- Kohler Co. v. Delta Faucet Co.Some claims unpatentablePTAB · Oct 1, 2025 · IPR2024-00700 · APJ Jane E Inglese · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1, 2, and 9 are unpatentable as obvious; claims 3–8 and 10–24 were not shown unpatentable because the asserted references failed to establish limitations including the claimed light pipe features.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s definition of a POSITA. Petitioner’s witness (Mr. Cook) qualifies as a POSITA under this definition, and, therefore, is qualified to opine from the perspective of a POSITA on technical matters included within the areas of expertise prescribed by the definition. As indicated above, Petitioner’s definition of a POSITA does not require education in the field of optics and professional experience designing or analyzing optical apparatus, unlike Patent Owner’s definition. We are aware, however, that Patent Owner’s witness (Dr. Klopp) has more extensive experience with optical systems and methods than Petitioner’s witness (Mr. Cook). Compare Ex 1003 ¶¶ 8–14, Ex. 2005, 39:21–59:17, with Ex. 2003 ¶¶ 3–20, Ex. 2004, 1–2, Ex. 1015, 10:22–13:25. Although Mr. Cook possesses excellent credentials in the field of mechanical engineering, his experience in the design and analysis of optical systems and methods is sparse and insubstantial compared to that of Dr. Klopp. Id. Due to this difference in experience levels, in instances where the witnesses express differing views on factual issues related to optical systems and methods, we will accord more weight to Dr. Klopp’s testimony than to Mr. Cook’s.” slip op. at 8
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedPatent owner expert creditedMixed
“through the light transmission portion and bottom output face 313 of light conductor 38, which teaches transmitting light in parallel with the longitudinal axis of the housing. Tseng does not disclose or teach that light is emitted through the side surface of annular protrusion 383 in a direction perpendicular to the longitudinal axis of the housing. Ex. 1004 ¶ 97. Petitioner’s assertions that this would be the case consist solely of conclusory statements, supported only by citations to Mr. Cook’s declaration. Mr. Cook, however, simply repeats Petitioner’s conclusory statements, without providing sound technical reasoning supported by objective evidence to explain and support his opinions. Ex. 2003 ¶¶ 101– 102, 105, 195–198, 202. We, therefore, accord little weight to Mr. Cook’s opinion on this particular matter because it “merely repeats, verbatim, the conclusory assertion for which it is offered to support,” and “does not cite to any additional supporting evidence or provide any technical reasoning [in] support.” Xerox Corp. v. Bytemark, Inc., IPR2022-00624, Paper 9 at 15 (PTAB Aug. 24, 2022) (precedential). Furthermore, Mr. Cook’s opinion conflicts with that of Patent Owner’s witness, Dr. Klopp, who opines that a “POSITA would understand from Tseng’s third embodiment that light from the LED would bypass the annular protrusion 383 of outer cliff 381, while transmitting downwardly toward the output face 313.” Compare Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 174–175, 190–194, with Ex. 2003 ¶¶ 101–102, 105. As discussed above, Mr. Cook is qualified to opine from the perspective of a POSITA on technical matters included within the expertise of a person meeting Petitioner’s definition of a POSITA, which do not include optics and optical apparatus. We, therefore, credit Dr. Klopp’s opinion over that of Mr. Cook on this particular factual issue of how it is directly related to optical systems and methods about which Mr. Cook possesses limited relevant experience. See Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 6–15 (experience in communication systems and electronics); Ex. 2005, 55:16–58:19 (design experience with electronics that use indicator lights or fiber-optic communications; no professional experience with light pipes, diffusers, or plumbing fixtures). Dr. Klopp possesses substantial research and professional experience with optical methods, fiber optic light pipes, light guides, diffusers, prisms, and analysis of faucets, spray heads, and plumbing fixtures. See Ex. 2003 ¶¶ 6–10 Supra 8 (discussing weight accorded to conflicting witness testimony); see also Resp. 2–3 (arguing that “Petitioner’s expert, Mr. Cook, is a mechanical engineer with substantial professional experience in electronics for high-voltage power systems and communications, but he has limited experience with the claimed subject matter.”).” slip op. at 34
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction needed
“would be used to construe the claim[s] in a civil action [held] under 35 U.S.C. 282(b).” 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b). Under that standard, claim terms generally are given their plain and ordinary meaning as would have been understood by the ordinarily skilled artisan at the time of the invention when read in the context of the specification and prosecution history. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). We construe terms in controversy only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy. Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). Petitioner asserts that the claim terms do not require construction and should be afforded their plain and ordinary meaning. Pet. 13. Patent Owner contends that it applies the plain and ordinary meaning of the claim terms. Resp. 7. Taking into consideration the information presented, we determine that none of the claim terms requires express construction for purposes of resolving the dispute before us.” slip op. at 9
- BurdenMixed
“perpendicular to the longitudinal axis of Tseng’s housing (internal 33 and external 34 sleeves). “In an inter partes review, the burden of persuasion is on the petitioner to prove ‘unpatentability by a preponderance of the evidence,’ 35 U.S.C. § 316(e), and that burden never shifts to the patentee.” In re Magnum Oil Tools Int’l Ltd., 829 F.3d 1364, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (quoting Dynamic Drinkware, LLC v. Nat’l Graphics, Inc., 800 F.3d 1375, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2015)); see also Aqua Products, Inc. v. Matal, 872 F.3d 1290, 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2017 (en banc (quoting Magnum Oil)).” slip op. at 40
Patent outcomesUS 10,393,363 mixedClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,393,363 - Chongqing Yanmei Technology Co., Ltd. v. Terves, LLCSome claims unpatentablePTAB · Aug 27, 2024 · IPR2023-00521 · APJ Jon B Tornquist · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 19–61, 63–77, and 79 are unpatentable as anticipated by Doud; claims 78, 80, and 81 are not shown unpatentable. The contingent motion to amend is granted in part and denied in part.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have at least a Ph.D. in chemistry, metallurgy, or material science or material engineering” or, in the alternative, “would have a Bachelor of Science or Master of Science degree in one of these disciplines plus experience involving the use and design of dissolvable metal alloys for use in creating tools and other downhole parts for well drilling or completion activities.” Pet. 13–14. Patent Owner does not oppose Petitioner’s contentions regarding the level of ordinary skill in the art. PO Resp. 12 n.4. Upon review of the prior art of record and the parties’ arguments, we adopt Petitioner’s unopposed definition of the ordinarily skilled artisan as it is consistent with the prior art of record.” slip op. at 7
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for patent owner
“With respect to claim 19, Petitioner proposes constructions for the terms “in situ precipitate” and “a plurality of particles of said in situ precipitate having a size of no more than 50 µm.” Pet. 11–12. With respect to claims 76–81, Petitioner proposes a construction for the term “wherein said additive material includes one or more metal materials selected from the group consisting of 0.1–35 wt. % copper, 0.1–24.5 wt. % nickel and 0.1–20 wt. % cobalt.” Id. at 13. Patent Owner contends no claims require construction for purposes of this Decision. PO Resp. 12 n.4, 17–18; Mot. 16–17. Upon review of the prior art of record, we determine that no claim terms require express construction for purposes of this Final Written Decision. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 8
- Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Written description inadequateWritten description adequateMixed
“Ex. 2027, 20:25–21:5 (emphasis added). The disclosure that the “magnesium composite” of “[t]he present invention” “includes at least 50 wt% magnesium” is unambiguous and constitutes strong evidence that the inventors were not in possession of a magnesium composite with less than 50 wt. % magnesium, or additive concentrations above 50 wt. %. See SciMed Life Systems, Inc. v. Advanced Cardiovasular Systems, Inc., 242 F.3d 1337, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (noting that a description of the “present invention” as having a particular structure “is strong evidence that the claims should not be read to encompass the opposite structure”). Consistent with this conclusion, the original claims of the ’295 application all limited the additive material in the composite to 0.05 wt %–45 wt %. Ex. 2027, 26:1– 13, 29:9–15. Likewise, in each example where copper, nickel, or cobalt additives are used in the range recited in the proposed substitute claims, the magnesium composite is “over 50 wt% magnesium,” and any claims that do not require this range of magnesium are limited to an additive range of “about 0.05 wt%–45 wt% of said mixture.”8 Ex. 2027, 6:13–7:4, 7:16–19, 8 Written description support is considered from the view point of the ordinarily skilled artisan. Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly and Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc). Patent Owner, bearing the burden to show written description support in any priority application for which it seeks the benefit of its filing date, provides no testimony from an ordinarily skilled artisan regarding written description support in the ’295 application, or any evidence to show what such an artisan would conclude from the express disclosures of the ’295 application. Lectrosonics, Paper 15 at 7; In re NTP, 654 F.3d 1268, 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (noting that “a patent’s claims are not entitled to an earlier priority date merely because the patentee claims priority . . . Rather, for a patent’s claims to be entitled to an earlier priority date, the patentee must demonstrate that the claims meet the requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 120”). Where there is any ambiguity in the disclosures of the ’295 application, the absence of supporting testimony tends to cut against 26:2–31:2; see Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 12, 13, 18, 19, 16–21, 26, 28, claims 16–21, 26– 28. In view of the foregoing, we are not persuaded that Patent Owner has demonstrated that the inventors of the priority applications were in possession of a magnesium cast composite that included less than 50 wt. % magnesium, or greater than 50 wt. % additives. As proposed substitute claim 104 encompasses a magnesium cast composite with up to 90 wt. % additives, and therefore as little as 10 wt. % magnesium, Patent Owner has not demonstrated that the full scope of this claim finds written description support in any application prior to the ’915 application, filed on October 12, 2018.” slip op. at 17
- Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Definiteness (Nautilus)DefiniteIndefiniteMixed
“The definiteness requirement of § 112(a) is satisfied when “a patent’s claims, viewed in light of the specification and prosecution history, inform those skilled in the art about the scope of the invention with reasonable clarity.” Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 572 U.S. 898, 910 (2014); see 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b) (changing the claim construction standard used to review a claim proposed in a motion to amend from the broadest reasonable construction to the “same construction standard that would be used to construe the claim in a civil action under 35 U.S.C. [§] 282(b)”). Proposed substitute claim 104 generically requires “in situ precipitate” and also a specific type of in situ precipitate: “in situ galvanically-active intermetallic precipitate.” Mot. Appendix A. Although this claim would have best been clarified by Patent Owner after seeking preliminary guidance on its Motion to Amend, upon review of the written description, claims, and figures of the ’740 patent, as well as Patent Owner’s clarification in its Reply to the Opposition, we agree with Patent Owner that one of ordinary skill in the art would have understood that the “in situ galvanically-active intermetallic precipitate” is merely a more complete description of the “in situ precipitate” mentioned earlier in the sentence. Mot. Reply 4. As such, we do not find that this part of proposed substitute claim renders claim 104 indefinite.” slip op. at 22
Patent outcomesUS 10,689,740 mixedClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Graham · NautilusPatents in suitUS 10,689,740 - Gce Gas Control Equipment Inc. v. Vbox, Inc.Some claims unpatentablePTAB · Jun 18, 2024 · IPR2023-00326 · APJ Jane E Inglese · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 12–14 and 16 are unpatentable under § 103 over Deane alone and Deane, Dubois, and Berntson; claims 1–11 and 15 were not shown unpatentable.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for patent owner
“III. ANALYSIS A. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art The level of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention is a factual determination that provides a primary guarantee of objectivity in an obviousness analysis. Al-Site Corp. v. VSI Int’l Inc., 174 F.3d 1308, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (citing Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1966); Ryko Mfg. Co. v. Nu-Star, Inc., 950 F.2d 714, 718 (Fed. Cir. 1991)). Based on Petitioner’s contention, which Patent Owner does not dispute, we find that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had a bachelor’s degree in mechanical engineering, chemical engineering, or a related field, and two years of experience in the research, design, or development of POCs and related hardware, software, and firmware. Compare Pet. 21, with Resp. 11. Our finding is supported by Dr. Knaebel’s testimony. Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 226–228. The level of ordinary skill in the art, as defined above, appears consistent with the disclosures of the asserted prior art and the written description of the invention provided in the ’614 patent.” slip op. at 8
- Expert testimonyPatent owner expert creditedDecided for patent owner
“Deane thus teaches that adsorbent housing 602 and adsorbent bed columns 508a, 508b—the asserted separation cartridge—are part of an apparatus that rests on a support surface such as a table or floor. Based on Deane’s disclosure, we find persuasive Patent Owner’s contention, and Patent Owner’s witness’s opinion, that Deane’s housing 602/adsorbent bed columns 508a, 508b (separation cartridge) cannot be removed from the receptacle by movement of the separation cartridge vertically downward. Resp. 37–38; Ex. 2001 ¶¶ 118–131. Neither Petitioner nor Petitioner’s witness, Dr. Knaebel, points to any evidence of record showing that one of ordinary skill in the art would have understood that Deane’s housing 602/adsorbent bed columns 508a, 508b (separation cartridge) could be removed from manifold 512 (receptacle) by moving housing 602/adsorbent bed columns 508a, 508b (separation cartridge) downward when the apparatus is resting on a table or floor, as taught by Deane. Pet. 42–43; Ex. 1078 ¶¶ 121–161. Petitioner fails to show that Deane’s housing 602/adsorbent bed columns 508a, 508b (separation cartridge) could be removed from the receptacle by movement of the separation cartridge in the downward (second) direction, as required by the removal direction limitation of claim 1. Petitioner, therefore, does not establish unpatentability under its axial movement theory.” slip op. at 26
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner
“Giving effect to “by movement relative to the receptacle,” when interpreting this phrase in combination with “a separation cartridge selectively removable from a receptacle,” requires that the separation cartridge is removable from the receptacle by movement of the separation cartridge itself. Interpreting the removal direction limitation to encompass a stationary separation cartridge, as Petitioner proposes, would render “by movement relative to the receptacle” superfluous. Specifically, Petitioner’s interpretation of “relative movement” does not accord weight to the recitation “movement relative to the receptacle,” which requires something other than the receptacle—the separation cartridge—to move in order for movement to occur with reference to or in comparison with the receptacle. Petitioner’s interpretation of “relative movement” as permitting removal of the separation cartridge from the receptacle when the separation cartridge remains stationary, is inconsistent with the plain language of removal direction limitation as a whole. The plain language of the removal direction limitation indicates that the separation cartridge must be removable from the receptacle by movement of the separation cartridge in a specified (first) direction. Claim 1 defines the first direction as a direction opposite the (second) direction in which the inlet and outlet are oriented. The plain language of the removal direction limitation, therefore, requires that the separation cartridge is removable from a receptacle by movement of the separation cartridge in comparison to the receptacle in a direction opposite the direction in which the separation cartridge’s inlet and outlet are oriented.” slip op. at 15
- Strike new argumentNew argument disregardedDecided for patent owner
“(a) Untimely new theory of unpatentability We agree with Patent Owner (Sur-Reply 4) that Petitioner’s relative movement theory is an impermissible new theory of unpatentability improperly presented for the first time in the Reply. Corephotonics, Ltd. v. Apple Inc., 84 F.4th 990, 1008–09 (Fed. Cir. 2023) (A petitioner may not raise in a reply “‘an entirely new theory of prima facie obviousness absent from the petition,’ even if the new theory is responsive to the patent owner’s response or the Board’s institution decision.”) (quoting Wasica Finance GmbH v. Continental Automotive Systems, Inc., 853 F.3d 1272, 1286 (Fed. Cir. 2017); see also Henny Penny Corp. v. Frymaster LLC, 938 F. 3d 1324, 1330–31 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“We conclude that the Board did not abuse its discretion in . . . disregarding its [petitioner’s] new theory first raised in reply.”). Petitioner does not present the relative movement theory in the Petition, and instead presents it for the first time in the Reply. Pet. 42–43. Far from fairly meeting any argument introduced by Patent Owner in the Response, this new theory unfairly changes the thrust of the challenge.” slip op. at 27
Patent outcomesUS 11,389,614 mixedClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,389,614
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.