• Shenzhen Tuozhu Technology Co., Ltd. v. Stratasys, Inc.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Sep 28, 2026 · IPR2025-00611 · APJ Christopher L Ogden · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–10, 12, 13, 19, and 20 are unpatentable under § 103 over the stated Douglas–Mark and Hamilton-based grounds.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “The parties agree that experience could substitute for a degree, and vice versa. Pet. 3; PO Resp. 10. The parties’ proposed levels of ordinary skill are substantially similar. For this decision, as in the Institution Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposed level, which is supported by credible testimonial evidence and is consistent with the problems addressed in the ’774 patent. See Ex. 1001, 1:16–52. Our decision would be the same, however, if we were to adopt Patent Owner’s proposal.” slip op. at 7

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Other

    “Neither Petitioner nor Patent Owner argues that we need to construe any claim terms explicitly. See Pet. 2–3; PO Resp. 10. However, the parties contest two material claim-construction issues which we address below. To the extent that the parties’ positions depend on interpreting other claim language in a particular way, we discuss the relevant claim language below in the context of the parties’ arguments regarding the prior art.” slip op. at 8

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner

    “We disagree with Patent Owner that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have understood that limitation 1.2 must be performed before limitations 1.3 or 1.4. See Ex. 1001, 35:21–24. See Interactive Gift Exp., Inc. v. Compuserve Inc., 256 F.3d 1323, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“Unless the steps of a method actually recite an order, the steps are not ordinarily construed to require one.” (citing Loral Fairchild Corp. v. Sony Corp., 181 F.3d 1313, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). The evidence suggests that a “target printer” is any printer that is ultimately selected for fabricating the object, and such a printer could send its configuration information either before or after that determination is made in limitation 1.2. This interpretation does not render the word “target” meaningless. At some point, a printer must be determined to be the target printer, which is the one intended to ultimately fabricate the three-dimensional object. But the target printer still exists, and is capable of being queried, before that determination is made. We find the examples in the ’774 patent pertinent to this question. The ’774 patent states that “the target printer may include more than one printer.” Ex. 1001, 18:66–67. In discussing the step of “query target printer for properties 306” (Fig. 3A), the ’774 patent states that “[i]n one aspect, numerous queries are sent to numerous printers, e.g., for use in selecting one or more of the printers as the target printer.” Id. at 19:8–10. Alternatively, “the query is sent to a printer that is not necessarily the target printer as described herein, e.g., when the query or information received from a response to the query is used for the selection of the target printer.” Id. at 19:11–14. Importantly, the second embodiment states that the queried printer “is not necessarily the target printer,” suggesting that the queried printer could be the target printer even before it is determined to be such. Id. at 19:11–12 (emphasis added). Based on the evidence of record, a person of ordinary skill in the art would have understood that the “target printer” can be determined after the query recited in limitation 1.3 or the reception of configuration information recited in limitation 1.4. Thus, the evidence does not impose an ordering between limitations 1.2 and 1.3 or between limitations 1.2 and 1.4. The evidence also does not support Patent Owner’s argument that the two reverse-order examples in the ’774 patent are unclaimed embodiments.” slip op. at 10

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of success › HindsightMotivation foundDecided for petitioner

    “We disagree that Petitioner’s arguments are based on impermissible hindsight, because they are based on the disclosures in Douglas and Mark, and Petitioner has articulated a persuasive reason to combine those references without referring to the ’774 patent itself, as we discuss below. See In re McLaughlin, 443 F.2d 1392, 1395 (CCPA 1971) (an obvious rationale is not improper hindsight if it “takes into account only knowledge which was within the level of ordinary skill at the time the claimed invention was made and does not include knowledge gleaned only from applicant’s disclosure”).” slip op. at 29

  Patent outcomesUS 11,886,774 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,886,774
• Microsoft Corporation v. X1 Discovery, Inc.No claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jun 18, 2026 · IPR2025-00254 · APJ Lisa A Murray · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–20 were not shown unpatentable under either §103 ground because Petitioner failed to establish motivation to combine and a reasonable expectation of success.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner

    “29. In my opinion, the POSITA at the time of the alleged invention of the Asserted Patents would have had a (1) a Bachelor’s degree in a pertinent discipline, such as computer science, electric engineering, computer engineering, or a related field and (2) have 2–4 years of experience in working with computing devices and have an understanding of indexed search systems utilized by such computing devices. 30. I am aware that Petitioner has provided its own definition . . . . 31. I believe Petitioner’s definition is not meaningfully different from my definition of a POSITA. My opinions would not change regardless of which definition of POSITA is applied. Ex. 2001 ¶¶ 29–31. In our Decision on Institution, we adopted Mr. Haeberli’s formulation, finding it to be consistent with the evidence then of record, including the asserted prior art and the ’490 patent. Dec. 9. Following a review of the full record, we agree with Mr. Haeberli’s statement that Petitioner’s definition of one of ordinary skill in the art is “not meaningfully different” from Mr. Haeberli’s for the purposes of this proceeding. We continue to view Mr. Haeberli’s proposed definition as consistent with the ’490 patent and the asserted prior art, and we apply it in our analysis below. However, our analysis of the issues below would have been the same had we instead adopted Petitioner’s proposed definition.” slip op. at 9

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached

    “In our Decision on Institution, the only term that we found it necessary to construe was the term “string separator character” in claim 1. We preliminarily construed this term to mean “a single-character string separator.” Dec. 11, 30–31. We invited the parties to address the appropriateness of this construction over the course of the trial. Id. at 11, 31. In its briefing, Patent Owner agrees with the Board’s preliminary construction, arguing that it is “consistent with the intrinsic evidence.” PO Resp. 8 (citing Ex. 1001, claims 8 and 20). Patent Owner further argues that a person of ordinary skill would have understood a multi-character Boolean operator such as “AND” to be “a search syntax instruction rather than a string separator.” Id. at 9 (citing Ex. 1059, 162; Ex. 2001 ¶ 112). Petitioner’s Reply Brief does not address the issue of claim construction. See generally Reply Br.; see also Pet. 11 (“Unless otherwise noted, Petitioner applies the plain and ordinary meaning of all claim terms below.”). Following our review of the full record, we determine that it is not necessary to construe this or any other claim term for the purposes of this Decision.2 See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (Only terms that are in controversy need to be construed, and then only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.). In our analysis below, we interpret the language of the claims according to its plain and ordinary meaning.” slip op. at 10

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedPatent owner expert creditedDecided for patent owner

    “Having reviewed the evidence of record, we find Mr. Haeberli’s testimony to be more persuasive and better supported by the evidence. According to Dr. Terveen, “[r]obust programming languages such as C and C++, together with well-developed operating system and UI frameworks, . . . allowed an ordinary programmer to build a UI that supported incremental searching, as evidenced by the numerous prior art systems that implemented such functionality, including Entourage, Eudora, Emacs, Canon Cat, SwyftWare, and others. Ex. 1100 ¶ 43 (citing Ex. 1004, 8–9, 161; Ex. 1021, 125, 127, 129; Ex. 1039, 102–103; Ex. 1043, 385–389). The relevant question, though, is not whether it would have been possible to build a user interface that supported incremental search, but whether it would have been “simple and straightforward” to execute an incremental search of multiple partial search strings on large, indexed multi-file databases such as those described in the Lotus Notes references, as Dr. Terveen alleges. None of the prior art discussed in the “State of the Art” section of Dr. Terveen’s initial declaration, taken individually or together, discloses incrementally searching a plurality of files using two partial search strings. See Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 32–33, 37, 40; Ex. 2001 ¶ 100. Thus, creating a user interface might be “simple,” but the evidence suggests that the back-end execution of an incremental search is not. See, e.g., Ex. 1021, 126 (Raskin, concluding that “almost all interface-building tools make it easy to implement delimited searches and difficult or impossible to implement incremental searches”).” slip op. at 23

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable

    “different approach from that taken in Lotus Notes. The difference between Raskin’s sequential scanning method and the index-based system described in Wilcox is that sequential scanning by definition can only scan one document at a time as each document is loaded into a “buffer.” See, e.g., Ex. 2020 ¶ 35. Lotus Notes, however, only needs to load the index into memory for a user to be able to locate the single index entry identifying all instances of an indexed term across all indexed files. In fact, Raskin acknowledges that indexing may be necessary to maintain an acceptable response time. Ex. 1021, 132 n.10; see also id. at 129 (indexing speeds search times). Mr. Haeberli’s third and final reason for concluding that one of ordinary skill would not have been motivated to combine Raskin’s incremental search with Lotus Notes is that at the time using incremental searches would have presented “extreme technical difficulties.” Ex. 2001 ¶ 101. Here again we find Mr. Haeberli’s explanation more persuasive than Dr. Terveen’s opinion that combining the teachings from Raskin with Lotus Notes’ teachings “would have required only simple and straightforward software modifications.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 80. According to Mr. Haeberli, “there are serious technical challenges with implementing the complex search strategies of the challenged claims in the systems on which Dr. Terveen relies.” Id. ¶ 96. As Patent Owner argues: searching across a set of files to find specific files requires the system to identify which files are in the set, access those files (which are often not loaded in active memory), search their contents, determine which files contain matches to search criteria, and then present results to the user; all tasks that do not exist in the same way (or at all) for a search confined to text in a single open file already loaded into memory. Sur-Reply 9; see Ex. 2020 ¶¶ 15, 35–36. There would have been other challenges as well. For example, “[t]he type of sequential scanning typically employed to search a single open document is very time and resource intensive if employed to search a large set of documents.” Ex. 2020 ¶ 15. Also, “[i]mplementing incremental search in the Lotus Notes indexed system would necessarily require a larger index, which would slow down, rather than increase the search speed.” PO Resp. 23; see Ex. 2020 ¶ 33. Finally, Raskin itself concludes that “even if incremental searching is advantageous, ‘almost all interface-building tools make it easy to implement delimited searches and difficult or impossible to implement incremental searches.’” Ex. 2001 ¶ 96 (emphasis added by Mr. Haeberli) (quoting Ex. 1021, 126). In short, Mr. Haeberli presents three significant reasons why there would have been no motivation or expectation of success in combining the teachings of Wilcox with those of Raskin. Dr. Terveen’s opinion to the contrary, on the other hand, is not supported by evidence. Dr. Terveen testifies that “[a] POSITA would have been motivated to perform Lotus Notes’ multi-string search incrementally for the reasons stated by Raskin: speed, effectiveness, and ease of use.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 78 (citing Ex. 1021 ¶¶ 125–127). The evidence, however, not only fails to support Dr. Terveen’s testimony, but also demonstrates that one attempting to make the proposed combination would not have reasonably expected the proposed combination to result in greater speed or effectiveness.” slip op. at 27

  Patent outcomesUS 10,552,490 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR
  Patents in suitUS 10,552,490
• Motorola Mobility LLC / Google LLC v. Multifold International Incorporated Pte. Ltd.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Apr 28, 2026 · IPR2025-00040 · APJ Brian P Murphy · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–9 are unpatentable: claims 1–4 and 6–9 as anticipated or obvious over the asserted references, and claim 5 as obvious over Yook or Yook in view of Purcell.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • BurdenDecided for petitioner

    “We disagree with Patent Owner’s argument because the Petition presents argument and evidence that substantively demonstrates, with clarity and particularity, how and why each reference discloses, teaches, suggests, or otherwise renders obvious the displaying element recited in limitation 1[B]. We agree with Petitioner that “Patent Owner neglects to address the actual substance of the Petition, which clearly addresses this limitation with respect to each reference.” Reply 1–2. The Petition addresses in detail how each asserted reference discloses displaying two applications on two separate displays in accordance with the displaying element, by presenting multiple annotated figures from Yook, Lee, Aguilar, and Purcell. Pet. 27–30, 47–50, 62–63, 77–78. The Petition also cites and quotes the accompanying descriptions for the annotated figures from each prior art reference as well as explanatory expert opinion testimony from Dr. Rodriguez. Id. (citing Rodriguez Decl. Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 70–74, 119–122, 149–150, 182–183; Yook Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 47, 51, 58, 96–101, Figs. 4b, 4d, 5; Lee Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 48–53, Figs. 4, 6, 9, 10; Aguilar Ex. 1006, 7:1–7, Figs. 5–5d; Purcell Ex. 1007 ¶ 16, Fig. 2). We provide detailed examples below of how the Petition maps Yook and Lee onto the displaying element of limitation 1[B] in compliance with the particularity requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3); 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(4). Although we do not provide detailed examples directed to Aguilar and Purcell, we find the Petition maps Aguilar and Purcell onto the displaying element of limitation 1[B] in compliance with the particularity requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3) and 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(4).” slip op. at 14

  • Strike new argumentNew argument disregardedDecided for petitioner

    “Instead, Patent Owner chose to raise an entirely new theory of patentability. Sur-Reply 3–13; Tr. 28:8–20. Patent Owner’s new theory is based on a claim construction that construes claim 1 of the ’756 patent as “recit[ing] a specific order of steps that must be performed in the order written.” Id. at 3–4. “Because of this order, the [displaying element] must occur after both (two) ‘selecting’ steps,” and Patent Owner contends none of the prior art references asserted in the Petition “meets the order required by claim 1.” Id. at 4. We will not consider Patent Owner’s new theory of patentability raised for the first time in its Sur-Reply. See Apple Inc. v. e-Watch, Inc., IPR2015-00412, Paper 50, 44 (PTAB May 6, 2016) (“‘Respond,’ in the context of 37 C.F.R. § 42.23(b), does not mean embark in a new direction with a new approach”); see also Optivus Tech., Inc. v. Ion Beam Appl’ns S.A., 469 F.3d 978, 989 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (argument raised for the first time in the reply brief, which could have been raised in the opening brief, is waived). Patent Owner should have raised its “specific order of steps” argument in the Response. By failing to do so, Patent Owner has waived the argument. Id.” slip op. at 22

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedPatent owner expert discountedDecided for petitioner

    “Third, we are further persuaded by Dr. Surati’s testimony that the wave shape visual indicator depicted in Figures 10A–C of the ’756 patent indicates that a user can do something, but not necessarily what that something is (e.g., minimizing or maximizing). Id. at 17 (citing Ex. 1012, 200:1–6). It is telling that Dr. Surati testified that only through repeated use and exposure would a user recognize a relationship between a wave shape and the functions of maximizing or minimizing an application. Id. (citing Ex. 1012, 197:13–199:22). We are also persuaded by Dr. Rodriguez’s testimony regarding the teachings of Yook: Yook therefore teaches giving users the ability to transition a split-screen application back into full screen mode. Further, a POSITA would have understood that this ability would undoubtedly be implemented in the form of a visual indicator, which, from the 2000s to today, is the industry’s universal method of alerting a user to an accessible function. . . . Ex. 1003 ¶ 107 (emphasis added); For claim 5, Yook discloses many different types of “icons” that are used to receive user gesture inputs. See, e.g., Figs. 1, 4e, 5a, 5c, 5d, 6, 7a, 7b, 7c, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13. Examples of these icons are displayed below: Id. ¶ 108; and A POSITA would have understood that Yook’s icons can have a wave shape because the shape taken by a visual indicator, or icon, is merely a matter of common and routine design choice. Indeed, the shape of an icon does not affect its function or how a gesture input is received. Id. ¶ 109 (emphasis added). In short, we are persuaded Petitioner has established by a preponderance of the evidence that a displayed visual indicator that “has a wave shape” is a design choice not affecting the function of the visual indicator, and a visual indicator that “has a wave shape” would have been an obvious design choice to a POSITA in view of Yook.” slip op. at 30

  • Skill levelSkill level board ownDecided for petitioner

    “In determining the level of ordinary skill in the art, various factors may be considered, including the “type of problems encountered in the art; prior art solutions to those problems; rapidity with which innovations are made; sophistication of the technology; and educational level of active workers in the field.” In re GPAC, Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (citing Custom Accessories, Inc. v. Jeffrey-Allan Indus., Inc., 807 F.2d 955, 962 (Fed. Cir. 1986)). “These factors are not exhaustive but are merely a guide to determining the level of ordinary skill in the art.” Daiichi Sankyo Co. v. Apotex, Inc., 501 F.3d 1254, 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2007). There is uncontested evidence in the record before us that reflects the knowledge and experience of a POSITA. We adopt the parties’ agreed level of ordinary skill in the art, which is consistent with the description in the ’756 patent and the prior art of record.” slip op. at 9

  Patent outcomesUS 9,134,756 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips
  Patents in suitUS 9,134,756
• Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. / Samsung Electronics America, Inc. v. Harbor Island Dynamic, LLCAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Mar 11, 2026 · IPR2024-01404 · APJ Hyun J Jung · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–18 are unpatentable: claims 1–6, 9–14, 17, and 18 as anticipated by Cooney and obvious over Cooney; claims 7 and 15 over Cooney and Dean; claims 8 and 16 over Cooney and Farooq or …

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Based on the full record, we maintain and affirm that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have had at least a master’s degree in electrical engineering or a similar field and at least two years of experience working with semiconductor systems” and that “[a]dditional relevant work experience can compensate for less education, and vice versa.” Pet. 9–10 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 72–74). We agree with the parties that any differences in the parties’ proposed level of ordinary skill would not affect our analysis. Pet. Reply 1; Tr. 25:4–9 (Patent Owner’s counsel agreeing that any differences in the parties’ proposed level of ordinary skill in the art are immaterial). We also find that Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art is consistent with the ’609 patent and the asserted prior art.” slip op. at 9

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached

    “Based on the full record and because Petitioner’s anticipation challenge is based on giving these recitations no patentable weight and Petitioner’s obviousness challenge is based on the same recitations having patentable weight, we determine that resolving whether to give patentable weight to the recitations “to reduce thermal stress in said semiconductor substrate,” “to provide space for said conductive filler to expand inward,” and “to prevent contamination during processing of said semiconductor substrate” is not necessary to resolve the parties’ dispute. Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms that . . . are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. full record, we also determine that express claim interpretation of any other claim term is not necessary. Id.” slip op. at 10

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “the claim, must be found in a single prior art reference. Net MoneyIN, Inc. v. VeriSign, Inc., 545 F.3d 1359, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2008); Karsten Mfg. Corp. v. Cleveland Golf Co., 242 F.3d 1376, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2001). Each element of the challenged claim must be found, either expressly or inherently, in the single prior art reference. Verdegaal Bros., Inc. v. Union Oil Co. of Cal., 814 F.2d 628, 631 (Fed. Cir. 1987). When evaluating a prior art reference in the context of anticipation, the reference must be “considered together with the knowledge of one of ordinary skill in the pertinent art.” In re Paulsen, 30 F.3d 1475, 1480 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (citing In re Samour, 571 F.2d 559, 562 (CCPA 1978)). “[A] reference can anticipate a claim even if it ‘d[oes] not expressly spell out’ all the limitations arranged or combined as in the claim, if a person of skill in the art, reading the reference, would ‘at once envisage’ the claimed arrangement or combination.” Kennametal, Inc. v. Ingersoll Cutting Tool Co., 780 F.3d 1376, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (quoting In re Petering, 301 F.2d 676, 681 (CCPA 1962)).” slip op. at 7

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner

    “find that Cooney discloses “silicon vias having a hollow center.” Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 120–123; Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 55, 60, Fig. 6. We also find that the portions of Pogge cited by Petitioner show that its “void 25 has an important function in relieving stresses caused by differences in the thermal coefficient of expansion (TCE) of the various materials in and around the feature” (Ex. 1005 ¶ 27) and that the portions of Edelstein cited by Petitioner show that, “[a]lthough it does not change the thermal expansion coefficient, the introduction of a void or voids reduces the effective modulus and Poisson ratio of the through-via, resulting in a compliant through-via that exerts much less stress and force on the surrounding structures” (Ex. 1006 ¶ 47). As discussed above, we find that Cooney’s void 25 is “entirely surrounded by” its conductive filler 24 that, in turn, is surrounded by liner 22 and substrate 10’. Ex. 1004, Fig. 6. We credit Petitioner’s relied-upon testimonial evidence that the presence of a void was known to reduce thermal stress in the surrounding substrate, because the citations to the record support it. Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 124–134; Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 1, 9, 25–28, Fig. 2D; that “a void can decrease thermal stress in the substrate”). We agree with Petitioner’s declarant that Pogge provides a void in a TSV similar to Cooney and the ’609 patent. Ex. 1001, Fig. 4; Ex. 1002 ¶ 127; Ex. 1004, Fig. 6; Ex. 1005, Fig. 2D. We, thus, credit the testimony that, because of their common structural arrangements, one of ordinary skill in the art would have understood that stress-relieving characteristics in Pogge would have been manifested in Cooney’s void. Ex. 1002 ¶ 127. We also agree with Petitioner’s declarant that Edelstein includes a void in a TSV similar to Cooney, the ’609 patent, and Pogge. Ex. 1001, Fig. 4; Ex. 1002 ¶ 130; Ex. 1004, Fig. 6; Ex. 1005, Fig. 2F; Ex. 1006, Fig. 6F. We, therefore, credit the testimony that, because of their common structural arrangements, one of ordinary skill in the art would have understood that stress-relieving characteristics in Edelstein would have also been manifested in Cooney’s void. Ex. 1002 ¶ 130.” slip op. at 33

  Patent outcomesUS 9,147,609 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 9,147,609
• Guangzho Eko Trading Development Co., Ltd. v. Nine Stars Group (U.S.A.) Inc.Instituted
  PTAB · Jan 14, 2026 · IPR2025-01191 · APJ Kara L Szpondowski · IPR · Institution

  The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–24 and all asserted grounds because the petition showed a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on at least one claim.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

    “Institution of an inter partes review is authorized when “the information presented in the petition . . . and any response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Based on the current record, and for the reasons explained below, we determine that Petitioner has established a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail with respect to at least one challenged claim, and we institute an inter partes review.” slip op. at 2

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsNot reached

    “IV. PATENT OWNER’S 35 U.S.C. § 325(D) ARGUMENTS Patent Owner presents arguments directed to discretionary considerations under 35 U.S.C. § 325(d) and requests the Petition be denied based on these arguments. Prelim. Resp. 2–16. However, Patent Owner’s § 325(d) arguments are untimely under the “Interim Director Discretionary Process,”6 and, as such, will not be considered by the Board. See Section I.C. (“The . . . patent owner should not present discretionary considerations in the . . . Patent Owner Preliminary Response (POPR)”); Section I.E. (“[A] Board panel will issue a decision on institution addressing the merits and other non-discretionary considerations.”). 5 Available at https://www.uspto.gov/patents/ptab/trial-practice-guide#step1 6 https://www.uspto.gov/patents/ptab/interim-director-discretionary-process.” slip op. at 38

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityPrinted publication establishedDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner bears the burden of establishing that Wang is a printed publication. Medtronic, 891 F.3d at 1380. The determination of whether a document is a “printed publication” “involves a case-by-case inquiry into the facts and circumstances surrounding the reference's disclosure to members of the public.” In re Klopfenstein, 380 F.3d 1345, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2004). “[A]t the institution stage, the petition must identify, with particularity, evidence sufficient to establish a reasonable likelihood that the reference was publicly accessible before the critical date of the challenged patent and therefore that there is a reasonable likelihood that it qualifies as a printed publication.” Hulu, IPR2018-01039, Paper 29 at 13.” slip op. at 19

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Instituted

    “A claim is unpatentable as anticipated under 35 U.S.C. § 102 “if each and every limitation is found either expressly or inherently in a single prior art reference.” WhitServe, LLC v. Computer Packages, Inc., 694 F.3d 10, 21 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting Celeritas Techs., Ltd. v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., 150 F.3d 1354, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 1998)). An anticipatory reference must also “disclose those elements ‘arranged as in the claim.’” Net MoneyIN, Inc. v. VeriSign, Inc., 545 F.3d 1359, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (quoting Connell v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 722 F.2d 1542, 1548 (Fed. Cir. 1983)).” slip op. at 11

  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,822,165
• Arashi Vision (U.S.) LLC (D/B/A Insta360) v. Gopro, IncNo claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Nov 25, 2025 · IPR2024-01165 · APJ William V Saindon · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–21 were not shown unpatentable because Zhou does not teach the claimed low-light high-pass or stickiness parameter limitations.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • BurdenFwd all claims patentableNot shown unpatentable

    “4. Conclusion for the Prior Art Analysis In sum, we find that Zhou does not disclose the low-light high-pass parameter or the stickiness parameter. Petitioner’s grounds for both independent claims 1 and 16 rely on Zhou for teaching a low-light high-pass parameter or a stickiness parameter. Pet. 23–28, 64. Because we find Zhou does not teach these limitations, all of Petitioner’s grounds fall for this reason. III. CONCLUSION For the reasons given above, we determine that Petitioner has not established by a preponderance of the evidence that any claim of the ’840 patent would have been obvious in view of the prior art cited.” slip op. at 18

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedOther

    “A person of ordinary skill in the art (POSITA) in the field of the ’840 patent would have a bachelor’s degree in engineering or computer science, or equivalent field, and two years of experience working on image or video processing, or digital cameras. Alternatively, a POSITA would have four years of experience working on image or video processing, or digital cameras. An advanced graduate degree in the disciplines cited above may make up for the work experience indicated above. Pet. 6 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 32). Patent Owner applies the same standard. PO Resp. 26–27. We use this agreed-upon standard for purposes of this Decision.” slip op. at 7

  • Expert testimonyPatent owner expert creditedPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner

    “We review this testimony based on the strength of the underlying factual basis. 37 C.F.R. § 42.65(a); Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Delta Resins & Refractories, Inc., 776 F.2d 281, 294 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (“Lack of factual support for expert opinion going to factual determinations, however, may render the testimony of little probative value . . ..”). Here, the underlying factual basis is not very strong for either witness. That said, we find that Dr. Foroosh’s testimony is more logically sound and consistent with the ’840 patent disclosure. Based on our reading of the specification, we find a clear indication that “stickiness” has to do with the past. In order to control “the extent by which preceding portion(s) . . . impacts determination of the smoothed trajectory” (emphasis added), one must control the degree by which the past frames impact determination. And to control the degree of the past’s influence, one must, as a consequence, favor the past over the future. That is, the frame of reference of the stickiness parameter is the past. The specification could have used a time-agnostic term, like a “nearness” or “adjacency” parameter, but it did not. Thus, the fact that “stickiness” is used in conjunction with “preceding” indicates that it deals with a preference for preceding frames. On this basis, we find Dr. Katsaggelos’s testimony less persuasive than Dr. Foroosh’s.” slip op. at 10

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for patent owner

    “That said, we do not construe a stickiness parameter as prohibiting consideration of future frames. Instead, we determine that the stickiness parameter’s value determines the impact of the preceding portions, versus the following portions. The ’840 patent recognizes this, when it says that a stickiness parameter value of “1,” representing a “lazy” stabilizer that maximally favors the past, would not override a violation of the margin constraint based on the look-ahead (i.e., would not allow the viewing window to fall out of bounds in the event of large future motion). See Ex. 1001, 22:26–30; see also id. at 12:61–13:29 (acknowledging that favoring the past may lead to a conflict with the viewing window determination), 15:39–60 (adjusting the viewing window to ensure it does not violate a margin constraint). Thus, while a past-favoring parameter by necessity favors the past over the future, it does not prohibit consideration of the future. In view of the above, we construe the claimed “stickiness parameter” as a parameter that controls the extent by which preceding portions of the trajectory impacts determination of the smoothed trajectory, with an understanding that in order to favor preceding portions, to some extent, the parameter must relatively disfavor following portions.” slip op. at 10

  Patent outcomesUS 10,958,840 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,958,840
• Google LLC v. Cellular South, Inc.Institution denied
  PTAB · Nov 21, 2025 · IPR2025-00877 · APJ William V Saindon · IPR · Institution

  The Board denied institution for claims 1–11 because the Zhao-Kouzani combination did not sufficiently show a fractal representation based on landmarks.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

    “review under 35 U.S.C. § 314(b) and 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a). The standard for instituting an inter partes review is set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), which provides that an inter partes review may not be instituted unless “there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” For the reasons provided below, we determine that Petitioner has not demonstrated a reasonable likelihood that at least one claim of the ’853 patent is unpatentable, and we do not institute an inter partes review. 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a).” slip op. at 2

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot reached

    “generally known in the art, and that this is acknowledged by the ’853 patent. Pet. 40–41 (citing, e.g., Ex. 1001, 15:40–44). Petitioner asserts that Kouzani touts the benefits of fractal models and that it would have been obvious to use Kouzani’s fractal model as the object model in Zhou. Pet 44 (asserting that “[a] person of ordinary skill would have therefore been motivated to implement Kouzani’s techniques in Zhao’s system”); see also id. 42–45. (entire argument). Patent Owner argues that Kouzani’s fractals would not result in the claimed limitation. Prelim. Resp. 21–23. In particular, Patent Owner points out that Kouzani’s fractals use a block-based fractal system, which do not include “a representation of the object based on landmarks associated with the object” as required by claim 1. Id. at 21–22. Patent Owner’s argument is persuasive. Even if Kouzani teaches fractals, claim 1 is not broadly claiming any fractal, but rather one that is “based on landmarks” (e.g., eyes, nose, etc.). See Ex. 1001, 13:53–57. The block-based system of Kouzani is based on abstract, repeated patterns of pixels, without regard to what the pixels represent. See, e.g., Ex. 1006, 8 (describing a “search . . . through the domain pool to find a domain block whose contractive transformation best approximates the range block” and then storing all of the transformations that, together, “represent the compressed image of a person’s face”), Fig. 4 (showing example blocks). This is in contrast to looking for particular landmarks in the image. Thus, we find that Petitioner has not sufficiently established that Kouzani’s fractal is based on landmarks. In Petitioner’s ground, Petitioner asserts that Zhao already teaches the claimed landmarks (Pet. 39, citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 58, 65), but Petitioner’s ground replaces or modifies the object model of Zhao with the fractals of Kouzani, which are not based on landmarks. Petitioner does not explain how Zhao’s modified model, now using a block-based fractal system, would still have the landmarks of Zhao’s original model. Even if it were obvious to include fractals, we are persuaded that the fractals included by Kouzani are not based on landmarks. Alternatively, if Petitioner is asserting merely to use fractals in Zhao’s models, then Petitioner has not sufficiently accounted for the particular fractals claimed and explained persuasively how merely using fractals in Zhao would lead to the claimed subject matter, i.e., fractals based on landmarks. In either event, Petitioner has not sufficiently established that the proposed combination satisfies the “fractal includes a representation of the object based on landmarks” limitation of claim 1.” slip op. at 11

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “Patent Owner’s argument is persuasive. Even if Kouzani teaches fractals, claim 1 is not broadly claiming any fractal, but rather one that is “based on landmarks” (e.g., eyes, nose, etc.). See Ex. 1001, 13:53–57. The block-based system of Kouzani is based on abstract, repeated patterns of pixels, without regard to what the pixels represent. See, e.g., Ex. 1006, 8 (describing a “search . . . through the domain pool to find a domain block whose contractive transformation best approximates the range block” and then storing all of the transformations that, together, “represent the compressed image of a person’s face”), Fig. 4 (showing example blocks). This is in contrast to looking for particular landmarks in the image. Thus, we find that Petitioner has not sufficiently established that Kouzani’s fractal is based on landmarks. In Petitioner’s ground, Petitioner asserts that Zhao already teaches the claimed landmarks (Pet. 39, citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 58, 65), but Petitioner’s ground replaces or modifies the object model of Zhao with the fractals of Kouzani, which are not based on landmarks. Petitioner does not explain how Zhao’s modified model, now using a block-based fractal system, would still have the landmarks of Zhao’s original model. Even if it were obvious to include fractals, we are persuaded that the fractals included by Kouzani are not based on landmarks. Alternatively, if Petitioner is asserting merely to use fractals in Zhao’s models, then Petitioner has not sufficiently accounted for the particular fractals claimed and explained persuasively how merely using fractals in Zhao would lead to the claimed subject matter, i.e., fractals based on landmarks. In either event, Petitioner has not sufficiently established that the proposed combination satisfies the “fractal includes a representation of the object based on landmarks” limitation of claim 1.” slip op. at 11

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction needed

    “standard set forth in Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312–13 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). That is, “the words of a claim ‘are generally given their ordinary and customary meaning’ . . . that the term would have to a person of ordinary skill in the art in question at the time of the invention.” Id. at 1312–13 (quoting in Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996)). We do not need to construe any claim terms to reach a decision in this proceeding. Realtime, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms. . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 6

  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,126,853
• Prime Time Toys LLC / Prime Time Toys Ltd. et al. v. Spin Master, Inc.No claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Oct 10, 2025 · IPR2023-01339 · APJ Brent M Dougal · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 4–9, 12, and 14 were not shown unpatentable because Petitioner failed to establish a reason to combine Peev and Spitballs.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedOther

    “We agree that the three definitions are similar. The parties do not advocate for any particular definition. We also determine that no distinction between the definitions is material to this Decision. As such, we do not repeat all three definitions and accept Patent Owner’s definition as most closely fitting the legal requirements: a bachelor’s degree in mechanical engineering, industrial design, or equivalent, with at least one year of relevant experience designing projectile launching systems but would also be a member of a team, which would include a person with a bachelor’s in materials science, chemistry, or equivalent (e.g., chemical engineering), or has at least one year experience working with materials for use in consumer products equivalent work experience may substitute for educational experience, and vice versa” slip op. at 7

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “Neither Petitioner or Patent Owner advocate for the construction of any particular claim term. Pet. 20–21; see generally PO Resp. We determine that no terms require express construction. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 8

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot shown unpatentableMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable

    “conducting this kind of basic muzzle energy analysis—a conventional, even industry standard technique at the time—would not have concluded that the polymer balls that Spitballs teaches are a safer form of ammunition simply because they are softer than lightweight airsoft rounds,” because the record supports it. Ex. 2015 ¶ 59. slip op. at 12

  • Obviousness (§103) › Objective indicia / secondary considerationsNot reached

    “that softer ammunition was a possible solution and that Vat19 shows Spitballs exploding on contact with a person without harm. Reply 28–30 (citing Paper 12, 16–17; PO Resp. 63). However, we agree with Patent Owner, that Kim and Vat19 do not disclose all of the limitations of the claims. PO Resp. 61–62; PO Sur-reply 26; Ex. 1004, 302:7–22; Ex. 1022, 8, 9; Ex. 1024; Ex. 2007, 100 (ALJ concluding “there is no disclosure that [Kim’s] gel material is a SAP”); Ex. 2015 ¶¶ 236–239. Petitioner makes no assertions to the contrary. See Pet. 57–60; Reply 28–30. As discussed above, the full record does not support that one of ordinary skill in the art would have combined Peev and Spitballs for the reasons asserted by Petitioner. Petitioner’s insufficient evidence of simultaneous invention does not overcome that deficiency.” slip op. at 21

  Patent outcomesUS 8,640,683 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,640,683
• Prime Time Toys LLC / Prime Time Toys Ltd. et al. v. Spin Master, Inc.No claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Oct 10, 2025 · IPR2023-01461 · APJ Hyun J Jung · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1, 2, 13, and 15–20 were not shown unpatentable because Petitioner failed to establish a sufficient motivation to combine Peev and Spitballs, including with Moorhouse.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner

    “The parties do not address the adopted level of ordinary skill in the art. See PO Resp.; Pet. Reply; PO Sur-reply. Based on the full record, we maintain and affirm that one of ordinary skill in the art would have had: a bachelor’s degree in mechanical engineering, industrial design, or equivalent, with at least one year of relevant experience designing projectile launching systems but would also be a member of a team, which would include a person with a chemical engineering), or has at least one year experience working with materials for use in consumer products and that “equivalent work experience may substitute for educational experience, and vice versa.” Pet. 21–22 (quoting Ex. 1015, 7–8); see also Ex. 1016 ¶ 55 (stating that “Patent Owner’s and Petitioner’s definitions of the [person of ordinary skill in the art] are similar, and my opinions in this Declaration would not change if I used Patent Owner’s definition of the [person of ordinary skill in the art] rather than Petitioner’s definition”). We find that the proposed level of ordinary skill in the art is consistent with the ’255 patent and the asserted prior art.” slip op. at 7

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “Neither Petitioner nor Patent Owner proposes any interpretation for any claim term. Pet. 23; see PO Resp. Petitioner notes that the ALJ in the ITC proceeding construed two terms used in the ’282 and ’683 patents, specifically “super absorbent polymer” and “a firing mechanism that directly applies a force to the ammunition.” Pet. 23 (citing Ex. 1015, 12, 14). Based on the full record, we determine that no term requires express construction to resolve the parties’ dispute. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 8

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedMixed

    “we give little weight to the opinion of Dr. Courtney on whether Spitballs would have been considered liquid filled by one of ordinary skill in the art. Pet. Reply 15–16; PO Sur-reply 18; Ex. 1037 ¶ 55; Ex. 2121, 61:12–13; see also PO Sur-reply 14–15 (arguing that Dr. Courtney does not meet the adopted level of ordinary skill in the art). We agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner’s list of “rubber, cork, foam, and soft plastics, such as SAPs” “does not exclude all of the other types of materials Petitioner failed to address—e.g., the gelatin materials used to make paintballs.” PO Resp. 24 (citing Ex. 2117, 1). The “openended” list “has no meaningful evidentiary support” because the cited paragraphs from its declaration “make no reference at all to potential airsoft ammunition.” Pet. 38; PO Resp. 24; Ex. 1016 ¶ 77; Ex. 1017 ¶¶ 36–39, 46– 48. Petitioner’s declarant Dr. Reitman also “acknowledged that airsoft considerations are beyond the scope of her testimony.” Ex. 2030, 117:17– 118:20. We agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner’s list would include “countless distinct polymers.” PO Resp. 25; Ex. 2120, 27–28.” slip op. at 21

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable

    “In other words, Petitioner does not squarely address the testimonial evidence that the softness of Spitballs would not have been equated with safety, because of its higher weight and kinetic energy. Ex. 2015 ¶¶ 44–55. We agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner does not assert fragmentation and deformation would have overcome the greater kinetic energy of the heavier Spitballs, and that Petitioner’s declarant admitted such calculation was not done. PO Sur-reply 7 (citing Ex. 2121, 48:11–49:7); Ex. 2121, 48:11–49:7 (Petitioner’s declarant testifying that calculations of how much kinetic energy is absorbed when Spitballs bounce or explode were not done). Petitioner’s declarant also identified that back splatter can create an additional safety concern. Ex. 2121, 101:14–104:4. We agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner failed to discuss the deformation and fragmentation of Spitballs in its Petition and declarations. PO Sur-reply 6 (citing Pet. Reply 10–11; Ex. 1037 ¶ 43). We also agree that Petitioner did not explain how one of ordinary skill in the art could have reliably assessed the safety of Spitballs and airsoft rounds. Id.; see also Ex. 2121, 47:1–48:10 (Petitioner’s declarant testifying that experimentation would be the best way to quantify how much kinetic energy is absorbed through deformation and fragmentation of a given projectile). focused on the mass and diameter calculations provided by Petitioner’s declarant, and Petitioner has the burden to analyze a projectile other than the one disclosed in Spitballs, not Patent Owner. PO Sur-reply 10–11 (citing Pet. Reply 13; Ex. 1017 ¶ 67; Ex. 2015 ¶ 59). Petitioner failed to do such an analysis of a 6mm Spitball or SAP projectile. Regarding Petitioner’s reliance on deposition testimony from the ITC proceedings, as argued by Patent Owner, its declarant agreed that making ammunition softer would make injury less likely, if all other parameters were equal, not larger and heavier like a substitution with Spitballs. PO Resp. 16–17 (citing Pet. 37; Ex. 1004, 531:25–532:9; Ex. 2015 ¶¶ 60–61); Ex. 1017 ¶ 67 (Petitioner’s declarant opining that Spitballs can “grow up to 200 times their original size” to reach a mass of 1.844g); Ex. 1037 ¶ 39 (Petitioner’s declarant agreeing that “when all other variables are held constant, heavier is less safe, meaning injury potential is increased”); Ex. 2015 ¶¶ 54–59 (Patent Owner’s declarant opining that heavier and softer ammunition can pose more injury risk); Ex. 2016, 11 (indicating that airsoft ammunition typically comes in weights from 0.12g to 0.25g). We, thus, agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner fails to prove that” slip op. at 16

  Patent outcomesUS 8,596,255 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,596,255
• Google LLC / Cellco Partnership D/B/A Verizon Wireless et al. v. Headwater Research LLCAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Oct 1, 2025 · IPR2024-00943 · APJ Scott B Howard · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 2–23, 26, 41–60, 63, 64, 91–152, and 155–171 are unpatentable; Rao anticipates some claims, and the stated Rao combinations render the remaining claims obvious.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner argues that a person having ordinary skill in the art “would have at least a bachelor’s degree in computer science, computer engineering, or a similar field, and approximately two years of industry or academic experience in a field related to computer software development and/or computer networking.” Pet. 2 (citing Ex. 1015 ¶¶ 50–52). Petitioner further argues that “[w]ork experience can substitute for education, and additional education can substitute for work experience.” Id. at 2–3 (citing Ex. 1015 ¶¶ 50–52). Because Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art is consistent with the field of the invention of the ’541 patent and not disputed by Patent Owner (see PO Resp.), we adopt Petitioner’s formulation of the person having ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 12

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached

    “Petitioner states “[n]o terms require construction to resolve this Petition.” Pet. 3. Patent Owner does not propose any claim constructions. See PO Resp. For the purposes of this Decision, we need not expressly construe any claim terms. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (noting that “we need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 13

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner
  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableNot shown unpatentableMixed

    “preponderance of the evidence that claim 3 was anticipated by Rao.” slip op. at 25

  Patent outcomesUS 8,589,541 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,589,541

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.