- Solvay USA Inc. v. Worldsource Enterprises, LLC, Eco Agro Resources LLC, And Eco World Group LLCRehearing deniedPTAB · Aug 10, 2020 · PGR2019-00046 · APJ Sheldon M Mcgee · PGR · Rehearing
The Board held claims 1–20 unpatentable as obvious over the stated combinations and denied Patent Owner’s rehearing request.
RulingsRehearing decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“In light of the complete record now before us, we adopt Petitioner’s definition of one of ordinary skill in the art. In addition to the academic requirements associated with obtaining a bachelor’s degree in chemistry or chemical engineering, Petitioner’s definition includes at least two years of experience specific to chemical formulations used in the agricultural industry. Pet. 8. Patent Owner’s “definition” is generic to “formulation chemistry.” Sur-Reply 4. Patent Owner does not explain, nor do we discern, why the skilled artisan would not have had at least some work experience in developing chemical formulations in the relevant field, i.e., the agrochemical industry. Indeed, some of Patent Owner’s arguments are directed to solvent delivery systems used in the agricultural market. PO Resp. 57–78.” slip op. at 7
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“filing date, we apply the claim construction standard articulated in Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). Under Phillips, claim terms are afforded “their ordinary and customary meaning.” Id. at 1312. “[T]he ordinary and customary meaning of a claim term is the meaning that the term would have to a person of ordinary skill in the art in question at the time of the invention.” Id. at 1313. Only terms that are in controversy need to be construed, and then only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy. Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999). Neither party offers a construction for any claim term. Pet. 11; see also PO Resp., generally. On the complete record, we determine that no claim limitations need an express construction to resolve the controversy.” slip op. at 6
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner
- Obviousness (§103) › Analogous artAnalogous artDecided for petitioner
“analogous art. PO Resp. 47; Sur-Reply 8, 15–16. Patent Owner incorrectly frames the analogous art inquiry by comparing whether the prior art references are analogous to each other. See PO Resp. 47 (“not all three references are in the same field of endeavor”); Sur-Reply 16 (asserting that CN400 “is not analogous art with Iannotta [] and/or Kolc” because CN400’s NBPT is purportedly “not dissolved in any solvent”). Our reviewing court has stated, however, that “[a] reference qualifies as prior art for a determination under § 103 when it is analogous to the claimed invention.” Innovention Toys, LLC v. MGA Entertainment, Inc., 637 F.3d 1314, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (citing In re Clay, 966 F.2d 656, 658 (Fed. Cir. 1992). Quoting In re Bigio, 381 F.3d 1320, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2004), the court stated Two separate tests define the scope of analogous art: (1) whether the art is from the same field of endeavor, regardless of the problem addressed, and (2) if the reference is not within the field of the inventor’s endeavor, whether the reference still is reasonably pertinent to the particular problem with which the inventor is involved. Innovention Toys, 637 F.3d at 1322. Regarding whether the CN400 patent is in the same field of endeavor as the ʼ108 patent, we must consider the scope of the ʼ108 patent as a whole and not just the claims. In re Mettke, 570 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (rejecting appellant’s attempt to rely on the claimed subject matter to define the relevant “field of endeavor” when the specification described a broader one). Significantly, the ʼ108 patent discloses both solutions and suspensions of NBPT. See Ex. 1001, 5:20–52, 6:5–12, 6:39–40 (disclosing various solutions of NBPT), and 13:24–36 (setting forth an embodiment that formed “a suspension of NBPT in the aqueous mixture” that may “be solved by agitation”). Therefore, regardless of whether CN400’s process set forth in its claim 1 results in a solution or suspension of NBPT, CN400 is from the same field of endeavor as defined by the ʼ108 patent itself––“solvent formulations for the urease inhibitor . . . NBPT.” Ex. 1001, 1:15–18. Even if CN400 was not in the same field of endeavor as the ʼ108 patent, we find it is reasonably pertinent to the particular problem with which the inventor was involved. The ʼ108 patent identifies NBPT formulation toxicity as problematic to the environment, animals, and possibly humans (id. at 2:60–62, 4:8–33), and expressly states “it is desirable to develop formulations/fertilizers that are less toxic to the environment and to animals and humans” (id. at 4:34–36). The skilled artisan would have been aware of this toxicity problem with NBPT-containing formulations (Ex. 1025, 1; Ex. 1007 ¶ 6), and CN400 was also concerned with this problem (Ex. 1006, 1 (Abstract), ¶¶ 2, 5; see also Ex. 2006, 461 (machine translation of CN400 abstract noting how use of its fertilizer formulation will not pollute the environment), 462 ¶ 2, 463 ¶ 5. Notably, Patent Owner does not address this second test in its briefing. Tr. 39:6–11 (Patent Owner’s counsel acknowledging “[w]e did not address the other prong in the briefing”). Thus, on several bases, we find CN400 is analogous art to the ʼ108 patent and may be properly relied on in our obviousness determination.” slip op. at 24
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,221,108 - Ditec Solutions, LLC v. Woblleworks, Inc.Rehearing deniedPTAB · Mar 13, 2019 · IPR2018-01414 · APJ Sheldon M Mcgee · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied Ditech’s rehearing request, leaving institution denied because the arguments did not show that the Board misapprehended or overlooked its construction of claims 1 and 13.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“II. THE REQUEST FOR REHEARING In pertinent part, 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d) states: The burden of showing a decision should be modified lies with the party challenging the decision. The request must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed in a motion, an opposition, or a reply. Thus, a request for rehearing is not an opportunity merely to disagree with the Board’s assessment of the arguments or weighing of the evidence, or to present new arguments or evidence.” slip op. at 2
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Prosecution history disclaimer / disavowalDisclaimer foundDecided for patent owner
“held cake decorator extruder” as “a three-dimensional (3D) drawing device” in the ʼ444 patent’s Notice of Allowance. Req. 4; Ex. 1002, 344. When viewed in context, however, we do not share Petitioner’s view that the Examiner’s mere characterization of Young’s extruder as a three-dimensional (3D) drawing device, on its own, rises to the level of a “rejection” of Patent Owner’s arguments distinguishing 3D drawing devices from devices that deposit material in layers over time. Ex. 1002, 317–322.2 In fact, the Examiner provides no discussion whatsoever regarding the “three-dimensional” aspect of Young’s device in the Notice of Allowance, but rather focuses on Young’s internal actuators, motor, and gear train. Id. at 344. Thus, the Examiner’s isolated statement that Young’s device is a three-dimensional (3D) drawing device, without more, is not enough to 2 We disagree with Petitioner’s contention (Req. 5) that Patent Owner’s statements made during prosecution were not sufficiently “clear and unmistakable” to invoke the doctrine of prosecution disclaimer. Omega Eng’g, Inc. v. Raytek Corp., 334 F.3d 1314, 1325–26 (Fed. Cir. 2003); see also Spectrum Int’l, Inc. v. Sterilite Corp., 164 F.3d 1372, 1378–79 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (explaining how “explicit statements made by a patent applicant during prosecution to distinguish a claimed invention over prior art may serve to narrow the scope of a claim” because “[b]y distinguishing the claimed invention over the prior art, an applicant is indicating what the claims do not cover.”). persuade us that the Examiner was unequivocally rejecting Patent Owner’s construction of “a three-dimensional (3D) drawing device.”” slip op. at 6
- Strike new argumentNew argument disregardedDecided for patent owner
“Thus, Petitioner’s Request raises new arguments that could have been raised in its Petition. Specifically, the prosecution histories of both the ʼ444 patent and the ʼ266 application provided ample notice to Petitioner of Patent Owner’s previous claim construction positions. Petitioner could have presented a countervailing claim construction argument in its Petition, but instead raises new arguments here in its Request. These new arguments fail the standard set forth in Rule 42.71(d) at the outset because the Board cannot overlook or misapprehend an argument that was not before it. Nevertheless, we determine that even if these arguments were timely made in the Petition or in a Board-authorized Reply, they do not persuade us that the claim construction for the phrase “three-dimensional (3D) drawing device” as set forth in our Decision was erroneous. Dec. 11.” slip op. at 5
Claim constructionPatents in suitUS 9,731,444 - Snap-On Inc. v. Milwaukee Electric Tool CorporationRehearing deniedPTAB · Jan 25, 2016 · IPR2015-01244 · APJ Grace Karaffa Obermann · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied the petitioner’s rehearing request, leaving in place institution on claims 1–6 and 8–19 for obviousness over Fohr, Sato, and Hallaj.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“ANALYSIS We review our decision for an abuse of discretion. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c). Petitioner bears the burden of showing that the decision should be modified, by specifically identifying all matters Petitioner “believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked.” Id. at § 42.71(d). The central argument presented in the rehearing request is that the Board misapprehended or overlooked the broadest reasonable interpretation of the average discharge current limitation, which appears in each of the independent claims of the ’510 patent. Ex. 1005, claims 1, 9, 10, 12, 14–16,” slip op. at 2
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for patent owner
“ordinary and customary meaning, as would be understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art in the context of the entire disclosure of the patent. In re Translogic Tech., Inc., 504 F.3d 1249, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2007). Each argument presented in the request for rehearing depends upon a contention that the broadest reasonable interpretation of the average discharge current limitation includes “currents approaching infinity.” Rehearing Req. 10. We did not overlook or misapprehend that contention. Dec. 13 (treating Petitioner’s view that claim 1 recites “an open-ended average battery pack discharge current range from 20 amps up to infinity”) (quoting Pet. 20). We considered and rejected it based on the information presented. Id. at 13–16.” slip op. at 3
Claim constructionPatents in suitUS 7,999,510 - Snap-On Inc. v. Milwaukee Electric Tool CorporationRehearing deniedPTAB · Jan 25, 2016 · IPR2015-01242 · APJ Grace Karaffa Obermann · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied Snap-On’s rehearing request, leaving review instituted on claims 1–8 and 10–11 over Fohr, Sato, and Hallaj; it found no error in declining the Johnson anticipation ground.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“ANALYSIS We review our decision for an abuse of discretion. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c). Petitioner bears the burden of showing that the decision should be modified, by specifically identifying all matters Petitioner “believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked.” Id. at § 42.71(d). The central argument presented in the rehearing request is that the Board misapprehended or overlooked the broadest reasonable interpretation of the average discharge current limitation of claim 1, highlighted below:” slip op. at 2
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for patent owner
“ordinary and customary meaning, as would be understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art in the context of the entire disclosure of the patent. In re Translogic Tech., Inc., 504 F.3d 1249, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2007). Each argument presented in the request for rehearing depends upon a contention that the broadest reasonable interpretation of the average discharge current limitation includes “currents approaching infinity.” Rehearing Req. 10. We did not overlook or misapprehend that contention. Dec. 13 (treating Petitioner’s view that claim 1 recites “an open-ended average battery pack discharge current range from 20 amps up to infinity”) (quoting Pet. 20). We considered and rejected it based on the information presented. Id. at 13–14.” slip op. at 3
Claim constructionPatents in suitUS 7,554,290 - PTAB · Mar 10, 2015 · IPR2014-01249 · APJ James T Moore · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied rehearing, leaving institution in place on the previously instituted claims and grounds; it rejected the challenges to denying claims 8–14 on Grounds 1 and 3 and other proposed grounds.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“II. STANDARD OF REVIEW In a request for rehearing, the dissatisfied party must identify, specifically, all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was addressed previously. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). Upon a request for rehearing, the decision on a petition will be reviewed for an abuse of discretion. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c).” slip op. at 2
- Claim Construction › Functional claiming / §112(f) means-plus-function › Whether §112(f) applies (Williamson, nonce words)§112(f) appliesDecided for patent owner
“We disagree with Petitioner’s assertion, and reading of the rules and statute. The appropriate rule, 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(3), is not to be read in isolation, but also in conjunction with other Board rules, including 37 C.F.R. § 42.1(b), which requires the rules to be interpreted for securing the just, speedy, and inexpensive resolution of every proceeding. Requiring identification of the means, and sufficient means, avoids institution of a trial where the scope of the means-plus-function claims cannot be determined with precision. The trial potentially would be delayed and ultimately potentially incapable of decision on the merits of the grounds. Consequently, the panel has the discretion to determine if the trial might stray into grounds outside of the statutory authority provided for inter partes review proceedings.” slip op. at 3
- Other 314aInstitution denied discretionary otherDecided for patent owner
“First, it is a long-standing part of jurisprudence that the tribunal has discretion in the conduct of its proceedings. The language of § 314 provides us with discretion in that it expressly states that review “may not” be authorized in certain situations, but it does not require that a review “shall” be instituted in any situation. 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). In addition, we direct Petitioner’s attention to 35 U.S.C. § 316(b), which provides our rules are to take into account the “regulation on the economy, the integrity of the patent system, the efficient administration of the Office, and the ability of the Office to timely complete proceedings.” Board trial rule 108 provides that the Board may “deny some or all grounds for unpatentability for some or all of the challenged claims.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(b). Petitioner’s position does not consider that the Board is charged with securing the just, speedy, and inexpensive resolution of every proceeding. 37 C.F.R. § 42.1(b). Trials are no exception; 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(c) requires us to administer proceedings such that the final written determination in an inter partes review be issued one year after the date of institution, except that the review may be extended by not more than six months for good cause shown. Our decision to proceed on a streamlined grouping of grounds, as opposed to all eleven, yet encompassing all claims, is a meaningful exercise of that discretion in administering the proceeding. Thus, we are not persuaded of error or an abuse of discretion in our decision not to institute those additional grounds.” slip op. at 5
- PTAB / AIA Trials › §315(e) estoppelNot reached
“The question of estoppel is premature at this point. Petitioner has not established the underlying conditions precedent with any persuasive evidence or argument that the Petitioner will be estopped ultimately. Presently, the trial is moving forward on all claims with the Petitioner having carried the initial burden on institution. Moreover, estoppel is but one of the many issues to be considered in litigation strategy, and we do not presume to make one factor so heavily weighted so as intrude into the province of counsel in making decisions as to how to proceed.” slip op. at 6
Claim constructionDiscretionary denialPatents in suitUS 6,362,850
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.