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  • PTAB · Jan 23, 2026 · IPR2024-01342 · APJ Terrence W Mcmillin · IPR · Final written decision

    Claims 1–4 and 6–10 are unpatentable as obvious over each asserted ground; claim 5 was not shown unpatentable because the petitions failed to establish its additional feed and time-period limitations.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for petitioner

      “1b, 1c, and 1e of claim 1 and in claims 4 and 5 of the ’753 patent. Patent Owner contends that the plain and ordinary meaning of “feed” is “one or more associated media elements.” See, e.g., PO Resp. 4. However, as discussed below, this alleged plain and ordinary meaning of feed is not supported by the claim language, the specification of the ’753 patent, or dictionary definitions of feed as contended by Patent Owner. We reject this contention and the related contentions that the cited art may be distinguished from the claims of the ’753 patent based on the recited term “feed.” Patent Owner relies on the language of claim 1 to support its” slip op. at 13

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “The parties’ definitions are similar, although we observe that Patent Owner proposes that the person of ordinary skill would have a bachelor’s degree or an equivalent or professional experience, whereas Petitioner proposes that such a person would have both a degree and experience. Neither party presents any arguments relating or referring to the level of ordinary skill in the art. Determining the level of ordinary skill in the art involves various factors, including the “type of problems encountered in the art; prior art solutions to those problems; rapidity with which innovations are made; sophistication of the technology; and educational level of active workers in the field.” In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (citation omitted). The prior art of record also reflects the level of ordinary skill in the art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001). We adopt Petitioner’s assessment of the level of skill in the art. Petitioner’s assessment is supported by the testimony of Dr. Almeroth and is consistent with the ’753 patent and the asserted prior art. However, our obviousness analysis would be the same under either party’s assessment. See Ex. 2014 ¶ 17 (Patent Owner’s declarant, Dr. Goodrich, stating that “I note that my definition of a POSITA is similar to that of Dr. Almeroth” and “My opinions in this declaration would not change were I to adopt the definition of a POSITA offered by Dr. Almeroth.”).” slip op. at 11

    • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner

      “16 With regard to claim 5, the Petition cites paragraphs 97 and 98 of the Almeroth Declaration (Ex. 1002). See Pet. 28–29. We have considered the cited paragraphs in the Almeroth Declatation and found that they consist of nothing more than the inadequate and conclusory contentions in the Petition preceded by, in paragraph 97, “[i]n my opinion” and “it is my opinion” and, in paragraph 98, “[i]t is also my opinion.” Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 97, 98. As related to claim 5, we accord the Almeroth Declaration little or no weight. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.65 (a) (“Expert testimony that does not disclose the underlying facts or data on which the opinion is based is entitled to little or no weight.”). that might become out-of-date before a user accesses access [sic] them. Ex. 1003, 11:49–58 (emphasis added). The cited passage in Whitehead mentioning “near real-time” does not support finding that Whitehead teaches or suggests the elements recited in claim 5.” slip op. at 39

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner

      “Petitioner contends, “[a] POSITA would have modified Whitehead’s mixing server 130 to incorporate Marcus ’904’s algorithm (running on Marcus ’904’s receiver) for receiving, selecting, ordering, and assembling different media streams (both for content and advertising).” Pet. 33. Petitioner supports this contention by articulating the following reasons for the asserted modification of Whitehead’s mixing server 130 to incorporate Marcus ’904’s algorithm: “makes it more likely the system will identify content best suited for a particular user,” “allows for more targeted advertising and/or an opportunity to maximize revenue,” “improves Whitehead’s ability to target content and advertising to a particular user,” “would unlock new revenue sources for Whitehead,” “Marcus ’904’s content selection and concatenation algorithm improves Whitehead’s efficiency,” “[b]oth Whitehead and Marcus ’904 generate custom media programming based on a user profile,” “incorporating Marcus ’904’s teachings would not require redesigning Whitehead’s architecture and instead merely supplements Whitehead’s disclosure,” and “Petitioner’s proposed modification can be implemented entirely in software and does not require any hardware modifications. Indeed, Whitehead acknowledges that such modifications are possible. EX1003 at 19:64-20:6, 22:26-40.” Id. at 33–35 (citing Ex. 1002 (Almeroth Decl.) ¶¶ 110–115) (emphasis omitted). Based on this undisputed showing, we find that one of ordinary skill would have had a motivation to combine the teachings of Whitehead and Marcus ’904 as asserted in the Petition with a reasonable expectation of success.” slip op. at 48

    Patent outcomesUS 8,886,753 mixed
    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Graham
    Patents in suitUS 8,886,753
  • PTAB · Sep 5, 2025 · IPR2024-00431 · APJ Jon M Jurgovan · IPR · Final written decision

    Claims 1, 3, and 4 are unpatentable as obvious over Afshary and Mirfakhraei; claim 2 was not shown unpatentable over either asserted combination.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • Skill levelSkill level board ownDecided for petitioner

      “Patent Owner’s proposal to limit a POSITA’s education and experience to “broadband networks over coaxial cables” is too narrow. Although Patent Owner points to various parts of the ’518 patent as supporting its restrictive proposal, other parts of the patent are not so limited. For example, the patent’s technical field and summary are not limited to coaxial cable, and the patent discusses twisted pair wiring and satellite communications as media that can be used. See, e.g., Ex. 1001, 1:27–29, 3:33–35, 3:49–50, 3:67–4:3, 5:61–6:3, 8:20–23, 9:28–33. Accordingly, we adopt the following level of ordinary skill in the art for use in this Decision: A POSITA would have a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, or a related field, and two to four years of experience with broadband communication networks. Additional professional experience could substitute for education, and additional education could substitute for professional experience. We find that this skill level is consistent with the problems and solutions identified in the ’518 patent and the prior art references asserted by Petitioner. In addition, we find the adopted skill level consistent with the education and experience that a POSITA would have had. See In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (citing Custom Accessories, Inc. v. Jeffrey-Allan Indus., Inc., 807 F.2d 955, 962 (Fed. Cir. 1986)) (citing factors to consider when determining level of ordinary skill in the art).” slip op. at 15

    • Expert testimonyDecided for petitioner

      “We determine that Mr. Bertonis and Mr. Garrett had at least the skill level of a POSITA at the time they submitted their declarations and testimony in this case. Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 4–15, Appx. A; Ex. 2001 ¶¶ 8–12, Appx. A; cf Osseo Imaging, LLC v. Planmeca USA Inc., 116 F.4th 1335 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2024) (“An expert need not have acquired that skill level prior to the time of the invention to be able to testify from the vantage point of a person of ordinary skill in the art.”). Accordingly, we see no reason to disregard the testimony of either on the basis that they do not have a POSITA’s skill level.” slip op. at 45

    • Claim Construction › Functional claiming / §112(f) means-plus-function › Whether §112(f) applies (Williamson, nonce words)§112(f) appliesTerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

      “Because an assessment of whether the prior art discloses a means- plus-function limitation depends not only on the presence of the recited function but also the structure that performs that function as described in the patent’s specification, we address Petitioner’s undisputed contentions for the means-plus-function limitations below.” slip op. at 12

    • Obviousness (§103) › Analogous artAnalogous artDecided for petitioner

      “We conclude that Petitioner has shown by preponderant evidence that Mirfakhraei is in the same field of endeavor as the ’518 patent, i.e., “broadband communication networks.” Mirfakhraei is thus analogous art because it is in the same field of endeavor as the ’518 patent.” slip op. at 27

    Patent outcomesUS 7,295,518 mixed
    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Graham
    Patents in suitUS 7,295,518
  • PTAB · Aug 15, 2025 · IPR2024-00442 · APJ Jon M Jurgovan · IPR · Final written decision

    Claims 1–4, 9–13, and 18 are unpatentable as obvious; claims 5–8 and 14–17 were not shown unpatentable over the asserted grounds.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “Patent Owner “accepts” Petitioner’s proposed level of skill in the art “solely for purposes of responding to the Petition.” PO Resp. 11. We adopt and apply Petitioner’s proposed skill level because it is consistent with the problems and solutions identified in the ’826 patent and the prior art references asserted by Petitioner. In addition, we find the adopted skill level consistent with the education and experience that a POSITA would have had. See In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (citing Custom Accessories, Inc. v. Jeffrey-Allan Indus., Inc., 807 F.2d 955, 962 (Fed. Cir. 1986)) (citing factors to consider when determining level of ordinary skill in the art).” slip op. at 10

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Plain and ordinary meaningDecided for patent owner

      “As there is no controversy between the parties regarding any claim language that we would need to resolve in order to render our decision in this case, we apply the ordinary and customary meaning of the claim terms without specific construction. See Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (only claim terms in controversy need to be construed, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy).” slip op. at 12

    • Claim Construction › Functional claiming / §112(f) means-plus-function › Whether §112(f) applies (Williamson, nonce words)§112(f) does not applyDecided for petitioner

      “In addition, Petitioner contends that the ’826 patent’s claims are not recited in means-plus-function form under § 112 ¶ 6. Pet. 25. Because the word “means” does not appear in the claims of the ’826 patent, there is a presumption that the claims do not recite means-plus-function limitations under § 112 ¶ 6. Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC, 792 F.3d 1339, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc in relevant part). Since neither party offers any argument or evidence to contravene this presumption, we do not construe any claim term as means-plus-function in rendering our decision.” slip op. at 12

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner

      “Although Patent Owner argues that adding Konstaninos’s multi- channel functionality to Kamieniecki’s single-channel device would increase costs and complexity, Patent Owner overlooks that multi-channel functionality would also increase the STB’s capabilities. In any case, “a given course of action often has simultaneous advantages and disadvantages, and this does not necessarily obviate a motivation to combine.” General Elec. Co. v. Raytheon Tech. Corp., 983 F.3d 1334, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (citing Medichem, S.A. v. Rolabo, S.L., 437 F.3d 1157, 1165 (Fed. Cir. 2006)). Furthermore, Petitioner presents preponderant evidence that the market demand was such that customers would have desired an STB with multi-channel functionality even though it would cost more than a basic STB. Pet. Reply 6–8 (citing Ex. 1010 ¶¶ 1, 11, 16, 102–104; Ex. 1032 ¶¶ 5–6; Ex. 1033, 27:6–29:23; Ex. 2013 ¶¶ 70, 108). Konstantinos expressly teaches that the “evolving market for data and programming services will demand that receivers have the capability of multi-channel tuning.” Ex. 1010 ¶ 1. Petitioner has thus established that there was market demand that would have led a POSITA to improve Kamieniecki with Konstantinos’s multi-carrier capability. See KSR, 550 U.S. at 418 (“Often, it will be necessary for a court to look to interrelated teachings of multiple patents; the effects of demands known to the design community or present in the marketplace; and the background knowledge of a [POSITA], all in order to determine whether there was an apparent reason to combine the known elements in the manner claimed by the patent at issue.” (emphasis added)). Moreover, we agree with Petitioner that Konstantinos addresses the cost and complexity issues that Patent Owner asserts are problematic. Pet. 35–36; Pet. Reply 8–9 (citing Ex. 1010 ¶¶ 102, 105–106). For example, Konstantinos teaches that breaking up the original signal into smaller subsignals decreases the required sampling rate for each band since interleaved lower-rate samplers can be used, which reduces power consumption and interference, and enables conventional digital channel selection methods to be used for fine selection of one channel from a band of channels. Ex. 1010 ¶¶ 102, 104105. In addition, Konstantinos teaches reducing cost and complexity through a single chip solution. Ex. 1002 ¶ 150; Ex. 1010 ¶ 44. Hence, we do not see the cost or complexity issues that Patent Owner mentions as barriers that would have prevented a POSITA from making the combination. Similarly unavailing is Patent Owner’s stance that Kamieniecki is satisfactory for the applications for which it is designed such that a POSITA would not seek to improve it with Konstantinos. PO Sur-Reply 8–11. Konstantinos recognizes the market demand for multi-channel functionality, so adding this capability to Kamieniecki’s single-channel device would have been a natural thing for the POSITA to pursue in light of the advantages afforded thereby. Ex. 1010 ¶ 1; KSR, 550 U.S. at 420 (“any need or problem known in the field of endeavor at the time of the invention and addressed by the patent can provide a reason for combining the elements in the manner claimed”).” slip op. at 17

    Patent outcomesUS 9,825,826 mixed
    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Graham
    Patents in suitUS 9,825,826
  • PTAB · Apr 24, 2025 · IPR2024-00209 · APJ Scott B Howard · IPR · Final written decision

    Claims 1–11 and 13–19 are unpatentable as obvious over Ho and Aoki; claims 12 and 20 were not shown unpatentable over Jiau and Aoki or Jiau and Kim.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner

      “Patent Owner argues for a slightly different level of ordinary skill in the art: “a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or a similar field, along with one to two years of experience developing or programming video games or video game systems, or similar types of computer systems.” PO Resp. 2 (citing Ex. 2006 ¶ 29). Patent Owner further argues that the person having ordinary skill in the art “may have additional education that might substitute for some of the experience, and additional experience might substitute for some of the educational background.” Id. (citing Ex. 2006 ¶ 29). According to Patent Owner, Petitioner’s proposal does not require experience in programming video games. Id. at 3. However, Patent Owner states, “[t]his difference does not materially affect the analysis presented below.” Id. We see very little difference between the parties’ respective proposals. We adopt Patent Owner’s marginally more specific proposal. Additionally, because we would reach the same conclusions under Petitioner’s proposal, we agree with Patent Owner that this does not affect our analysis.” slip op. at 9

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

      “Patent Owner argues that the plain and ordinary meaning of “downloading” excludes “real-time fetching of data by a client from a server system.” PO Resp. 34; see also PO Sur-reply 16–17; Tr. 32:22–34:7. Because we need not expressly construe any claim terms, we do not construe any terms of the ’662 patent. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co. Matal, 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (noting that “we need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 11

    • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityPrinted publication establishedReference is prior artDecided for petitioner

      “date of the ’662 patent, Ho is not a “printed publication” within the meaning of 35 U.S.C. § 311(b). PO Resp. 30–33; PO Sur-reply 15–16. The Federal Circuit has rejected this argument, holding that: a published patent application is, by its literal terms, a “printed publication.” So, when § 311(b) permits IPR challenges based upon “prior art . . . printed publications,” it includes within its literal scope challenges based upon a published patent application. And, by virtue of § 102(e)(1), a published patent application—this specific type of “printed publication”—is deemed prior art as of its filing date. Therefore, the plain language of §§ 311(b) and 102(e)(1) permits IPR challenges based upon published patent applications, and such published patent applications can be deemed prior art in IPRs as of their filing date. Lynk Labs, Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 125 F.4th 1120, 1127 (Fed. Cir. 2025). Thus, Petitioner asserts permissible grounds of unpatentability under 35 U.S.C. § 311(b) by arguing that claims 1–20 are unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) on the basis of Ho, which is a prior art printed publication, and either Aoki or Kim.” slip op. at 11

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner

      “A person having ordinary skill in the art would have combined Aoki’s teaching of using user-identification information as part of the request for an advertisement with Ho’s system, which also teaches a client device sending information to a server to request hot spot information, such as advertisements. See Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 103–107, 111, 114, 117. Because both Ho and Aoki are directed to improvements in game design and monetization from using advertisements (id. ¶ 106; Ex. 1004, 1:26–28; Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 6–8), a person having ordinary skill in the art would have looked at both Ho and Aoki and combined the relevant features with a reasonable expectation of success (Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 103, 106, 117). A person having ordinary skill in the art would have appreciated that using Aoki’s teaching of sending user-identification information with Ho, which includes sending information with a request for information relating to interactive information elements (hot spots), allows for targeted advertisements, which was a known advantage in advertising. Id. ¶ 117; Ex. 10089 ¶¶ 54–55 (describing advantages of targeted advertising).” slip op. at 26

    Patent outcomesUS 9,427,662 mixed
    Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 9,427,662
  • PTAB · Mar 6, 2025 · IPR2023-01292 · APJ David C Mckone · IPR · Final written decision

    Claims 1–4, 6–10, and 17–21 are unpatentable over Ohel; claims 5 and 11–16 were not shown unpatentable over Ohel or Nigawara.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “III. ANALYSIS A. Level of Skill in the Art Petitioner, relying on the testimony of Mr. Williams, contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have had at least a bachelor’s degree in computer science, electrical engineering, or a similar field, and would have had approximately two years industry experience in networking or communication systems.” Pet. 3 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 55–58). Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s proposal. PO Resp. 9. Petitioner’s proposal is consistent with the technology described in the Specification and the cited prior art. On the complete record, we adopt this level of skill.” slip op. at 9

    • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner

      “We have considered the parties’ citations to the specification and find examples that support Petitioner’s view that the term “entity” is broad enough to encompass dispatchers and individual users. See e.g., Ex. 1001, 3:52–4:5, 7:18–20, Fig. 1). However, we find no disclosure that redefines “entity” or excludes dispatchers and individual users from the category of “entity.” Patent Owner’s best examples (e.g., Ex. 1001, 1:15–21, 3:59–62) are no more than non-limiting examples. On the complete record, we conclude that “entity” is broad enough to include dispatchers and individual users.” slip op. at 20

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

      “have used a queue with Ohel’s system. This is insufficient because it does not provide evidence of a reason why a skilled artisan would have implemented Ohel’s system with a queue. See Auris Health, Inc. v. Intuitive Surgical Operations, Inc., 32 F.4th 1154, 1158 (Fed. Cir. 2022) (“The motivation-to-combine inquiry asks whether a skilled artisan ‘not only could have made but would have been motivated to make the combinations . . . of prior art to arrive at the claimed invention.’” (quoting Belden Inc. v. Berk- Tek LLC, 805 F.3d 1064, 1073 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (emphasis omitted))).” slip op. at 35

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of success › HindsightNot reached

      “have used a queue with Ohel’s system. This is insufficient because it does not provide evidence of a reason why a skilled artisan would have implemented Ohel’s system with a queue. See Auris Health, Inc. v. Intuitive Surgical Operations, Inc., 32 F.4th 1154, 1158 (Fed. Cir. 2022) (“The motivation-to-combine inquiry asks whether a skilled artisan ‘not only could have made but would have been motivated to make the combinations . . . of prior art to arrive at the claimed invention.’” (quoting Belden Inc. v. Berk- Tek LLC, 805 F.3d 1064, 1073 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (emphasis omitted))).” slip op. at 35

    Patent outcomesUS 7,324,802 mixed
    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 7,324,802
  • PTAB · Jun 13, 2024 · IPR2023-00577 · APJ David C Mckone · IPR · Final written decision

    Claims 14–18 are unpatentable as obvious over either Robertson, Gralla, and Gettman or Sauve and Tsuda; claims 1–13 were not shown unpatentable.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • Prior constructionPrior construction adoptedDecided for patent owner

      “1. “3D space” and “two-dimensional (2D) space” As we stated in the Institution Decision, at page 20, the parties agree” slip op. at 11

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

      “4. Remaining claim terms Based on the record before us, we do not find it necessary to provide” slip op. at 23

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundUnpatentable

      “predictably improved Sauve’s quick pick interface, and would have promoted space efficiency and conveyed order more clearly. Id. at 59–60 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 159). Petitioner further argues that the combination would have exploited spatial memory and more efficient use of screen space and, thus, would have been a differentiator among competing web browsers. Id. at 60–61 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 160–162). Petitioner argues that a skilled artisan would have had a reasonable expectation of success in making the combination because GUIs, web browsers, and simulated 3D environments were all well-known technologies that had been demonstrated successfully in the real world. Id. at 61 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 163). Dr. Fuchs’ testimony has rational underpinning, is logical and well-reasoned, and, accordingly, we give it substantial weight.” slip op. at 64

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of success › Teaching awayTeaching away not foundDecided for petitioner

      “reference teaches away “when a person of ordinary skill, upon reading the reference, would be discouraged from following the path set out in the reference, or would be led in a direction divergent from the path that was taken by the applicant.” Gurley, 27 F.3d at 553. We have considered the portions of Sauve and Tsuda cited by Patent Owner and Dr. Schaefer, and find nothing that would discourage or lead in a direction divergent from the path taken by the inventor. Other than repeating Patent Owner’s argument that Sauve and Tsuda provide drastically different solutions for moving from one active window to another, Dr. Schaefer does not explain why he concludes that the solutions teach away from one another or point to evidence to support that conclusion. Ex. 2014 ¶¶ 225–227.” slip op. at 65

    Patent outcomesUS 8,881,048 mixed
    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 8,881,048
  • PTAB · Jun 13, 2024 · IPR2023-00242 · APJ David C Mckone · IPR · Final written decision

    Claims 14–18 are unpatentable as obvious over either instituted ground; claims 1–13 were not shown unpatentable because the petitioner failed to prove the challenged combinations met the claims.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • Prior constructionPrior construction adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “1. “3D space” and “two-dimensional (2D) space” As we stated in the Institution Decision, at page 20, the parties agree” slip op. at 11

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed board ownOther

      “3. “the rendered first webpage” Claim limitation 1dii recites “replacing the first and second objects within the 3D space with a window within a two-dimensional (2D) space in response to receiving the interaction, wherein the window includes the rendered first webpage.” Petitioner does not propose a construction for the term “the rendered first webpage” in the Petition. Pet. 13–14. Nevertheless, Patent Owner contends in the Patent Owner Response that “‘the rendered first webpage’ is the webpage that was requested by the user via the ‘first input’ from which the ‘first image’ was captured.” PO Resp. 13. As Petitioner summarizes, “[a]ccording to Patent Owner, ‘the rendered first webpage’ presented in 2D space ‘is the version that was previously received and rendered (e.g., stored in memory) from which the first image was captured. It is not a ‘live’ webpage from the Internet.’” Reply 6. Despite not proposing a construction in the Petition, Petitioner, in the Reply, asks us to construe “the rendered first webpage” to include either the previously received and rendered first webpage or a new (so called “live”) version of the first webpage rendered in response to receiving the user interaction of claim limitation 1dii. Reply 6–7. The plain and ordinary meaning of claim 1 supports Patent Owner’s argument. “To begin with, the context in which a term is used in the asserted claim can be highly instructive.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1314 (“To take a simple example, the claim in this case refers to ‘steel baffles,’ which strongly implies that the term ‘baffles’ does not inherently mean objects made of steel.”). Here, claim 1 refers to replacing the first and second objects with “the rendered first webpage,” which implies that the objects are not replaced with just any version of the first webpage. “Rendered” is in the past tense, suggesting a webpage that previously has been rendered. This is a clear reference to limitation 1ci, “rendering the first and second webpages.” Dr. Fuchs’ testimony is instructive. According to Dr. Fuchs, a skilled artisan “would have known that webpage rendering was a ubiquitous process for converting raw HTML code received from a web server into visible content.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 104. According to Dr. Fuchs, “[w]ebpage rendering is a core functionality of virtually all web browsers, and it would have been obvious to a [person of ordinary skill in the art] that rendering is a prerequisite step to obtaining ‘screen snapshots of actual web pages,’ as explained in Robertson’s companion Data Mountain paper.” Id. ¶ 105 (citing Ex. 1030, 5). Dr. Fuchs testifies that a skilled artisan “would have understood that Robertson’s 3D-GUI captures images of the rendered (first/second) webpages to obtain the webpage images on the object thumbnails.” Id. ¶ 107. Similarly, Dr. Fuchs testifies that “Gettman’s technique involves ‘cach[ing]’ ‘bitmap screenshots’ (captured first/second images) of rendered (first/second) webpages in local memory.” Id. ¶ 108. Here, as Dr. Fuchs reads claim limitations 1ci and 1cii, in step 1ci, a” slip op. at 20

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundUnpatentable

      “reference teaches away “when a person of ordinary skill, upon reading the reference, would be discouraged from following the path set out in the reference, or would be led in a direction divergent from the path that was taken by the applicant.” Gurley, 27 F.3d at 553. We have considered the portions of Sauve and Tsuda cited by Patent Owner and Dr. Schaefer, and find nothing that would discourage or lead in a direction divergent from the path taken by the inventor. Other than repeating Patent Owner’s argument that Sauve and Tsuda provide drastically different solutions for moving from one active window to another, Dr. Schaefer does not explain why he concludes that the solutions teach away from one another or point to evidence to support that conclusion. Ex. 2014 ¶¶ 225–227.” slip op. at 65

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of success › Teaching awayTeaching away not foundDecided for petitioner

      “reference teaches away “when a person of ordinary skill, upon reading the reference, would be discouraged from following the path set out in the reference, or would be led in a direction divergent from the path that was taken by the applicant.” Gurley, 27 F.3d at 553. We have considered the portions of Sauve and Tsuda cited by Patent Owner and Dr. Schaefer, and find nothing that would discourage or lead in a direction divergent from the path taken by the inventor. Other than repeating Patent Owner’s argument that Sauve and Tsuda provide drastically different solutions for moving from one active window to another, Dr. Schaefer does not explain why he concludes that the solutions teach away from one another or point to evidence to support that conclusion. Ex. 2014 ¶¶ 225–227.” slip op. at 65

    Patent outcomesUS 8,881,048 mixed
    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 8,881,048
  • PTAB · Oct 11, 2023 · IPR2022-00646 · APJ David C Mckone · IPR · Final written decision

    Claims 1–4, 12–16, 18, and 19 are unpatentable; claims 5–11, 17, and 20 are not unpatentable, based on the Sunada grounds.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › §315(e) estoppelEstoppel does not applyDecided for patent owner

      “certain arguments based on the Kayak FWD. Reply 1–5. Yet, the Federal Circuit vacated the Kayak FWD and remanded to the Board for further consideration. Ex. 1006, 2 (“We vacate the Sunada IPR decision because it rests on an incorrect claim construction of the ‘federated computing environment’ limitation of all claims at issue, and we remand for further consideration under the correct construction.”), 8 (“The Board’s decision in IPR2016-00608 is vacated because it rests on an incorrect claim construction, and the matter is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.”).” slip op. at 8

    • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownOther

      “shown that Sunada discloses “protected resources” under our claim construction of the term and, accordingly, Petitioner has not shown, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Sunada anticipates claims 1, 3, 12, 14, 15, and 18.” slip op. at 17

    • Skill levelOther

      “1. Level of Skill in the Art Petitioner, relying on the testimony of Dr. Crovella, contends that a” slip op. at 17

    • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableMixed

      “shown that Sunada discloses “protected resources” under our claim construction of the term and, accordingly, Petitioner has not shown, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Sunada anticipates claims 1, 3, 12, 14, 15, and 18.” slip op. at 17

    Patent outcomesUS 7,631,346 mixed
    Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 7,631,346
  • PTAB · Jul 13, 2023 · IPR2022-00281 · APJ Nathan A Engels · IPR · Final written decision

    Claims 1–4, 6, 13, 14, 17–19, and 25–27 are unpatentable as obvious; the remaining challenged claims were not shown unpatentable.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the alleged invention would have had “a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer science, or a similar field and two years of experience in the design of digital audio systems and associated signal processing.” Pet. 7 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 22). Petitioner also states that a person of ordinary skill “could have also obtained similar knowledge and experience through other means.” Pet. 7. Patent Owner’s Response applies Petitioner’s level of ordinary skill. PO Resp. 17. We adopt Petitioner’s assessment of the level of ordinary skill, which is consistent with the level reflected in the ’244 patent and the prior art.” slip op. at 7

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

      “As a general rule, ‘[u]nless the steps of a method [claim] actually recite an order, the steps are not ordinarily construed to require one.’” Mformation Techs., Inc. v. Research In Motion Ltd., 764 F.3d 1392, 1398 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Interactive Gift Express, Inc. v. Compuserve Inc., 256 F.3d 1323, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2001)). “However, a claim ‘requires an ordering of steps when the claim language, as a matter of logic or grammar, requires that the steps be performed in the order written, or the specification directly or implicitly requires’ an order of steps.” Id. (quoting TALtech Ltd. v. Esquel Apparel, Inc., 279 F. App’x 974, 978 (Fed. Cir. 2008)). Our preliminary discussion in the Decision Granting Institution states that “logic dictates that a voice timer must be active before something can happen ‘during a voice timer,’” but the Decision Granting Institution notes that the claims can be read in different ways, e.g.: “(a) changing a mixing gain at some point in time while the voice timer is active, or (b) maintaining an adjusted mix throughout a voice timer ‘pending voice activity.’” Paper 13, 15. On the full record, we determine the latter reading is correct; the claims do not require performing the “activating/activate” step before the “adjusting/adjusts” step, nor that a singular act of “adjusting/adjusts” must occur “during” a voice timer. slip op. at 10

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successUnpatentableMotivation foundUnpatentable

      “based on Kvaløy’s additional teachings of a protective earplug that protects a user’s hearing by sealing a user’s outer ear canal while allowing selected sounds to pass through. Pet. 29–30 (citing Ex. 1009 1:39–44, 3:40–46, 3:50–52, 4:22–26, 4:38–41, Fig. 1; Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 143–156). Petitioner also contends a person of ordinary skill would have been motivated to combine the teachings of Rosenberg and Kvaløy because, among other things, the references teach similar devices designed to protect users’ hearing and employing Kvaløy’s sealing section to provide full sound isolation in Rosenberg’s device would have improved Rosenberg’s hearing protection. Pet. 31–32. Patent Owner does not separately address or rebut Petitioner’s contentions for claim 4. We agree with Petitioner that the cited portions of Kvaløy satisfy claim 4, and we determine Petitioner has adequately articulated reasons a person of ordinary skill would have been motivated to combine the teachings of Rosenberg and Kvaløy, including to improve the hearing protection of Rosenberg’s device with the Kvaløy’s teachings of a sealing section. Accordingly, we determine Petitioner has proven by a preponderance of the evidence that claim 4 would have been obvious in view of the combined teachings of Rosenberg and Kvaløy.” slip op. at 27

    • Obviousness (§103) › Analogous artNot shown unpatentableNon analogous artNot shown unpatentable

      “First, we determine Petitioner forfeited these arguments by failing to show in the Petition that Olwal qualifies as analogous art. Even if these arguments were timely, Petitioner’s arguments are unpersuasive because Olwal describes a user interface for use with a desktop computer, which is well removed from the relevant field of endeavor, and Petitioner has not adequately established that Olwal’s teachings are reasonably pertinent to the problems with which the inventor of the ’244 patent was involved. Accordingly, we determine Petitioner has not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that claim 15 is unpatentable in view of Rosenberg, Park, and Olwal.” slip op. at 35

    Patent outcomesUS 9,270,244 mixed
    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 9,270,244
  • PTAB · Jul 7, 2023 · IPR2022-00302 · APJ Russell E Cass · IPR · Final written decision

    Claims 1–11 are unpatentable as obvious; claims 12–20 were not shown unpatentable, principally because the Allen–Victorian and Ryan-based combinations failed on disputed limitations.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for petitioner

      “reciting “a processor operatively coupled to evaluate a seal quality of the earpiece based on seal quality measurements made while driving or exciting a signal into the speaker located in the earpiece.” To construe this phrase, we start with the claim language itself. The claim language requires that the “processor” is operatively coupled “to evaluate a seal quality of the earpiece,” indicating that the processor evaluates seal quality. The claim also states that this evaluation is performed “based on seal quality measurements made while driving or exciting a signal into the speaker located in the earpiece,” indicating that the processor uses seal quality measurements to evaluate seal quality. The phrase “while driving or exciting a signal into the speaker located in the earpiece” modifies “seal quality measurements made,” indicating the timing of when the seal quality measurements are made, namely while (at the same time as) a signal is driven or excited into the speaker. This “while driving or exciting . . .” clause does not specify what component performs the “driving or exciting a signal into the speaker located into the earpiece.” Significantly, although the claim language states that the processor “evaluate[s] seal quality,” it does not state that the processor drives or excites the signal into the speaker. Had the applicant wanted to limit the claim in that manner, it could have drafted it to specify that the seal quality measurements are made “while the processor is driving or exciting a signal into the speaker.” The applicant, however, did not do so. Indeed, elsewhere in the claim, the language clearly specifies that certain functions are carried out by the processor, for example: • “a processor operatively coupled to evaluate a seal quality of the earpiece” (claim [1b]); • “the processor is configured to generate a visual or audio message identifying whether the at least one earpiece is properly sealed” (claim [1c]); • “the processor by way of the speaker and microphone adjusts the audio” (claim 3); • “the processor measures differences in a further sound pressure level between an ambient microphone and the [earpiece] microphone, and determines a sealing profile of the ear canal” (claim 4); • “the processor determines whether the earpiece is properly inserted . . . and generates the visual or audio message identifying compliance” (claim 5); • “the processor by way of the speaker and microphone in the earpiece performs in-situ measurement of a user’s ear anatomy” (claim 6); and • “the processor monitors changes in the ECTF to determine a sealing level of the earpiece” (claim 7). Ex. 1001, 13:25–67. Claim 1, however, does not include any comparable language specifying that the processor performs the “driving or exciting a signal into the speaker located in the earpiece.” Therefore, we find that the plain and ordinary meaning of claim 1’s language does not require that the processor itself must drive or excite a signal into the speaker.” slip op. at 19

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedOther

      “Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the alleged invention would have had “a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer science, audio engineering or a similar field and two years of experience in hearing instruments such as earphones, hearing aids and/or hearing protectors.” Pet. 9 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 22). Petitioner further states that the person of ordinary skill “could have also obtained similar knowledge and experience through other means.” Id. Patent Owner “applies the level of ordinary skill in the art that is proposed by Petitioners.” PO Resp. 13. We adopt Petitioner’s assessment of the level of ordinary skill in the art, which is supported by the ’424 patent and the asserted prior art.” slip op. at 10

    • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedPatent owner expert discountedDecided for petitioner

      “We do not agree with Dr. Struck’s testimony that “[a] person of ordinary skill in the art would understand that the processor performs the ‘driving or exciting’ of the signal to the speaker” and “would not even consider any other component mentioned in claim 1 as a candidate to perform the driving or exciting.” See Ex. 2006 ¶ 46. Dr. Struck does not discuss the grammar and structure of the claim language, including the fact that the phrase “while driving or exciting a signal into the speaker” modifies “seal quality measurements” and indicates the timing of when the seal quality measurements are made (while (at the same time as) a signal is driven or excited into the speaker). See id. Dr. Struck also does not discuss the fact that claim 1 recites that the processor “evaluate[s] a seal quality of the earpiece” but does not say that the same processor “driv[es] or excit[es] a signal into the speaker located into the earpiece, instead leaving the subject of what component performs the “driving or exciting” unspecified. See id. Indeed, Dr. Struck acknowledged at his deposition that his declaration lacks an “analysis of the grammar used in the limitation of [c]laim 1” at issue here. Ex. 1027, 20:4–15. Additionally, Dr. Struck appears to assume that the “driving or exciting” must be performed by some “other component mentioned in claim 1,” but there is no requirement that the claim must specify a particular component for carrying out this function. See Ex. 2006 ¶ 46.” slip op. at 21

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable

      “We also agree with Patent Owner that, in Petitioner’s proposed combination, the above rule that gates off the ear canal microphone would frustrate Allen’s purpose of comparing the signals from the inner and outer microphones to determine a reverse transfer function and perform a seal fit analysis. See PO Resp. 53–54; PO Sur-reply 13. In reaching this conclusion, we credit the testimony of Mr. Struck that “[w]hen this rule is in force, the Allen-Victorian combination would not be able to measure a reverse transfer function” and, accordingly, “would be incapable of performing the automatic adjustments that the Allen hearing aid can perform based on the reverse transfer function.” Ex. 2006 ¶ 114. Dr. Kyriakakis also confirmed at his deposition that, when this rule is in effect, Allen would not be able to use the reflectance method, which relies on signals from the inner and outer microphones: Q: So while the rule at Column 10, lines 19 through 22, of Victorian is being employed, Allen is not able to solve any of the problems that it solves by the reflectance method; is that correct? A: If Allen doesn’t have access to the signals, that is correct, to the two microphone signals. Ex. 2007, 63:16–23. We are not persuaded by Petitioner’s argument that Victorian’s VOX circuit would not interfere with Allen’s seal fit analysis, because Victorian states that gating off may cause microphone signals to be “blanked or substantially attenuated,” and “[s]ubstantial attenuation refers to an attenuation after which the attenuated sound does not cause any echo or tinging7 having an intolerable intensity.” See Pet. Reply 14–15 (citing Ex. 1013 ¶ 32; Ex. 1027, 120:1–8, 121:3–9). As noted above, the Petition relies on the embodiment of Victorian’s VOX that “prevents the remote sound from being detected by ear canal microphone 440,” rather than an embodiment that simply attenuates that sound. See Pet. 46; Ex. 1002 ¶ 152; Ex. 2007, 61:2–16. Petitioner’s shift to relying on a different embodiment of Victorian that “substantially attenuat[es]” the sound rather than blocking it is a new argument that is presented for the first time in Petitioner’s Reply, and we therefore need not consider it. See Patent Trial and Appeal Board Consolidated Trial Practice Guide (Nov. 2019), at 73 (“Petitioner may not submit new evidence or argument in reply that it could have presented earlier, e.g. to make out a prima facie case of unpatentability.”). 8 Moreover, 7 The quoted portion of Victorian refers to “tinging,” but this appears to be intended to refer to “ringing.” For example, the previous sentence states that “[b]lanking refers to a substantially complete blockage of a sound, or in other words, that a detected sound is practically ignored by processor 460 such that it does not cause any echo or ringing which is audible by an ear.” See Ex. 1013 ¶ 32 (emphasis added). 8 Available at https://www.uspto.gov/TrialPracticeGuideConsolidated.” slip op. at 52

    Patent outcomesUS 9,609,424 mixed
    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 9,609,424
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