- Coastal Industries, Inc. v. Shower Enclosures America, Inc.Some claims unpatentablePTAB · Nov 19, 2018 · IPR2017-00573 · APJ Michael W Kim · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–3, 5, 7–9, 11–14, and 16–26 are unpatentable; claims 4, 6, 10, and 15 are not shown unpatentable. Substitute claims 33 and 34 are granted.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“invention. Pet. 26. Patent Owner sets forth many assertions related to the level of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention. PO Resp. 3–14, 20–30; PO Supp. Resp. 15–20. Petitioner responds to those assertions. Pet. Reply 2–4, 9–18; Pet. Supp. Reply 15–16. While we will address each of those assertions, as a substantive matter, Petitioner asserts that “PO does not dispute the definition of a PHOSITA, offer a contrary definition, explain how a different definition might affect the Board’s analysis, nor contest the Board’s specific interpretation of the prior art references to put the PHOSITA determination at issue.” Pet. Reply 16–18; Pet. Supp. Reply 15– 16. We agree with that assessment. Moreover, we note that the level of ordinary skill in the art is often reflected by the prior art of record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001); In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995); In re Oelrich, 579 F.2d 86, 91 (CCPA 1978). Accordingly, as an initial matter, we address Petitioner’s unopposed substantive assertion with respect to the level of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention.” slip op. at 7
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Other
“1. “track members” Independent claims 1, 12, 19, and 22 each recite “track members.”” slip op. at 28
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Motions to amend / substitute claimsMotion to amend, grantedGranted
“B. Patentability of Substitute Claims 33 and 34 Petitioner asserts that various claim limitations are disclosed in the” slip op. at 100
- ExcludeMotion to exclude, deniedDenied
“701, 702 and 37 C.F.R. § 42.65(a). Specifically, Patent Owner asserts that Mr. Poenariu’s testimony is entirely based on his finding as to the level of ordinary skill in the art, and because Mr. Poenariu did not articulate a sufficient factual basis for his conclusion as to the level of ordinary skill in the art, his entire testimony us unreliable and should be excluded. PO Mot. 5–6. Petitioner responds that Mr. Poenariu discloses more than a sufficient amount of underlying facts on which to base his testimony, and, thus, Patent Owner’s assertions go to weight and not admissibility. Pet. Opp. 6–9. We agree with Petitioner.” slip op. at 105
Patent outcomesUS 7,174,944 mixedClaim constructioncites Phillips · KSRPatents in suitUS 7,174,944 - Smart Microwave Sensors GmbH v. Wavetronix LLCAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Jul 17, 2017 · IPR2016-00488 · APJ Daniel N Fishman · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 9, 10, 12, 13, 22, 23, and 25 are unpatentable, including as anticipated by Boles or Farmer and obvious over combinations including Boles, Farmer, Herman, and others.
RulingsFinal written decision- ExcludeMotion to exclude, grantedGranted
“1. Exhibits 1002, 1008, 1009, and 1012 Patent Owner argues the date printed on each of Exhibits 1002, 1008, 1009, and 1012, is inadmissible hearsay under FRE 801 and 802 as out of court statement offered to prove that truth of the matter asserted—that each document was a printed publication as of the date printed on that document (i.e., that it was sufficiently publicly accessible). Paper 45, 2–3 (citing Standard Innovation Corp. v. Lelo, Inc., Case IPR2014-00148, Paper 41 (PTAB April 23, 2015)). As discussed supra, we agree with Patent Owner that the dates printed on these Exhibits are hearsay with no applicable exception. Thus, we grant Patent Owner’s motion requesting that we exclude the copyright notice date from each of Exhibits 1008, 1009, and 1012, and exclude the date of the EuMC conference on Exhibit 1002. However, we note that the documents per se are not excluded from the record as hearsay—only the date imprinted on each as proof of the printed publication status of each document. The underlying documents of these Exhibits are offered not to prove the publication dates thereof but, instead, are statements offered to demonstrate the knowledge of persons of ordinary skill in the art. Petitioner may rely on other evidence to establish the date of public accessibility of each of these documents, the analysis of which we have set forth supra. See Section II.B.1–4.” slip op. at 54
- Skill levelNot reached
- Expert testimonyPatent owner expert discountedDecided for patent owner
“data about multiple vehicles on a particular section of roadway (PO Resp. 7– 8), Petitioner counters by identifying references in the field of traffic engineering that use mobile sensors (i.e., not at a fixed location) for acquiring “traffic data.” Pet. Reply 2 (citing Ex. 1031 ¶¶ 6, 22, 181–183). Referring to pages 7–13 of Exhibit 1031 (Texas Highway Operations Manual discussing “Vehicle-based Equipment”), Patent Owner’s expert testified, on cross-examination, as follows: Q In view of the paragraph, would it be accurate to note that one of ordinary skill in the art would understand that the equipment located in a vehicle can be used to measure the speed of the traffic stream? A It says that a vehicle-mounted radar unit can be used to measure the timing speed of other vehicles in the traffic stream. It does not say it is used to measure the traffic stream. Q I said measure the speed of the traffic. A Yes. This says it is measuring the speed of vehicles in the traffic stream. Q So one of ordinary skill in the art would understand that the equipment located in a vehicle can be used to measure the speed of vehicles in a traffic stream? A That is how it’s worded, the speed of other vehicles in the traffic stream. Ex. 1036, 98:21–99:13. In light of that testimony, we determine that Patent Owner’s expert testimony in support of their assertion is not credible.” slip op. at 14
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner
“Id. at 49:19–50:10. Given, at best, significant ambiguity as to whether the Specification and other evidence requires that “traffic data” must refer to “all or substantially all vehicles,” we are persuaded that such a requirement would not be proper under a broadest reasonable construction. Regarding Patent Owner’s assertion that “traffic data” is limited to data about multiple vehicles on a particular section of roadway (PO Resp. 7– 8), Petitioner counters by identifying references in the field of traffic engineering that use mobile sensors (i.e., not at a fixed location) for acquiring “traffic data.” Pet. Reply 2 (citing Ex. 1031 ¶¶ 6, 22, 181–183). Referring to pages 7–13 of Exhibit 1031 (Texas Highway Operations Manual discussing “Vehicle-based Equipment”), Patent Owner’s expert testified, on cross-examination, as follows: Q In view of the paragraph, would it be accurate to note that one of ordinary skill in the art would understand that the equipment located in a vehicle can be used to measure the speed of the traffic stream? A It says that a vehicle-mounted radar unit can be used to measure the timing speed of other vehicles in the traffic stream. It does not say it is used to measure the traffic stream. Q I said measure the speed of the traffic. A Yes. This says it is measuring the speed of vehicles in the traffic stream. Q So one of ordinary skill in the art would understand that the equipment located in a vehicle can be used to measure the speed of vehicles in a traffic stream? A That is how it’s worded, the speed of other vehicles in the traffic stream.” slip op. at 14
Patent outcomesUS 6,693,557 unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 6,693,557 - Captioncall, L.L.C. v. Ultratec, Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Dec 14, 2016 · IPR2015-01355 · APJ Barbara A Benoit · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–13, 15, and 18 are unpatentable under § 103 over the stated combinations of Liebermann, Aronow, O’Toole, and McLaughlin.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Patent Owner does not challenge directly Mr. Occhiogrosso’s testimony. See generally PO Resp. 5. Mr. Ivan Zatkovich, Patent Owner’s declarant, does not propose a level of ordinary skill in the art to be adopted, but he does testify that the opinions set forth in his declaration would not change if he “assumed that [one of ordinary skill in the art] had the qualifications set forth in Mr. Occhiogrosso’s declaration.” Ex. 2098 ¶ 24 (citing Ex. 1008 ¶ 27). Having reviewed the prior art asserted in this proceeding (see, e.g., Exs. 1002–1005), we determine that the level of ordinary skill proposed by Petitioner’s declarant and employed by both declarants is consistent with the challenged patent and the referenced prior art, and we adopt Mr. Occhiogrosso’s definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art for the purposes of the analysis below.” slip op. at 11
- ExcludeMotion to exclude, deniedDenied
“Turning to the merits of the Motion to Exclude, we find Patent Owner’s assertion that a person of ordinary skill in the art “must know the relevant prior art of telephone technology for the deaf and HOH” (Mot. Exc. 4) lacks sufficient factual corroboration or explanation. For example, Patent 10 Mr. Zatkovich is referring to the level of ordinary skill discussed previously and which we adopted for this proceeding. 14 Owner does not address the sentence that immediately precedes the single citation in the challenged patent on which Patent Owner relies: “[t]he present invention relates to the general field of telephone communications.” Ex. 1001, 1:13–14. Nor does Patent Owner discuss the level of ordinary skill reflected in the prior art of record or other factors that may be considered, including the types of problems encountered in the art, the sophistication of the technology, and educational level of active workers in the field. Okajima, 261 F.3d at 1355. Even if we were to adopt Patent Owner’s definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art, we find Mr. Occhiogrosso meets Patent Owner’s proffered level of ordinary skill: “must know the relevant prior art of telephone technology for the deaf and HOH” (Mot. Exc. 4). Mr. Occhiogrosso’s experience providing expert testimony in proceedings regarding assistive technologies for the deal or hard of hearing is uncontroverted. See Mot. Exc. 4–5 (identifying three inter partes reviews); Ex. 2105, 5:23–6:10 (deposition on August 9, 2016 indicating Mr. Occhiogrosso has been deposed between twelve and twenty times concerning Patent Owner’s patents). Furthermore, the five prior art references Mr. Occhiogrosso considered for this case (Ex. 1008 ¶ 28) all involve telephone technology for the deaf and HOH and support his qualification under the definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art now offers for the first time in its Motion to Exclude (and after it relied on the testimony of its declarant as to a different level). 15” slip op. at 14
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner
“Mr. Occhiogrosso testifies that one of ordinary skill in the art “would consider the screen in Figure 6 [shown on a cellular phone] as analogous to the screen depicted in Figure 8.” Ex. 1043 ¶ 6; see Pet. Reply 9–10 (citing Ex. 1043 ¶ 4–7). Mr. Occhiogrosso’s testimony relies on, and better comports with, Liebermann’s description of Figure 8 as illustrating “a layout for the visual display to present multiple information to the deaf person.” Ex. 1002, 6:29–36; Ex. 1043 ¶ 6. Mr. Occhiogrosso opines that the layout in Figure 8 “can be applied to different devices with displays of varying dimensions,” including the cellular embodiment of Figure 6, the personal computer embodiment in Figure 5a, and the kiosk embodiment in Figure 5c. Ex. 1043 ¶ 6. Mr. Occhiogrosso explains that Figure 8 depicts a “three-part, logical screen layout [that would be] identical and would be scaled appropriately, depending on display size.” Id. We credit Mr. Occhiogrosso’s testimony over that of Mr. Zatkovich because Mr. Occhiogrosso’s testimony better comports with the express disclosure of Liebermann—Figure 8 is not described as being limited to the embodiments in Figures 5a–5c or otherwise not being applicable to the cellular phone embodiment shown in Figure 6. Rather, Figure 8 is described more generally as being “a layout for the visual display.” Ex. 1002, 6:31– 34 36. In addition, Mr. Zatkovich opines that one of ordinary skill in the art purportedly would not incorporate the display shown in Figure 8—that is, the three-part display. At issue here, however, is only a small portion of that display—the incoming text screen—showing the text communication representing a transcription of the voice of the person speaking to a user of the personal interpreter device.” slip op. at 34
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner
“skill in the art would combine Aronow’s initiation switch into Liebermann’s device to save power. PO Resp. 35–36. We agree with Patent Owner that, because the initiation switch is not an “on/off switch” that would enable a user to turn off the device and save power, Mr. Occhiogrosso’s power saving rationale (Ex. 1008 ¶¶ 58–59) is an insufficient motivation to combine the initiation switch. PO Resp. 35–36 (citing Ex. 2098 ¶ 62; Ex. 2097, 141:21– 142:12). Similarly, we also agree with Patent Owner’s challenge regarding Mr. Occhiogrosso’s testimony that Aronow’s switch improves Liebermann’s communicator by making it a “low cost, self contained telephonic interface device requiring no programming for operation.” Id. at 36. Relying on Mr. Zatkovich’s testimony, Patent Owner indicates “the communicator/cellular phone embodiment of Fig. 6 of Liebermann[] already appears to be a self-contained device.” Id. (citing Ex. 2098 ¶ 61). Nevertheless, we note that there is no dispute that Liebermann’s communicator and cellular telephone implementations provide for a user initiating a call to the center by dialing the center. See, e.g., PO Resp. 36 (“As a special case of a telephone, Liebermann can initiate a call simply by dialing a stored number to the Center.”). We disagree with Patent Owner that the addition of Aronow’s switch would not simplify the communicator 48 of Liebermann. Id. Common sense suggests that a single initiation switch is a simpler way to initiate a call than by dialing the multiple digits of a telephone number. Furthermore, we credit Mr. Occhiogrosso’s testimony of the simplifying benefits of a user-operated initiation switch, which is based on Aronow’s discussion about the benefits of the initiation switch to simplify operations of the telephonic device, especially for elderly people who are hard of hearing. Ex. 1008 ¶ 58. For these reasons, we determine that Petitioner has provided sufficient” slip op. at 48
Patent outcomesUS 5,974,116 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 5,974,116 - Captioncall, L.L.C. / Sorenson Communications, Inc. v. Ultratec, Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Sep 7, 2016 · IPR2015-00637 · APJ William V Saindon · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–30 are unpatentable as obvious; Patent Owner’s contingent motion to amend is denied for lack of written-description support and indefiniteness.
RulingsFinal written decision- ExcludeMotion to exclude, grantedMotion to exclude, deniedGranted in part
“admitted that the patented features of voice and revoiced text are responsible for ‘giv[ing] the phone back to folks with hearing loss.’” PO Resp. 48 (emphasis added). Thus, Patent Owner is offering the statement for the truth that voice and re-voiced text gives the phone back to folks with hearing loss. Patent Owner’s argument that Mr. Puzey was discussing the existence of features in his company’s product rather than features in Patent Owner’s product does not change that his statement is offered as proof regarding an alleged long-felt need for the features. Accordingly, his testimony is hearsay. slip op. at 15
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“art is telecommunication systems. Thus, a [POSA] is a person familiar with at least that technology by way of background and/or experience.” CaptionCall, LLC v. Ultratec, Inc., Case IPR2013-00549, Paper 71, 13 (Final Written Decision) (PTAB 2015); see also CaptionCall, LLC v. Ultratec, Inc., Case IPR2013-00780, Paper 35, 9 (Final Written Decision) (PTAB 2015) (reaffirming our finding in IPR2013- 00549). Patent Owner states that it “does not agree” with that definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art, and that, “without waiving the foregoing objection and reserving all rights,” states that it will “appl[y]” our prior definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art “for purposes of this Response.” PO Resp. 3. By not setting forth arguments advocating a particular definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art, and by applying our prior definition, Patent Owner has waived arguments for any other definition. Accordingly, we adopt Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art, as expressed by its declarant, Mr. Occhiogrosso. Ex. 1009 ¶¶ 26–27. This person typically has “a bachelor’s degree” slip op. at 35
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“understand a “communication link,” as claimed, to refer to the “communication line” described in the specification. In particular, the link is “intended not only to apply to a traditional land-line . . . but also to all equivalents that offer similar functionality.” Id. at 8:60–63. A link could be “a portion of the bandwidth” of a particular connection, such that a single mode of connection (e.g., IP) could carry out two types of communication (voice and text), with each type corresponding to a different “communication link.” See id. at 8:44–47, 8:63–65. For example, as explained in the ’838 patent, “[e]ach of the telephone lines could be . . . a portion of the bandwidth of an ISDN or DSL service.” Id. at 8:53–65. Accordingly, we adopt Petitioner’s construction of “communication link” as “any communication session, protocol, link, connection, or path distinguishable from [another] communication link[].”” slip op. at 22
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundUnpatentable
“3. Combination of References As we discussed above, Petitioner’s combination takes the two-line” slip op. at 43
Patent outcomesUS 8,908,838 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites KSRPatents in suitUS 8,908,838 - Gordon * Howard Associates, Inc. v. Lunareye, Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Feb 2, 2016 · IPR2014-01213 · APJ J John Lee · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–24 are unpatentable under § 103 based on the instituted combinations of Mohan, Oncore, Roach, and Lewis.
RulingsFinal written decision- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner
“accompanying description requiring that GPS Receiver 48 and Controller 36 be physically distinct components. Even if there was such a requirement, however, “a particular embodiment appearing in the written description may not be read into a claim when the claim language is broader than the embodiment.” Superguide Corp. v. DirecTV Enters., Inc., 358 F.3d 870, 875 (Fed. Cir. 2004). LunarEye’s reliance on other figures and descriptions of embodiments in the specification is unpersuasive for the same reason. See PO Resp. 20–21 & n.48; see also Ex. 2031 ¶¶ 14–15 (LunarEye’s proffered expert relying on descriptions of embodiments for opinion that data selecting device is external to GPS receiver). Merely describing a narrower embodiment does not constitute the clear disclaimer required to apply the limitation at issue to the claim. See In re Am. Acad. of Sci. Tech Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2004). In addition, LunarEye also contends the claim language itself indicates the recited GPS receiver (or location-signal generating device) and data selector are physically distinct components. PO Resp. 22. LunarEye asserts claims 1 and 2 recite that the GPS receiver produces “GPS data” first, and that the data selector operates on that output of the GPS receiver to produce “selected GPS data.” Id. at 22–23. According to LunarEye, this claim language requires that the GPS receiver and data selector be “distinct,” i.e., physically separate. See id. at 20–22. The claim language, however, does not support LunarEye’s position. Although claims 1 and 2 recite the GPS receiver and data selector separately and recite distinct functions for each, nothing in those claims indicates these structures must be physically separated or precludes one being housed physically within the other, particularly under their broadest reasonable interpretation. LunarEye does not present any compelling evidence indicating otherwise.” slip op. at 7
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner
“to combine Mohan, Oncore, and Roach. Pet. 12–16. For example, GH argues that both Mohan and Oncore are directed to GPS receiver technology, and that combining them would have involved a simple substitution that would achieve predictable results. Id. at 12. GH also contends that one of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated by Oncore’s discussion of the advantages of its GPS receiver technology, and that applying that technology in combination with Mohan would have amounted to nothing more than the use of a prior art element for its established function to obtain its stated benefits. Id. at 12–13 (citing Ex. 1007, 1.1). Likewise, GH asserts that combining Roach with Mohan would have involved a simple substitution with predictable results, which would have amounted to the use of Roach’s prior art cellular communications system for its established function to achieve its known benefits. Id. at 13–15 (citing Ex. 1008, 9:6– 30). In addition to the prior art references, GH also relies on the Declaration of Dr. Janky, whose testimony supports GH’s contentions. Ex. 1010 ¶¶ 96– 102. We have considered Dr. Janky’s testimony, including his underlying analysis and reasoning, and find it credible. Based on all of the evidence presented, including Dr. Janky’s testimony, GH has articulated sufficient reasoning with rational underpinning to support the conclusion that one of ordinary skill would have had reason to combine the teachings of Mohan, Oncore, and Roach in the manner advanced by GH. See KSR, 550 U.S. at 418 (citing In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006)).” slip op. at 25
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of success › Teaching awayTeaching away not foundDecided for petitioner
“are unpersuasive. LunarEye argues that the asserted prior art references teach away from the combinations advanced by GH. PO Resp. 45–57. Specifically, LunarEye contends Mohan states that a device constructed according to its teachings should conform to certain size constraints to achieve adequate miniaturization. Id. at 48–52. The GPS device described in Oncore14 are too large and are, thus, incompatible with Mohan, according to LunarEye. Id. This argument is unpersuasive, however, because none of the claims of the ’035 patent require miniaturization, nor do they include any limitations restricting the size of the claimed apparatus or any recited component device. LunarEye does not identify any portion of Mohan that criticizes, discredits, or otherwise discourages combining Mohan and Oncore in the manner advanced by GH. See In re Fulton, 391 F.3d 1195, 1201 (Fed. Cir. 2004). Merely describing the benefits of a miniaturized GPS device does not teach away from non-miniaturized devices. See id.; In re Gurley, 27 F.3d 551, 554 (Fed. Cir. 1994). Moreover, “[t]he test for obviousness is not whether the features of a secondary reference may be bodily incorporated into the structure of the primary reference.” Keller, 642 14 LunarEye does not argue that the GPS device of Lewis, or the communications devices of Roach, are incompatible with Mohan’s purported size restrictions. F.2d at 425. Thus, whether the Oncore GPS receiver is too large to be incorporated physically into the Mohan GPS device is inapposite, because the challenged claims do not recite any limitations on size.” slip op. at 27
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Other PTAB motions (exclude, strike, seal, additional discovery, rehearing)Granted
“MOTION TO SEAL GH moves to seal Exhibit 1028. Mot. Seal. 2. As this is the Final Written Decision, we consider GH’s Motion to Seal as a motion to expunge Exhibit 1028 from the record pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 42.56. Exhibit 1028 was not relied on for this Decision. Consequently, GH’s motion is granted, and Exhibit 1028 will be expunged. ORDER Accordingly, it is: ORDERED that claims 1–24 of U.S. Patent No. 6,484,035 B2 are held unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103; and FURTHER ORDERED that Exhibit 1028 is expunged from the record.” slip op. at 29
Patent outcomesUS 6,484,035 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 6,484,035 - Gordon * Howard Associates, Inc. v. Lunareye, Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Sep 28, 2015 · IPR2014-00712 · APJ J John Lee · IPR · Final written decision
Claim 3 is unpatentable under § 103 over Mohan and Oncore because their combination teaches or suggests each limitation and a person of ordinary skill would have had reason to combine them.
RulingsFinal written decision- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Specification disavowal / 'present invention' languageDisclaimer not foundDecided for petitioner
“argument. LunarEye relies on the specification’s descriptions of certain embodiments. For example, Figure 2 of the ’035 patent is a block diagram depicting certain features of an embodiment of the claimed invention, including Global Positioning Satellite System Receiver 48 (“GPS Receiver 48”) and Controller 36. Ex. 1002, Fig. 2, 5:49–6:8. As an initial matter, LunarEye does not identify anything in Figure 2 or its accompanying description requiring that GPS Receiver 48 and Controller 36 be physically distinct components. Even if there was such a requirement, however, “a particular embodiment appearing in the written description may not be read into a claim when the claim language is broader than the embodiment.” Superguide Corp. v. DirecTV Enters., Inc., 358 F.3d 870, 875 (Fed. Cir.” slip op. at 6
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed board ownOther
“reorders the selected location data” in either the Petition or the Preliminary Response, we construed the term due to its significance in the analysis of GH’s asserted grounds of unpatentability. Inst. Dec. 9. Specifically, we construed the term preliminarily in the Decision on Institution as “arranges the selected location data into the desired order for transmission.” Id. This construction was based on the ’035 patent specification, which describes the reordering function: An example of the data selector function is illustrated in FIGS. 6 and 7. The Motorola® GT Plus OncoreTM GPS family of chips produces an digital output signal 86 containing bits representing the latitude, longitude, height, velocity, and heading of the apparatus 12 and the current time, as shown in FIG. 6. . . . Preferably, only the bits representing latitude, longitude, velocity and heading 88 are included in the data to transmit signal 56, as shown in FIG. 7. . . . Further, it may be desirable to change the order that the various portions of the information are transmitted. For example, it may be desirable to send the heading portion first. The data selector selects the data to be transmitted and arranges it into the desired order. Ex. 1002, 7:4–20 (emphasis added). We concluded, “the specification explains that reordering the selected location data encompasses arranging the data received from the location-signal generating device (e.g., a GPS device) into the order desired for transmission.” Inst. Dec. 9. The ordinary meaning of the term “reorders”—as contrasted with “orders”—indicates a change in order. The specification supports this understanding of the term, stating that “it may be desirable to change the order that the various portions of the information are transmitted.” Ex. 1002, 7:15–17 (emphasis added). Therefore, based on the parties’ arguments and evidence developed since the Decision on Institution, we now determine the broadest reasonable interpretation of “reorders the selected location data” is “changes the order of the selected location data into the desired order for transmission.”7 slip op. at 10
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“initial order of the location data received by the GPS receiver. Id.; Tr. 50:23–53:2. LunarEye argues that when Oncore discusses generating multiple different NMEA messages, each message is constructed separately from the original, unordered data; thus, the data is ordered for each output message in the first instance, rather than reordered. PO Resp. 28–29; Tr. 53:3–18. In an obviousness analysis, however, we consider not only the express disclosures of the asserted prior art references, but also the “inferences and creative steps that a person of ordinary skill in the art would employ.” KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418 (2007). Here, the record indicates that a person of ordinary skill would have had at least a bachelor’s degree in electrical or computer engineering and familiarity with GPS and communications technology, such as that gained from five years of professional experience in the design and implementation of GPS technology. See Ex. 1010 ¶¶ 38–41 (Dr. Janky’s testimony on level of ordinary skill); Ex. 2024 ¶¶ 8–9 (LunarEye’s proffered expert, Joseph McAlexander, adopting Dr. Janky’s testimony regarding level of ordinary skill). Considering the level of ordinary skill and the evidence of record, we find that Oncore would have taught or suggested to an ordinary artisan a device that changes the order of selected location data from one order (e.g., an NMEA message) to another order (e.g., a different NMEA message).” slip op. at 16
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“claimed location-signal generating device and its related limitations. Id. at 25–26 (citing Ex. 1006, 2:7–12, 3:5–15, Fig. 1). According to GH, the communications transmitter/receiver of Mohan teaches the claimed telemetry transmitter, and the disclosed power management system teaches the claimed enable controller and its related limitations. Id. at 26–30 (citing Ex. 1006, 3:2–15, 4:43–5:49, Figs. 1, 3). LunarEye does not dispute that Mohan teaches these aspects of claim 3 of the ’035 patent. The record supports GH’s contentions regarding Mohan.” slip op. at 14
Patent outcomesUS 6,484,035 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSRPatents in suitUS 6,484,035 - Groupon, Inc. v. Blue Calypso, LLCNo claims unpatentablePTAB · Dec 17, 2014 · CBM2013-00044 · APJ Barbara A Benoit · CBM · Final written decision
Claims 4-9 were not shown unpatentable because Ratsimor was not established as prior art; cancellation of claims 1-3 and 10-13 was granted.
RulingsFinal written decision- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Lexicography (patentee as own lexicographer)Term construed board ownDecided for petitioner
“customary meaning, as would be understood by one of ordinary skill in the art in the context of the entire disclosure. In re Translogic Tech., Inc., 504 F.3d 1249, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2007). Any special definition for a claim term must be set forth in the specification with reasonable clarity, deliberateness, and precision. In re Paulsen, 30 F.3d 1475, 1480 (Fed. Cir. 1994). We must be careful not to read a particular embodiment appearing in the written description into the claim if the claim language is broader than the embodiment. In re Van Geuns, 988 F.2d 1181, 1184 (Fed. Cir. 1993). We construe the terms “incentive program,” “incentive,” and “incentivizing” in accordance with these principles.” slip op. at 9
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Motions to amend / substitute claimsMotion to amend, grantedGranted
“C. Patent Owner’s Motion to Amend Patent Owner’s Motion to Amend (Paper 18) is before us for consideration. In the motion, Patent Owner requests cancellation of claims 1-3 and 10-13 of the ’646 patent. The cancellation of these claims is not based on any contingency. There is no indication, for example, that claims 1-3 and 10-13 should be cancelled only if the claims are determined unpatentable. Rather, the Motion to Amend leaves no doubt that Patent Owner unequivocally requests cancellation of claims 1-3 and 10-13. For these reasons, we grant Patent Owner’s request to cancel claims 1-3 and 10-13 of the ’646 patent. Because Patent Owner requested cancellation of claims 1-3 and 10-13, not based on any contingency, Patent Owner has waived any issues with respect to claims 1-3 and 10-13, and, therefore, we need not address the patentability of those claims.” slip op. at 13
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityPrinted publication not establishedReference not prior artNot shown unpatentable
“prior art printed publication “involves a case-by-case inquiry into the facts and circumstances surrounding the reference’s disclosure to members of the public.” In re Klopfenstein, 380 F.3d 1345, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2004). The key inquiry is whether the reference was made “sufficiently accessible to the public interested in the art” before the critical date. In re Cronyn, 890 F.2d 1158, 1160 (Fed. Cir. 1989). “A given reference is ‘publicly accessible’ upon a satisfactory showing that such document has been disseminated or otherwise made available to the extent that persons interested and ordinarily skilled in the subject matter or art exercising reasonable diligence, can locate it . . . .” Bruckelmyer v. Ground Heaters, Inc., 445 F.3d 1374, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2006). Indexing is not “a necessary condition for a reference to be publicly accessible,” but is among many factors that may bear on public accessibility. In re Lister, 583 F.3d 1307, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2009).” slip op. at 16
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“3. The Ratsimor Paper Is Not Prior Art For the foregoing reasons, we determine that Petitioner has not demonstrated, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the Ratsimor paper is a printed publication within the meaning of 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) and, therefore, the Ratsimor paper is not prior art to the claims of the ’646 patent. Therefore, Petitioner may not rely upon the Ratsimor paper for its asserted grounds of patentability under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). Accordingly, we conclude that Petitioner has not demonstrated that (i) claims 4 and 5 would have been obvious over the Ratsimor paper and Paul, (ii) claims 6-8 would have been obvious over the Ratsimor paper, Paul, and Kitaura, or (iii) claim 9 would have been obvious over the Ratsimor paper, Paul, Hall, and MacEachren.” slip op. at 23
Patent outcomesUS 8,452,646 not shown unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 8,452,646
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.