distance between” a user and the post’s author. Id. at 9:54–67, cited in Williams Decl. ¶ 148. Jackson weights a post’s global score against a position of the posts author in a social graph. Id. at 9:25–53. Mr. Williams testifies that it is obvious and conventional to generate the modified scores embodiment. Williams Decl. ¶ 144. This is supported by Jackson. In another example cited by Petitioner, Jackson multiplies a post’s global score by a geographic distance to generate a personal score. Id. at 21:60–22:5, cited in Pet. 37, 39, 43. Thus, Petitioner has shown Jackson teaches or suggests applying two different sets of preference factors to a post’s global score. Pet. 41 (citing Williams Decl. ¶ 144). We disagree with Patent Owner’s argument that neither Petitioner nor” slip op. at 31

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successUnpatentableMotivation foundUnpatentable

    “We agree with Petitioner that Jackson adequately supports this part of Mr. Williams’s analysis. Reply 7–9. Specifically, Jackson discloses that a determination may use social-network distance to “modify the criteria” that it uses to provide posts to users. Ex. 1006, 3:66–4:1, cited in Williams Decl. ¶ 147. Jackson further explains how geographic distance can be used in addition to other criteria: “Transmitting the post to the second computing device may be dependent upon determining that the criteria is met and determining that the posting location is within the threshold distance.” Id. at 4:19–22 (emphasis added), cited in Williams Decl. ¶ 147. This is consistent with Jackson’s teaching that a post may be recommended based on several factors and for several reasons. Id. at 17:47–67, cited in Williams Decl. ¶ 147. Also, Jackson explains how the global score, which Petitioner mapped to the recited “general score,” is used to generate a post’s score: “[A] particular post’s global score . . . is multiplied by, divided by, or summed with a distance between” a user and the post’s author. Id. at 9:54–67, cited in Williams Decl. ¶ 148. Jackson weights a post’s global score against a position of the posts author in a social graph. Id. at 9:25–53. Mr. Williams testifies that it is obvious and conventional to generate the modified scores embodiment. Williams Decl. ¶ 144. This is supported by Jackson. In another example cited by Petitioner, Jackson multiplies a post’s global score by a geographic distance to generate a personal score. Id. at 21:60–22:5, cited in Pet. 37, 39, 43. Thus, Petitioner has shown Jackson teaches or suggests applying two different sets of preference factors to a post’s global score. Pet. 41 (citing Williams Decl. ¶ 144).” slip op. at 32

  Patent outcomesUS 10,616,727 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR
  Patents in suitUS 10,616,727
• Mylan Pharmaceuticals Inc. / Celltrion, Inc. et al. v. Regeneron Pharmaceuticals, Inc.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Nov 9, 2022 · IPR2022-00257 · APJ John G New · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1 and 8–12 are unpatentable: Dixon anticipates claims 1 and 9–12 and claim 8, and the Board also finds the claims obvious over Dixon.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingJoinder, grantedGranted

    “On February 9, 2022, we instituted an inter partes review in IPR2022- 00257 and granted the motion for joinder with IPR2021-00880, adding Celltrion, Inc. as a petitioner in the instant proceeding. Paper 35. On the same date, we also instituted an inter partes in IPR2022-00301 and likewise granted the motion for joinder with IPR2021-00880, adding Apotex, Inc. as a petitioner in the instant proceeding. Paper 36. We refer to Mylan Pharmaceuticals, Inc., Celltrion, Inc. and Apotex, Inc., collectively, as “Petitioner.”” slip op. at 3

  • ExcludeMotion to exclude, deniedDenied

    “We are not persuaded by Petitioner’s argument that the challenged Exhibits are not authenticated. Federal Rule of Evidence 901 sets a relatively low bar for authentication. See Comcast, 2020 WL 4687062, at *28. Rule 901(a) states: “To satisfy the requirement of authenticating or identifying an item of evidence, the proponent must produce evidence sufficient to support a finding that the item is what the proponent claims it is.” Fed. R. Evid. 901(a). By way of example, Rule 901(b)(1) states that a witness with knowledge can provide authenticating testimony that an item is what it is claimed to be. Fed. R. 901(b)(1).” slip op. at 15

  • Strike new argumentNew argument consideredDenied

    “We deny the motion to exclude the referenced argument in Petitioners’ Reply, as well as the invitation to consider the motion as one to strike the argument. As Patent Owner notes in the motion, Patent Owner raised this issue previously in this proceeding. PO Mot. Exclude 5. At that time, we denied Patent Owner’s request for authorization to file a motion to strike the referenced argument in the Reply. It is improper for Patent Owner to now seek to strike the argument in a motion to exclude. A motion to exclude is not the proper vehicle to address arguments or evidence that a party believes exceeds the proper scope of a reply. See USPTO, Consolidated Trial Practice Guide (2019) at 79, available at: https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/tpgnov.pdf?MURL= (last visited October 27, 2022) (“CTPG”). Moreover, as Petitioners correctly assert, Patent Owner has failed to satisfy the prerequisite for filing a motion to exclude by failing to timely file an objection. See 37 C.F.R. 42.64(b)(1); CTPG 78–79. Patent Owner has not been left without an opportunity to address the Reply argument. When we denied authorization to file a motion to strike, we authorized Patent Owner to file, with its Sur-Reply, a table identifying any portion of the Reply that Patent Owner considers to have exceeded the scope of the Reply. Further, we explained that Patent Owner, alternatively, may address that contention, or the merits of any newly-raised arguments or evidence in its Sur-Reply. Indeed, Patent Owner addressed the issue in its 26 Sur-Reply for our consideration. Thus, Patent Owner had sufficient opportunity to identify in its Sur-Reply its contentions regarding Petitioners’ allegedly inappropriate Reply argument and took advantage of that opportunity. That is sufficient for us to consider the issue and determine whether such argument should be disregarded. See CTPG 80.” slip op. at 26

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “We find that Petitioner’s definition is the better definition for purposes of this proceeding. We acknowledge that the claims of the ’069 patent are directed to a “method for treating an angiogenic eye disorder in a patient” 29 and that the actual practice of the method would therefore seem to be limited to those who have the ability to treat patients, i.e., physicians, etc. However, we find Patent Owner’s definition to be unduly limiting. Individuals who are involved in drug development or sub-clinical level testing of drugs for treating eye disorders may be extremely knowledgeable about the development of the treatment of eye disorders and drug development, and able to comprehend and evaluate the teachings of the prior art. See, e.g., Pet. 25. Such individuals might not possess an M.D. degree, but instead possess a Ph.D. in a “biotechnological, or pharmaceutical field,” or a lesser degree with a corresponding increased depth of experience, as suggested by Petitioner. We agree that such individuals should be considered persons of ordinary skill in the art. We also find that Petitioner’s definition is commensurate with the level of skill reflected in the prior art. See, e.g., Exs. 1006, 1010, 1030, 1033; see also Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (explaining that specific findings regarding ordinary skill level are not required “where the prior art itself reflects an appropriate level and a need for testimony is not shown” (quoting Litton Indus. Prods., Inc. v. Solid State Sys. Corp., 755 F.2d 158, 163 (Fed. Cir. 1985))). We consequently adopt Petitioner’s definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art has having an M.D. or Ph.D. or equivalent, or less education but considerable professional experience in the medical, biotechnological, or pharmaceutical field, and having practical academic or medical experience in developing treatments 30 for angiogenic eye disorders or treating angiogenic eye disorders including through the use of VEGF antagonists.” slip op. at 29

  Patent outcomesUS 9,669,069 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips
  Patents in suitUS 9,669,069
• T-Mobile USA, Inc. v. Traxcell Technologies, LLCInstituted
  PTAB · May 24, 2022 · IPR2022-00669 · APJ Norman H Beamer · IPR · Institution

  The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–30 under all six §103 grounds and granted T-Mobile’s motion to join IPR2021-01552.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

    “The standard for instituting an inter partes review is set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), which provides that an inter partes review may not be instituted unless the information presented in the petition and any preliminary response shows that “there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” As elaborated below, we determine that Petitioner has established a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail with respect to at least one challenged claim, and we institute an inter partes review as to the challenged claims and grounds raised in the Petition. We also grant the Joinder Motion.” slip op. at 2

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingJoinder, grantedGranted

    “We are persuaded by Petitioner’s arguments. Because the Petition challenges the same claims on the same grounds using the same prior art, Kyocera factor (2) favors joinder. See Kyocera, IPR2013-00004, Paper 15 at 4. Indeed, the Board “routinely grants motions for joinder where the party seeking joinder introduces identical arguments and the same grounds raised in the existing proceeding.” Samsung Elecs. Co., Ltd. v. Raytheon Company, IPR2016-00962, Paper 12 at 9 (PTAB Aug. 24, 2016).” slip op. at 34

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Either proposal is consistent with the level of ordinary skill in the art reflected by the prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001); In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995). On this record, the level of ordinary skill is neither in dispute nor dispositive of any challenge. For purposes of this Decision, we apply Petitioner’s articulation.” slip op. at 10

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “Claim terms need only be construed to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy. Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017). Petitioner states, “[n]o claim term requires express construction.” Pet. 11. Patent Owner states that it “considered the plain and ordinary meaning of each term of the ’196 patent as it would have been understood by one skilled in the art as of October 23, 2001.” Prelim. Resp. 3–4. For purposes of this Decision, we do not construe any claim terms.” slip op. at 10

  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 9,918,196
• Slayback Pharma LLC v. Sumitomo Dainippon Pharma Co., Ltd.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jan 20, 2022 · IPR2020-01053 · APJ Zhenyu Yang · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–75 are unpatentable as obvious over Saji; the Board did not reach the Latuda Information anticipation or Latuda Information and Loebel obviousness grounds.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner

    “We do not discern an appreciable difference in the parties’ respective definitions of the level of ordinary skill in the art, and any perceived distinction does not impact our Decision. Indeed, as Patent Owner acknowledges, the parties’ proposed definitions of the ordinary skill level do “not differ significantly.” Id. at 25. Nevertheless, for purposes of this Decision, we adopt Patent Owner’s definition of the skill level, as it is consistent with the ’827 patent disclosures and the prior art of record, and more inclusively describes the suitable experience for one of ordinary skill in the art. We further note that, in this case, the prior art itself demonstrates the level of skill in the art at the time of the invention. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 9

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

    “On this record, we find Petitioner’s proposed constructions are supported by intrinsic and extrinsic evidence. See Pet. 18–23. We agree with Petitioner here that “a patient” or “the patient” should have its ordinary and customary meaning of “one or more patients,” as opposed to a “patient population” as Patent Owner has previously argued in a district court litigation involving another party. See id. at 19–20. Indeed, Patent Owner agrees. See Reply 19 (“There is no dispute that ‘a patient,’ as recited in the ’827 claims, refers to ‘one or more patients.’”). We also agree with Petitioner that the dependent claims requiring treating patients with schizophrenia and manic depressive psychosis supports the conclusion that “treating a patient with an antipsychotic” in independent claims 25, 40, and 56 includes treatment of a patient with these particular diseases. See Pet. 20–21. 10 On this record, we further agree with Petitioner that “manic depressive psychosis” would be interpreted by a person or ordinary skill in the art as “bipolar disorder,” which includes Bipolar I Disorder, Bipolar II Disorder, Cyclothymia, and Bipolar Disorder Not Otherwise Specified. See id. at 21–22 (citations omitted); see also PO Resp. 3 (“Bipolar disorder, once known as manic depressive psychosis.”). Thus, for purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposed constructions.” slip op. at 10

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for petitioner

    “On this record and for purposes of this Decision, we see no need to construe any other term expressly. See Wellman, Inc. v. Eastman Chem. Co., 642 F.3d 1355, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (stating that claim terms need only be construed to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy).” slip op. at 11

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable

  Patent outcomesUS 9,815,827 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 9,815,827
• Slayback Pharma LLC v. Sumitomo Dainippon Pharma Co., Ltd.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Dec 7, 2021 · IPR2020-01053 · APJ Zhenyu Yang · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–75 are unpatentable as obvious over Saji; the Board did not reach the Latuda Information anticipation and Latuda Information–Loebel obviousness grounds.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner

    “We do not discern an appreciable difference in the parties’ respective definitions of the level of ordinary skill in the art, and any perceived distinction does not impact our Decision. Indeed, as Patent Owner acknowledges, the parties’ proposed definitions of the ordinary skill level do “not differ significantly.” Id. at 25. Nevertheless, for purposes of this Decision, we adopt Patent Owner’s definition of the skill level, as it is consistent with the ’827 patent disclosures and the prior art of record, and more inclusively describes the suitable experience for one of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 9

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

    “On this record, we find Petitioner’s proposed constructions are supported by intrinsic and extrinsic evidence. See Pet. 18–23. We agree with Petitioner here that “a patient” or “the patient” should have its ordinary and customary meaning of “one or more patients,” as opposed to a “patient population” as Patent Owner has previously argued in a district court litigation involving another party. See id. at 19–20. Indeed, Patent Owner agrees. See Reply 19 (“There is no dispute that ‘a patient,’ as recited in the ’827 claims, refers to ‘one or more patients.’”).” slip op. at 10

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “On this record and for purposes of this Decision, we see no need to construe any other term expressly. See Wellman, Inc. v. Eastman Chem. Co., 642 F.3d 1355, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (stating that claim terms need only be construed to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy).” slip op. at 11

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundUnpatentable

    “Based on Saji’s preferred dose range of 5 to 100 mg/day, which overlaps with the “from 20 to 120 mg/day” range required by each challenged independent claim, Petitioner argues that an ordinarily skilled artisan would have been “motivated to conduct dose ranging studies and would find the claimed dosing regimens.” Pet. 62; see also id. at 55 (contending that “dose ranging was a routine part of drug development” (citing Ex. 1030)). Dr. Stahl’s testimony supports Petitioner’s argument. Indeed, Dr. Stahl testifies that, although with some drugs, it can be difficult to find a safe and effective dose, or to get an effective dose into the patient, neither is the case with lurasidone. Ex. 1054, 141:3–14; see also id. at 142:2–6 (“Q. [A]re you aware of any particular difficulties with lurasidone hydrochloride and finding a safe and effective dose for schizophrenia and manic depressive psychosis? A. No.”); 135:18–25 19 (Dr. Stahl testifying that he is “not aware of anything unusual about [lurasidone’s] dose range”). Thus, we agree with Petitioner that an ordinarily skilled artisan, starting from Saji’s preferred dosing range, would have conducted routine dose ranging studies and identified the claimed dosing regimens.” slip op. at 19

  Patent outcomesUS 9,815,827 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 9,815,827
• Eis GmbH v. Novoluto GmbHRehearing granted
  PTAB · Sep 25, 2020 · IPR2020-00007 · APJ Susan L C Mitchell · IPR · Rehearing

  Granted EIS GMBH’s rehearing request and instituted IPR of claims 1–3, 5, 7, 8, 11, 14, 15, 17–21, and 23–26 on all asserted grounds.

  RulingsRehearing decision

  • RehearingRehearing, grantedGranted

    “We find that Dr. Prisco’s testimony is a reasonable interpretation of how Taylor works if the bellows are bidirectional, and the bellows are expanded and contracted when the suction cup is sealingly engaged. Figure 3 of Taylor shown above appears to support Dr. Prisco’s testimony that the bellows may be expanded or contracted from the initial position shown in Figure 3 and does not appear to show any valve or second opening in the bellows to provide unidirectional flow as Dr. Jensen, Patent Owner’s declarant, asserts. Also, as Petitioner asserts, Taylor indicates that a squeeze ball may be substituted for the bellows expressly indicating a device with a bidirectional flow. Although Patent Owner raises valid arguments concerning a common definition of bellows indicating unidirectional flow and provides testimony from Dr. Jensen reasonably supporting such a position, these dueling positions create a genuine issue of material fact that we weigh in favor of Petitioner on institution. See 37 C.F.R. 42.108(c).” slip op. at 18

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsDecided for petitioner

    “We conclude from a review of Fang and Taylor that they are not substantially the same art nor is Petitioner making substantially the same argument as was presented the Office during prosecution of the ’061 Patent based on Fang. We find that the way in which Fang and Taylor work appear to be materially different. Fang appears to apply only suction to the skin whereas Taylor, with the sealingly connected suction cup, appears to apply a cyclical vacuum that Dr. Prisco testifies meets the claim limitations requiring generation of a pattern of negative and positive pressures, modulated with respect to a reference pressure. Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 62–64, 75. Thus Taylor appears to teach the claim element Patent Owner argued during prosecution was missing from Fang. Also, in applying factors (b) and (d) of Becton, Dickinson, because of such differences noted above, we find that Taylor is not cumulative of Fang, which was considered and applied by the Office during prosecution of the ’061 Patent. 4. Conclusion Thus, we find that Taylor and Fang are not substantially the same art, nor were substantially the same arguments based on these references presented in the Petition and during prosecution of the ’061 Patent, respectively. As discussed above, because Petitioner primarily relies on Taylor in all four grounds for teaching the modulation of positive and negative pressures with respect to a reference pressure as required by all of the challenged claims, we also find that, overall, the same or substantially the same art was not previously presented to the Office nor were the same or substantially the same arguments previously presented to the Office. Therefore, we do not need to reach the application of the remaining Becton, Dickenson factors relating to whether the Petitioner has demonstrated a material error by the Office. Thus, we decline to exercise our discretion under § 325(d) to deny institution of an inter partes review here.” slip op. at 12

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

    “how Taylor works if the bellows are bidirectional, and the bellows are expanded and contracted when the suction cup is sealingly engaged. Figure 3 of Taylor shown above appears to support Dr. Prisco’s testimony that the bellows may be expanded or contracted from the initial position shown in Figure 3 and does not appear to show any valve or second opening in the bellows to provide unidirectional flow as Dr. Jensen, Patent Owner’s declarant, asserts. Also, as Petitioner asserts, Taylor indicates that a squeeze ball may be substituted for the bellows expressly indicating a device with a bidirectional flow. Although Patent Owner raises valid arguments concerning a common definition of bellows indicating unidirectional flow and provides testimony from Dr. Jensen reasonably supporting such a position, these dueling positions create a genuine issue of material fact that we weigh in favor of Petitioner on institution. See 37 C.F.R. 42.108(c).” slip op. at 18

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Instituted

    “We find that Dr. Prisco’s testimony is a reasonable interpretation of how Taylor works if the bellows are bidirectional, and the bellows are expanded and contracted when the suction cup is sealingly engaged. Figure 3 of Taylor shown above appears to support Dr. Prisco’s testimony that the bellows may be expanded or contracted from the initial position shown in Figure 3 and does not appear to show any valve or second opening in the bellows to provide unidirectional flow as Dr. Jensen, Patent Owner’s declarant, asserts. Also, as Petitioner asserts, Taylor indicates that a squeeze ball may be substituted for the bellows expressly indicating a device with a bidirectional flow. Although Patent Owner raises valid arguments concerning a common definition of bellows indicating unidirectional flow and provides testimony from Dr. Jensen reasonably supporting such a position, these dueling positions create a genuine issue of material fact that we weigh in favor of Petitioner on institution. See 37 C.F.R. 42.108(c).” slip op. at 18

  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denial
  Patents in suitUS 9,849,061
• Reactive Surfaces Ltd., LLP v. LG Chem Ltd.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Feb 24, 2020 · IPR2018-01520 · APJ Timothy G Majors · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–8 are unpatentable as obvious; the contingent motion to amend is granted for substitute claims 9–16.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

    “1. “anti-fingerprint coating” The phrase “anti-fingerprint coating” appears twice in claim 1: first in” slip op. at 16

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successUnpatentableMotivation foundUnpatentable

    “fingerprint must “vaporize” from the coated surface.30 As discussed above (Section III(C)), the claimed “anti-fingerprint” functionality encompasses a coating that is capable of actively reducing transfer of a fingerprint or decomposing a fingerprint transferred to a surface of the coated substrate. Accordingly, notwithstanding Buchanan’s shortcomings in evidencing inherent vaporization of enzymatically decomposed fingerprint components, we are unpersuaded this is fatal to Petitioner’s challenge. Rather, for” slip op. at 43

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedPatent owner expert creditedDecided for patent owner

    “conclusory” lack merit. Dr. Cairns has relevant expertise in this area, whereas Petitioner’s declarant, Dr. Rozzell, does not. Ex. 2035 (Rozzell dep.), 128:15–20 (“[Y]ou are not a person of ordinary skill in the art as it pertains to the use of haze values to assess visibility, are you? A. No.”); Ex. 2033 (Cairns Decl.) ¶¶ 2–9 (describing, inter alia, Dr. Cairns’s many years of experience working with and researching specialized coatings for display and touch-sensor applications and optical properties for such devices). Accordingly, Dr. Cairns’s testimony about there being a recognized and sufficiently definite correlation between haze and contaminant (including fingerprint) visibility on display devices is entitled to greater weight than Dr. Rozzell’s opinions on the topic. See, e.g., Ex. 2036 ¶¶ 62–67 (analyzing portions of the patent and prior art to support the opinion that haze is correlated to visibility); Ex. 2035 (Rozzell dep.) 125:1– 16 (“[W]hatever familiarity you have acquired with respect to the utilization of haze as a measurement of visibility has been acquired in the context of this IPR; correct? A That’s correct.”). Dr. Cairns’s opinions are also not conclusory as argued, but are supported with evidence from the patent and the prior art as noted. Ex. 2036 ¶¶ 62–67. slip op. at 83

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Motions to amend / substitute claimsMotion to amend, grantedGranted

    “have wanted to combine Amin’s and Wang’s coatings, Petitioner simply does not provide an adequate, evidence-backed analysis of how such person would have predictably done so. As Patent Owner points out, the evidence on this record raises doubts that the two coatings could have been successfully combined. MTA Reply 6–8. Specifically, evidence of record supports Patent Owner’s argument that a skilled artisan would not have reasonably expected “that the digestive enzymes of Wang could be successfully immobilized on the fluorine-coated surface of Amin.” Id.; Ex. 2036, ¶¶ 6–10; Ex. 2035, 15:5˗19:2. Notably, the testimony of Petitioner’s own declarant supports the conclusion that the combination Petitioner proposes would not have been reasonably predictable—if even possible at all. When Dr. Rozzell was asked if there were other materials (like enzymes) that could be adhered to the surface of Amin’s coatings, he did not know. Ex. 2035: 15:16–17:13 (“[Y]ou don’t know what any of those materials [that might adhere] are, sitting here today? A Not without doing some research on my end.”) (“So turning back to our discussion of immobilizing an enzyme on this [Amin’s coating], you don’t know of a way, today, that you could immobilize an enzyme on top of a fluorine-coated layer. A Well, I’ve personally not done exactly that type of experiment, but I can imagine that there would be approaches that would allow you to do that. Q But you don’t know any of them today? A I can’t tell you one as I’m sitting here today. Q Okay. And you’ve not recalled seeing this in a publication? A No.”).” slip op. at 87

  Patent outcomesUS 8,932,717 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Graham · Nautilus
  Patents in suitUS 8,932,717
• Hyperbranch Medical Technology, Inc. v. Incept LLCAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Apr 9, 2018 · IPR2016-01836 · APJ Kristi L R Sawert · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–6 and 8–12 are unpatentable as obvious under § 103 over Rhee ’500 or Rhee ’587, each combined with Bass or Tse.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Upon review of the parties’ respective definitions of a person of ordinary skill in the art, we adopt Petitioner’s definition as a person with either: (1) a Ph.D. in the field of chemistry, polymer chemistry, chemical engineering, materials science and/or a related field and having at least one year of educational or work experience in the synthesis and development of biocompatible polymer materials; (2) a bachelor’s degree in in [sic] the field of chemistry, polymer chemistry, chemical engineering, materials science and/or a related field and at least two years of work experience in the synthesis and development of biocompatible polymer materials; or (3) any education and experience equivalent to (1) or (2). Pet. 22 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 49). We find that Patent Owner’s definition of the ordinarily skilled artisan, i.e., a person having “a Ph.D. degree, or equivalent education, in polymer chemistry, or a bachelor of science degree in chemistry or a closely related field and several years of experience in the development and manufacture of polymer materials for use as tissue sealants,” PO Resp. 15–16 (citing Ex. 2006 ¶ 27), does not differ materially from Petitioner’s definition. Furthermore, our analysis would be the same under either parties’ definition.” slip op. at 9

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed board ownOther

    “1. “visualization agent” In its Petition, Petitioner proposed interpretations of certain claim terms. Pet. 18–22. The Board determined in its Institution Decision, however, that only the term “visualization agent” required express interpretation. Inst. Dec. 8 (citing Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“[O]nly those terms need be construed that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.”)). The Board set forth the broadest reasonable interpretation of “visualization agent” as “an agent that reflects or emits light at a wavelength detectable to a human eye so that a human eye may visualize the hydrogel coating.” Id. at 9. Neither party challenges that interpretation. See, e.g., Third Tr. 6:15–17. We have reassessed that determination in light of the arguments and evidence adduced at trial, and maintain that determination based on the full record.” slip op. at 11

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Preamble limiting or notPreamble limitingDecided for patent owner

    “In general, a preamble limits the invention if it recites essential structure or steps, or if it is necessary to give life, meaning, and vitality to the claim.” Catalina Mktg. Int’l, Inc. v. Coolsavings.com, Inc., 289 F.3d 801, 808 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (quotation omitted). “Conversely, a preamble is not limiting where a patentee defines a structurally complete invention in the claim body and uses the preamble only to state a purpose or intended use for the invention.” Id. Here, we determine that the preamble phrase “suitable to coat a tissue of a patient” is not merely a statement of purpose, but instead represents the “essence or a fundamental characteristic of the claimed invention.” Vizio, Inc. v. Int’l Trade Com’n, 605 F.3d 1330, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2010). In Vizio, the Federal Circuit held that a preamble reciting “for decoding” certain data “is properly construed as a claim limitation” because the apparatus and method claims reciting that preamble “would have little meaning without the intended objective of decoding.” Id. at 1341. Similarly here, we determine that the method step of claim 1—namely, mixing reactive nucleophilic precursor species, electrophilic precursor species, and a visualization agent—would have little meaning without the intended objective of forming a hydrogel coating on the tissue of a patient. Put differently, there would be no reason to perform the method step of claim 1 but for forming a hydrogel coating on the patient’s tissue. See Ex. 1001, 39:56–40:2 (claim 1) (providing that the reactive precursors crosslink after contact with the tissue to form a hydrogel in the form of a coating). Thus, we determine that “suitable to coat a tissue of a patient” is limiting in this case because it gives “life and meaning” to method claim 1. We further find that the arguments and evidence in this case show that skilled artisans would reasonably interpret “suitable to coat a tissue of a patient” as encompassing a biocompatibility requirement. Although Petitioner correctly notes that “[n]one of challenged claims recite the term ‘biocompatible,” Petitioner acknowledges that skilled artisans understand “that hydrogels are, by their nature as water-swelled materials, known to be biocompatible.” Pet. Suppl. Br. 4–5. Petitioner’s expert, Dr. Lowman, declared that “biocompatibility is presumed as a fundamental aspect of the claimed and disclosed inventions.” Ex. 2018 ¶ 40. And in his deposition, Dr. Lowman testified that skilled artisans would understand “biocompatible” to mean that the hydrogel composition is “suitable for use and tolerated by a patient.” Ex. 2019, 13:2–11 (emphasis added). Thus, we agree with Patent Owner that “suitable to coat a tissue of a patient” reasonably encompasses a biocompatibility requirement for the hydrogel composition. slip op. at 12

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner

    “3. Motivation to combine the prior art references and reasonable expectation of success Even “[i]f all elements of the claims are found in a combination of prior art references,” “the factfinder should further consider whether a person of ordinary skill in the art would [have been] motivated to combine those references, and whether in making that combination, a person of ordinary skill would have [had] a reasonable expectation of success.” Merck & Cie v. Gnosis S.P.A., 808 F.3d 829, 833 (Fed. Cir. 2015). The “motivation to combine” and “reasonable expectation of success” factors are subsidiary requirements for obviousness subsumed within the Graham factors. Pfizer, Inc. v. Apotex, Inc., 480 F.3d 1348, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2007).” slip op. at 28

  Patent outcomesUS 7,009,034 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousness
  Patents in suitUS 7,009,034
• Blue Coat Systems, Inc. v. Finjan, Inc.Rehearing granted
  PTAB · Jul 18, 2017 · IPR2016-01444 · APJ Patrick M Boucher · IPR · Rehearing

  Granted Blue Coat’s rehearing request and instituted review of claims 1, 4–6, 9, 12–14, 17, 24, 35, and 37; the petition showed a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on the asserted § 103 grounds.

  RulingsRehearing decision

  • RehearingRehearing, grantedGranted

    “reexamination proceeding. Of particular relevance, the reexamination concluded with a Reexamination Certificate issued on November 28, 2016, including a claim for the benefit of the November 8, 1996 filing date of U.S. Provisional Appl. No. 60/030,639 (“the ’639 provisional application”). Ex. 3006 at [60]. In denying the Petition, the Prior Decision noted that “Petitioner has taken no steps to explain or respond to the effect of these developments on its argument.” Dec. 7. This remains true. Nevertheless, we agree with Petitioner that our Prior Decision gave insufficient consideration to the Petition’s assertion that “U.S. Patent No. 7,613,926 [(“the ’926 patent”), i.e., an intermediate patent in the priority chain of the ’086 patent] fails to claim priority to the ’639 provisional application and instead the earliest priority document cited in the ’926 patent is [the ’194 patent].” Pet. 5 (citing Ex. 1012, col. 1, ll. 8–32); see Req. Reh’g 4–5, 6 n.4, 7–9. For a claim of a patent to be entitled to the effective filing date of an earlier filed application, each application in the priority chain must refer to the earlier filed application. Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc. v. Alpine Elecs. of Am., Inc., 609 F.3d 1345, 1350–52 (Fed. Cir. 2010). Accordingly, we grant Petitioner’s Rehearing Request and proceed to the merits of the Petition.” slip op. at 8

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedMixed

    “a formally defined safety policy” and allows checking “with certainty, that the proof is valid and hence the foreign code is safe to execute.” Ex. 1004, 107. Thus, Petitioner argues that one of ordinary skill in the art would reasonably understand Necula to teach that its proof-carrying code adds to the foreign code, consistent with the construction of “append” that we apply herein, and Petitioner articulates sufficient reasoning with rational underpinning to apply that teaching to Swimmer’s representation of DSP data. See Pet. 46–49. This is not an instance, for example, in which Petitioner relies on a characterization of the problem provided by the patent to derive its reasoning. Cf., e.g., Mintz v. Dietz & Watson, Inc., 679 F.3d 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2012). Indeed, Patent Owner’s contention that “the storage of the DSP in a database is one of the key features that distinguishes the ‘086 Patent over the prior art” dilutes the strength of its argument. The contrary positions of the parties’ declarants in their testimonial evidence creates a genuine issue of material fact, which we resolve in the light most favorable to Petitioner for purposes of this Decision. 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(c). Accordingly, we conclude that Petitioner has made a sufficient showing also with respect to these elements, and that Petitioner demonstrates a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on its challenge of claims 1 and 9. See infra Section II.E.10 (discussing limits in our weighing of Patent Owner’s Secondary Considerations evidence in this Preliminary Proceeding).” slip op. at 21

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Real party in interest / privityRpi dispute resolved for petitionerDecided for petitioner

    “be considered under 35 U.S.C. § 312 because Petitioner has failed to name all real parties in interest, as required by the statute.” Prelim. Resp. 9. The parties agree that, on June 12, 2016, Symantec Corporation (“Symantec”) announced that it was acquiring Petitioner. Pet. 13; Prelim. Resp. 9. The Petition discloses that “[t]he transaction is expected to close in the third quarter of 2016,” and that “[a]s of the filing date of this petition the transaction has not been executed.” Pet. 13. The Petition further represents that “Symantec has not controlled or had the ability to control the filing of this petition, whether through funding or strategy.” Id. As noted above, Petitioner expressly identified Symantec as a real party in interest before any decision on institution of an inter partes review was made. Paper 8, 2. Patent Owner contends that “Symantec had control over the filing of the Petition during the period between the announcement of the acquisition and the closing of the acquisition,” which it asserts occurred on August 1, 2016. Prelim. Resp. 9. Patent Owner also contends that it “understands from the underlying litigation that ‘Blue Coat Systems, Inc.’ no longer exists 1 A petition to accept an unintentionally delayed claim of priority for the ’926 patent, claiming the benefit of U.S. Patent Appl. No. 08/790,097 which was filed January 29, 1997, was dismissed by the Office on June 13, 2017. Exs. 1027, 3007. A renewed petition was filed on June 16, 2017. Ex. 3008. At this time, the Office has not ruled on the renewed petition, and that pending petition accordingly does not affect our determination of the challenged claims’ effective filing date for purposes of this Decision. as an entity, or at least goes by ‘Blue Coat Systems LLC’ for at least the last two months.” Id. at 10. We have reviewed the evidence provided by Patent Owner and find it insufficient to support Patent Owner’s allegation that Petitioner has failed to comply with 35 U.S.C. § 312(a) or 37 C.F.R. § 42.8(a)(3). That evidence is, at best, suggestive regarding an issue that is not jurisdictional. Lumentum Holdings, Inc. v. Capella Photonics, Inc., Case IPR2015-00739, slip op. (PTAB Mar. 4, 2016) (Paper 38) (precedential).” slip op. at 9

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

    “1. “Downloadable” Every challenged independent claim recites a “Downloadable,” and Petitioner contends that “[t]he broadest reasonable interpretation of the term ‘downloadable’ includes ‘an executable application program, which is downloaded from a source computer and run on a destination computer.’” Pet. 15. Petitioner’s proposed construction parallels a statement made in the Specification of the ’194 patent. Ex. 1012, col. 1, ll. 44–47. Patent Owner “does not dispute” this proposed construction, which we adopt for purposes of this Decision. Prelim. Resp. 5. 2. “database” Challenged independent claim 42 recites “a database of Downloadable security profiles.” Petitioner contends that “[t]he broadest reasonable interpretation of the term ‘database’ includes ‘a collection of interrelated data organized according to a database schema to serve one or more applications.’” Pet. 15. Patent Owner also “does not dispute” this proposed construction, but argues that “the practical import of Petitioner’s proposed construction for the term ‘database,’ is that log files, such as Swimmer’s audit trail, do not fall within the scope of the claims.” Prelim. Resp. 5–6. That is, Patent Owner contends that “logging functionality is distinct from storing in a database, which allows DSP to be efficiently retrieved from the database,” as compared with the “record-keeping” functionality of an “event log.” Id. at 7. Patent Owner’s argument was considered by the panel in IPR2015- 01892, which concluded that, “[t]o the extent that construction would exclude a log file consisting of an ‘unstructured collection of data on a computer,’ . . . [an] unstructured log file would not be a database,” but the construction does not “necessarily exclude[] all log files from being databases.” 1892 Dec. 16 (emphasis in original). We agree with the reasoning expressed in the Final Written Decision of IPR2015-01892. Id. at 12–17. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposed construction.” slip op. at 10

  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips
  Patents in suitUS 8,079,086

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.