- PTAB · Dec 19, 2025 · IPR2025-01078 · APJ Robert L Kinder · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1, 2, 4–12, 14–22, and 24–30, finding a reasonable likelihood that Kido anticipates at least one challenged claim.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“review. 35 U.S.C. § 314(b); 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2024). An inter partes review may not be instituted “unless. . . the information presented in the petition . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Moreover, a decision to institute under 35 U.S.C. § 314 may not institute on fewer than all claims challenged in the petition. SAS Inst., Inc. v. Iancu, 584 U.S. 357, 371 (2018).” slip op. at 2
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for petitioner
“At this juncture in the proceeding, and based on the current record, we do not agree with Patent Owner that “payout,” as claimed, should be limited to “the amount a player will win in relation to the amount wagered.” We recognize, as Patent Owner points out, that the examples provided in the Specification are listed in odds format. See id. at 2. The Specification, however, also states that “[a]ny suitable payouts can be used in some embodiments.” Ex. 1011, 5:18–21. This language suggests a broader interpretation of “payout” beyond just payout odds and we therefore decline to import the wager limitation into the claim term. Although the ’371 patent generally describes payouts in terms of odds, like 49:1, the intrinsic record lacks clear evidence necessary to limit the claims as Patent Owner proposes.” slip op. at 8
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner proposes “a person having at least a Bachelor’s Degree in electrical engineering, computer science, or computer engineering, or undergraduate training in an equivalent field and at least two years of relevant experience in electronic gaming technology.” Pet. 10 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 22–26). Petitioner further notes that “[a]dditional graduate education could substitute for professional experience, and significant work experience could substitute for formal education.” Id. Patent Owner does not dispute this level of skill. See Prelim. Resp. 13–14 (“Evolution does not set forth an alternative level of skill for a person of ordinary skill in the art”). For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposal, which comports with the teachings of the ’371 patent and the asserted prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (holding that the prior art itself can reflect the appropriate level of ordinary skill in the art).” slip op. at 11
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Instituted
“Based on the evidence before us, we find persuasive Petitioner’s contention that Kido’s accumulated jackpot paid when landing on a star mark reads on the claimed “a first selected position . . . to have an increased payout . . . greater than a first non-selected payout.” See Pet. 25–27, 30, 35, 36. As explained above, the current record does not support limiting the term “payout” to just the amount a player will win in relation to the amount wagered. As Petitioner notes, a payout that receives Kido’s accumulated Prog bonus payout is necessarily higher than a payout that does not receive the Prog bonus. Pet. 35–36 (“had the first selected position not been randomly selected, the player would only be eligible for the basic payout”). Further, Kido even describes its bonus routines and jackpots as payouts. Kido describes, for example, that “[w]hen the privilege unit 113 obtains the win information from the special game value award mark win determining unit 112, it awards, as a payout, the game value stored in the accumulated game value memory 117” and it describes the “jackpot (JP) amount” as “a special payout.” Ex. 1007 ¶¶ 119, 129.” slip op. at 14
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 11,756,371 - PTAB · Dec 17, 2025 · IPR2025-01072 · APJ Frederick C Laney · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted review of claims 1–3, 5–11, 13–19, and 21–24 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that Kido anticipates claims 1, 9, and 17.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“review. 35 U.S.C. § 314(b); 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2024). An inter partes review may not be instituted “unless. . . the information presented in the petition . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Moreover, a decision to institute under 35 U.S.C. § 314 may not institute on fewer than all claims challenged in the petition. SAS Inst., Inc. v. Iancu, 584 U.S. 357, 371 (2018).” slip op. at 2
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for petitioner
“At this juncture in the proceeding, and based on the current record, we do not agree with Patent Owner that “payout,” as claimed, should be limited to “the amount a player will win in relation to the amount wagered.” Sur-reply 2. We recognize, as Patent Owner points out, that the examples provided in the Specification are listed in odds format. See id. The Specification, however, also states that “[a]ny suitable payouts can be used in some embodiments.” Ex. 1001, 5:16–17. This language suggests a broader interpretation of “payout” beyond just payout odds and we therefore decline to import the wager limitation into the claim term. Although the ’014 patent generally describes payouts in terms of odds, like 49:1, the intrinsic record lacks clear evidence necessary to limit the claims as Patent Owner proposes.” slip op. at 8
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Reference is prior artInstituted
“Based on the evidence before us, we find persuasive Petitioner’s contention that Kido’s accumulated jackpot paid when landing on a star mark reads on the claimed “first payout . . . wherein the first payout is higher.” See Pet. 32–36. As explained above, the current record does not support limiting the term “payout” to just the amount a player will win in relation to the amount wagered. As Petitioner notes, a first payout that receives Kido’s accumulated Prog bonus payout is necessarily higher than a second payout that does not receive the Prog bonus. Id. at 35. Further, Kido even describes its bonus routines and jackpots as payouts. Kido describes, for example, that “[w]hen the privilege unit 113 obtains the win information from the special game value award mark win determining unit 112, it awards, as a payout, the game value stored in the accumulated game value memory 117” and it describes the “jackpot (JP) amount” as “a special payout.” Ex. 1007 ¶¶ 119, 129.” slip op. at 14
Claim construction§ 102 anticipationcites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 11,011,014 - PTAB · Dec 16, 2025 · IPR2025-01073 · APJ Robert L Kinder · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR of claims 1–5, 7–12, 14–18, and 20 on all petitioned grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that Kido anticipates at least one challenged claim.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“review. 35 U.S.C. § 314(b); 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2024). An inter partes review may not be instituted “unless. . . the information presented in the petition . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Moreover, a decision to institute under 35 U.S.C. § 314 may not institute on fewer than all claims challenged in the petition. SAS Inst., Inc. v. Iancu, 584 U.S. 357, 371 (2018).” slip op. at 2
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“At this juncture in the proceeding, and based on the current record, we do not agree with Patent Owner that “payout,” as claimed, should be limited to “the amount a player will win in relation to the amount wagered.” We recognize, as Patent Owner points out, that the examples provided in the Specification are listed in odds format. See id. at 2. The Specification, however, also states that “[a]ny suitable payouts can be used in some embodiments.” Ex. 1005, 5:13–17. This language suggests a broader interpretation of “payout” beyond just payout odds and we therefore decline to import the wager limitation into the claim term. Although the ’024 patent generally describes payouts in terms of odds, like 49:1, the intrinsic record lacks clear evidence necessary to limit the claims as Patent Owner proposes.” slip op. at 8
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Instituted
“Based on the evidence before us, we find persuasive Petitioner’s contention that Kido’s accumulated jackpot paid when landing on a star mark reads on the claimed “first payout . . . wherein the first payout is higher.” See Pet. 33–35. As explained above, the current record does not support limiting the term “payout” to just the amount a player will win in relation to the amount wagered. As Petitioner notes, a first payout that receives Kido’s accumulated Prog bonus payout is necessarily higher than a second payout that does not receive the Prog bonus. Pet. 35. Further, Kido even describes its bonus routines and jackpots as payouts. Kido describes, for example, that “[w]hen the privilege unit 113 obtains the win information from the special game value award mark win determining unit 112, it awards, as a payout, the game value stored in the accumulated game value memory 117” and it describes the “jackpot (JP) amount” as “a special payout.” Ex. 1007 ¶¶ 119, 129. Patent Owner next contends that Kido does not disclose a first payout that is “for the spin of the roulette wheel.” Prelim. Resp. 29. Patent Owner’s argument is premised on the cumulative nature of Kido’s Prog bonus – it builds with every spin of the roulette wheel until won. Id. (“Each time the wheel is spun, 0.5% of the amount wagered is added to the progressive jackpot, and thus, the jackpot’s value reflects multiple spins of the roulette wheel.”). Thus, according to Patent Owner, the value of the jackpot is determined using multiple spins of the roulette wheel and is not “for a spin of the roulette wheel” as claimed.” Id. at 30. The claims, however, only require a first payout that is higher than a second payout. Nothing prohibits the higher payout from accumulating from prior spins of the roulette wheel because, when it is actually won, it will be for that last spin of the roulette wheel. Ex. 1005, 8:35–36 (“indicating that the first player is to be paid at the first payout for the spin of the roulette wheel”). Regardless of how Kido’s Prog bonus accumulated, it is paid for a spin of the roulette wheel – at that juncture Kido discloses each claim element. Anticipation occurs when a prior art reference discloses every element of a patent claim at a point in time, as Kido does with a single spin of the roulette wheel that pays the Prog bonus. As persuasively explained by Petitioner, “the steps of Figure 12 (including A13) occur within a single round of roulette, for a single spin of the roulette wheel, until the routine ‘returns to the step of A1 and is transited to a next game.’” Pet. 39 (quoting Ex. 1007 ¶ 233).” slip op. at 13
Claim construction§ 102 anticipationcites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 10,629,024 - PTAB · Dec 8, 2025 · IPR2025-01064 · APJ George R Hoskins · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR of claims 1–18 on all four §103 grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that Volkswagen would prevail on at least claim 1 over Weese.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“A. Legal Standards — Petitioner’s Burden “In an [inter partes review], the petitioner has the burden from the onset to show with particularity why the patent it challenges is unpatentable.” Harmonic Inc. v. Avid Tech., Inc., 815 F.3d 1356, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citing 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3) (requiring inter partes review petitions to identify “with particularity . . . the evidence that supports the 1 Amendments to 35 U.S.C. § 103 enacted by the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) (“AIA”) took effect in March 2013. The ’353 patent issued from an application filed in September 2004. See Ex. 1001, code (22). Thus, we apply the pre-AIA version of § 103. grounds for the challenge to each claim”)). This burden of persuasion never shifts to the patent owner. See Dynamic Drinkware, LLC v. Nat’l Graphics, Inc., 800 F.3d 1375, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2015). B. Legal Standards — Obviousness A patent claim is unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) if the differences between the claimed subject matter and the prior art are such that the subject matter, as a whole, would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 406 (2007). The question of obviousness is resolved on the basis of underlying factual determinations including: (1) the scope and content of the prior art; (2) any differences between the claimed subject matter and the prior art; (3) the level of ordinary skill in the art; and (4) objective evidence of nonobviousness, if made available in the record, which has not happened here. See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1966).” slip op. at 6
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“C. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner contends a person having ordinary skill in the art pertaining to the ’353 patent “would have possessed at least a four-year degree in physics, biophysics, medical physics, or a related field, and two years of experience in developing and/or applying computed tomography methods,” wherein “[a]dditional education and professional experience are interchangeable.” Pet. 1; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 54–55. “Patent Owner utilizes Petitioner’s proposed level of skill in the art.” Prelim. Resp. 2. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s formulation of ordinary skill in the art, as it appears to be consistent with the ’353 patent and the asserted prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 7
- Expert testimonyOther
“unpatentable as having been obvious over Weese, including supporting testimony from Dr. Peterson. See Pet. 17–22, 26–83; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 138–149, 159–257. Patent Owner opposes. See Prelim. Resp. 1–2, 6–7. We conclude Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on its assertions, as follows.” slip op. at 13
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Instituted
“(iii) Analysis Based on the present record, we determine Petitioner’s contentions regarding the third step of claim 1 are supported sufficiently by the cited disclosures in Weese and Dr. Peterson’s testimony to justify institution of review. In particular, Weese describes obtaining a plurality of second images of the patient’s internal organs (i.e., PET image I0 in Fig. 1, and PET image I10 in Fig. 3) using a second imaging technique (i.e., PET). See Ex. 1005, Figs. 1, 3, and 6, ¶¶ 47–49, 58–59, 72. In particular, PET image I0 in Figure 1 may be a reconstructed “volume image[]” composed of a plurality of “quasi two-dimensional” “slice images” that, when combined, represent a three-dimensional region inside the patient. Id. ¶¶ 48, 58, 61; see also Pet. 56–57. PET image I10 in Figure 3 may be a similarly reconstructed volume image composed of a plurality of slice images.4 See 4 We do not rely here on Petitioner’s alternative theory that Weese discloses a “plurality” of second images because PET images I0 and I10 are “superposed” images encompassing “several states of motion.” Pet. 58. Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 61, 83–84. Patent Owner’s sole opposition to Petitioner’s assertions in this regard are limited to whether Weese “obtain[s]” PET images I0 and I10 as recited in claim 1, which we address below. Also, it appears that PET images I0 and I10 are obtained while also obtaining second movement measurements of the patient’s internal organs using a second sensor system (i.e., motion acquisition unit 12 and motion sensor 15 / S1) which is independent from the PET imaging technique. See Ex. 1005, Figs. 1 and 6, ¶ 65 (“[T]he respiratory motion is determined during the acquisition of the PET projections P1 by means of a respiratory motion sensor provided on the patient and therefrom the frequency function f(r) or, more generally, a state of motion function F1 is derived for the construction of the motion model M2.”). Furthermore, Weese describes how frequency function f(r) is utilized to facilitate image comparison between CT and PET images at common motion states. See id. ¶¶ 31, 49–51, 70–71, 75–77, 79–80, 83; see also Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 214–216 (Dr. Peterson’s supporting testimony). Patent Owner’s sole opposition to Petitioner’s assertions in this regard are limited to whether Weese “obtain[s]” PET images I0 and I10 as recited in claim 1, which we address below. Patent Owner’s two opposing arguments are unavailing, based on the present preliminary record. First, Petitioner relies on reconstructed PET images I0 and I10 as satisfying the “plurality of second images” recited in claim 1, not PET projections P1 from which PET images I0 and I10 are derived. See, e.g., Pet. 56, 58 (“I0 and I10 disclose and render obvious a ‘plurality of second images’ in two ways” — “I0 and I10 may be ‘volume images’ formed using ‘known’ techniques,” and “I0 and I10 are ‘superposed’ PET images encompassing ‘several states of motion,’ which” slip op. at 18
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,265,353 - PTAB · Oct 6, 2025 · IPR2025-00812 · APJ Robert L Kinder · IPR · Institution
Instituted IPR of claims 1–28 on all petitioned grounds because the petition showed a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on at least one claim.
RulingsInstitution decision- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“According to Petitioner, “no express constructions are required in this proceeding.” Pet. 4. Patent Owner “agrees that the terms of the ’728 Patent have their plain and ordinary meaning.” Prelim. Resp. 7. However, Patent Owner contends that Petitioner construes the claim language “during the driving period” to mean “throughout the driving period.” Id. at 10 (claim language found in claims 1, 13, 24, and 25). Patent Owner contends Petitioner consistently uses the term “during” rather than “throughout” in the analysis of the challenged claims. Id. Patent Owner does not provide support for any specific construction or explain why any claim construction would be necessary for resolution of this proceeding. Based on the current record, we determine the differentiation asserted by Patent Owner between the use of “during” and “throughout” does not require express interpretation as the terms “during” and “throughout” are synonymous.8 Upon review of the record, we determine that no claim terms require express construction for purposes of this Decision. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 9
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner and Dr. Michalson propose “that a person of ordinary skill in the art in this matter would have had at least a Bachelor of Science Degree (or equivalent) in an academic area emphasizing electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or a related technical field, and about 2-3 years of experience in the field of telematics systems.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 15; Pet. 2, 11. Dr. Michalson further proposes “[a] greater amount of education, e.g., a doctorate in an academic area emphasizing electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or a related technical field, would compensate for fewer years of work experience.” Id. Patent Owner does not dispute this level of skill. See generally Prelim. Resp. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposal, which comports with the teachings of the ’728 patent and the asserted prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (holding that the prior art itself can reflect the appropriate level of ordinary skill in the art).” slip op. at 11
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundInstituted
“Based on our review of the preliminary record, we conclude Petitioner has explained with supporting evidence how the combination of Callopy, Curry, and Thompson teaches or suggests claim 1, sufficiently to justify institution of review. That is, Petitioner explains how a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to supplement the risk assessment capabilities of Callopy-Curry with the well-known accident detection techniques of Thompson’s WreckWatch application to reduce vehicular accidents and casualties. For the purposes of institution, Petitioner has articulated a reasoned explanation why a POSITA would have been motivated to modify Callopy’s wireless device with Curry’s calculation techniques, and Thompson’s accident detection capabilities. The Petitioner has explained in detail that Curry contemplates the need for multi-modal operation for nuanced driving conditions, and that the incorporation of Callopy would be a natural modification that aligns with standard insurance evaluation methods. Petitioner further explains the implementation of Curry’s scoring system, which is capable of logging data and processing safety statistics, in combination with Callopy’s system leads to enhanced sensor-based driving evaluation in the determination of a driver’s risk profile for insurance purposes. Petitioner further explains in detail how Thompson’s implementation further provides motivation for Curry’s initiatives to “reduce traffic-related fatalities and injuries” and that a POSITA would seek the well-known accident detection technique of Thompson to achieve this. Petitioner identifies that the combination of Callopy, Curry, and Thompson not only can be achieved without any changes to underlying hardware, but also provides the functionality of recording sensor data relating to driving, calculating driving safety statistics, and detecting driving-related incidents. Moreover, as discussed, Petitioner has provided citations to the references along with corroborating testimony from Dr. Michalson that support its arguments for why and how a POSITA would have combined the prior art disclosures with a reasonable expectation of success. See Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 100–116.” slip op. at 34
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Upon consideration of the Petition, the Preliminary Response, and the evidence of record, we conclude that the information presented shows a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner will prevail in showing the unpatentability of at least one of the challenged claims at issue. Pursuant to § 314, we hereby institute an inter partes review as to challenged claims 1–28 of the ’728 patent.” slip op. at 3
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 12,236,728 - PTAB · Aug 22, 2025 · IPR2025-00343 · APJ Scott A Daniels · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–6 and 8–13 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that at least one challenged claim is unpatentable.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), an inter partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” Upon consideration of the arguments and evidence presented by Petitioner and Patent Owner, we are persuaded that Petitioner demonstrated a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in showing the unpatentability of at least one of the challenged claims. See 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review of the challenged claims.” slip op. at 2
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot reached
“and 4) does not address Petitioner’s first two arguments and evidence, which, on this record, appear to show that Bucknell’s prioritized queue length is based on buffered data in either, or both, of a first and second iteration. Therefore, at this stage of the proceeding, we need not reach Patent Owner’s assertions as to the third alternative argument and evidence Petitioner provides, namely the combination of examples 2), 3), and 4). For completeness, however, we acknowledge that Bucknell does not expressly combine examples 2), 3), and 4), mainly because example 4) only refers back to example 2). However, we note that from a plain reading of Bucknell’s written description it may not be a significant leap to understand that the disclosed combination of examples 2) and 4), with first and second portions 90 and 95 populated in reverse order as taught in example 4), that this combination could be subsequently modified by example 3) to provide a “second iteration . . . based on buffered data.” Ex. 1006 ¶¶ 26–27. In other words, on the current record it is not clear why “the unused resource” of Bucknell’s second portion 95 cannot also “be made available,” to the first portion 90 if the order was simply reversed per the combination of examples 2) and 4). 3. Conclusion as to Claim 1 In summary, we find Petitioner’s arguments and evidence sufficient to show a reasonable likelihood that claim 1 is unpatentable over Eckert in view of Bucknell and Lohr-1. On the current record, we find that Bucknell discloses “a first iteration” based on receiving the priority values for logical channels associated with the MAC-d flows. Ex. 1006 ¶ 26. And, as discussed above, Bucknell’s described “priorities,” are plural, just like the claimed “received parameters.” Ex. 1001, 14:11; Ex. 1006 ¶ 26. In on a priority.” See Ex. 1001, 13:57–14:16. As to the issue of whether the Petition provides sufficient explanation or motivation to combine Bucknell’s examples 2), 3), and 4), which is an alternative argument to Petitioner’s other mappings for limitation [1.9] which we find sufficient for institution, we leave this alternative mapping issue for development at trial. See Pet. 55 (Petitioner explaining that “Bucknell describes additional ways that limitation [1.9] is disclosed, based on the teachings of examples 2 and 4 (discussed previously) in view of example 3.”).” slip op. at 27
- Prior constructionPrior construction adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner points out that in IPR2022-01127 the Board “preliminarily determined that a subset of the plurality of radio bearers” means “less than all of the plurality of radio bearers.” Pet 12 (citing Ex. 1019, 18–19). Petitioner explains that, in the present proceeding, it has applied “the prior art in accordance with that construction; however, in view of the asserted grounds, no claim term requires express construction to find the Challenged Claims unpatentable.” Id. (citing Nidec 868 F.3d 1017). Patent Owner neither disputes the prior construction of “a subset of radio bearers,” nor offers additional constructions. To the extent necessary, and in accordance with our prior determination, we construe “a subset of the plurality of radio bearers” to mean “less than all of the plurality of radio bearers.” At this early stage of the proceeding, no claim terms are disputed and we need not construe any other terms for purposes of institution.” slip op. at 13
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Patent Owner does not expressly dispute Petitioner’s definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art. See generally Prelim. Resp. On this record, Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art is not disputed and is consistent with our review and understanding of the technology and descriptions in the ’138 patent and the asserted prior art references. Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001). For purposes of this Decision, we rely on Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 12
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,292,138 - Yealink (USA) Network Technology Co. Ltd. / Yealink Network Technology Co., Ltd. v. Barco N.V.InstitutedPTAB · Jul 29, 2025 · IPR2025-00491 · APJ Frederick C Laney · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR of claims 1–18 on all asserted grounds after finding a reasonable likelihood that claims 1, 9, and 15 are unpatentable over Ground 1.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Having considered the arguments and evidence presented by both parties at this stage of the proceeding, we are persuaded that there is a reasonable likelihood Petitioners would prevail in showing that Beel discloses or suggests to a skilled artisan a base unit having a transmitter and a first peripheral device having a receiver and at least one fixed or a configurable endpoint, where the at least one fixed or a configurable endpoint is a data source or a data sink which is able to store or emit data, of the functional device exposed or made available on the first peripheral device.” slip op. at 26
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioners contend that a person having ordinary skill in the art would have had “Master of Science (M.S.) degree in electrical engineering or computer science, and five years of work experience in a related field. Additional educational experience could substitute for some of the work experience.” Pet. 9–10 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 36–37). Patent Owner does not dispute this position at this time. See generally Prelim. Resp. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioners’ proposed definition of a person of ordinary skill in the pertinent art, as it is consistent with the ’972 patent and the asserted prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionTerm construed board ownDecided for patent owner
“We do not agree with Patent Owner that “fixed” or “configurable” requires more than what is agreed to by the parties––i.e., the characteristics and operational parameters of the endpoint are either set prior to operation or can be set during operation. We disagree that the ’972 patent defines “fixed or a configurable endpoint” as “a number of descriptive fields of the endpoint.” Rather column 8, lines 5–6, of the ’972 patent states that “[a]n endpoint is defined by a number of descriptive fields,” which speaks more about the mechanism used to establish the characteristics and operational parameters of the endpoint than it does about how “fixed” or “configurable” would be understood by a skilled artisan. And the fact that an endpoint may be defined by descriptive fields does not inform a skilled artisan that “fixed” or “configurable” requires the endpoint to allow the processing device to correctly interpret and utilize the data from the endpoint. Correctly interpreting and utilizing data may be the goal, but that goal is not turned into a requirement of the claims because the recited endpoint is fixed or configurable. Similarly, there is no basis for making that goal a requirement simply because a fixed endpoint is described as providing basic functionality and a configurable endpoint is described as being configurable by the base unit either while pairing or via the processing device. As a result, we find little merit in Patent Owner’s contention that the language “fixed or a configurable” requires a process for setting up the characteristics and operational parameters of an endpoint within a device so that the processing device can correctly interpret and utilize the data of this endpoint. Patent Owner, however, will have an opportunity during trial to further develop this contention.” slip op. at 11
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableInstituted
“Having considered the arguments and evidence presented by both parties at this stage of the proceeding, we are persuaded that there is a reasonable likelihood Petitioners would prevail in showing that Beel discloses or suggests to a skilled artisan a base unit having a transmitter and a first peripheral device having a receiver and at least one fixed or a configurable endpoint, where the at least one fixed or a configurable endpoint is a data source or a data sink which is able to store or emit data, of the functional device exposed or made available on the first peripheral device. Petitioners’ offers evidence, supported by its expert declarant, that the endpoints disclosed in Beel are either fixed, such as a mass storage unit with predefined characteristics, or configurable, such as a virtual audio interface that may change configuration based on driver instructions or use context. Pet. 32–33. As Petitioners point out, the ’972 patent itself acknowledges that Beel’s Figure 11 illustrates a system comprising a combination of vendor-specific and standard endpoints, and further interprets these endpoints to correspond to drivers and host applications used for functionality like screen sharing and audio streaming, which demonstrates a direct conceptual and structural alignment between the ’972 patent and Beel. Id. Furthermore, Petitioner’s evidence demonstrates sufficiently that Beel describes a peripheral device acting as a virtual composite device capable of emulating different functions—such as a USB audio speaker—while rerouting the data stream (e.g., RTP audio stream) over the network. Id. For instance, Petitioners’ evidence demonstrates sufficiently Beel discloses or suggests that audio data can be captured by a virtual sound card interface implemented within the peripheral device, re-encoded, and transmitted to the base unit for playback or synchronization with video content. Id. In addition, Petitioners have demonstrated sufficiently that Beel’s architecture supports the requirement that the endpoint of the functional device—whether it is a camera, microphone, or speaker—is made available through or exposed on the peripheral device. Id. The functional device’s capabilities are effectively rendered accessible to the processing device by way of the peripheral device, which acts as an intermediary. Id. Petitioners’ evidence demonstrates sufficiently that this exposure can occur via logical interfaces, such as USB Audio Class (UAC) virtual drivers, that allow the processing device to recognize and interact with these endpoints using standard protocols. Id. Furthermore, Petitioners show sufficiently Beel discloses that the peripheral device may include software that facilitates communication with and presentation of media content on the processing device, further demonstrating that the endpoints are not only present but also actively used for data transmission. Id. Patent Owner’s arguments, at least at this stage of the proceeding, fail to undermine Petitioners’ showing because they are largely just that–– attorney arguments––without sufficient evidentiary backing and because they lack sufficient clarity regarding how the recited claim language distinguishes Beel’s disclosed system. First, Patent Owner makes several representations that Petitioners misplace its reliance on certain teachings or suggests found in Beel and that Beel does not support the contention Petitioners make, but Petitioners’ positions are backed the testimony of Dr. Almeroth and Patent Owner offers no contradictory evidence for why a skilled artisan would understand Beel differently. And, suffice it to say that, when the declaration of Dr. Almeroth is considered in juxtaposition with the cited evidence from Beel, we have found declarant Dr. Almeroth sufficiently persuasive to demonstrate Petitioner is reasonably likely to prevail on the point. For example, Patent Owner simply argues that “there is no indication in Beel of using any fixed or a configurable endpoint of the functional device exposed or made available on the first peripheral device” (Prelim. Resp. 31), but declarant Dr. Almeroth states that “Beel discloses that a peripheral device can act as a ‘virtual audio device’ using a USB Audio Class (UAC) interface,” which “indicates that endpoints of the functional device are ‘exposed or made available on the first peripheral device’” (Ex. 1002 ¶ 130 (emphasis added); see also id. ¶¶ 128–129). Patent Owner’s argument, without any evidentiary support, does little to undermine the opinion testimony from Dr. Almeroth about what Beel’s teachings would indicate to a skilled artisan. Second, although Patent Owner repeatedly states that Beel fails to” slip op. at 26
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,684,972 - PTAB · Jul 24, 2025 · IPR2025-00339 · APJ Kristen L Droesch · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–3, 10–12, 22–25, 28, 30, 32, and 33 on all petitioned grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that at least one challenged claim is obvious.
RulingsInstitution decision- Director reviewOther
“Memorandum (“Memorandum”) issued on March 26, 2025, Patent Owner filed its Discretionary Denial Brief on March 28, 2025. Paper 7. Petitioner filed its Opposition Brief on May 20, 2025. Paper 9. On June 13, 2025, Acting Director Stewart issued a decision determining that discretionary denial of institution is not appropriate in this case and referring the Petition to us for merits and other non-discretionary statutory considerations. Paper 10.” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“For the reasons provided below, we determine, based on the record before us, there is a reasonable likelihood Petitioner would prevail in showing at least one of the challenged claims is unpatentable.” slip op. at 3
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached
“We do not agree with Patent Owner’s proposed claim construction because, as pointed out by Petitioner, claim 1 does not recite limitations directed to the resolution of the source data of a frame that is to be combined “to provide an image having a relatively high resolution.” We also do not agree with Patent Owner’s arguments that claims should not be read to encompass prior art distinguished in the specification based on Patent Owner’s citations to the Background passages of the ’180 Patent. The cited passages disclose foveal image sensors for acquiring both a wide and narrow field of view and having smaller pixel sizes arranged in the central foveal region and larger pixel sizes arranged in peripheral rings about the central region, resulting in sensors that have a high resolution only in the narrow field of view. Consistent with Petitioner’s observation (see Prelim. Reply 2–3), this cited passage at best distinguishes prior art foveal sensors with smaller pixel sizes arranged in the central foveal region and larger pixel sizes arranged in peripheral rings about the central region. See Ex. 1001, 2:10–24. Finally, we do not agree with Patent Owner’s arguments regarding the prosecution history. Patent Owner does not direct us to persuasive absent any statements by the Applicant regarding that applied prior art, amounts to prosecution history disclaimer. Aside from declining to adopt Patent Owner’s proposed construction, for the purpose of institution we need not explicitly construe “combine data of a frame from at least one of the plurality of channels to provide an image having relatively high resolution,” as recited in claim 1. See Realtime, 912 F.3d at 1375. 3. Other claim terms and phrases Petitioner also proposes a construction for “data of a frame,” recited in claim 1. See Pet. 8. Patent Owner does not specifically address this claim construction. See Prelim. Resp. 23–30. For the purpose of institution, we need not explicitly construe “data of a frame” or any other claim term or phrase. See Realtime, 912 F.3d at 1375.” slip op. at 12
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have had a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or a related field and 2-3 years of experience in digital imaging systems,” and that “[l]ess experience may be necessary with additional education, and likewise, less education may be necessary with additional work experience.” Pet. 6 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 16–19). Patent Owner proposes a similar level of skill in the art as Petitioner, namely, that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have had a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer science, computer engineering, physics, or a related subject, and two to three years of work experience in digital imaging.” Prelim. Resp. 31 (citing Ex. 2013 ¶ 80). person of ordinary skill in the art because it is consistent with the level of skill reflected by the ’180 Patent Specification and the asserted prior art.” slip op. at 13
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 7,916,180 - PTAB · Jul 8, 2025 · IPR2025-00222 · APJ Frederick C Laney · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1, 2, 4, 5, 8–11, 13–16, and 19 because the petition showed a reasonable likelihood of success on the asserted obviousness grounds.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2018). The Board determines whether to institute a trial on behalf of the Director. 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a). A decision to institute is “a simple yes-or-no institution choice respecting a petition, embracing all challenges included in the petition.” PGS Geophysical AS v. Iancu, 891 F.3d 1354, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2018). For the reasons set forth below, we determine that Petitioner has demonstrated that there is a reasonable likelihood that at least one of the challenged claims is unpatentable. Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review of the challenged claims in the Petition.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“relevant time would have had a “a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or a related field and 2–3 years of experience in digital imaging systems.” Pet. 6–7 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 16–18). In the Preliminary Response, Patent Owner contends that a skilled artisan would have had “a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer science, computer engineering, physics, or a related subject, and two to three years of work experience in digital imaging.” Prelim. Resp. 30 (citing Ex. 2005 ¶ 82). For purposes of this Decision, and based on the current record, we adopt Petitioner’s characterization of the level of skill for one of ordinary skill in the art. However, we note Patent Owner’s proposed characterization of a skilled artisan is not meaningfully different than the one proposed by Petitioner. Because we find the parties’ characterizations to be consistent with the ’158 patent and the asserted prior art, our analysis below applies Petitioner’s characterization for the level of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner
“Prelim. Resp. 22–23 (citing Pet. 8; Ex. 2005 ¶¶ 71–72; Ex. 2009 ¶ 34); see id. at 23–29 (citing Ex. 1001, 1:43–45, 1:52–53, 1:58–2:5, 2:34–47, 3:47– 57, 4:3–6, 5:3–15; Ex. 2005 ¶¶ 74–81; Ex. 1015, 48; Ex. 1030, 150–151, 153, 515–517; Ex. 2011, 267–269; Ex. 2012, 2–3; Ex. 2015, 7:55–8:11, Fig. 5). At this stage of the proceeding, however, we decline to read into the accepted District Court construction of “integration time” the additional negative limitation that Patent Owner proposes––i.e., the term “scene” excludes a photograph or still image. This is an issue that warrants a more fully developed record by both parties. For now, even without having the benefit of Petitioner’s position on this issue, we determine that there is a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would be successful in refuting Patent Owner’s proposed negative limitation. This is because the ’158 patent makes clear that the invention is intended to address “a need for a digital camera in which the effective single-frame dynamic exposure range is expanded” to accommodate situations wherein a scene may include “an indoor room with a window view of the outdoors, an outdoor scene with mixed shadows and bright sunshine, and evening or night scenes combining artificial lighting and shadows.” Ex. 1001, 1:43–49, 2:28–42, 3:39–41. The ’158 patent explains that “[i]mage capture by the camera is performed using multiple camera channels, and each camera channel is controlled during a frame under an independent integration time.” Id. at 3:47–50 (emphasis added). The ’158 patent states further that its “digital camera systems, through the use of multiple integration times, enable formation of an image having a wide dynamic range by combining the data from all camera channels to form a composite single frame.” Id. at 3:28–61 (emphasis added). Still further, the ’158 patent states for one exemplary embodiment that “[t]he integration time of at least one channel is controlled relative to the integration time of at least one other channel so that an image formed by combining data of a frame received simultaneously from the channels has a relatively large dynamic range.” Id. at 5:6–11 (emphasis added). Rather than supporting Patent Owner’s contention that the meaning of the term “integration time” excludes a photograph or still image, the above illustrative teachings from the ’158 patent establish at least a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would succeed in establishing that “integration time,” and the term “scene” more particularly, encompasses the time the image sensor collects and integrates signals for a photograph or still image. As Patent Owner appears to acknowledge, the ordinary meaning of “scene” encompasses a “shot,” as well as, a “frame” (Prelim. Resp. 27 (citing Ex. 2011, 267–269)) and, as such, it would be counterintuitive to adopt an interpretation of “integration time” that excludes the very parts that make up a scene. Additionally, dependent claim 2 suggests that “integration time” encompasses a frame of a scene because it recites, “[t]he device of claim 1,” slip op. at 12
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundInstituted
“demonstrated sufficiently that there is a reasonable likelihood it would be successful in establishing Matsushima discloses or renders obvious limitation 1.3. Petitioner’s evidence shows that Matsushima discloses “two independent imaging systems” controlled by CPU 30 that each form an image on the light-receiving surfaces of CCD sensors 18A and 18B via their respective imaging optics 14A and 14B. Ex. 1007 ¶¶ 17, 28 (emphasis added). In that configuration, Matsushima teaches that CCD sensors 18A and 18B each has an associated CCD drive circuit 20A and 20B that apply CCD drive pulses to retrieve the accumulated signal charges of their respective CCD sensors. Id. ¶ 23. Additionally, Matsushima teaches that CCD sensors 18A and 18B each has an “electronic shutter function that controls the accumulation time (shutter speed) of the charge accumulated by each sensor via shutter gate pulses” and that the shutter speed is determined based on integration of the Red, Green, and Blue signals in a single frame by the integration circuit 60A and 60B. Id. ¶¶ 24, 31, 34–35. Patent Owner notably does not dispute Petitioner’s cited evidence shows Matsushima discloses a processing component configured to control the integration time for CCD sensors 18A and 18B. See Prelim. Resp. 34– 50. Instead, despite Matsushima’s teaching that its imaging systems are independent, Patent Owner argues that Matsushima does not disclose independently controlling the integration time for CCD sensors 18A and 18B. Id. This is so, according to Patent Owner, because Matsushima describes operating CCD drive circuits 20A and 20B synchronously and describes using a single, common shutter speed for each of CCD sensors 18A and 18B. Id. at 35–38 (citing Ex. 1007 ¶¶ 17, 23, 27, 31, 34–35; Ex. 2005 ¶¶ 88–92). At this stage of the proceeding, Patent Owner’s argument raises genuine issues of disputed fact that would be best resolved on a fully developed record, rather than undermining the reasonable likelihood of success of Petitioner’s contention. In particular, going forward, the record would benefit from the parties addressing the issue raised by Patent Owner regarding whether Matsushima discloses to a skilled artisan individually controlling the shutter speed of each CCD sensor 18A and 18B. For example, although Patent Owner notes that Matsushima suggests an embodiment that may use a single, common shutter speed value and an intention for each circuit to be driven synchronously, it is unclear why those facts demonstrate Matsushima fails to suggest individually controlling the integration time of the disclosed independent imaging systems. To the extent Patent Owner is suggesting that limitation 1.3 does not encompass individually controlling the integration time of CCDs sensor 18A and 18B to operate synchronously with a single, common shutter speed value, Patent Owner should explain how the intrinsic record of the ’158 patent and the understanding of a skilled artisan at the time of the invention supports that position. Nevertheless, at this time and on this record, we determine there is a reasonable likelihood of success that Matsushima renders unpatentable claims 1, 2, 5, 8, 9, 11, 13–16, and 19.” slip op. at 21
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,232,158 - PTAB · Jul 7, 2025 · IPR2025-00221 · APJ Scott A Daniels · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–8 and all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that at least one challenged claim would have been shown unpatentable.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), an inter partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” Upon consideration of the arguments and evidence presented by Petitioner and Patent Owner, we are persuaded that Petitioner demonstrated a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in showing the unpatentability of at least one of the challenged claims. See 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review of the challenged claims.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Relying on the declaration testimony of Dr. Kotzin, Petitioner contends that an ordinarily skilled artisan for the ’889 patent [w]ould have been someone knowledgeable and familiar with the wireless communications systems that are pertinent to the ’889 patent. That person would have a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or equivalent training, and approximately two years of experience working in the field of wireless communication systems or design of similar communication systems. Pet. 18–19 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 25). Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s contention as to the level of ordinary skill in the art. See generally, Prelim. Resp. Based on this record, and because there is no dispute, we adopt Petitioner’s articulation of the level of ordinary skill in the art, which is consistent with the ’889 patent and the asserted prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the prior art, itself, can reflect appropriate level of ordinary skill in art).” slip op. at 10
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached
“We point out that in contrast with Patent Owner’s case law, the “indefinite article ‘a’ or ‘an’ in patent parlance usually carries the meaning of ‘one or more’ in open-ended claims containing the transitional phrase ‘comprising.’” KCJ Corp. v. Kinetic Concepts, Inc., 223 F.3d 1351, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2000). “That ‘a’ or ‘an’ can mean ‘one or more’ is best described as a rule, rather than merely as a presumption or even a convention.” Baldwin Graphic Sys., Inc. v. Siebert, Inc., 512 F.3d 1338, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2008). “The subsequent use of definite articles ‘the’ or ‘said’ in a claim to refer back to the same claim term does not change the general plural rule, but simply reinvokes that non-singular meaning.” Id. “The exceptions to this rule are extremely limited: a patentee must evince a clear intent to limit ‘a’ or ‘an’ to ‘one.’” 01 Communique Lab’y, Inc. v. LogMeIn, Inc., 687 F.3d 1292, 1297 (Fed. Cir. 2012). But for the time being, we need not decide this issue.” slip op. at 12
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successInstituted
“D. Ground 1: Claims 1, 2, 5, and 6 – Obviousness over Dateki Petitioner contends that claims 1, 2, 5, and 6 of the ’889 patent are unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as obvious over Dateki. Pet. 21–47. Patent Owner opposes. Prelim. Resp. 33–64. Having considered the arguments and evidence before us, we determine that the record establishes a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail on this asserted ground of unpatentability. In their Preliminary Response, Patent Owner has limited the dispute at the institution stage mainly towards limitations [1.2], [1.3] and [1.4] and the claimed “control message.” We, therefore, address specifically the parties’ arguments with respect to these claim limitations.” slip op. at 16
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,664,889
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.