• Shenzhen Tuozhu Technology Co., Ltd. v. Stratasys, Inc.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Sep 28, 2026 · IPR2025-00611 · APJ Christopher L Ogden · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–10, 12, 13, 19, and 20 are unpatentable under § 103 over the stated Douglas–Mark and Hamilton-based grounds.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “The parties agree that experience could substitute for a degree, and vice versa. Pet. 3; PO Resp. 10. The parties’ proposed levels of ordinary skill are substantially similar. For this decision, as in the Institution Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposed level, which is supported by credible testimonial evidence and is consistent with the problems addressed in the ’774 patent. See Ex. 1001, 1:16–52. Our decision would be the same, however, if we were to adopt Patent Owner’s proposal.” slip op. at 7

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Other

    “Neither Petitioner nor Patent Owner argues that we need to construe any claim terms explicitly. See Pet. 2–3; PO Resp. 10. However, the parties contest two material claim-construction issues which we address below. To the extent that the parties’ positions depend on interpreting other claim language in a particular way, we discuss the relevant claim language below in the context of the parties’ arguments regarding the prior art.” slip op. at 8

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner

    “We disagree with Patent Owner that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have understood that limitation 1.2 must be performed before limitations 1.3 or 1.4. See Ex. 1001, 35:21–24. See Interactive Gift Exp., Inc. v. Compuserve Inc., 256 F.3d 1323, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“Unless the steps of a method actually recite an order, the steps are not ordinarily construed to require one.” (citing Loral Fairchild Corp. v. Sony Corp., 181 F.3d 1313, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). The evidence suggests that a “target printer” is any printer that is ultimately selected for fabricating the object, and such a printer could send its configuration information either before or after that determination is made in limitation 1.2. This interpretation does not render the word “target” meaningless. At some point, a printer must be determined to be the target printer, which is the one intended to ultimately fabricate the three-dimensional object. But the target printer still exists, and is capable of being queried, before that determination is made. We find the examples in the ’774 patent pertinent to this question. The ’774 patent states that “the target printer may include more than one printer.” Ex. 1001, 18:66–67. In discussing the step of “query target printer for properties 306” (Fig. 3A), the ’774 patent states that “[i]n one aspect, numerous queries are sent to numerous printers, e.g., for use in selecting one or more of the printers as the target printer.” Id. at 19:8–10. Alternatively, “the query is sent to a printer that is not necessarily the target printer as described herein, e.g., when the query or information received from a response to the query is used for the selection of the target printer.” Id. at 19:11–14. Importantly, the second embodiment states that the queried printer “is not necessarily the target printer,” suggesting that the queried printer could be the target printer even before it is determined to be such. Id. at 19:11–12 (emphasis added). Based on the evidence of record, a person of ordinary skill in the art would have understood that the “target printer” can be determined after the query recited in limitation 1.3 or the reception of configuration information recited in limitation 1.4. Thus, the evidence does not impose an ordering between limitations 1.2 and 1.3 or between limitations 1.2 and 1.4. The evidence also does not support Patent Owner’s argument that the two reverse-order examples in the ’774 patent are unclaimed embodiments.” slip op. at 10

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of success › HindsightMotivation foundDecided for petitioner

    “We disagree that Petitioner’s arguments are based on impermissible hindsight, because they are based on the disclosures in Douglas and Mark, and Petitioner has articulated a persuasive reason to combine those references without referring to the ’774 patent itself, as we discuss below. See In re McLaughlin, 443 F.2d 1392, 1395 (CCPA 1971) (an obvious rationale is not improper hindsight if it “takes into account only knowledge which was within the level of ordinary skill at the time the claimed invention was made and does not include knowledge gleaned only from applicant’s disclosure”).” slip op. at 29

  Patent outcomesUS 11,886,774 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,886,774
• Motorola Mobility LLC / Google LLC v. Multifold International Incorporated Pte. Ltd.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Apr 28, 2026 · IPR2025-00040 · APJ Brian P Murphy · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–9 are unpatentable: claims 1–4 and 6–9 as anticipated or obvious over the asserted references, and claim 5 as obvious over Yook or Yook in view of Purcell.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • BurdenDecided for petitioner

    “We disagree with Patent Owner’s argument because the Petition presents argument and evidence that substantively demonstrates, with clarity and particularity, how and why each reference discloses, teaches, suggests, or otherwise renders obvious the displaying element recited in limitation 1[B]. We agree with Petitioner that “Patent Owner neglects to address the actual substance of the Petition, which clearly addresses this limitation with respect to each reference.” Reply 1–2. The Petition addresses in detail how each asserted reference discloses displaying two applications on two separate displays in accordance with the displaying element, by presenting multiple annotated figures from Yook, Lee, Aguilar, and Purcell. Pet. 27–30, 47–50, 62–63, 77–78. The Petition also cites and quotes the accompanying descriptions for the annotated figures from each prior art reference as well as explanatory expert opinion testimony from Dr. Rodriguez. Id. (citing Rodriguez Decl. Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 70–74, 119–122, 149–150, 182–183; Yook Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 47, 51, 58, 96–101, Figs. 4b, 4d, 5; Lee Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 48–53, Figs. 4, 6, 9, 10; Aguilar Ex. 1006, 7:1–7, Figs. 5–5d; Purcell Ex. 1007 ¶ 16, Fig. 2). We provide detailed examples below of how the Petition maps Yook and Lee onto the displaying element of limitation 1[B] in compliance with the particularity requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3); 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(4). Although we do not provide detailed examples directed to Aguilar and Purcell, we find the Petition maps Aguilar and Purcell onto the displaying element of limitation 1[B] in compliance with the particularity requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3) and 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(4).” slip op. at 14

  • Strike new argumentNew argument disregardedDecided for petitioner

    “Instead, Patent Owner chose to raise an entirely new theory of patentability. Sur-Reply 3–13; Tr. 28:8–20. Patent Owner’s new theory is based on a claim construction that construes claim 1 of the ’756 patent as “recit[ing] a specific order of steps that must be performed in the order written.” Id. at 3–4. “Because of this order, the [displaying element] must occur after both (two) ‘selecting’ steps,” and Patent Owner contends none of the prior art references asserted in the Petition “meets the order required by claim 1.” Id. at 4. We will not consider Patent Owner’s new theory of patentability raised for the first time in its Sur-Reply. See Apple Inc. v. e-Watch, Inc., IPR2015-00412, Paper 50, 44 (PTAB May 6, 2016) (“‘Respond,’ in the context of 37 C.F.R. § 42.23(b), does not mean embark in a new direction with a new approach”); see also Optivus Tech., Inc. v. Ion Beam Appl’ns S.A., 469 F.3d 978, 989 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (argument raised for the first time in the reply brief, which could have been raised in the opening brief, is waived). Patent Owner should have raised its “specific order of steps” argument in the Response. By failing to do so, Patent Owner has waived the argument. Id.” slip op. at 22

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedPatent owner expert discountedDecided for petitioner

    “Third, we are further persuaded by Dr. Surati’s testimony that the wave shape visual indicator depicted in Figures 10A–C of the ’756 patent indicates that a user can do something, but not necessarily what that something is (e.g., minimizing or maximizing). Id. at 17 (citing Ex. 1012, 200:1–6). It is telling that Dr. Surati testified that only through repeated use and exposure would a user recognize a relationship between a wave shape and the functions of maximizing or minimizing an application. Id. (citing Ex. 1012, 197:13–199:22). We are also persuaded by Dr. Rodriguez’s testimony regarding the teachings of Yook: Yook therefore teaches giving users the ability to transition a split-screen application back into full screen mode. Further, a POSITA would have understood that this ability would undoubtedly be implemented in the form of a visual indicator, which, from the 2000s to today, is the industry’s universal method of alerting a user to an accessible function. . . . Ex. 1003 ¶ 107 (emphasis added); For claim 5, Yook discloses many different types of “icons” that are used to receive user gesture inputs. See, e.g., Figs. 1, 4e, 5a, 5c, 5d, 6, 7a, 7b, 7c, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13. Examples of these icons are displayed below: Id. ¶ 108; and A POSITA would have understood that Yook’s icons can have a wave shape because the shape taken by a visual indicator, or icon, is merely a matter of common and routine design choice. Indeed, the shape of an icon does not affect its function or how a gesture input is received. Id. ¶ 109 (emphasis added). In short, we are persuaded Petitioner has established by a preponderance of the evidence that a displayed visual indicator that “has a wave shape” is a design choice not affecting the function of the visual indicator, and a visual indicator that “has a wave shape” would have been an obvious design choice to a POSITA in view of Yook.” slip op. at 30

  • Skill levelSkill level board ownDecided for petitioner

    “In determining the level of ordinary skill in the art, various factors may be considered, including the “type of problems encountered in the art; prior art solutions to those problems; rapidity with which innovations are made; sophistication of the technology; and educational level of active workers in the field.” In re GPAC, Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (citing Custom Accessories, Inc. v. Jeffrey-Allan Indus., Inc., 807 F.2d 955, 962 (Fed. Cir. 1986)). “These factors are not exhaustive but are merely a guide to determining the level of ordinary skill in the art.” Daiichi Sankyo Co. v. Apotex, Inc., 501 F.3d 1254, 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2007). There is uncontested evidence in the record before us that reflects the knowledge and experience of a POSITA. We adopt the parties’ agreed level of ordinary skill in the art, which is consistent with the description in the ’756 patent and the prior art of record.” slip op. at 9

  Patent outcomesUS 9,134,756 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips
  Patents in suitUS 9,134,756
• Google LLC / Motorola Mobility LLC v. Multifold International Incorporated Pte. Ltd.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Apr 22, 2026 · IPR2025-00060 · APJ Arthur M Peslak · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1, 2, 4–9, 12–16, and 20 are unpatentable: claims 1, 2, 12, 13, and 20 as anticipated by Ogawa, and claims 4–9 and 14–16 as obvious over the stated combinations.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for petitioner

    “Claim 1 also recites “wherein the first and second states comprise an open application state.” Given the usage of “comprise” in this clause, we determine that the possible first and second states must include an open application state but the states are not limited to an open application state. Claim 12 similarly recites a processor that is operable to “displaying an icon associated with the application in at least one of the first display and the second display, wherein the icon indicates that the application is in one of two or more states associated with a display status of the application” and “wherein the first and second states comprise an open application state.” Ex. 1001, 16:12–19. Given the usage of “comprise” in these clauses, we determine that the first and second states must include an open application state but are not limited to an open application state that is being displayed in the corresponding display status as argued by Patent Owner. Patent Owner’s proposed construction, which requires the application to be “open and being displayed in the corresponding display condition/status,” further narrows the wherein clauses of claims 1 and 12 which do not require the application to be open and displayed. In fact, Patent Owner’s declarant, Dr. Surati, testified that the applications have multiple states and are not limited to open application states. Ex. 1016, 50:4–51:4. Patent Owner does not cite to an any portion of the Specification or prosecution history in support of its construction. PO Resp. 7–9.” slip op. at 13

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “would have had an undergraduate degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science or a related field along with two years of work experience in the field of user interface technologies, including e.g., graphical interface technologies, or a related field. . . . More education can supplement practical experience and vice versa. Pet. 5–6 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 20–21). Patent Owner applies Petitioner’s definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art. PO Resp. 10. We apply Petitioner’s uncontested definition because it appears consistent with the problems addressed in the ’080 patent and the prior art.” slip op. at 10

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “For the following reasons, we find that Petitioner establishes that Ogawa discloses this limitation. Patent Owner’s contentions are not responsive to Petitioner’s mapping of Ogawa to claim limitation [1.f]. This claim limitation recites that “the morphing comprising changing the shape and size of the icon.” Ex. 1001, 15:4–7. Petitioner relies on the size and shape of access bar 42 changing as shown by a comparison of Ogawa’s Figure 4(B) and Figure 4(C). Pet. 24– 25. Patent Owner does not dispute that the size and shape of access bar 42 changes from Figure 4(B) to Figure 4(C). See PO Resp. 10–16. Patent Owner focuses on the color of access bar 42 shown as cross- hatching in Figure 4 to argue that the icon does not represent the state of the application. PO Resp. 12–14. However, the color of access bar 42 and the size and shape of access bar 42 are set independently of each other by different functions. Ogawa explains that: [t]he splitting position of the screen is indicated by a pointer 44. When the pointer 44 is designated with the pen 12 and the pen is moved left or right (along the access bar 42), the splitting ratio (horizontal size ratio) of the two screens 13A, 13B changes as depicted in FIG. 4(C). Ex. 1005 ¶ 19.” slip op. at 29

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundUnpatentable

    “Petitioner next contends that it would have been obvious to an ordinarily skilled artisan to modify “Ogawa’s display control method using Yook’s technique such that Ogawa’s method would have included first displaying a program across both logically divided displays of display input surface 13 . . . to increase the viewing area for the program as shown and described [in] Yook’s figures 4b and 4d.” Pet. 54–55 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 137). Petitioner further contends that the modification would “include[] minimizing the program to occupy only one of the first and second parts of display input surface 13 . . . as also shown and described with reference to Yook’s figures 4b and 4d.” Id. at 55. Petitioner then provides an example of the modification. Id. Namely, Ogawa’s operation would have been modified so that “when a user elects to split a screen in figure 4(A) using the split screen menu 41, the program is first displayed like in figure 4(C) . . . across two displays and then, based on user input to minimize the program size” resulting in the program displayed on one display. Id. (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 137; Ex. 1005, Figs. 4(A)–4(C)). Petitioner next contends that the modification of Ogawa with Yook “would have involved the substitution of one known way of displaying a program” as shown in Ogawa “with another known display method” as shown in Yook, “and thus would yield a predictable result.” Pet. 56–57 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 139). Patent Owner does not address claim 4. See PO Resp. 10–18. We have reviewed Petitioner’s evidence and argument and find that Petitioner has shown that an ordinarily skilled artisan would have been motivated to combine Ogawa and Yook as a simple substitution of one known way of displaying a program for another with a predictable result. Ex. 1002 ¶ 139. Further, Petitioner has also shown that the combination of Ogawa and Yook teaches the limitations of claim 4. For the foregoing reasons, Petitioner establishes by a preponderance” slip op. at 43

  Patent outcomesUS 8,842,080 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,842,080
• Apple Inc. / Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. et al. v. Smart Mobile Technologies LLCAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Apr 22, 2026 · IPR2022-01002 · APJ Jameson Lee · IPR · Remand

  On remand, claims 1–9 and 12–20 are unpatentable as obvious over Paulraj and Heath under § 103.

  RulingsRemand decision

  • RemandOther

    “determining no challenged claim had been proved unpatentable by Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd., Samsung Electronics America, Inc., and Apple Inc. (collectively, “Petitioner”). Paper 41. Petitioner appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. Papers 43, 44. On January 13, 2026, the Federal Circuit vacated and remanded, on the basis that the Board erred by not considering certain alternative arguments presented in the Petitioner’s Reply (Paper 29), which were properly responsive to claim construction proposed in the Patent Owner Response and adopted by the Board.1 Paper 45. In its Reply, Petitioner alternatively argued that even under the Patent Owner’s claim construction relating to “the plurality of antennas,” the same prior art references nonetheless still rendered obvious the challenged claims. In this remand proceeding, neither party requested the filing of additional briefing, despite having been given an opportunity to make and explain such a request. Paper 51. We have authority to conduct this inter partes review under 35 U.S.C. § 6. This Final Written Decision on Remand is issued pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 318(a) and 37 C.F.R. § 42.73. Having considered all of the arguments presented in Petitioner’s Reply, we determine that Petitioner has proved by a preponderance of the evidence that claims 1–9 and 12–20 of U.S. Patent No. 9,191,083 B1 (Ex. 1001, “the ’083 patent”) are unpatentable. A.” slip op. at 2

  • Skill levelSkill level board ownDecided for petitioner

    “Bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or a related field, and at least two years of experience related to the design or development of wireless communication systems, or the equivalent.” Pet. 2–3 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 27–28). Petitioner additionally states that “[a]dditional graduate education could substitute for professional experience, or significant experience in the field could substitute for formal education.” Pet. 3. Patent Owner does not in its Response address the level of ordinary skill. Patent Owner’s expert witness, Dr. Cooklev, testifies that he “will apply the same definition of the level of skill of a POSITA [as Petitioner].” Ex. 2004 ¶ 19. Based on the evidence of record, we determine a person of ordinary skill would have had a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or a related field, and two years of experience related to the design or development of wireless communication systems. This is consistent with Petitioner’s articulation of the level of ordinary skill, with the exception of Petitioner’s open-ended reference to “at least” two years of experience, because that would improperly encompass a level of experience only possessed by an expert. This articulation of the level of ordinary skill is also the same as what we determined in the Final Written decision issued on November 30, 2023. Paper 41, 6. C. slip op. at 6

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner

    “Patent Owner contends: “The plain meaning of the claims requires that the same ‘plurality of antennas’ be used for transmitting and receiving the plurality of signal streams.” PO Resp. 5, 9–12. Citing Dr. Cooklev’s testimony, Patent Owner contends that the ’083 patent’s Specification describes embodiments that use the same antennas for both transmitting and receiving data streams. PO Resp. 7–9 (citing Ex. 2004 ¶¶ 34–35). In the Final Written Decision, we determined: Although we do not understand the claims to require both transmission and reception “via all antennas” all of the time, we determine the claims require a set of antennas in which at least some of the antennas are for both transmitting and receiving. We disagree with Petitioner that two separate sets of antennas— one set of transmitting antennas and a separate, nonoverlapping set of receiving antennas—fall within the scope of the challenged claims. Paper 41, 13 (emphasis added). The Federal Circuit agreed with our claim construction. Apple Inc. v. Smart Mobile Technologies LLC, U.S. Ct. App. Fed. Cir., slip op. 24-1419 (January 13, 2026) (2026 WL 91021) (Paper 45, 2–4). We continue to apply the same construction here that we adopted in the Final Written Decision.” slip op. at 9

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “legally sufficient motivation for modifying Paulraj, but only attempted to show that the modification “could” have been made by one of ordinary skill in the art which is not enough for a showing of obviousness. Sur-reply 8–9. We disagree with Patent Owner. Establishing that certain technique was well-known to one of ordinary skill in the art at the effective filing date of the challenged patent constitutes sufficient motivation to make a modification in accordance with what was well-known in the art to one of ordinary skill, absent factors not present here. Indeed, “if a technique has been used to improve one device, and a person of ordinary skill in the art would recognize that it would improve similar devices in the same way, using the technique is obvious unless its actual application is beyond his or her skill.” KSR, 550 U.S. at 417. That would be the situation where a technique was well-known to one of ordinary skill in the art, unless there is actual difficulty in making the application. The “improvement” here, although not articulated by Petitioner, is inherent with the technique, not requiring use of separate antennas for transmitting and receiving, i.e., eliminating the need for additional parts. Further, it is not necessary to show that a modification is the “best option,” because any “suitable option” would suffice. See Intel Corporation v. Qualcomm Incorporated, 21 F.4th 784, 800 (Fed. Cir. 2021). Here, Patent Owner does not assert that one of ordinary skill in the art would have had difficulty modifying Paulraj to use some of the same antennas both for transmitting and for receiving. Nor does Patent Owner dispute that it was well known to one of ordinary skill in the art to use the same antenna(s) for both transmitting and for receiving. We further note the following description in the Specification of the ’083 patent: “The typical CT/MD [cellular telephone/mobile device] has one transmitter and one receiver (T/R), with one antenna.” Ex. 1001, 1:47–48. That statement is fully consistent with Petitioner’s assertion that it was well-known to use the same antenna for transmitting and for receiving. For the foregoing reasons, notwithstanding Patent Owner’s arguments to the contrary, we determine that Petitioner sufficiently has shown that it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art to modify Paulraj such that some of the same antennas would be used both for transmitting and for receiving, according to limitations 1[b], 1[d], and 1[e].” slip op. at 36

  Patent outcomesUS 9,191,083 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 9,191,083
• Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. / Samsung Electronics America, Inc. et al. v. Harbor Island Dynamic, LLCAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Mar 16, 2026 · IPR2025-00954 · APJ Gregg I Anderson · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 3 and 8–19 are unpatentable: claim 3 is anticipated by Yu and obvious over Okashita, Okashita and Yu, and Burgener and Okashita; claims 8–19 are obvious over Burgener and Okashita, with or without Yu.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Motions to amend / substitute claimsMotion to amend, grantedGranted

    “ORDER For the foregoing reasons, ORDERED that Patent Owner’s Unopposed Motion to Amend (Paper 19) is granted, and claims 1, 2, and 4–7 are canceled;” slip op. at 37

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Patent Owner proposes a slightly different level of ordinary skill, arguing that a bachelor’s degree, not a master’s degree, is all that is required because that is the “target audience for the ’886 Patent.” PO Resp. 11. Patent Owner does not otherwise dispute Petitioner’s proposed level of skill. Id. We used Petitioner’s proposed definition in the Institution Decision. Inst. Dec. 13. Neither party argues any issue as dependent on the level of ordinary skill or the differences between the proposals. Accordingly, the issues here are not dependent on the level of ordinary skill and the result is the same regardless of which definition is adopted. On this record, there is no reason to change from Petitioner’s definition used in the Institution Decision.” slip op. at 7

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “transistors” as a term that might require construction during trial. Inst. Dec. 17–18. At the hearing, the Petitioner argued that “cascaded transistors” means “[ar]ranged in a series of or in succession of stages so that each stage derives from or acts upon the product of the preceding [transistor]” and that there is no dispute that the limitation is taught by the prior art. Tr. 9:15–22. Patent Owner takes no position as to whether or not the prior art discloses “cascaded transistors.” Id. at 33:13–21 (“For the remainder of this proceeding, post institution, we have not taken any position regarding the scope of the cascaded transistors or the disclosure of the cascaded transistors in any of the prior art. We have not disputed that.”). Because Patent Owner takes no position on the issue, there is no dispute that “cascaded transistors” are shown in the prior art, construction is not necessary. Realtime, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. original)). 2. “isolated island” Patent Owner disputes Petitioner’s contention that the prior art teaches or suggests claim 3’s recitation of “said plurality of cascaded transistors is situated within an isolated island.” Pet. 35–36; PO Resp. 16–17. Although the parties dispute whether an “isolated island” is shown in the prior art, neither party proposes a construction for the term “isolated island.” We agree that the arguments presented do not require construction of “isolated island.” The issues can be determined on the plain meaning of the term in view of the arguments made. See Section II.D below.” slip op. at 8

  • Obviousness (§103) › Analogous artAnalogous artDecided for petitioner

    “We find that Petitioner has sufficiently shown Yu is analogous art to Okashita. Both references are directed to the manufacture of semiconductors, which we find to be the field of endeavor. Ex. 1004, 1:47– 58; Ex. 1005, 1:16–26. More specifically, we agree with Petitioner and find that both references are in the same field of endeavor because they relate to SOI configuration. Pet. Reply 6 (citing Pet. 7–8, 39–40; Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 77–80, 90–91). Because we find the references relied upon are in the same field of endeavor, we need not reach whether they are reasonably pertinent to the problem faced by the inventor.” slip op. at 21

  Patent outcomesUS 7,745,886 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 7,745,886
• Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. / Samsung Electronics America, Inc. et al. v. Harbor Island Dynamic, LLCAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Mar 16, 2026 · IPR2024-01402 · APJ Gregg I Anderson · IPR · Final written decision

  The Board held claims 3 and 8–19 unpatentable: claim 3 was anticipated by Yu and obvious on the stated grounds, and claims 3 and 8–19 were obvious over Burgener and Okashita, with or without Yu.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Motions to amend / substitute claimsMotion to amend, grantedGranted

    “Inc. (“Petitioner”) filed a Petition (Paper 1, “Pet.”) requesting an inter partes review of claims 1–19 of U.S. Patent No. 7,745,886 B2 (Ex. 1001, “the ’886 patent”). Petitioner filed a Declaration of Dr. Scott E. Thompson, Ph.D., in support of the Petition. Ex. 1002 (“Thompson Dec.”). Harbor Island Dynamic, LLC (“Patent Owner”) filed a Preliminary Response. Paper 7 (“Prelim. Resp.”). On April 4, 2025, we instituted this inter partes review as to the Challenged Claims and all grounds presented in the Petition. Paper 9 (“Inst. Dec.”). Following institution, Patent Owner filed a Response to the Petition (“PO Resp.”) limited to the patentability of the challenged claims. Paper 18. In support of the Patent Owner’s Response, Patent Owner filed a Declaration of John Berg. Ex. 2006. Patent Owner also filed an Unopposed Motion to Amend, cancelling claims 1, 2, and 4–7. Paper 19 (“Mot.”). We grant the motion. This proceeding is therefore limited to the patentability of claims 3 and 8–19 (“challenged claims”).” slip op. at 2

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Patent Owner proposes a slightly different level of ordinary skill, arguing that a bachelor’s degree, not a master’s degree, is all that is required because that is the “target audience for the ’886 Patent.” PO Resp. 11. Patent Owner does not otherwise dispute Petitioner’s proposed level of skill. Id. We used Petitioner’s proposed definition in the Institution Decision. Inst. Dec. 13. Neither party argues any issue as dependent on the level of ordinary skill or the differences between the proposals. Accordingly, the issues here are not dependent on the level of ordinary skill and the result is the same regardless of which definition is adopted. On this record, there is no reason to change from Petitioner’s definition used in the Institution Decision.” slip op. at 7

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “transistors” as a term that might require construction during trial. Inst. Dec. 17–18. At the hearing, the Petitioner argued that “cascaded transistors” means “[ar]ranged in a series of or in succession of stages so that each stage derives from or acts upon the product of the preceding [transistor]” and that there is no dispute that the limitation is taught by the prior art. Tr. 9:15–22. Patent Owner takes no position as to whether or not the prior art discloses “cascaded transistors.” Id. at 33:13–21 (“For the remainder of this proceeding, post institution, we have not taken any position regarding the scope of the cascaded transistors or the disclosure of the cascaded transistors in any of the prior art. We have not disputed that.”). Because Patent Owner takes no position on the issue, there is no dispute that “cascaded transistors” are shown in the prior art, construction is not necessary. Realtime, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. original)). 2. “isolated island” Patent Owner disputes Petitioner’s contention that the prior art teaches or suggests claim 3’s recitation of “said plurality of cascaded transistors is situated within an isolated island.” Pet. 35–36; PO Resp. 16–17. Although the parties dispute whether an “isolated island” is shown in the prior art, neither party proposes a construction for the term “isolated island.” We agree that the arguments presented do not require construction of “isolated island.” The issues can be determined on the plain meaning of the term in view of the arguments made. See Section II.D below.” slip op. at 8

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successAnalogous artMotivation foundUnpatentable

    “We find that Petitioner has sufficiently shown Yu is analogous art to Okashita. Both references are directed to the manufacture of semiconductors, which we find to be the field of endeavor. Ex. 1004, 1:47– 58; Ex. 1005, 1:16–26. More specifically, we agree with Petitioner and find that both references are in the same field of endeavor because they relate to SOI configuration. Pet. Reply 6 (citing Pet. 7–8, 39–40; Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 77–80, 90–91). Because we find the references relied upon are in the same field of endeavor, we need not reach whether they are reasonably pertinent to the problem faced by the inventor. We also find that Petitioner has shown rational underpinnings for combining Okashita and Yu. Pet. 43–44. That the references have differences is not the test. Rather, the test is whether a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had motivation to combine them. We find there is sufficient motivation. Id. at 43 (citing Ex. 1005, 2:4–17; Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 177– 178). 3. Conclusion on Ground 3 Patent Owner does not argue any other reason that Ground 3 has not been sufficiently shown. Based on the full record, we determine that Okashita and Yu teach or suggest all the limitations of claim 3 and that one of ordinary skill in the art would have combined the references in the manner asserted with a reasonable expectation of success. We thus determine that Petitioner has established by a preponderance of the evidence that claim 3 would have been obvious over the combination of Okashita and Yu.” slip op. at 21

  Patent outcomesUS 7,745,886 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 7,745,886
• Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. / Samsung Electronics America, Inc. v. Harbor Island Dynamic, LLCAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Mar 13, 2026 · IPR2024-01405 · APJ Arthur M Peslak · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–20 are unpatentable: claims 1–20 over Torii, claims 1–3, 9, 11–13, and 19 over Ide, and claims 1–7, 10–17, and 20 over Gambino with Conn, with Ding for claims 10 and 20.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner

    “of the substrate is based on Dr. Thompson’s testimony. In his first declaration, Dr. Thompson relies on Conn’s paragraphs 31 and 35 to support the annotated version of Figure 2 in the Petition. Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 83–84. As discussed above, paragraphs 31 and 35 do not disclose that the anchor vias 14 are located in the corner of the substrate. The second annotated Figure 2 shown in Petitioner’s Reply does not appear in either of Dr. Thompson’s declarations (See Ex. 1003, Ex. 1034). It appears to be mere attorney argument not evidence. Dr. Thompson testified in his deposition that the second annotated version is based on his interpretation of Conn. Ex. 2009, 45:2–46:9. Because Dr. Thompson’s testimony is not adequately supported by the disclosure of Conn, we find that his testimony on the point of whether Conn discloses anchor vias located in the corner of the substrate is entitled to little, if any, weight. 37 C.F.R. § 42.65(a) (“Expert testimony that does not disclose the underlying facts or data on which the opinion is based is entitled to little or no weight.”). Therefore, because Petitioner has the burden of proof, we find that Petitioner has not shown that Conn discloses this limitation.” slip op. at 27

  • ExcludeMotion to exclude, deniedDenied

    “J. Petitioner’s Motion to Exclude Petitioner moves to exclude Exhibits 2007 and 2008. MTE, 1. Petitioner argues that the Exhibits are in violation of FRE 401, 402, 403, and 901. Id. We do not rely on either Exhibit 2007 or 2008 in this Decision. Consequently, we deny Petitioner’s MTE as moot.” slip op. at 72

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “We agree with Petitioner that the differences between the parties’ proposed levels of skill in the art are immaterial for the purposes of this Decision. We apply Petitioner’s proposed level of skill in the art because it appears consistent with the problems addressed in the ’826 patent and the prior art. Further, our determination in this case would not be affected if we were to adopt Patent Owner’s proposed level of skill in the art.” slip op. at 11

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

    “Claim 1 uses the term “comprising” which is open-ended and normally does not exclude additional, unrecited elements. See Mars Inc. v. H.J. Heinz Co., 377 F.3d 1369, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2004). This is in contrast to the phrase “consisting of.” See Multilayer Stretch Cling Film Holdings, Inc. v. Berry Plastics Corp., 831 F.3d 1350, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (there is an “exceptionally strong presumption that a claim term set off with ‘consisting of’ is closed to unrecited elements.”). The use of comprising in claim 1, thus, weighs against a construction limiting claim 1 to direct contact between the backside metal layer and the bottom surface of the semiconductor substrate. Additionally, we note that claim 1 does not recite that the backside metal layer is “directly on” or “formed on” the bottom surface or similar language that would suggest “direct contact” may be required. For these reasons, we determine that the language of claim 1 does not support Patent Owner’s proposed construction.” slip op. at 17

  Patent outcomesUS 9,245,826 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 9,245,826
• Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. / Samsung Electronics America, Inc. v. Harbor Island Dynamic, LLCAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Mar 11, 2026 · IPR2024-01404 · APJ Hyun J Jung · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–18 are unpatentable: claims 1–6, 9–14, 17, and 18 as anticipated by Cooney and obvious over Cooney; claims 7 and 15 over Cooney and Dean; claims 8 and 16 over Cooney and Farooq or …

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Based on the full record, we maintain and affirm that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have had at least a master’s degree in electrical engineering or a similar field and at least two years of experience working with semiconductor systems” and that “[a]dditional relevant work experience can compensate for less education, and vice versa.” Pet. 9–10 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 72–74). We agree with the parties that any differences in the parties’ proposed level of ordinary skill would not affect our analysis. Pet. Reply 1; Tr. 25:4–9 (Patent Owner’s counsel agreeing that any differences in the parties’ proposed level of ordinary skill in the art are immaterial). We also find that Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art is consistent with the ’609 patent and the asserted prior art.” slip op. at 9

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached

    “Based on the full record and because Petitioner’s anticipation challenge is based on giving these recitations no patentable weight and Petitioner’s obviousness challenge is based on the same recitations having patentable weight, we determine that resolving whether to give patentable weight to the recitations “to reduce thermal stress in said semiconductor substrate,” “to provide space for said conductive filler to expand inward,” and “to prevent contamination during processing of said semiconductor substrate” is not necessary to resolve the parties’ dispute. Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms that . . . are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. full record, we also determine that express claim interpretation of any other claim term is not necessary. Id.” slip op. at 10

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “the claim, must be found in a single prior art reference. Net MoneyIN, Inc. v. VeriSign, Inc., 545 F.3d 1359, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2008); Karsten Mfg. Corp. v. Cleveland Golf Co., 242 F.3d 1376, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2001). Each element of the challenged claim must be found, either expressly or inherently, in the single prior art reference. Verdegaal Bros., Inc. v. Union Oil Co. of Cal., 814 F.2d 628, 631 (Fed. Cir. 1987). When evaluating a prior art reference in the context of anticipation, the reference must be “considered together with the knowledge of one of ordinary skill in the pertinent art.” In re Paulsen, 30 F.3d 1475, 1480 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (citing In re Samour, 571 F.2d 559, 562 (CCPA 1978)). “[A] reference can anticipate a claim even if it ‘d[oes] not expressly spell out’ all the limitations arranged or combined as in the claim, if a person of skill in the art, reading the reference, would ‘at once envisage’ the claimed arrangement or combination.” Kennametal, Inc. v. Ingersoll Cutting Tool Co., 780 F.3d 1376, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (quoting In re Petering, 301 F.2d 676, 681 (CCPA 1962)).” slip op. at 7

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner

    “find that Cooney discloses “silicon vias having a hollow center.” Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 120–123; Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 55, 60, Fig. 6. We also find that the portions of Pogge cited by Petitioner show that its “void 25 has an important function in relieving stresses caused by differences in the thermal coefficient of expansion (TCE) of the various materials in and around the feature” (Ex. 1005 ¶ 27) and that the portions of Edelstein cited by Petitioner show that, “[a]lthough it does not change the thermal expansion coefficient, the introduction of a void or voids reduces the effective modulus and Poisson ratio of the through-via, resulting in a compliant through-via that exerts much less stress and force on the surrounding structures” (Ex. 1006 ¶ 47). As discussed above, we find that Cooney’s void 25 is “entirely surrounded by” its conductive filler 24 that, in turn, is surrounded by liner 22 and substrate 10’. Ex. 1004, Fig. 6. We credit Petitioner’s relied-upon testimonial evidence that the presence of a void was known to reduce thermal stress in the surrounding substrate, because the citations to the record support it. Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 124–134; Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 1, 9, 25–28, Fig. 2D; that “a void can decrease thermal stress in the substrate”). We agree with Petitioner’s declarant that Pogge provides a void in a TSV similar to Cooney and the ’609 patent. Ex. 1001, Fig. 4; Ex. 1002 ¶ 127; Ex. 1004, Fig. 6; Ex. 1005, Fig. 2D. We, thus, credit the testimony that, because of their common structural arrangements, one of ordinary skill in the art would have understood that stress-relieving characteristics in Pogge would have been manifested in Cooney’s void. Ex. 1002 ¶ 127. We also agree with Petitioner’s declarant that Edelstein includes a void in a TSV similar to Cooney, the ’609 patent, and Pogge. Ex. 1001, Fig. 4; Ex. 1002 ¶ 130; Ex. 1004, Fig. 6; Ex. 1005, Fig. 2F; Ex. 1006, Fig. 6F. We, therefore, credit the testimony that, because of their common structural arrangements, one of ordinary skill in the art would have understood that stress-relieving characteristics in Edelstein would have also been manifested in Cooney’s void. Ex. 1002 ¶ 130.” slip op. at 33

  Patent outcomesUS 9,147,609 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 9,147,609
• Lenovo (United States) Inc. v. Intellectual Ventures, II LLCAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Feb 18, 2026 · IPR2024-00124 · APJ John D Hamann · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–4, 6, 7, 10–14, and 16 are unpatentable as obvious over the Neufeld grounds; the Board found the IPMI and Lawrence grounds insufficient.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “time it was made, we consider the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art at the time of the invention. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17 (1966). In assessing the level of ordinary skill in the art, various factors may be considered, including the “type of problems encountered in the art; prior art solutions to those problems; rapidity with which innovations are made; sophistication of the technology; and educational level of active workers in the field.” In re GPAC, Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (citing Custom Accessories, Inc. v. Jeffrey-Allan Indus., Inc., 807 F.2d 955, 962–63 (Fed. Cir. 1986)). “[O]ne or more factors may predominate.” Id. In our Decision on Institution, we adopted the definition Petitioner proposes for one having ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention of the ’140 patent. Dec. on Inst. 7–8. Namely, we found that one of ordinary skill in the art “would have had a Bachelors’ degree in electrical or computer engineering or a comparable field of study, plus approximately two to three years of professional experience in the field of computer and/or” slip op. at 7

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

    “same claim construction standard that would be used in a civil action under 35 U.S.C. § 282(b), following the standard articulated in Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b); 83 Fed. Reg. 51,340, 51,340–41, 51,343 (Oct. 11, 2018). In applying such standard, claim terms generally are given their ordinary and customary meaning, as would be understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art, at the time of the invention and in the context of the entire patent disclosure. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312–13. “In determining the meaning of the disputed claim limitation, we look principally to the intrinsic evidence of record, examining the claim language itself, the written description, and the prosecution history, if in evidence.” DePuy Spine, Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc., 469 F.3d 1005, 1014 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (citing Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312–17). in claim 1 means “said managed network device.” Pet. 9. Patent Owner does not dispute this construction. We adopt Petitioner’s proposed construction for this term as it appears to be consistent with the Specification’s use of “element” as referring to networked devices, and with the overall claim. See generally Ex. 1002.” slip op. at 8

  • Claim Construction › Functional claiming / §112(f) means-plus-function › Whether §112(f) applies (Williamson, nonce words)Term construed petitioner construction§112(f) appliesDecided for petitioner

    “First, Petitioner argues that “an out of band access connection means” is a means-plus-function term with the recited function being “connecting said one or more network services or remote users with said secure management access controller for management of said network device.” Id. at 10. Petitioner argues that the function’s corresponding structure is “one or more of the following networks: a Public Switched Telephone Network (PSTN) (2:45–57, 3:2–4, 12:37-61), an Integrated Services Digital Network (ISDN) (2:45–57), a cellular network (6:14–21, 7:60–62, 12:37–61), an Ethernet network (12:37–61), a wireless network, and/or a Digital Subscriber Line (DSL) (12:37–61, 15:55–60), where the one or more networks use one or more of the following protocols: [Simple Network Management Protocol (“SNMP”)], TFTP, FTP, DNS, SysLog, Telnet, SSH, HTTP, HTTPs, point to point IP, and/or XML (8:30–38).” Id. Second, Petitioner argues that “virtual management interface connection means” is a means-plus-function term with the following recited with said secure management access controller’; (ii) ‘provides logical separation of management data from user data,’ and (iii) ‘utilizes user interfaces of said managed network element for connecting said one or more network services or remote users with said secure management access controller.’” Id. at 10–11. Petitioner argues that the functions’ corresponding structure is a VPN. Id. at 11 (citing Ex. 1002, 6:22–44, 6:63– 7:5, 12:5–21).” slip op. at 9

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for patent owner

    “Lastly, we determine that we do not need to construe any other terms to resolve the disputes between the parties. See, e.g., Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”).” slip op. at 11

  Patent outcomesUS 7,325,140 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 7,325,140
• Lenovo (United States) Inc. v. Intellectual Ventures, II LLCAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Feb 18, 2026 · IPR2024-00109 · APJ John D Hamann · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–3, 6–9, 12, and 14–17 are unpatentable as obvious over grounds involving Neufeld; the Board found the grounds involving IPMI and Huckins insufficient.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “In our Decision on Institution, we adopted the definition Petitioner proposes for one having ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention of the ’016 patent. Dec. on Inst. 8–9. Namely, we found that one of ordinary skill in the art “would have had a Bachelors’ degree in electrical or computer engineering or a comparable field of study, plus approximately two to three years of professional experience in the field of computer and/or network design and security or other relevant industry experience,” and that “[a]dditional graduate education could substitute for professional experience, and significant experience in the field could substitute for formal education.” Id. (citing Pet. 6 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 56)). Patent Owner does not address Petitioner’s definition, nor provide its own. See generally PO Resp. Because Petitioner’s definition of the level of skill in the art is consistent with the ’016 patent and the asserted prior art, we maintain it for purposes of this Final Written Decision. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001); In re GPAC, 57 F.3d at 1579; In re Oelrich, 579 F.2d 86, 91 (CCPA 1978).” slip op. at 9

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for petitioner

    “We determine that we do not need to construe any term to resolve the disputes between the parties. See, e.g., Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”).” slip op. at 10

  • Expert testimonyPatent owner expert discountedDecided for patent owner

    “In addition, we find not credible Dr. Mishra’s deposition testimony that Neufeld teaches only out-of-band communication, and it is not possible for a remote management command to come to remote management controller 116 via network N and through NIC 110. See Ex. 1043,22 43:5– 44:6, 49:9–50:7; PO Sur-reply 4–5. This testimony is inconsistent with Neufeld’s express teachings, which we discuss above. Compare Ex. 1043, 43:5–44:6, 49:9–50:7, with Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 11–12, 15, 34–35, 43, Figs. 1–2.” slip op. at 18

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundReasonable expectation not foundNot shown unpatentable

    “[O]bviousness concerns whether a skilled artisan not only could have made but would have been motivated to make the combinations or modifications of prior art to arrive at the claimed invention.” See Belden Inc. v. Berk-Tek LLC, 805 F.3d 1064, 1073 (Fed. Cir. 2015); Polaris Indus., Inc. v. Arctic Cat, Inc., 882 F.3d 1056, 1068−69 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (finding that “the Board focused on what a skilled artisan would have been able to do, rather than what a skilled artisan would have been motivated to do at the time of the invention”). Petitioner’s arguments focus on that the modified version of IPMI could have been made, rather than that one of ordinary skill would have been motivated to combine the teachings to make the proffered combination. For example, Petitioner argues that the modified IPMI version is “one way to implement a side-band connection.” Pet. 62. This argues that the modified IPMI version could have been made. Petitioner also argues that one of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to make the combined modifications because “IPMI’s LAN Controller already has the necessary logic and hardware to send packets to [the] managed server via the PCI bus as shown in unmodified version of Fig. 12-1.” Pet. Reply 23; see also id. at 24 (arguing that “implementing the I2C sideband interface taught by IPMI using a PCI-I2C controller/bridge is a simple and logical solution on the PCI bus”). We agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner does not explain why this would be a motivation to add Huckins’s “PCI-I2C Bus Controller/Bridge” to IPMI’s teachings. E.g., PO Resp. 60; PO Sur-reply 20. And, we find persuasive Dr. Mishra’s testimony that “[r]equiring a LAN controller to offload management data onto the PCI bus only to route it back internally via the I/O Controller Hub introduces unnecessary design complexity, reduces system performance, and consumes additional bandwidth and power, all without technical justification.” Ex. 2007 ¶ 148; see also id. ¶¶ 145–146 (testifying to the modified combination’s operation). We also find unavailing Petitioner’s argument that Patent Owner’s criticisms of the modified version of Figure 12-1 “do not defeat the Petition’s showing of obviousness because ‘[i]t’s not necessary to show that a combination is the best option, only that it be a suitable option.’” Pet. Reply 26 (citing Intel Corp. v. PACT XPP Schweiz AG, 61 F.4th 1373, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2023) (citing Intel Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 21 F.4th 784, 799– 800 (Fed. Cir. 2021)). But Petitioner does not address why the modified version of IPMI is suitable. Nor does Petitioner persuasively counter Dr. Mishra’s testimony as to why one of skill in the art would not have made the proposed combination. See Pet. Reply 24–26; Ex. 2007 ¶¶ 145–148. In addition, in our view, Petitioner’s modification of IPMI to add Huckins’s “PCI-I2C Bus Controller/Bridge” is driven by impermissible hindsight and the desire to locate a distinct, second bus (the PCI bus) as required by the claims. Petitioner’s arguments to this end rely impermissibly on the ’016 patent itself as a roadmap. See Grain Processing Corp. v. Am.-Maize Prods. Co., 840 F.2d 902, 907 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (quoting Orthopedic Equip. Co. v. United States, 702 F.2d 1005, 1012 (Fed. Cir. patent in suit as a guide through the maze of prior art references, combining the right references in the right way so as to achieve the result of the claims in suit.”’)); Metalcraft of Mayville, Inc. v. The Toro Co., 848 F.3d 1358, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“[W]e cannot allow hindsight bias to be the thread that stitches together prior art patches into something that is the claimed invention.”). slip op. at 37

  Patent outcomesUS 8,474,016 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,474,016

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.